What it Takes to Change Your Mind: Consistency of Metacognitive Cues
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Abstract
The uncertainty monitoring account proposes that during reasoning, people may generate several intuitive responses, each contributing to an overall uncertainty parameter that will trigger conscious deliberation if it becomes high enough. In two experiments (total N = 186), we test this account by utilising methods and theory of metacognition – which also describes a second-order process that regulates the operation of first-order cognition. We analyse which internal cues influence confidence and accuracy, and how the consistency of cues influences confidence, accuracy, and participants changing their answers. Confidence judgements were not sensitive to belief-logic conflict when other cues were accounted for, contrary to prior research. Instead, overall cue consistency was more important for determining confidence and response changes. We discuss the implications of these findings in the context of current dual process accounts of reasoning.
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- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00