Deliberation and Polarization: Evidence from Group Decision Experiments

Deliberation and Polarization: Evidence from Group Decision Experiments | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Deliberation and Polarization: Evidence from Group Decision Experiments Jessica Jachimowicz, Clemens Puppe This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8902384/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract How does deliberation in like-minded groups impact collective decision-making - does it polarize or moderate voting decisions? To investigate this question, we developed a pre-registered laboratory experiment (N = 216) using a three-round group allocation design that systematically varies group composition (like-minded vs. mixed-minded) and decision rules (unanimity vs. median). Participants allocated real monetary endowments between themselves and a local refugee organization, enabling us to study morally salient decisions regarding redistribution. Contrary to enclave-deliberation theories, we find that deliberation consistently moderates allocations toward fairness benchmarks, regardless of group composition or rule. Selfish participants in mixed-minded groups, in particular, reduced self-retention most strongly, while generous participants slightly increased it. These moderation effects vanish once participants return to individual decision-making. The results reveal deliberation as a temporary depolarizing mechanism that promotes short-term fairness and consensus without lasting attitudinal change. This finding adds to research on behavioral models of deliberation by highlighting the social-norm dynamics that underlie moderation in collective decisions. Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files supplementarymaterials.pdf Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8902384","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":604984568,"identity":"244c7303-abc4-4ef0-8045-a1cdf0bfa62d","order_by":0,"name":"Jessica Jachimowicz","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Jessica","middleName":"","lastName":"Jachimowicz","suffix":""},{"id":604984569,"identity":"34c9bd72-6210-43a9-95b8-1359e3a494ce","order_by":1,"name":"Clemens Puppe","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Clemens","middleName":"","lastName":"Puppe","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-02-17 15:23:14","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8902384/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8902384/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":104782274,"identity":"cb4deee5-985d-4feb-9fb1-93b99a133275","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-17 07:57:05","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1098072,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"submission.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8902384/v1_covered_16d7f256-1860-441d-99c9-55e5bf3c79a1.pdf"},{"id":104605705,"identity":"83a23d39-cb83-48ef-ad21-bf88aa3154a6","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-13 23:56:26","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":599300,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"supplementarymaterials.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8902384/v1/36cdae57766eee7e93cc9fae.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Deliberation and Polarization: Evidence from Group Decision Experiments","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8902384/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8902384/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"How does deliberation in like-minded groups impact collective decision-making - does it polarize or moderate voting decisions? 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