Abstract
The Bayesian Brain hypothesis assumes that cognition relies on internal generative models of the world, yet existing implementations remain constrained by pre-specified, task-specific generative structures and computationally heavy iterative inference schemes. Here, we introduce modular neural state-space models as a scalable realization of the Bayesian Brain, replacing fixed generative structures and pre-specified inference rules with learned world-model components and amortized neural updates. This framework preserves the core commitment to explaining observations through hidden causes while making inference learned and reusable rather than pre-specified and task-specific. Our modular implementation of these models affords learned components to be seamlessly recombined and stacked across superficially different tasks that share similar latent dynamics. Such computational reuse supports zero-shot generalization and predicts selective correlations of inference parameters between tasks. We confirm these key predictions in human behavior, identifying learned and reusable world-model components as a candidate computational principle for flexible cognition.
Full text
1,295 characters
· extracted from
oa-doi-fallback
· click to expand
Abstract
The Bayesian Brain hypothesis assumes that cognition relies on internal generative models of the world, yet existing implementations remain constrained by pre-specified, task-specific generative structures and computationally heavy iterative inference schemes. Here, we introduce modular neural state-space models as a scalable realization of the Bayesian Brain, replacing fixed generative structures and pre-specified inference rules with learned world-model components and amortized neural updates. This framework preserves the core commitment to explaining observations through hidden causes while making inference learned and reusable rather than pre-specified and task-specific. Our modular implementation of these models affords learned components to be seamlessly recombined and stacked across superficially different tasks that share similar latent dynamics. Such computational reuse supports zero-shot generalization and predicts selective correlations of inference parameters between tasks. We confirm these key predictions in human behavior, identifying learned and reusable world-model components as a candidate computational principle for flexible cognition.
Competing Interest Statement
The authors have declared no competing interest.
Footnotes
↵5 Joint senior authorship
Text is read by the "Ask this paper" AI Q&A widget below.
Extraction quality varies by source — PMC NXML preserves structure
cleanly, OA-HTML may include some navigation residue, and OA-PDF can
have broken hyphenation. The publisher copy
(via DOI)
is the canonical version.