General flaws of currently discussed election systems and a solution based on a new view on abstention from voting
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Abstract
Most voting systems suffer from a common weakness: they approach voting as a problem of choice or ranking. However, voting is merely the final step in an election procedure, following one or more selection stages. Furthermore, an election is not an isolated event but is repeated every few years. In this paper, we propose a new perspective on elections that takes into account the entire process, starting from the initial set of individuals with passive electoral rights, and the aspect of reelection. By adopting a fresh perspective on abstentions and introducing an adapted form of Majority Judgment, which can also be understood as an expanded form of Approval Voting, we are able to design a comprehensive election process that can be easily legislated. This process establishes appropriate incentives for politicians seeking reelection, as well as for parties nominating candidates.
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