Police, Protests, and Legitimacy - A Case of Myanmar

Police, Protests, and Legitimacy - A Case of Myanmar | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Police, Protests, and Legitimacy - A Case of Myanmar Khaing Lynn, Hong Lu, Steven Pace This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7715910/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract In Myanmar, military governance has predominated, with a brief interlude from 2011 to 2020 under a quasi-democratic government. The 2021 coup, orchestrated by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, ended this period and reinstated military rule. To quell dissent, the regime responded in various ways, including mobilizing the Myanmar Police Force (MPF). This study analyzes 78 news articles from Myanmar's state-controlled newspaper and examines the MPF's post-coup activities from the perspectives of legitimacy and policing. The findings reveal the key frames employed to justify the MPF's use of force, including authority, institutional protocol, public safety, and threats to police. These frames align MPF actions with the principles of formal rationality and legitimacy. By highlighting a non-Western authoritarian context, this study contributes to the discourse on police legitimacy and public protests. These findings underscore how state media in authoritarian regimes shape perceptions of police actions and legitimacy, offering insights into the complexities of policing in diverse political landscapes. Myanmar policing police legitimacy use of force protest management Introduction In recent decades, police strategies, particularly in the context of protest management, have been increasingly scrutinized. During civil protests, there is significant potential for adverse interactions or violence between law enforcement and the public. Such negative interactions can undermine public trust, cooperation, and consequently, the legitimacy of police authority. Therefore, given the heightened sensitivities surrounding these police-citizen encounters, there has been a substantial increase in calls to assess the effectiveness of these tactics, especially in protest scenarios (Gillham, 2011 ). Subsequently, police use of force, especially in protests, remains a topic of much debate. The heightened focus, primarily driven by advocacy groups, policymakers, and media outlets, has predominantly been on police use-of-force tactics during protests (Christián et al., 2022 ). Consequently, police conduct in these situations is of paramount importance, as the perceived legitimacy of police authority may significantly influence the application of force, particularly in the context of crowd management during protests (Mazerolle et al., 2013 ). The specific strategies and amount of force employed in protest situations can vary significantly, particularly when comparing their implementation in democratic nations with that in authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the perceived legitimacy and public acceptance of police authority are essential for maintaining order and ensuring the effective functioning of the state. This is crucial because when the public perceives the police as legitimate, they are more inclined to cooperate, thereby reducing the potential for violence and enhancing the police's capacity to maintain order, especially in dynamic contexts such as protests (Skogan & Frydl, 2004 ; Tyler, 2003 ). Grounded in legitimacy theory, this study analyzed 78 news reports from Myanmar’s largest state-run newspaper in 2021. This study explores the common frames employed by the newspaper, Global New Light of Myanmar, in reporting police tactics to suppress protests following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup. The study further examined whether and how legitimacy was invoked to justify police tactics in this non-democratic military dictatorship and investigated any similarities or differences in the portrayal and justification of police actions in non-democratic versus democratic contexts. Myanmar as a Research Context Myanmar's modern history is characterized by one of the world's longest periods of military rule, briefly interrupted by the quasi-democratic governance of the National League for Democracy (NLD) from 2011 to 2020 under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) contested the NLD's decisive victory in the November 2020 elections, alleging election fraud and demanding a re-vote. This contention culminated in a military coup on February 1, 2021, which resulted in the detention of NLD leaders and the declaration of a year-long state of emergency (Head, 2021). The coup ignited nationwide protests, which were met with harsh crackdowns by the military and police forces (Nichols, 2021). The MPF, which maintains a close association with the military, originated in British colonial rule, which was established in 1825. During both the British and Japanese colonial periods, the police were tasked with maintaining law and order, supporting civil administration, safeguarding the colonizers’ commercial interests, and participating in the suppression of rebellions (Selth, 2012 ; Than, 2001). Following the attainment of independence, the police became subordinate to the increasingly dominant military, engaging in counterinsurgency operations and suppressing pro-democracy movements (Aung Myo Maung, 2018 ). During the quasi-democratic government period between 2011 and 2020, substantial efforts were made to professionalize and demilitarize the MPF. These initiatives sought to establish a professional police force committed to the rule of law, enhance female representation, and transition to community-based policing, all with international support (Min Zaw Oo & Myo Naing, 2021). Nevertheless, challenges such as inadequate funding, corruption, excessive workloads, outdated training, and a legitimacy crisis among the public, driven by perceptions of unfairness and corruption, persisted (Min Zaw Oo & Myo Naing, 2021; Egreteau, 2021 ; Sithu, 2019 ). Despite recent reforms, the MPF remains significantly influenced by the military and continues to undertake civil and military policing functions. As a component of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), its responsibilities include maintaining public order, preventing and controlling crime, ensuring public security, and enforcing drug-related legislation. In contrast to the decentralized police forces in the United States, Myanmar's police system is characterized by a high degree of centralization. This centralized structure is manifested in its hierarchical organization, which extends from the national headquarters to local police stations throughout the country (Min Zaw Oo & Myo Naing, 2021; Selth, 2012 ; ASEANOPOL, 2013 ). Police centralization presumably makes it easier for the military regime to control and use as a pawn for political oppression, including suppressing political protests post the military coup in 2021 (Tin Maung Maung Than, 2001 ). Theory and Research on Legitimacy and Protest Policing The concept of state legitimacy, as conceptualized by Max Weber ( 1947 ), emerges from three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. This concept is pivotal in establishing and sustaining authority, explaining why individuals or groups comply with state-directed authority. These legitimacy types— affective (involving awe and reverence), rational (tied to values), formal (based on legal norms and authority), and substantive rationality (rooted in value-oriented norms and authority)—are crucial in the execution of authority by constitutional governments (Kolstad, 2023 ). Scholars have noted that perceived legitimacy shapes social action (Spencer, 1970 ). As such, stability and uniformity in social actions often stem from self-interest, custom, or a belief in a legitimate order. Consequently, belief in state legitimacy stabilizes actions by normatively validating specific behaviors and associating them with duties and obligations, thus contributing to compliance. Subsequently, the manner in which authority is exercised by the state serves as a predictor of how legitimacy may be perceived and accepted by its population. This is important because the mechanisms (actions) by which authority is exercised by the state may promote or inhibit cooperation among those within that system. Furthermore, public trust, accountability, and perceived fairness establish the foundation for state-citizen cooperation, which ultimately serves to strengthen state legitimacy and thus public order (Jackson & Bradford, 2019 ). This legitimacy framework is often associated with democratic societies and serves as a key distinction when compared to authoritarian states, which exercise authority through more apparent coercive means. Conceptualizing Police Legitimacy and Procedural Justice Tyler ( 1990 ) defined police legitimacy as the public’s willingness to align with an external authority, measured by their perceived duty to obey and support local laws and authorities. In his seminal 1990 study, Tyler explored the factors influencing individuals’ compliance with laws, specifically investigating whether compliance is driven more by the fear of punishment or by the perceived legitimacy of the state. Using survey data from over 1, 000 Chicago residents, Tyler discovered that individuals were more likely to adhere to laws when they viewed legal authorities as legitimate, and procedural justice (e.g., fair, unbiased, and neutral actions) facilitates public cooperation and perceived police legitimacy. The concept of police legitimacy includes two forms: instrumental legitimacy and normative legitimacy. Instrumental legitimacy evaluates an authority’s capacity to achieve outcomes such as order maintenance and societal stability, whereas normative legitimacy examines whether an authority’s actions align with widely recognized norms and values, such as respecting citizens’ rights and adhering to the rule of law (Habermas, 1979, as cited in Murray, 2010 ). Building on this, Beetham ( 1991 ) argued that legitimate power arises from actions demonstrating legal validity, shared values, and consent, particularly from the less powerful, aligning with Tyler’s concept of procedural justice, which emphasizes fairness in the police’s practices. Researchers have traditionally evaluated police legitimacy and procedural justice through surveys that assess procedural fairness, focusing on elements such as respect, neutrality, voice, legitimacy, and cooperation. For instance, in a survey of 1,500 residents from a major city in the Southeastern U.S., Reisig and Bratton ( 2007 ) identified voice and respect as key components of procedural justice. Tyler and Huo’s ( 2002 ) study found that procedural justice significantly predicted trust and cooperation with the police in racially diverse communities in Los Angeles. Similarly, Gau and Brunson ( 2015 ) argued that when police-public interactions are perceived as positive, fair, and impartial, the potential for restoring legitimacy is enhanced; and a positive, 10-minute interaction with police may significantly increase trust and legitimacy among minority residents in New Heaven (Peyton et al., 2019 ). Protest Policing and Legitimacy Protests are inherently dynamic events. Public perception of police legitimacy can thus fluctuate. In protest situations, police legitimacy must be actively negotiated through the establishment of fairness and respect by law enforcement to tamper down high emotions (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012 ). Scholars have noted three principal models of protest policing (Sombatpoonsiri, 2015 ). The non-confrontational, negotiated management model prioritizes cooperation and regards protests as integral to national politics, typically employing force only as a last resort. The command-and-control model, characterized by limited negotiation and stringent behavioral guidelines, is primarily concerned with maintaining control (Vitale, 2005 ). Finally, the escalated force model emphasizes law and order, legitimizing the use of force when protests disrupt public order (Waddington, 1994 ; Schweingruber, 2000 ; McPhail & McCarthy, 2005 ). To mention past efforts related to protest policing and legitimacy, the specific strategies employed by law enforcement during protests can substantially affect perceptions of legitimacy. For example, utilizing survey data from 960 adults in the United Kingdom, Gerber and Jackson ( 2016 ) found that high perceptions of legitimacy were associated with increased support for moderate force and diminished support for excessive force. They further contend that perceptions of the police as fair and legitimate mitigate ideological extremism. Perry et al. (2017), in examining the paramilitary tactics employed by the police during Israel’s 2001 Occupy Social Justice protest, found that an increase in aggressive control measures, such as the deployment of riot gear and surveillance drones, reduced the perceived legitimacy of the police. Such perceived reduction in police legitimacy was particularly pronounced among protesters who initially expressed support for the police, and overall, escalated models of force reduced perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy. Protest Policing in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes The dynamics of legitimacy and protest policing exhibit significant variations between democratic and authoritarian countries. In democratic contexts, policing is informed by the principles of constitutionalism, liberalism, and the rule of law, with the objective of cultivating a secure, orderly, and free environment for citizens. This approach emphasizes legitimacy, accountability, performance, and fairness (Cao et al. 2012 ; Lee 2013 ). In contrast, within authoritarian regimes, policing primarily serves as an instrument of repression, accountable solely to political leadership, and its role becomes more pronounced during periods of civil unrest (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998 ; Tupper, 2021 ; Lejune, 2022 ). For instance, Sombatpoonsiri ( 2017 ) analyzed the strategies employed by Thailand's police force to uphold their legitimacy during the political crisis of 2013–2014. This study underscores the complexities faced by the police when navigating the dual responsibilities of law enforcement and maintaining political neutrality. It was found that the Thai Royal Police exhibited inconsistent responses to the protests, which eroded public trust and led to allegations of political bias. Moreover, the legitimacy crisis was intensified by government pressure and the institutional legacy of authoritarianism within the Thai police force. In a related study, Wang et al. ( 2020 ) examined the protest-policing strategies in Hong Kong, specifically the shift from negotiated management to a paramilitary approach and its subsequent impact on legitimacy. Using documentary and survey data, the study identified four factors contributing to legitimacy: procedural justice, legality, distributive justice, and expressive performance. Of them, procedural justice was found to be the most significant predictor, whereas expressive performance was particularly important in racially diverse communities. Studies also find that authoritarian regimes frequently adopt enforcement strategies that manage public dissent while enabling the state to maintain control. For example, based on protest data from 1991 to 2011, Arriola ( 2013 ) found that the Ethiopian regime disproportionately repressed protests in ethnically non-aligned regions by employing selective enforcement to control dissent. Furthermore, the state media depicted protests in marginalized regions as ethnic extremism while portraying pro-regime demonstrations as legitimate, which reinforced inter-ethnic mistrust and facilitated the maintenance of authoritarian rule through controlled polarization. Similarly, Juska and Woolfson ( 2012 ) revealed that the Lithuanian authorities employed preemptive strategies, such as surveillance, infiltration, and event permits, alongside riot control measures to manage protest activities. Curtice and Behlendorf ( 2021 ) identified similar outcomes in their investigation of the impact of prior exposure to violent repression on protests in Uganda. They observed that individuals who witnessed or experienced previous police violence were significantly less inclined to express an intention to protest again. The authors argue that state repression induces a chilling effect even when grievances remain unresolved. Media, Public Perception, and Legitimacy Dynamics The dynamics of legitimacy are increasingly influenced by the use of digital media platforms. Thus, the rapid dissemination of information facilitates the real-time construction and critique of police narratives. Consequently, the manner in which the police employ force during protests significantly affects public perception, with media framing serving as a critical factor (Ralph, 2021 ). As such, perspectives on police forces can differ significantly, ranging from an emphasis on law and order to a focus on procedural justice and civil rights, with these perspectives often being influenced by the source of information (Bonner & Dammert, 2022 ). Police and state-controlled media typically portray police actions as legally justified, thereby reinforcing the notion of police legitimacy and suggesting acceptance of their actions regardless of the degree of violence or potential for abuse. Simply put, this framing process distills and interprets events and actions to align with the perspectives of specific audiences, influenced by factors such as the identity of the protesters, their cause, and the perceived effectiveness of the police through a specific interpretive lens. The Current Study This study examines how MPF actions are articulated following the 2021 coup to enhance the comprehension of police legitimacy within an authoritarian framework. We explore the legitimacy crisis confronting the MPF, characterized by a decline in public trust, which has been exacerbated by anti-government protests in the aftermath of the coup. This context offers a critical perspective for analyzing how the state, police, and their supporters frame their responses to maintain the legitimacy of their actions. Grounded in the theoretical framework of legitimacy, this study analyzed data from the state-operated publication, the Global New Light of Myanmar (GNLM). The research was structured around three primary questions. Firstly, how did the newspaper frame police actions and protests in the aftermath of the coup? Second, how does the concept of legitimacy underpin the justification of police actions? Third, how does the media's depiction of the police and protests differ between Myanmar's authoritarian regime and democratic systems, such as that of the United States? Methods Data Collection Data used in this analysis were extracted from Myanmar’s largest state-run newspaper, Myanmar Alinn (MAL), available on www.burmalibrary.org . We first identified news reports containing any of the following keywords – police ( Myanmar ye or Myanmar ye tat pwe ), protest ( sandapya or su pu sandapya ), and protestor ( sandapya thu or lu su lu wayy sandapya ) for all issues published in 2021. The search in MAL yielded 1,408 news articles. The GNLM is considered the English version of MAL. As such, we randomly selected two issue dates and compared 5 MAL to 5 GNLM news reports on police and protests. A comparison of the two sources showed that reports related to police and protests were identical in content. We thus decided to proceed with using GLNM for conducting keyword searches. In addition, we decided to narrow the scope of searches to only include articles pertaining police and protests. Therefore, for GNLM, the keywords used were “police”, “protest”, and other synonymous terms such as “demonstration”, “march”, and “rally” (Atak & Bayram, 2017). The initial search for police and protest in GLNM yielded 96 news articles. A closer examination of the articles resulted in a removal of 18 of them (e.g., 3 articles did not cover the 2021 protests, 12 articles did not deal with protest policing, and 3 articles were duplicates), thus yielding a final total of 78 reports for this analysis. An average report is three-fourths of a page in length, ranging from the shortest with 47 words and the longest with 5,672 words. Some reports clearly indicated their relevance to police and protests. Examples include “Police take actions against two protestors on Shwebo-YeU Road” on March 7, 2021; “Protesters rioting on streets arrest police, carry out unlawful activities” on March 1, 2021; and “In the events of the riots, 16 police members fell, and more than 260 were injured” on April 20, 2021. Others can be vague as reports can take on forms of official announcements, opinion pieces, or press briefings. Examples include “The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council” on July 2, 2021; “Statement on situation after Tatmadaw took State responsibilities, ASEAN Special Envoy” on October 24, 2021; and “Grave Perils of Narcotic Drugs behind the Current Terrorist Acts and Riots in Myanmar” on November 8, 2021. Most reports listed affiliations, but few listed authors. The reports typically cite government-related agencies as sources such as State Administration Council Information Team, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, and the MPF, albeit that residents’ views were also included in some reports such as “To peaceful protestors” by Maung Phyu Lay on March 20, 2021 and “The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council” by Kanaung on July 2, 2021. Most of the reports are descriptive, but with limited key information on protests (e.g., protestor, size, motivation, and tactics) and the police (e.g., number, responses, and suppression methods used). The reports tend to strike a very positive tone on police actions with neither criticisms nor reflections of what could be done differently to reduce casualties (e.g., “Police detain protestors in Sangyoung, Kamayut of Yangon Region” on February 27, 2021; “Rioters in Bago detained by law” on March 1, 2021). In contrast, they bear a more negative tone in condemning the protesters, especially those involved in violent means such as rioting and terrorism (e.g., “People be cautious of destructive elements that incite unrest” on March 5, 2021; “Angry protestors attack security forces in Mandalay” on March 24, 2021). Given that GNLM is state-run and is the English version of MAL, it is reasonable to assume that it caters to domestic and international readers, including foreign staff at various embassies, international organizations, and businesses in Myanmar (Kironska & Peng, 2021). Data triangulation with various sources such as fieldwork research, survey research and interviews, would enhance the validity of the current research; yet the feasibility of conducting such research is low due to the lack of access to the research site and to desired individuals in Myanmar. This is compounded with Western media’s general lack of attention to Myanmar (or negative portrayal of events due to ideological differences, where there is), given its relatively marginalized geo-political reporting, it tended to negatively portray protest policing due to political/ideological antagonism between the Myanmar’s military dictatorship and Western democracy. Under these conditions, the current study fills a void with an attempt to analyze protest policing in a military dictatorship based on analyses of Myanmar’s state-run news reports. Method of Data Coding Both deductive and inductive coding/thematic approaches were used in deriving main variables and themes for this analysis. For deductive approach, two studies served as important guides for constructing the variables/frames for this current study. For example, Bonner & Dammert (2022) used three key frames –criminal threat, police protocols, and domestic and international law, in depicting how Chilean newspapers portrayed police-protestor interactions during the 2019 Chilean social uprising. Using protest data in South Korea, Chang and Vitale (2013) provided key variables in capturing main characteristics of protestors, protests, and police tactics in interacting with protesters. They variables served as a guide for constructing our codes in this analysis. Besides variables/themes deduced from existing literature, we also identified new variables/themes as we were coding the reports, with an understanding that the Myanmar case may necessarily be unique given its military dictatorship and the unique context of a recent military-coup. This inductive approach led to two new themes identified from the coding of the news reports: 1) a humane theme, where multiple reports portrayed police officers were seriously injured by protesters and monks, who enjoyed a high status in Myanmar, were brutally harassed and abused by protesters; and 2) a media bias theme, where the Myanmar state media accused Western media biased coverage of protest policing in Myanmar. Manifest and latent content analyses methods were used in coding the reports. Following our coding scheme, seven frames were generated. In descending order of frequency of mentions, these frames are domestic law (65.4%, n=51), police protocol (39.7%, n=31), threat to officer safety (39.7%, n=31), threat to public safety (29.5%, n=23), human costs (15.4%, n=12), media bias (16.7%, n=13), and international norms (11.5%, n=9). We then further collapsed several variables into one based on their conceptual similarities and the purpose of the study. This derivation yielded the final three general frames for the current study: 1) domestic law, police protocol and the international norms, 2) threat to official safety, threat to public safety, and human costs, and 3) media bias. The analyses of these frames are summarized below. Results Frame of Domestic Law, Police Protocol, and International Norms The most frequently used frame in justifying police action is law, police protocol, and international norms. According to Weber (as cited in Spencer, 1970 ), legitimacy is derived from law and authority. Based on our analyses of 78 news reports on police and protest in post-military coup in 2021, we found three subthemes tapping this perspective. Domestic Laws The majority of reports (65.4%, n = 51) cited legal authority in justifying police actions. In using law as authority, two patterns may be observed. The first is to refer to law generally. For example, multiple reports mentioned response “with laws” (e.g., regarding how riots are being maintained in “Security forces maintain riots in accordance with the law across the country” on March 7, 2021), how security measures were “in line with the law” (e.g., regarding how MPF is conducting security measures in line with laws in “Four police members injured” on February 10, 2021), and “the rule of law” (e.g., in an MPF statement regarding how administrative officials and security forces are enforcing the rule of law in “Administrative officials, security forces make efforts for rule of law” on March 1, 2021). In the more lengthy example below of an MPF statement, security force members were described as enforcing the rule of law within issued directives, to which protestors responded by shouting out slangs, to which security forces in turn responded with measures in line with the law: The administrative officials and security force members requested the protest crowds to disperse for many times in accordance with the directives. But the protesters kept protesting shouting out slangs. When the security members tried to disperse the crowd by using shields in accordance with the law, the protesters seemed to attack the security members. Therefore, the police fired sound bombs to disperse the crowds (“Police detain protestors in Sangyoung, Kamayut of Yangon Region”, 2021, p. 6). The second is to cite specific legal stipulations. For instance, Section 144 of Myanmar’s Criminal Procedure Law, which bans gatherings of 5 or more people, was cited 22 times in the reports (e.g., in “Four police members injured” on February 10, 2021). Reports also frequently cited Section 505-A of the Penal Code. As an example, MNA wrote in “One education staff arrested for making attempts to deteriorate stability of State”: Actions have been taken under Section 505-A of the Penal Code against those who incite State service personnel, health staff, education staff, banking staff and other departmental staff to participate in CDM activities, oppress or threaten and do social punishment to deteriorate the State administrative machinery. The police arrested an education staff…for posting fake information, inciting other education staff to join CDM…The case was opened against the detainee under Penal Code section 505(a)/505(c) at Dawei Myoma police station (2021, p. 5). In addition, martial law was mentioned in multiple press briefings and statements by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. For example, in “Riotous protests transformed themselves to the anarchic mobs breaking laws and then to armed violent acts”: …the order of martial law was released in Hlinethaya, Shwepyitha, Dagon Myothit (South and North), North Okkalapa and Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) townships of Yangon Region for ensuring security, the rule of law, and community peace and tranquility (2021, p. 4) Police Protocol Over half of the reports (39.7%, n = 31) refer to police protocol in justifying police actions against protesters. Some reports referenced prescribed crowd dispersal methods generally. For example, MNA detailed MPF’s procedure in dispersing a crowd in “Security forces detain protestors in Nay Pyi Taw Council Area”: … Myanmar Police Force repeatedly requested the protestors to disperse as their doings were disturbing others and causing traffic jams. The protestors did not disperse and so police members dispersed them in accordance with the prescribed crowd dispersal methods…The large protest crowd was dispersed at about 3 pm (2021, p. 4). Other reports cited manuals and rules, such as the riots manual of the Union of Myanmar Government (1956) and the Myanmar Police Force’s Crowd Control Manual (2015) of the Ministry of Home Affairs. For example, MNA wrote, a state official detailed about “response by the security forces to the riots in conformity with the rules of the Riot Manual Law-1956 and the rules of the manual-2015 with the use of minimum forces” (“Vice-Chairman of State Adminstration Council Vice-Senior General Soe Win meets officers, other ranks, their families, cadets in Bahtoo, PyinOoLwin stations”, 2021, p. 3). However, specific clauses were not mentioned in the reports, prohibiting us from further understanding justifications for police actions in the context of said manuals. Moreover, multiple reports stressed restraint exercised by security forces, including police, in executing crowd control and riot protocols. As examples: To respond to the rioters who attack the security forces during that incident, the security forces had to dispersed the crowd by following the steps and procedures for dispersing crowds with the use of minimum force. (“Protesters rioting on streets arrest police, carry out unlawful activities”, 2021, p. 5) …the Senior General said the protests staged have now turned into riots and violence. Myanmar Police Force was assigned duties to subdue the protests according to democratic norms by exercising utmost restraint. The Tatmadaw [Myanmar military] is helping the police troops as rearguards in required places to solve the difficulties and obstacles. (“Chairman of State Administration Council Senior General Min Aung Hlaing addresses Council’s meeting (6/2021)”, 2021, p. 1) …security forces systematically dispersed the angry protest crowds. Even when the protesters attempted to attack the security forces, [security forces] conducted actions at the lowest level. (Maung Thaw Ma Na, 2021, p. 10) …the rioters began to hold weapons and commit violent means. By exercising utmost restraints, security forces are handling the protests in accord with step-step procedures. In comparison with the incidents in the international community, measures being taken here are far less severe. (“Tatmadaw will strive for a genuine, disciplined and concrete democracy: Senior General”, 2021, p. 3) International Norms Besides citing domestic laws and rules, the reports also appealed to international norms. While few reports did so (11.5%, n = 9), it is interesting for a military, autocratic government to repeatedly stress that state-sanctioned tactics in suppressing anti-regime protests conform to international norms and practices. Based on our analysis, we identified three strands of arguments. The first strand is that riot control protocols are compatible with the international community or are in line with those implemented in democratic countries. As examples: …the Senior General said…although protests were staged during the period between the second and third weeks, the Council took measures under control as much as it can. The action was taken similar to that of democratic countries in accord with the practices of democracy. Other countries carried out the use of tear gas bombs, rubber bullets and water cannons to crack down the crowds of riots and interruption of the internet. In comparing the number of dead and injured persons in other countries’ demonstrations, there were four deceased persons within three weeks in Myanmar. (“Council needs to put energy into reviving country’s ailing economy: Senior General”, 2021, p. 1) It was only from 9 February onwards when the protests became violent, with rioting, that security forces implemented measures of riot control, keeping to international norms for crowd and riot control by exercising utmost restraint and using the least force and the lowest level of response possible in each situation. (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10) A second strand of arguments is that the measures used for crowd dispersion are intended to result in least harm and the level of force minimal. For example, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing articulated that the MPF uses minimum force and least harmful means in controlling protests. In addition, police are also working “in accordance with democracy practices and the measures it is taking are even softer than the ones in other countries.” (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10) He also emphasized that “in the international community, it can be seen that the countries on the path of democracy for a long time take more severe action [in handling riots] than that of Myanmar.” (“Equal term of rights must be carefully created for ethnics: Senior General”, 2021, p. 1) Furthermore, it was implied that the means of control used so far are justified, as “no country can tolerate such violence and anarchy.” (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 9) The final strand of arguments is related to democratic values. As an example, the report “The demonstrations have turned into violence” mentioned that while protestors engaged in violent tactics and security forces had to shoot to disperse them, “control measures were taken only through democratic means and with patience (2021, p. 3). In addition, reports articulated how some protest tactics, such as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), were not in line with democratic values as they “attempt to keep silent the different political views and a threat to freedom of opinion and expression.” (Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, 2021, p. 2) Here, police actions against protestors are framed as aiming to restore democratic values hindered by protest movements and, therefore, can be justified. The Threat Frame A core responsibility of contemporary police forces is to maintain order and reduce crime rates (Arriola, 2013 ). Within this framework, public safety and self-defense frequently serve as justifications for police actions during civil unrest. Our analysis of the GNLM identified three subthemes in threat-based justifications for police actions against protesters: threats to public safety, threats to police officers, and the severity of these threats in terms of human cost. This analysis revealed that GNLM predominantly depicted police actions as necessary responses to threats against public safety and the safety of police officers. This framing emphasizes legal justifications and portrays protestors as instigators of violence, thereby reinforcing the narrative that police actions align with the objectives of maintaining public order and ensuring safety. Threat to Public Safety Multiple reports (29.5%, n = 23) articulated that protests threaten public safety in various ways and to varying degrees. While some threats are relatively passive in nature, they are described as causing inconvenience and displeasure to members of the public. For instance, protestors were reported to be using tactics that were obstructive – such as causing traffic jams (“Security forces detain protestors in Nay Pyi Taw Council Area”, 2021); blocking railways with iron bars, logs, and stones and causing unrest (“Protestors block railway in Chanayethazan of Mandalay”, 2021); ); blocking public roads with tires, concrete blocks, and trees (“Announcement for people not to join violent riots”, 2021); gathering in front of government offices in hopes of inciting and accelerating riots; and instigating minors to take to the streets (“Administrative officials, security forces make efforts for rule of law”, 2021). Healthcare and fire services were reported to be disrupted as a result of protestors’ actions as well. For example, reports mentioned how “fire trucks were violently barred not to leave their stations” to aid with burning factories and how “innocent patients were dead due to a lack of opportunity to receive medical treatment” as health staff were participating in CDM as a sign of protest (“Information Team of State Administration Council meets media at 3/2021 press conference”, 2021, p. 1–3) Protestors were reported to pose active threats as well, with several articles mentioning violent rioting, arson, and use of explosives. As examples: …riotous protests transformed themselves to the anarchic mobs breaking laws and then to armed violent acts in holding destructive elements such as arms, home-made guns, home-made grenades and arson wares, setting fire to State administrative buildings, police stations, law office and people’s housings as well as factories and making attempts to raid these buildings. (“Riotous protests transformed themselves to the anarchic mobs breaking laws and then to armed violent acts”, 2021, p. 4) The rioters committed crimes of violent attacks in addition to arsons at 72 places, including 49 police stations and outposts, 29 ward/administrative offices, 39 departmental buildings, 11 roads/bridges, 10 banks, public housings, CCTVs, phone operator towers, warehouses, stalls, factories and industries in March. (“Record of Press Conference (4/2021) held on 9 April 2021 by the State Administration Council’s Information Team”, 2021, p. 10) Kanaung (2021), in “The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council”, wrote the following and justified the actions of security forces in protecting members of the public against terrorist-like actions: Security forces exerted untiring efforts to protect innocent civilians, civil servants, children and schools from arson attacks, bombings and cruel intentional murders by terrorists [referring to anti-military government protestors]…(p. 6) Threat to Police Officers’ Safety Reports (39.7%, n = 31) also mentioned threats that were directly posed towards security forces, which include police officers. Passive threats obstructed security personnel from their duties and included: using obscene language by using hand speakers to attack the police (“Protest crackdown at Myaynigone, Hledan”, 2021); refusing to follow police orders to disperse and attempting to break security barriers (“Security forces disperse crowd Taninthayi Region Administration Council Office”, 2021); and blocking roads to stop vehicle convoys coming to aid police members blocked by protestors (“Protestors attack security force members at Mandalay Yadanabon dock”, 2021). There were active threats towards security personnel as well. For example, a report titled “Protesters rioting on streets arrest police, carry out unlawful activities” outlined three incidents in which police officers were arrested by crowds of protestors in Mawlamyine, Thakayta Township, and Mandalay. Afterwards, protestors reportedly robbed the officers of their firearms, supplies, and cars. Overall, the report carried a condemning tone towards protestors “[threatening] and [detaining] the police who are enforcing the rule of law for community peace.” (2021, p. 5) GNLM reports emphasized that the use of force by security forces in dealing with the threats above was in the interest of self-defense. In the case above where about 1,500 protestors refused to disperse after several requests made by MPF officers, but instead used obscene language and attacked them, police reportedly “dispersed in accordance with crowd dispersal methods.” (“Protest crackdown at Myaynigone, Hledan”, 2021, p. 6) In the second case, after protestors refused to disperse and attempted to break security barriers, 100 of them attacked security personnel with stones. In response, “police fired rubber bullets of .12V gun.” (“Security forces disperse crowd Taninthayi Region Administration Council Office”, 2021, p. 6). In the third case, in addition to blocking vehicle convoys coming to aid police members, protestors reportedly attacked with stick, knives, stones, catapults, harpoons and other materials. Following the injuries of 11 security force members and damage of five vehicles, security forces “softly dispersed the crowds in accordance with the prescribed crowd dispersal methods and law to save the [police officers] blocked by the crowd.” (“Protestors attack security force members at Mandalay Yadanabon dock”, 2021, p. 4) A press release in April more clearly justified the actions of security force members as self-defense. Along with a summary of injuries and death tolls of security personnel and protestors since the coup, it stated: Since the terrorists led by the extremist members of the NLD party [main opposition of the military government] raided the police stations and attacked security forces with live ammunition, security forces had to retaliate as needed depending on the extent of their violence…there were inevitable casualties on both sides while security forces responded to the insurgents’ attacks in self-defence. (“Press release on inaccurate death toll in riots”, 2021, p. 12) Human Costs In addition to the reports’ portrayal of threats to safety of the general public and police officers, several of them (15.4%, n = 12) further elaborated the human costs associated with the protests by describing injuries and deaths suffered by innocent civilians and officers. For example, a press release in April presented a list of people killed or injured as “alleged traitors” by protestors. It read: They also accused and abducted innocent people who didn’t have the same opinion as to the traitors and killed brutally or punished them inhumanely. There were a total of 17 innocent people who were killed brutally and 30 with severe injuries. (“Press release on inaccurate death toll in riots”, 2021, p. 10) Other reports described incidents in which officers and/or civilians were injured or killed by protestors in more detail. For example, a summary of a press conference in April read: Due to [the rioters’] attacks, 16 police members died, and 263 police (36 + 227) were seriously injured. Moreover, six security forces and one family member also died. Some monks lost one eye, and the people grabbed the monks out of the cars and ordered them to disrobe. (“Record of Press Conference (4/2021) held on 9 April 2021 by the State Administration Council’s Information Team, 2021, p. 10) Similarly, some articles stated: During the angry protest in Mahaaungmye of Mandalay Region on 9 February, the police were injured…Those injured were being treated at military hospitals in Mandalay and PyinOoLwin…One of the police who is currently under the medical treatment of ICU of PyinOoLwin military hospital is unlikely to survive a wound to the head. (“Police injured in Mandalay protest”, 2021, p. 4) You might remember the case that occurred on 14th Street of Mandalay region on 29 March. A police officer on his off-duty was stabbed, chopped down by axe, placed over the pile of used tired and burnt to death. (“Grave Perils of Narcotic Drugs behind the Current Terrorist Acts and Riots in Myanmar”, 2021, p. 8) Some reports went further and stated for security force members and police officers, who are humans themselves, such human costs can negatively impact their mental state. For example: …two police died in Dabayin, one security force member was killed in Hninsi Housing of Aungmyethazan of Mandalay, and four police members in Thanlyin Township faced tortured, and two police sergeants of Pyin Oo Lwin, one police of Mawlamyine and another five police members of Chanmyathazi also faced brutalities. Then, one acting head of Kyauktada Township police station was also killed, one police second lieutenant died and three injured due to the shots by protestors in Bago, four military members, including officers, were killed in Pekon, Ma Win Thandar Swe, wife of the military officer in Hlinethaya Township, was also killed. So these cases can irk the security forces. If they use their weapons carelessly due to anger, those who committed such crimes might face causalities. (“Angry protestors attack security forces in Mandalay, 2021, p. 11) This implies that when carrying out security and police duties in a negative mental state, use of force and casualties are probable, hence serving as another justification for police actions against protestors after the 2021 coup. Frame of Media Bias The final frame we will discuss is related to the media (16.7%, n = 13), as our analysis of the GNLM identified a notable framing that challenges the accuracy and impartiality of non-state media, particularly in their reports on the actions of security forces during protests. Misinformation and Biased Reporting Several GNLM reports (9.0%, n = 7) claim that social media posts and information from non-state sources are inaccurate. In addition to misinformation, multiple articles mentioned that biases are present in the “acts of some media and majority of western countries in broadcasting images of security forces in brutally killing peaceful protesters…” (“Plan underway to reopen basic education schools in 2021–2022 academic year: Vice-Senior General, 2021, p. 3). As examples: Some media intentionally incite and publish misinformation despite having responsibilities to write news under the correct and bilateral views, avoid presentations harming State peace and tranquillity and the rule of law and incitements to cause riots. Media blacked out the events with one-sided presentations. (“Information Team of State Administration Council meets media at 3/2021 press conference”, 2021, p. 3) Some of the media express the security forces use violence against peaceful protestors. Then, the western countries accused the security forces like the violence against the protestors for the restoration of democracy are such abhorrent manners. The security forces are also accused of using brutalities against protestors locally. (Maung Phyu Lay, 2021, p. 11) Because of such false reporting, these outlets were labelled as “illegitimate”, such as in “Press release on inaccurate death toll in riots” (2021): Although there were inevitable casualties on both sides while security forces responded to the insurgents’ attacks in self-defence, the security forces have been accused of firing at peaceful protests by illegitimate media outlets, which the State has shut down, in violation of the law and fake news is being biased. (p. 12) International Perception The GNLM reports (3.8%, n = 3) suggested that biased media coverage significantly affects global perceptions of Myanmar. This was exemplified by the dissemination of misinformation on social media platforms and statements from international figures, including United Nations (UN) representatives, which were found to be reported as inconsistent with actual events. As an example: …some tried to spread false news like “the security forces fatally shot the children and brutally killed the children,” via social media to international countries and UN. (Maung Thaw Ma Na, 2021, p. 10) At the UN Security Council session held on 31 March 2021, the remarks by Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar Ms Christine Schraner Burgener were a far cry from reality…her remarks are inaccurate, biased, and one-sided. (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10) Purpose and Evidence of Misinformation Multiple reports (3.8%, n = 3) argued that the spreading of misinformation and biased information is done for various purposes, including wanting to escalate conflict, disrupting State stability through incitement (“Information Team of State Administration Council meets media at 3/2021 press conference”, 2021, p. 3), and preventing Myanmar from becoming a democracy. The first example is extracted from “Second-month performance of the State Administration Council” by Kanaung (2021), which read: …the State Administration Council Chairman noted the instigating role of social media posts in spreading unrest and fuelling violence and emphasized that the security forces would continue to exercise utmost restraint and the lowest level of response possible in every situation, in line with international norms for riot control. (p. 4) The second example is regarding a case involving Ma Kyal Zin, who was suspected of death by live ammunition used by police. While several social media posts and international media outlets reported that she was hit by a bullet after police and soldiers into a protesting crowd (Fortify Rights, 2022), a GNLM article implied these reports are false according to findings by a MPF investigation. Therefore, the posts and articles claiming otherwise aim to escalate conflict. It read: According to the autopsy, the injury was caused in the left of her head right behind her ear and a piece of lead metal of 1.2 centimetre long and 0.7 centimetre wide which is different from the riot control bullets used by the Myanmar Police Force, was found. Although the security guards on duty at the time of incident were in a face-to-face position to the crowd, the injury was in the back of the deceased person and the lead piece found in the head was a type of ammunition that can be fired with a shotgun with 0.38 round of ammunition. It can be seen that those who do not want stability in the country are attempting to escalate the conflict and actions are being taken to identify those who are behind this and prosecute according to the law. (“Release of information about the cause of death of Ma Kyal Zin died in riot, Mandalay”, 2021, p. 4) Similarly, the State Administration Council (SAC) stated that the inaccurate remarks made by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar (introduced above) “could delay and destabilize the efforts by the State Administration Council to establish a genuine and disciplined multiparty democracy.” (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10) Some reports went as far as to offer evidence of misinformation and inaccurate reporting by media. For instance, Maung Thaw Ma Na (2021) in “Don’t make fake tragic situations” wrote: People can vividly see if we watch the CCTV footage that the security forces systematically dispersed the angry protest crowds. Even when the protesters attempted to attack the security forces, they conducted actions at the lowest level. (p. 10) In the context of this paper, the media bias frame helps indicate and further articulate that, even when non-state sources may claim otherwise, police actions against protestors were continuously justified and police (and other government security forces) were continuously portrayed as legitimate authorities by the State in GNLM articles published between January 1 and December 31, 2021. Discussion and Conclusion The Myanmar government employs both explicit and implicit strategies to establish and justify police legitimacy in the management of post-coup protests. Initially, it invokes laws, legal authorities, police protocols, and international standards. This reliance on formal rationality suggests that the police, by adhering to these principles, are mandated to use necessary force to disperse protests, irrespective of public opinion or the effectiveness of their actions. Additionally, the police bolster their legitimacy by portraying themselves as defenders of public order and acting in self-defense against threats from protesters. The 'humane' theme is intended to evoke moral indignation against the destructive acts of protesters, thereby legitimizing police intervention. Third, the government frames criticism of police actions as misinformation or disinformation, reinforcing the perceived authority and legitimacy of Myanmar's police. Media landscapes vary significantly across political contexts, exhibiting different levels of freedom and diversity in content. In Western democracies, such as the United States, the media is relatively free and diverse, as evidenced by the coverage of incidents such as the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson and George Floyd, which present multiple perspectives on the police use of force. In contrast, in less democratic environments, state media often predominates, functioning primarily as propaganda tools, with limited space for diverse opinions. Our analysis of Myanmar’s state media revealed a predominantly positive portrayal of police actions, strong condemnation of protestors, particularly those involved in violence, and a lack of in-depth analysis of protest motivations and potential improvements in police tactics. This is in stark contrast to media coverage in Western democracies, where a broader array of viewpoints is typically available to the public. However, while this study underscores how state media in an authoritarian regime shape perceptions of police actions and legitimacy and offers insights into the complexities of policing in diverse political landscapes, we urge readers to be mindful of the following limitations. Firstly, a known issue of utilizing news reports content as data is reporting bias. Such bias stems from reasons such as political or ideological leanings, which can skew how events or issues are portrayed. Another known issue is related to sensationalism, which can lead to certain aspects being selectively exaggerated over others. Media bias is apparent even in relatively free and diverse societies that support freedom of press. In an authoritarian context where freedom of press is severely restricted, readers should expect a higher degree of media bias in favor of state entities in control of information publishing and distribution. Secondly, as readers may have noticed, news stories can lack detailed context or background that academic sources normally provide. Related to this, relying on any sort of secondhand information rather than primary sources may result in important nuances and relevant stakeholder perspectives becoming overlooked. Finally, related to the first and second limitations, only official or elite perspectives tend to be represented, and less attention is given to grassroots voices. Future studies can mitigate these limitations by triangulating news reports content with other data, such as interviews with primary sources, official statistics, or social media activity, to gain a more robust view of the issues of interest. In conclusion, while this study focused on state media in Myanmar, it is essential to consider the broader media landscape, including privately owned media. Understanding the extent to which private media in Myanmar align with protests or face censorship is crucial for comprehensively understanding the media environment. Consequently, our analysis offers insights into the characteristics of Myanmar state media’s coverage of protest policing, highlighting its divergence from media practices in Western democracies and other developing countries. Declarations The authors declare no conflicts of interest. Author Contribution K.L. held main responsibilities in finding data sources, gathering appropriate data, and managing and analyzing said data. In addition, she wrote the research context, methodology, and findings sections of the manuscript. Final formatting and submitting of manuscript were also done by K.L.H.L. advised K.L. on the subject matter of the manuscript itself. Towards the end, she heavily focused on the editing of the manuscript, ensuring all sections of the manuscript ties well together while meeting set publishing guidelines by the journal.S.P. lent his expertise in organizing and referencing background literature related to legitimacy in policing. In addition, he drafted the discussion and conclusion sections of the manuscript.As per order of authors, all authors contributed fairly to the manuscript. References Administrative officials, security forces make efforts for rule of law. (2021, March 1). Burma Library. Retrieved February 2, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-01-red.pdf Angry protestors attack security forces in Mandalay. (2021, March 24). Burma Library. Retrieved February 2, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-24-red.pdf Announcement for people not to join violent riots. (2021, March 4). Burma Library. 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Peaceful protest and police violence: Comparing escalation and de-escalation strategies in Thailand and Myanmar. Asian Survey, 55 (5), 845-869. Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2017). The policing of anti-government protests: Thailand's 2013-2014 demonstrations and a crisis of police legitimacy. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 4 (1), 95-122. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016689224 Spencer, M. E. (1970). Weber on legitimate norms and authority. British Journal of Sociology, 21 (2), 123-134. Statement on situation after Tatmadaw took State responsibilities, ASEAN Special Envoy. (2021, October 24). Burma Library. Retrieved Jan 28, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-10-24-red.pdf Tatmadaw will strive for a genuine, disciplined and concrete democracy: Senior General. (2021, April 4). Burma Library. Retrieved Jan 4, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-04-04-red.pdf Tin Maung Maung Than. (2001). Myanmar's police under military rule: A historical perspective. Southeast Asian Studies, 39 (2), 178-195. The demonstrations have turned into violence. (2021, March 3). Burma Library. Retrieved Feb 2, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-03-red.pdf The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council. (2021, July 2). Burma Library. Retrieved Jan 28, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-07-02-red.pdf Tupper, K. (2021). State violence and police legitimacy in hybrid regimes. Comparative Political Studies, 54 (8), 1456-1483. Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law . Yale University Press. Tyler, T. R. (2003). Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law. Crime and Justice, 30 , 283-357. Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the police and courts . Russell Sage Foundation. Vitale, A. S. (2005). From negotiated management to command and control: How the New York Police Department polices protests. Policing and Society, 15 (3), 283-304. Waddington, P. A. J. (1994). Liberty and order: Public order policing in a capital city . UCL Press. Wang, P., Joosse, P., & Cho, L. L. (2020). The evolution of protest policing in a hybrid regime. The British Journal of Criminology, 60 (6), 1523-1546. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaa040 Weber, M. (1947). Max Weber: The theory of social and economic organization . Free Press. Vice-Chairman of State Adminstration Council Vice-Senior General Soe Win meets officers, other ranks, their families, cadets in Bahtoo, PyinOoLwin stations. (2021, March 14). Burma Library. Retrieved January 4, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-14-red.pdf Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Lynn","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Nevada, Las Vegas","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Khaing","middleName":"","lastName":"Lynn","suffix":""},{"id":534573270,"identity":"3031cfbd-310d-4c60-8415-05b74c72e836","order_by":1,"name":"Hong Lu","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Nevada, Las 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management, have been increasingly scrutinized. During civil protests, there is significant potential for adverse interactions or violence between law enforcement and the public. Such negative interactions can undermine public trust, cooperation, and consequently, the legitimacy of police authority. Therefore, given the heightened sensitivities surrounding these police-citizen encounters, there has been a substantial increase in calls to assess the effectiveness of these tactics, especially in protest scenarios (Gillham, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Subsequently, police use of force, especially in protests, remains a topic of much debate.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe heightened focus, primarily driven by advocacy groups, policymakers, and media outlets, has predominantly been on police use-of-force tactics during protests (Christi\u0026aacute;n et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, police conduct in these situations is of paramount importance, as the perceived legitimacy of police authority may significantly influence the application of force, particularly in the context of crowd management during protests (Mazerolle et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe specific strategies and amount of force employed in protest situations can vary significantly, particularly when comparing their implementation in democratic nations with that in authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the perceived legitimacy and public acceptance of police authority are essential for maintaining order and ensuring the effective functioning of the state. This is crucial because when the public perceives the police as legitimate, they are more inclined to cooperate, thereby reducing the potential for violence and enhancing the police's capacity to maintain order, especially in dynamic contexts such as protests (Skogan \u0026amp; Frydl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Tyler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGrounded in legitimacy theory, this study analyzed 78 news reports from Myanmar\u0026rsquo;s largest state-run newspaper in 2021. This study explores the common frames employed by the newspaper, Global New Light of Myanmar, in reporting police tactics to suppress protests following Myanmar\u0026rsquo;s 2021 military coup. The study further examined whether and how legitimacy was invoked to justify police tactics in this non-democratic military dictatorship and investigated any similarities or differences in the portrayal and justification of police actions in non-democratic versus democratic contexts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eMyanmar as a Research Context\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMyanmar's modern history is characterized by one of the world's longest periods of military rule, briefly interrupted by the quasi-democratic governance of the National League for Democracy (NLD) from 2011 to 2020 under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) contested the NLD's decisive victory in the November 2020 elections, alleging election fraud and demanding a re-vote. This contention culminated in a military coup on February 1, 2021, which resulted in the detention of NLD leaders and the declaration of a year-long state of emergency (Head, 2021). The coup ignited nationwide protests, which were met with harsh crackdowns by the military and police forces (Nichols, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe MPF, which maintains a close association with the military, originated in British colonial rule, which was established in 1825. During both the British and Japanese colonial periods, the police were tasked with maintaining law and order, supporting civil administration, safeguarding the colonizers\u0026rsquo; commercial interests, and participating in the suppression of rebellions (Selth, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Than, 2001). Following the attainment of independence, the police became subordinate to the increasingly dominant military, engaging in counterinsurgency operations and suppressing pro-democracy movements (Aung Myo Maung, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDuring the quasi-democratic government period between 2011 and 2020, substantial efforts were made to professionalize and demilitarize the MPF. These initiatives sought to establish a professional police force committed to the rule of law, enhance female representation, and transition to community-based policing, all with international support (Min Zaw Oo \u0026amp; Myo Naing, 2021). Nevertheless, challenges such as inadequate funding, corruption, excessive workloads, outdated training, and a legitimacy crisis among the public, driven by perceptions of unfairness and corruption, persisted (Min Zaw Oo \u0026amp; Myo Naing, 2021; Egreteau, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Sithu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDespite recent reforms, the MPF remains significantly influenced by the military and continues to undertake civil and military policing functions. As a component of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), its responsibilities include maintaining public order, preventing and controlling crime, ensuring public security, and enforcing drug-related legislation. In contrast to the decentralized police forces in the United States, Myanmar's police system is characterized by a high degree of centralization. This centralized structure is manifested in its hierarchical organization, which extends from the national headquarters to local police stations throughout the country (Min Zaw Oo \u0026amp; Myo Naing, 2021; Selth, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; ASEANOPOL, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Police centralization presumably makes it easier for the military regime to control and use as a pawn for political oppression, including suppressing political protests post the military coup in 2021 (Tin Maung Maung Than, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eTheory and Research on Legitimacy and Protest Policing\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe concept of state legitimacy, as conceptualized by Max Weber (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR86\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1947\u003c/span\u003e), emerges from three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. This concept is pivotal in establishing and sustaining authority, explaining why individuals or groups comply with state-directed authority. These legitimacy types\u0026mdash; affective (involving awe and reverence), rational (tied to values), formal (based on legal norms and authority), and substantive rationality (rooted in value-oriented norms and authority)\u0026mdash;are crucial in the execution of authority by constitutional governments (Kolstad, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eScholars have noted that perceived legitimacy shapes social action (Spencer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1970\u003c/span\u003e). As such, stability and uniformity in social actions often stem from self-interest, custom, or a belief in a legitimate order. Consequently, belief in state legitimacy stabilizes actions by normatively validating specific behaviors and associating them with duties and obligations, thus contributing to compliance. Subsequently, the manner in which authority is exercised by the state serves as a predictor of how legitimacy may be perceived and accepted by its population. This is important because the mechanisms (actions) by which authority is exercised by the state may promote or inhibit cooperation among those within that system. Furthermore, public trust, accountability, and perceived fairness establish the foundation for state-citizen cooperation, which ultimately serves to strengthen state legitimacy and thus public order (Jackson \u0026amp; Bradford, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). This legitimacy framework is often associated with democratic societies and serves as a key distinction when compared to authoritarian states, which exercise authority through more apparent coercive means.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eConceptualizing Police Legitimacy and Procedural Justice\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTyler (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1990\u003c/span\u003e) defined police legitimacy as the public\u0026rsquo;s willingness to align with an external authority, measured by their perceived duty to obey and support local laws and authorities. In his seminal 1990 study, Tyler explored the factors influencing individuals\u0026rsquo; compliance with laws, specifically investigating whether compliance is driven more by the fear of punishment or by the perceived legitimacy of the state. Using survey data from over 1, 000 Chicago residents, Tyler discovered that individuals were more likely to adhere to laws when they viewed legal authorities as legitimate, and procedural justice (e.g., fair, unbiased, and neutral actions) facilitates public cooperation and perceived police legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe concept of police legitimacy includes two forms: instrumental legitimacy and normative legitimacy. Instrumental legitimacy evaluates an authority\u0026rsquo;s capacity to achieve outcomes such as order maintenance and societal stability, whereas normative legitimacy examines whether an authority\u0026rsquo;s actions align with widely recognized norms and values, such as respecting citizens\u0026rsquo; rights and adhering to the rule of law (Habermas, 1979, as cited in Murray, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Building on this, Beetham (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1991\u003c/span\u003e) argued that legitimate power arises from actions demonstrating legal validity, shared values, and consent, particularly from the less powerful, aligning with Tyler\u0026rsquo;s concept of procedural justice, which emphasizes fairness in the police\u0026rsquo;s practices.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eResearchers have traditionally evaluated police legitimacy and procedural justice through surveys that assess procedural fairness, focusing on elements such as respect, neutrality, voice, legitimacy, and cooperation. For instance, in a survey of 1,500 residents from a major city in the Southeastern U.S., Reisig and Bratton (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) identified voice and respect as key components of procedural justice. Tyler and Huo\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR82\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e) study found that procedural justice significantly predicted trust and cooperation with the police in racially diverse communities in Los Angeles. Similarly, Gau and Brunson (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) argued that when police-public interactions are perceived as positive, fair, and impartial, the potential for restoring legitimacy is enhanced; and a positive, 10-minute interaction with police may significantly increase trust and legitimacy among minority residents in New Heaven (Peyton et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eProtest Policing and Legitimacy\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eProtests are inherently dynamic events. Public perception of police legitimacy can thus fluctuate. In protest situations, police legitimacy must be actively negotiated through the establishment of fairness and respect by law enforcement to tamper down high emotions (Bottoms \u0026amp; Tankebe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eScholars have noted three principal models of protest policing (Sombatpoonsiri, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). The non-confrontational, negotiated management model prioritizes cooperation and regards protests as integral to national politics, typically employing force only as a last resort. The command-and-control model, characterized by limited negotiation and stringent behavioral guidelines, is primarily concerned with maintaining control (Vitale, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR83\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, the escalated force model emphasizes law and order, legitimizing the use of force when protests disrupt public order (Waddington, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e; Schweingruber, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; McPhail \u0026amp; McCarthy, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo mention past efforts related to protest policing and legitimacy, the specific strategies employed by law enforcement during protests can substantially affect perceptions of legitimacy. For example, utilizing survey data from 960 adults in the United Kingdom, Gerber and Jackson (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) found that high perceptions of legitimacy were associated with increased support for moderate force and diminished support for excessive force. They further contend that perceptions of the police as fair and legitimate mitigate ideological extremism. Perry et al. (2017), in examining the paramilitary tactics employed by the police during Israel\u0026rsquo;s 2001 Occupy Social Justice protest, found that an increase in aggressive control measures, such as the deployment of riot gear and surveillance drones, reduced the perceived legitimacy of the police. Such perceived reduction in police legitimacy was particularly pronounced among protesters who initially expressed support for the police, and overall, escalated models of force reduced perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eProtest Policing in Authoritarian and Hybrid Regimes\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe dynamics of legitimacy and protest policing exhibit significant variations between democratic and authoritarian countries. In democratic contexts, policing is informed by the principles of constitutionalism, liberalism, and the rule of law, with the objective of cultivating a secure, orderly, and free environment for citizens. This approach emphasizes legitimacy, accountability, performance, and fairness (Cao et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Lee \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). In contrast, within authoritarian regimes, policing primarily serves as an instrument of repression, accountable solely to political leadership, and its role becomes more pronounced during periods of civil unrest (Della Porta \u0026amp; Reiter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Tupper, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Lejune, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor instance, Sombatpoonsiri (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) analyzed the strategies employed by Thailand's police force to uphold their legitimacy during the political crisis of 2013\u0026ndash;2014. This study underscores the complexities faced by the police when navigating the dual responsibilities of law enforcement and maintaining political neutrality. It was found that the Thai Royal Police exhibited inconsistent responses to the protests, which eroded public trust and led to allegations of political bias. Moreover, the legitimacy crisis was intensified by government pressure and the institutional legacy of authoritarianism within the Thai police force. In a related study, Wang et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR85\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) examined the protest-policing strategies in Hong Kong, specifically the shift from negotiated management to a paramilitary approach and its subsequent impact on legitimacy. Using documentary and survey data, the study identified four factors contributing to legitimacy: procedural justice, legality, distributive justice, and expressive performance. Of them, procedural justice was found to be the most significant predictor, whereas expressive performance was particularly important in racially diverse communities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eStudies also find that authoritarian regimes frequently adopt enforcement strategies that manage public dissent while enabling the state to maintain control. For example, based on protest data from 1991 to 2011, Arriola (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) found that the Ethiopian regime disproportionately repressed protests in ethnically non-aligned regions by employing selective enforcement to control dissent. Furthermore, the state media depicted protests in marginalized regions as ethnic extremism while portraying pro-regime demonstrations as legitimate, which reinforced inter-ethnic mistrust and facilitated the maintenance of authoritarian rule through controlled polarization. Similarly, Juska and Woolfson (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e) revealed that the Lithuanian authorities employed preemptive strategies, such as surveillance, infiltration, and event permits, alongside riot control measures to manage protest activities. Curtice and Behlendorf (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) identified similar outcomes in their investigation of the impact of prior exposure to violent repression on protests in Uganda. They observed that individuals who witnessed or experienced previous police violence were significantly less inclined to express an intention to protest again. The authors argue that state repression induces a chilling effect even when grievances remain unresolved.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eMedia, Public Perception, and Legitimacy Dynamics\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe dynamics of legitimacy are increasingly influenced by the use of digital media platforms. Thus, the rapid dissemination of information facilitates the real-time construction and critique of police narratives. Consequently, the manner in which the police employ force during protests significantly affects public perception, with media framing serving as a critical factor (Ralph, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). As such, perspectives on police forces can differ significantly, ranging from an emphasis on law and order to a focus on procedural justice and civil rights, with these perspectives often being influenced by the source of information (Bonner \u0026amp; Dammert, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Police and state-controlled media typically portray police actions as legally justified, thereby reinforcing the notion of police legitimacy and suggesting acceptance of their actions regardless of the degree of violence or potential for abuse. Simply put, this framing process distills and interprets events and actions to align with the perspectives of specific audiences, influenced by factors such as the identity of the protesters, their cause, and the perceived effectiveness of the police through a specific interpretive lens.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe Current Study\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study examines how MPF actions are articulated following the 2021 coup to enhance the comprehension of police legitimacy within an authoritarian framework. We explore the legitimacy crisis confronting the MPF, characterized by a decline in public trust, which has been exacerbated by anti-government protests in the aftermath of the coup. This context offers a critical perspective for analyzing how the state, police, and their supporters frame their responses to maintain the legitimacy of their actions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGrounded in the theoretical framework of legitimacy, this study analyzed data from the state-operated publication, the Global New Light of Myanmar (GNLM). The research was structured around three primary questions. Firstly, how did the newspaper frame police actions and protests in the aftermath of the coup? Second, how does the concept of legitimacy underpin the justification of police actions? Third, how does the media's depiction of the police and protests differ between Myanmar's authoritarian regime and democratic systems, such as that of the United States?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Collection\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData used in this analysis were extracted from Myanmar\u0026rsquo;s largest state-run newspaper, \u003cem\u003eMyanmar Alinn \u003c/em\u003e(MAL), available on www.burmalibrary.org . We first identified news reports containing any of the following keywords \u0026ndash; police (\u003cem\u003eMyanmar ye \u003c/em\u003eor \u003cem\u003eMyanmar ye tat pwe\u003c/em\u003e), protest (\u003cem\u003esandapya \u003c/em\u003eor \u003cem\u003esu pu sandapya\u003c/em\u003e), and protestor (\u003cem\u003esandapya thu \u003c/em\u003eor \u003cem\u003elu su lu wayy sandapya\u003c/em\u003e) for all issues published in 2021. The search in MAL yielded 1,408 news articles. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe GNLM is considered the English version of MAL. As such, we randomly selected two issue dates and compared 5 MAL to 5 GNLM news reports on police and protests. A comparison of the two sources showed that reports related to police and protests were identical in content. We thus decided to proceed with using GLNM for conducting keyword searches. In addition, we decided to narrow the scope of searches to only include articles pertaining police and protests. Therefore, for GNLM, the keywords used were \u0026ldquo;police\u0026rdquo;, \u0026ldquo;protest\u0026rdquo;, and other synonymous terms such as \u0026ldquo;demonstration\u0026rdquo;, \u0026ldquo;march\u0026rdquo;, and \u0026ldquo;rally\u0026rdquo; (Atak \u0026amp; Bayram, 2017). The initial search for police and protest in GLNM yielded 96 news articles. A closer examination of the articles resulted in a removal of 18 of them (e.g., 3 articles did not cover the 2021 protests, 12 articles did not deal with protest policing, and 3 articles were duplicates), thus yielding a final total of 78 reports for this analysis. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn average report is three-fourths of a page in length, ranging from the shortest with 47 words and the longest with 5,672 words. Some reports clearly indicated their relevance to police and protests. Examples include \u0026ldquo;Police take actions against two protestors on Shwebo-YeU Road\u0026rdquo; on March 7, 2021; \u0026ldquo;Protesters rioting on streets arrest police, carry out unlawful activities\u0026rdquo; on March 1, 2021; and \u0026ldquo;In the events of the riots, 16 police members fell, and more than 260 were injured\u0026rdquo; on April 20, 2021. Others can be vague as reports can take on forms of official announcements, opinion pieces, or press briefings. Examples include \u0026ldquo;The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council\u0026rdquo; on July 2, 2021; \u0026ldquo;Statement on situation after Tatmadaw took State responsibilities, ASEAN Special Envoy\u0026rdquo; on October 24, 2021; and \u0026ldquo;Grave Perils of Narcotic Drugs behind the Current Terrorist Acts and Riots in Myanmar\u0026rdquo; on November 8, 2021.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMost reports listed affiliations, but few listed authors. The reports typically cite government-related agencies as sources such as State Administration Council Information Team, Office of the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, and the MPF, albeit that residents\u0026rsquo; views were also included in some reports such as \u0026ldquo;To peaceful protestors\u0026rdquo; by Maung Phyu Lay on March 20, 2021 and \u0026ldquo;The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council\u0026rdquo; by Kanaung on July 2, 2021. Most of the reports are descriptive, but with limited key information on protests (e.g., protestor, size, motivation, and tactics) and the police (e.g., number, responses, and suppression methods used).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe reports tend to strike a very positive tone on police actions with neither criticisms nor reflections of what could be done differently to reduce casualties (e.g., \u0026ldquo;Police detain protestors in Sangyoung, Kamayut of Yangon Region\u0026rdquo; on February 27, 2021; \u0026ldquo;Rioters in Bago detained by law\u0026rdquo; on March 1, 2021). In contrast, they bear a more negative tone in condemning the protesters, especially those involved in violent means such as rioting and terrorism (e.g., \u0026ldquo;People be cautious of destructive elements that incite unrest\u0026rdquo; on March 5, 2021; \u0026ldquo;Angry protestors attack security forces in Mandalay\u0026rdquo; on March 24, 2021). Given that GNLM is state-run and is the English version of MAL, it is reasonable to assume that it caters to domestic and international readers, including foreign staff at various embassies, international organizations, and businesses in Myanmar (Kironska \u0026amp; Peng, 2021). \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData triangulation with various sources such as fieldwork research, survey research and interviews, would enhance the validity of the current research; yet the feasibility of conducting such research is low due to the lack of access to the research site and to desired individuals in Myanmar. This is compounded with Western media\u0026rsquo;s general lack of attention to Myanmar (or negative portrayal of events due to ideological differences, where there is), given its relatively marginalized geo-political reporting, it tended to negatively portray protest policing due to political/ideological antagonism between the Myanmar\u0026rsquo;s military dictatorship and Western democracy. Under these conditions, the current study fills a void with an attempt to analyze protest policing in a military dictatorship based on analyses of Myanmar\u0026rsquo;s state-run news reports.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMethod of Data Coding \u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBoth deductive and inductive coding/thematic approaches were used in deriving main variables and themes for this analysis. For deductive approach, two studies served as important guides for constructing the variables/frames for this current study. For example, Bonner \u0026amp; Dammert (2022) used three key frames \u0026ndash;criminal threat, police protocols, and domestic and international law, in depicting how Chilean newspapers portrayed police-protestor interactions during the 2019 Chilean social uprising. Using protest data in South Korea, Chang and Vitale (2013) provided key variables in capturing main characteristics of protestors, protests, and police tactics in interacting with protesters. They variables served as a guide for constructing our codes in this analysis. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBesides variables/themes deduced from existing literature, we also identified new variables/themes as we were coding the reports, with an understanding that the Myanmar case may necessarily be unique given its military dictatorship and the unique context of a recent military-coup. This inductive approach led to two new themes identified from the coding of the news reports: 1) a humane theme, where multiple reports portrayed police officers were seriously injured by protesters and monks, who enjoyed a high status in Myanmar, were brutally harassed and abused by protesters; and 2) a media bias theme, where the Myanmar state media accused Western media biased coverage of protest policing in Myanmar. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eManifest and latent content analyses methods were used in coding the reports. Following our coding scheme, seven frames were generated. In descending order of frequency of mentions, these frames are domestic law (65.4%, n=51), police protocol (39.7%, n=31), threat to officer safety (39.7%, n=31), threat to public safety (29.5%, n=23), human costs (15.4%, n=12), media bias (16.7%, n=13), and international norms (11.5%, n=9). We then further collapsed several variables into one based on their conceptual similarities and the purpose of the study. This derivation yielded the final three general frames for the current study: 1) domestic law, police protocol and the international norms, 2) threat to official safety, threat to public safety, and human costs, and 3) media bias. The analyses of these frames are summarized below.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFrame of Domestic Law, Police Protocol, and International Norms\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe most frequently used frame in justifying police action is law, police protocol, and international norms. According to Weber (as cited in Spencer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1970\u003c/span\u003e), legitimacy is derived from law and authority. Based on our analyses of 78 news reports on police and protest in post-military coup in 2021, we found three subthemes tapping this perspective.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eDomestic Laws\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe majority of reports (65.4%, n = 51) cited legal authority in justifying police actions. In using law as authority, two patterns may be observed. The first is to refer to law generally. For example, multiple reports mentioned response “with laws” (e.g., regarding how riots are being maintained in “Security forces maintain riots in accordance with the law across the country” on March 7, 2021), how security measures were “in line with the law” (e.g., regarding how MPF is conducting security measures in line with laws in “Four police members injured” on February 10, 2021), and “the rule of law” (e.g., in an MPF statement regarding how administrative officials and security forces are enforcing the rule of law in “Administrative officials, security forces make efforts for rule of law” on March 1, 2021). In the more lengthy example below of an MPF statement, security force members were described as enforcing the rule of law within issued directives, to which protestors responded by shouting out slangs, to which security forces in turn responded with measures in line with the law:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe administrative officials and security force members requested the protest crowds to disperse for many times in accordance with the directives. But the protesters kept protesting shouting out slangs. When the security members tried to disperse the crowd by using shields in accordance with the law, the protesters seemed to attack the security members. Therefore, the police fired sound bombs to disperse the crowds (“Police detain protestors in Sangyoung, Kamayut of Yangon Region”, 2021, p. 6).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe second is to cite specific legal stipulations. For instance, Section 144 of Myanmar’s Criminal Procedure Law, which bans gatherings of 5 or more people, was cited 22 times in the reports (e.g., in “Four police members injured” on February 10, 2021). Reports also frequently cited Section 505-A of the Penal Code. As an example, MNA wrote in “One education staff arrested for making attempts to deteriorate stability of State”:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eActions have been taken under Section 505-A of the Penal Code against those who incite State service personnel, health staff, education staff, banking staff and other departmental staff to participate in CDM activities, oppress or threaten and do social punishment to deteriorate the State administrative machinery. The police arrested an education staff…for posting fake information, inciting other education staff to join CDM…The case was opened against the detainee under Penal Code section 505(a)/505(c) at Dawei Myoma police station (2021, p. 5).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, martial law was mentioned in multiple press briefings and statements by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. For example, in “Riotous protests transformed themselves to the anarchic mobs breaking laws and then to armed violent acts”:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e…the order of martial law was released in Hlinethaya, Shwepyitha, Dagon Myothit (South and North), North Okkalapa and Dagon Myothit (Seikkan) townships of Yangon Region for ensuring security, the rule of law, and community peace and tranquility (2021, p. 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePolice Protocol\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eOver half of the reports (39.7%, n = 31) refer to police protocol in justifying police actions against protesters. Some reports referenced prescribed crowd dispersal methods generally. For example, MNA detailed MPF’s procedure in dispersing a crowd in “Security forces detain protestors in Nay Pyi Taw Council Area”:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e… Myanmar Police Force repeatedly requested the protestors to disperse as their doings were disturbing others and causing traffic jams. The protestors did not disperse and so police members dispersed them in accordance with the prescribed crowd dispersal methods…The large protest crowd was dispersed at about 3 pm (2021, p. 4).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOther reports cited manuals and rules, such as the riots manual of the Union of Myanmar Government (1956) and the Myanmar Police Force’s Crowd Control Manual (2015) of the Ministry of Home Affairs. For example, MNA wrote, a state official detailed about “response by the security forces to the riots in conformity with the rules of the Riot Manual Law-1956 and the rules of the manual-2015 with the use of minimum forces” (“Vice-Chairman of State Adminstration Council Vice-Senior General Soe Win meets officers, other ranks, their families, cadets in Bahtoo, PyinOoLwin stations”, 2021, p. 3). However, specific clauses were not mentioned in the reports, prohibiting us from further understanding justifications for police actions in the context of said manuals.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, multiple reports stressed restraint exercised by security forces, including police, in executing crowd control and riot protocols. As examples:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo respond to the rioters who attack the security forces during that incident, the security forces had to dispersed the crowd by following the steps and procedures for dispersing crowds with the use of minimum force. (“Protesters rioting on streets arrest police, carry out unlawful activities”, 2021, p. 5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e…the Senior General said the protests staged have now turned into riots and violence. Myanmar Police Force was assigned duties to subdue the protests according to democratic norms by exercising utmost restraint. The Tatmadaw [Myanmar military] is helping the police troops as rearguards in required places to solve the difficulties and obstacles. (“Chairman of State Administration Council Senior General Min Aung Hlaing addresses Council’s meeting (6/2021)”, 2021, p. 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e…security forces systematically dispersed the angry protest crowds. Even when the protesters attempted to attack the security forces, [security forces] conducted actions at the lowest level. (Maung Thaw Ma Na, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e…the rioters began to hold weapons and commit violent means. By exercising utmost restraints, security forces are handling the protests in accord with step-step procedures. In comparison with the incidents in the international community, measures being taken here are far less severe. (“Tatmadaw will strive for a genuine, disciplined and concrete democracy: Senior General”, 2021, p. 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eInternational Norms\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBesides citing domestic laws and rules, the reports also appealed to international norms. While few reports did so (11.5%, n = 9), it is interesting for a military, autocratic government to repeatedly stress that state-sanctioned tactics in suppressing anti-regime protests conform to international norms and practices. Based on our analysis, we identified three strands of arguments.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe first strand is that riot control protocols are compatible with the international community or are in line with those implemented in democratic countries. As examples:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e…the Senior General said…although protests were staged during the period between the second and third weeks, the Council took measures under control as much as it can. The action was taken similar to that of democratic countries in accord with the practices of democracy. Other countries carried out the use of tear gas bombs, rubber bullets and water cannons to crack down the crowds of riots and interruption of the internet. In comparing the number of dead and injured persons in other countries’ demonstrations, there were four deceased persons within three weeks in Myanmar. (“Council needs to put energy into reviving country’s ailing economy: Senior General”, 2021, p. 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt was only from 9 February onwards when the protests became violent, with rioting, that security forces implemented measures of riot control, keeping to international norms for crowd and riot control by exercising utmost restraint and using the least force and the lowest level of response possible in each situation. (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA second strand of arguments is that the measures used for crowd dispersion are intended to result in least harm and the level of force minimal. For example, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing articulated that the MPF uses minimum force and least harmful means in controlling protests. In addition, police are also working “in accordance with democracy practices and the measures it is taking are even softer than the ones in other countries.” (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10) He also emphasized that “in the international community, it can be seen that the countries on the path of democracy for a long time take more severe action [in handling riots] than that of Myanmar.” (“Equal term of rights must be carefully created for ethnics: Senior General”, 2021, p. 1) Furthermore, it was implied that the means of control used so far are justified, as “no country can tolerate such violence and anarchy.” (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 9)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe final strand of arguments is related to democratic values. As an example, the report “The demonstrations have turned into violence” mentioned that while protestors engaged in violent tactics and security forces had to shoot to disperse them, “control measures were taken only through democratic means and with patience (2021, p. 3). In addition, reports articulated how some protest tactics, such as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), were not in line with democratic values as they “attempt to keep silent the different political views and a threat to freedom of opinion and expression.” (Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, 2021, p. 2) Here, police actions against protestors are framed as aiming to restore democratic values hindered by protest movements and, therefore, can be justified.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe Threat Frame\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eA core responsibility of contemporary police forces is to maintain order and reduce crime rates (Arriola, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Within this framework, public safety and self-defense frequently serve as justifications for police actions during civil unrest. Our analysis of the GNLM identified three subthemes in threat-based justifications for police actions against protesters: threats to public safety, threats to police officers, and the severity of these threats in terms of human cost. This analysis revealed that GNLM predominantly depicted police actions as necessary responses to threats against public safety and the safety of police officers. This framing emphasizes legal justifications and portrays protestors as instigators of violence, thereby reinforcing the narrative that police actions align with the objectives of maintaining public order and ensuring safety.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThreat to Public Safety\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMultiple reports (29.5%, n = 23) articulated that protests threaten public safety in various ways and to varying degrees. While some threats are relatively passive in nature, they are described as causing inconvenience and displeasure to members of the public. For instance, protestors were reported to be using tactics that were obstructive – such as causing traffic jams (“Security forces detain protestors in Nay Pyi Taw Council Area”, 2021); blocking railways with iron bars, logs, and stones and causing unrest (“Protestors block railway in Chanayethazan of Mandalay”, 2021); ); blocking public roads with tires, concrete blocks, and trees (“Announcement for people not to join violent riots”, 2021); gathering in front of government offices in hopes of inciting and accelerating riots; and instigating minors to take to the streets (“Administrative officials, security forces make efforts for rule of law”, 2021). Healthcare and fire services were reported to be disrupted as a result of protestors’ actions as well. For example, reports mentioned how “fire trucks were violently barred not to leave their stations” to aid with burning factories and how “innocent patients were dead due to a lack of opportunity to receive medical treatment” as health staff were participating in CDM as a sign of protest (“Information Team of State Administration Council meets media at 3/2021 press conference”, 2021, p. 1–3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eProtestors were reported to pose active threats as well, with several articles mentioning violent rioting, arson, and use of explosives. As examples:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e…riotous protests transformed themselves to the anarchic mobs breaking laws and then to armed violent acts in holding destructive elements such as arms, home-made guns, home-made grenades and arson wares, setting fire to State administrative buildings, police stations, law office and people’s housings as well as factories and making attempts to raid these buildings. (“Riotous protests transformed themselves to the anarchic mobs breaking laws and then to armed violent acts”, 2021, p. 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe rioters committed crimes of violent attacks in addition to arsons at 72 places, including 49 police stations and outposts, 29 ward/administrative offices, 39 departmental buildings, 11 roads/bridges, 10 banks, public housings, CCTVs, phone operator towers, warehouses, stalls, factories and industries in March. (“Record of Press Conference (4/2021) held on 9 April 2021 by the State Administration Council’s Information Team”, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eKanaung (2021), in “The Fourth Month of the State Administration Council”, wrote the following and justified the actions of security forces in protecting members of the public against terrorist-like actions:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecurity forces exerted untiring efforts to protect innocent civilians, civil servants, children and schools from arson attacks, bombings and cruel intentional murders by terrorists [referring to anti-military government protestors]…(p. 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThreat to Police Officers’ Safety\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eReports (39.7%, n = 31) also mentioned threats that were directly posed towards security forces, which include police officers. Passive threats obstructed security personnel from their duties and included: using obscene language by using hand speakers to attack the police (“Protest crackdown at Myaynigone, Hledan”, 2021); refusing to follow police orders to disperse and attempting to break security barriers (“Security forces disperse crowd Taninthayi Region Administration Council Office”, 2021); and blocking roads to stop vehicle convoys coming to aid police members blocked by protestors (“Protestors attack security force members at Mandalay Yadanabon dock”, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere were active threats towards security personnel as well. For example, a report titled “Protesters rioting on streets arrest police, carry out unlawful activities” outlined three incidents in which police officers were arrested by crowds of protestors in Mawlamyine, Thakayta Township, and Mandalay. Afterwards, protestors reportedly robbed the officers of their firearms, supplies, and cars. Overall, the report carried a condemning tone towards protestors “[threatening] and [detaining] the police who are enforcing the rule of law for community peace.” (2021, p. 5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGNLM reports emphasized that the use of force by security forces in dealing with the threats above was in the interest of self-defense. In the case above where about 1,500 protestors refused to disperse after several requests made by MPF officers, but instead used obscene language and attacked them, police reportedly “dispersed in accordance with crowd dispersal methods.” (“Protest crackdown at Myaynigone, Hledan”, 2021, p. 6) In the second case, after protestors refused to disperse and attempted to break security barriers, 100 of them attacked security personnel with stones. In response, “police fired rubber bullets of .12V gun.” (“Security forces disperse crowd Taninthayi Region Administration Council Office”, 2021, p. 6). In the third case, in addition to blocking vehicle convoys coming to aid police members, protestors reportedly attacked with stick, knives, stones, catapults, harpoons and other materials. Following the injuries of 11 security force members and damage of five vehicles, security forces “softly dispersed the crowds in accordance with the prescribed crowd dispersal methods and law to save the [police officers] blocked by the crowd.” (“Protestors attack security force members at Mandalay Yadanabon dock”, 2021, p. 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA press release in April more clearly justified the actions of security force members as self-defense. Along with a summary of injuries and death tolls of security personnel and protestors since the coup, it stated:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSince the terrorists led by the extremist members of the NLD party [main opposition of the military government] raided the police stations and attacked security forces with live ammunition, security forces had to retaliate as needed depending on the extent of their violence…there were inevitable casualties on both sides while security forces responded to the insurgents’ attacks in self-defence. (“Press release on inaccurate death toll in riots”, 2021, p. 12)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eHuman Costs\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition to the reports’ portrayal of threats to safety of the general public and police officers, several of them (15.4%, n = 12) further elaborated the human costs associated with the protests by describing injuries and deaths suffered by innocent civilians and officers. For example, a press release in April presented a list of people killed or injured as “alleged traitors” by protestors. It read:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThey also accused and abducted innocent people who didn’t have the same opinion as to the traitors and killed brutally or punished them inhumanely. There were a total of 17 innocent people who were killed brutally and 30 with severe injuries. (“Press release on inaccurate death toll in riots”, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOther reports described incidents in which officers and/or civilians were injured or killed by protestors in more detail. For example, a summary of a press conference in April read:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDue to [the rioters’] attacks, 16 police members died, and 263 police (36 + 227) were seriously injured. Moreover, six security forces and one family member also died. Some monks lost one eye, and the people grabbed the monks out of the cars and ordered them to disrobe. (“Record of Press Conference (4/2021) held on 9 April 2021 by the State Administration Council’s Information Team, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, some articles stated:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDuring the angry protest in Mahaaungmye of Mandalay Region on 9 February, the police were injured…Those injured were being treated at military hospitals in Mandalay and PyinOoLwin…One of the police who is currently under the medical treatment of ICU of PyinOoLwin military hospital is unlikely to survive a wound to the head. (“Police injured in Mandalay protest”, 2021, p. 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eYou might remember the case that occurred on 14th Street of Mandalay region on 29 March. A police officer on his off-duty was stabbed, chopped down by axe, placed over the pile of used tired and burnt to death. (“Grave Perils of Narcotic Drugs behind the Current Terrorist Acts and Riots in Myanmar”, 2021, p. 8)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome reports went further and stated for security force members and police officers, who are humans themselves, such human costs can negatively impact their mental state. For example:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e…two police died in Dabayin, one security force member was killed in Hninsi Housing of Aungmyethazan of Mandalay, and four police members in Thanlyin Township faced tortured, and two police sergeants of Pyin Oo Lwin, one police of Mawlamyine and another five police members of Chanmyathazi also faced brutalities. Then, one acting head of Kyauktada Township police station was also killed, one police second lieutenant died and three injured due to the shots by protestors in Bago, four military members, including officers, were killed in Pekon, Ma Win Thandar Swe, wife of the military officer in Hlinethaya Township, was also killed. So these cases can irk the security forces. If they use their weapons carelessly due to anger, those who committed such crimes might face causalities. (“Angry protestors attack security forces in Mandalay, 2021, p. 11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis implies that when carrying out security and police duties in a negative mental state, use of force and casualties are probable, hence serving as another justification for police actions against protestors after the 2021 coup.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFrame of Media Bias\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe final frame we will discuss is related to the media (16.7%, n = 13), as our analysis of the GNLM identified a notable framing that challenges the accuracy and impartiality of non-state media, particularly in their reports on the actions of security forces during protests.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eMisinformation and Biased Reporting\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eSeveral GNLM reports (9.0%, n = 7) claim that social media posts and information from non-state sources are inaccurate. In addition to misinformation, multiple articles mentioned that biases are present in the “acts of some media and majority of western countries in broadcasting images of security forces in brutally killing peaceful protesters…” (“Plan underway to reopen basic education schools in 2021–2022 academic year: Vice-Senior General, 2021, p. 3). As examples:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome media intentionally incite and publish misinformation despite having responsibilities to write news under the correct and bilateral views, avoid presentations harming State peace and tranquillity and the rule of law and incitements to cause riots. Media blacked out the events with one-sided presentations. (“Information Team of State Administration Council meets media at 3/2021 press conference”, 2021, p. 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome of the media express the security forces use violence against peaceful protestors. Then, the western countries accused the security forces like the violence against the protestors for the restoration of democracy are such abhorrent manners. The security forces are also accused of using brutalities against protestors locally. (Maung Phyu Lay, 2021, p. 11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBecause of such false reporting, these outlets were labelled as “illegitimate”, such as in “Press release on inaccurate death toll in riots” (2021):\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlthough there were inevitable casualties on both sides while security forces responded to the insurgents’ attacks in self-defence, the security forces have been accused of firing at peaceful protests by illegitimate media outlets, which the State has shut down, in violation of the law and fake news is being biased. (p. 12)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eInternational Perception\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe GNLM reports (3.8%, n = 3) suggested that biased media coverage significantly affects global perceptions of Myanmar. This was exemplified by the dissemination of misinformation on social media platforms and statements from international figures, including United Nations (UN) representatives, which were found to be reported as inconsistent with actual events. As an example:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e…some tried to spread false news like “the security forces fatally shot the children and brutally killed the children,” via social media to international countries and UN. (Maung Thaw Ma Na, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the UN Security Council session held on 31 March 2021, the remarks by Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar Ms Christine Schraner Burgener were a far cry from reality…her remarks are inaccurate, biased, and one-sided. (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePurpose and Evidence of Misinformation\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMultiple reports (3.8%, n = 3) argued that the spreading of misinformation and biased information is done for various purposes, including wanting to escalate conflict, disrupting State stability through incitement (“Information Team of State Administration Council meets media at 3/2021 press conference”, 2021, p. 3), and preventing Myanmar from becoming a democracy. The first example is extracted from “Second-month performance of the State Administration Council” by Kanaung (2021), which read:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e…the State Administration Council Chairman noted the instigating role of social media posts in spreading unrest and fuelling violence and emphasized that the security forces would continue to exercise utmost restraint and the lowest level of response possible in every situation, in line with international norms for riot control. (p. 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe second example is regarding a case involving Ma Kyal Zin, who was suspected of death by live ammunition used by police. While several social media posts and international media outlets reported that she was hit by a bullet after police and soldiers into a protesting crowd (Fortify Rights, 2022), a GNLM article implied these reports are false according to findings by a MPF investigation. Therefore, the posts and articles claiming otherwise aim to escalate conflict. It read:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAccording to the autopsy, the injury was caused in the left of her head right behind her ear and a piece of lead metal of 1.2 centimetre long and 0.7 centimetre wide which is different from the riot control bullets used by the Myanmar Police Force, was found. Although the security guards on duty at the time of incident were in a face-to-face position to the crowd, the injury was in the back of the deceased person and the lead piece found in the head was a type of ammunition that can be fired with a shotgun with 0.38 round of ammunition. It can be seen that those who do not want stability in the country are attempting to escalate the conflict and actions are being taken to identify those who are behind this and prosecute according to the law. (“Release of information about the cause of death of Ma Kyal Zin died in riot, Mandalay”, 2021, p. 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, the State Administration Council (SAC) stated that the inaccurate remarks made by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar (introduced above) “could delay and destabilize the efforts by the State Administration Council to establish a genuine and disciplined multiparty democracy.” (“Response to the remarks by Ms Christine Schraner Burgener Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Myanmar made at the UN Security Council session on 31 March 2021”, 2021, p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome reports went as far as to offer evidence of misinformation and inaccurate reporting by media. For instance, Maung Thaw Ma Na (2021) in “Don’t make fake tragic situations” wrote:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePeople can vividly see if we watch the CCTV footage that the security forces systematically dispersed the angry protest crowds. Even when the protesters attempted to attack the security forces, they conducted actions at the lowest level. (p. 10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the context of this paper, the media bias frame helps indicate and further articulate that, even when non-state sources may claim otherwise, police actions against protestors were continuously justified and police (and other government security forces) were continuously portrayed as legitimate authorities by the State in GNLM articles published between January 1 and December 31, 2021.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion and Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe Myanmar government employs both explicit and implicit strategies to establish and justify police legitimacy in the management of post-coup protests. Initially, it invokes laws, legal authorities, police protocols, and international standards. This reliance on formal rationality suggests that the police, by adhering to these principles, are mandated to use necessary force to disperse protests, irrespective of public opinion or the effectiveness of their actions. Additionally, the police bolster their legitimacy by portraying themselves as defenders of public order and acting in self-defense against threats from protesters. The 'humane' theme is intended to evoke moral indignation against the destructive acts of protesters, thereby legitimizing police intervention. Third, the government frames criticism of police actions as misinformation or disinformation, reinforcing the perceived authority and legitimacy of Myanmar's police.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMedia landscapes vary significantly across political contexts, exhibiting different levels of freedom and diversity in content. In Western democracies, such as the United States, the media is relatively free and diverse, as evidenced by the coverage of incidents such as the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson and George Floyd, which present multiple perspectives on the police use of force. In contrast, in less democratic environments, state media often predominates, functioning primarily as propaganda tools, with limited space for diverse opinions. Our analysis of Myanmar’s state media revealed a predominantly positive portrayal of police actions, strong condemnation of protestors, particularly those involved in violence, and a lack of in-depth analysis of protest motivations and potential improvements in police tactics. This is in stark contrast to media coverage in Western democracies, where a broader array of viewpoints is typically available to the public.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, while this study underscores how state media in an authoritarian regime shape perceptions of police actions and legitimacy and offers insights into the complexities of policing in diverse political landscapes, we urge readers to be mindful of the following limitations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirstly, a known issue of utilizing news reports content as data is reporting bias. Such bias stems from reasons such as political or ideological leanings, which can skew how events or issues are portrayed. Another known issue is related to sensationalism, which can lead to certain aspects being selectively exaggerated over others. Media bias is apparent even in relatively free and diverse societies that support freedom of press. In an authoritarian context where freedom of press is severely restricted, readers should expect a higher degree of media bias in favor of state entities in control of information publishing and distribution. Secondly, as readers may have noticed, news stories can lack detailed context or background that academic sources normally provide. Related to this, relying on any sort of secondhand information rather than primary sources may result in important nuances and relevant stakeholder perspectives becoming overlooked. Finally, related to the first and second limitations, only official or elite perspectives tend to be represented, and less attention is given to grassroots voices. Future studies can mitigate these limitations by triangulating news reports content with other data, such as interviews with primary sources, official statistics, or social media activity, to gain a more robust view of the issues of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, while this study focused on state media in Myanmar, it is essential to consider the broader media landscape, including privately owned media. Understanding the extent to which private media in Myanmar align with protests or face censorship is crucial for comprehensively understanding the media environment. Consequently, our analysis offers insights into the characteristics of Myanmar state media’s coverage of protest policing, highlighting its divergence from media practices in Western democracies and other developing countries.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no conflicts of interest.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eK.L. held main responsibilities in finding data sources, gathering appropriate data, and managing and analyzing said data. In addition, she wrote the research context, methodology, and findings sections of the manuscript. Final formatting and submitting of manuscript were also done by K.L.H.L. advised K.L. on the subject matter of the manuscript itself. Towards the end, she heavily focused on the editing of the manuscript, ensuring all sections of the manuscript ties well together while meeting set publishing guidelines by the journal.S.P. lent his expertise in organizing and referencing background literature related to legitimacy in policing. In addition, he drafted the discussion and conclusion sections of the manuscript.As per order of authors, all authors contributed fairly to the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cem\u003eAdministrative officials, security forces make efforts for rule of law. \u003c/em\u003e(2021, March 1). Burma Library. Retrieved February 2, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-01-red.pdf\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cem\u003eAngry protestors attack security forces in Mandalay. \u003c/em\u003e(2021, March 24). Burma Library. 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Retrieved January 4, 2023, from burmalibrary.org/sites/burmalibrary.org/files/obl/GNLM2021-03-14-red.pdf\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Myanmar, policing, police legitimacy, use of force, protest management","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7715910/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7715910/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"In Myanmar, military governance has predominated, with a brief interlude from 2011 to 2020 under a quasi-democratic government. The 2021 coup, orchestrated by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, ended this period and reinstated military rule. To quell dissent, the regime responded in various ways, including mobilizing the Myanmar Police Force (MPF). This study analyzes 78 news articles from Myanmar's state-controlled newspaper and examines the MPF's post-coup activities from the perspectives of legitimacy and policing. The findings reveal the key frames employed to justify the MPF's use of force, including authority, institutional protocol, public safety, and threats to police. These frames align MPF actions with the principles of formal rationality and legitimacy. By highlighting a non-Western authoritarian context, this study contributes to the discourse on police legitimacy and public protests. These findings underscore how state media in authoritarian regimes shape perceptions of police actions and legitimacy, offering insights into the complexities of policing in diverse political landscapes.","manuscriptTitle":"Police, Protests, and Legitimacy - A Case of Myanmar","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-10-28 16:39:56","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7715910/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"e5320481-ab18-447a-8db4-fec7a67af945","owner":[],"postedDate":"October 28th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-01-28T15:43:02+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-10-28 16:39:56","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7715910","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7715910","identity":"rs-7715910","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}