Fault Modeling and Countermeasures for DRAM-Targeted Electromagnetic Fault Injection | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Fault Modeling and Countermeasures for DRAM-Targeted Electromagnetic Fault Injection Qiang Liu, Longtao Guo, Xianzhao Xia, Zhen Gao This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8685862/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) attacks pose significant threats to the security of integrated circuits. With the advent of second-order attacks, memory storing sensitive data and codes has increasingly become primary target of EMFI attacks. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) under EMFI attacks. Specifically, we first design and conduct a physical EMFI attack experiment on a DRAM chip, based on which four fault models are constructed. Next, we investigate the generation and propagation mechanisms of faults in the DRAM memory array, and further validate the observed fault models through systematic analysis. Finally, two circuit-level countermeasures against EMFI attacks are proposed. Experimental results demonstrate that these countermeasures can effectively enhance DRAM's resistance to EMFI. This study not only deepens the understanding of DRAM fault models under EMFI but also provides valuable guidance for the security-oriented design of DRAM against such attacks. Hardware security Fault injection attack DRAM Fault model Anti-attack design Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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