The Perspective-Simulating Mind: How Internal Representations Shape Moral Judgment and Action

The Perspective-Simulating Mind: How Internal Representations Shape Moral Judgment and Action | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article The Perspective-Simulating Mind: How Internal Representations Shape Moral Judgment and Action Martin Ernst, Martin Kronbichler, Patric Meyer This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8442280/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 7 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Mental imagery is a simulation process, yet its representational format is rarely measured in moral cognition. We tested whether spontaneously adopted imagery perspective (first- vs third-person) and imagery vividness relate to moral evaluation in trolley dilemmas. In an online sample (N = 156), participants read either a switch or footbridge scenario, judged moral acceptability and willingness to act (order randomized), and after each judgment reported imagery vividness (1–6; including a “no imagery” option) and perspective. We replicated the classic asymmetry: acceptability and willingness were far higher in the switch than the footbridge dilemma. Imagery perspective was largely consistent within persons across the two judgments, indicating a stable simulation stance. In the footbridge dilemma, third-person simulation was associated with higher moral acceptability than first-person simulation, whereas no association emerged in the switch dilemma; perspective did not meaningfully alter willingness to act. Vividness showed no robust scenario differences, but action-related imagery was more vivid than judgment-related imagery, and some participants reported no visual imagery for at least one judgment. These findings identify representational perspective as a parameter of mental simulation that can shape moral evaluation under high emotional load, linking imagery research to questions of conscious experience and choice. Biological sciences/Neuroscience Biological sciences/Psychology Social science/Psychology mental imagery imagery vividness visual perspective taking moral decision-making trolley dilemmas mental simulation Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 1. Introduction Moral Decision-Making and the Role of Internal Simulation Human moral judgment emerges from the interaction of affective and deliberative processes. Dual-process theories propose that deontological judgments arise primarily from intuitive, emotional reactions, whereas utilitarian judgments depend on controlled reasoning about outcomes [ 1 , 2 ].Later developments, such as action-aversion accounts and multidimensional models like the CNI framework, have expanded this view by showing that moral judgments reflect not only outcome sensitivity, but also adherence to moral norms and preferences for action versus inaction. Action‐aversion accounts suggest that people may condemn harmful actions because performing them feels aversive even when no one is actually harmed [ 3 ].The CNI model decomposes responses in moral dilemmas into sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to norms (N), and a general tendency toward inaction (I), demonstrating that “utilitarian” and “deontological” decisions can arise from different combinations of these latent parameters [ 4 , 5 ]. Yet despite extensive work on moral cognition, the nature of the internal simulation process, particularly the perspective from which individuals imagine moral events, has received remarkably little empirical attention. Representational format may be a crucial, yet overlooked, source of variance in moral decision-making. Perspective Simulation as a Missing Variable in Moral Theories Research in social cognition, mental imagery, and embodied perspective-taking demonstrates that imagining events from a first-person (egocentric) versus third-person (allocentric; will be used synonymously with 3rd person perspective in this article) perspective recruits partially distinct neural systems and alters emotional engagement, agency, and personal involvement. Neuroimaging studies show that adopting an egocentric perspective engages regions involved in self-related and agency-related processing, such as medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal areas [ 6 , 7 ], whereas manipulating perspective and performing perspective transformations also recruits posterior parietal and precuneus regions that support spatial transformation and distancing from one’s own bodily viewpoint [ 8 , 9 ]. Theoretical work further links egocentric perspective to embodied processing of one’s own actions and emotional states, and allocentric perspective to a more detached, observer-like stance [ 10 , 11 ]. From this perspective, imagining a harmful action “through one’s own eyes” versus “from the outside” is not a superficial stylistic difference but an encoding choice that may change which bodily sensations, emotions, and action tendencies are brought to the fore. These findings suggest that the representational perspective adopted during moral cognition could systematically modulate how the judgment is processed. Philosophical and psychological discussions about the personal versus impersonal structure of moral dilemmas typically assume that “personalness” is a property of the scenario itself for example, whether the agent must apply direct physical force to a victim [ 12 ]. At the same time, critics have argued that sacrificial dilemmas may mislead researchers about people’s genuine moral commitments because they conflate multiple factors, including physical contact, intention, and outcome asymmetries [ 13 ]. If individuals spontaneously imagine the same scenario from different perspectives, then the subjective personalness of a dilemma may be constructed during internal simulation rather than fixed by the dilemma’s surface structure. Surprisingly, empirical studies have rarely measured perspective simulation directly, nor examined whether individuals maintain stable representational stances across evaluative contexts or switch between perspectives depending on task demands. Whether perspective simulation reflects a stable preference or a context-sensitive process remains largely unknown. Mental Imagery Vividness and Emotional Amplification A second representational dimension that has been largely overlooked in moral cognition is the vividness of mental imagery. Mental imagery intensifies affective experience and can modulate physiological and emotional responses: imagining a situation in vivid, sensory detail tends to elicit stronger emotional reactions than thinking about the same content in more abstract verbal form [ 14 , 15 ]. In line with this idea, Amit and Greene [ 16 ] showed that individuals who rely more on visual processing styles are more likely to make deontological judgments in sacrificial dilemmas, presumably because vivid imagery of harming another person heightens emotional conflict. However, previous studies did not examine whether vividness interacts with perspective, nor did they distinguish between imagery used when evaluating one’s own potential action and imagery used when making a moral acceptability judgment. Findings from the broader imagery and emotion-regulation literature indicate that visual perspective is critical for how vivid imagery shapes affect. First-person imagery tends to be more affectively intense and bodily grounded, whereas adopting a more distanced, observer-like perspective can reduce negative affect and rumination [ 17 , 18 ]. Translating these insights to sacrificial moral dilemmas suggests that vivid egocentric simulation should amplify embodied negative affect in response to harming another person, whereas vivid allocentric simulation may provide psychological distance and thereby reduce emotional resistance. The interaction between vividness and representational perspective may therefore be critical for understanding within-scenario variability in moral judgment. Yet no study to date has directly tested this interaction in the context of sacrificial moral decisions. Reconsidering the Trolley Dilemmas Although trolley dilemmas have faced criticism for their limited ecological validity and for the risk of overgeneralizing from highly stylized scenarios [ 13 ], they remain uniquely suited for investigating representational processes. Both the switch and the footbridge dilemma require imagining a harmful action that trades off one life against several others, but they differ systematically in how direct and physically embodied the harmful act is. In the switch case, harm is mediated mechanically by flipping a lever, whereas in the footbridge case the agent must apply direct physical force to another person’s body. This structural contrast has played a central role in debates about moral cognition because it robustly modulates affective responses and willingness to endorse harm in order to save others [ 19 , 2 ]. Existing theories predict robust scenario effects: the footbridge case elicits stronger affective resistance and lower willingness to act than the switch case, a pattern that has been interpreted as evidence for distinct contributions of emotional and outcome-based processes [ 2 , 19 ]. If representational perspective influences the emotional salience of harmful actions, such effects should be particularly pronounced in the footbridge case, where bodily contact and personal force are salient. Thus, rather than defending trolley dilemmas as realistic analogues of everyday morality, the present study uses them as controlled tools for isolating representational variables - perspective and vividness - that prevailing theories have thus far largely neglected. Individual Differences in Moral Cognition A rich literature shows that interpersonal dispositions shape moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. Traits associated with reduced empathic concern and a greater willingness to instrumentalize others, such as psychopathy and the broader Dark Triad constellation, have been linked to increased endorsement of harmful actions when they maximize aggregate outcomes [ 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 ]. Conversely, Honesty–Humility and related facets in the HEXACO model predict reduced exploitation and more prosocial behavior, suggesting that individuals high on these traits may be less willing to endorse instrumental harm [ 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 ]. Emotional intelligence is associated with emotion perception and regulation and may affect how people experience and manage emotional conflict during moral decision-making [ 29 , 30 ]. These variables are not the primary focus of the present study but offer important boundary conditions that may influence how individuals simulate and evaluate harmful actions, and how stable their simulation style is across different judgments. The Present Study The current study examines how individuals internally simulate moral events and how this simulation relates to moral judgment and willingness to act. Participants evaluated either the switch or the footbridge dilemma, judged the moral acceptability of the harmful action and their willingness to perform it, and then reported both the perspective from which they imagined the scenario and the vividness of their imagery for each judgment. This design makes it possible to assess whether individuals adopt egocentric or allocentric simulation, whether they maintain a stable perspective across judgments or switch perspectives, and how vividness interacts with perspective to shape moral evaluation. In addition, we measured a broad set of personality traits (HEXACO, Short Dark Triad, and trait emotional intelligence) to explore how interpersonal dispositions relate to simulation patterns or influence the relationship between simulation and moral judgment. These measures allow us to examine representational processes while accounting for known sources of individual variability in moral cognition. Theoretical Contribution By integrating research on perspective-taking, mental imagery, emotion regulation, and moral reasoning, this study introduces a representational account of moral cognition. The findings aim to show that how individuals imagine moral events, specifically whether they adopt egocentric or allocentric perspectives, how vividly they simulate these events, and whether they maintain or switch perspectives systematically shapes their moral judgments. This framework extends existing models such as dual-process accounts, action-aversion theories, and the CNI model by identifying internal simulation as a previously unmeasured, theoretically meaningful component of moral decision-making. 2. Methods 2.1. Participants Participants were adults between 18 and 35 years of age (M = 24.51). Recruitment occurred online via and social media. Inclusion criteria required normal or corrected vision, absence of color blindness, no history of stroke, brain cancer, or brain surgery, no current neurological or psychiatric diagnosis, and no medication affecting brain metabolism. A total of N = 156 individuals completed the study. The sample consisted of 112 women (71.8%), 40 men (25.6%), and 4 participants identifying as diverse (2.6%). Participation was voluntary, pseudonymized, and written informed consent was obtained prior to participation. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and applicable national guidelines. The study protocol was reviewed by the Ethics Committee of Lower Austria (Niederösterreichische Ethikkommission). The committee confirmed in writing that, under Austrian law, the present study did not require formal ethical approval. All participants provided informed consent prior to participation. 2.2. Materials 2.2.1. Moral dilemmas Participants were presented with one of two established text-based moral dilemmas from the trolley-problem family: the switch scenario, in which a runaway trolley can be diverted via lever onto a track where one person will be harmed, and the footbridge scenario, in which stopping the trolley requires physically pushing a person from a bridge to save five others. Each participant completed two key judgments for their assigned scenario: a moral acceptability judgment (“Is the action morally acceptable?”) and a willingness to act/behavioral intention judgment (“Would you carry out the action?”). The order of the two core judgments was randomized, and perspective and vividness were assessed immediately after each judgment. 2.2.2. Perspective-taking and mental imagery vividness After responding to each of the two critical questions, participants reported how they had envisioned the scenario. They indicated whether they imagined the situation from a first-person (egocentric) perspective or a third-person (allocentric) perspective; an open-response field allowed participants to specify alternatives if neither option applied. Participants also rated the vividness of their mental imagery on a 6-point Likert scale. Vividness ratings referred to the clarity of the mental imagery used while evaluating the preceding question (vividness of thinking about the willingness to act & vividness of thinking about the moral acceptability). Consistent with the questionnaire structure, individuals could additionally indicate that they had not used visual imagery. This response option was treated as a valid categorical answer and not as missing data, which explains the variation in sample sizes across analyses that used vividness or perspective variables. Vividness was always assessed before perspective. The sequence of these measures mirrored the structure of the dilemma section and was aligned with the randomized and counterbalanced order of the judgment questions, such that the vividness–perspective block referred either to moral acceptability or to willingness to act, depending on question order. This design ensured that both experiential components of moral reasoning action-related imagination and evaluative imagination were captured without influencing the initial moral judgment. Perspective and vividness reports were collected retrospectively to capture participants’ spontaneously adopted representational style without influencing their initial judgment as this has not been investigated in previous studies. 2.2.3. Personality measures To capture individual differences in interpersonal functioning, self-regulation, and socio-cognitive dispositions, participants completed the HEXACO-60, the Short Dark Triad (SD3), and a trait emotional intelligence inventory. These measures were included not to test specific directional hypotheses, but to account for broad personality variation that has been theoretically and empirically linked to decision-making in socially and morally relevant contexts [ 31 , 32 ]. Within the HEXACO framework, the factor Honesty–Humility is robustly associated with sincerity, fairness, and reduced tendencies toward exploitative behavior [ 25 , 26 ]. Emotionality has been related to heightened sensitivity to interpersonal harm and empathic concern, whereas Agreeableness captures tendencies toward forgiveness, patience, and non-retaliatory responses [ 28 , 33 ]. The Dark Triad traits were assessed due to their well-documented links to reduced affective empathy, increased instrumental social behavior, and altered patterns of responses in moral and economic decision-making tasks. Psychopathic traits in particular have been associated with attenuated aversive responses to harming others and increased utilitarian responding in sacrificial moral dilemmas [ 34 , 35 ]. Machiavellianism and narcissism represent complementary interpersonal styles characterized by manipulativeness, strategic self-interest, and self-enhancement motives [ 36 ]. Finally, trait emotional intelligence operationalized with the EI-4 [ 37 ] was included as an index of individuals’ capacity for emotion regulation and interpersonal awareness. Prior work has shown that higher trait emotional intelligence is associated with adaptive emotion management and reduced stress reactivity in social situations [ 38 , 30 ], making it a theoretically relevant construct in contexts involving emotionally charged moral decisions. 2.3. Procedure Participants accessed the study via SoSci Survey and were instructed to generate a pseudonymous identification code to ensure full anonymization. After providing consent and confirming eligibility, participants were randomly assigned to either the switch or the footbridge scenario. They then completed the two core evaluations of the scenario (moral acceptability and willingness to act) in randomized order. Immediately after each of these two judgments, participants answered the perspective and vividness questions corresponding to that specific evaluative context. This design captured the representational format in which participants engaged with the dilemma, without affecting the initial judgment process. As described in the questionnaire, participants could also indicate the absence of visual imagery. Upon completing the moral dilemma tasks, participants proceeded through a fixed sequence of questionnaires (SD3, EI4, and HEXACO-PI-R). Participants also completed the I-8 impulsivity scale and a subtest of the INT assessing visual working memory. These measures are part of the larger research program based on this dataset but are not reported in the present article. Participants studying at the University of Salzburg were awarded course credit at the end of the study. The debriefing page thanked participants and offered optional contact information for updates about study results. Figure 1 illustrates the study procedure. 2.4. Statistical Analysis All analyses were conducted using SPSS 29 [ 39 ]. Descriptive statistics were computed for all variables, including the frequency of egocentric vs. allocentric perspective reports, vividness ratings, and the number of participants indicating no visual imagery. Ns for each model are reported in the corresponding results. Full descriptive distributions of vividness and perspective categories for both moral acceptability and willingness to act are provided in the Results section. The inferential analyses used the same statistical tests typically applied in moral cognition research: chi-square tests to compare moral acceptability and willingness to act between the switch and footbridge scenarios and to assess perspective consistency, additional chi-square tests to examine associations between perspective and moral judgments, and independent-samples t-tests to compare vividness ratings across scenarios. Moderation analyses were conducted via logistic regression using dichotomous outcomes (moral acceptability; willingness to act), and further logistic models examined exploratory associations with personality traits (SD3, HEXACO, EI4). To increase robustness and avoid reliance on parametric assumptions, all inferential estimates were obtained using nonparametric bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples. Reported confidence intervals therefore correspond to bootstrap percentile intervals. Influential-case diagnostics (e.g., Cook’s distance, leverage) were inspected to ensure model stability, but no observations were excluded on this basis. Logistic models were additionally checked for sparse-cell bias and numerical instability; models showing clear signs of complete separation or inflated standard errors were not interpreted. All tests were two-tailed. Given the exploratory status of the personality models and the focus on effect-size estimation, no post-hoc corrections were applied; emphasis was placed on the magnitude and precision of the bootstrapped confidence intervals rather than on null-hypothesis significance testing. 3. Results 3.1 Data Preparation and Descriptive Statistics A total of N = 156 participants completed the study. Because responses indicating no visual imagery were treated as valid categorical answers rather than missing data, sample sizes vary across analyses involving vividness or perspective. All inferential and descriptive estimates rely on nonparametric bootstrapping (5,000 resamples) with percentile 95% confidence intervals. 3.3.1 Final Sample Sizes and Data Handling For the moral acceptability judgment, valid responses were obtained from n = 74 participants in the switch scenario and n = 82 in the footbridge scenario. For willingness to act, valid responses were available from n = 74 (switch) and n = 82 (footbridge). Vividness ratings were available from n = 146 participants for the action-related imagery and n = 120 for the acceptability-related imagery. A total of n = 10 participants indicated that they had not used visual imagery for imagining willingness to act and n = 36 for imagining moral acceptability. These responses were retained as a separate, theoretically meaningful category. Open-text perspective responses occurred with n = 12 for moral acceptability and n = 12 for willingness to act conditions. These were not considered for the statistical analysis of perspective. 3.1.2 Primary Outcome Distributions Moral acceptability of the harmful action was endorsed by n = 58, 78.4% of participants in the switch scenario and by n = 16, 19.5% in the footbridge scenario. Willingness to act was higher in the switch dilemma with n = 63, 85.1%, than in the footbridge dilemma n = 3, 3.7%. These patterns replicate the classic trolley dilemma effects. 3.1.3 Perspective Descriptive Patterns For the willingness-to-act question, the switch scenario elicited 68.9% first-person simulations ( n = 51) and 28.4% third-person simulations ( n = 21), while 2.7% of participants ( n = 2) did not report a perspective. In the footbridge scenario, 59.8% of participants ( n = 49) imagined the action from a first-person perspective, 28.0% ( n = 23) from a third-person perspective, and 12.2% ( n = 10) provided no perspective report. For the moral-acceptability question, 51.4% of participants in the switch scenario ( n = 38) imagined the scenario from a first-person perspective, whereas 41.9% ( n = 31) used a third-person perspective; 6.8% ( n = 5) did not report a perspective. In the footbridge scenario, 51.2% of participants ( n = 42) reported imagining the acceptability judgment from a first-person perspective, 40.2% ( n = 33) from a third-person perspective, and 8.5% ( n = 7) did not provide a perspective report. 3.1.4 Descriptive Associations Between Simulation Variables Across both dilemmas, participants showed a clear tendency to use the same perspective for both judgments. In the switch scenario, 64.7% of participants maintained a consistent perspective, and perspective for willingness to act and perspective for moral acceptability were significantly associated, χ²(1, N = 68) = 5.54, p = .019, φ = .29 (95% bootstrapped CI: .05–.51). This pattern was even stronger in the footbridge scenario, where 73.5% of participants used the same perspective across judgments and the association was highly significant, χ²(1, N = 68) = 13.98, p < .001, φ = .45 (95% bootstrapped CI: .23–.65). Together, these findings indicate that representational perspective reflects a stable simulation stance rather than a response-specific fluctuation. 3.1.5 Reported open perspective answers Information regarding reported open perspective answers can be found in the supplementary material. 3.1.5 Vividness Distributions Vividness associated with imagining one’s own action ranged from 1 to 6 in the switch case ( N = 51; M = 4.31, SD = 1.35), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [3.94, 4.69]. In the footbridge case, vividness associated with imagining one’s own action also ranged from 1 to 6 ( N = 64; M = 4.48, SD = 1.39), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [4.14, 4.81]. Vividness associated with imagining the moral acceptability judgment in the switch case showed a similar distribution ( N = 51; M = 3.84, SD = 1.86), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [3.31, 4.33]. In the footbridge case, vividness associated with imagining the moral acceptability judgment again ranged from 1 to 6 ( N = 64; M = 3.92, SD = 1.92), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [3.44, 4.38]. 3.1.5 Non-Visualizer Rates For the switch case, n = 7 participants (9.5%) indicated that they did not use visual imagery when imagining their own action, and n = 19 participants (25.7%) reported not using visual imagery when imagining the moral acceptability judgment. In the footbridge case, n = 3 participants (3.7%) indicated that they did not use visual imagery for the action-related judgment, and n = 17 participants (20.7%) selected the non-imagery option for the acceptability-related judgment. These participants were retained as a separate analytical category. Because “no imagery” represents a theoretically meaningful absence of visual simulation, these responses were treated as a separate category rather than as missing data in subsequent analyses. 3.1.6 Bootstrap-Based Descriptive Estimates All proportions, means, medians, correlations, and effect sizes reported in this section include percentile bootstrap 95% confidence intervals derived from 5,000 resamples. This approach ensures robust estimation under potential non-normality and maintains consistency with the inferential bootstrap analyses reported in later sections. 3.2 Replication of Classic Trolley Effects 3.2.1 Moral Acceptability To compare moral acceptability judgments between the switch and footbridge dilemmas, a chi-square test of independence was conducted on the dichotomous response (“Is the action morally acceptable?”). In the switch scenario, 58 of 74 participants (78.4%) judged pulling the lever as morally acceptable, whereas 16 (21.6%) judged it unacceptable. In contrast, in the footbridge scenario, only 16 of 82 participants (19.5%) considered pushing the person morally acceptable, while 66 (80.5%) judged the action to be morally unacceptable.. The chi-square test indicated a highly significant association between scenario type and moral acceptability, χ²(1, N = 156) = 54.06, p < .001, Fisher’s exact p < .001. All expected cell counts exceeded 5, and model assumptions were therefore met. The effect size was large, with Cramér’s V = .589, p < .001, confirming a strong dependency between scenario type and moral evaluation. A bootstrapped estimate based on 5,000 resamples yielded a 95% percentile confidence interval of [.460, .715], SE = .065, indicating a stable and robust large effect. Equivalent results were obtained for phi (–.589; 95% CI [–.715, –.460]) and for eta (.589; 95% CI [.460, .715]), confirming the strength and consistency of the association. Taken together, participants were substantially more likely to judge the action as morally acceptable in the switch dilemma than in the footbridge dilemma, replicating the classic pattern reported in decades of trolley-problem research. The direction and magnitude of the effect remained fully consistent across traditional chi-square statistics and bootstrapped estimators. Results can be seen in Fig. 2. 3.2.2 Willingness to Act To examine differences in willingness to perform the action between the two scenarios, a chi-square test of independence was conducted. In the switch scenario, 63 of 74 participants (85.1%) indicated that they would perform the action, whereas 11 (14.9%) would not. In contrast, in the footbridge scenario, only 3 of 82 participants (3.7%) reported willingness to act, while 79 (96.3%) indicated that they would not push the person. The chi-square test revealed a highly significant association between scenario type and willingness to act, χ²(1, N = 156) = 105.79, p < .001, Fisher’s exact p < .001. All expected cell counts exceeded 5, indicating that the assumptions of the test were met. The magnitude of the effect was very large, with Cramér’s V = .823, p < .001. A bootstrapped estimate based on 5,000 resamples produced a 95% percentile confidence interval of [.732, .909], SE = .044, demonstrating a highly robust effect. Equivalent values emerged for phi (–.823; 95% CI [–.909, –.732]) and eta (.823; 95% CI [.732, .909]), confirming the strength and stability of the association. Overall, participants were dramatically more willing to pull the lever in the switch dilemma than to push the person in the footbridge dilemma. The direction, significance, and bootstrapped effect sizes collectively underscore the robustness of this classic behavioral asymmetry. Results can be seen in Fig. 1 . 3.3 Perspective Simulation Patterns 3.3.1 Perspective Consistency Across Judgments In the Switch scenario, complete data was available for 68 participants. For the judgment of willingness to act, 49 participants adopted the first-person perspective and 19 adopted the third-person perspective; for moral acceptance, 37 responded from the first-person and 31 from the third-person perspective. Cross-tabulation showed that 64.7% of participants used the same perspective for both judgments. A chi-square test indicated a significant association between PH and PMA perspectives, χ²(1, N = 68) = 5.54, p = .019 (Fisher’s exact test: p = .029). The effect size was φ = .29, indicating a small-to-moderate association. A nonparametric bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples yielded a 95% confidence interval for φ of [.05, .51] with a standard error of SE = .117. These results suggest that, in the Switch dilemma, participants showed a tendency to maintain a consistent perspective across both behavioral and moral judgments rather than switching between first- and third-person viewpoints. In the Bridge scenario, complete perspective data was likewise available for 68 participants. For the imagined perspective in willingness to act, 47 participants responded from the first-person and 21 from the third-person perspective; for the imagined perspective in moral acceptability, 39 used the first-person and 29 the third-person perspective. Here, 73.5% of participants adopted the same perspective across both judgments. The association between PH and PMA perspectives was highly significant, χ²(1, N = 68) = 13.98, p < .001 (Fisher’s exact test: p < .001). The effect size was φ = .45, which reflects a moderate-to-large association. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples produced a 95% confidence interval of [.23, .65] with a standard error of SE = .108. Thus, in the Bridge dilemma, the tendency toward perspective consistency was even stronger, indicating a robust coupling between the viewpoint adopted when evaluating moral acceptability and the viewpoint used when evaluating behavioral willingness. As shown in Fig. 3 , most participants maintained a consistent imagined perspective across moral acceptability and willingness-to-act judgments in both dilemmas. 3.3.2 Differences regarding perspective and Moral Acceptability between cases This analysis can be found in the supplementary material. 3.3.3 Differences regarding perspective and Willingness to Act between cases This analysis can be found in the supplementary material. 3.3.4 Differences regarding perspective and Moral Acceptability within the Switch Case To examine whether the perspective adopted when judging the moral acceptability of pulling the lever was associated with the moral evaluation itself in the switch scenario, a chi-square test of independence was conducted ( N = 69). Among participants who reported an egocentric perspective, 31 of 38 (81.6%) judged the action as morally acceptable, while 7 (18.4%) judged it as unacceptable. A highly similar pattern was observed for participants who adopted a third-person perspective, 24 of 31 (77.4%) indicating that pulling the lever was morally acceptable and 7 (22.6%) judging it as unacceptable. The chi-square test revealed no significant association between perspective choice and moral acceptability in the switch case, χ²(1, N = 69) = 0.18, p = .669, and the corresponding effect size was very small, Cramér’s V = .051. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples confirmed the negligible magnitude of this association, yielding a percentile confidence interval of [.005, .296], SE = .079. Equivalent results were observed for phi (–.051; 95% CI [–.292, .188]). Thus, in this classic version of the dilemma, judgments of acceptability appear largely independent of whether participants simulated the event from a first-person or third-person viewpoint. 3.3.5 Differences regarding perspective and Moral Acceptability within the Footbridge Case To examine whether the perspective adopted when judging the moral acceptability of pushing the person differed depending on participants’ moral evaluation, a chi-square test of independence was conducted ( N = 75). Among participants imagining the scenario from an egocentric perspective, only 5 of 42 (11.9%) judged pushing the person as morally acceptable. This proportion almost tripled in the third-person condition: 11 of 33 (33.3%) judged the action as acceptable a difference of 21.4 percentage points. The chi-square test indicated a significant association between perspective choice and moral acceptability in the footbridge scenario, χ²(1, N = 75) = 5.06, p = .025. The effect size was small-to-moderate, Cramér’s V = .260. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples yielded a consistent effect-size estimate (Cramér’s V = .260; 95% percentile CI = [.040, .472], SE = .110), confirming the stability of the association. Equivalent values were observed for phi (.260; 95% CI [.030, .472]). Conceptually, these results suggest that in the footbridge dilemma, adopting a third-person perspective increases the likelihood of judging the action as morally acceptable relative to an egocentric perspective. Unlike in the switch scenario, perspective thus appears to contribute meaningfully to participants’ evaluations the moral permissibility of pushing the person. As illustrated in Fig. 4 , imagined perspective was associated with moral acceptability in the footbridge dilemma but not in the switch dilemma. 3.3.6 Perspective and Willingness to Act (Switch Case) To examine whether the perspective adopted when imagining the action influenced participants’ willingness to pull the lever in the switch scenario, a chi-square test of independence was conducted ( N = 72). Among participants who imagined the action from a first-person perspective, 43 of 51 (84.3%) indicated that they would pull the lever, whereas 8 (15.7%) would not. A nearly identical pattern emerged among those who used a third-person perspective: 18 of 21 participants (85.7%) reported that they would pull the lever, and 3 (14.3%) indicated that they would not. The chi-square test showed no significant association between perspective choice and willingness to act, χ²(1, N = 72) = 0.02, p = .881. The corresponding effect size was very small, Cramér’s V = .018. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples confirmed the negligible effect size (Cramér’s V = .018; 95% percentile CI = [.005, .255], SE = .070). Bootstrapped values for phi were similarly minimal (phi = .018; 95% CI [–.222, .232]). 3.3.7 Perspective and Willingness to Act (Footbridge Case) To examine whether the perspective adopted when imagining the action influenced participants’ willingness to push the person in the footbridge scenario, a chi-square test of independence was conducted ( N = 72). Among participants who imagined the action from a first-person perspective, 47 of 49 (95.9%) indicated that they would not push the person, whereas 2 (4.1%) reported that they would. The pattern was almost identical among participants who adopted a third-person perspective: 22 of 23 (95.7%) indicated they would not push, while 1 participant (4.3%) indicated they would. The chi-square test showed no significant association between perspective choice and willingness to act, χ²(1, N = 72) = 0.003, p = .958, with an essentially zero effect size, Cramér’s V = .006. A bootstrap analysis (5,000 resamples; valid = 4,794 resamples) confirmed the negligible magnitude of the association, yielding a percentile confidence interval of [.006, .249], SE = .065. The corresponding bootstrapped estimate for phi was equally minimal (phi = .006; 95% CI [–.174, .249]). Hence, consistent with prior research, willingness to perform the harmful action was extremely low across perspectives, and perspective simulation did not modulate this behavioral reluctance. 3.4 Vividness Across Scenarios (Moral Acceptability) To examine whether vividness of mental imagery during the moral-acceptability judgment differed between the switch and footbridge scenarios, an independent-samples t -test was conducted. Vividness ratings were highly similar across scenarios. In the switch case ( n = 51), vividness was M = 3.84 (SD = 1.86), 95% bootstrap CI [3.33, 4.33]. In the footbridge case ( n = 64), vividness was M = 3.92 (SD = 1.92), 95% bootstrap CI [3.46, 4.37]. The mean difference between conditions was very small and nonsignificant, t(113) = − 0.22, p = .825, with a negligible effect size, Cohen’s d = − 0.04 (95% CI [–0.41, 0.33]). A bootstrap procedure (5,000 samples) yielded a percentile CI for the mean difference of [–0.76, 0.62], confirming that vividness during moral evaluation did not differ meaningfully between the classic switch and footbridge dilemmas. 3.5 Vividness Across Scenarios (Willingness To Act) A second independent-samples t -test compared vividness during the willingness-to-act simulation (i.e., imagining performing the action). Vividness was numerically higher overall than for the acceptability judgment but again showed no scenario differences. In the switch scenario ( n = 51), vividness was M = 4.31 (SD = 1.35), 95% bootstrap CI [3.94, 4.67]. In the footbridge scenario ( n = 64), vividness was M = 4.48 (SD = 1.39), 95% bootstrap CI [4.15, 4.81]. The difference was not statistically significant, t(113) = − 0.66, p = .509, and effect sizes again indicated a negligible difference, Cohen’s d = − 0.12 (95% CI [–0.49, 0.24]). Bootstrapped percentile CIs for the mean difference overlapped substantially, [–0.69, 0.32] (5,000 samples), reinforcing that vividness was highly comparable across scenarios. 3.6. Switch Scenario: Vividness of Moral Evaluation vs. Action Simulation To examine whether participants imagined moral acceptability judgments and their own actions with different degrees of vividness in the switch scenario, a paired-samples comparison was conducted ( n = 51). Participants reported moderate vividness when imagining the moral acceptability judgment (M = 3.84, SD = 1.86; 95% bootstrap CI [3.33, 4.33]) and higher vividness when imagining performing the action themselves (M = 4.31, SD = 1.35; 95% bootstrap CI [3.94, 4.67]). The paired-samples t -test indicated a trend-level difference, t(50) = − 1.92, p = .060, with action imagery being somewhat more vivid than judgment-related imagery. This pattern was supported by the bootstrap estimate of the mean difference (–0.47), whose percentile confidence interval narrowly excluded zero 95% CI [–0.94, − 0.02], though the two-tailed bootstrap significance was marginal ( p = .057). The effect size was small, Cohen’s dz = − 0.27 (95% CI [–0.55, 0.01]). 3.7 Footbridge Scenario: Vividness of Moral Evaluation vs. Action Simulation A parallel paired-samples comparison was conducted for the footbridge scenario ( n = 64). Vividness for imagining the moral acceptability judgment was moderate (M = 3.92, SD = 1.92; 95% bootstrap CI [3.45, 4.38]), whereas vividness for imagining performing the action was higher (M = 4.48, SD = 1.39; 95% bootstrap CI [4.14, 4.81]). The paired t-test revealed a significant and robust within-scenario difference, t(63) = − 3.00, p = .004, with action imagery being more vivid than judgment-related imagery. The bootstrap estimate of the mean difference (–0.56) yielded a stable percentile confidence interval of 95% CI [–0.92, − 0.20], and the bootstrapped two-tailed significance remained strong ( p = .007). The effect size was small-to-moderate, Cohen’s dz = − 0.38 (95% CI [–0.63, − 0.12]). 3.4.2 Moderation: Scenario x Perspective on Moral Acceptability A logistic moderation analysis (PROCESS Model 1) [ 40 ] was conducted to examine whether the relationship between reported visual perspective and moral acceptability differed between the switch and footbridge scenarios. The model employed heteroscedasticity-consistent HC3 standard errors and 5,000 bootstrap samples. Overall model fit indicated substantial explanatory value (− 2LL = 142.10; McFadden’s R ² = .29; Cox–Snell R ² = .33; Nagelkerke R ² = .44). Scenario type was a strong predictor of moral acceptability, b = − 3.49, SE = 0.63, Z = − 5.50, p < .001, 95% CI [− 4.73, − 2.25], with lower acceptability in the footbridge scenario. The main effect of visual perspective was not significant, b = − 1.82, SE = 1.34, p = .175, 95% CI [− 4.45, 0.81]. The interaction between perspective and scenario type approached significance, b = 1.56, SE = 0.85, p = .066, 95% CI [− 0.10, 3.23], and the corresponding bootstrap interval also included zero (BootLLCI = − 0.22, BootULCI = 3.59). Simple-effects analyses showed that in the switch scenario, visual perspective was not associated with moral acceptability, b = − 0.26, SE = 0.60, p = .670, 95% CI [− 1.43, 0.92]. In the footbridge scenario, however, an allocentric (3rd person) perspective was associated with higher moral acceptability, b = 1.31, SE = 0.60, p = .030, 95% CI [0.13, 2.49]. Taken together, the moderation indicates that the association between visual perspective and moral acceptability differs between the two scenarios, with a detectable relationship in the footbridge condition but not in the switch condition, thereby supporting the descriptive and chi-square results reported above. 3.4.3. Moderation: Scenario x Perspective on Willingness to Act A logistic moderation analysis tested whether the effect of scenario type (switch vs. footbridge) on willingness to perform the harmful action was moderated by the adopted perspective. The overall model was significant, reflecting the well-known difference in willingness between scenarios, Nagelkerke R² = .72. However, neither perspective nor the interaction contributed explanatory variance. The interaction term was non-significant, B = − 0.04, SE = 1.45, p = .976, 95% CI [–2.89, 2.80], indicating no evidence that perspective altered the effect of scenario type on willingness to act. Estimates should be interpreted with caution given the very low number of affirmative responses in the footbridge condition. 3.6 Exploratory trait analyses 3.6.1 Moral and action judgements Exploratory logistic regressions probed whether Dark Triad traits, HEXACO dimensions, and EI-4 facets account for additional variance in moral acceptability and willingness-to-act decisions. All models used binary outcomes and nonparametric bootstrapping (5,000 resamples) to obtain robust confidence intervals (see Supplement for full details). For the Dark Triad, none of the models for the switch case were significant. For moral acceptability, the overall model did not improve on the intercept-only solution, χ²(3) = 1.42, p = .700, with very small explained variance (Nagelkerke R² = .03) and no reliable predictors (e.g., Machiavellianism: B = − 0.16, p = .760, 95% CI [− 1.24, 0.84]; narcissism: B = 0.37, p = .403, 95% CI [− 0.55, 1.39]; psychopathy: B = − 0.45, p = .405, 95% CI [− 1.70, 0.96]). The model for willingness to pull the switch was similarly null, χ²(3) = 2.55, p = .466, Nagelkerke R² = .06, with non-significant coefficients (e.g., Machiavellianism: B = − 0.76, p = .195, 95% CI [− 2.89, 0.63]). In the footbridge case, the model for moral acceptability showed only a modest, non-significant trend, χ²(3) = 5.52, p = .137, Nagelkerke R² = .10; higher Machiavellianism numerically predicted greater moral acceptability (B = 0.97, p = .053, OR = 2.64, 95% CI [− 0.24, 2.34]), but the bootstrapped interval included zero. The model for willingness to push was also non-significant, χ²(3) = 4.82, p = .186, despite a large but unstable coefficient for psychopathy (B = 2.79, p = .064, OR ≈ 16.25, 95% CI [0.85, 310.24]) driven by only three “push” responses. Overall, Dark Triad traits did not robustly predict binary moral or action decisions once uncertainty and class imbalance were taken into account. For HEXACO, no reliable associations emerged for the switch scenario. The model predicting moral acceptability was not significant, χ²(7) = 7.25, p = .403 (Nagelkerke R² = .14), and none of the linear or quadratic predictors reached significance (e.g., Honesty–Humility: B = 0.33, p = .485, 95% CI [− 1.02, 1.82]; Emotionality²: B = 0.35, p = .582). The model predicting willingness to act was not significant, χ²(7) = 8.33, p = .305 (Nagelkerke R² = .19). Consistent with this, none of the trait effects, including the quadratic Agreeableness term, was robust ( Agreeableness²: B = 0.31, p = .768, 95% CI [− 2.83, 45.03]). In the footbridge scenario, however, the model predicting moral acceptability was significant, χ²(6) = 12.93, p = .044, with moderate explained variance (Nagelkerke R² = .23). Moreover, lower Honesty–Humility was associated with higher moral acceptability of pushing (B = − 1.23, p = .042, OR = 0.29, 95% CI [0.09, 0.96]; bootstrap CI [− 3.09, − 0.25]). Conscientiousness showed a converging trend in the same direction (lower Conscientiousness → higher acceptability), though it did not reach significance (B = − 0.81, p = .071, OR = 0.44, 95% CI [0.18, 1.07]; bootstrap CI [− 2.11, 0.20]). The corresponding model for willingness to push, however, was not significant, χ²(6) = 4.66, p = .588 (Nagelkerke R² = .21), and none of the traits reached significance (all ps ≥ .17; all 95% CIs included 1). Thus, the clearest exploratory signal at the level of binary decisions is that lower Honesty–Humility is associated with a higher likelihood of judging the extreme harmful action as morally acceptable. For EI-4, all decision models were non-significant. In the switch scenario, the model for moral acceptability yielded χ²(4) = 4.30, p = .367 (Nagelkerke R² = .09), and no facet showed a reliable effect (e.g., empathy: B = − 0.08, p = .926, 95% CI [− 1.97, 1.83]). The model for willingness to pull the switch was similarly null, χ²(4) = 4.08, p = .396 (Nagelkerke R² = .09), although higher emotional self-control showed a borderline association with greater willingness to act (B = 1.14, p = .069, OR = 3.13, 95% CI [0.92, 10.69]; bootstrap CI [0.09, 3.43]). In the footbridge scenario, EI-4 facets did not significantly predict moral acceptability, χ²(4) = 3.51, p = .476 (Nagelkerke R² = .07), or willingness to push, χ²(4) = 6.65, p = .155 (Nagelkerke R² = .29), with all 95% confidence intervals extremely wide and spanning zero. Taken together, these exploratory analyses indicate that binary moral and action judgements were only weakly related to the assessed trait measures, with the most consistent effect being that lower Honesty–Humility predicts greater moral acceptability of pushing in the footbridge case (p ≈ .04, OR ≈ 0.29, CI excluding 1), while other associations remained small, unstable, or non-significant. 3.6.2 Perspective and vividness Having established that imagined visual perspective can influence moral judgments, we then turned to a follow-up question: what predicts how people simulate the dilemmas in the first place—specifically, whether they adopt a first- versus third-person perspective and how vividly they imagine the moral situation and the harmful action. For the Dark Triad, none of the logistic regression models predicting imagined perspective in either scenario were significant (all χ²(3) between 0.58 and 4.74, all ps ≥ .19, Nagelkerke R² ≤ .09), and all coefficients had 95% bootstrapped CIs spanning zero. In contrast, one vividness model in the footbridge scenario revealed clear, robust effects: the regression predicting action vividness was significant, F(3, 75) = 4.31, p = .007, R² = .15. Higher psychopathy predicted more vivid imagery of pushing (B = 0.80, p = .021, 95% CI [0.27, 1.29]), whereas higher Machiavellianism predicted less vivid action imagery (B = − 0.82, p = .003, 95% CI [− 1.25, − 0.33]); narcissism was not significant (B = 0.35, p = .247, CI including zero). All other Dark Triad vividness models (switch moral/action vividness and footbridge moral vividness) were non-significant (Fs ≤ 1.07, ps ≥ .37, R² ≤ .06). Thus, Dark Triad traits did not appear to shape which perspective participants adopted, but they did relate to how vividly the harmful action was mentally simulated in the more extreme footbridge dilemma. For HEXACO, most perspective models were again non-significant, but several effects emerged. After moral acceptability judgments in the switch case, the perspective model was non-significant, χ²(6) = 8.65, p = .194 (Nagelkerke R² = .16), with only a marginal trend for higher Honesty–Humility to predict third-person perspective adoption (B = 0.83, p = .060, OR = 2.28, 95% CI [0.97, 5.40]; bootstrap CI [0.02, 2.45]). After willingness-to-act judgments in the switch scenario, the overall model approached significance, χ²(6) = 11.86, p = .065 (Nagelkerke R² = .22), but it nonetheless showed a reliable individual predictor: lower Emotionality significantly increased the likelihood of adopting a third-person perspective (B = − 0.90, p = .042, OR = 0.41, 95% CI [0.17, 0.97]; bootstrap CI [− 2.31, − 0.02]) Lower Conscientiousness pointed in the same direction but this effect was less robust, as its bootstrap interval still included zero.(B = − 0.80, p = .045, OR = 0.45, 95% CI [0.21, 0.98]; bootstrap CI [− 2.16, 0.17]). The strongest evidence emerged in the footbridge scenario. After moral acceptability judgments, the perspective model was non-significant, χ²(6) = 8.21, p = .223 (Nagelkerke R² = .14), with only trend-level hints for lower Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (ps ≈ .06–.09, CIs including zero). By contrast, the model for perspective after willingness-to-act judgments was clearly significant, χ²(6) = 17.55, p = .007 (Nagelkerke R² = .30), and yielded multiple converging, statistically supported predictors: higher Honesty–Humility increased the likelihood of adopting a third-person perspective (B = 1.48, p = .016, OR = 4.40, 95% CI [1.33, 14.63]; bootstrap CI [0.37, 3.50]), whereas lower Emotionality (B = − 1.07, p = .036, OR = 0.34, 95% CI [0.13, 0.93]; bootstrap CI [− 3.28, − 0.03]) and lower Conscientiousness (B = − 1.22, p = .009, OR = 0.30, 95% CI [0.12, 0.74]; bootstrap CI [− 3.20, − 0.28]) also predicted third-person perspective adoption. Overall, these exploratory results suggest that HEXACO traits, most consistently Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, and Conscientiousness, are meaningfully related to perspective choice, particularly when participants evaluated their willingness to act and especially in the footbridge case. HEXACO traits also showed systematic associations with vividness. In the switch scenario, the model predicting vividness of moral acceptability was significant, F(6, 48) = 2.79, p = .021, R² = .26. Higher Emotionality predicted more vivid imagery of moral evaluation (B = 1.02, p = .021, 95% CI [0.07, 1.81]), and higher Extraversion also showed a positive association (B = 0.87, p = .043, 95% CI [− 0.01, 1.66]; lower bound borderline). The model for action vividness in the switch scenario was likewise significant, F(6, 60) = 4.24, p = .001, R² = .30. Here, higher Emotionality (B = 1.00, p < .001, 95% CI [0.58, 1.47]), higher Extraversion (B = 0.54, p = .020, 95% CI [0.10, 1.01]), and higher Openness (B = 0.62, p = .041, 95% CI [0.07, 1.23]) all predicted more vivid action imagery. In the footbridge scenario, the model for vividness of moral acceptability was not significant, F(6, 58) = 1.14, p = .35, R² = .11, and only weak trends for Conscientiousness and Openness emerged (ps ≈ .09, CIs including zero). The model for action vividness in the footbridge scenario was also non-significant overall, F(6, 72) = 1.69, p = .14, R² = .12, but Openness remained a robust positive predictor (B = 0.79, p = .002, 95% CI [0.33, 1.31]). In sum, Emotionality, Extraversion, and Openness were reliably associated with more vivid simulation in the switch case, and Openness generalized to action vividness in the footbridge case. For EI-4, logistic models predicting perspective were uniformly weak. Across switch and footbridge scenarios and both judgment types, models did not significantly improve on the intercept-only solution (all χ²(4) between 1.64 and 8.80, all ps ≥ .066, Nagelkerke R² ≤ .16), and all individual coefficients had 95% bootstrapped CIs that included zero. The strongest pattern was a trend for lower empathy to be associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a third-person perspective after willingness-to-act judgments in the footbridge case (B = − 1.50, p = .078, OR = 0.22, 95% CI [0.04, 1.18]; bootstrap CI [− 3.95, 0.11]), but this effect was not robust. For vividness, EI-4 facets did not significantly predict how vividly participants imagined moral acceptability in either scenario (switch: F(5, 49) = 2.11, p = .080, R² = .18; footbridge: F(5, 59) = 0.68, p = .64, R² = .06). The model predicting action vividness in the switch scenario, however, was significant, F(5, 61) = 3.72, p = .005, R² = .23. Higher empathy predicted more vivid action imagery (B = 1.24, p = .026, 95% CI [0.17, 2.29]), as did higher assertiveness (B = 0.97, p = .014, 95% CI [0.20, 1.75]), while higher emotional self-control predicted less vivid imagery (B = − 0.68, p = .053, 95% CI [− 1.45, − 0.07]; borderline but bootstrap-supported). In the footbridge scenario, the model for action vividness did not reach significance, F(5, 73) = 2.01, p = .087, R² = .12, and none of the EI-4 facets had CIs excluding zero. Overall, these exploratory results suggest that traits are more strongly linked to the form and intensity of mental simulation (perspective, vividness) than to the binary moral and action decisions themselves. Dark Triad traits show a dissociation for action vividness in the footbridge case (Psychopathy ↑, Machiavellianism ↓), HEXACO traits, especially Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Openness, systematically predict perspective choice and vividness in several models, and EI-4 facets show selective associations with how vividly participants imagine acting in the switch case. Given the modest sample sizes, class imbalance, and multiple testing, all effects are interpreted as exploratory and hypothesis-generating, with full model details provided in the Supplementary Materials. 4. Discussion The present study examined how people internally simulate sacrificial moral dilemmas and how this simulation relates to moral judgment and willingness to act. Using classic switch and footbridge variants of the trolley problem, we asked participants not only what they would judge and do, but also from which perspective they imagined the scenario and how vividly they visualized it. In addition, we explored how personality traits and emotional intelligence relate to these representational choices. As expected, we replicated the robust asymmetry between the switch and footbridge dilemmas: participants were much more likely to endorse and perform the harmful action in the impersonal switch case than in the personally confronting footbridge case. Beyond this replication, our findings yield three main contributions. First, we show that the imagined perspective from which a moral dilemma is simulated is associated with moral judgment in the emotionally charged footbridge scenario: adopting a third-person, allocentric perspective was linked to higher moral acceptability of pushing the person, whereas first-person simulation was associated with stronger resistance to harm. Second, vividness of mental imagery did not show robust main effects but displayed suggestive interaction patterns with perspective, consistent with the idea that imagery amplifies emotional responses in a perspective-dependent way. Third, exploratory analyses indicate that traits such as Machiavellianism, psychopathy, Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, and aspects of emotional intelligence are more strongly related to how people simulate moral events (perspective, vividness) than to the binary decision alone. Across these three contributions, representational perspective emerges as a previously unmeasured but theoretically important component of internal simulation. Rather than adding a new moral process, it specifies how classical affective and deliberative mechanisms are instantiated in concrete mental representations of sacrificial dilemmas. 4.1. Perspective-taking and the “personalness” of moral dilemmas Our first key finding is that third-person perspective-taking was associated with higher moral acceptability of the harmful action in the footbridge dilemma, whereas no such effect emerged in the switch case. In the footbridge condition, participants who imagined the scene from a third-person perspective were roughly three times as likely to endorse pushing the person compared to those who simulated the scenario from a first-person viewpoint. This pattern converges with dual-process models, which posit that “personal” harms elicit strong affective responses that favor deontological judgments, whereas more psychologically distant harms afford greater weight to outcome-based reasoning [ 1 , 2 , 31 ]. By shifting from a first-person to a third-person vantage point, individuals may attenuate self-referential emotion and thereby reduce the aversive impact of directly harming another. The present data thus refine the notion that the personalness of a moral dilemma is solely fixed by its surface features, such as physical contact or spatial proximity [ 1 , 13 ]. Instead, our results suggest that personalness is at least partly constructed internally via perspective-taking. A formally “personal” dilemma like footbridge may be experienced as less personally involving when simulated from an allocentric stance. This is consistent with neuroimaging work showing that first- and third-person perspectives engage partially distinct networks, with first-person views recruiting medial prefrontal regions associated with self-referential processing and affective evaluation, whereas third-person views engage more dorsal parietal and temporo-parietal regions linked to externally oriented attention and perspective-taking [ 41 , 7 , 42 ]. Complementing this neural evidence, work on self-distancing in emotion regulation shows that adopting an observer-like vantage point reliably reduces the intensity of negative affect and promotes more abstract, meaning-focused construals of aversive events [ 17 , 43 , 18 ]. In the present context, third-person simulation of the footbridge dilemma may thus down-regulate self-implicating emotional responses to harming another person, making outcome-based considerations more psychologically accessible without changing the objective structure of the dilemma. Importantly, imagined perspective was not randomly assigned but reported post hoc, and overall base rates favored first-person simulation, especially for willingness-to-act judgments. The fact that a relatively small subset of participants who spontaneously adopted a third-person vantage point nonetheless showed systematically higher utilitarian judgments underscores that even subtle differences in representational stance can matter. At the same time, perspective-taking did not meaningfully influence willingness to act in the footbridge dilemma, where willingness was near floor. This aligns with the idea that endorsing a utilitarian judgment and committing to a harmful action are separable stages that may be differentially constrained by affective and motivational factors [ 19 , 44 ]. Together, these findings suggest that perspective-taking constitutes a representational parameter that modulates how existing moral architectures, whether cast in dual-process terms or more recent multinomial frameworks, are instantiated in particular situations. Rather than replacing distinctions such as “personal” vs. “impersonal” or “consequences” vs. “norms,” perspective-taking may serve as a higher-level control setting that biases which information becomes focal in moral evaluation. 4.2. Vividness of mental imagery: a subtle, perspective-dependent influence Contrary to our initial expectations, vividness of mental imagery did not show robust main effects on moral judgments or willingness to act in either dilemma. Differences in vividness between conditions were small and often only at trend level, with slightly higher vividness reported for the more emotional footbridge scenario. Moderation analyses indicated that vividness might shape how perspective relates to moral acceptability in the switch case, but these effects remained non-significant once multiple testing and wide confidence intervals are taken into account. Nonetheless, the qualitative pattern is informative. When vividness was low, egocentric perspective tended to be associated with higher moral acceptability; at high vividness, the trend shifted such that third-person perspective was (weakly) associated with greater acceptability. One interpretation is that vivid imagery amplifies emotional responses, but the direction of this amplification depends on vantage point: vivid first-person images may intensify self-focused aversion to harming another, whereas vivid third-person simulation may instead highlight outcome structures and attenuate self-involvement, resembling a cinematic or observer-based appraisal. This perspective-dependent view of vividness aligns with broader work on imagery and emotion. Amit and Greene [ 16 ] likewise showed that engaging visual processing can heighten the emotional salience of harmful actions and bias judgments away from utilitarian trade-offs. Experimental evidence indicates that the absence or reduction of visual imagery (as in aphantasia) is associated with dampened physiological responses to emotionally charged narratives [ 45 , 46 , 47 ]. In this context, our findings add a representational twist: imagery vividness does not operate in a vacuum but in the coordinate frame defined by perspective-taking. High vividness may “lock in” whatever the perspective foregrounds, either the self as agent of harm (first-person) or the broader state of affairs (third-person). Recent work on aphantasia provides a useful boundary condition for this account. Individuals who report a complete absence of visual imagery show not only reduced physiological reactivity to emotionally charged narratives, consistent with the idea that imagery amplifies affect [ 46 ], but also a distinctive profile of multi-sensory imagery, episodic memory, and dreaming [ 48 ]. These findings suggest that reduced imagery provides a kind of natural “knockout model” for testing simulation-based accounts of moral cognition. In light of the sizeable minority of participants in the present study who reported little or no imagery for at least one judgment, future work could explicitly compare high- and low-imagery groups on sacrificial dilemmas to clarify whether visual simulation is necessary for typical patterns of moral sensitivity or primarily modulates their intensity. However, given that our vividness effects were modest and statistically fragile, they should be treated as hypothesis-generating. Future work should experimentally manipulate vividness, e.g., through guided imagery instructions, sensory detail prompts, or concurrent visual load, rather than relying purely on retrospective self-report. 4.3. Personality, empathy, and the style of moral simulation Exploratory analyses revealed that personality traits were more tightly coupled to simulation style than to the binary moral decisions themselves. Machiavellianism and, to a lesser degree, psychopathy predicted increased utilitarian endorsement in the footbridge scenario, whereas Honesty–Humility and Conscientiousness were associated with stronger deontological resistance. This pattern is consistent with prior work linking antisocial traits to utilitarian responses in sacrificial dilemmas [ 49 , 24 , 50 ], while prosocial traits and concern for fairness promote adherence to deontological norms [ 32 , 51 ]. More intriguingly, traits from the HEXACO model and emotional intelligence inventory predicted which perspective and how vividly participants simulated the dilemmas. Higher Honesty–Humility was associated with a greater likelihood of adopting a third-person perspective when judging moral acceptability in the switch case, whereas higher Emotionality predicted a preference for first-person perspective in both scenarios. Empathy and assertiveness predicted more vivid action imagery in the switch scenario, while higher emotional self-control predicted less vivid imagery. These findings suggest that dispositional factors do not merely bias outcomes (utilitarian vs. deontological) but also shape the representational format through which moral situations are internally construed. From a cognitive-science perspective, this supports an interactionist view in which moral cognition emerges from the joint influence of stable traits and situationally constructed mental models. Traits such as Emotionality or Honesty–Humility may function partly by modulating default representational stances, how close one feels to the scene, whether one sees oneself as agent or observer, and how much sensory detail is recruited, rather than directly imposing a fixed moral principle. 4.4. Implications for models of Dual-process models of moral cognition and for CNI-style paradigms Our findings speak to ongoing debates about how best to model moral decision-making. Dual-process theories frame deontological and utilitarian judgments as the outputs of affective versus deliberative systems [ 52 , 53 ]. The CNI model, in turn, decomposes responses into sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to norms (N), and a general preference for inaction vs. action (I) across systematically varied dilemma structures [ 4 , 5 , 54 , 55 ]. Recent discussions of the CNI framework have highlighted that its inferences depend on invariance assumptions that may be violated under certain task manipulations [ 56 , 57 , 58 ]. Incorporating representational factors such as perspective and vividness into CNI-style designs offers one principled way to probe these assumptions by testing whether shifts in internal simulation systematically bias specific parameters. Our data suggest that perspective-taking and imagery vividness could be integrated as representational parameters into such models. For instance, allocentric simulation in the footbridge case appears to increase utilitarian judgments without altering the written content of the dilemma. Within the CNI framework, this might correspond to a shift in the weights assigned to consequences vs. norms or to a reduction in generalized inaction when the harmful action is experienced as less self-implicating. By systematically manipulating perspective and vividness in CNI-style stimulus sets, rather than in a single pair of trolley scenarios, future work could test whether these representational factors consistently bias specific parameters (e.g., C vs. N vs. I) across a broader range of moral contexts. Such an approach would also help address critiques that sacrificial trolley dilemmas provide a narrow and potentially misleading window into moral cognition [ 13 , 56 , 59 ]. By embedding perspective-taking manipulations into structurally diverse CNI dilemmas, varying not only personalness, but also norm type and consequence structure, researchers could examine whether representational shifts generalize beyond classic “push vs. pull” scenarios and how they interact with different normative dimensions. 4.5. Limitations and future directions Several limitations qualify our conclusions and point toward concrete next steps. First, the design was cross-sectional and correlational. Perspective and vividness were assessed retrospectively after each judgment, raising concerns about introspective accuracy and post hoc reconstruction. Participants might infer how they must have imagined the scene based on their decisions rather than accurately recalling the simulation itself. Moreover, without experimental manipulation, we cannot make strong causal claims about whether perspective-taking or vividness produce differences in moral judgment, or whether both are downstream of other processes (e.g., affective arousal or abstract reasoning style). Nevertheless, we considered it informative to examine which visual perspective participants spontaneously adopted when simulating the dilemmas, and whether there were systematic individual or scenario-based differences in these default perspective choices. Further studies will investigate this association, manipulating perspective and imagery vividness, allowing more causal claims. Second, willingness to push the person in the footbridge dilemma was extremely rare (≈ 4%), leading to floor effects and limited statistical power for modeling decisions in that condition. This constraint likely contributed to non-significant interaction terms and trend-level personality effects. Future work could use larger samples, alternative dilemmas with less extreme harm trade-offs, or designs that elicit a wider spread of action tendencies (e.g., probabilistic or graded willingness ratings) to mitigate floor effects. Third, although the sample size was adequate for the main comparisons, many of the personality and moderation analyses were exploratory, involved multiple predictors, and should be interpreted cautiously. We treated these effects as hypothesis-generating and report full details in supplementary material. Larger, more targeted studies focusing on a limited set of traits, particularly Emotionality, Honesty–Humility, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, are needed to clarify their role in shaping simulation style. Fourth, perspective and vividness were assessed in a binary (perspective) and in an unidimensional way (vividness), respectively. Real-life simulation is likely richer, involving mixed or shifting perspectives, non-visual modalities, and dynamic changes over time. More fine-grained measures, including continuous perspective scales and multi-modal imagery assessments, could refine our understanding of how mental models of moral events are constructed moment-to-moment. Fifth, we did not fully exploit the information contained in the subgroup of participants who reported no or minimal visual imagery. In future studies, pre-screening for imagery ability and oversampling low-imagery individuals would allow more powerful tests of whether differences in sacrificial judgments and action tendencies can be attributed to the presence or absence of visual simulation per se. Building on these limitations, we see three main avenues for future research. Experimental manipulation of perspective and vividness. A natural next step is to directly manipulate perspective-taking (e.g., “imagine this through your own eyes” vs. “imagine it as if you are observing from a distance”) and imagery vividness (e.g., detailed sensory-guided imagery vs. abstract numerical focus; high vs. low visual load). Random assignment to such conditions would allow causal inferences about whether perspective and vividness shift CNI parameters or dual-process markers [ 4 , 16 ]. Extending to CNI-style stimulus sets and beyond trolley problems. Applying the same simulation measures and manipulations to structurally diverse moral dilemmas, varying consequences, norms, and action/inaction dimensions, would test whether perspective and vividness exert consistent effects across moral “micro-structures.” Combined with multinomial modeling, this would provide a more fine-grained account of how representational formats bias sensitivity to consequences versus norms [ 5 , 54 , 55 ]. Bridging text-based and immersive paradigms. Finally, our text-based findings can be situated relative to immersive VR work, which often reports higher rates of utilitarian action in scenarios analogous to the footbridge dilemma [ 44 , 60 , 61 ]. By experimentally aligning perspective and vividness across formats, e.g., instructing first- vs. third-person viewing in VR and text conditions, or parametrically varying environmental realism, future studies could test whether the representational mechanisms identified here help explain when and why VR diverges from vignette-based results [ 62 , 63 ]. Such work would further illuminate how externally scaffolded versus internally constructed simulations jointly determine moral decisions. 5. Conclusion This study contributes to a growing literature that treats moral judgment not merely as the outcome of abstract principles or trait dispositions, but as the product of how moral situations are mentally represented. By showing that self-reported perspective-taking and imagery vividness covary with moral evaluations, particularly in high-conflict personal dilemmas, and are systematically related to personality traits, we highlight internal simulation as a meaningful dimension in the cognitive architecture of moral decision-making. Integrating representational variables such as perspective and vividness into formal models like the CNI framework may help explain why ostensibly similar moral scenarios can elicit strikingly different judgments across individuals, contexts, and modalities. Ultimately, understanding how people imagine moral events may be as important as knowing what they decide. Declarations Funding statement The project did not receive any funding and the authors declare no conflict of interest. Author contributions CRediT author statement Martin Ernst: Conceptualization; Methodology; Software; Validation; Formal analysis; Investigation; Resources; Data Curation; Writing - Original Draft; Visualization; Project administration. Martin Kronbichler: Supervision; Writing - Review & Editing. Patric Meyer: Feedback on Conceptualization & Methodology; Support on Writing - Original Draft; Writing - Review & Editing; Supervision. Data Availability The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are not publicly available due to ethical and data protection considerations, as participants did not consent to public data sharing and the dataset contains sensitive information on moral judgments and personality measures, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. References Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. & Cohen, J. D. An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment. 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Supplementary Files SupplementaryMaterialPerspectiveSimulatingMind.pdf Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 21 Apr, 2026 Reviews received at journal 13 Mar, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 03 Mar, 2026 Reviewers invited by journal 03 Mar, 2026 Editor assigned by journal 20 Feb, 2026 Submission checks completed at journal 30 Dec, 2025 First submitted to journal 30 Dec, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":242325,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eOverview of the Study Design and Procedure\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8442280/v1/bae91a2fd13dc786345c4e36.png"},{"id":99691824,"identity":"791d3ef3-9e5c-4762-ba81-0645ff3353f9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-07 10:28:26","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":127741,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMoral acceptability and willingness to act in the switch and footbridge dilemmas.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\nParticipants judged the harmful action as morally acceptable and indicated their willingness to perform the action. Bars represent the percentage of participants endorsing each response. The classic trolley asymmetry was replicated: moral acceptability and willingness to act were substantially higher in the switch dilemma than in the footbridge dilemma. Effect sizes and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals are reported in the text.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8442280/v1/d28b94479336009c220d5735.png"},{"id":99796434,"identity":"e41126fa-7768-482b-9622-f1c98be56312","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-08 13:41:46","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":153969,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eConsistency of imagined perspective across moral acceptability and willingness-to-act judgments. Bars show the percentage of participants who maintained the same perspective across both judgments versus those who switched perspectives, separately for the switch and footbridge dilemmas. Effect sizes (φ) and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals are reported in the text.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8442280/v1/262f20883e8ff7b72c476a2d.png"},{"id":99691825,"identity":"b8bf642c-229b-4764-b94e-ba476a9e367c","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-07 10:28:26","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":166142,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMoral acceptability as a function of imagined perspective and dilemma type. In the footbridge dilemma, third-person simulation was associated with higher moral acceptability than first-person simulation, whereas no such difference emerged in the switch dilemma. Points represent percentages of participants judging the action as morally acceptable. Effect sizes and 95 % bootstrap confidence intervals are reported in the text.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8442280/v1/7a881b417fc36b27f4370ea5.png"},{"id":100356471,"identity":"7befe1d3-db84-4386-b575-c407b4464509","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-16 07:10:54","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":2324385,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8442280/v1/7677e1ab-b9b9-445e-b887-63e75661fd7d.pdf"},{"id":99795618,"identity":"fd69df23-2cf9-4464-9ff6-e30e939fb7eb","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-08 13:39:04","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":365768,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryMaterialPerspectiveSimulatingMind.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8442280/v1/2389c0ea43cce86127212a5a.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The Perspective-Simulating Mind: How Internal Representations Shape Moral Judgment and Action","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eMoral Decision-Making and the Role of Internal Simulation\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHuman moral judgment emerges from the interaction of affective and deliberative processes. Dual-process theories propose that deontological judgments arise primarily from intuitive, emotional reactions, whereas utilitarian judgments depend on controlled reasoning about outcomes [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e].Later developments, such as action-aversion accounts and multidimensional models like the CNI framework, have expanded this view by showing that moral judgments reflect not only outcome sensitivity, but also adherence to moral norms and preferences for action versus inaction. Action‐aversion accounts suggest that people may condemn harmful actions because performing them feels aversive even when no one is actually harmed [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e].The CNI model decomposes responses in moral dilemmas into sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to norms (N), and a general tendency toward inaction (I), demonstrating that \u0026ldquo;utilitarian\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;deontological\u0026rdquo; decisions can arise from different combinations of these latent parameters [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eYet despite extensive work on moral cognition, the nature of the internal simulation process, particularly the perspective from which individuals imagine moral events, has received remarkably little empirical attention. Representational format may be a crucial, yet overlooked, source of variance in moral decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003ePerspective Simulation as a Missing Variable in Moral Theories\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResearch in social cognition, mental imagery, and embodied perspective-taking demonstrates that imagining events from a first-person (egocentric) versus third-person (allocentric; will be used synonymously with 3rd person perspective in this article) perspective recruits partially distinct neural systems and alters emotional engagement, agency, and personal involvement. Neuroimaging studies show that adopting an egocentric perspective engages regions involved in self-related and agency-related processing, such as medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal areas [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e], whereas manipulating perspective and performing perspective transformations also recruits posterior parietal and precuneus regions that support spatial transformation and distancing from one\u0026rsquo;s own bodily viewpoint [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e]. Theoretical work further links egocentric perspective to embodied processing of one\u0026rsquo;s own actions and emotional states, and allocentric perspective to a more detached, observer-like stance [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e]. From this perspective, imagining a harmful action \u0026ldquo;through one\u0026rsquo;s own eyes\u0026rdquo; versus \u0026ldquo;from the outside\u0026rdquo; is not a superficial stylistic difference but an encoding choice that may change which bodily sensations, emotions, and action tendencies are brought to the fore.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese findings suggest that the representational perspective adopted during moral cognition could systematically modulate how the judgment is processed. Philosophical and psychological discussions about the personal versus impersonal structure of moral dilemmas typically assume that \u0026ldquo;personalness\u0026rdquo; is a property of the scenario itself for example, whether the agent must apply direct physical force to a victim [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. At the same time, critics have argued that sacrificial dilemmas may mislead researchers about people\u0026rsquo;s genuine moral commitments because they conflate multiple factors, including physical contact, intention, and outcome asymmetries [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e]. If individuals spontaneously imagine the same scenario from different perspectives, then the subjective personalness of a dilemma may be constructed during internal simulation rather than fixed by the dilemma\u0026rsquo;s surface structure. Surprisingly, empirical studies have rarely measured perspective simulation directly, nor examined whether individuals maintain stable representational stances across evaluative contexts or switch between perspectives depending on task demands. Whether perspective simulation reflects a stable preference or a context-sensitive process remains largely unknown.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eMental Imagery Vividness and Emotional Amplification\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA second representational dimension that has been largely overlooked in moral cognition is the vividness of mental imagery. Mental imagery intensifies affective experience and can modulate physiological and emotional responses: imagining a situation in vivid, sensory detail tends to elicit stronger emotional reactions than thinking about the same content in more abstract verbal form [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e]. In line with this idea, Amit and Greene [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e] showed that individuals who rely more on visual processing styles are more likely to make deontological judgments in sacrificial dilemmas, presumably because vivid imagery of harming another person heightens emotional conflict. However, previous studies did not examine whether vividness interacts with perspective, nor did they distinguish between imagery used when evaluating one\u0026rsquo;s own potential action and imagery used when making a moral acceptability judgment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFindings from the broader imagery and emotion-regulation literature indicate that visual perspective is critical for how vivid imagery shapes affect. First-person imagery tends to be more affectively intense and bodily grounded, whereas adopting a more distanced, observer-like perspective can reduce negative affect and rumination [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e]. Translating these insights to sacrificial moral dilemmas suggests that vivid egocentric simulation should amplify embodied negative affect in response to harming another person, whereas vivid allocentric simulation may provide psychological distance and thereby reduce emotional resistance. The interaction between vividness and representational perspective may therefore be critical for understanding within-scenario variability in moral judgment. Yet no study to date has directly tested this interaction in the context of sacrificial moral decisions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eReconsidering the Trolley Dilemmas\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlthough trolley dilemmas have faced criticism for their limited ecological validity and for the risk of overgeneralizing from highly stylized scenarios [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e], they remain uniquely suited for investigating representational processes. Both the switch and the footbridge dilemma require imagining a harmful action that trades off one life against several others, but they differ systematically in how direct and physically embodied the harmful act is. In the switch case, harm is mediated mechanically by flipping a lever, whereas in the footbridge case the agent must apply direct physical force to another person\u0026rsquo;s body. This structural contrast has played a central role in debates about moral cognition because it robustly modulates affective responses and willingness to endorse harm in order to save others [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExisting theories predict robust scenario effects: the footbridge case elicits stronger affective resistance and lower willingness to act than the switch case, a pattern that has been interpreted as evidence for distinct contributions of emotional and outcome-based processes [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e]. If representational perspective influences the emotional salience of harmful actions, such effects should be particularly pronounced in the footbridge case, where bodily contact and personal force are salient. Thus, rather than defending trolley dilemmas as realistic analogues of everyday morality, the present study uses them as controlled tools for isolating representational variables - perspective and vividness - that prevailing theories have thus far largely neglected.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eIndividual Differences in Moral Cognition\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA rich literature shows that interpersonal dispositions shape moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. Traits associated with reduced empathic concern and a greater willingness to instrumentalize others, such as psychopathy and the broader Dark Triad constellation, have been linked to increased endorsement of harmful actions when they maximize aggregate outcomes [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e]. Conversely, Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility and related facets in the HEXACO model predict reduced exploitation and more prosocial behavior, suggesting that individuals high on these traits may be less willing to endorse instrumental harm [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e]. Emotional intelligence is associated with emotion perception and regulation and may affect how people experience and manage emotional conflict during moral decision-making [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e]. These variables are not the primary focus of the present study but offer important boundary conditions that may influence how individuals simulate and evaluate harmful actions, and how stable their simulation style is across different judgments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eThe Present Study\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe current study examines how individuals internally simulate moral events and how this simulation relates to moral judgment and willingness to act. Participants evaluated either the switch or the footbridge dilemma, judged the moral acceptability of the harmful action and their willingness to perform it, and then reported both the perspective from which they imagined the scenario and the vividness of their imagery for each judgment. This design makes it possible to assess whether individuals adopt egocentric or allocentric simulation, whether they maintain a stable perspective across judgments or switch perspectives, and how vividness interacts with perspective to shape moral evaluation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn addition, we measured a broad set of personality traits (HEXACO, Short Dark Triad, and trait emotional intelligence) to explore how interpersonal dispositions relate to simulation patterns or influence the relationship between simulation and moral judgment. These measures allow us to examine representational processes while accounting for known sources of individual variability in moral cognition.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eTheoretical Contribution\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBy integrating research on perspective-taking, mental imagery, emotion regulation, and moral reasoning, this study introduces a representational account of moral cognition. The findings aim to show that how individuals imagine moral events, specifically whether they adopt egocentric or allocentric perspectives, how vividly they simulate these events, and whether they maintain or switch perspectives systematically shapes their moral judgments. This framework extends existing models such as dual-process accounts, action-aversion theories, and the CNI model by identifying internal simulation as a previously unmeasured, theoretically meaningful component of moral decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Methods","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1. Participants\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants were adults between 18 and 35 years of age (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;24.51). Recruitment occurred online via and social media. Inclusion criteria required normal or corrected vision, absence of color blindness, no history of stroke, brain cancer, or brain surgery, no current neurological or psychiatric diagnosis, and no medication affecting brain metabolism. A total of \u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;156 individuals completed the study. The sample consisted of 112 women (71.8%), 40 men (25.6%), and 4 participants identifying as diverse (2.6%). Participation was voluntary, pseudonymized, and written informed consent was obtained prior to participation. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and applicable national guidelines. The study protocol was reviewed by the Ethics Committee of Lower Austria (Nieder\u0026ouml;sterreichische Ethikkommission). The committee confirmed in writing that, under Austrian law, the present study did not require formal ethical approval. All participants provided informed consent prior to participation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2. Materials\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2.1. Moral dilemmas\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants were presented with one of two established text-based moral dilemmas from the trolley-problem family: the \u003cem\u003eswitch\u003c/em\u003e scenario, in which a runaway trolley can be diverted via lever onto a track where one person will be harmed, and the \u003cem\u003efootbridge\u003c/em\u003e scenario, in which stopping the trolley requires physically pushing a person from a bridge to save five others.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEach participant completed two key judgments for their assigned scenario: a moral acceptability judgment (\u0026ldquo;Is the action morally acceptable?\u0026rdquo;) and a willingness to act/behavioral intention judgment (\u0026ldquo;Would you carry out the action?\u0026rdquo;). The order of the two core judgments was randomized, and perspective and vividness were assessed immediately after each judgment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2.2. Perspective-taking and mental imagery vividness\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAfter responding to each of the two critical questions, participants reported how they had envisioned the scenario. They indicated whether they imagined the situation from a first-person (egocentric) perspective or a third-person (allocentric) perspective; an open-response field allowed participants to specify alternatives if neither option applied. Participants also rated the vividness of their mental imagery on a 6-point Likert scale. Vividness ratings referred to the clarity of the mental imagery used while evaluating the preceding question (vividness of thinking about the willingness to act \u0026amp; vividness of thinking about the moral acceptability). Consistent with the questionnaire structure, individuals could additionally indicate that they had not used visual imagery. This response option was treated as a valid categorical answer and not as missing data, which explains the variation in sample sizes across analyses that used vividness or perspective variables. Vividness was always assessed before perspective. The sequence of these measures mirrored the structure of the dilemma section and was aligned with the randomized and counterbalanced order of the judgment questions, such that the vividness\u0026ndash;perspective block referred either to moral acceptability or to willingness to act, depending on question order.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis design ensured that both experiential components of moral reasoning action-related imagination and evaluative imagination were captured without influencing the initial moral judgment. Perspective and vividness reports were collected retrospectively to capture participants\u0026rsquo; spontaneously adopted representational style without influencing their initial judgment as this has not been investigated in previous studies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2.3. Personality measures\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e To capture individual differences in interpersonal functioning, self-regulation, and socio-cognitive dispositions, participants completed the HEXACO-60, the Short Dark Triad (SD3), and a trait emotional intelligence inventory. These measures were included not to test specific directional hypotheses, but to account for broad personality variation that has been theoretically and empirically linked to decision-making in socially and morally relevant contexts [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWithin the HEXACO framework, the factor Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility is robustly associated with sincerity, fairness, and reduced tendencies toward exploitative behavior [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e]. Emotionality has been related to heightened sensitivity to interpersonal harm and empathic concern, whereas Agreeableness captures tendencies toward forgiveness, patience, and non-retaliatory responses [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Dark Triad traits were assessed due to their well-documented links to reduced affective empathy, increased instrumental social behavior, and altered patterns of responses in moral and economic decision-making tasks. Psychopathic traits in particular have been associated with attenuated aversive responses to harming others and increased utilitarian responding in sacrificial moral dilemmas [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e]. Machiavellianism and narcissism represent complementary interpersonal styles characterized by manipulativeness, strategic self-interest, and self-enhancement motives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, trait emotional intelligence operationalized with the EI-4 [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e] was included as an index of individuals\u0026rsquo; capacity for emotion regulation and interpersonal awareness. Prior work has shown that higher trait emotional intelligence is associated with adaptive emotion management and reduced stress reactivity in social situations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e], making it a theoretically relevant construct in contexts involving emotionally charged moral decisions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3. Procedure\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants accessed the study via SoSci Survey and were instructed to generate a pseudonymous identification code to ensure full anonymization. After providing consent and confirming eligibility, participants were randomly assigned to either the switch or the footbridge scenario. They then completed the two core evaluations of the scenario (moral acceptability and willingness to act) in randomized order.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e Immediately after each of these two judgments, participants answered the perspective and vividness questions corresponding to that specific evaluative context. This design captured the representational format in which participants engaged with the dilemma, without affecting the initial judgment process. As described in the questionnaire, participants could also indicate the absence of visual imagery.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUpon completing the moral dilemma tasks, participants proceeded through a fixed sequence of questionnaires (SD3, EI4, and HEXACO-PI-R). Participants also completed the I-8 impulsivity scale and a subtest of the INT assessing visual working memory. These measures are part of the larger research program based on this dataset but are not reported in the present article. Participants studying at the University of Salzburg were awarded course credit at the end of the study. The debriefing page thanked participants and offered optional contact information for updates about study results. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e illustrates the study procedure.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.4. Statistical Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll analyses were conducted using SPSS 29 [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e]. Descriptive statistics were computed for all variables, including the frequency of egocentric vs. allocentric perspective reports, vividness ratings, and the number of participants indicating no visual imagery. Ns for each model are reported in the corresponding results. Full descriptive distributions of vividness and perspective categories for both moral acceptability and willingness to act are provided in the Results section.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe inferential analyses used the same statistical tests typically applied in moral cognition research: chi-square tests to compare moral acceptability and willingness to act between the switch and footbridge scenarios and to assess perspective consistency, additional chi-square tests to examine associations between perspective and moral judgments, and independent-samples t-tests to compare vividness ratings across scenarios. Moderation analyses were conducted via logistic regression using dichotomous outcomes (moral acceptability; willingness to act), and further logistic models examined exploratory associations with personality traits (SD3, HEXACO, EI4).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo increase robustness and avoid reliance on parametric assumptions, all inferential estimates were obtained using nonparametric bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples. Reported confidence intervals therefore correspond to bootstrap percentile intervals. Influential-case diagnostics (e.g., Cook\u0026rsquo;s distance, leverage) were inspected to ensure model stability, but no observations were excluded on this basis. Logistic models were additionally checked for sparse-cell bias and numerical instability; models showing clear signs of complete separation or inflated standard errors were not interpreted. All tests were two-tailed. Given the exploratory status of the personality models and the focus on effect-size estimation, no post-hoc corrections were applied; emphasis was placed on the magnitude and precision of the bootstrapped confidence intervals rather than on null-hypothesis significance testing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1 Data Preparation and Descriptive Statistics\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA total of N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;156 participants completed the study. Because responses indicating no visual imagery were treated as valid categorical answers rather than missing data, sample sizes vary across analyses involving vividness or perspective. All inferential and descriptive estimates rely on nonparametric bootstrapping (5,000 resamples) with percentile 95% confidence intervals.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.1 Final Sample Sizes and Data Handling\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor the moral acceptability judgment, valid responses were obtained from \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;74 participants in the switch scenario and \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;82 in the footbridge scenario. For willingness to act, valid responses were available from \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;74 (switch) and \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;82 (footbridge). Vividness ratings were available from \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;146 participants for the action-related imagery and \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;120 for the acceptability-related imagery. A total of \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;10 participants indicated that they had not used visual imagery for imagining willingness to act and n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;36 for imagining moral acceptability. These responses were retained as a separate, theoretically meaningful category. Open-text perspective responses occurred with \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;12 for moral acceptability and \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;12 for willingness to act conditions. These were not considered for the statistical analysis of perspective.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.2 Primary Outcome Distributions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoral acceptability of the harmful action was endorsed by \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;58, 78.4% of participants in the switch scenario and by \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;16, 19.5% in the footbridge scenario. Willingness to act was higher in the switch dilemma with \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;63, 85.1%, than in the footbridge dilemma \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3, 3.7%. These patterns replicate the classic trolley dilemma effects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.3 Perspective Descriptive Patterns\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor the willingness-to-act question, the switch scenario elicited 68.9% first-person simulations (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;51) and 28.4% third-person simulations (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;21), while 2.7% of participants (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2) did not report a perspective. In the footbridge scenario, 59.8% of participants (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;49) imagined the action from a first-person perspective, 28.0% (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;23) from a third-person perspective, and 12.2% (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;10) provided no perspective report. For the moral-acceptability question, 51.4% of participants in the switch scenario (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;38) imagined the scenario from a first-person perspective, whereas 41.9% (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;31) used a third-person perspective; 6.8% (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5) did not report a perspective. In the footbridge scenario, 51.2% of participants (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;42) reported imagining the acceptability judgment from a first-person perspective, 40.2% (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;33) from a third-person perspective, and 8.5% (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;7) did not provide a perspective report.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.4 Descriptive Associations Between Simulation Variables\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcross both dilemmas, participants showed a clear tendency to use the same perspective for both judgments. In the switch scenario, 64.7% of participants maintained a consistent perspective, and perspective for willingness to act and perspective for moral acceptability were significantly associated, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;68)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.54, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.019, φ\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.29 (95% bootstrapped CI: .05\u0026ndash;.51). This pattern was even stronger in the footbridge scenario, where 73.5% of participants used the same perspective across judgments and the association was highly significant, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;68)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;13.98, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, φ\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.45 (95% bootstrapped CI: .23\u0026ndash;.65). Together, these findings indicate that representational perspective reflects a stable simulation stance rather than a response-specific fluctuation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.5 Reported open perspective answers\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformation regarding reported open perspective answers can be found in the supplementary material.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.5 Vividness Distributions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eVividness associated with imagining one\u0026rsquo;s own action ranged from 1 to 6 in the switch case (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;51; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.31, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.35), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [3.94, 4.69]. In the footbridge case, vividness associated with imagining one\u0026rsquo;s own action also ranged from 1 to 6 (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;64; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.48, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.39), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [4.14, 4.81]. Vividness associated with imagining the moral acceptability judgment in the switch case showed a similar distribution (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;51; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.84, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.86), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [3.31, 4.33]. In the footbridge case, vividness associated with imagining the moral acceptability judgment again ranged from 1 to 6 (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;64; \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.92, \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.92), with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [3.44, 4.38].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.5 Non-Visualizer Rates\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor the switch case, \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;7 participants (9.5%) indicated that they did not use visual imagery when imagining their own action, and \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;19 participants (25.7%) reported not using visual imagery when imagining the moral acceptability judgment. In the footbridge case, \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3 participants (3.7%) indicated that they did not use visual imagery for the action-related judgment, and \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;17 participants (20.7%) selected the non-imagery option for the acceptability-related judgment. These participants were retained as a separate analytical category. Because \u0026ldquo;no imagery\u0026rdquo; represents a theoretically meaningful absence of visual simulation, these responses were treated as a separate category rather than as missing data in subsequent analyses.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.6 Bootstrap-Based Descriptive Estimates\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll proportions, means, medians, correlations, and effect sizes reported in this section include percentile bootstrap 95% confidence intervals derived from 5,000 resamples. This approach ensures robust estimation under potential non-normality and maintains consistency with the inferential bootstrap analyses reported in later sections.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Replication of Classic Trolley Effects\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.1 Moral Acceptability\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo compare moral acceptability judgments between the switch and footbridge dilemmas, a chi-square test of independence was conducted on the dichotomous response (\u0026ldquo;Is the action morally acceptable?\u0026rdquo;). In the switch scenario, 58 of 74 participants (78.4%) judged pulling the lever as morally acceptable, whereas 16 (21.6%) judged it unacceptable. In contrast, in the footbridge scenario, only 16 of 82 participants (19.5%) considered pushing the person morally acceptable, while 66 (80.5%) judged the action to be morally unacceptable.. The chi-square test indicated a highly significant association between scenario type and moral acceptability, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;156)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;54.06, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, Fisher\u0026rsquo;s exact \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll expected cell counts exceeded 5, and model assumptions were therefore met.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe effect size was large, with Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.589, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, confirming a strong dependency between scenario type and moral evaluation. A bootstrapped estimate based on 5,000 resamples yielded a 95% percentile confidence interval of [.460, .715], SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.065, indicating a stable and robust large effect. Equivalent results were obtained for phi (\u0026ndash;.589; 95% CI [\u0026ndash;.715, \u0026ndash;.460]) and for eta (.589; 95% CI [.460, .715]), confirming the strength and consistency of the association.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, participants were substantially more likely to judge the action as morally acceptable in the switch dilemma than in the footbridge dilemma, replicating the classic pattern reported in decades of trolley-problem research. The direction and magnitude of the effect remained fully consistent across traditional chi-square statistics and bootstrapped estimators. Results can be seen in Fig.\u0026nbsp;2.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.2 Willingness to Act\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine differences in willingness to perform the action between the two scenarios, a chi-square test of independence was conducted. In the switch scenario, 63 of 74 participants (85.1%) indicated that they would perform the action, whereas 11 (14.9%) would not. In contrast, in the footbridge scenario, only 3 of 82 participants (3.7%) reported willingness to act, while 79 (96.3%) indicated that they would not push the person. The chi-square test revealed a highly significant association between scenario type and willingness to act, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;156)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;105.79, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, Fisher\u0026rsquo;s exact \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001. All expected cell counts exceeded 5, indicating that the assumptions of the test were met.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe magnitude of the effect was very large, with Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.823, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001. A bootstrapped estimate based on 5,000 resamples produced a 95% percentile confidence interval of [.732, .909], SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.044, demonstrating a highly robust effect. Equivalent values emerged for phi (\u0026ndash;.823; 95% CI [\u0026ndash;.909, \u0026ndash;.732]) and eta (.823; 95% CI [.732, .909]), confirming the strength and stability of the association.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, participants were dramatically more willing to pull the lever in the switch dilemma than to push the person in the footbridge dilemma. The direction, significance, and bootstrapped effect sizes collectively underscore the robustness of this classic behavioral asymmetry. Results can be seen in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3 Perspective Simulation Patterns\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.1 Perspective Consistency Across Judgments\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the Switch scenario, complete data was available for 68 participants. For the judgment of willingness to act, 49 participants adopted the first-person perspective and 19 adopted the third-person perspective; for moral acceptance, 37 responded from the first-person and 31 from the third-person perspective. Cross-tabulation showed that 64.7% of participants used the same perspective for both judgments. A chi-square test indicated a significant association between PH and PMA perspectives, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;68)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.54, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.019 (Fisher\u0026rsquo;s exact test: \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.029). The effect size was φ\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.29, indicating a small-to-moderate association. A nonparametric bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples yielded a 95% confidence interval for φ of [.05, .51] with a standard error of SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.117. These results suggest that, in the Switch dilemma, participants showed a tendency to maintain a consistent perspective across both behavioral and moral judgments rather than switching between first- and third-person viewpoints.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the Bridge scenario, complete perspective data was likewise available for 68 participants. For the imagined perspective in willingness to act, 47 participants responded from the first-person and 21 from the third-person perspective; for the imagined perspective in moral acceptability, 39 used the first-person and 29 the third-person perspective. Here, 73.5% of participants adopted the same perspective across both judgments. The association between PH and PMA perspectives was highly significant, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;68)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;13.98, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001 (Fisher\u0026rsquo;s exact test: \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001). The effect size was φ\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.45, which reflects a moderate-to-large association. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples produced a 95% confidence interval of [.23, .65] with a standard error of SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.108. Thus, in the Bridge dilemma, the tendency toward perspective consistency was even stronger, indicating a robust coupling between the viewpoint adopted when evaluating moral acceptability and the viewpoint used when evaluating behavioral willingness. As shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, most participants maintained a consistent imagined perspective across moral acceptability and willingness-to-act judgments in both dilemmas.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.2 Differences regarding perspective and Moral Acceptability between cases\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis analysis can be found in the supplementary material.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.3 Differences regarding perspective and Willingness to Act between cases\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis analysis can be found in the supplementary material.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec27\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.4 Differences regarding perspective and Moral Acceptability within the Switch Case\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine whether the perspective adopted when judging the moral acceptability of pulling the lever was associated with the moral evaluation itself in the switch scenario, a chi-square test of independence was conducted (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;69). Among participants who reported an egocentric perspective, 31 of 38 (81.6%) judged the action as morally acceptable, while 7 (18.4%) judged it as unacceptable. A highly similar pattern was observed for participants who adopted a third-person perspective, 24 of 31 (77.4%) indicating that pulling the lever was morally acceptable and 7 (22.6%) judging it as unacceptable.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe chi-square test revealed no significant association between perspective choice and moral acceptability in the switch case, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;69)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.18, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.669, and the corresponding effect size was very small, Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.051. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples confirmed the negligible magnitude of this association, yielding a percentile confidence interval of [.005, .296], SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.079. Equivalent results were observed for phi (\u0026ndash;.051; 95% CI [\u0026ndash;.292, .188]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, in this classic version of the dilemma, judgments of acceptability appear largely independent of whether participants simulated the event from a first-person or third-person viewpoint.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec28\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.5 Differences regarding perspective and Moral Acceptability within the Footbridge Case\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine whether the perspective adopted when judging the moral acceptability of pushing the person differed depending on participants\u0026rsquo; moral evaluation, a chi-square test of independence was conducted (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;75). Among participants imagining the scenario from an egocentric perspective, only 5 of 42 (11.9%) judged pushing the person as morally acceptable. This proportion almost tripled in the third-person condition: 11 of 33 (33.3%) judged the action as acceptable a difference of 21.4 percentage points.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe chi-square test indicated a significant association between perspective choice and moral acceptability in the footbridge scenario, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;75)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.06, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.025. The effect size was small-to-moderate, Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.260. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples yielded a consistent effect-size estimate (Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.260; 95% percentile CI = [.040, .472], SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.110), confirming the stability of the association. Equivalent values were observed for phi (.260; 95% CI [.030, .472]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConceptually, these results suggest that in the footbridge dilemma, adopting a third-person perspective increases the likelihood of judging the action as morally acceptable relative to an egocentric perspective. Unlike in the switch scenario, perspective thus appears to contribute meaningfully to participants\u0026rsquo; evaluations the moral permissibility of pushing the person. As illustrated in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, imagined perspective was associated with moral acceptability in the footbridge dilemma but not in the switch dilemma.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec29\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.6 Perspective and Willingness to Act (Switch Case)\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine whether the perspective adopted when imagining the action influenced participants\u0026rsquo; willingness to pull the lever in the switch scenario, a chi-square test of independence was conducted (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;72). Among participants who imagined the action from a first-person perspective, 43 of 51 (84.3%) indicated that they would pull the lever, whereas 8 (15.7%) would not. A nearly identical pattern emerged among those who used a third-person perspective: 18 of 21 participants (85.7%) reported that they would pull the lever, and 3 (14.3%) indicated that they would not.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe chi-square test showed no significant association between perspective choice and willingness to act, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;72)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.02, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.881. The corresponding effect size was very small, Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.018. A bootstrap procedure with 5,000 resamples confirmed the negligible effect size (Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.018; 95% percentile CI = [.005, .255], SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.070). Bootstrapped values for phi were similarly minimal (phi\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.018; 95% CI [\u0026ndash;.222, .232]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec30\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3.7 Perspective and Willingness to Act (Footbridge Case)\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine whether the perspective adopted when imagining the action influenced participants\u0026rsquo; willingness to push the person in the footbridge scenario, a chi-square test of independence was conducted (\u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;72). Among participants who imagined the action from a first-person perspective, 47 of 49 (95.9%) indicated that they would \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e push the person, whereas 2 (4.1%) reported that they would. The pattern was almost identical among participants who adopted a third-person perspective: 22 of 23 (95.7%) indicated they would not push, while 1 participant (4.3%) indicated they would.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe chi-square test showed no significant association between perspective choice and willingness to act, χ\u0026sup2;(1, N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;72)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.003, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.958, with an essentially zero effect size, Cram\u0026eacute;r\u0026rsquo;s V\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.006. A bootstrap analysis (5,000 resamples; valid\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4,794 resamples) confirmed the negligible magnitude of the association, yielding a percentile confidence interval of [.006, .249], SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.065. The corresponding bootstrapped estimate for phi was equally minimal (phi\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.006; 95% CI [\u0026ndash;.174, .249]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHence, consistent with prior research, willingness to perform the harmful action was extremely low across perspectives, and perspective simulation did not modulate this behavioral reluctance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec31\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.4 Vividness Across Scenarios (Moral Acceptability)\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine whether vividness of mental imagery during the moral-acceptability judgment differed between the switch and footbridge scenarios, an independent-samples \u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e-test was conducted. Vividness ratings were highly similar across scenarios. In the switch case (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;51), vividness was M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.84 (SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.86), 95% bootstrap CI [3.33, 4.33]. In the footbridge case (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;64), vividness was M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.92 (SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.92), 95% bootstrap CI [3.46, 4.37]. The mean difference between conditions was very small and nonsignificant, t(113) = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.22, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.825, with a negligible effect size, Cohen\u0026rsquo;s d = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.04 (95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.41, 0.33]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA bootstrap procedure (5,000 samples) yielded a percentile CI for the mean difference of [\u0026ndash;0.76, 0.62], confirming that vividness during moral evaluation did not differ meaningfully between the classic switch and footbridge dilemmas.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec32\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.5 Vividness Across Scenarios (Willingness To Act)\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA second independent-samples \u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e-test compared vividness during the willingness-to-act simulation (i.e., imagining performing the action). Vividness was numerically higher overall than for the acceptability judgment but again showed no scenario differences. In the switch scenario (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;51), vividness was M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.31 (SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.35), 95% bootstrap CI [3.94, 4.67]. In the footbridge scenario (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;64), vividness was M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.48 (SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.39), 95% bootstrap CI [4.15, 4.81].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe difference was not statistically significant, t(113) = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.66, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.509, and effect sizes again indicated a negligible difference, Cohen\u0026rsquo;s d = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.12 (95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.49, 0.24]). Bootstrapped percentile CIs for the mean difference overlapped substantially, [\u0026ndash;0.69, 0.32] (5,000 samples), reinforcing that vividness was highly comparable across scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec33\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.6. Switch Scenario: Vividness of Moral Evaluation vs. Action Simulation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo examine whether participants imagined moral acceptability judgments and their own actions with different degrees of vividness in the switch scenario, a paired-samples comparison was conducted (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;51). Participants reported moderate vividness when imagining the moral acceptability judgment (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.84, SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.86; 95% bootstrap CI [3.33, 4.33]) and higher vividness when imagining performing the action themselves (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.31, SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.35; 95% bootstrap CI [3.94, 4.67]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paired-samples \u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e-test indicated a trend-level difference, t(50) = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.92, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.060,\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ewith action imagery being somewhat more vivid than judgment-related imagery. This pattern was supported by the bootstrap estimate of the mean difference (\u0026ndash;0.47), whose percentile confidence interval narrowly excluded zero 95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.94, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.02], though the two-tailed bootstrap significance was marginal (\u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.057). The effect size was small, Cohen\u0026rsquo;s dz = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.27 (95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.55, 0.01]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec34\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.7 Footbridge Scenario: Vividness of Moral Evaluation vs. Action Simulation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA parallel paired-samples comparison was conducted for the footbridge scenario (\u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;64). Vividness for imagining the moral acceptability judgment was moderate (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.92, SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.92; 95% bootstrap CI [3.45, 4.38]), whereas vividness for imagining performing the action was higher (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.48, SD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.39; 95% bootstrap CI [4.14, 4.81]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paired t-test revealed a significant and robust within-scenario difference, t(63) = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3.00, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.004,\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ewith action imagery being more vivid than judgment-related imagery. The bootstrap estimate of the mean difference (\u0026ndash;0.56) yielded a stable percentile confidence interval of\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.92, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.20], and the bootstrapped two-tailed significance remained strong (\u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.007). The effect size was small-to-moderate, Cohen\u0026rsquo;s dz = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.38 (95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.63, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.12]).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec35\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.4.2 Moderation: Scenario x Perspective on Moral Acceptability\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA logistic moderation analysis (PROCESS Model 1) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e] was conducted to examine whether the relationship between reported visual perspective and moral acceptability differed between the switch and footbridge scenarios. The model employed heteroscedasticity-consistent HC3 standard errors and 5,000 bootstrap samples. Overall model fit indicated substantial explanatory value (\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2LL\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;142.10; McFadden\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eR\u003c/em\u003e\u0026sup2; = .29; Cox\u0026ndash;Snell \u003cem\u003eR\u003c/em\u003e\u0026sup2; = .33; Nagelkerke \u003cem\u003eR\u003c/em\u003e\u0026sup2; = .44). Scenario type was a strong predictor of moral acceptability, \u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3.49, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.63, \u003cem\u003eZ\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;5.50, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;4.73, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2.25], with lower acceptability in the footbridge scenario. The main effect of visual perspective was not significant, \u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.82, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.34, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.175, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;4.45, 0.81]. The interaction between perspective and scenario type approached significance, \u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.56, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.85, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.066, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.10, 3.23], and the corresponding bootstrap interval also included zero (BootLLCI\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.22, BootULCI\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.59). Simple-effects analyses showed that in the switch scenario, visual perspective was not associated with moral acceptability, \u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.26, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.60, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.670, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.43, 0.92]. In the footbridge scenario, however, an allocentric (3rd person) perspective was associated with higher moral acceptability, \u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.31, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.60, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.030, 95% CI [0.13, 2.49].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, the moderation indicates that the association between visual perspective and moral acceptability differs between the two scenarios, with a detectable relationship in the footbridge condition but not in the switch condition, thereby supporting the descriptive and chi-square results reported above.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec36\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.4.3. Moderation: Scenario x Perspective on Willingness to Act\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA logistic moderation analysis tested whether the effect of scenario type (switch vs. footbridge) on willingness to perform the harmful action was moderated by the adopted perspective. The overall model was significant, reflecting the well-known difference in willingness between scenarios, Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .72. However, neither perspective nor the interaction contributed explanatory variance. The interaction term was non-significant, \u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.04, SE\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.45, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.976, 95% CI [\u0026ndash;2.89, 2.80], indicating no evidence that perspective altered the effect of scenario type on willingness to act. Estimates should be interpreted with caution given the very low number of affirmative responses in the footbridge condition.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec37\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.6 Exploratory trait analyses\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec38\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.6.1 Moral and action judgements\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eExploratory logistic regressions probed whether Dark Triad traits, HEXACO dimensions, and EI-4 facets account for additional variance in moral acceptability and willingness-to-act decisions. All models used binary outcomes and nonparametric bootstrapping (5,000 resamples) to obtain robust confidence intervals (see Supplement for full details).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor the Dark Triad, none of the models for the switch case were significant. For moral acceptability, the overall model did not improve on the intercept-only solution, χ\u0026sup2;(3)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.42, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.700, with very small explained variance (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .03) and no reliable predictors (e.g., Machiavellianism: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.16, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.760, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.24, 0.84]; narcissism: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.37, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.403, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.55, 1.39]; psychopathy: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.45, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.405, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.70, 0.96]). The model for willingness to pull the switch was similarly null, χ\u0026sup2;(3)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.55, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.466, Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .06, with non-significant coefficients (e.g., Machiavellianism: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.76, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.195, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2.89, 0.63]). In the footbridge case, the model for moral acceptability showed only a modest, non-significant trend, χ\u0026sup2;(3)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.52, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.137, Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .10; higher Machiavellianism numerically predicted greater moral acceptability (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.97, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.053, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.64, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.24, 2.34]), but the bootstrapped interval included zero. The model for willingness to push was also non-significant, χ\u0026sup2;(3)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.82, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.186, despite a large but unstable coefficient for psychopathy (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.79, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.064, OR\u0026thinsp;\u0026asymp;\u0026thinsp;16.25, 95% CI [0.85, 310.24]) driven by only three \u0026ldquo;push\u0026rdquo; responses. Overall, Dark Triad traits did not robustly predict binary moral or action decisions once uncertainty and class imbalance were taken into account.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor HEXACO, no reliable associations emerged for the switch scenario. The model predicting moral acceptability was not significant, χ\u0026sup2;(7)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;7.25, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.403 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .14), and none of the linear or quadratic predictors reached significance (e.g., Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.33, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.485, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.02, 1.82]; Emotionality\u0026sup2;: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.35, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.582). The model predicting willingness to act was not significant, χ\u0026sup2;(7)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;8.33, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.305 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .19). Consistent with this, none of the trait effects, including the quadratic Agreeableness term, was robust ( Agreeableness\u0026sup2;: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.31, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.768, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2.83, 45.03]). In the footbridge scenario, however, the model predicting moral acceptability was significant, χ\u0026sup2;(6)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;12.93, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.044, with moderate explained variance (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .23). Moreover, lower Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility was associated with higher moral acceptability of pushing (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.23, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.042, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.29, 95% CI [0.09, 0.96]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3.09, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.25]). Conscientiousness showed a converging trend in the same direction (lower Conscientiousness \u0026rarr; higher acceptability), though it did not reach significance (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.81, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.071, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.44, 95% CI [0.18, 1.07]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2.11, 0.20]). The corresponding model for willingness to push, however, was not significant, χ\u0026sup2;(6)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.66, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.588 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .21), and none of the traits reached significance (all ps\u0026thinsp;\u0026ge;\u0026thinsp;.17; all 95% CIs included 1). Thus, the clearest exploratory signal at the level of binary decisions is that lower Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility is associated with a higher likelihood of judging the extreme harmful action as morally acceptable.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor EI-4, all decision models were non-significant. In the switch scenario, the model for moral acceptability yielded χ\u0026sup2;(4)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.30, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.367 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .09), and no facet showed a reliable effect (e.g., empathy: B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.08, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.926, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.97, 1.83]). The model for willingness to pull the switch was similarly null, χ\u0026sup2;(4)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.08, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.396 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .09), although higher emotional self-control showed a borderline association with greater willingness to act (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.14, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.069, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.13, 95% CI [0.92, 10.69]; bootstrap CI [0.09, 3.43]). In the footbridge scenario, EI-4 facets did not significantly predict moral acceptability, χ\u0026sup2;(4)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.51, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.476 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .07), or willingness to push, χ\u0026sup2;(4)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;6.65, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.155 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .29), with all 95% confidence intervals extremely wide and spanning zero.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, these exploratory analyses indicate that binary moral and action judgements were only weakly related to the assessed trait measures, with the most consistent effect being that lower Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility predicts greater moral acceptability of pushing in the footbridge case (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026asymp;\u0026thinsp;.04, OR\u0026thinsp;\u0026asymp;\u0026thinsp;0.29, CI excluding 1), while other associations remained small, unstable, or non-significant.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec39\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.6.2 Perspective and vividness\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eHaving established that imagined visual perspective can influence moral judgments, we then turned to a follow-up question: what predicts how people simulate the dilemmas in the first place\u0026mdash;specifically, whether they adopt a first- versus third-person perspective and how vividly they imagine the moral situation and the harmful action. For the Dark Triad, none of the logistic regression models predicting imagined perspective in either scenario were significant (all χ\u0026sup2;(3) between 0.58 and 4.74, all ps\u0026thinsp;\u0026ge;\u0026thinsp;.19, Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; \u0026le; .09), and all coefficients had 95% bootstrapped CIs spanning zero. In contrast, one vividness model in the footbridge scenario revealed clear, robust effects: the regression predicting action vividness was significant, F(3, 75)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.31, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.007, R\u0026sup2; = .15. Higher psychopathy predicted more vivid imagery of pushing (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.80, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.021, 95% CI [0.27, 1.29]), whereas higher Machiavellianism predicted less vivid action imagery (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.82, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.003, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.25, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.33]); narcissism was not significant (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.35, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.247, CI including zero). All other Dark Triad vividness models (switch moral/action vividness and footbridge moral vividness) were non-significant (Fs\u0026thinsp;\u0026le;\u0026thinsp;1.07, ps\u0026thinsp;\u0026ge;\u0026thinsp;.37, R\u0026sup2; \u0026le; .06). Thus, Dark Triad traits did not appear to shape \u003cem\u003ewhich\u003c/em\u003e perspective participants adopted, but they did relate to \u003cem\u003ehow vividly\u003c/em\u003e the harmful action was mentally simulated in the more extreme footbridge dilemma.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor HEXACO, most perspective models were again non-significant, but several effects emerged. After moral acceptability judgments in the switch case, the perspective model was non-significant, χ\u0026sup2;(6)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;8.65, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.194 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .16), with only a marginal trend for higher Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility to predict third-person perspective adoption (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.83, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.060, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.28, 95% CI [0.97, 5.40]; bootstrap CI [0.02, 2.45]). After willingness-to-act judgments in the switch scenario, the overall model approached significance, χ\u0026sup2;(6)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;11.86, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.065 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .22), but it nonetheless showed a reliable individual predictor: lower Emotionality significantly increased the likelihood of adopting a third-person perspective (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.90, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.042, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.41, 95% CI [0.17, 0.97]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2.31, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.02]) Lower Conscientiousness pointed in the same direction but this effect was less robust, as its bootstrap interval still included zero.(B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.80, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.045, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.45, 95% CI [0.21, 0.98]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;2.16, 0.17]). The strongest evidence emerged in the footbridge scenario. After moral acceptability judgments, the perspective model was non-significant, χ\u0026sup2;(6)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;8.21, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.223 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .14), with only trend-level hints for lower Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (ps\u0026thinsp;\u0026asymp;\u0026thinsp;.06\u0026ndash;.09, CIs including zero). By contrast, the model for perspective after willingness-to-act judgments was clearly significant, χ\u0026sup2;(6)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;17.55, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.007 (Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; = .30), and yielded multiple converging, statistically supported predictors: higher Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility increased the likelihood of adopting a third-person perspective (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.48, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.016, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.40, 95% CI [1.33, 14.63]; bootstrap CI [0.37, 3.50]), whereas lower Emotionality (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.07, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.036, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.34, 95% CI [0.13, 0.93]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3.28, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.03]) and lower Conscientiousness (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.22, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.009, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.30, 95% CI [0.12, 0.74]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3.20, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.28]) also predicted third-person perspective adoption. Overall, these exploratory results suggest that HEXACO traits, most consistently Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility, Emotionality, and Conscientiousness, are meaningfully related to perspective choice, particularly when participants evaluated their willingness to act and especially in the footbridge case.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHEXACO traits also showed systematic associations with vividness. In the switch scenario, the model predicting vividness of moral acceptability was significant, F(6, 48)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.79, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.021, R\u0026sup2; = .26. Higher Emotionality predicted more vivid imagery of moral evaluation (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.02, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.021, 95% CI [0.07, 1.81]), and higher Extraversion also showed a positive association (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.87, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.043, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.01, 1.66]; lower bound borderline). The model for action vividness in the switch scenario was likewise significant, F(6, 60)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.24, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.001, R\u0026sup2; = .30. Here, higher Emotionality (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.00, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, 95% CI [0.58, 1.47]), higher Extraversion (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.54, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.020, 95% CI [0.10, 1.01]), and higher Openness (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.62, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.041, 95% CI [0.07, 1.23]) all predicted more vivid action imagery. In the footbridge scenario, the model for vividness of moral acceptability was not significant, F(6, 58)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.14, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.35, R\u0026sup2; = .11, and only weak trends for Conscientiousness and Openness emerged (ps\u0026thinsp;\u0026asymp;\u0026thinsp;.09, CIs including zero). The model for action vividness in the footbridge scenario was also non-significant overall, F(6, 72)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.69, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.14, R\u0026sup2; = .12, but Openness remained a robust positive predictor (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.79, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.002, 95% CI [0.33, 1.31]). In sum, Emotionality, Extraversion, and Openness were reliably associated with more vivid simulation in the switch case, and Openness generalized to action vividness in the footbridge case.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor EI-4, logistic models predicting perspective were uniformly weak. Across switch and footbridge scenarios and both judgment types, models did not significantly improve on the intercept-only solution (all χ\u0026sup2;(4) between 1.64 and 8.80, all ps\u0026thinsp;\u0026ge;\u0026thinsp;.066, Nagelkerke R\u0026sup2; \u0026le; .16), and all individual coefficients had 95% bootstrapped CIs that included zero. The strongest pattern was a trend for lower empathy to be associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a third-person perspective after willingness-to-act judgments in the footbridge case (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.50, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.078, OR\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.22, 95% CI [0.04, 1.18]; bootstrap CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3.95, 0.11]), but this effect was not robust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor vividness, EI-4 facets did not significantly predict how vividly participants imagined moral acceptability in either scenario (switch: F(5, 49)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.11, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.080, R\u0026sup2; = .18; footbridge: F(5, 59)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.68, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.64, R\u0026sup2; = .06). The model predicting action vividness in the switch scenario, however, was significant, F(5, 61)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.72, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.005, R\u0026sup2; = .23. Higher empathy predicted more vivid action imagery (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.24, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.026, 95% CI [0.17, 2.29]), as did higher assertiveness (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.97, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.014, 95% CI [0.20, 1.75]), while higher emotional self-control predicted less vivid imagery (B\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.68, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.053, 95% CI [\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;1.45, \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0.07]; borderline but bootstrap-supported). In the footbridge scenario, the model for action vividness did not reach significance, F(5, 73)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.01, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.087, R\u0026sup2; = .12, and none of the EI-4 facets had CIs excluding zero.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, these exploratory results suggest that traits are more strongly linked to the \u003cem\u003eform\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eintensity\u003c/em\u003e of mental simulation (perspective, vividness) than to the binary moral and action decisions themselves. Dark Triad traits show a dissociation for action vividness in the footbridge case (Psychopathy \u0026uarr;, Machiavellianism \u0026darr;), HEXACO traits, especially Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility, Emotionality, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Openness, systematically predict perspective choice and vividness in several models, and EI-4 facets show selective associations with how vividly participants imagine acting in the switch case. Given the modest sample sizes, class imbalance, and multiple testing, all effects are interpreted as exploratory and hypothesis-generating, with full model details provided in the Supplementary Materials.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe present study examined how people internally simulate sacrificial moral dilemmas and how this simulation relates to moral judgment and willingness to act. Using classic switch and footbridge variants of the trolley problem, we asked participants not only what they would judge and do, but also from which perspective they imagined the scenario and how vividly they visualized it. In addition, we explored how personality traits and emotional intelligence relate to these representational choices. As expected, we replicated the robust asymmetry between the switch and footbridge dilemmas: participants were much more likely to endorse and perform the harmful action in the impersonal switch case than in the personally confronting footbridge case.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond this replication, our findings yield three main contributions. First, we show that the \u003cem\u003eimagined perspective\u003c/em\u003e from which a moral dilemma is simulated is associated with moral judgment in the emotionally charged footbridge scenario: adopting a third-person, allocentric perspective was linked to higher moral acceptability of pushing the person, whereas first-person simulation was associated with stronger resistance to harm.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, vividness of mental imagery did not show robust main effects but displayed suggestive interaction patterns with perspective, consistent with the idea that imagery amplifies emotional responses in a perspective-dependent way. Third, exploratory analyses indicate that traits such as Machiavellianism, psychopathy, Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility, Emotionality, and aspects of emotional intelligence are more strongly related to \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e people simulate moral events (perspective, vividness) than to the binary decision alone. Across these three contributions, representational perspective emerges as a previously unmeasured but theoretically important component of internal simulation. Rather than adding a new moral process, it specifies \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e classical affective and deliberative mechanisms are instantiated in concrete mental representations of sacrificial dilemmas.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec41\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1. Perspective-taking and the \u0026ldquo;personalness\u0026rdquo; of moral dilemmas\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur first key finding is that third-person perspective-taking was associated with higher moral acceptability of the harmful action in the footbridge dilemma, whereas no such effect emerged in the switch case. In the footbridge condition, participants who imagined the scene from a third-person perspective were roughly three times as likely to endorse pushing the person compared to those who simulated the scenario from a first-person viewpoint.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis pattern converges with dual-process models, which posit that \u0026ldquo;personal\u0026rdquo; harms elicit strong affective responses that favor deontological judgments, whereas more psychologically distant harms afford greater weight to outcome-based reasoning [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e]. By shifting from a first-person to a third-person vantage point, individuals may attenuate self-referential emotion and thereby reduce the aversive impact of directly harming another.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe present data thus refine the notion that the personalness of a moral dilemma is solely fixed by its surface features, such as physical contact or spatial proximity [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e]. Instead, our results suggest that personalness is at least partly constructed \u003cem\u003einternally\u003c/em\u003e via perspective-taking. A formally \u0026ldquo;personal\u0026rdquo; dilemma like footbridge may be experienced as less personally involving when simulated from an allocentric stance. This is consistent with neuroimaging work showing that first- and third-person perspectives engage partially distinct networks, with first-person views recruiting medial prefrontal regions associated with self-referential processing and affective evaluation, whereas third-person views engage more dorsal parietal and temporo-parietal regions linked to externally oriented attention and perspective-taking [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e]. Complementing this neural evidence, work on self-distancing in emotion regulation shows that adopting an observer-like vantage point reliably reduces the intensity of negative affect and promotes more abstract, meaning-focused construals of aversive events [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e]. In the present context, third-person simulation of the footbridge dilemma may thus down-regulate self-implicating emotional responses to harming another person, making outcome-based considerations more psychologically accessible without changing the objective structure of the dilemma.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImportantly, imagined perspective was not randomly assigned but reported post hoc, and overall base rates favored first-person simulation, especially for willingness-to-act judgments. The fact that a relatively small subset of participants who spontaneously adopted a third-person vantage point nonetheless showed systematically higher utilitarian judgments underscores that even subtle differences in representational stance can matter. At the same time, perspective-taking did \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e meaningfully influence willingness to act in the footbridge dilemma, where willingness was near floor. This aligns with the idea that endorsing a utilitarian judgment and committing to a harmful action are separable stages that may be differentially constrained by affective and motivational factors [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTogether, these findings suggest that perspective-taking constitutes a representational parameter that modulates how existing moral architectures, whether cast in dual-process terms or more recent multinomial frameworks, are instantiated in particular situations. Rather than replacing distinctions such as \u0026ldquo;personal\u0026rdquo; vs. \u0026ldquo;impersonal\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;consequences\u0026rdquo; vs. \u0026ldquo;norms,\u0026rdquo; perspective-taking may serve as a higher-level control setting that biases which information becomes focal in moral evaluation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec42\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2. Vividness of mental imagery: a subtle, perspective-dependent influence\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eContrary to our initial expectations, vividness of mental imagery did not show robust main effects on moral judgments or willingness to act in either dilemma. Differences in vividness between conditions were small and often only at trend level, with slightly higher vividness reported for the more emotional footbridge scenario. Moderation analyses indicated that vividness \u003cem\u003emight\u003c/em\u003e shape how perspective relates to moral acceptability in the switch case, but these effects remained non-significant once multiple testing and wide confidence intervals are taken into account.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNonetheless, the qualitative pattern is informative. When vividness was low, egocentric perspective tended to be associated with higher moral acceptability; at high vividness, the trend shifted such that third-person perspective was (weakly) associated with greater acceptability. One interpretation is that vivid imagery amplifies emotional responses, but the direction of this amplification depends on vantage point: vivid first-person images may intensify self-focused aversion to harming another, whereas vivid third-person simulation may instead highlight outcome structures and attenuate self-involvement, resembling a cinematic or observer-based appraisal.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis perspective-dependent view of vividness aligns with broader work on imagery and emotion. Amit and Greene [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e] likewise showed that engaging visual processing can heighten the emotional salience of harmful actions and bias judgments away from utilitarian trade-offs. Experimental evidence indicates that the absence or reduction of visual imagery (as in aphantasia) is associated with dampened physiological responses to emotionally charged narratives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e]. In this context, our findings add a representational twist: imagery vividness does not operate in a vacuum but in the coordinate frame defined by perspective-taking. High vividness may \u0026ldquo;lock in\u0026rdquo; whatever the perspective foregrounds, either the self as agent of harm (first-person) or the broader state of affairs (third-person). Recent work on aphantasia provides a useful boundary condition for this account. Individuals who report a complete absence of visual imagery show not only reduced physiological reactivity to emotionally charged narratives, consistent with the idea that imagery amplifies affect [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e], but also a distinctive profile of multi-sensory imagery, episodic memory, and dreaming [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e]. These findings suggest that reduced imagery provides a kind of natural \u0026ldquo;knockout model\u0026rdquo; for testing simulation-based accounts of moral cognition. In light of the sizeable minority of participants in the present study who reported little or no imagery for at least one judgment, future work could explicitly compare high- and low-imagery groups on sacrificial dilemmas to clarify whether visual simulation is necessary for typical patterns of moral sensitivity or primarily modulates their intensity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, given that our vividness effects were modest and statistically fragile, they should be treated as hypothesis-generating. Future work should experimentally manipulate vividness, e.g., through guided imagery instructions, sensory detail prompts, or concurrent visual load, rather than relying purely on retrospective self-report.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec43\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3. Personality, empathy, and the style of moral simulation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eExploratory analyses revealed that personality traits were more tightly coupled to simulation style than to the binary moral decisions themselves. Machiavellianism and, to a lesser degree, psychopathy predicted increased utilitarian endorsement in the footbridge scenario, whereas Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility and Conscientiousness were associated with stronger deontological resistance. This pattern is consistent with prior work linking antisocial traits to utilitarian responses in sacrificial dilemmas [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e], while prosocial traits and concern for fairness promote adherence to deontological norms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMore intriguingly, traits from the HEXACO model and emotional intelligence inventory predicted which perspective and how vividly participants simulated the dilemmas. Higher Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility was associated with a greater likelihood of adopting a third-person perspective when judging moral acceptability in the switch case, whereas higher Emotionality predicted a preference for first-person perspective in both scenarios. Empathy and assertiveness predicted more vivid action imagery in the switch scenario, while higher emotional self-control predicted less vivid imagery. These findings suggest that dispositional factors do not merely bias \u003cem\u003eoutcomes\u003c/em\u003e (utilitarian vs. deontological) but also shape the representational format through which moral situations are internally construed. From a cognitive-science perspective, this supports an interactionist view in which moral cognition emerges from the joint influence of stable traits and situationally constructed mental models. Traits such as Emotionality or Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility may function partly by modulating default representational stances, how close one feels to the scene, whether one sees oneself as agent or observer, and how much sensory detail is recruited, rather than directly imposing a fixed moral principle.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec44\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.4. Implications for models of Dual-process models of moral cognition and for CNI-style paradigms\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur findings speak to ongoing debates about how best to model moral decision-making. Dual-process theories frame deontological and utilitarian judgments as the outputs of affective versus deliberative systems [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e]. The CNI model, in turn, decomposes responses into sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to norms (N), and a general preference for inaction vs. action (I) across systematically varied dilemma structures [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e]. Recent discussions of the CNI framework have highlighted that its inferences depend on invariance assumptions that may be violated under certain task manipulations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e57\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e58\u003c/span\u003e]. Incorporating representational factors such as perspective and vividness into CNI-style designs offers one principled way to probe these assumptions by testing whether shifts in internal simulation systematically bias specific parameters.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur data suggest that perspective-taking and imagery vividness could be integrated as \u003cem\u003erepresentational parameters\u003c/em\u003e into such models. For instance, allocentric simulation in the footbridge case appears to increase utilitarian judgments without altering the written content of the dilemma. Within the CNI framework, this might correspond to a shift in the weights assigned to consequences vs. norms or to a reduction in generalized inaction when the harmful action is experienced as less self-implicating. By systematically manipulating perspective and vividness in CNI-style stimulus sets, rather than in a single pair of trolley scenarios, future work could test whether these representational factors consistently bias specific parameters (e.g., C vs. N vs. I) across a broader range of moral contexts. Such an approach would also help address critiques that sacrificial trolley dilemmas provide a narrow and potentially misleading window into moral cognition [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e59\u003c/span\u003e]. By embedding perspective-taking manipulations into structurally diverse CNI dilemmas, varying not only personalness, but also norm type and consequence structure, researchers could examine whether representational shifts generalize beyond classic \u0026ldquo;push vs. pull\u0026rdquo; scenarios and how they interact with different normative dimensions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec45\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.5. Limitations and future directions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeveral limitations qualify our conclusions and point toward concrete next steps.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst, the design was cross-sectional and correlational. Perspective and vividness were assessed retrospectively after each judgment, raising concerns about introspective accuracy and post hoc reconstruction. Participants might infer how they \u003cem\u003emust have\u003c/em\u003e imagined the scene based on their decisions rather than accurately recalling the simulation itself. Moreover, without experimental manipulation, we cannot make strong causal claims about whether perspective-taking or vividness \u003cem\u003eproduce\u003c/em\u003e differences in moral judgment, or whether both are downstream of other processes (e.g., affective arousal or abstract reasoning style). Nevertheless, we considered it informative to examine which visual perspective participants \u003cem\u003espontaneously\u003c/em\u003e adopted when simulating the dilemmas, and whether there were systematic individual or scenario-based differences in these default perspective choices. Further studies will investigate this association, manipulating perspective and imagery vividness, allowing more causal claims.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, willingness to push the person in the footbridge dilemma was extremely rare (\u0026asymp;\u0026thinsp;4%), leading to floor effects and limited statistical power for modeling decisions in that condition. This constraint likely contributed to non-significant interaction terms and trend-level personality effects. Future work could use larger samples, alternative dilemmas with less extreme harm trade-offs, or designs that elicit a wider spread of action tendencies (e.g., probabilistic or graded willingness ratings) to mitigate floor effects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, although the sample size was adequate for the main comparisons, many of the personality and moderation analyses were exploratory, involved multiple predictors, and should be interpreted cautiously. We treated these effects as hypothesis-generating and report full details in supplementary material. Larger, more targeted studies focusing on a limited set of traits, particularly Emotionality, Honesty\u0026ndash;Humility, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy, are needed to clarify their role in shaping simulation style.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFourth, perspective and vividness were assessed in a binary (perspective) and in an unidimensional way (vividness), respectively. Real-life simulation is likely richer, involving mixed or shifting perspectives, non-visual modalities, and dynamic changes over time. More fine-grained measures, including continuous perspective scales and multi-modal imagery assessments, could refine our understanding of how mental models of moral events are constructed moment-to-moment. Fifth, we did not fully exploit the information contained in the subgroup of participants who reported no or minimal visual imagery. In future studies, pre-screening for imagery ability and oversampling low-imagery individuals would allow more powerful tests of whether differences in sacrificial judgments and action tendencies can be attributed to the presence or absence of visual simulation per se.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding on these limitations, we see three main avenues for future research.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eExperimental manipulation of perspective and vividness.\u003c/em\u003e A natural next step is to directly manipulate perspective-taking (e.g., \u0026ldquo;imagine this through your own eyes\u0026rdquo; vs. \u0026ldquo;imagine it as if you are observing from a distance\u0026rdquo;) and imagery vividness (e.g., detailed sensory-guided imagery vs. abstract numerical focus; high vs. low visual load). Random assignment to such conditions would allow causal inferences about whether perspective and vividness shift CNI parameters or dual-process markers [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eExtending to CNI-style stimulus sets and beyond trolley problems.\u003c/em\u003e Applying the same simulation measures and manipulations to structurally diverse moral dilemmas, varying consequences, norms, and action/inaction dimensions, would test whether perspective and vividness exert consistent effects across moral \u0026ldquo;micro-structures.\u0026rdquo; Combined with multinomial modeling, this would provide a more fine-grained account of how representational formats bias sensitivity to consequences versus norms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eBridging text-based and immersive paradigms.\u003c/em\u003e Finally, our text-based findings can be situated relative to immersive VR work, which often reports higher rates of utilitarian action in scenarios analogous to the footbridge dilemma [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e60\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e61\u003c/span\u003e]. By experimentally aligning perspective and vividness across formats, e.g., instructing first- vs. third-person viewing in VR and text conditions, or parametrically varying environmental realism, future studies could test whether the representational mechanisms identified here help explain when and why VR diverges from vignette-based results [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e62\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e63\u003c/span\u003e]. Such work would further illuminate how externally scaffolded versus internally constructed simulations jointly determine moral decisions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study contributes to a growing literature that treats moral judgment not merely as the outcome of abstract principles or trait dispositions, but as the product of how moral situations are mentally represented. By showing that self-reported perspective-taking and imagery vividness covary with moral evaluations, particularly in high-conflict personal dilemmas, and are systematically related to personality traits, we highlight internal simulation as a meaningful dimension in the cognitive architecture of moral decision-making. Integrating representational variables such as perspective and vividness into formal models like the CNI framework may help explain why ostensibly similar moral scenarios can elicit strikingly different judgments across individuals, contexts, and modalities. Ultimately, understanding \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e people imagine moral events may be as important as knowing \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e they decide.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eFunding statement\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe project did not receive any funding and the authors declare no conflict of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eAuthor contributions\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCRediT author statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMartin Ernst:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eConceptualization; Methodology; Software; Validation; Formal analysis; Investigation; Resources; Data Curation; Writing - Original Draft; Visualization; Project administration.\u0026nbsp;\u003cstrong\u003eMartin Kronbichler:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eSupervision; Writing - Review \u0026amp; Editing.\u0026nbsp;\u003cstrong\u003ePatric Meyer:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eFeedback on\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eConceptualization \u0026amp; Methodology; Support on Writing - Original Draft; Writing - Review \u0026amp; Editing; Supervision.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are not publicly available due to ethical and data protection considerations, as participants did not consent to public data sharing and the dataset contains sensitive information on moral judgments and personality measures, but are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGreene, J. 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Enhancing Our Lives with Immersive Virtual Reality. \u003cem\u003eFront Robot AI\u003c/em\u003e \u003cb\u003e3\u003c/b\u003e, (2016).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMadary, M. \u0026amp; Metzinger, T. K. Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology. \u003cem\u003eFront Robot AI\u003c/em\u003e \u003cb\u003e3\u003c/b\u003e, (2016).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"mental imagery, imagery vividness, visual perspective taking, moral decision-making, trolley dilemmas, mental simulation","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8442280/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8442280/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eMental imagery is a simulation process, yet its representational format is rarely measured in moral cognition. We tested whether spontaneously adopted imagery perspective (first- vs third-person) and imagery vividness relate to moral evaluation in trolley dilemmas. In an online sample (N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;156), participants read either a switch or footbridge scenario, judged moral acceptability and willingness to act (order randomized), and after each judgment reported imagery vividness (1\u0026ndash;6; including a \u0026ldquo;no imagery\u0026rdquo; option) and perspective. We replicated the classic asymmetry: acceptability and willingness were far higher in the switch than the footbridge dilemma. Imagery perspective was largely consistent within persons across the two judgments, indicating a stable simulation stance. In the footbridge dilemma, third-person simulation was associated with higher moral acceptability than first-person simulation, whereas no association emerged in the switch dilemma; perspective did not meaningfully alter willingness to act. Vividness showed no robust scenario differences, but action-related imagery was more vivid than judgment-related imagery, and some participants reported no visual imagery for at least one judgment. These findings identify representational perspective as a parameter of mental simulation that can shape moral evaluation under high emotional load, linking imagery research to questions of conscious experience and choice.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The Perspective-Simulating Mind: How Internal Representations Shape Moral Judgment and Action","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-01-07 10:28:21","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8442280/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-04-21T14:25:58+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-03-13T22:41:01+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"207038700410496534794446486059142094657","date":"2026-03-03T14:33:53+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-03-03T10:56:31+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-02-20T13:26:26+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-12-30T09:44:25+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Scientific Reports","date":"2025-12-30T09:35:57+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"fd0e3032-36a6-4f38-b015-ee1b20813d8c","owner":[],"postedDate":"January 7th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[{"id":60372573,"name":"Biological sciences/Neuroscience"},{"id":60372574,"name":"Biological sciences/Psychology"},{"id":60372575,"name":"Social science/Psychology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-11T10:29:57+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-01-07 10:28:21","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8442280","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8442280","identity":"rs-8442280","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}