Abstract
In this simulation study, we adopt the comprehensive neurocomputational approach of Active Inference (AIF) to illustrate some key concepts of Material Engagement Theory (MET) [1]. MET posits that craftwork does not require, or rely on, rich internal ‘pre-planning’, i.e., complex and highly detailed representations that occur mainly in the maker’s head. Instead, the maker engages materiality through ’thinging’ , where the human agent (the maker) is guided by and leverages the materiality of the artefact (such as a spinning of clay or a chunk of marble). MET assigns a crucial co-participatory role to materiality, attributing agency to it. We investigate MET’s claims through the widely adopted theory of AIF [2]. Our first aim is to simulate the plausibility of the (creative) thinging , adopting a simple modelling scenario. Then, we also discuss its applicability to other, more complex cases, which seem to require greater levels of ‘pre-thinking’ (e.g., planning, imagining and conceptualising outcomes). We highlight how these cases, too, align with the general principle of thinging . With our AIF neurocomputational understanding, we explain that even in these situations, the predictive brains involved in the creative process attempt to minimise the complexity of their internal model. The upshot of this is that, always and everywhere, our human minds engage the materiality to make the most of the characteristic dynamics of the world surrounding us - things and processes alike.
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Abstract
In this simulation study, we adopt the comprehensive neurocomputational approach of Active Inference (AIF) to illustrate some key concepts of Material Engagement Theory (MET) [1]. MET posits that craftwork does not require, or rely on, rich internal ‘pre-planning’, i.e., complex and highly detailed representations that occur mainly in the maker’s head. Instead, the maker engages materiality through ’thinging’, where the human agent (the maker) is guided by and leverages the materiality of the artefact (such as a spinning of clay or a chunk of marble). MET assigns a crucial co-participatory role to materiality, attributing agency to it. We investigate MET’s claims through the widely adopted theory of AIF [2]. Our first aim is to simulate the plausibility of the (creative) thinging, adopting a simple modelling scenario. Then, we also discuss its applicability to other, more complex cases, which seem to require greater levels of ‘pre-thinking’ (e.g., planning, imagining and conceptualising outcomes). We highlight how these cases, too, align with the general principle of thinging. With our AIF neurocomputational understanding, we explain that even in these situations, the predictive brains involved in the creative process attempt to minimise the complexity of their internal model. The upshot of this is that, always and everywhere, our human minds engage the materiality to make the most of the characteristic dynamics of the world surrounding us - things and processes alike.
Competing Interest Statement
The authors have declared no competing interest.
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