Strategic Compliance with Gender Quotas: A Model of Party Behaviour and Evidence from Brazil

Strategic Compliance with Gender Quotas: A Model of Party Behaviour and Evidence from Brazil | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Strategic Compliance with Gender Quotas: A Model of Party Behaviour and Evidence from Brazil Eduardo Mello This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6874544/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Why do parties follow the rules but sidestep the intent of electoral gender quotas? Although quotas are designed to promote inclusion, parties often nominate women while denying them viable support, resulting in widespread symbolic compliance. This article develops a formal model of strategic quota behaviour, theorising how parties navigate the trade-off between token gestures and meaningful investment. The model incorporates a viability threshold for campaign funding and parameters for elite entrenchment, status quo bias, and ideological commitment. We apply it to Brazil’s 2022 federal deputy elections, simulating party-level decisions using campaign finance and incumbency data. The model captures observed variation in compliance and identifies meaningful residuals, such as the Workers’ Party’s overperformance and NOVO’s underperformance. These findings show that while structural incentives matter, internal party norms and ideologies remain decisive. By combining formal modelling with empirical diagnostics, we provide a new framework for understanding how institutional rules are distorted or activated by political incentives. Social science/Politics and international relations Social science/Sociology Quotas Electoral Systems Party Behaviour Representation Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6874544","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":472317406,"identity":"d3ff3815-a6e6-4a7f-8dae-bf7e9ca6a4d7","order_by":0,"name":"Eduardo Mello","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Fundação Getulio Vargas","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Eduardo","middleName":"","lastName":"Mello","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-11 19:38:11","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6874544/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6874544/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":84853319,"identity":"4a3dd801-b70e-4ee3-a2c3-3c1313ba6f58","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-18 05:10:24","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":345314,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"quotaspaperanonymised.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6874544/v1_covered_6972080a-ff4a-4b30-8654-bb06ce015fef.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003eStrategic Compliance with Gender Quotas: A Model of Party Behaviour and Evidence from Brazil\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Quotas, Electoral Systems, Party Behaviour, Representation","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6874544/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6874544/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"Why do parties follow the rules but sidestep the intent of electoral gender quotas? 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