The illusion of information adequacy: A corollary to naïve realism

NOTE: The final published paper (focused on study 2) is now available at https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0310216The theory of naïve realism suggests that many disagreements occur because different parties construe the same situation differently. The present study proposes a corollary: the illusion of information adequacy. Specifically, we argue that in addition divergent construals of the same situation, naïve realism is precipitated by people who are exposed to different information assuming that their information is sufficient to adequately understand the situation. Participants in our preregistered studies (Ns = 218 and 1261, respectively) responded to a hypothetical scenario in which control participants received full information and treatment participants received approximately half of that same information. Across both studies, we found that treatment participants assumed that they had comparably adequate information and that they were just as competent in making a thoughtful decision based on that information. Participants’ decisions were heavily influenced by which cross-section of information they received. Finally, in line with the false consensus effect, participants believed that most other people would make a similar decision to the one they made. We discuss the implications of this corollary to naïve realism within the context of interpersonal conflict resolution strategies.