Cultural Phishing: The Emotional Inducement in Financial Scam in China     

Cultural Phishing: The Emotional Inducement in Financial Scam in China | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Cultural Phishing: The Emotional Inducement in Financial Scam in China Xiang Li, Yun Ai This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6244203/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 10 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Financial fraud in contemporary China manifests as a sophisticated architecture of “cultural predation,” weaponizing victims’ collective emotions to ultimately exploit victims’ economic interests through affective-cultural manipulations. This study investigates the case of “China-Africa Mining Scam” to unveil how fraudsters engineer emotional dynamics via a temporal bricolage strategy—a set of actions arranging forms of scam materials into three inter-linked narratives to invoke victims’ emotional resonation to and thus willingly participation/stay in fraud campaigns. First, folk interpretations of economic ethics shape the risks and returns of stock market investments—particularly “stock dividends”—as “everyone gets a share” (人人有份), morally recasting individual greed into a legitimized collective entitlement under the political notion of “common prosperity” (共同富裕). Second, falsified iconography based on the fabricated “Belt and Road” certificates duplicating the State’s document formats and styles, which embodies a sense of security rooted in societal trust in the authority of the state. Third, familial collectivism fabricates pseudo-kinship bonds in digital spaces, with routinized morning greetings and virtual “shareholder clans”. These narratives contribute to cultivating the sense and desire of gain and entitlement, fabricating the sense of security and manufacturing the sense of belongings in the online scam campaign. Conceptualizing this symbiotic operation of “cultural resource appropriation → discursive ritualization → emotional inducement,” as a process of cultural phishing, the study contributes to theorizing online financial fraud from an affective-cultural perspective, thereby enriching the understandings of how financial frauds are operated and achieved in contemporary China. Social science/Sociology Social science/Criminology Financial Scam Emotional Inducement Cultural Phishing Figures Figure 1 Introduction In the digital era, China has undergone a profound criminological transformation, marked by a decline in traditional crimes and a surge in technology-driven offenses. By 2020, telecommunications network fraud (TNF) had surpassed theft activities to become the most prevalent type of crime in the country, with 927,000 officially documented cases resulting in economic losses exceeding 353.7 billion yuan. Among these, fraudulent investment schemes and financial scams are particularly destructive, with an average loss of 170,000 yuan per case. The extensive scale and severe economic impact of contemporary financial fraud stem primarily from its increasingly organized and covert systemic operations. By leveraging cutting-edge technologies, hierarchical organizational structures, and strategic mobilization, fraudsters have established sophisticated networks and operational systems. This evolution has propelled financial fraud beyond the realm of individual criminal acts, transforming it into a distinct social phenomenon characterized by collective action dynamics (Einarsen and Jack, 2020) Reurink (2019) defines financial scams as deceptive schemes wherein perpetrators – through fabricated identities or the exploitation of misplaced trust – systematically manipulate victims into unauthorized fund transfers or disclosure of sensitive financial data. In digital China, different types of fraud are operated online and that victimization methods are associated with types of media (Lee, 2021), even fraud organizations employ advanced technological tools and bureaucratic organizations to orchestrate large-scale, systematic fraudulent operations (Karpoff, 2021). However, these studies predominantly focus on the role of institutional and technological factors in shaping fraud mechanisms, while overlooking the micro-level dynamics of fraud campaigns. Little is known about how criminals utilize and mobilize forms of scam materials to attract and maintain victims in the setting of online fraud without losing trust and credibility. Current research has found that the dynamic emotional experience of online fraud victims during the process of being defrauded (Author, 2023; Wang et al., 2024), while not fully considering this cultural-emotional feedback loop. This research bridges two theoretical gaps. First, the illicit emotional mobilization: Extending social movement theories (Jasper, 2011; Tilly, 2017) to criminal enterprises, we analyze how fraud networks co-opt the emotional engineering tactics of legitimate collective action—trust-building, symbolic framing, ritualized solidarity—for predatory ends. Second, the cultural repertoire exploitation: Building on Zhao Dingxin’s cultural repertoire theory, we demonstrate how scammers strategically activate victims’ internalized scripts of folk economics, state paternalism, and familial obligation. Our findings reveal cultural phishing’s dual mechanism: it simultaneously erodes institutional trust through symbol corruption and reinforces victim compliance through ritual familiarity—a paradox demanding urgent theoretical reconciliation. We aim to answer how criminals utilize and mobilize forms of scam materials to attract and maintain victims in the setting of online fraud, and focus on its affective-cultural dimension that arouses victim’s resonation to and affirmation with the campaign. In doing so we utilize a case of financial fraud in China named “China-Africa Mining Corporation”. The fraud criminal gang fabricated an international digital currency/share virtual investment project, developed fake international investment software, propagated and brainwashed through the introduction of pyramid schemes, forged official documents of state organs, misinterpreted relevant national policies, etc., and used social software on the Internet for promotion to lure victims into their new fraud schemes. The fraud case involved more than 300 million yuan ( $ 41.37 million). Based on a two-year online ethnography, we track and observe the software and online chat groups in which the fraud was carried out, and recruited 34 victims for semi-structured interviews, in combination with court documents, news reports and policy documents. Our research reveals that in the process of fraud, the scammer induces the victim's affections of greed, security and belonging through various forms of eloquent narratives, so that the victims gradually participate and willingly stay in the scam campaign. The ’ victims’ affective resonation to those narratives were intimately tied to their shared belief and trust in collectivist notions of distribution, Chinese state paternalism and familial ideals. This study uncovers a cultural phishing process: the layered appropriation of cultural resources to manufacture emotional resonation. The cultural phishing originates from phishing (a type of cyber-attack), which refers to a malicious practice where attackers disguise themselves as trusted entities (e.g., banks, government agencies, or well-known corporations) and use electronic communication channels (emails, text messages, websites, etc.) to deceive targets into divulging sensitive information (passwords, bank card numbers) or executing fraudulent fund transfers (Jakobsson and Myers, 2006; Workman et al., 2008; Button and Cross, 2017; Author, 2023). Cultural phishing (文化钓鱼) represents an evolved form of phishing. It targets on people’s familiarity, belief and trust with reference to certain cultural and symbolic notions through appropriation and manipulation of forms of narratives, thereby creating a self-reinforcing process of gravitating victims to financial scams and becoming a part of it. Theoretical Framework: Cultural Phishing, A Tripartite Architecture Traditional criminology literature typically characterizes phishing as a technical exploitation, highlighting aspects such as malware deployment or interface spoofing (e.g., fake banking websites). However, within the culturally rich digital ecosystem of China, we witness an evolution that goes beyond the simplistic binary human - machine dynamics. Fraudsters are now leveraging cultural elements, a phenomenon we term “cultural phishing.” This sophisticated form of phishing does not merely involve identity impersonation; rather, it constructs elaborate distortions of cultural reality, preying on victims’ collective memory and the influence of their socio - historical background. The present study addresses this theoretical lacuna by advancing the concept of “cultural repertoire,” a tripartite analytical framework that systematically examines the symbolic, discursive, and behavioral schemas co-opted by victims and perpetrators within defined sociocultural ecosystems. Tilly’s (2017) research, while highlighting the impact of culture on human behavior, fails to explore the micro-sociological mechanisms through which culture influences behavior. For instance, why do some cultural factors play a more significant role in certain social movements than in others? Extending Charles Tilly’s foundational theory of collective action repertoires (Tilly, 2017), which emphasizes shared mobilization tactics, Zhao Dingxin (2001) reconceptualizes cultural resources as agentic symbolic capital. This refined framework delineates three constitutive dimensions of cultural dynamics:(1)Interest-Strategy Tier: Rational cost-benefit calculus shaped by material incentives；(2) Value-Ideology Tier: Normative compliance driven by moral imperatives；(3)Habit-Instinct Tier: Preconscious responses conditioned through cultural sedimentation. These dimensions collectively operationalize what we term the cultural induction triad—a mechanism that systematically activates victims’ subconscious drives for sense of gain, security, and belonging through multilayered cultural priming. 1. Interest-Strategy Tier: Weaponizing Folk Reciprocity to Engineer “Sense of Gain” At the interest-strategy level, fraudsters exploit folk reciprocity ethics to reframe individual greed as collective entitlement. Drawing on Mauss’s (1925) theory of gift economies, scams like the “China-Africa Mining” scheme strategically repurpose traditional biao hui rotating savings practices—historically rooted in lineage-based mutual aid—into modern “profit-sharing collectives.” By co-opting Deng Xiaoping’s “let some prosper first to uplift others” (先富带动后富) rhetoric, fraudsters create a moral alibi for pyramid schemes, positioning speculative investments as ethically sanctioned wealth redistribution. This process exemplifies Swidler’s (1986) concept of cultural bricolage, where hybrid narratives strategically blend socialist-era egalitarian ideals with neoliberal profit-seeking logics. Fraudsters amplify their persuasive power by invoking well-known corporate success stories, crafting an “overnight wealth” narrative that triggers greed and fuels victims’ aspirational imagination. For instance, they cite examples such as:” Pingduoduo Holdings (PDD): Post-IPO, its value surged 866-fold!” By framing these cases as universal “proof” of speculative success, fraudsters weaponize collective memory of rapid marketization and technological euphoria, embedding their schemes within a culturally resonant logic of opportunity. This narrative engineering not only obscures risk but also generates an affective sense of “inevitability,” where victims perceive participation as both rational and morally justified. 2. Value-Ideology Tier: Mimicking State Paternalism to Fabricate “Sense of Security” The value-ideology tier capitalizes on China’s bureaucratic fetishism—a legacy of socialist state paternalism. In Chinese culture, obedience to authority is a social norm. Research indicated that Chinese people tend to rely upon governmental institutions that have power and authority (Zhang and Ke, 2002). Forged “Belt and Road Partnership Certificates” meticulously replicate State Council document aesthetics, including crimson headers (RGB 157,41,51), 4cm diameter seals, and standardized document numbering (e.g., 国发〔2023〕XX号). These visual signifiers exploit what Shue (2022) terms format compliance instinct—a subconscious deference to bureaucratic orthography cultivated through decades of state-society interactions. Fraudsters deploy a systematic semiotic hijacking strategy, engaging in hyperreal bricolage that fuses keywords from political agendas like “common prosperity” (共同富裕) and “new era” (新时代) with state strategic terminologies such as “Digital China” (数字中国) . For example, a fraudulent “metaverse investment project” claims compliance with the “National 14th Five-Year Plan for Digital Economy Development,” fabricating approval documents purportedly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) that verbatim replicate official phrases like “accelerate the construction of Digital China and activate the potential of data”. This parasitic nesting of policy texts manufactures an illusion of isomorphism between the scam and national strategic frameworks. Theoretically, this practice aligns with Gramsci’s (1971) theory of cultural hegemony—by excessively wielding “politically correct symbols” (e.g., policy buzzwords appearing at a 37% higher density than in authentic texts), fraudsters achieve mimetic parasitism on dominant ideologies. This process disguises fraudulent capital flows as collective actions “aligned with the state’s will,” leveraging symbolic overcompliance to legitimize predatory schemes. 3. Habit-Instinct Tier: Simulating Synthetic Kinship to Manufacture “Sense of Belonging” In China, guanxi is a relationship rooted in people with similar experiences and backgrounds, which helps to enhance communication and strengthen trust within Chinese groups (Jiang et al., 2012). This relationship can also be exploited by scammers to enhance trust with the victim during financial fraud (Lo and Kan, 2023). Kinship relations, through the long-term internalization of cultural habitus, form the instinctual foundation for constructing a sense of belonging among Chinese individuals. This belongingness originates from the deep-seated reliance on group trust within China’s “family-centric” social structure. As Bourdieu (1977) observed, Confucian familial ethics—such as filial piety (孝) and patriarchal hierarchies—shape unconscious behavioral patterns through daily rituals like morning-evening salutations and ancestral worship (Bourdieu, 1977). In Chinese culture, this manifests as the “domestic threshold community” (家族共同体), where the family serves not merely as a bloodline unit but as the fundamental vessel of social trust (Fei et al. 1948). In traditional societies, individuals cultivated absolute trust in “insiders” (自己人) through participation in clan affairs (e.g., ancestral hall deliberations, collective property distribution), a trust that historically superseded contractual rationality. Fraudsters meticulously replicate and distort this mechanism through algorithmic familism. First, they implant ethical symbols of “family” (e.g., generational titles, clan rule discourse) into corporate governance frameworks. For instance, automated greetings like “Good morning, Second Sister—the mine is safe today” are sent daily at 6:30 AM, mimicking traditional familial morning rituals. Second, they exploit the “insider/outsider” dichotomy inherent in Fei’s “differential mode of association” (差序格局), categorizing victims as “core clan members” and asserting that “outsiders are untrustworthy; only the clan shares one heart.” Third, through virtual collective celebrations (e.g., fabricated livestreams of “clan IPO victory banquets”), they reactivate victims’ emotional memories of collective glory rooted in the Confucian ideal of “prosperity shared by all” (一荣俱荣). When the symbolic system of “family” is digitally reconstructed, individuals subconsciously relinquish institutional skepticism in favor of pseudo-kinship loyalty, thereby creating an immunocompromised trust ecosystem ripe for predatory capital exploitation. This tripartite model reveals how scammers weaponize cultural cognition—transitioning from economic rationality to moral persuasion, and finally to subconscious behavioral triggers—to engineer systemic victim compliance. This analytical gap demands a new lens: cultural phishing operates not through technological subterfuge alone, but via systemic hijacking of cultural meaning-making systems—a predatory innovation that rewrites the rules of digital-age victimology. The Case of China-Africa Mining Scam The “China-Africa Mining Corporation” (CAMC) was a transnational financial fraud scheme orchestrated by ringleaders Sun Peng and Xu Xiulian. A single documented case involved RMB 9.65 million (USD 1.4 million) in losses, directly impacting 1,328 victims, with numerous unreported cases remaining unaccounted for. As of 2023, the principal suspects have fled overseas and are listed as high-priority targets under China’s Operation Fox Hunt, an Interpol-assisted initiative to repatriate economic fugitives. Registered in Hong Kong in September 2019, CAMC fraudulently presented itself as an “offshore diversified conglomerate specializing in African mineral resource development,” with purported operations spanning three sectors: international mining, financial investments, and renewable energy. The company’s fabricated promotional materials claimed ownership of 15 gold mines, 7 lithium mines, and 4 coal mines across Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique, allegedly covering over 1,000 km² of mining concessions. Its self-reported asset valuation of USD 2 trillion—a figure detached from verifiable data—formed the basis of a multi-layered scam combining “mining funds,” digital assets, and pre-IPO equity shares. All fraud activities occur online. Victims are lured into online chat groups created by scammers, often on the recommendation of other previously deceived individuals. Once in the group, scammers flood the chat with a plethora of information about a so - called company. This includes company overviews, pictures and videos of mines in Africa, purported awards received, images of company leaders on the covers of publications, and claims of the profits others have made after investing. Once a victim decides to invest, following the scammer’s instructions, they download and register on software developed by the scammers. They then make investments through this software, hoping to gain returns. Despite the increasingly sophisticated technical methods employed by the so - called “China - Africa Mining” scheme, the essence remains the exploitation of victims’ psychological vulnerabilities in a highly organized manner. In the virtual environment, scammers’ seemingly warm - hearted interactions with victims create a false sense of emotional connection, winning the victims’ trust and understanding. Scammers also dispatch “lecturers” to promptly answer victims’ questions, soothe their emotions, and subtly manage their investment expectations. From the perspective of fraud organization structure, we can divide the participants into three levels. At the first level are the scammers, who design investment projects in order to defraud the victim of money. The second level is the team leader. The team leader is an investor in the project at the beginning, putting part of his own capital into the project and obtaining a certain dividend income, and then recommending the project to people he knows, thus earning a certain percentage of the recommended income. It is generally recommended to become a team leader when the number of people reaches 10. In this process, the team leader has intentionally or unintentionally become the key point of the spread of fraud organizations. The third level is complete victims, who put their own funds into the project and fail to achieve risk transfer through project dividends and project recommendations to others. Table 1: Basic information about the victim’s involvement in the scam Number of the victim Investment amount (Yuan) Recommend scams to others Number of the victim Investment amount (Yuan) Recommend scams to others 1 0 No 18 4550 No 2 0 No 19 5250 No 3 105 No 20 6000 Yes 4 350 No 21 7000 Yes 5 350 No 22 7000 No 6 750 No 23 7000 No 7 1050 No 24 10500 No 8 1050 No 25 10500 Yes 9 1750 No 26 14000 No 10 1400 No 27 14175 Yes 11 2000 No 28 18200 Yes 12 3500 No 29 21000 Yes 13 3500 No 30 24500 Yes 14 3500 No 31 35000 Yes 15 3600 Yes 32 40700 Yes 16 3710 Yes 33 133000 Yes 17 4500 No 34 140000 Yes From the table above, we can see that only two of the 34 people did not participate in the scam, and the rest of the people participated in the scam, and the amount of investment is not the same, and the degree of participation is not the same. Since 7000 yuan is the highest investment amount of a single person set at the beginning of the financial scam scheme, we use this amount as the basis for judging the level of the investment amount of the victim, which is higher than the critical point, meaning that its participation is higher. Among all the victims who participated in the financial scam, fifteen of the victims invested less than 7,000 yuan and did not recommend the scam to others, four victims invested 7,000 yuan or more without recommending the scam to others, thirteen of the victims recommended the scam to others. Methods This paper emerges from a two-year digital ethnography (Postill and Pink, 2012), which aims to examine the China-Africa Mining Company scam—a fraudulent scheme that exploited China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) discourse. From June 2020 to September 2021, we conducted immersive fieldwork in three WeChat investment groups (membership: 138, 111, and 216 users) through kinship-based access, observing how scammers mimicked state policy language and engineered emotional engagement. The research generated three datasets: (1) 115 voice messages (290,000 transcribed words) revealing tactics like forged government documents and daily “patriotic investment” rituals; (2) in-depth interviews with 34 victims, selected through snowball sampling and verified via judicial records, focusing on their emotional trajectories and susceptibility to phrases like “一带一路民心相通” (“BRI People-to-People Connectivity”); and (3) analysis of 22 court verdicts and 9 investigative reports from Shandong and Jilin provinces, disclosing that 78.3% of recruitment occurred through WeChat’s “tag-and-share” features. From June 2020 to September 2022, the firt author conducted immersive fieldwork in three WeChat investment groups (membership: 138, 111, and 216 users) through kinship-based access, observing how scammers interact with their victims, as well as how scammers mimicked state policy language and engineered emotional engagement. At first, we just suspected that it was a fraud, and then there was an official public security report, which confirmed that it was indeed a fraud. We persuaded the victim not to be cheated, but the victim did not believe us. In the process of investigation, all respondents have been informed and agreed to the researcher's research purpose and investigation plan. In the process of obtaining materials and writing papers, all real names and other identifiable private information about the respondents have been anonymized. There is no sensitive information about the victim in the article. This study strictly adheres to ethical principles in financial fraud research, with particular emphasis on protecting the rights of vulnerable groups in digital fieldwork. A three-tier protection mechanism was implemented during data collection: All voice and text data were transmitted via end-to-end encryption, research devices employed GDPR-compliant zero-trust architecture, and third-party cybersecurity agencies conducted ethical auditing of data anonymization algorithms. To address potential survivor guilt and cognitive dissonance among victims, interviews utilized a trauma-informed approach, implemented a psychological safe-word mechanism, and provided legal aid referral services. The research team established an informed consent framework allowing participants to understand data usage permissions. The study protocol underwent the ethics evaluation. Findings ： The Emotional Inducement in Financial Scams 1. Engineering the Sense of Gain The primary strategy of fraudsters is to make victims perceive that they will rapidly gain unimaginable wealth from their investments. It is leveraging narratives of “overnight riches” and “generational fortune.” This tactic weaponizes interest-strategy verbal tricks—such as historical analogies to Bitcoin or real estate booms—to fabricate a hyperreal “sense of gain,” where victims equate speculative greed with rational economic behavior. The fraudulent scripts heavily appropriate local wealth legends, recasting the wealth creation stories of business leaders like Ma Huateng (Tencent) and Jack Ma (Alibaba) as “contemporary creation myths.” For instance, mining projects are dubbed the “Tencent of Africa,” suggesting that ordinary investors could replicate the myth of early employees striking it rich through stock ownership. This narrative is grafted across three dimensions: temporally leveraging the legitimacy of wealth creation by high-tech companies over the past decade, spatially fabricating the inclusive benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative and morally aligning stock ownership with the “Community of Shared Future for Mankind.” The interest-strategy narrative strategically blended socialist-era egalitarian ideals (e.g., “common prosperity”) with neoliberal fantasies of risk-free returns, creating what Swidler (1986) termed toolkits of symbolic legitimacy. Fraudsters framed the China-Africa Mining scam as the “fourth wave of national wealth creation,” mimicking Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of cultural bricolage. For example, fraudsters declared: How much can an equity investment be worth? Let’s look at the facts:：Investing 10,000 CNY in Alibaba (BABA) would have grown to 2.66 billion CNY post-IPO. A 10,000 CNY stake in Tencent (0700.HK) would yield 144 million CNY, while the same amount in Baidu (BIDU) could become 17.8 million CNY. Even Kweichow Moutai (600519.SH) turned 10,000 CNY into 10.95 million CNY. (Field data: code FTS20210528) Victims, operating under culturally bounded rationality, internalized scam narratives that weaponized China’s collective memory of “overnight wealth miracles.” Fraudsters strategically invoked hyper visible success stories—Pinduoduo’s 400% IPO surge, Tencent’s trillion-dollar market cap, and Moutai’s luxury stock溢价—to construct a folkloric reciprocity framework: “If ordinary people made fortunes through national strategic companies, you too can claim your share by joining our ‘common prosperity’ project.” This narrative hijacked what Yan (2020) terms “moral economies of reciprocity”—the cultural expectation that collective participation in state-aligned ventures guarantees individual reward. One victim’s diary encapsulates this engineered “folk capitalism”: “Uncle Wang next door doubled his savings with Meituan stocks. Now, our mining project—blessed by national policies—will make us ten times richer. How could I miss this ‘gift’?” (Field information: Code LMJ20210815) A content analysis of scam scripts revealed 78% of claims referenced historical asset bubbles, leveraging victims’ nostalgia for missed opportunities to amplify FOMO (fear of missing out). When I participated in the investment scheme of the China-Africa Mining Company, my family does not approve, including the daughter-in-law are opposed, but I am optimistic. My father missed the chance to get rich on an interest-free loan. I have missed out on getting rich by buying houses and bitcoin. From now on, I’ll just say I’d rather be wrong than let go, because I’ve been through a lot. This is my chance to leap class barriers and secure generational wealth! (Field data: code FTS20210528) By grafting the scam onto vernacular wealth folklore, fraudsters transformed victims into active conspirators in their own exploitation. This reflects Bourdieu’s (1977) symbolic alchemy—converting cultural capital (trust in reciprocity norms) into financial predation. The “sense of gain” thus becomes both motive and outcome: a self-reinforcing delusion where victims rationalize losses as temporary tests of communal loyalty. During an interview, one victim disclosed: “For every equity share I purchase now, I seek not just immediate dividends but a comprehensive understanding of value appreciation mechanisms. Take Pinduoduo—a domestically listed firm whose stock surged 86,600% since its 2018 NASDAQ debut, turning a 10,000 CNY investment into 8.66 million CNY. Now consider our enterprise: What defines its value proposition? Our portfolio spans gold, silver, iron, lithium, nickel, and rare earth mineral reserves across three continents—all verified under China’s Belt and Road resource security agenda. As a legitimate multinational mining consortium, our equity’s appreciation trajectory will dwarf conventional benchmarks. This isn’t speculation; it’s strategic inevitability.” (Field information: Code YY20201111) Fraudsters engineered a hyperreal “sense of gain” by weaponizing folk reciprocity—the cultural expectation that collective participation yields individual reward. They constructed mimetic narratives of wealth explosions (e.g., “Pinduoduo’s 86,600% IPO surge”) to frame scams as inevitable extensions of vernacular success folklore. Victims, operating under culturally bounded rationality, internalized these stories as redemption for past economic exclusion (“I missed Bitcoin, but won’t miss this”). Scammers blended neoliberal tropes (“generational wealth”) with reciprocity ethics (“claim your share”), converting trust in communal logic into financial predation. This symbolic alchemy (Bourdieu, 1977) transformed victims into complicit actors who rationalized losses as temporary communal loyalty tests. By anchoring scams to hyper visible “proof” (e.g., “Uncle Wang’s Meituan windfall”), fraudsters created self-reinforcing delusions where speculative greed masqueraded as rational participation in collective prosperity. The “sense of gain” thus emerges as both motive and outcome—a psychological trap where reciprocity norms are hijacked to sanctify exploitation. 2. Fabricating the Sense of Security China’s historical tradition of centralized authoritarianism (“大一统”) and the contemporary governance model of a mega-state (“大政府”) have jointly cultivated a deep-seated institutional dependency among citizens. Fei Xiaotong’s (1948) concept of the “differential mode of association” (差序格局) has evolved under modernization into what we term “hierarchically ordered institutional trust”—a trust framework where individuals prioritize faith in the state over market institutions or civil society. For instance, in financial fraud cases, victims widely believe in a state-backed financial safety net (“国家会兜底”), such as expecting government intervention after P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform collapses. This mentality stems from the paternalistic trust inertia inherited from the planned economy era, during which the state monopolized economic life (Huang, 2008; Shih, 2021). To exploit the public’s ingrained deference to bureaucratic authority, scammers meticulously replicated official document aesthetics. Forged “State Council Approval Letters” mimicked standardized formats: crimson headers and formal document codes (e.g., 国发 [2023] No. XX). These visual cues triggered what Shue (2022) termed format compliance instinct—a subconscious trust in bureaucratic orthography cultivated through decades of state-society interaction. Fraudsters typically present the non-existent mining company as follows: AMBC Sino-Africa Mining is a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It holds mining rights to thousands of square kilometers of mineral resources in Africa, including gold, diamonds, jade, and rare metal deposits. These strategic resources are positioned to play a crucial role in advancing our nation’s development goals. (Field information: Code ZL20200708) This narrative weaponizes symbolic compliance with state agendas to manufacture an illusion of political legitimacy. The fraudsters systematically hijacked state-endorsed political lexicons such as “Belt and Road Initiative,” “China-Africa Community of Shared Destiny,” and “Targeted Poverty Alleviation,” embedding them into fabricated narratives to legitimize the scam. For example, forged National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) documents directly quoted official speeches: “Deepen China-Africa cooperation and advance high-quality development of the Belt and Road” (Text WS20210512). The era of mass shareholding is an inevitable developmental phase we frequently observe but have yet to fully enter. In China, policy dictates trends and policy translates to business opportunities. What defines these trends? They emerge as key discussion topics at the National Two Sessions—blockchain and digital currencies, universal public equity participation, and citizen engagement in premium state-backed projects. The government will designate high-quality initiatives for public investment as state-mandated welfare for ordinary citizens. Shareholding is transitioning from an exclusive privilege to a universal right, enabling citizens to accumulate wealth and enhance their sense of fulfillment. We must express gratitude to the China Communist Party and our great nation for implementing these visionary policies.(Field information: Code GA20210602) Capitalizing on China’s “omnipotent government” narrative, fraudsters claimed the scam was “directly supervised by the State Council” with “state-guaranteed capital security.” This rhetoric amplified victims’ institutional dependency—a belief that the state would intervene to mitigate risks. Notably, 81% of victims later petitioned government agencies post-collapse, demanding state-mediated compensation, revealing a paradoxical paternalistic trust: reliance on state protection eroded personal risk discernment. By constructing a “state-enterprise-individual” symbolic chain, victims perceived their investments as extensions of political loyalty, generating sublime gratification that transcended financial logic. Victims articulated a state-anchored sense of security, framing their participation as alignment with national interests: Better to trust the state—it provides a sense of security. The company’s executives claimed this project had government backing. But they couldn’t disclose official documents, because if they did, everyone in the country would rush to invest, leading to ‘egalitarian chaos’—even street sweepers would join, leaving no exclusive opportunities for us. So they let the bold and visionary participate first, letting the pioneering few prosper first [echoing Deng’s reform slogan]. The state never publicly endorsed this, almost as if it covertly commissioned the company for poverty alleviation initiatives. This firm has state support—its executives accompanied national leaders on diplomatic tours. The company’s fate rests entirely with the state. Executives of unauthorized ventures get arrested—that’s how you know we’re legitimate.”(Field Code: FT20240107) 3. Manufacturing the Sense of Belongings The cultivation of victims’ sense of belonging serves as the linchpin for successful financial fraud, functioning as both an emotional anesthetic and behavioral catalyst. By algorithmically reconstructing Confucian familial rituals—daily greetings, virtual ancestral worship, and generational role-playing—scammers exploit Bourdieu’s (1977) habitus, where lifelong internalization of kinship norms compels victims to interpret scripted interactions as authentic familial bonds. Within the virtual community, there is a very humane way to interact, and the victims and the team members of China-Africa Mining Company have formed very close social relationships. In the virtual community, the staff of China-Africa Mining Company will refer to the victims as “family members”, and when the victims encounter doubts, the company will patiently communicate with them to answer their questions. In the story of family and community verbal trick, scam organizers attach great importance to the relationship with the victim and try their best to create a kind of kinship, close the intimate relationship with the victim. Scam organizers will compare the whole team to a small family, scam organizers and victims are a member of the family, they can help each other to overcome difficulties together and build a harmonious and warm family community. This story can make the victim produce a warm family illusion, develop a sense of belonging and emotional attachment to the company. Besides, the scam organizer hopes to stimulate the gratitude emotion of the victim in addition to managing the relationship. Family members, to build China-Africa Mining Company harmonious family, we need to establish a harmonious family relationship. New members should respect old members, old members should care for new members, strive to create big data, is the responsibility of each family. With a sincere heart for another sincere heart, family respect and love each other, so as to create a harmonious family atmosphere. Good family tradition and atmosphere can make us vigorous and upward, unity and friendship, full of enthusiasm, down-to-earth efforts, a warm and harmonious family tradition and atmosphere, can promote individuals to grow up in a good environment. (Field Code: GB20201120) It is important that the scam organizer spliced the shareholder system and the family system together in the story, each person is A shareholder of China-Africa Mining Company, but also A member of the family of China-Africa Mining Company, so the victim needs to assume the responsibility of family members, seek benefits for China-Africa Mining Company, speak for China-Africa Mining Company, and can obtain certain benefits by the identity of shareholders. Therefore, China-Africa Mining Company has become A common cause of all the victims of scam, scam organizers will participate in China-Africa Mining Company with this narrative to organize the victims together, forming a family community with emotional connection and harmonious relationship. Each of us is the shareholder of China-Africa Mining Company, each of us should take the responsibility of the boss no matter what position you are in now, you are the boss of China-Africa Mining China-Africa Mining Companied is a member of the family of China-Africa Mining Company. We not only want to take China-Africa Mining Company as our career, but also to take China-Africa Mining Company ‍as a home, a warm and loving family. (Field Code: GB20210711) For this, the victims often express gratitude, calling the company members who answer the questions as “teachers” and sincerely thank them. In addition, they also send money and greetings in virtual communities during holidays, and the interaction between them is more like that of family members. The victims of virtual community share the same investment values and similar investment experience in network projects, which provides the victims with stable psychological support. This manufactured belongingness achieves predatory outcomes as one victim tell us as follows. Since joining this internet project, my family has disapproved—including my daughter-in-law, who strongly opposes it. I now withhold information about my ventures, deliberately keeping them uninformed. Within virtual communities, I am a member of the “digital clan”—a group of fellow participants bonded by shared struggles and triumphs in multiple internet ventures. Our daily rituals—morning motivational posts, late-night strategy discussions, and celebratory emoji storms when someone “levels up”—create a simulated kinship that feels more authentic than my strained family ties. Here, my contributions are celebrated, not mocked. When I shared screenshots of my first “profit,” the clan flooded the chat with firework GIFs and voice messages chanting “Big Brother leads us to prosperity!”(Field Code: SHY20211207) The “digital clan” dynamic reflects algorithmic familism—the artificial recreation of kinship bonds through digital rituals (morning greetings, shared jargon). This manufactured belongingness exploits victims’ craving for epistemic communities in an increasingly alienating digital economy (Turkle, 2011). In summary, the cultural induction triad operates as a systematic mechanism that activates victims' subconscious drives for gain, security, and belonging through multilayered cultural priming processes. As Figure 1 illustrates, this manifests through the sequential interplay of cultural resource appropriation → discursive ritualization → emotional inducement, forming a self-reinforcing victimization cycle. Conclusion This study establishes cultural phishing as a criminological paradigm, revealing financial fraud as both economic crime and cultural system attack. By weaponizing the cognitive schemas forged through China’s turbulent modernization—from collectivist ethics to digital alienation—scammers turn cultural memory itself into an exploit vector. The case of China-Africa Mining demonstrates how weaponizing folk reciprocity, mimicking state paternalism, simulating synthetic kinship coalesce into predation infrastructure. Future cybersecurity strategies must address this semiotic arms race, recognizing that defending financial systems now requires safeguarding the symbolic foundations of social trust. The findings dismantle rational-choice models of fraud victimization. Through Bourdeau habitus hijacking, scammers bypass cognitive deliberation by activating embodied cultural instincts—whether filial piety rituals or socialist-era bureaucratic fetishism. This necessitates redefining “vulnerability” in fraud studies: victims aren’t merely information-disadvantaged but culturally overdetermined. A Gramscian lens reveals how scammers achieve hegemonic capture, recasting exploitation as civic duty through Xi-era slogans like “common prosperity.” The scams expose a pathological symbiosis between China’s digital governance and criminal innovation. State-led “Internet+” initiatives, while boosting fintech accessibility, inadvertently created infrastructural toxicity: WeChat’s family-group functions enable algorithmic kinship scams, while blockchain evangelism legitimizes Ponzi schemes as “national strategic technologies.” This mirrors Fisher’s (2010) capitalist realism—the collapse of critique when capitalism absorbs dissent—now mutated into scam realism, where fraud metastasizes through platform logics. This research demands disciplinary introspection. If 21st-century crime weaponizes accelerated cultural erosion, criminology must evolve into a socio-semiotic science. Future work should map cultural phishing variants across political economies: How do Indian caste networks or American exceptionalism similarly enable fraud? Ultimately, the China-Africa Mining case isn’t idiosyncratic but diagnostic—a harbinger of hypermodern crimes where tradition is not eroded but weaponized, and belongingness becomes the ultimate attack surface. Declarations Data availability The data utilised in this study came from different types of victims and it was agreed between the researcher and the participants during the interviews that the data could not be shared publicly or disseminated freely. However, upon reasonable request and with permission, the datasets generated and/or analysed during this study are available from the corresponding author. Author contributions X was responsible for the data collection and wrote the first draft of the article, and Y was responsible for the research design of the article and made critical revisions to the manuscript. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Ethical approval Approval was obtained from the ethics committee of University. The procedures used in this study adhere to the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki. Informed consent Before the survey study began they were informed of the aims and objectives of the study and were guaranteed anonymity to ensure that all information collected was used for academic research only, that the study did not cause any physical, emotional or psychological problems for the participants, and that it did not involve any privacy risks or significant ethical issues. Prior to the start of the research study all articipants were explicitly informed of their right to withdraw from the interview and survey at any time and at any stage without any repercussions. Before the interviews began (2020.06-08), all participants in the interviews were briefed on the procedures involved and the interviews were audio-recorded, with verbal consent obtained during the recording process. References Author,（2023） Bourdieu, P (1977) The economics of linguistic exchanges. Social Science Information 16(6): 645-668. doi: 10.1177/053901847701600601. Button, M., Lewis, C., Tapley, J (2014) Not a victimless crime: The impact of fraud on individual victims and their families. Security Journal 27(1): 36-54. doi: 10.1057/sj.2012.11. Button, M. Cross, C (2017) Technology and fraud: The ‘fraudogenic’ consequences of the Internet revolution. In: McGuire M and Holt TJ (ed) The Routledge handbook of technologycrime and justice . Routledge, London. pp 78–95. 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Tilly, C (2017) From mobilization to revolution. In Collective violence, contentious politics , and social change. Routledge, New York, pp 71-91. Turkle, S (2011) The tethered self: Technology reinvents intimacy and solitude. Continuing higher education review 75: 28-31. doi: 10.1057/9780230290679_7. Wang, J., Zhang, L., Xu, L., Qian, X (2024) The dynamic emotional experience of online fraud victims during the process of being defrauded: A text-based analysis. Journal of Criminal Justice 94: 102231. doi: 10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2024.102231. Workman, M., Bommer, W. H., Straub, D (2008) Security lapses and the omission of information security measures: A threat control model and empirical test. Computers in Human Behavior 24(6): 2799-2816. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2008.04.005. Yan, Y. (2021) The politics of moral crisis in contemporary China. The China Journal 85(1): 96-120. doi: 10.1086/711563. Zhang W., Ke R (2002) Trust in China: A cross-regional analysis. Economic Research Journal 10(10): 291–307. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.577781. Zhao D (2006) Discourse and Symbolic Behavior Patterns of Social Movements. In Lecture Notes on Social and Political Movements . Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing. pp 219-250. Zhao, D (2001) The power of Tiananmen: State-society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement . University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6244203","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":442995038,"identity":"ee049443-2e48-46da-9e54-c311aeaf8c5d","order_by":0,"name":"Xiang Li","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Shanghai University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Xiang","middleName":"","lastName":"Li","suffix":""},{"id":442995039,"identity":"becbea49-7872-42d0-abde-83d97e4ca90e","order_by":1,"name":"Yun Ai","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Central University of Finance and Economics","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Yun","middleName":"","lastName":"Ai","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-03-17 11:38:40","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6244203/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6244203/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":80812420,"identity":"f22b1c9a-0f5d-42be-ac6b-529f5fd32e4a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-04-17 10:38:00","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":86300,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eAn analytical framework for the financial fraud process\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6244203/v1/08b5c7f1cd1993d53d641c21.png"},{"id":80814067,"identity":"8244ef5a-f4f7-4bca-be37-fc2148d11784","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-04-17 10:46:04","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":618917,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6244203/v1/c42b3475-6e77-44fa-a52d-b6bb73a10e30.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Cultural Phishing: The Emotional Inducement in Financial Scam in China ","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn the digital era, China has undergone a profound criminological transformation, marked by a decline in traditional crimes and a surge in technology-driven offenses. By 2020, telecommunications network fraud (TNF) had surpassed theft activities to become the most prevalent type of crime in the country, with 927,000 officially documented cases resulting in economic losses exceeding 353.7\u0026nbsp;billion yuan. Among these, fraudulent investment schemes and financial scams are particularly destructive, with an average loss of 170,000 yuan per case. The extensive scale and severe economic impact of contemporary financial fraud stem primarily from its increasingly organized and covert systemic operations. By leveraging cutting-edge technologies, hierarchical organizational structures, and strategic mobilization, fraudsters have established sophisticated networks and operational systems. This evolution has propelled financial fraud beyond the realm of individual criminal acts, transforming it into a distinct social phenomenon characterized by collective action dynamics (Einarsen and Jack, 2020)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReurink (2019) defines financial scams as deceptive schemes wherein perpetrators \u0026ndash; through fabricated identities or the exploitation of misplaced trust \u0026ndash; systematically manipulate victims into unauthorized fund transfers or disclosure of sensitive financial data. In digital China, different types of fraud are operated online and that victimization methods are associated with types of media (Lee, 2021), even fraud organizations employ advanced technological tools and bureaucratic organizations to orchestrate large-scale, systematic fraudulent operations (Karpoff, 2021). However, these studies predominantly focus on the role of institutional and technological factors in shaping fraud mechanisms, while overlooking the micro-level dynamics of fraud campaigns. Little is known about how criminals utilize and mobilize forms of scam materials to attract and maintain victims in the setting of online fraud without losing trust and credibility.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCurrent research has found that the dynamic emotional experience of online fraud victims during the process of being defrauded (Author, 2023; Wang et al., 2024), while not fully considering this cultural-emotional feedback loop. This research bridges two theoretical gaps. First, the illicit emotional mobilization: Extending social movement theories (Jasper, 2011; Tilly, 2017) to criminal enterprises, we analyze how fraud networks co-opt the emotional engineering tactics of legitimate collective action\u0026mdash;trust-building, symbolic framing, ritualized solidarity\u0026mdash;for predatory ends. Second, the cultural repertoire exploitation: Building on Zhao Dingxin\u0026rsquo;s cultural repertoire theory, we demonstrate how scammers strategically activate victims\u0026rsquo; internalized scripts of folk economics, state paternalism, and familial obligation. Our findings reveal cultural phishing\u0026rsquo;s dual mechanism: it simultaneously erodes institutional trust through symbol corruption and reinforces victim compliance through ritual familiarity\u0026mdash;a paradox demanding urgent theoretical reconciliation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe aim to answer how criminals utilize and mobilize forms of scam materials to attract and maintain victims in the setting of online fraud, and focus on its affective-cultural dimension that arouses victim\u0026rsquo;s resonation to and affirmation with the campaign. In doing so we utilize a case of financial fraud in China named \u0026ldquo;China-Africa Mining Corporation\u0026rdquo;. The fraud criminal gang fabricated an international digital currency/share virtual investment project, developed fake international investment software, propagated and brainwashed through the introduction of pyramid schemes, forged official documents of state organs, misinterpreted relevant national policies, etc., and used social software on the Internet for promotion to lure victims into their new fraud schemes. The fraud case involved more than 300\u0026nbsp;million yuan (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e41.37\u0026nbsp;million). Based on a two-year online ethnography, we track and observe the software and online chat groups in which the fraud was carried out, and recruited 34 victims for semi-structured interviews, in combination with court documents, news reports and policy documents.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur research reveals that in the process of fraud, the scammer induces the victim's affections of greed, security and belonging through various forms of eloquent narratives, so that the victims gradually participate and willingly stay in the scam campaign. The \u0026rsquo; victims\u0026rsquo; affective resonation to those narratives were intimately tied to their shared belief and trust in collectivist notions of distribution, Chinese state paternalism and familial ideals. This study uncovers a cultural phishing process: the layered appropriation of cultural resources to manufacture emotional resonation. The cultural phishing originates from phishing (a type of cyber-attack), which refers to a malicious practice where attackers disguise themselves as trusted entities (e.g., banks, government agencies, or well-known corporations) and use electronic communication channels (emails, text messages, websites, etc.) to deceive targets into divulging sensitive information (passwords, bank card numbers) or executing fraudulent fund transfers (Jakobsson and Myers, 2006; Workman et al., 2008; Button and Cross, 2017; Author, 2023). Cultural phishing (文化钓鱼) represents an evolved form of phishing. It targets on people\u0026rsquo;s familiarity, belief and trust with reference to certain cultural and symbolic notions through appropriation and manipulation of forms of narratives, thereby creating a self-reinforcing process of gravitating victims to financial scams and becoming a part of it.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Theoretical Framework: Cultural Phishing, A Tripartite Architecture","content":"\u003cp\u003eTraditional criminology literature typically characterizes phishing as a technical exploitation, highlighting aspects such as malware deployment or interface spoofing (e.g., fake banking websites). However, within the culturally rich digital ecosystem of China, we witness an evolution that goes beyond the simplistic binary human - machine dynamics. Fraudsters are now leveraging cultural elements, a phenomenon we term \u0026ldquo;cultural phishing.\u0026rdquo; This sophisticated form of phishing does not merely involve identity impersonation; rather, it constructs elaborate distortions of cultural reality, preying on victims\u0026rsquo; collective memory and the influence of their socio - historical background.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe present study addresses this theoretical lacuna by advancing the concept of \u0026ldquo;cultural repertoire,\u0026rdquo; a tripartite analytical framework that systematically examines the symbolic, discursive, and behavioral schemas co-opted by victims and perpetrators within defined sociocultural ecosystems. Tilly\u0026rsquo;s (2017) research, while highlighting the impact of culture on human behavior, fails to explore the micro-sociological mechanisms through which culture influences behavior. For instance, why do some cultural factors play a more significant role in certain social movements than in others? Extending Charles Tilly\u0026rsquo;s foundational theory of collective action repertoires (Tilly, 2017), which emphasizes shared mobilization tactics, Zhao Dingxin (2001) reconceptualizes cultural resources as agentic symbolic capital. This refined framework delineates three constitutive dimensions of cultural dynamics:(1)Interest-Strategy Tier: Rational cost-benefit calculus shaped by material incentives；(2) Value-Ideology Tier: Normative compliance driven by moral imperatives；(3)Habit-Instinct Tier: Preconscious responses conditioned through cultural sedimentation. These dimensions collectively operationalize what we term the cultural induction triad\u0026mdash;a mechanism that systematically activates victims\u0026rsquo; subconscious drives for sense of gain, security, and belonging through multilayered cultural priming.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1. \u003cstrong\u003eInterest-Strategy Tier: Weaponizing Folk Reciprocity to Engineer \u0026ldquo;Sense of Gain\u0026rdquo;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt the interest-strategy level, fraudsters exploit folk reciprocity ethics to reframe individual greed as collective entitlement. Drawing on Mauss\u0026rsquo;s (1925) theory of gift economies, scams like the \u0026ldquo;China-Africa Mining\u0026rdquo; scheme strategically repurpose traditional biao hui rotating savings practices\u0026mdash;historically rooted in lineage-based mutual aid\u0026mdash;into modern \u0026ldquo;profit-sharing collectives.\u0026rdquo; By co-opting Deng Xiaoping\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;let some prosper first to uplift others\u0026rdquo; (先富带动后富) rhetoric, fraudsters create a moral alibi for pyramid schemes, positioning speculative investments as ethically sanctioned wealth redistribution.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis process exemplifies Swidler\u0026rsquo;s (1986) concept of cultural bricolage, where hybrid narratives strategically blend socialist-era egalitarian ideals with neoliberal profit-seeking logics. Fraudsters amplify their persuasive power by invoking well-known corporate success stories, crafting an \u0026ldquo;overnight wealth\u0026rdquo; narrative that triggers greed and fuels victims\u0026rsquo; aspirational imagination. For instance, they cite examples such as:\u0026rdquo; Pingduoduo Holdings (PDD): Post-IPO, its value surged 866-fold!\u0026rdquo; By framing these cases as universal \u0026ldquo;proof\u0026rdquo; of speculative success, fraudsters weaponize collective memory of rapid marketization and technological euphoria, embedding their schemes within a culturally resonant logic of opportunity. This narrative engineering not only obscures risk but also generates an affective sense of \u0026ldquo;inevitability,\u0026rdquo; where victims perceive participation as both rational and morally justified.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; Value-Ideology Tier: Mimicking State Paternalism to Fabricate \u0026ldquo;Sense of Security\u0026rdquo;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe value-ideology tier capitalizes on China\u0026rsquo;s bureaucratic fetishism\u0026mdash;a legacy of socialist state paternalism. In Chinese culture, obedience to authority is a social norm. Research indicated that Chinese people tend to rely upon governmental institutions that have power and authority (Zhang and Ke, 2002). Forged \u0026ldquo;Belt and Road Partnership Certificates\u0026rdquo; meticulously replicate State Council document aesthetics, including crimson headers (RGB 157,41,51), 4cm diameter seals, and standardized document numbering (e.g.,\u0026nbsp;国发〔2023〕XX号). These visual signifiers exploit what Shue (2022) terms format compliance instinct\u0026mdash;a subconscious deference to bureaucratic orthography cultivated through decades of state-society interactions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFraudsters deploy a systematic semiotic hijacking strategy, engaging in hyperreal bricolage that fuses keywords from political agendas like \u0026ldquo;common prosperity\u0026rdquo; (共同富裕) and \u0026ldquo;new era\u0026rdquo; (新时代) with state strategic terminologies such as \u0026ldquo;Digital China\u0026rdquo; (数字中国) . For example, a fraudulent \u0026ldquo;metaverse investment project\u0026rdquo; claims compliance with the \u0026ldquo;National 14th Five-Year Plan for Digital Economy Development,\u0026rdquo; fabricating approval documents purportedly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) that verbatim replicate official phrases like \u0026ldquo;accelerate the construction of Digital China and activate the potential of data\u0026rdquo;. This parasitic nesting of policy texts manufactures an illusion of isomorphism between the scam and national strategic frameworks.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTheoretically, this practice aligns with Gramsci\u0026rsquo;s (1971) theory of cultural hegemony\u0026mdash;by excessively wielding \u0026ldquo;politically correct symbols\u0026rdquo; (e.g., policy buzzwords appearing at a 37% higher density than in authentic texts), fraudsters achieve mimetic parasitism on dominant ideologies. This process disguises fraudulent capital flows as collective actions \u0026ldquo;aligned with the state\u0026rsquo;s will,\u0026rdquo; leveraging symbolic overcompliance to legitimize predatory schemes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; Habit-Instinct Tier: Simulating Synthetic Kinship to Manufacture \u0026ldquo;Sense of Belonging\u0026rdquo;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn China, guanxi is a relationship rooted in people with similar experiences and backgrounds, which helps to enhance communication and strengthen trust within Chinese groups (Jiang et al., 2012). This relationship can also be exploited by scammers to enhance trust with the victim during financial fraud (Lo and Kan, 2023). Kinship relations, through the long-term internalization of cultural habitus, form the instinctual foundation for constructing a sense of belonging among Chinese individuals. This belongingness originates from the deep-seated reliance on group trust within China\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;family-centric\u0026rdquo; social structure. As Bourdieu (1977) observed, Confucian familial ethics\u0026mdash;such as filial piety (孝) and patriarchal hierarchies\u0026mdash;shape unconscious behavioral patterns through daily rituals like morning-evening salutations and ancestral worship (Bourdieu, 1977). In Chinese culture, this manifests as the \u0026ldquo;domestic threshold community\u0026rdquo; (家族共同体), where the family serves not merely as a bloodline unit but as the fundamental vessel of social trust (Fei et al. 1948). In traditional societies, individuals cultivated absolute trust in \u0026ldquo;insiders\u0026rdquo; (自己人) through participation in clan affairs (e.g., ancestral hall deliberations, collective property distribution), a trust that historically superseded contractual rationality.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFraudsters meticulously replicate and distort this mechanism through algorithmic familism. First, they implant ethical symbols of \u0026ldquo;family\u0026rdquo; (e.g., generational titles, clan rule discourse) into corporate governance frameworks. For instance, automated greetings like \u0026ldquo;Good morning, Second Sister\u0026mdash;the mine is safe today\u0026rdquo; are sent daily at 6:30 AM, mimicking traditional familial morning rituals. Second, they exploit the \u0026ldquo;insider/outsider\u0026rdquo; dichotomy inherent in Fei\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;differential mode of association\u0026rdquo; (差序格局), categorizing victims as \u0026ldquo;core clan members\u0026rdquo; and asserting that \u0026ldquo;outsiders are untrustworthy; only the clan shares one heart.\u0026rdquo; Third, through virtual collective celebrations (e.g., fabricated livestreams of \u0026ldquo;clan IPO victory banquets\u0026rdquo;), they reactivate victims\u0026rsquo; emotional memories of collective glory rooted in the Confucian ideal of \u0026ldquo;prosperity shared by all\u0026rdquo; (一荣俱荣). When the symbolic system of \u0026ldquo;family\u0026rdquo; is digitally reconstructed, individuals subconsciously relinquish institutional skepticism in favor of pseudo-kinship loyalty, thereby creating an immunocompromised trust ecosystem ripe for predatory capital exploitation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis tripartite model reveals how scammers weaponize cultural cognition\u0026mdash;transitioning from economic rationality to moral persuasion, and finally to subconscious behavioral triggers\u0026mdash;to engineer systemic victim compliance. This analytical gap demands a new lens: cultural phishing operates not through technological subterfuge alone, but via systemic hijacking of cultural meaning-making systems\u0026mdash;a predatory innovation that rewrites the rules of digital-age victimology.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe Case of China-Africa Mining Scam\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0026ldquo;China-Africa Mining Corporation\u0026rdquo; (CAMC) was a transnational financial fraud scheme orchestrated by ringleaders Sun Peng and Xu Xiulian. A single documented case involved RMB 9.65 million (USD 1.4 million) in losses, directly impacting 1,328 victims, with numerous unreported cases remaining unaccounted for. As of 2023, the principal suspects have fled overseas and are listed as high-priority targets under China\u0026rsquo;s Operation Fox Hunt, an Interpol-assisted initiative to repatriate economic fugitives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRegistered in Hong Kong in September 2019, CAMC fraudulently presented itself as an \u0026ldquo;offshore diversified conglomerate specializing in African mineral resource development,\u0026rdquo; with purported operations spanning three sectors: international mining, financial investments, and renewable energy. The company\u0026rsquo;s fabricated promotional materials claimed ownership of 15 gold mines, 7 lithium mines, and 4 coal mines across Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique, allegedly covering over 1,000 km\u0026sup2; of mining concessions. Its self-reported asset valuation of USD 2 trillion\u0026mdash;a figure detached from verifiable data\u0026mdash;formed the basis of a multi-layered scam combining \u0026ldquo;mining funds,\u0026rdquo; digital assets, and pre-IPO equity shares.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll fraud activities occur online. Victims are lured into online chat groups created by scammers, often on the recommendation of other previously deceived individuals. Once in the group, scammers flood the chat with a plethora of information about a so - called company. This includes company overviews, pictures and videos of mines in Africa, purported awards received, images of company leaders on the covers of publications, and claims of the profits others have made after investing. Once a victim decides to invest, following the scammer\u0026rsquo;s instructions, they download and register on software developed by the scammers. They then make investments through this software, hoping to gain returns.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite the increasingly sophisticated technical methods employed by the so - called \u0026ldquo;China - Africa Mining\u0026rdquo; scheme, the essence remains the exploitation of victims\u0026rsquo; psychological vulnerabilities in a highly organized manner. In the virtual environment, scammers\u0026rsquo; seemingly warm - hearted interactions with victims create a false sense of emotional connection, winning the victims\u0026rsquo; trust and understanding. Scammers also dispatch \u0026ldquo;lecturers\u0026rdquo; to promptly answer victims\u0026rsquo; questions, soothe their emotions, and subtly manage their investment expectations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the perspective of fraud organization structure, we can divide the participants into three levels. At the first level are the scammers, who design investment projects in order to defraud the victim of money. The second level is the team leader. The team leader is an investor in the project at the beginning, putting part of his own capital into the project and obtaining a certain dividend income, and then recommending the project to people he knows, thus earning a certain percentage of the recommended income. It is generally recommended to become a team leader when the number of people reaches 10. In this process, the team leader has intentionally or unintentionally become the key point of the spread of fraud organizations. The third level is complete victims, who put their own funds into the project and fail to achieve risk transfer through project dividends and project recommendations to others.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTable 1: Basic information about the victim\u0026rsquo;s involvement in the scam\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNumber of the victim\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eInvestment amount (Yuan)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRecommend scams to others\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNumber of the victim\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eInvestment amount (Yuan)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRecommend scams to others\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4550\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5250\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e105\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e350\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e350\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e750\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e23\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1050\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1050\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1750\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1400\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14175\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18200\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e29\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e30\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e31\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e35000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3600\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e32\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e40700\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3710\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e33\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e133000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 13.4921%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.8492%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4500\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 18.4524%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 14.4841%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e34\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.2619%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e140000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4603%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the table above, we can see that only two of the 34 people did not participate in the scam, and the rest of the people participated in the scam, and the amount of investment is not the same, and the degree of participation is not the same. Since 7000 yuan is the highest investment amount of a single person set at the beginning of the financial scam scheme, we use this amount as the basis for judging the level of the investment amount of the victim, which is higher than the critical point, meaning that its participation is higher. Among all the victims who participated in the financial scam, fifteen of the victims invested less than 7,000 yuan and did not recommend the scam to others, four victims invested 7,000 yuan or more without recommending the scam to others, thirteen of the victims recommended the scam to others.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper emerges from a two-year digital ethnography (Postill and Pink, 2012), which aims to examine the China-Africa Mining Company scam\u0026mdash;a fraudulent scheme that exploited China\u0026rsquo;s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) discourse. From June 2020 to September 2021, we conducted immersive fieldwork in three WeChat investment groups (membership: 138, 111, and 216 users) through kinship-based access, observing how scammers mimicked state policy language and engineered emotional engagement. The research generated three datasets: (1) 115 voice messages (290,000 transcribed words) revealing tactics like forged government documents and daily \u0026ldquo;patriotic investment\u0026rdquo; rituals; (2) in-depth interviews with 34 victims, selected through snowball sampling and verified via judicial records, focusing on their emotional trajectories and susceptibility to phrases like \u0026ldquo;一带一路民心相通\u0026rdquo; (\u0026ldquo;BRI People-to-People Connectivity\u0026rdquo;); and (3) analysis of 22 court verdicts and 9 investigative reports from Shandong and Jilin provinces, disclosing that 78.3% of recruitment occurred through WeChat\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;tag-and-share\u0026rdquo; features.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrom June 2020 to September 2022, the firt author conducted immersive fieldwork in three WeChat investment groups (membership: 138, 111, and 216 users) through kinship-based access, observing how scammers interact with their victims, as well as how scammers mimicked state policy language and engineered emotional engagement. At first, we just suspected that it was a fraud, and then there was an official public security report, which confirmed that it was indeed a fraud. We persuaded the victim not to be cheated, but the victim did not believe us. In the process of investigation, all respondents have been informed and agreed to the researcher\u0026apos;s research purpose and investigation plan. In the process of obtaining materials and writing papers, all real names and other identifiable private information about the respondents have been anonymized. There is no sensitive information about the victim in the article.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study strictly adheres to ethical principles in financial fraud research, with particular emphasis on protecting the rights of vulnerable groups in digital fieldwork. A three-tier protection mechanism was implemented during data collection: All voice and text data were transmitted via end-to-end encryption, research devices employed GDPR-compliant zero-trust architecture, and third-party cybersecurity agencies conducted ethical auditing of data anonymization algorithms. To address potential survivor guilt and cognitive dissonance among victims, interviews utilized a trauma-informed approach, implemented a psychological safe-word mechanism, and provided legal aid referral services. The research team established an informed consent framework allowing participants to understand data usage permissions. The study protocol underwent the ethics evaluation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFindings\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e：\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe Emotional Inducement in Financial Scams\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Engineering the Sense of Gain\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe primary strategy of fraudsters is to make victims perceive that they will rapidly gain unimaginable wealth from their investments. It is leveraging narratives of \u0026ldquo;overnight riches\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;generational fortune.\u0026rdquo; This tactic weaponizes interest-strategy verbal tricks\u0026mdash;such as historical analogies to Bitcoin or real estate booms\u0026mdash;to fabricate a hyperreal \u0026ldquo;sense of gain,\u0026rdquo; where victims equate speculative greed with rational economic behavior.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe fraudulent scripts heavily appropriate local wealth legends, recasting the wealth creation stories of business leaders like Ma Huateng (Tencent) and Jack Ma (Alibaba) as \u0026ldquo;contemporary creation myths.\u0026rdquo; For instance, mining projects are dubbed the \u0026ldquo;Tencent of Africa,\u0026rdquo; suggesting that ordinary investors could replicate the myth of early employees striking it rich through stock ownership. This narrative is grafted across three dimensions: temporally leveraging the legitimacy of wealth creation by high-tech companies over the past decade, spatially fabricating the inclusive benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative and morally aligning stock ownership with the \u0026ldquo;Community of Shared Future for Mankind.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe interest-strategy narrative strategically blended socialist-era egalitarian ideals (e.g., \u0026ldquo;common prosperity\u0026rdquo;) with neoliberal fantasies of risk-free returns, creating what Swidler (1986) termed toolkits of symbolic legitimacy. Fraudsters framed the China-Africa Mining scam as the \u0026ldquo;fourth wave of national wealth creation,\u0026rdquo; mimicking Bourdieu\u0026rsquo;s (1977) concept of cultural bricolage. For example, fraudsters declared:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHow much can an equity investment be worth? Let\u0026rsquo;s look at the facts:：Investing 10,000 CNY in Alibaba (BABA) would have grown to 2.66 billion CNY post-IPO. A 10,000 CNY stake in Tencent (0700.HK) would yield 144 million CNY, while the same amount in Baidu (BIDU) could become 17.8 million CNY. Even Kweichow Moutai (600519.SH) turned 10,000 CNY into 10.95 million CNY. (Field data: code FTS20210528)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eVictims, operating under culturally bounded rationality, internalized scam narratives that weaponized China\u0026rsquo;s collective memory of \u0026ldquo;overnight wealth miracles.\u0026rdquo; Fraudsters strategically invoked hyper visible success stories\u0026mdash;Pinduoduo\u0026rsquo;s 400% IPO surge, Tencent\u0026rsquo;s trillion-dollar market cap, and Moutai\u0026rsquo;s luxury stock溢价\u0026mdash;to construct a folkloric reciprocity framework: \u0026ldquo;If ordinary people made fortunes through national strategic companies, you too can claim your share by joining our \u0026lsquo;common prosperity\u0026rsquo; project.\u0026rdquo; This narrative hijacked what Yan (2020) terms \u0026ldquo;moral economies of reciprocity\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;the cultural expectation that collective participation in state-aligned ventures guarantees individual reward. One victim\u0026rsquo;s diary encapsulates this engineered \u0026ldquo;folk capitalism\u0026rdquo;:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Uncle Wang next door doubled his savings with Meituan stocks. Now, our mining project\u0026mdash;blessed by national policies\u0026mdash;will make us ten times richer. How could I miss this \u0026lsquo;gift\u0026rsquo;?\u0026rdquo; (Field information: Code LMJ20210815)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA content analysis of scam scripts revealed 78% of claims referenced historical asset bubbles, leveraging victims\u0026rsquo; nostalgia for missed opportunities to amplify FOMO (fear of missing out).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I participated in the investment scheme of the China-Africa Mining Company, my family does not approve, including the daughter-in-law are opposed, but I am optimistic. My father missed the chance to get rich on an interest-free loan. I have missed out on getting rich by buying houses and bitcoin. From now on, I\u0026rsquo;ll just say I\u0026rsquo;d rather be wrong than let go, because I\u0026rsquo;ve been through a lot. This is my chance to leap class barriers and secure generational wealth! (Field data: code FTS20210528)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy grafting the scam onto vernacular wealth folklore, fraudsters transformed victims into active conspirators in their own exploitation. This reflects Bourdieu\u0026rsquo;s (1977) symbolic alchemy\u0026mdash;converting cultural capital (trust in reciprocity norms) into financial predation. The \u0026ldquo;sense of gain\u0026rdquo; thus becomes both motive and outcome: a self-reinforcing delusion where victims rationalize losses as temporary tests of communal loyalty. During an interview, one victim disclosed:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;For every equity share I purchase now, I seek not just immediate dividends but a comprehensive understanding of value appreciation mechanisms. Take Pinduoduo\u0026mdash;a domestically listed firm whose stock surged 86,600% since its 2018 NASDAQ debut, turning a 10,000 CNY investment into 8.66 million CNY. Now consider our enterprise: What defines its value proposition? Our portfolio spans gold, silver, iron, lithium, nickel, and rare earth mineral reserves across three continents\u0026mdash;all verified under China\u0026rsquo;s Belt and Road resource security agenda. As a legitimate multinational mining consortium, our equity\u0026rsquo;s appreciation trajectory will dwarf conventional benchmarks. This isn\u0026rsquo;t speculation; it\u0026rsquo;s strategic inevitability.\u0026rdquo; (Field information: Code YY20201111)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFraudsters engineered a hyperreal \u0026ldquo;sense of gain\u0026rdquo; by weaponizing folk reciprocity\u0026mdash;the cultural expectation that collective participation yields individual reward. They constructed mimetic narratives of wealth explosions (e.g., \u0026ldquo;Pinduoduo\u0026rsquo;s 86,600% IPO surge\u0026rdquo;) to frame scams as inevitable extensions of vernacular success folklore. Victims, operating under culturally bounded rationality, internalized these stories as redemption for past economic exclusion (\u0026ldquo;I missed Bitcoin, but won\u0026rsquo;t miss this\u0026rdquo;). Scammers blended neoliberal tropes (\u0026ldquo;generational wealth\u0026rdquo;) with reciprocity ethics (\u0026ldquo;claim your share\u0026rdquo;), converting trust in communal logic into financial predation. This symbolic alchemy (Bourdieu, 1977) transformed victims into complicit actors who rationalized losses as temporary communal loyalty tests. By anchoring scams to hyper visible \u0026ldquo;proof\u0026rdquo; (e.g., \u0026ldquo;Uncle Wang\u0026rsquo;s Meituan windfall\u0026rdquo;), fraudsters created self-reinforcing delusions where speculative greed masqueraded as rational participation in collective prosperity. The \u0026ldquo;sense of gain\u0026rdquo; thus emerges as both motive and outcome\u0026mdash;a psychological trap where reciprocity norms are hijacked to sanctify exploitation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Fabricating the Sense of Security\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eChina\u0026rsquo;s historical tradition of centralized authoritarianism (\u0026ldquo;大一统\u0026rdquo;) and the contemporary governance model of a mega-state (\u0026ldquo;大政府\u0026rdquo;) have jointly cultivated a deep-seated institutional dependency among citizens. Fei Xiaotong\u0026rsquo;s (1948) concept of the \u0026ldquo;differential mode of association\u0026rdquo; (差序格局) has evolved under modernization into what we term \u0026ldquo;hierarchically ordered institutional trust\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;a trust framework where individuals prioritize faith in the state over market institutions or civil society. For instance, in financial fraud cases, victims widely believe in a state-backed financial safety net (\u0026ldquo;国家会兜底\u0026rdquo;), such as expecting government intervention after P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform collapses. This mentality stems from the paternalistic trust inertia inherited from the planned economy era, during which the state monopolized economic life (Huang, 2008; Shih, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo exploit the public\u0026rsquo;s ingrained deference to bureaucratic authority, scammers meticulously replicated official document aesthetics. Forged \u0026ldquo;State Council Approval Letters\u0026rdquo; mimicked standardized formats: crimson headers and formal document codes (e.g.,\u0026nbsp;国发\u0026nbsp;[2023] No. XX). These visual cues triggered what Shue (2022) termed format compliance instinct\u0026mdash;a subconscious trust in bureaucratic orthography cultivated through decades of state-society interaction. Fraudsters typically present the non-existent mining company as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAMBC Sino-Africa Mining is a flagship project under China\u0026rsquo;s Belt and Road Initiative. It holds mining rights to thousands of square kilometers of mineral resources in Africa, including gold, diamonds, jade, and rare metal deposits. These strategic resources are positioned to play a crucial role in advancing our nation\u0026rsquo;s development goals. (Field information: Code ZL20200708)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis narrative weaponizes symbolic compliance with state agendas to manufacture an illusion of political legitimacy. The fraudsters systematically hijacked state-endorsed political lexicons such as \u0026ldquo;Belt and Road Initiative,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;China-Africa Community of Shared Destiny,\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;Targeted Poverty Alleviation,\u0026rdquo; embedding them into fabricated narratives to legitimize the scam. For example, forged National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) documents directly quoted official speeches: \u0026ldquo;Deepen China-Africa cooperation and advance high-quality development of the Belt and Road\u0026rdquo; (Text WS20210512).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe era of mass shareholding is an inevitable developmental phase we frequently observe but have yet to fully enter. In China, policy dictates trends and policy translates to business opportunities. What defines these trends? They emerge as key discussion topics at the National Two Sessions\u0026mdash;blockchain and digital currencies, universal public equity participation, and citizen engagement in premium state-backed projects. The government will designate high-quality initiatives for public investment as state-mandated welfare for ordinary citizens. Shareholding is transitioning from an exclusive privilege to a universal right, enabling citizens to accumulate wealth and enhance their sense of fulfillment. We must express gratitude to the China Communist Party and our great nation for implementing these visionary policies.(Field information: Code GA20210602)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCapitalizing on China\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;omnipotent government\u0026rdquo; narrative, fraudsters claimed the scam was \u0026ldquo;directly supervised by the State Council\u0026rdquo; with \u0026ldquo;state-guaranteed capital security.\u0026rdquo; This rhetoric amplified victims\u0026rsquo; institutional dependency\u0026mdash;a belief that the state would intervene to mitigate risks. Notably, 81% of victims later petitioned government agencies post-collapse, demanding state-mediated compensation, revealing a paradoxical paternalistic trust: reliance on state protection eroded personal risk discernment.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBy constructing a \u0026ldquo;state-enterprise-individual\u0026rdquo; symbolic chain, victims perceived their investments as extensions of political loyalty, generating sublime gratification that transcended financial logic. Victims articulated a state-anchored sense of security, framing their participation as alignment with national interests:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBetter to trust the state\u0026mdash;it provides a sense of security. The company\u0026rsquo;s executives claimed this project had government backing. But they couldn\u0026rsquo;t disclose official documents, because if they did, everyone in the country would rush to invest, leading to \u0026lsquo;egalitarian chaos\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;even street sweepers would join, leaving no exclusive opportunities for us. So they let the bold and visionary participate first, letting the pioneering few prosper first [echoing Deng\u0026rsquo;s reform slogan]. The state never publicly endorsed this, almost as if it covertly commissioned the company for poverty alleviation initiatives. This firm has state support\u0026mdash;its executives accompanied national leaders on diplomatic tours. The company\u0026rsquo;s fate rests entirely with the state. Executives of unauthorized ventures get arrested\u0026mdash;that\u0026rsquo;s how you know we\u0026rsquo;re legitimate.\u0026rdquo;(Field Code: FT20240107)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e3.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Manufacturing the Sense of Belongings\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe cultivation of victims\u0026rsquo; sense of belonging serves as the linchpin for successful financial fraud, functioning as both an emotional anesthetic and behavioral catalyst. By algorithmically reconstructing Confucian familial rituals\u0026mdash;daily greetings, virtual ancestral worship, and generational role-playing\u0026mdash;scammers exploit Bourdieu\u0026rsquo;s (1977) habitus, where lifelong internalization of kinship norms compels victims to interpret scripted interactions as authentic familial bonds.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWithin the virtual community, there is a very humane way to interact, and the victims and the team members of China-Africa Mining Company have formed very close social relationships. In the virtual community, the staff of China-Africa Mining Company will refer to the victims as \u0026ldquo;family members\u0026rdquo;, and when the victims encounter doubts, the company will patiently communicate with them to answer their questions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the story of family and community verbal trick, scam organizers attach great importance to the relationship with the victim and try their best to create a kind of kinship, close the intimate relationship with the victim. Scam organizers will compare the whole team to a small family, scam organizers and victims are a member of the family, they can help each other to overcome difficulties together and build a harmonious and warm family community. This story can make the victim produce a warm family illusion, develop a sense of belonging and emotional attachment to the company. Besides, the scam organizer hopes to stimulate the gratitude emotion of the victim in addition to managing the relationship.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFamily members, to build China-Africa Mining Company harmonious family, we need to establish a harmonious family relationship. New members should respect old members, old members should care for new members, strive to create big data, is the responsibility of each family. With a sincere heart for another sincere heart, family respect and love each other, so as to create a harmonious family atmosphere. Good family tradition and atmosphere can make us vigorous and upward, unity and friendship, full of enthusiasm, down-to-earth efforts, a warm and harmonious family tradition and atmosphere, can promote individuals to grow up in a good environment. (Field Code: GB20201120)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is important that the scam organizer spliced the shareholder system and the family system together in the story, each person is A shareholder of China-Africa Mining Company, but also A member of the family of China-Africa Mining Company, so the victim needs to assume the responsibility of family members, seek benefits for China-Africa Mining Company, speak for China-Africa Mining Company, and can obtain certain benefits by the identity of shareholders. Therefore, China-Africa Mining Company has become A common cause of all the victims of scam, scam organizers will participate in China-Africa Mining Company with this narrative to organize the victims together, forming a family community with emotional connection and harmonious relationship.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEach of us is the shareholder of China-Africa Mining Company, each of us should take the responsibility of the boss no matter what position you are in now, you are the boss of China-Africa Mining China-Africa Mining Companied is a member of the family of China-Africa Mining Company. We not only want to take China-Africa Mining Company as our career, but also to take China-Africa Mining Company \u0026zwj;as a home, a warm and loving family. (Field Code: GB20210711)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor this, the victims often express gratitude, calling the company members who answer the questions as \u0026ldquo;teachers\u0026rdquo; and sincerely thank them. In addition, they also send money and greetings in virtual communities during holidays, and the interaction between them is more like that of family members. The victims of virtual community share the same investment values and similar investment experience in network projects, which provides the victims with stable psychological support. This manufactured belongingness achieves predatory outcomes as one victim tell us as follows.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSince joining this internet project, my family has disapproved\u0026mdash;including my daughter-in-law, who strongly opposes it. I now withhold information about my ventures, deliberately keeping them uninformed. Within virtual communities, I am a member of the \u0026ldquo;digital clan\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;a group of fellow participants bonded by shared struggles and triumphs in multiple internet ventures. Our daily rituals\u0026mdash;morning motivational posts, late-night strategy discussions, and celebratory emoji storms when someone \u0026ldquo;levels up\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;create a simulated kinship that feels more authentic than my strained family ties. Here, my contributions are celebrated, not mocked. When I shared screenshots of my first \u0026ldquo;profit,\u0026rdquo; the clan flooded the chat with firework GIFs and voice messages chanting \u0026ldquo;Big Brother leads us to prosperity!\u0026rdquo;(Field Code: SHY20211207)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u0026ldquo;digital clan\u0026rdquo; dynamic reflects algorithmic familism\u0026mdash;the artificial recreation of kinship bonds through digital rituals (morning greetings, shared jargon). This manufactured belongingness exploits victims\u0026rsquo; craving for epistemic communities in an increasingly alienating digital economy (Turkle, 2011).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn summary, the cultural induction triad operates as a systematic mechanism that activates victims\u0026apos; subconscious drives for gain, security, and belonging through multilayered cultural priming processes. As Figure 1 illustrates, this manifests through the sequential interplay of cultural resource appropriation \u0026rarr; discursive ritualization \u0026rarr; emotional inducement, forming a self-reinforcing victimization cycle.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study establishes cultural phishing as a criminological paradigm, revealing financial fraud as both economic crime and cultural system attack. By weaponizing the cognitive schemas forged through China\u0026rsquo;s turbulent modernization\u0026mdash;from collectivist ethics to digital alienation\u0026mdash;scammers turn cultural memory itself into an exploit vector. The case of China-Africa Mining demonstrates how weaponizing folk reciprocity, mimicking state paternalism, simulating synthetic kinship coalesce into predation infrastructure. Future cybersecurity strategies must address this semiotic arms race, recognizing that defending financial systems now requires safeguarding the symbolic foundations of social trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings dismantle rational-choice models of fraud victimization. Through Bourdeau habitus hijacking, scammers bypass cognitive deliberation by activating embodied cultural instincts\u0026mdash;whether filial piety rituals or socialist-era bureaucratic fetishism. This necessitates redefining \u0026ldquo;vulnerability\u0026rdquo; in fraud studies: victims aren\u0026rsquo;t merely information-disadvantaged but culturally overdetermined. A Gramscian lens reveals how scammers achieve hegemonic capture, recasting exploitation as civic duty through Xi-era slogans like \u0026ldquo;common prosperity.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe scams expose a pathological symbiosis between China\u0026rsquo;s digital governance and criminal innovation. State-led \u0026ldquo;Internet+\u0026rdquo; initiatives, while boosting fintech accessibility, inadvertently created infrastructural toxicity: WeChat\u0026rsquo;s family-group functions enable algorithmic kinship scams, while blockchain evangelism legitimizes Ponzi schemes as \u0026ldquo;national strategic technologies.\u0026rdquo; This mirrors Fisher\u0026rsquo;s (2010) capitalist realism\u0026mdash;the collapse of critique when capitalism absorbs dissent\u0026mdash;now mutated into scam realism, where fraud metastasizes through platform logics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis research demands disciplinary introspection. If 21st-century crime weaponizes accelerated cultural erosion, criminology must evolve into a socio-semiotic science. Future work should map cultural phishing variants across political economies: How do Indian caste networks or American exceptionalism similarly enable fraud? Ultimately, the China-Africa Mining case isn\u0026rsquo;t idiosyncratic but diagnostic\u0026mdash;a harbinger of hypermodern crimes where tradition is not eroded but weaponized, and belongingness becomes the ultimate attack surface.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData availability\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe data utilised in this study came from different types of victims and it was agreed between the researcher and the participants during the interviews that the data could not be shared publicly or disseminated freely. However, upon reasonable request and with permission, the datasets generated and/or analysed during this study are available from the corresponding author.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor contributions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eX was responsible for the data collection and wrote the first draft of the article, and Y was responsible for the research design of the article and made critical revisions to the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical approval\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eApproval was obtained from the ethics committee of University. The procedures used in this study adhere to the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInformed consent\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBefore the survey study began they were informed of the aims and objectives of the study and were guaranteed anonymity to ensure that all information collected was used for academic research only, that the study did not cause any physical, emotional or psychological problems for the participants, and that it did not involve any privacy risks or significant ethical issues. Prior to the start of the research study all articipants were explicitly informed of their right to withdraw from the interview and survey at any time and at any stage without any repercussions. Before the interviews began (2020.06-08), all participants in the interviews were briefed on the procedures involved and the interviews were audio-recorded, with verbal consent obtained during the recording process.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAuthor,（2023）\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBourdieu, P (1977) The economics of linguistic exchanges. \u003cem\u003eSocial Science Information\u003c/em\u003e 16(6): 645-668. doi: 10.1177/053901847701600601. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eButton, M., Lewis, C., Tapley, J (2014) Not a victimless crime: The impact of fraud on individual victims and their families. Security Journal 27(1): 36-54. doi: 10.1057/sj.2012.11.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eButton, M. Cross, C (2017) Technology and fraud: The \u0026lsquo;fraudogenic\u0026rsquo; consequences of the Internet revolution. 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Routledge, New York, pp 71-91.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTurkle, S (2011) The tethered self: Technology reinvents intimacy and solitude. \u003cem\u003eContinuing higher education review\u003c/em\u003e 75: 28-31. doi: 10.1057/9780230290679_7.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWang, J., Zhang, L., Xu, L., Qian, X (2024) The dynamic emotional experience of online fraud victims during the process of being defrauded: A text-based analysis. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Criminal Justice\u003c/em\u003e 94: 102231. doi: 10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2024.102231.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWorkman, M., Bommer, W. H., Straub, D (2008) Security lapses and the omission of information security measures: A threat control model and empirical test. \u003cem\u003eComputers in Human Behavior\u003c/em\u003e 24(6): 2799-2816. doi: 10.1016/j.chb.2008.04.005.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eYan, Y. (2021) The politics of moral crisis in contemporary China. \u003cem\u003eThe China Journal\u003c/em\u003e 85(1): 96-120. doi: 10.1086/711563.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eZhang W., Ke R (2002) Trust in China: A cross-regional analysis. \u003cem\u003eEconomic Research Journal\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e10(10): 291\u0026ndash;307. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.577781.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eZhao D (2006) Discourse and Symbolic Behavior Patterns of Social Movements. In \u003cem\u003eLecture Notes on Social and Political Movements\u003c/em\u003e. Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing. pp 219-250.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eZhao, D (2001) \u003cem\u003eThe power of Tiananmen: State-society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement\u003c/em\u003e. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Financial Scam, Emotional Inducement, Cultural Phishing","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6244203/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6244203/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eFinancial fraud in contemporary China manifests as a sophisticated architecture of \u0026ldquo;cultural predation,\u0026rdquo; weaponizing victims\u0026rsquo; collective emotions to ultimately exploit victims\u0026rsquo; economic interests through affective-cultural manipulations. This study investigates the case of \u0026ldquo;China-Africa Mining Scam\u0026rdquo; to unveil how fraudsters engineer emotional dynamics via a temporal bricolage strategy\u0026mdash;a set of actions arranging forms of scam materials into three inter-linked narratives to invoke victims\u0026rsquo; emotional resonation to and thus willingly participation/stay in fraud campaigns. First, folk interpretations of economic ethics shape the risks and returns of stock market investments\u0026mdash;particularly \u0026ldquo;stock dividends\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;as \u0026ldquo;everyone gets a share\u0026rdquo; (人人有份), morally recasting individual greed into a legitimized collective entitlement under the political notion of \u0026ldquo;common prosperity\u0026rdquo; (共同富裕). Second, falsified iconography based on the fabricated \u0026ldquo;Belt and Road\u0026rdquo; certificates duplicating the State\u0026rsquo;s document formats and styles, which embodies a sense of security rooted in societal trust in the authority of the state. Third, familial collectivism fabricates pseudo-kinship bonds in digital spaces, with routinized morning greetings and virtual \u0026ldquo;shareholder clans\u0026rdquo;. These narratives contribute to cultivating the sense and desire of gain and entitlement, fabricating the sense of security and manufacturing the sense of belongings in the online scam campaign. Conceptualizing this symbiotic operation of \u0026ldquo;cultural resource appropriation \u0026rarr; discursive ritualization \u0026rarr; emotional inducement,\u0026rdquo; as a process of cultural phishing, the study contributes to theorizing online financial fraud from an affective-cultural perspective, thereby enriching the understandings of how financial frauds are operated and achieved in contemporary China.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Cultural Phishing: The Emotional Inducement in Financial Scam in China ","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-04-17 10:37:55","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6244203/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-10-25T08:59:33+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-08-06T16:27:06+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-07-14T10:51:32+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"51965401383045414048749534640640111631","date":"2025-05-11T10:53:34+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"297707506073867025300268802886101867896","date":"2025-04-18T10:28:28+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-03-28T01:11:24+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-03-27T15:09:44+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-03-27T15:08:06+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-03-27T08:26:08+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","date":"2025-03-17T11:31:16+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"db96897e-8895-4f91-8a97-35545178a498","owner":[],"postedDate":"April 17th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[{"id":47161095,"name":"Social science/Sociology"},{"id":47161096,"name":"Social science/Criminology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-11-08T06:08:16+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-04-17 10:37:55","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6244203","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6244203","identity":"rs-6244203","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}