Image Motives Drive Lying Behavior Independent of Financial Incentives: Experimental Evidence from Strength, Preference, and President Rating Tasks

Image Motives Drive Lying Behavior Independent of Financial Incentives: Experimental Evidence from Strength, Preference, and President Rating Tasks | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Image Motives Drive Lying Behavior Independent of Financial Incentives: Experimental Evidence from Strength, Preference, and President Rating Tasks Kai Barron, Agne Kajackaite, Silvia Saccardo This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7180420/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Revision Version 1 posted 29 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The extensive behavioral economics and social psychology literature on lying has focused almost exclusively on experimental settings in which individuals lie for financial gain. However, in everyday life, people frequently lie to enhance their social and self‑image – perhaps even more often than they lie to gain monetary advantage. In this paper, we introduce three experiments – conducted both in the laboratory and online – in which participants may lie about their physical strength, their preferences for everyday items, or their favorite U.S. President. Using these experiments, we examine how the willingness to present a desirable social or self‑image (or to avoid an undesirable one) influences lying behavior. Our results demonstrate that image concerns significantly affect the decision to lie: they increase lying even when no financial incentive is present, and they promote truth‑telling when lying would yield monetary gain but threaten one’s image. Biological sciences/Neuroscience Biological sciences/Psychology Social science/Psychology Lying Cheating Social Image Self Image Experiment Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Introduction In social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and lie to pursue private ends. Because dishonesty can substantially reduce cooperation in organizations and society, understanding the motives underlying such dishonest behavior is important. In many circumstances, unethical behavior is driven by financial incentives. Examples include citizens cheating when filing their taxes, employees misreporting the number of hours they have worked, and politicians lying to acquire votes. In some circumstances, however, individuals behave dishonestly even when financial rewards are not at stake. In this paper, we focus on a potentially important nonfinancial driver of dishonest behavior—image concerns. Consider, for example, the marathon-cheating scandals. Between 2017 and 2018, over 5,000 runners were disqualified from the Mexico City Marathon for transgressions such as having someone else running under their name or for taking shortcuts. Similar violations have been detected at a variety of races. Whereas some of these people cheat to win prizes or to qualify for more prestigious races, others appear to simply be motivated by the image rewards associated with completing a marathon, such as the ability to impress friends or show off on social media. More generally, this example fits into the broader pattern of behavior generated by the proliferation of social media, where individuals try to portray an idealized version of their life [ 1 , 2 ]. In organizations, this type of lying could take the form of workers hiding their lack of comprehension of a given task to appear smart or misrepresenting their preferences and opinions to preserve a particular image. These behaviors can be costly because they can lead to the suboptimal allocation of tasks, undermine trust, and limit the voicing of unconventional ideas. Other situations where dishonesty may arise from self-presentation motives include, for example, lying about one’s physical traits online [ 3 ] or lying about engaging in socially desirable behaviors such as voting [ 4 – 6 ]. In general, this type of lying due to self-presentation motives can reduce the efficiency of communication [ 7 ]. Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we study the extent to which individuals are willing to misrepresent private information to curate a desirable image or avoid an undesirable image. We think of image concerns as a mix of social-image and self-image related considerations, which are intertwined in many domains. Social-image concerns, namely an individual’s desire to influence how external observers perceive them, have been shown to affect many behaviors, including prosocial decisions [ 8 – 10 ], consumption choices [ 11 ], political participation [ 12 ], and performance in the workplace [ 13 , 14 ]. In addition, individuals are typically also motivated by self-image concerns: they want to preserve the positive personal view that they have of themselves [ 15 , 16 ]. These findings point toward the hypothesis that image concerns could also be an important determinant in lying decisions. Although image-related motivations for lying may be important, the economics and social psychology literature has mainly focused on contexts where the incentive to lie is purely financial, with no image-based motives involved [ 17 – 22 ]. In experimental paradigms where participants can lie for monetary gain, this research consistently finds that people lie less than standard economic models predict, because lying incurs psychological costs. Recent theoretical work has further identified the drivers of preferences for truthfulness [ 21 – 24 ]. Together, these studies demonstrate that the desire to feel honest and to be perceived as honest discourages many individuals from telling lies that would be financially beneficial. When deciding whether to lie, individuals weigh: (a) the financial incentives to lie, (b) the social and self-image benefits gained from enhancing one’s appearance through lying, and (c) the psychological costs associated with dishonesty, such as the desire to feel and appear honest. While components (a) and (c) are frequently discussed in the literature, component (b) receives less attention. If sufficiently strong, image-related motives may lead individuals to lie, outweighing the psychological costs even in the absence of financial incentives. Conversely, in other contexts, such motives could deter individuals from lying, even when doing so would be financially advantageous. We introduce three novel experimental paradigms designed to investigate the role of image-related motives in driving lying behavior. In the first two experiments, we examine whether such motives can induce lying in the absence of financial incentives. Specifically, we assess the extent to which individuals are willing to lie to present a desirable image and to avoid an undesirable one. In the third experiment, we explore how individuals balance image-related and financial motives in a context where lying could increase financial gains but would also harm their image. In the first two experiments, we find that participants lie both to gain a desirable image (specifically, to appear physically strong) and to avoid an undesirable image (particularly, to prevent being perceived as sharing personal preferences with an out-group), even when there are no financial incentives to lie. In the third experiment, we find that only a few participants lie for money when the lie involves an image-relevant statement. Specifically, a large fraction of participants sacrifice monetary benefits to avoid making the false statement that they support Donald Trump. Together, our findings highlight the importance of image concerns in influencing lying behavior. Our paper relates to social psychology research in which students kept daily diaries of their lies over a week [ 25 ]. According to these diaries, participants told an average of about two lies per day and were more likely to lie for psychological rewards, such as appearing smarter or kinder, than for material gain. Our paper also connects to literature in social psychology and behavioral economics showing that individuals lie or deceive themselves to project a more accomplished image and thereby gain financial benefits. These experiments demonstrate that individuals lie to make a good impression in job interviews [ 26 ] and delude themselves to persuade others that they are more accomplished than they are [ 27 , 28 ]. In these experiments, differently from our study, a better image leads to a higher financial gain, and thus the image concerns are instrumental. Our study is also closely related to research examining the relationship between lying and self-presentation concerns. One experiment in behavioral economics finds that the presence of an audience leads individuals to make more optimistic self-assessments of their performance on a knowledge quiz compared to when no audience is present [ 29 ]. In the context of a public goods game, a subgroup of individuals reports contributing more to the public good than they do, even when they have no material or strategic reason to do so [ 30 ]. Another study shows that individuals prefer to lie rather than deliver negative feedback, and that this preference is driven by a desire to protect their own image rather than a concern for others’ feelings [ 31 ]. All these studies support the idea that image concerns are an important driver of lying behavior. However, unlike this previous work, our study focuses explicitly on the effect of image concerns on lying behavior and does so across a series of experiments. The Experiments We ran three experiments (N = 2931) to investigate how image concerns shape lying decisions. In Experiment 1, we study how the desire to appear strong leads individuals to over-report their performance in a strength task. In Experiment 2, we test whether individuals lie to pursue a desirable image or avoid an undesirable image in a survey about personal preferences. In Experiment 3, we investigate whether image concerns make individuals tell the truth and forgo financial rewards from lies, when a lie would compromise their image. The experiments are summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 Summary of the experiments. The table provides an overview of the treatments, incentives and sample sizes in the experiments. Experiment Treatments Payment Sample Task Sample Size Experiment 1 Observed Image $ 10 fixed fee Lab Push up N = 120 Unobserved Image $ 10 fixed fee Lab Push up N = 121 Observed Image & Money $ 10 fixed fee + 0.10 piece rate Lab Push up N = 120 Unobserved Image & Money $ 10 fixed fee + 0.10 piece rate Lab Push up N = 120 Experiment 2 Control $ 0.50 show-up fee Mturk Survey about Preferences N = 217 Republicans N = 207 Democrats Democrat Identity Frame $ 0.50 show-up fee Mturk Survey about Preferences N = 182 Republicans N = 216 Democrats Republican Identity Frame $ 0.50 show-up fee Mturk Survey about Preferences N = 220 Republicans N = 208 Democrats Experiment 3 No-Image-No-Money 0.50 GBP show-up fee Prolific Question: Phone calls vs. texting N = 300 No-Image-Money 0.50 GBP show-up fee & 0 GBP or 1.50 GBP Prolific Question: Phone calls vs. texting N = 300 Image-No-Money 0.50 GBP show-up fee Prolific Question: Obama vs. Trump N = 300 Image-Money 0.50 GBP show-up fee & 0 GBP or 1.50 GBP Prolific Question: Obama vs. Trump N = 300 Experiment 1: Lying for Image in a Strength Task In Experiment 1, we introduced a novel laboratory experiment to test whether individuals lie for image reasons. In the experiment, participants worked on a real-effort task that was tightly linked to an image-relevant characteristic and were asked to report their performance. Specifically, we asked participants to perform a strength task: the objective was to complete as many push-ups as they could in three minutes. Treatments We assigned participants to one of four treatments using a 2x2 between-subjects design. In all treatments, participants completed the push-ups task individually without being observed by other participants. To study the influence of different underlying motives for lying, we varied the following dimensions between treatments: (i) the incentive scheme (fixed payment vs. piece-rate payment) and (ii) whether the experimenter observed the participant. The Image‑Observed and Image‑Unobserved treatments did not offer any financial incentives for exerting effort or exaggerating performance, unlike standard cheating paradigms [ 17 ] in which dishonesty yields monetary gain. Consequently, in these treatments, participants had no monetary motivation to overstate the number of push‑ups completed, or to perform any push‑ups at all. In the Image-Unobserved treatment, participants performed the task in private while the experimenter waited in a separate room and then reported to the experimenter the number of push-ups they completed. In the Image-Observed treatment, participants performed the task in front of the experimenter, who counted and recorded the number of push-ups each participant performed. Our identification of cheating relies on the comparison of the performance distributions in the Image-Observed and Image-Unobserved treatments. Given that the experimenter observed participants in the Image-Observed condition, misrepresenting one’s performance was not possible. In the Image-Unobserved treatment, on the other hand, cheating was possible. If we find the distribution of push-ups differs significantly between the treatments, we can conclude that participants in the Image-Unobserved condition lied. Importantly, evidence from social psychology shows that people often exert more effort in simple tasks when they are observed [ 32 , 33 ]. Because this previous evidence indicates that greater effort may be exerted in the Observed treatment, our experimental design is conservative and provides us with a lower bound estimate of lying. That is, the actual number of push-ups completed is likely to be higher in the Observed treatment than in the Unobserved treatment. In the Image&Money-Observed and Image&Money-Unobserved treatments, we added material incentives to lie. Participants received the same fixed payment as in the Image treatments plus a piece-rate of 10 cents per push-up. This payment scheme created dual incentives to exaggerate performance: financial (more push-ups result in more money) and image-based (appearing stronger). Comparing push-up distributions between the Image&Money and Image treatments allows us to assess the strength of image and material rewards in motivating lying behavior. Hypotheses Based on experimental and theoretical evidence showing that image concerns affect behavior [ 9 , 15 ], we expect our participants in the two Unobserved treatments to lie to present a more desirable image of themselves: Hypothesis a: Individuals lie to present a more appealing version of themselves. Push-ups (Image-Observed) < Push-ups (Image-Unobserved) Hypothesis b: Individuals lie when they have both monetary and image reasons to do so. Push-ups (Image&Money-Observed) < Push-ups (Image&Money-Unobserved) To examine whether the image concerns or monetary payments are the primary driver of any lying behavior, we examine the difference-in-differences comparison of the four treatments. Because the literature that examines lying in simple tasks under piece-rate incentives finds that, on average, individuals over-report their performance [ 34 – 36 ], we expect that adding monetary incentives to achieve a higher number of push-ups will strengthen the motivation to lie. Hypothesis 2 The addition of monetary incentives to lie leads to an increase in lying. Push-ups (Image-Unobserved) – Push-ups (Image-Observed) < Push-ups (Image&Money-Unobserved) – Push-ups (Image&Money-Observed) Results We start by comparing the pairs of Observed and Unobserved treatments. Panels A of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , in which only image concerns may play a role in generating lying, show that, in line with Hypothesis 1a, subjects claimed to have done more push-ups when they were not observed by the experimenter during the task. Whereas participants did 33.44 push-ups on average in the Image-Observed treatment, the number of push-ups reported increased significantly to 38.64 in the Image-Unobserved treatment (p = 0.027, Fisher-Pitman test). Panels B of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show a similar pattern of behavior when monetary incentives were added. Whereas participants in the Image&Money-Observed treatments did 33.98 push-ups on average, the number of reported push-ups increased significantly to 40.03 in the Image&Money-Unobserved treatment (p = 0.008, Fisher-Pitman test). This result is in line with Hypothesis 1b. Panel A: Only Image Incentives Panel B: Image and Financial Incentives Panel A: Only Image Incentives Panel B: Image and Financial Incentives Next, we compare the magnitudes of the average lie in the Image and Image&Money treatments by running a difference-in-differences test and find that the magnitude of the change in lying does not differ significantly when comparing the two Image conditions with the two Image&Money conditions (p = 0.792, estimated using a linear regression). Therefore, we find no support for Hypothesis 2 . Overall, the evidence shows that image concerns are the dominant driver of the behavior in our experiment and the monetary rewards play a minor role. A further factor that could limit lying even when incentives are introduced is the desire to signal honesty, which may place an upper bound on the magnitude of the lies that individuals are willing to tell because they want their lies to remain plausibly true (i.e., announcing an implausibly high number of push-ups would reveal the individual as a liar). An ancillary result of our experiment is that the piece-rate incentives did not induce our participants to do more push-ups: the number of push-ups was not significantly different between the Image-Observed and Image&Money-Observed treatments (p = 0.798, Fisher-Pitman test). This finding suggests social-image concerns alone may have been sufficient to motivate maximal effort in this task. Experiment 2: Lying for Image in a Survey The goal of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the results from Experiment 1 by testing whether image concerns can influence lying behavior in an image-relevant domain other than strength. Second, we introduced a novel online experiment to measure how participants would lie both to gain a desirable image and to avoid an undesirable image . In Experiment 1, some participants may have over-reported the number of push-ups not because they wanted to appear strong ( desirable image ), but because they wanted to not appear weak ( undesirable image ). Whereas the design of Experiment 1 does not allow us to disentangle the desirable from undesirable image motives, Experiment 2 was designed to do so. In the experiment, we asked participants to answer a set of 30 binary image-irrelevant questions (e.g., “Which of the following beverages do you prefer? 1) Water, 2) Juice”; see SI). Each response added either zero or five points to their score, with the assignment randomized per question. Participants were informed in advance about the point allocation and knew that their final score had no financial consequences. We induced image concerns by giving participants information about the final score of other participants. Specifically, in the treatment conditions, we truthfully told participants that previous participants from a particular political affiliation obtained a high score in the survey. We recruited Democrat and Republican participants and, for each group, varied whether we provided information about the scores achieved by individuals from their own or the opposing political party. Hence, we generated variation in whether the decision maker identified with (or did not identify with) the past participants they were informed about. We examined whether participants lied about their own preferences to manipulate their final score, thereby sending a signal that they were more like other participants who shared their political affiliation or more distant from the participants with the opposite political affiliation. Treatments We assigned participants to one of three conditions using a between-subjects design. In the Control condition, subjects received no information about a comparison group and simply completed the survey and received their score at the end. Before answering the questions in the survey, the participants saw the following message: “During this session, you will complete a survey.” In the Democrat Identity Frame condition, before answering the survey questions, participants were truthfully told that of the 100 participants in an earlier session, the average Democrat obtained a high score in the survey. They received the following message: “During this session, you will complete a survey. We have already conducted the same survey with 100 Americans. Of those surveyed, Democrats typically scored high – on average, Democrats collected more than 95 points out of 150 in the survey. Fill out the survey to find out how well your preferences match those of the average Democrat!” Similarly, in the Republican Identity Frame condition, before answering the questions, subjects were truthfully told that of the 100 participants in an earlier session, the average Republican obtained a high score in the survey. Hypothesis We hypothesized that individuals lie about their own preferences to appear more like the members of groups they identify with ( desirable image ) or to appear different from the members of groups they do not identify with ( undesirable image ): Hypothesis 3 Individuals lie to conform with the characteristics of the members of their political affiliation and to differentiate themselves from the characteristics of the members of the opposite political affiliation. Final Score (Desirable Image: Democrats in Democrat Identity Frame & Republicans in Republican Identity Frame) > Final Score (Control) > Final Score (Undesirable Image: Democrats in Republican Identity Frame & Republicans in Democrat Identity Frame) Results We assessed lying by comparing the final survey scores in the Control with the answers in the Democrat Identity Frame and Republican Identity Frame . Whereas in the Control , participants had no incentives to lie, in other conditions, they had image incentives to manipulate their final score by lying in the answers to the binary questions. Democrats (Republicans) might have lied to inflate their score in the Democrat (Republican) Identity Frame . Similarly, Democrats (Republicans) might have lied in their answers to deflate their score in the Republican (Democrat) Identity Frame. Figure 3 shows that final scores decreased in the undesirable-image condition, which is stochastically dominated by the other two treatments. Whereas in the control condition, the average final score totaled 108.17 points, it decreased significantly to 102.64 points in the undesirable-image condition (p = 0.007, Fisher-Pitman test). However, we find no effect of the desirable-image framing on the final score outcome with the average score amounting to 106.72 points in the desirable-image condition and not differing significantly from the control condition (p = 0.458, Fisher-Pitman test). Table 2 presents the results of OLS regression analyses. Column (1) shows that individuals in the undesirable-image conditions reported a significantly lower number of points on average (5.53 fewer points) than those in the control condition (p = 0.007). Those in the desirable-image condition reported 1.45 fewer points than those in the control condition, which is not statistically significant (p = 0.456). The results are robust to controlling for political affiliation, gender and age. We also interact the indicator for whether participants were Republicans with the desirable-image and undesirable-image indicators and find no significant interaction (p = 0.669 for the undesirable image condition and p = 0.174 for the desirable image condition). (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Score Score Score Score Desirable Image -1.45 -1.38 1.28 1.48 (1.95) (1.93) (2.69) (2.69) Undesirable Image -5.53** -5.06* -5.80* -6.05* (2.06) (2.02) (2.82) (2.81) Republican 10.52*** 11.81*** 11.57*** (1.61) (2.77) (2.78) Republican * Desirable Image -5.24 -5.57 (3.85) (3.84) Republican * Undesirable Image 1.73 1.63 (4.04) (4.04) Female -4.75** (1.71) Age -0.05 (0.07) Constant 108.17*** 102.79*** 102.13*** 105.80*** (1.41) (1.60) (1.96) (3.22) Observations 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 Table 2 : Lying to move toward a desirable image or away from an undesirable image . This table reports results from an OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the score in the test. Desirable Image is a dummy variable coded as 1 when participants were in the desirable-image condition (i.e., Republicans in the Republicans condition and Democrats in the Democrats condition). Undesirable Image is a dummy variable coded as 1 when participants were in the undesirable-image condition (i.e., Republicans in the Democrats condition and Democrats in the Republicans condition). Female is a dummy variable coded as 1 for female participants, and 0 otherwise. Age indicates participants’ age. Republican is a dummy variable coded a 1 for participants who self-reported being Republicans, and 0 otherwise. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Put together, in support of Hypothesis 3 , some participants lied on the survey to lower their score and avoid an undesirable image. However, we found no evidence for the first part of Hypothesis 3 : desirable-image incentives did not prompt participants to lie for a higher score in this context. Experiment 3: Costly Truth-Telling After finding that a substantial fraction of participants lied to improve their image (Experiment 1) and to avoid an undesirable image (Experiment 2), Experiment 3 examined whether image concerns could encourage truth-telling, even when honesty meant sacrificing monetary gains. Treatments We assigned participants to one of four treatments using a 2x2 between-subjects design. We asked participants to state their preferences between pairs of options and varied the following dimensions between treatments: (i) whether the stated preference was image relevant and (ii) the incentive scheme—either no payment for both options or a payment for one option. Specifically, in the Image treatments, we asked the participants which President of the United States they preferred: Donald Trump or Barack Obama (see SI for the exact wording). In the No-Image treatments, we asked the participants whether they preferred communicating via phone calls or texting. We introduced material incentives to lie by adding a monetary bonus. Whereas in the No-Money conditions, participants did not receive payment for their stated preferences, in the Money conditions, stating a preference for Donald Trump over Barack Obama, or phone calls over texting, led to a bonus of 1.50 GBP. Whereas in the No-Image condition, the lie came at no additional image cost, in the Image conditions, appearing to be a supporter of the president they did not prefer entailed an image cost. Hypotheses In the No-Money conditions, we expected low rates of participants preferring phone calls to texting and Donald Trump to Barack Obama, consistent with the pre-test (see Methods). By contrast, in the Money conditions, we expected some participants to lie about their preferences to secure the monetary bonus. In the No-Image/Money condition, stating that one preferred phone calls to texting resulted in a 1.50 GBP bonus. We expected that, for some participants, the monetary incentives would outweigh the psychological cost of lying and they would lie: Hypothesis 4 When no image cost is at stake, individuals lie about their preferences to obtain a monetary reward. Fraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/Money) > Fraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/No-Money) In the Image/Money condition, stating that one preferred Donald Trump to Barack Obama resulted in a 1.50 GBP bonus. However, if untrue, such a claim could undermine both self- and social-image—being seen to favor Trump when one prefers Obama. Because the lie carries this additional image cost, we expected (virtually) no lying in the Image/Money treatment: Hypothesis 5 When an image cost is at stake, individuals generally do not lie about their preferences to obtain a monetary reward. Fraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/Money) = Fraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/No-Money) Finally, we predict that individuals are less likely to lie by making an image-contradictory statement than when making an image-irrelevant statement. The difference-in-differences comparison in Hypothesis 6 captures this hypothesis: Hypothesis 6 Individuals are more willing to falsely report their preferences to obtain a monetary reward when making image-irrelevant statements than when making image-relevant statements. Fraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/Money) – Fraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/No-Money) > Fraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/Money) – Fraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/No-Money) Results We begin the analysis with the No-Image treatments. Figure 4 shows that whereas in the No-Image/No-Money treatment, only 17.67% of participants chose phone calls over texting, in the No-Image/Money treatment, 56.67% claimed to prefer phone calls to texting. The difference is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001, test of proportions). That is, in line with Hypothesis 4 , after we introduced the monetary incentive, a large fraction of participants chose to lie about their preference. Finally, we compare the magnitudes of lying in the No-Image and Image treatments by running a diff-in-diff test. We find that lying differed significantly between the two treatment groups with p = 0.002 (estimated using a linear regression). Therefore, we find support for Hypothesis 6 , thus implying that image concerns generate a significant increase in truth-telling at the cost of foregoing monetary payments. This effect is even more pronounced when we focus only on Democrats (see SI). Together, our results show that participants lied for money in both the Image and No-Image conditions. However, significantly more participants lied for money when doing so did not affect their image than when it did. That is, even in an anonymous online survey, a large fraction of participants sacrificed their monetary benefits to not appear to be a Donald Trump supporter when they in fact supported Barack Obama. Participants’ answers in the post-questionnaire suggest they forewent the money in the Image treatments due to both self-image (“I'm not going to betray myself for $ 2”) and social-image concerns (“ There are things I would do for money, but never could I say I prefer Trump to someone else”). Discussion and Conclusion Behavioral economics and social psychology literature has researched the topic of lying extensively in recent years and has shown that people not only balance standard economic monetary costs and benefits when deciding whether and how to lie (as in [ 37 ]) but also experience a moral disutility when telling a lie and/or care about appearing to be honest. This paper provides experimental evidence on an additional variable in the utility function: a pure image motive to lie. Importantly, we show that image concerns may outweigh the psychological costs of lying. In addition, and surprisingly, we showed in Experiment 1 that in the presence of these image concerns, adding monetary incentives did not motivate one to lie more. That is, the main driver of the lying decisions participants made in Experiment 1 was the desire to impress the experimenter with the number of push-ups they could do. Similarly, in Experiment 3, some individuals displayed a strong aversion to lying about an image-relevant aspect of their own preferences. This self-presentation motive was strong enough to induce truth-telling behavior and forego material rewards. Together, Experiments 1 and 3 suggest image concerns can be a stronger determinant of the statements that individuals make relative to the truth than material rewards. Our results also point toward an important role of identity in mediating the effect of self-presentation concerns on truth-telling behavior. In Experiment 2, we showed that some individuals lie to not appear like people of the opposite political affiliation. Importantly, the lying about the preferences was driven by a rather light-touch information intervention. Experiment 3 further reinforces the importance of identity in shaping the statements that we make about ourselves by showing that the desire to project a specific image of oneself can be strong enough to overcome material preferences: individuals display a strong pull to tell the truth about core elements of their identity, but they are much more willing to make incorrect statements about peripheral elements of their identity. A large literature examines how individuals trade off monetary rewards against an inclination to tell the truth. Our study suggests that more work should examine the role of non-material motives in determining when individuals tell the truth and when they lie. The literature considering how individuals navigate trade-offs between non-material motives is still in its infancy, perhaps partially because it is more challenging to study. However, given the importance of non-material motives in human society, more work in this direction is warranted. Methods Ethics Statement. Ethical approval for data collection was issued by the WZB Research Ethics Committee. All experimental procedures were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) and its later amendments. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to data collection, and participant confidentiality and privacy were strictly maintained. Experimental Procedures. Experiment 1 was conducted at the WZB–TU Berlin laboratory. We recruited 481 participants using ORSEE [ 38 ]. Because gender may influence how desirable a strong performance is in a strength task and since gender is not the focus of our study, we restricted the sample to males to avoid this additional source of heterogeneity. We invited only one subject per session. Subjects always worked on the task alone; they did not see other participants completing the task, nor did other people observe them (except for the experimenter in the Observed treatments). We used this design to cleanly identify the effect of appearing strong/fit separately from the influence of peer effects and the desire to outperform others. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject received written instructions that informed them of the incentive structure and the details of the task. The instructions made clear that the experiment involved a one-shot interaction and did not include any tasks other than the push-ups (see SI). In both the Image-Observed and Image&Money-Observed treatments, we informed each participant that, when they were ready, the experimenter would start the countdown on the timer clock. Upon completion, the experimenter entered the number of push-ups at the bottom of the instruction sheet. In the Image-Unobserved and Image&Money-Unobserved treatments, the procedures were identical except that each subject completed the task in private and self-reported the number of push-ups completed. We informed participants that, when they were ready, the experimenter would start the three-minute countdown on the timer clock and wait for them in a different room. Upon completion of the three minutes, the experimenter returned to the room, and the participant reported the total number of push-ups he completed. The experimenter then entered the number at the bottom of the instruction sheet. At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a short post-experimental questionnaire in which we asked participants to report their age, field of study, height, weight, weekly exercise frequency, and frequency of doing push-ups. Participants then received their cash payment in private and left. In conditions without additional financial incentives for push-ups, participants received five euros for showing up and an additional five euros for participating in the experiment. The experiment lasted approximately 10 minutes. Experiment 2 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We limited our recruitment to participants who were based in the US. A total of 1250 participants took part in the experiment, of which 631 were Democrats and 619 Republicans, as reported in a post-experimental survey. In all treatments, participants completed the task anonymously and received 0.50 USD for participating in the experiment. The experiment lasted approximately four minutes. Prior to the main experiment, we pre-tested the experiment with 100 MTurk users based in the US to truthfully construct our framing messages. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject received instructions that informed them of the participation fee and the details of the questionnaire. We explained that each of the 30 questions had two possible answers, and we asked the participants to pick the answer that best represented their preferences and tastes. Upon completion of the survey, participants saw their final score and filled out a post-experimental questionnaire about their age, gender, and political affiliation. Participants could then leave the platform and receive their payment. Experiment 3 was conducted on Prolific. We limited our recruitment to participants who were based in the US. A total of 1,200 participants (71.50% Democrats, 22.83% Republicans, and 5.67% Independents) took part in the experiment, which lasted approximately five minutes. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject received instructions that informed them of the participation fee and the details of the experiment. The participants were asked to choose their preference between a single binary pair of options (phone calls vs. texting, Donald Trump vs. Barack Obama) and to write down their choice on a piece of paper for themselves. After this stage, in the No-Money treatments, participants were asked to state their preference on the computer. In the Money treatments, the participants learned about the bonus payment associated with one of the options and thereafter were asked to state their preference on the computer. Upon completion of the survey, they filled out a post-experimental questionnaire about their age, gender, and political affiliation. Participants could then leave the platform and receive their payment. Prior to the main experiment, we pre-tested a series of image-irrelevant and image-relevant questions (e.g., “Which fruit do you prefer? Apples or bananas?” “If you think about your views regarding abortion, are you pro-choice or pro-life?”) with 200 Prolific users based in the US. We chose two questions that resulted in the most similar distributions of the answers: in the pre-test, 20% of participants claimed they preferred phone calls to texting, and 18.50% claimed they preferred Trump to Obama. We assigned a monetary bonus to the less commonly chosen option in each pair: phone calls and Donald Trump. Declarations Acknowledgements We thank Johannes Abeler, Tilman Fries, Uri Gneezy, and seminar participants at the Baltic Economic Seminar, MiddExLab Virtual Seminar Series and Purdue Economics Seminar, for valuable comments and suggestions. Author contributions K.B., A.K, and S.S. performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper. Funding The research was funded by the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and Carnegie Mellon University. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Data availability statement Data will be made available upon request. References Fardouly, J., Diedrichs, P., Vartanian, L. & Halliwell, E. Social comparisons on social media: The impact of Facebook on young women's body image concerns and mood. Body Image . 13 , 38–45 (2015). Braghieri, L., Levy, R. & Makarin, A. Social Media and Mental Health. Am. Econ. Rev. 112 (11), 3660–3693 (2022). Toma, C. L., Hancock, J. T. & Ellison, N. B. Separating fact from fiction: An examination of deceptive self-presentation in online dating profiles. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 34 (8), 1023–1036 (2008). Silver, B. D., Abramson, P. R. & Anderson, B. A. The presence of others and overreporting of voting in American national elections. Pub. Opin. Q. 50 (2), 228–239 (1986). Harbaugh, W. T. If people vote because they like to, then why do so many of them lie? Public. Choice . 89 (1–2), 63–76 (1996). Dellavigna, S., List, J. A., Malmendier, U. & Rao, G. Voting to tell others. Rev. Econ. Stud. 84 (1), 143–181 (2017). Braghieri, L. Political Correctness, Social Image, and Information Transmission. Am. Econ. Rev. 114 (12), 3877–3904 (2024). Ariely, D., Bracha, A. & Meier, S. Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. Am. Econ. Rev. 99 (1), 544–555 (2009). Andreoni, J. & Bernheim, B. D. Social image and the 50–50 norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica 77 (5), 1607–1636 (2009). Dellavigna, S., List, J. A. & Malmendier, U. Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. Quart. J. Econ. 127 (1), 1–56 (2012). Bursztyn, L., Ferman, B., Fiorin, S., Kanz, M. & Rao, G. Status Goods: Experimental Evidence from Platinum Credit Cards. Q. J. Econ. 133 (3), 1561–1595 (2017). Funk, P. Social incentives and voter turnout: evidence from the Swiss mail ballot system. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 8 (5), 1077–1103 (2010). Kosfeld, M. & Neckermann, S. Getting more work for nothing? Symbolic awards and worker performance. Am. Economic Journal: Microeconomics . 3 (3), 86–99 (2011). Bursztyn, L. & Jensen, R. Social image and economic behavior in the field: Identifying, understanding, and shaping social pressure. Annual Rev. Econ. 9 , 131–153 (2017). Akerlof, G. A. & Kranton, R. E. „Economics and Identity. Q. J. Econ. 115 (3), 715–753 (2000). Gneezy, U., Saccardo, S., Serra-Garcia, M. & van Veldhuizen, R. Bribing Self Games Economic Behavior , 120 (3), 311–324. (2020). Fischbacher, U. & Föllmi-Heusi, F. Lies in disguise—an experimental study on cheating. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 11 (3), 525–547 (2013). Abeler, J., Becker, A. & Falk, A. Representative evidence on lying costs. J. Public. Econ. 113 , 96–104 (2014). Cohn, A., Fehr, E. & Maréchal, M. Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry. Nature 516 , 86–89 (2014). Kajackaite, A. & Gneezy, U. Incentives and cheating. Games Econ. Behav. 102 , 433–444 (2017). Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A. & Sobel, J. Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie. Am. Econ. Rev. 108 (2), 419–453 (2018). Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D. & Raymond, C. Preferences for truth-telling. Econometrica 87 (4), 1115–1153 (2019). Dufwenberg, M. & Dufwenberg, M. A. Lies in disguise—a theoretical analysis of cheating. J. Econ. Theory . 175 , 248–264 (2018). Khalmetski, K. & Sliwka, D. Disguising lies – image concerns and partial lying in cheating games. AEJ: Micro . 11 , 79–110 (2019). DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M. & Epstein, J. A. Lying in everyday life. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 70 (5), 979 (1996). Weiss, B. & Feldman, R. S. Looking good and lying doing it: deception as an impression management strategy in job interviews. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 36 (4), 1070–1086 (2006). Schwardmann, P. & van der Weele, J. Deception and self-deception. Nat. Hum. Behav. 3 , 1055–1061 (2019). Solda, A., Ke, C., Page, L. & von Hippel, W. Strategically delusional. Exp. Econ. 23 , 604–631 (2020). Ewers, M. & Zimmermann, F. Image and misreporting. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 13 (2), 363–380 (2015). Barron, K. & Nurminen, T. Nudging cooperation in public goods provision. J. Behav. Experimental Econ. 88 , 101542 (2020). Gneezy, U., Gravert, C., Saccardo, S. & Tausch, F. A must lie situation–avoiding giving negative feedback. Games Econ. Behav. 102 , 445–454 (2017). Broadhurst, P. The interaction of task difficulty and motivation: The Yerkes Dodson law revived. Acta Psychologica , Amsterdam. (1959). Teigen, K. H. Yerkes-Dodson: A law for all seasons. Theory Psychol. 4 (4), 525–547 (1994). Mazar, N., Amir, O. & Ariely, D. The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. J. Mark. Res. 45 (6), 633–644 (2008). Kajackaite, A. Lying about luck versus lying about performance. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 153 , 194–199 (2018). Gerlach, P., Teodorescu, K. & Hertwig, R. The truth about lies: A meta-analysis on dishonest behavior. Psychol. Bull. 145 (1), 1–44 (2019). Becker, G. S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. J. Polit. Econ. 76 (2), 169–217 (1968). Greiner, B. Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE. J. Economic Sci. Association . 1 , 114–125 (2015). Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7180420","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":501738342,"identity":"35f9e480-8ba1-4826-93a5-0a93a9416584","order_by":0,"name":"Kai Barron","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Social Science Research Center Berlin","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Kai","middleName":"","lastName":"Barron","suffix":""},{"id":501738343,"identity":"b52fcae1-d98e-4a0f-b288-ff8802ce2675","order_by":1,"name":"Agne Kajackaite","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Milan","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Agne","middleName":"","lastName":"Kajackaite","suffix":""},{"id":501738344,"identity":"b8c7906e-269b-42d0-9769-2be14aaf2c9f","order_by":2,"name":"Silvia Saccardo","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Carnegie Mellon University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Silvia","middleName":"","lastName":"Saccardo","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-07-21 19:23:07","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7180420/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7180420/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":89542964,"identity":"3c144d66-28a6-4567-9318-4729a09d4e69","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-21 06:51:58","extension":"jpg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":33569,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAverage number of push-ups in Experiment 1\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e \u003c/strong\u003eThe panels display the average number of push-ups reported in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003eand \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved \u003c/em\u003etreatments (Panel A) and the \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money \u003c/em\u003eand the\u003cem\u003e Image\u0026amp;Money-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatments (Panel B). Error bars are 95% confidence interval bars around the mean.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7180420/v1/cee5fe9988d655e8b2da971c.jpg"},{"id":89544361,"identity":"5cf36e34-2355-44b5-9d99-b6b2303c43fe","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-21 06:59:58","extension":"jpg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":40370,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDistribution of push-ups in Experiment 1. \u003c/strong\u003eThe panels display cumulative distributions of push-ups reported in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved \u003c/em\u003etreatments (Panel A) and the \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money \u003c/em\u003eand the\u003cem\u003e Image\u0026amp;Money-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatments (Panel B).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7180420/v1/189a1bde1be89d58a0cdfd82.jpg"},{"id":89542971,"identity":"1a537192-4c47-48a4-bbfe-793b99bc98e0","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-21 06:51:58","extension":"jpg","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":27052,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDistribution of final scores across treatments.\u003c/strong\u003e Figure 3 displays cumulative distributions of final scores in the control, desirable- image, and undesirable-image conditions.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7180420/v1/c9565a83da0592c10b706f70.jpg"},{"id":89542967,"identity":"0e38022a-1781-4b3f-9bcf-5a90125a3b4b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-21 06:51:58","extension":"jpg","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":24559,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFraction of participants reporting preferring “phone calls” or “Trump”. \u003c/strong\u003eThe two bars in the left panel of Figure 4 display the fraction of participants who reported that phone calls were their preferred way to communicate. The two bars in the right panel of Figure 4 display the fraction of participants who reported preferring Donald Trump to Barack Obama.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"4.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7180420/v1/df727e1378f8a98ef7c35091.jpg"},{"id":89545608,"identity":"f6b5992a-9319-489c-9c0d-5ac34080f4ca","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-21 07:15:59","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1065147,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7180420/v1/a4658745-1c41-47d8-b630-07b95d695f4d.pdf"},{"id":89542968,"identity":"080d1993-98d8-4636-90ce-01d560ba5326","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-21 06:51:58","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":93351,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SIJuly212025.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7180420/v1/b88dced5a71bf9a998697db6.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Image Motives Drive Lying Behavior Independent of Financial Incentives: Experimental Evidence from Strength, Preference, and President Rating Tasks","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn social and economic interactions, individuals often exploit informational asymmetries and lie to pursue private ends. Because dishonesty can substantially reduce cooperation in organizations and society, understanding the motives underlying such dishonest behavior is important. In many circumstances, unethical behavior is driven by financial incentives. Examples include citizens cheating when filing their taxes, employees misreporting the number of hours they have worked, and politicians lying to acquire votes. In some circumstances, however, individuals behave dishonestly even when financial rewards are not at stake. In this paper, we focus on a potentially important nonfinancial driver of dishonest behavior\u0026mdash;image concerns.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eConsider, for example, the marathon-cheating scandals. Between 2017 and 2018, over 5,000 runners were disqualified from the Mexico City Marathon for transgressions such as having someone else running under their name or for taking shortcuts. Similar violations have been detected at a variety of races. Whereas some of these people cheat to win prizes or to qualify for more prestigious races, others appear to simply be motivated by the image rewards associated with completing a marathon, such as the ability to impress friends or show off on social media. More generally, this example fits into the broader pattern of behavior generated by the proliferation of social media, where individuals try to portray an idealized version of their life [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn organizations, this type of lying could take the form of workers hiding their lack of comprehension of a given task to appear smart or misrepresenting their preferences and opinions to preserve a particular image. These behaviors can be costly because they can lead to the suboptimal allocation of tasks, undermine trust, and limit the voicing of unconventional ideas. Other situations where dishonesty may arise from self-presentation motives include, for example, lying about one\u0026rsquo;s physical traits online [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e] or lying about engaging in socially desirable behaviors such as voting [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR5\" citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e]. In general, this type of lying due to self-presentation motives can reduce the efficiency of communication [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMotivated by these observations, in this paper, we study the extent to which individuals are willing to misrepresent private information to curate a desirable image or avoid an undesirable image. We think of image concerns as a mix of social-image and self-image related considerations, which are intertwined in many domains. Social-image concerns, namely an individual\u0026rsquo;s desire to influence how external observers perceive them, have been shown to affect many behaviors, including prosocial decisions [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR9\" citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e], consumption choices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e], political participation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e], and performance in the workplace [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e]. In addition, individuals are typically also motivated by self-image concerns: they want to preserve the positive personal view that they have of themselves [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e]. These findings point toward the hypothesis that image concerns could also be an important determinant in lying decisions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlthough image-related motivations for lying may be important, the economics and social psychology literature has mainly focused on contexts where the incentive to lie is purely financial, with no image-based motives involved [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR18 CR19 CR20 CR21\" citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e]. In experimental paradigms where participants can lie for monetary gain, this research consistently finds that people lie less than standard economic models predict, because lying incurs psychological costs. Recent theoretical work has further identified the drivers of preferences for truthfulness [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR22 CR23\" citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e]. Together, these studies demonstrate that the desire to feel honest and to be perceived as honest discourages many individuals from telling lies that would be financially beneficial.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhen deciding whether to lie, individuals weigh: (a) the financial incentives to lie, (b) the social and self-image benefits gained from enhancing one\u0026rsquo;s appearance through lying, and (c) the psychological costs associated with dishonesty, such as the desire to feel and appear honest. While components (a) and (c) are frequently discussed in the literature, component (b) receives less attention. If sufficiently strong, image-related motives may lead individuals to lie, outweighing the psychological costs even in the absence of financial incentives. Conversely, in other contexts, such motives could deter individuals from lying, even when doing so would be financially advantageous.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe introduce three novel experimental paradigms designed to investigate the role of image-related motives in driving lying behavior. In the first two experiments, we examine whether such motives can induce lying in the absence of financial incentives. Specifically, we assess the extent to which individuals are willing to lie to present a desirable image and to avoid an undesirable one. In the third experiment, we explore how individuals balance image-related and financial motives in a context where lying could increase financial gains but would also harm their image.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the first two experiments, we find that participants lie both to gain a desirable image (specifically, to appear physically strong) and to avoid an undesirable image (particularly, to prevent being perceived as sharing personal preferences with an out-group), even when there are no financial incentives to lie. In the third experiment, we find that only a few participants lie for money when the lie involves an image-relevant statement. Specifically, a large fraction of participants sacrifice monetary benefits to avoid making the false statement that they support Donald Trump. Together, our findings highlight the importance of image concerns in influencing lying behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOur paper relates to social psychology research in which students kept daily diaries of their lies over a week [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e]. According to these diaries, participants told an average of about two lies per day and were more likely to lie for psychological rewards, such as appearing smarter or kinder, than for material gain.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOur paper also connects to literature in social psychology and behavioral economics showing that individuals lie or deceive themselves to project a more accomplished image and thereby gain financial benefits. These experiments demonstrate that individuals lie to make a good impression in job interviews [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e] and delude themselves to persuade others that they are more accomplished than they are [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e]. In these experiments, differently from our study, a better image leads to a higher financial gain, and thus the image concerns are instrumental.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOur study is also closely related to research examining the relationship between lying and self-presentation concerns. One experiment in behavioral economics finds that the presence of an audience leads individuals to make more optimistic self-assessments of their performance on a knowledge quiz compared to when no audience is present [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e]. In the context of a public goods game, a subgroup of individuals reports contributing more to the public good than they do, even when they have no material or strategic reason to do so [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e]. Another study shows that individuals prefer to lie rather than deliver negative feedback, and that this preference is driven by a desire to protect their own image rather than a concern for others\u0026rsquo; feelings [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e]. All these studies support the idea that image concerns are an important driver of lying behavior. However, unlike this previous work, our study focuses explicitly on the effect of image concerns on lying behavior and does so across a series of experiments.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"The Experiments","content":"\u003cp\u003eWe ran three experiments (N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2931) to investigate how image concerns shape lying decisions. In Experiment 1, we study how the desire to appear strong leads individuals to over-report their performance in a strength task. In Experiment 2, we test whether individuals lie to pursue a desirable image or avoid an undesirable image in a survey about personal preferences. In Experiment 3, we investigate whether image concerns make individuals tell the truth and forgo financial rewards from lies, when a lie would compromise their image. The experiments are summarized in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSummary of the experiments.\u003c/b\u003e The table provides an overview of the treatments, incentives and sample sizes in the experiments.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"7\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTreatments\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePayment\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSample\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTask\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSample Size\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment 1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObserved Image\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e10 fixed fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePush up\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnobserved Image\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e10 fixed fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePush up\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;121\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObserved Image \u0026amp; Money\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e10 fixed fee\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;0.10 piece rate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePush up\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnobserved Image \u0026amp; Money\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e10 fixed fee\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;0.10 piece rate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLab\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePush up\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment 2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e0.50 show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMturk\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSurvey about Preferences\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;217 Republicans N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;207 Democrats\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDemocrat Identity Frame\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e0.50 show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMturk\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSurvey about Preferences\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;182 Republicans N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;216 Democrats\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRepublican Identity Frame\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e0.50 show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMturk\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSurvey about Preferences\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;220 Republicans N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;208 Democrats\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment 3\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNo-Image-No-Money\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.50 GBP show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProlific\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuestion: Phone calls vs. texting\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;300\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNo-Image-Money\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.50 GBP show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026amp; 0 GBP or 1.50 GBP\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProlific\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuestion: Phone calls vs. texting\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;300\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eImage-No-Money\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.50 GBP show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProlific\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuestion: Obama vs. Trump\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;300\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eImage-Money\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.50 GBP show-up fee\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026amp; 0 GBP or 1.50 GBP\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProlific\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuestion: Obama vs. Trump\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;300\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExperiment 1: Lying for Image in a Strength Task\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn Experiment 1, we introduced a novel laboratory experiment to test whether individuals lie for image reasons. In the experiment, participants worked on a real-effort task that was tightly linked to an image-relevant characteristic and were asked to report their performance. Specifically, we asked participants to perform a strength task: the objective was to complete as many push-ups as they could in three minutes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTreatments\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe assigned participants to one of four treatments using a 2x2 between-subjects design. In all treatments, participants completed the push-ups task individually without being observed by other participants. To study the influence of different underlying motives for lying, we varied the following dimensions between treatments: (i) the incentive scheme (fixed payment vs. piece-rate payment) and (ii) whether the experimenter observed the participant.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eImage‑Observed\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage‑Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments did not offer any financial incentives for exerting effort or exaggerating performance, unlike standard cheating paradigms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e] in which dishonesty yields monetary gain. Consequently, in these treatments, participants had no monetary motivation to overstate the number of push‑ups completed, or to perform any push‑ups at all.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment, participants performed the task in private while the experimenter waited in a separate room and then reported to the experimenter the number of push-ups they completed. In the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatment, participants performed the task in front of the experimenter, who counted and recorded the number of push-ups each participant performed. Our identification of cheating relies on the comparison of the performance distributions in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments. Given that the experimenter observed participants in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e condition, misrepresenting one\u0026rsquo;s performance was not possible. In the \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment, on the other hand, cheating was possible. If we find the distribution of push-ups differs significantly between the treatments, we can conclude that participants in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e condition lied. Importantly, evidence from social psychology shows that people often exert more effort in simple tasks when they are observed [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e]. Because this previous evidence indicates that greater effort may be exerted in the \u003cem\u003eObserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment, our experimental design is conservative and provides us with a lower bound estimate of lying. That is, the actual number of push-ups completed is likely to be higher in the \u003cem\u003eObserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment than in the \u003cem\u003eUnobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Observed\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments, we added material incentives to lie. Participants received the same fixed payment as in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e treatments plus a piece-rate of 10 cents per push-up. This payment scheme created dual incentives to exaggerate performance: financial (more push-ups result in more money) and image-based (appearing stronger). Comparing push-up distributions between the \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e treatments allows us to assess the strength of image and material rewards in motivating lying behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHypotheses\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBased on experimental and theoretical evidence showing that image concerns affect behavior [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e], we expect our participants in the two \u003cem\u003eUnobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments to lie to present a more desirable image of themselves:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ea: Individuals lie to present a more appealing version of themselves.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePush-ups (Image-Observed)\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;Push-ups (Image-Unobserved)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eb: Individuals lie when they have both monetary and image reasons to do so.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePush-ups (Image\u0026amp;Money-Observed)\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;Push-ups (Image\u0026amp;Money-Unobserved)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo examine whether the image concerns or monetary payments are the primary driver of any lying behavior, we examine the difference-in-differences comparison of the four treatments. Because the literature that examines lying in simple tasks under piece-rate incentives finds that, on average, individuals over-report their performance [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR35\" citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e], we expect that adding monetary incentives to achieve a higher number of push-ups will strengthen the motivation to lie.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 2\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe addition of monetary incentives to lie leads to an increase in lying.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePush-ups (Image-Unobserved) \u0026ndash; Push-ups (Image-Observed)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026lt;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePush-ups (Image\u0026amp;Money-Unobserved) \u0026ndash; Push-ups (Image\u0026amp;Money-Observed)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResults\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe start by comparing the pairs of \u003cem\u003eObserved\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eUnobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments. Panels A of Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e and Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, in which only image concerns may play a role in generating lying, show that, in line with Hypothesis 1a, subjects claimed to have done more push-ups when they were not observed by the experimenter during the task. Whereas participants did 33.44 push-ups on average in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatment, the number of push-ups reported increased significantly to 38.64 in the \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.027, Fisher-Pitman test). Panels B of Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e and Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e show a similar pattern of behavior when monetary incentives were added. Whereas participants in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatments did 33.98 push-ups on average, the number of reported push-ups increased significantly to 40.03 in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatment (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.008, Fisher-Pitman test). This result is in line with Hypothesis 1b.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel A: Only Image Incentives Panel B: Image and Financial Incentives\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel A: Only Image Incentives Panel B: Image and Financial Incentives\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNext, we compare the magnitudes of the average lie in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money\u003c/em\u003e treatments by running a difference-in-differences test and find that the magnitude of the change in lying does not differ significantly when comparing the two \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e conditions with the two \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money\u003c/em\u003e conditions (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.792, estimated using a linear regression). Therefore, we find no support for Hypothesis \u003cspan refid=\"FPar3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the evidence shows that image concerns are the dominant driver of the behavior in our experiment and the monetary rewards play a minor role. A further factor that could limit lying even when incentives are introduced is the desire to signal honesty, which may place an upper bound on the magnitude of the lies that individuals are willing to tell because they want their lies to remain plausibly true (i.e., announcing an implausibly high number of push-ups would reveal the individual as a liar).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAn ancillary result of our experiment is that the piece-rate incentives did not induce our participants to do more push-ups: the number of push-ups was not significantly different between the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatments (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.798, Fisher-Pitman test). This finding suggests social-image concerns alone may have been sufficient to motivate maximal effort in this task.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExperiment 2: Lying for Image in a Survey\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe goal of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the results from Experiment 1 by testing whether image concerns can influence lying behavior in an image-relevant domain other than strength. Second, we introduced a novel online experiment to measure how participants would lie both to gain a \u003cem\u003edesirable image\u003c/em\u003e and to avoid an \u003cem\u003eundesirable image\u003c/em\u003e. In Experiment 1, some participants may have over-reported the number of push-ups not because they wanted to appear strong (\u003cem\u003edesirable image\u003c/em\u003e), but because they wanted to not appear weak (\u003cem\u003eundesirable image\u003c/em\u003e). Whereas the design of Experiment 1 does not allow us to disentangle the desirable from undesirable image motives, Experiment 2 was designed to do so.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the experiment, we asked participants to answer a set of 30 binary image-irrelevant questions (e.g., \u0026ldquo;Which of the following beverages do you prefer? 1) Water, 2) Juice\u0026rdquo;; see SI). Each response added either zero or five points to their score, with the assignment randomized per question. Participants were informed in advance about the point allocation and knew that their final score had no financial consequences.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe induced image concerns by giving participants information about the final score of other participants. Specifically, in the treatment conditions, we truthfully told participants that previous participants from a particular political affiliation obtained a high score in the survey. We recruited Democrat and Republican participants and, for each group, varied whether we provided information about the scores achieved by individuals from their own or the opposing political party. Hence, we generated variation in whether the decision maker identified with (or did not identify with) the past participants they were informed about. We examined whether participants lied about their own preferences to manipulate their final score, thereby sending a signal that they were more like other participants who shared their political affiliation or more distant from the participants with the opposite political affiliation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTreatments\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe assigned participants to one of three conditions using a between-subjects design. In the \u003cem\u003eControl\u003c/em\u003e condition, subjects received no information about a comparison group and simply completed the survey and received their score at the end. Before answering the questions in the survey, the participants saw the following message: \u0026ldquo;During this session, you will complete a survey.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003eDemocrat Identity Frame\u003c/em\u003e condition, before answering the survey questions, participants were truthfully told that of the 100 participants in an earlier session, the average Democrat obtained a high score in the survey. They received the following message: \u0026ldquo;During this session, you will complete a survey. We have already conducted the same survey with 100 Americans. Of those surveyed, Democrats typically scored high \u0026ndash; on average, Democrats collected more than 95 points out of 150 in the survey. Fill out the survey to find out how well your preferences match those of the average Democrat!\u0026rdquo; Similarly, in the \u003cem\u003eRepublican Identity Frame\u003c/em\u003e condition, before answering the questions, subjects were truthfully told that of the 100 participants in an earlier session, the average Republican obtained a high score in the survey.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe hypothesized that individuals lie about their own preferences to appear more like the members of groups they identify with (\u003cem\u003edesirable image\u003c/em\u003e) or to appear different from the members of groups they do not identify with (\u003cem\u003eundesirable image\u003c/em\u003e):\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 3\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIndividuals lie to conform with the characteristics of the members of their political affiliation and to differentiate themselves from the characteristics of the members of the opposite political affiliation.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFinal Score (Desirable Image: Democrats in Democrat Identity Frame \u0026amp; Republicans in Republican Identity Frame)\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;Final Score (Control)\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;Final Score (Undesirable Image: Democrats in Republican Identity Frame \u0026amp; Republicans in Democrat Identity Frame)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResults\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe assessed lying by comparing the final survey scores in the \u003cem\u003eControl\u003c/em\u003e with the answers in the \u003cem\u003eDemocrat Identity Frame\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eRepublican Identity Frame\u003c/em\u003e. Whereas in the \u003cem\u003eControl\u003c/em\u003e, participants had no incentives to lie, in other conditions, they had image incentives to manipulate their final score by lying in the answers to the binary questions. Democrats (Republicans) might have lied to inflate their score in the \u003cem\u003eDemocrat (Republican) Identity Frame\u003c/em\u003e. Similarly, Democrats (Republicans) might have lied in their answers to deflate their score in the \u003cem\u003eRepublican (Democrat) Identity Frame.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFigure \u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e shows that final scores decreased in the undesirable-image condition, which is stochastically dominated by the other two treatments. Whereas in the control condition, the average final score totaled 108.17 points, it decreased significantly to 102.64 points in the undesirable-image condition (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.007, Fisher-Pitman test). However, we find no effect of the desirable-image framing on the final score outcome with the average score amounting to 106.72 points in the desirable-image condition and not differing significantly from the control condition (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.458, Fisher-Pitman test).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003epresents the results of OLS regression analyses. Column (1) shows that individuals in the undesirable-image conditions reported a significantly lower number of points on average (5.53 fewer points) than those in the control condition (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.007). Those in the desirable-image condition reported 1.45 fewer points than those in the control condition, which is not statistically significant (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.456). The results are robust to controlling for political affiliation, gender and age. We also interact the indicator for whether participants were Republicans with the desirable-image and undesirable-image indicators and find no significant interaction (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.669 for the undesirable image condition and p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.174 for the desirable image condition).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVARIABLES\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eScore\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eScore\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eScore\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eScore\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDesirable Image\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.45\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.38\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.28\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.48\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.95)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.93)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.69)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.69)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUndesirable Image\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-5.53**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-5.06*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-5.80*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-6.05*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.06)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.02)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.82)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.81)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRepublican\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10.52***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e11.81***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e11.57***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.61)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.77)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.78)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRepublican * Desirable Image\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-5.24\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-5.57\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3.85)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3.84)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRepublican * Undesirable Image\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.73\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.63\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4.04)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4.04)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.75**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.71)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.05\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.07)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e108.17***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e102.79***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e102.13***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e105.80***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.41)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.60)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.96)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3.22)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,250\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,250\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,250\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,250\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eR-squared\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.01\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.04\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.04\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.05\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e: \u003cb\u003eLying to move toward a desirable image or away from an undesirable image\u003c/b\u003e. This table reports results from an OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the score in the test. Desirable Image is a dummy variable coded as 1 when participants were in the desirable-image condition (i.e., Republicans in the Republicans condition and Democrats in the Democrats condition). Undesirable Image is a dummy variable coded as 1 when participants were in the undesirable-image condition (i.e., Republicans in the Democrats condition and Democrats in the Republicans condition). Female is a dummy variable coded as 1 for female participants, and 0 otherwise. Age indicates participants\u0026rsquo; age. Republican is a dummy variable coded a 1 for participants who self-reported being Republicans, and 0 otherwise. *** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePut together, in support of Hypothesis \u003cspan refid=\"FPar5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, some participants lied on the survey to lower their score and avoid an undesirable image. However, we found no evidence for the first part of Hypothesis \u003cspan refid=\"FPar5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e: desirable-image incentives did not prompt participants to lie for a higher score in this context.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExperiment 3: Costly Truth-Telling\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter finding that a substantial fraction of participants lied to improve their image (Experiment 1) and to avoid an undesirable image (Experiment 2), Experiment 3 examined whether image concerns could encourage truth-telling, even when honesty meant sacrificing monetary gains.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTreatments\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe assigned participants to one of four treatments using a 2x2 between-subjects design. We asked participants to state their preferences between pairs of options and varied the following dimensions between treatments: (i) whether the stated preference was image relevant and (ii) the incentive scheme\u0026mdash;either no payment for both options or a payment for one option.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSpecifically, in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e treatments, we asked the participants which President of the United States they preferred: Donald Trump or Barack Obama (see SI for the exact wording). In the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image\u003c/em\u003e treatments, we asked the participants whether they preferred communicating via phone calls or texting.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe introduced material incentives to lie by adding a monetary bonus. Whereas in the \u003cem\u003eNo-Money\u003c/em\u003e conditions, participants did not receive payment for their stated preferences, in the \u003cem\u003eMoney\u003c/em\u003e conditions, stating a preference for Donald Trump over Barack Obama, or phone calls over texting, led to a bonus of 1.50 GBP. Whereas in the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image\u003c/em\u003e condition, the lie came at no additional image cost, in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e conditions, appearing to be a supporter of the president they did not prefer entailed an image cost.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eHypotheses\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003eNo-Money\u003c/em\u003e conditions, we expected low rates of participants preferring phone calls to texting and Donald Trump to Barack Obama, consistent with the pre-test (see Methods). By contrast, in the \u003cem\u003eMoney\u003c/em\u003e conditions, we expected some participants to lie about their preferences to secure the monetary bonus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image/Money\u003c/em\u003e condition, stating that one preferred phone calls to texting resulted in a 1.50 GBP bonus. We expected that, for some participants, the monetary incentives would outweigh the psychological cost of lying and they would lie:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 4\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eWhen no image cost is at stake, individuals lie about their preferences to obtain a monetary reward.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/Money)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/No-Money)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the \u003cem\u003eImage/Money\u003c/em\u003e condition, stating that one preferred Donald Trump to Barack Obama resulted in a 1.50 GBP bonus. However, if untrue, such a claim could undermine both self- and social-image\u0026mdash;being seen to favor Trump when one prefers Obama. Because the lie carries this additional image cost, we expected (virtually) no lying in the \u003cem\u003eImage/Money\u003c/em\u003e treatment:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 5\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eWhen an image cost is at stake, individuals generally do not lie about their preferences to obtain a monetary reward.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/Money)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e=\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/No-Money)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, we predict that individuals are less likely to lie by making an image-contradictory statement than when making an image-irrelevant statement. The difference-in-differences comparison in Hypothesis \u003cspan refid=\"FPar8\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e captures this hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 6\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIndividuals are more willing to falsely report their preferences to obtain a monetary reward when making image-irrelevant statements than when making image-relevant statements.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/Money) \u0026ndash; Fraction preferring phone calls (No-Image/No-Money)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/Money) \u0026ndash; Fraction preferring Donald Trump (Image/No-Money)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResults\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe begin the analysis with the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image\u003c/em\u003e treatments. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e shows that whereas in the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image/No-Money\u003c/em\u003e treatment, only 17.67% of participants chose phone calls over texting, in the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image/Money\u003c/em\u003e treatment, 56.67% claimed to prefer phone calls to texting. The difference is highly statistically significant (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001, test of proportions). That is, in line with Hypothesis \u003cspan refid=\"FPar6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, after we introduced the monetary incentive, a large fraction of participants chose to lie about their preference.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, we compare the magnitudes of lying in the \u003cem\u003eNo-Image\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e treatments by running a diff-in-diff test. We find that lying differed significantly between the two treatment groups with p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.002 (estimated using a linear regression). Therefore, we find support for Hypothesis \u003cspan refid=\"FPar8\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, thus implying that image concerns generate a significant increase in truth-telling at the cost of foregoing monetary payments. This effect is even more pronounced when we focus only on Democrats (see SI).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTogether, our results show that participants lied for money in both the \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eNo-Image\u003c/em\u003e conditions. However, significantly more participants lied for money when doing so did not affect their image than when it did. That is, even in an anonymous online survey, a large fraction of participants sacrificed their monetary benefits to not appear to be a Donald Trump supporter when they in fact supported Barack Obama. Participants\u0026rsquo; answers in the post-questionnaire suggest they forewent the money in the \u003cem\u003eImage\u003c/em\u003e treatments due to \u003cem\u003eboth\u003c/em\u003e self-image (\u0026ldquo;I'm not going to betray myself for \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e2\u0026rdquo;) and social-image concerns \u003cem\u003e(\u0026ldquo;\u003c/em\u003eThere are things I would do for money, but never could I say I prefer Trump to someone else\u0026rdquo;).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion and Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eBehavioral economics and social psychology literature has researched the topic of lying extensively in recent years and has shown that people not only balance standard economic monetary costs and benefits when deciding whether and how to lie (as in [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e]) but also experience a moral disutility when telling a lie and/or care about appearing to be honest. This paper provides experimental evidence on an additional variable in the utility function: a pure image motive to lie. Importantly, we show that image concerns may outweigh the psychological costs of lying.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, and surprisingly, we showed in Experiment 1 that in the presence of these image concerns, adding monetary incentives did not motivate one to lie more. That is, the main driver of the lying decisions participants made in Experiment 1 was the desire to impress the experimenter with the number of push-ups they could do. Similarly, in Experiment 3, some individuals displayed a strong aversion to lying about an image-relevant aspect of their own preferences. This self-presentation motive was strong enough to induce truth-telling behavior and forego material rewards. Together, Experiments 1 and 3 suggest image concerns can be a stronger determinant of the statements that individuals make relative to the truth than material rewards.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOur results also point toward an important role of identity in mediating the effect of self-presentation concerns on truth-telling behavior. In Experiment 2, we showed that some individuals lie to not appear like people of the opposite political affiliation. Importantly, the lying about the preferences was driven by a rather light-touch information intervention.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment 3 further reinforces the importance of identity in shaping the statements that we make about ourselves by showing that the desire to project a specific image of oneself can be strong enough to overcome material preferences: individuals display a strong pull to tell the truth about core elements of their identity, but they are much more willing to make incorrect statements about peripheral elements of their identity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA large literature examines how individuals trade off monetary rewards against an inclination to tell the truth. Our study suggests that more work should examine the role of non-material motives in determining when individuals tell the truth and when they lie. The literature considering how individuals navigate trade-offs between non-material motives is still in its infancy, perhaps partially because it is more challenging to study. However, given the importance of non-material motives in human society, more work in this direction is warranted.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEthics Statement.\u003c/b\u003e Ethical approval for data collection was issued by the WZB Research Ethics Committee. All experimental procedures were conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki (1964) and its later amendments. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to data collection, and participant confidentiality and privacy were strictly maintained.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eExperimental Procedures.\u003c/b\u003e Experiment 1 was conducted at the WZB\u0026ndash;TU Berlin laboratory. We recruited 481 participants using ORSEE [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e]. Because gender may influence how desirable a strong performance is in a strength task and since gender is not the focus of our study, we restricted the sample to males to avoid this additional source of heterogeneity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe invited only one subject per session. Subjects always worked on the task alone; they did not see other participants completing the task, nor did other people observe them (except for the experimenter in the \u003cem\u003eObserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments). We used this design to cleanly identify the effect of appearing strong/fit separately from the influence of peer effects and the desire to outperform others.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the beginning of the experiment, each subject received written instructions that informed them of the incentive structure and the details of the task. The instructions made clear that the experiment involved a one-shot interaction and did not include any tasks other than the push-ups (see SI). In both the \u003cem\u003eImage-Observed\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Observed\u003c/em\u003e treatments, we informed each participant that, when they were ready, the experimenter would start the countdown on the timer clock. Upon completion, the experimenter entered the number of push-ups at the bottom of the instruction sheet. In the \u003cem\u003eImage-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eImage\u0026amp;Money-Unobserved\u003c/em\u003e treatments, the procedures were identical except that each subject completed the task in private and self-reported the number of push-ups completed. We informed participants that, when they were ready, the experimenter would start the three-minute countdown on the timer clock and wait for them in a different room. Upon completion of the three minutes, the experimenter returned to the room, and the participant reported the total number of push-ups he completed. The experimenter then entered the number at the bottom of the instruction sheet.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the end of the experiment, participants filled out a short post-experimental questionnaire in which we asked participants to report their age, field of study, height, weight, weekly exercise frequency, and frequency of doing push-ups. Participants then received their cash payment in private and left. In conditions without additional financial incentives for push-ups, participants received five euros for showing up and an additional five euros for participating in the experiment. The experiment lasted approximately 10 minutes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment 2 was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). We limited our recruitment to participants who were based in the US. A total of 1250 participants took part in the experiment, of which 631 were Democrats and 619 Republicans, as reported in a post-experimental survey. In all treatments, participants completed the task anonymously and received 0.50 USD for participating in the experiment. The experiment lasted approximately four minutes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrior to the main experiment, we pre-tested the experiment with 100 MTurk users based in the US to truthfully construct our framing messages. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject received instructions that informed them of the participation fee and the details of the questionnaire. We explained that each of the 30 questions had two possible answers, and we asked the participants to pick the answer that best represented their preferences and tastes. Upon completion of the survey, participants saw their final score and filled out a post-experimental questionnaire about their age, gender, and political affiliation. Participants could then leave the platform and receive their payment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExperiment 3 was conducted on Prolific. We limited our recruitment to participants who were based in the US. A total of 1,200 participants (71.50% Democrats, 22.83% Republicans, and 5.67% Independents) took part in the experiment, which lasted approximately five minutes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the beginning of the experiment, each subject received instructions that informed them of the participation fee and the details of the experiment. The participants were asked to choose their preference between a single binary pair of options (phone calls vs. texting, Donald Trump vs. Barack Obama) and to write down their choice on a piece of paper for themselves. After this stage, in the \u003cem\u003eNo-Money\u003c/em\u003e treatments, participants were asked to state their preference on the computer. In the \u003cem\u003eMoney\u003c/em\u003e treatments, the participants learned about the bonus payment associated with one of the options and thereafter were asked to state their preference on the computer. Upon completion of the survey, they filled out a post-experimental questionnaire about their age, gender, and political affiliation. Participants could then leave the platform and receive their payment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrior to the main experiment, we pre-tested a series of image-irrelevant and image-relevant questions (e.g., \u0026ldquo;Which fruit do you prefer? Apples or bananas?\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;If you think about your views regarding abortion, are you pro-choice or pro-life?\u0026rdquo;) with 200 Prolific users based in the US. We chose two questions that resulted in the most similar distributions of the answers: in the pre-test, 20% of participants claimed they preferred phone calls to texting, and 18.50% claimed they preferred Trump to Obama. We assigned a monetary bonus to the less commonly chosen option in each pair: phone calls and Donald Trump.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAcknowledgements\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe thank Johannes Abeler, Tilman Fries, Uri Gneezy, and seminar participants at the Baltic Economic Seminar, MiddExLab Virtual Seminar Series and Purdue Economics Seminar, for valuable comments and suggestions.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor contributions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eK.B., A.K, and S.S. performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe research was funded by the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and Carnegie Mellon University.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData availability statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData will be made available upon request.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFardouly, J., Diedrichs, P., Vartanian, L. \u0026amp; Halliwell, E. 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Association\u003c/em\u003e. \u003cb\u003e1\u003c/b\u003e, 114\u0026ndash;125 (2015).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Lying, Cheating, Social Image, Self Image, Experiment","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7180420/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7180420/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe extensive behavioral economics and social psychology literature on lying has focused almost exclusively on experimental settings in which individuals lie for financial gain. However, in everyday life, people frequently lie to enhance their social and self‑image \u0026ndash; perhaps even more often than they lie to gain monetary advantage. In this paper, we introduce three experiments \u0026ndash; conducted both in the laboratory and online \u0026ndash; in which participants may lie about their physical strength, their preferences for everyday items, or their favorite U.S. President. Using these experiments, we examine how the willingness to present a desirable social or self‑image (or to avoid an undesirable one) influences lying behavior. Our results demonstrate that image concerns significantly affect the decision to lie: they increase lying even when no financial incentive is present, and they promote truth‑telling when lying would yield monetary gain but threaten one\u0026rsquo;s image.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Image Motives Drive Lying Behavior Independent of Financial Incentives: Experimental Evidence from Strength, Preference, and President Rating Tasks","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-08-21 06:51:54","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7180420/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision 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