Social-Ecological Analysis of Resilience to Co-Management Challenges in a Bangladeshi Wetland Fishery Community

Social-Ecological Analysis of Resilience to Co-Management Challenges in a Bangladeshi Wetland Fishery Community | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Social-Ecological Analysis of Resilience to Co-Management Challenges in a Bangladeshi Wetland Fishery Community Mohammed Anwar Hossain, Nor Hafizah Selamat This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8160162/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract A social-ecological system framework (SESF) is employed to analyze fishers’ resilience to social-ecological challenges in co-managing the Bogiani fishery’s social-ecological system (SES). This study uses in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to provide an in-depth assessment of fishers’ resilience to co-management challenges. Results indicate that socioeconomic adversities and local hierarchical political processes mainly restrict fishers’ ability to address these challenges. Specifically, fishers seek assistance from well-off individuals to co-manage the fishery due to their inability to cover high maintenance costs and the competitive leasing process. This allows the wealthy and influential to capture the fishery. Moreover, overharvesting and declining biophysical settings prevent fishers from growing the fishery. Fishers also report minimal participation in fishery governance and the creation of formal rules, ignoring their customary practices. Ultimately, co-management has failed to stimulate joint action among fishers to mitigate ecological challenges and achieve sustainable fishery management. Co-management challenges Bogiani Wetland fishery social-ecological system (SES) SESF framework Fishers’ resilience Bangladesh Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Introduction Inland wetland fisheries are an essential source of animal protein, export earnings, and employment for the rural population in Bangladesh (Department of Fisheries (DoF), 2018). Many rural Bangladeshis rely on fishing, fish processing, and fish trading in the area’s rivers, estuaries, canals, beels (fisheries), lakes, haors (wetlands), and floodplains for their lives and livelihoods. Fishing has become a vital livelihood for wetland communities, with over two-thirds of people either consuming or selling fish from wetland fisheries (Thompson et al., 2003 ). However, this sector’s contribution to the national economy has decreased over time, from 62.59 percent in 1983-84 to 28.45 percent in 2017-18 (DoF, 2018 ), mainly due to harmful fishing practices, habitat damage, and the exclusion of fishers from fisheries management (Newaz and Rahman, 2019 ). To address these challenges, the Bangladesh government has adopted a community-based fisheries management (CBFM) strategy to engage fishers in the country's fisheries management (DoF, 2018 ). CBMF promotes the sharing of power and responsibilities between fishers and government bodies (e.g., the Department of Fisheries and local governments) for managing fisheries (Newaz and Rahman, 2019 ). CBFM approach aims to ensure that fish resources are managed to safeguard both present and future use by promoting: the delegation of fishing rights to local fishers; the formation of organizations among fishers; collaboration between stakeholders (DoF, local government, fishers, and local people); equitable benefits sharing; and the enhancement of alternative employments and personal skills (Sultana et al., 2022 ; Thompson et al., 2003 ). It also emphasizes resolving conflicts over resources, establishing mutual understanding among fishers to facilitate co-management, developing and conserving sanctuaries, and integrating local knowledges into fishery use strategies (Thompson et al., 2003 ). These activities are intended to improve fishers’ ability to co-manage fisheries and, consequently, their livelihoods (Islam et al., 2014 ). Nonetheless, fishers’ access and declining wetland fisheries resources have yet to be fully restored (Newaz and Rahman, 2019 ). Wetland fisheries co-management faces numerous critical social challenges, including conflicts between institutions, a lack of protocols for monitoring institutions and enforcing policies, exclusionary decision-making, power imbalances, absence of conflict-mitigation procedures, scarcity of livelihood redundancy, disregard of shared learning in pursuing continuous improvement, weak leadership, lack of faith and mutuality among actors, and weak collaboration among stakeholders (Allison and Badjeck, 2004 ; Carrillo et al., 2019 ; Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ; Hossain and Banik, 2022 ; Tima et al., 2021 ). Moreover, fisheries co-management also faces ecological challenges, including decreasing species diversity, catch decline, limited resource mobility, inadequate knowledge of local ecology and practices, and environmental changes (Mondal et al., 2010 ; London et al., 2017 ; Lozano and Heinen, 2016 ; Pukkalla and Rama Mohan, 2021 ). Fishers often fail to adequately address social-ecological challenges, leading to resource degradation, disparities, and conflicts among stakeholders in co-managing wetland fisheries as social-ecological systems (SESs) in Bangladesh (Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ). Thus, fishing communities must develop resilience, as this will bolster their ability to address the challenges of co-managing fishery SESs (Pellowe and Leslie, 2020 ). Resilient co-management enables fishers to devise strategies, decisions, and activities to confront the challenges inherent to their particular SES (Satumanatpan and Pollnac, 2020 ). Fishers’ resilience within a fishery SES indicates their ability to handle challenges posed by the system’s ongoing actions and arrangements (Marshall and Marshall, 2007 ). Resilient SESs provide resource users with expected outcomes and can respond to unexpected challenges in resource management (Allen et al., 2018 ). Fishers’ resilience in fisheries management is influenced by challenges, such as resource scarcity, bans on usage, adaptation to new resource policies, and livelihood uncertainty (Marshall and Marshall, 2007 ). Resilience analysis remains undeveloped, as most procedures use small-range or inappropriate scales to analyze parts of an SES, participant feedback on personal well-being, and key drivers, rather than employing multiple scales across various arrangements and interests (Angeler and Allen, 2016 ). Furthermore, current resilience analyses overlook uncertainties and challenges in fishery SESs, as well as the resulting levels of fishers’ resilience (Salomon et al., 2019 ). While existing literature examines co-management challenges and resilience using specific theoretical approaches (Allen et al., 2018 ; Armitage et al., 2009 ; Cinner and Barnes, 2019 ; Fabinyi et al., 2014 ; Said et al., 2019 ), both resilience and co-management are interdisciplinary and multidimensional (Clay and Olson, 2008 ; Pope et al., 2014 ). An SESF is particularly effective for analyzing social and ecological challenges to fishers’ resilience in co-managing fishery SESs (Partelow et al., 2018 ). Co-management challenges and their effects on fishers’ resilience can be diagnosed using the SESF developed by McGinnis and Ostrom ( 2014 ) (Carrillo et al., 2019 ; London et al., 2017 ). The SESF diagnoses challenges to fishers’ resilience in fisheries co-management by examining interactions between SES variables and fishers’ local settings (Partelow and Boda, 2015 ; Partelow et al., 2018 ). It also facilitates qualitative analysis of fisheries’ SES resilience through data classification (Aswani, 2020 ). In this work, SESF is applied using descriptive methods to diagnose co-management challenges and their overall effects on fishers’ lives, livelihoods, and resilience in the Bogiani fishery in Bangladesh’s northeastern floodplain, Sunamganj district. Framework of the Study Resilience, as an interdisciplinary approach, can address a wide range of challenges to the continued functioning of SESs (Folke, 2016 ). An SES comprises social (economy, polity, culture, institutions, community, people) and ecological (ecosystems) systems, both of which are interdependent and equally important (Folke, 2016 ). Resilience theory can combine both systems and explain their nuances in different social contexts (Baggio et al., 2015 ). It describes the ability of individuals, collectivities, social values, and behaviors, or SESs, to adapt to perceived and unpredictable challenges while maintaining current actions, systems, and responses (Folke, 2016 ). Adaptation, a key component of resilience, encompasses ideas, facts, creativity, and rules to address challenges and build resilience in SESs (Folke, 2016 ). Resilience depends on the ability of people or SESs to reorganize activities across varying levels of challenge, transform these challenges into opportunities, and replace current unsustainable SESs with new, sustainable ones (Folke, 2016 ). An SESF considers a set of interrelated variables in examining social and ecological challenges within SESs (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014 ). It describes actors as resource users and managers who accumulate resource units from an ever-changing resource system maintained by a governance system based on diverse formal and informal rules and strategies, interactions as the procedures of resource accumulation and management, and outcomes as the consequences of interactions within social-political-economic settings and related ecological systems (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014 ). The italicized components are considered first-layer variables in describing an SESF. In an SESF, the resource system builds on an environment that generates resource units (e.g., water, fish, food); the governance system comprises interconnected rules that influence and are influenced by the SES; interactions indicate actions, interchanges, and disagreements among actors; outcomes reflect the effects of interactions between other variables; social-political-economic settings represent the external, broader social, political, and economic contexts that influence or are influenced by the SES; and related ecological systems represent interconnections between the SES and adjoining ecosystems (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014 ). An SESF identifies the interactions between relevant social and ecological variables in local settings to assess a fishery’s SES ability to address social and ecological challenges in its co-management (London et al., 2017 ). Methods Study Location The study area is located within the larger wetlands of northeastern Tahirpur Upazila (sub-district) in Bangladesh, between 25°01' and 25°12' north latitudes and 91°02' and 91°19' east longitudes (Banglapedia, 2020 ). This area experiences average annual temperatures ranging from 21.1 ° C to 31.2 ° C and 3,576.96 millimeters of rainfall (BBS, 2019). The Bogiani fishery, covering 1,000.66 acres, comprises eleven interconnected parts, including two sanctuaries and several mini-forests. It connects to the larger Shanir Haor from June to November, but is visibly separated for the rest of the year. Management of Bogiani Fishery The Tahirpur Jamalgar Motsojibi Sombay Somiti (Tahirpur Jamalgar Fishers’ Cooperative Association) (TJMSS), which was established in 1972 by 48 fishers from Jamalgar village, leased the fishery from the government for six years from 2017 to 2023. Previously, the 45-member Vati (low-lying) Tahirpur Motsojibi Sombay Somiti (Vati Tahirpur Fishers’ Cooperative Association) (VTMSS), which was founded in 2007 from Vati Tahirpur village, leased the fishery from 2010 to 2016. However, TJMSS (current leaseholders) transferred fishery management to a former wealthy leaseholder due to their inability to bear the expenses (yearly leasing fee: BDT 6.2 million = $ 68,000; total expenses: BDT 20 million = $ 225,000) and manage the fishery. Notably, most fishers are landless and marginalized, with agriculture being the key means of subsistence in the region (Banglapedia, 2020 ). Study Design This study employs a qualitative approach, utilizing an instrumental case study design to assess co-management challenges and their effects on fishers’ resilience. The Bogiani fishery is the primary focus of the study, offering a real-world context to better understand broader issues of co-management and resilience. To develop a rich and well-rounded understanding, the study draws on several sources of information, including in-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and document analysis. Data Collection The fieldwork started with twenty online individual conversations with TJMSS (12) and VTMSS (8) members from August 2021, using WhatsApp with the help of assistants from the study area to build rapport with the informants, as the spread of Covid-19 impeded the researcher from traveling from Malaysia to Bangladesh for in-person data collection to complete the study. Additionally, thirty in-person conversations were conducted with TJMSS (17), VTMSS (10) members, and government officials (3) in the study area from November 2021 to build relationships with more informants. This study conducted 18 IDIs with fishers from TJMSS (9) and VTMSS (6), along with government officials (3), and five FGDs with six members each from TJMSS (3) and VTMSS (2) in-person between February and May 2022, using convenience sampling to explore key aspects of fishers’ resilience to their co-management challenges. It used separate semi-structured interview guides for IDIs and FGDs to collect data using predetermined question sets, which were further refined by asking informants follow-up questions based on their responses. Informants were selected for their experience in co-managing Bogiani and knowledge of how it affects their lives and livelihoods, including their limited participation and the deprivation of benefits in co-management. Government officials were also interviewed to record their experiences and knowledge about co-management. IDIs obtained information about fishers’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, fishing practices, fish catch, leadership patterns, trust and reciprocity, rules-in-use, family and fishing assets, and their challenges in co-management. FGDs gathered collective insights from fishers on their social, economic, political, cultural, and ecological settings. Additionally, published documents, including the Statistical Yearbooks of Bangladesh 2019 and 2020, the Bangladesh Population and Housing Census Report 2011, and the Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh 2017-18, were used to contextualize wetland fisheries in Bangladesh and in Bogiani, Tahirpur. The unit of analysis for this study was the Bogiani fishery, including all relevant actors, particularly the fishers of TJMSS and VTMSS and government officials (UNO-Upazila Nirbahi (executive) officer, UFO-Upazila fishery officer, and OC-officer in charge of the local police station) in Tahirpur subdistrict. Before IDIs and FGDs, verbal informed consent and availability were ensured. They were conducted in Bengali and then translated and transcribed into English using the back-translation method. IDI and FGD sessions lasted approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. Data Analysis This study used the SESF (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014 ) to organize three tiers of social and ecological variables to identify challenges in co-managing the Bogiani fishery SES. Interview guides were developed around first-, second, and third-tier variables of the SESF. This study employed the thematic analysis framework developed by Braun and Clarke ( 2006 ) to review and analyze interview and FGD transcripts, reading them repeatedly and taking essential notes to become familiar with the data. Next, transcripts were organized to generate initial codes, comparing their meanings and trends pertinent to the research questions. All layer variables were coded using collected data, aligning with research aims and questions. The codes were grouped into major themes related to the Bogiani SES. These themes were then cross-checked for their relevance and accuracy. They were clarified with subthemes and various excerpts from interviews and FGDs. Identified codes and themes were subsequently used to describe fishers’ challenges in co-managing Bogiani SES from a resilience perspective. Results Information from interviews, FGDs, field notes, and published documents reveals various challenges for co-managing the Bogiani fishery. The SESF is applied to characterize Bogiani as an SES, focusing on the key challenges for its co-management. It includes eight first-tier variables, along with a set of interconnected second- and third-tier variables derived from each first- and second-tier variable. The focal fishery SES comprises the resource system (RS), resource units (RU), governance system (GS), and actors (A), which influence and are influenced by exogenous social-economic-political settings (S) and related ecosystems (ECO). The outcomes (O) from interactions (I) among relevant actors in the focal fishery SES denote its action situation. The SESF components have been modified based on their definitions in the literature (Carrillo et al., 2019 ; London et al., 2017 ; Partelow et al., 2018 ), research aims, and the SES attributes of Bogiani. The first-tier variables are divided into 41 second- and 67 third-tier variables. These variables are coded in brackets with uppercase letters followed by numerical superscripts and lowercase letters. The entire set of variables (first and second-tier variables summarized in Fig. 3 , third-tier variables listed in Tables 1 – 8 ) and outcomes resulting from their interactions determines fishers’ resilience to co-management challenges in the Bogiani SES. Exogenous Challenges for the Bogiani Wetland Fishery’s SES and Fishers’ Resilience Fishery SESs often influence or are influenced by their broader socio-economic-political (S) and ecological (ECO) settings. The broader settings and attributes of the fishery SES are wide-ranging and challenging to clarify in local contexts, often leading to failures in fishery SES co-management. Successful co-management is, therefore, directly related to fishers’ ability to address social-economic-political-ecological challenges generated outside fisheries. Similarly, fishers’ resilience to challenges in co-managing the Bogiani SES is influenced by their national and regional socio-economic-political-ecological settings. Table 1 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fisher’s Social-Economic-Political Settings (S) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges S1a: High population density In 2011, Tahirpur’s population was 215,200, with a density of 682 people/km 2 (BBS, 2013). Approximately 80% of Tahirpur’s population directly or indirectly depends on fishing for livelihood during the rainy season (Interviews). S1b: High population growth rate Population growth rate in Tahirpur was 3.27% in 2011, compared to 2.02% in Sunamganj district and 1.47% nationally (BBS 2013). The reliance of most population on fishing for livelihood adversely affects fish production and habitat in the area (Interviews). S1c: Population structure In 2011, the average household in Tahirpur comprised 5.59 people (vs. 4.35 nationally) and the sex ratio was 105 (vs. 100 nationally) (BBS 2013). The dependency ratio for rural areas was 54% in Bangladesh in 2020 (BBS, 2021). S2a: Low per capita income Per capita income for 2020-21 in Bangladesh was US $ 2,227 (BBS, 2021); in contrast, the average yearly household income among fishers was below $ 1000 (Interviews). In 2016, the poverty rate in Tahirpur Upazila was 26.2%, compared to 26% in Sunamganj district, 16.2% in Sylhet division, and 24.3% at the national level (BBS, 2020). Economic development has remained low in the northeastern wetland areas of Bangladesh over the decades. Fishers report their challenges in bearing leasing and maintenance costs to manage fisheries (Interviews). S2b: High income disparity In the Tahirpur region, most resources (land, money, fishery) are occupied by a small group of people, with about 40.66% of the population being landless (Banglapedia, 2021). The Gini coefficient of income for rural areas of Bangladesh was 0.454 in 2016 (BBS, 2017). About 75% of people are poor, 10–15% have modest wealth, and 5–7% are affluent (Interviews). S2c: Lack of economic diversity Agriculture is the main source of income for 68.05% of people in Tahirpur (Banglapedia, 2021), with other income sources being scarce in the area. There are some seasonal jobs in agriculture (paddy cultivation) and the stone quarry (picking sand and stone) during the dry season. While fishers have the right to catch fish in the open haor water during the rainy season, leaseholders prohibit fishing in the area. Fishers often borrow money from NGOs, moneylenders, and relatives to cover living expenses (Interviews). S2d: Limited public services In 2011, the literacy rate in Tahirpur was 30.4%, compared to 35% in Sunamganj district and 56.09% at the national level. Furthermore, only 17.5% of households in Tahirpur had sanitary latrines (vs. 61.6% nationally), 25.5% had electricity access (vs. 56.6% nationally), and 39 km of roads were paved (BBS, 2013). Tahirpur has only a 31-bed hospital, lacking essential staff and supplies. Important local roads are incomplete and damaged due to regular floods. During the rainy season, people use boats to travel between villages. At least 25–30 households shared the same tube well for drinking water. Basic government services in this area were considered inadequate (interviews). S3a: Hierarchical legal structure Local government executives, UNO, and DC (Deputy Commissioner of the district), often lease wetland fisheries to influential individuals, violating government rules and depriving local fishers of their customary fishing rights. Formal rules are established via a top-down process (Interviews). S3b: Lack of conformity to norms Local people show minimal compliance with formal fishing norms and rules. Influential individuals evade formal rules to secure leases for fisheries, despite being ineligible to apply for them. They overexploit resources and believe that they will not face punishment for breaching laws and norms (Interviews). S3c: Intensity of conflicts Conflicts originate from disagreements in decisions or interests among fishers, government officials, or influential people to control a fishery (Interviews). S4a: Inconsistent fisheries resource policy Rules assign fishing rights to local fishers, but the government allocates fisheries to the highest bidders in the auction (Interviews). S4b: Lack of conformity to policies People maintain little compliance with fishery resource policies in the area. There is no mechanism to conserve inland fisheries. S5a: Increasing demand for fish Leaseholders overexploit fish due to higher demand in local markets, leading to species extinction and habitat damage. S5b: Lack of conservation measures Regulations for using and conserving fisheries are not strongly enforced in the area. * The latest population and housing data in Bangladesh were captured in the 2011 census. The northeastern Tahirpur subdistrict in Bangladesh is characterized by numerous nutrient-rich and large wetland fisheries spanning 315.33 km ² (BBS, 2013). The availability of wetland resources has contributed to the permanent settlement of local communities in Tahirpur’s floodplains. A large and increasing population (S1) directly or indirectly depends on fisheries resources in the Tahirpur area. The ability of local fishers to make decisions and co-manage fisheries is affected by the regional population attributes (S1a, S1b, S1c). Sajal Roy, a 58-year-old member of TJMSS, describes: Almost three-fourths of the inhabitants in the Tahirpur area earn their livelihood by fishing in larger water bodies during the entire rainy season, from June to November. Most people use destructive kona/ber jal (surrounding net, a type of seine net), current jal (gill net), bhar jal (set bag net), tana jal (dragnet), and mosquito nets to catch fish, including juveniles. We, 48 members, are exclusively dependent on fishing for livelihood. Unrestricted fishing by local people puts pressure on fish stocks and habitats in the area. Many fish species are becoming extinct due to overexploitation. When a large population depends on fishing for its livelihood, it often leads to a decline in fish stocks. Overfishing hinders fishers from generating profits and maintaining fisheries productivity. This situation hampers fishers’ ability to co-manage wetland fisheries and, hence, their improvement. Fisheries co-management can also be hindered by the low socioeconomic development (S2a, S2b, S2c, S2d) in the floodplains of Tahirpur. Some VTMSS’s deprived members expressed in a group discussion that: We are the poorest people in the area, possessing less than 5% of the resources. The government has given us fishing rights in wetland fisheries, but our poverty prevents us from obtaining them. We are compelled to rely on wealthy individuals to secure the lease. The weak socioeconomic situation forces fishers to depend on the rich for leasing fisheries; consequently, the rich capture the fishery. Moreover, the attributes of the region’s centralized political system (S3a, S3b, S3c) are not conducive to ensuring fishers’ participation in co-management. A group discussion with 45-60-year-old informants of TJMSS indicates: We received support from a local financial elite, who spent money and managed government offices and political leaders to secure the lease for Bogiani. TJMSS handed over the fishery to the elite. The fishery, boats, and nets are ours, but we cannot go to the fishery. If we go to the fishery to catch fish, they seize our nets. Altogether, the leaseholder gives us BDT 100,000 ( $ 1,075) yearly as profit from the fishery. We feel like he bought us for BDT 1 lac, which means we have been sold. Influential persons manipulate the leasing process to capture fisheries in association with political leaders and government officials. The competition for leasing fisheries between fishers, political leaders, and power groups often leads to conflict in the Tahirpur area. Similarly, contradictory fisheries resource policies (S4a) and non-compliance with these policies (S4b) restrict local fishers’ rights to wetland fisheries. UNO of Tahirpur elucidates: Fishers have a legitimate right to fisheries, but the lease value is so high for poor fishers. They are unable to manage high-level government officials and political leaders to obtain the lease. Power groups lease fisheries year after year. The existing fisheries resource policy excludes local fishers from their customary fishing rights to wetland fisheries. Informants stated increasing prices of wetland fish in local markets (S5a) and the lack of protective measures (such as payments, levies for services, and fines) (S5b) as crucial drivers of overexploitation and habitat damage in the area, highlighting the distinct taste, smell, and color of the fish and the exploitation of sanctuaries for more profit. Moreover, ecological factors (ECO1a, ECO2a) hinder the nutrient quality and the flow of fish into/out of the Bogiani fishery SES (ECO3a). Table 2 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fisher’s Related Ecosystems (ECO) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges ECO1a: Extreme weather events Increasing temperature, unusual precipitation patterns, and floods adversely affect spawning and fries in the fishery. ECO2a: Medium pollution from agricultural production and sedimentation from upstream floods Pesticides and fertilizers from neighboring agricultural lands hamper the growth of plankton in fisheries. Fish production is also hampered by sedimentation from upstream floods. ECO3a: Declining flows into and out of the focal SES Flows of fish species into or out of the Bogiani fishery are falling due to overexploitation. Some traditional fishers of TJMSS shared in a group discussion that: Bogiani fishery is situated in the haor area of Tahirpur, under the Meghalaya hills of India. The alluvial deposits accumulated by flash floods during the rainy season, combined with fluctuating temperatures and rainfall, as well as pesticide and fertilizer substances from nearby agricultural lands in recent years, have impacted fish production during the dry season, from December to May. Bogiani is failing to sustain fish diversity and the flow of fish species toward or away from the fishery. Ecological disturbances are likely to reduce fisheries’ and fishers’ resilience, undermining the sustainability of fisheries over time. Bogiani Resource Systems (RS) and Resource Units’ (RU) Challenges for Fishers’ Resilience Fishers identified unclear boundaries (RS1a) and declining carrying capacity (RS2a) as the two most significant barriers to growing fish in the Bogiani fishery. The discussion with TJMSS’s active group brings out: Earlier, we would see about 150 types of fish in the fishery, but now we see fewer than 100. The main reasons for this decline are the shortage of natural food, sedimentation, water level dropping from 10–15 feet to 2–4 feet from February-April, shortage of rainfall, loss of fish eggs and fries due to increasing temperature, spawning in hot water, reduced space for fish to grow, restricted movement of water and fish into and out of the fishery by the dam built to protect paddy fields in the haor, damage to water plants ( Shapla-water lily, Singra-hornwort, Kochuri pana-Water hyacinth, Hijal-Barringtonia acutangula, Koroch- Pongamia pinnata) that provide nutrients and shelter for fish, pollution of the fishery water by fertilizers and pesticides used in agriculture, and overfishing for profit. As a result, many fish species, such as Chitol (Clown Knifefish), Minar carp, Nandina (Labeo nandina), Ghonia (Labeo boggut), and Ghagot (Long-whiskered catfish), are missing. Fishers reported that the artificial habitat (RS3a) fails to prevent the decline of fish stocks (RS4a) and the fishery (RS4b). UFO noted a decreasing trend in the size and number of fish, as the central part of the fishery has now been leveled like agricultural lands. Table 3 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fishery Resource Systems (RS) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges RS1a: Fuzzy spatial and ecological fishery boundaries Fishery boundaries adjoin private agricultural and marsh lands on two sides. Fish catching areas and sanctuaries are inseparable. Fishing is prohibited in the sanctuaries, yet fishers still catch fish in conservation areas. RS2a: Declining carrying capacity Many fish species have become extinct or endangered, such as Chitol, Ghagot, Nandina, Kalibaush, Ghonia, Minar carp. RS3a: Limited fishery access facilities Fishers use small-mesh nets and boats to catch fish and build temporary cottages in the fishery area for monitoring, catching, and processing fish (drying or selling to traders) from November to May. They constructed an artificial habitat with bamboo and tree branches, planted trees, released fry, and added feeders to grow fish in the fishery. The fishery can be accessed for resource extraction by boat during the rainy season and on foot during the dry season, as there is no road access to the area. Fishers follow ancestral knowledge to cultivate fish and increase income from the fishery. It is challenging to earn from the deteriorating fishery with limited facilities. RS4a: Decreasing fish stock Catches have been decreasing. Fishers indiscriminately catch fish, and no regulations are enforced to prohibit fishing. RS4b: Decreasing biophysical features The shortage of phytoplankton, caused by increasing temperatures, shallow water levels, reduced rainfall, and overexploitation, disrupts favorable conditions for fish growth. RS5a: Recurring hazards Floods and heavy rainfall promote fish growth during the rainy season (June-November), but low rainfall and high temperatures hamper fish production during the dry season (December-May). The silt carried by floods has filled much of the fishery for fish production in the dry season. RS5b: Past experiences Sedimentation, pollution from agricultural land, climate change, overharvesting, use of artificial feeds, and release of exotic species are altering the diet, variety, and quality of wetland fish. RS6a: Lack of ability to predict fishery dynamics Fishers fail to relate weather events (rainfall, floods, temperature, water level) with fishery development. They understand the presence of fish species in different parts of the fishery from their experience (bubble of fish) during March and April, when water levels are very low. However, they do not understand how ecological changes or overexploitation affect the fishery. RS7a: Disturbances to storage capacity Low rainfall and water levels during the dry season, rising temperatures, and unregulated fishing hinder the fishery's ability to recover from damage. Similarly, the weakening equilibrium (RS5a, RS5b), unpredictable changes (RS6a), and human-natural disturbances (RS7a) have damaged the fishery habitat to the point where it may never naturally restore to its former condition. An experienced fisher group from VTMSS discusses: The fishery was highly productive 10 to 12 years ago; fish were larger, quantities were huge, and the variety of fish was greater. Now, fish are smaller, numbers are limited, and many fish species have already disappeared. The fishery was very deep earlier. People used to be scared when entering the fishery's water. It is now difficult for fish eggs and fry to survive in a congested, shallow, hot-water area during the dry season. We understand that fish production, the fishery’s ability to support diverse fish species, and the ability to recover naturally from damage are declining. The absence of activities to address ongoing social-ecological disturbances may have long-term adverse effects on the recovery of fishery resources and fishers’ livelihood. UFO emphasized that restricted fish movement (RU1a), fluctuating growth (RU2a) due to overexploitation and habitat degradation, and interrupted interactions (such as spawning) (RU3a) are key factors driving declining catch sizes in the fishery. Table 4 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fishery Resource Units (RU) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges RU1a: Constrained fish unit mobility The natural movement of fish is affected when the fishery is separated from the larger wetland area during the dry season (December to May). The migration of fish in the open water of haor during the rainy season is restricted by local fishers using nets in the haor and rivers. The high dam built to prevent flooding of paddy fields during the monsoon also restricts water flow and fish migration within and between fisheries and rivers. These restrictions on natural water movement reduce food availability and affect the spawning of many deep-water and migratory fish species. RU2a: Declining growth rate Fishers report a declining trend in catches over the years. The fishery growth is decreasing mainly due to overharvesting and environmental factors. RU3a: Interrupted reproduction Fish units’ reproduction is becoming vulnerable to food-chain disturbances triggered by human-natural factors. Spawning is affected by low water levels and high temperatures during the peak reproductive months of April to June. Fish units face rivalry and predation in the fishery. RU4a: Increasing economic value Prices of fish are ever-increasing. The leaseholder overharvests the fishery. RU4b: Decreasing environmental and cultural values Bogiani can nurture diverse fish species and contribute to other fisheries in the larger wetland area. Its reproductive capacity has been declining due to overharvesting, increased pollution, sedimentation, and extreme weather. Many fishers still consider fishing as their primary identity. It is difficult for them to ensure earnings from fishing, as the leaseholder controls the fishery. RU5a: Overexploitation of resources Fishers harvest the maximum units from the fishery, as they may not retain the lease next time. Therefore, total catch is declining. RU6a: Declining typical qualities Typical size, length, color, smell, and taste of wetland fish have been lacking. RU7a: Inconsistent spatial and temporal distribution patterns of fish units across the fishery The spatial and temporal distribution of fish in the fishery is inconsistent. Some species (rohu, boal, catla) are predictable in the fishery from December-May, while others (prawn, chitol, ghagot) are not predictable due to changing ecological conditions. The higher economic value (RU4a) of fish in local markets enables the leaseholder to make a profit every year. Informants notice that fish from the haor are thought to taste better due to their diet of unrestricted natural food and exposure to abundant light and air. In contrast, the environmental and cultural values of the fishery are declining (RU4b) due to social-ecological reasons. The TJMSS president reiterates Bogiani’s declining ability to nurture fish. Similarly, informants emphasized concerns about their identity. Tapan Barman (pseudonym), a professional fisher of TJMSS, describes: We are traditional fishermen because we have been catching fish since our early ancestors. As the earnings from fishing have become insecure, it is challenging to continue fishing as our profession. We have seen a fishing community since childhood. Our profession is now at risk because the non-fishermen (newly formed fishery associations and powerful leaseholders) have now become fishermen by taking cards from the fishery office. Many fishers are now leaving fishing as they are unable to earn a living from it. Fishers’ cultural unity and similarity appear to be failing to preserve their identity as fishermen due to uncertain earnings and displacement from fisheries. Informants highlighted a decline in total catch (RU5a) and fish quality (RU6a), indicating overharvesting with small-mesh nets, draining different parts of the fishery using power pumps by the leaseholder, and reduced nutrient levels. They also suggested that various fish species were randomly present across the fishery at different times (RU7a). Informants acknowledge their inability to predict the movement patterns of fish species due to changes in water temperature, reproductive cycles, biological development stages, and disruptions to the food cycle. Actors’ Challenges for Co-managing Bogiani and Their Resilience Informants viewed the lack of coordination between the 48 TJMSS members (A1a) and the responsible government bodies (A1b) as the key obstacle to effective co-management of the Bogiani fishery, mentioning disagreements among members, negligence by TJMSS and government officials (UNO, FO, OC), and the leaseholder’s dominance over the fishery as the main factors. They further identified their relative poverty (A2a, A2b) as a significant barrier to establishing TJMSS as a collective organization for co-management. The group discussion with TJMSS’s management team revealed: We come from the same clan of Jamalgar village, and our unity is strong. We, 48 members, are the entitled users of the fishery, but TJMSS is not engaging us in fishery management. TJMSS committee members and the leaseholder collaborate with UNO, FO, OC, and other government officials to manage the fishery, ignoring us. Informants report that weak coordination significantly hampers their ability to work together as a team in the Bogiani fishery. TJMSS and the leaseholder apply a divide-and-rule strategy among members to control and manage the fishery smoothly. Table 5 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Actors (A) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges A1a: Similar fishery users Forty-eight fishers from similar kinfolks in Jamalgar village are direct users of the fishery. About 100 local people catch fish and support the leaseholder in managing it. A1b: Diverse government bodies Five government bodies (i.e., fishery, land, cooperatives, police, UNO) oversee the fishery. A2a: Low socioeconomic condition Fishing is the main source of income for most fishers. Some fishers have little land, and most are landless. Fishers’ socioeconomic conditions are quite poor, characterized by low-income and subsistence livelihoods. A2b: Limited access to basic services Fishers have inadequate access to government basic services such as education, health, electricity, sanitation, and transportation services in Tahirpur. A3a: Crisis Catch decline is ruining fishers’ livelihoods and the fishery habitat. The leaseholder dominates TJMSS and keeps most of the profits. Local people attempt to catch fish or demand benefits from the fishery. The leaseholder suppresses threats by engaging local leaders (UP and Upazila chairmen) and law enforcement agencies (UNO, OC). A3b: Duration Fishers reported tense relations with local people throughout the leasing period. A3c: Living away from the fishery Fishers live several kilometers away from the fishery. The resultant extra time, energy, and expense make fishery management stressful and costly. A4a: Self-interested leadership/entrepreneurship The leaseholder is concerned about his benefits from the fishery. He maintains functional relations with fishers for his own gain. TJMSS leaders also maintain good relations with the leaseholder and government bodies to ensure their dominance in the fishery. Entrepreneurial activities are limited to leasing and extracting fishery resources. TJMSS and the leaseholder engage a few members in management. There are no fish processing plants in the Tahirpur area. A5a: Lower trust and reciprocity Fishers have working relations to manage the fishery, but they lack trust and reciprocity. Bonding social ties are prevalent because fishers come from the same clan in the same village. They have weak connections with government officials and local residents. They fail to collaborate and collect assistance (money, decisions, law enforcement, and fish extraction) from their relations to manage the fishery. A6a: Profit-oriented mindset Fishers manage the fishery using traditional knowledge with a commercial mindset. Fishers consider the distance between their residence and the fishery (A3c) and ongoing tensions among themselves and with local people (A3a, A3b) as key challenges to co-managing the fishery. They indicate that the leaseholder and TJMSS intentionally isolate fishers to maximize their profits from the fishery. Responses from informants revealed that a lack of competence and eagerness among leaders to ensure collective participation and initiate commercial enterprises (A4a) inhibits the aim of co-management. Furthermore, the lack of unity among fishers both in belief and action (A5a) and the leaseholder's exploitative attitude (A6a) suggest fishers’ nominal engagement and the leaseholder’s profit-making orientation in co-managing the fishery. A traditional fisher group from TJMSS discusses: The president and the secretary of TJMSS are not actively working to establish our rights in the fishery. However, the leaseholder seeks profit, even at the expense of damaging fish diversity and habitat. TJMSS committee members prioritize leadership positions and benefits over ensuring fishers’ active participation in fishery governance. Governance Challenges for Co-management and Fishers’ Resilience Exclusion from decision-making (GS1a), weak collaboration between fishers’ cooperatives and government bodies in enforcing rules (GS2a), and limited property rights (GS3a) hinder fishers from organizing for co-management. Table 6 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fishery Governance Systems (GS) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges GS1a: Low community participation in fisheries co-management Although the fishery management is community-based, some fishers exercise power. TJMSS members are recruited from chosen circles to ensure their control over the fishery. Governance of the fishery has remained top-down and non-participatory. GS2a: Dysfunctional rulemaking and enforcing organizations There is a lack of collaboration between government bodies and TJMSS in managing the fishery. Government bodies prioritize the interests of the leaseholder. The leaseholder has established complete control over the fishery after fishers handed it over to him for six years. GS3a: Limited property rights The leaseholder (non-fisher) controls fishers’ rights in the fishery. The leasing process limits the rights of local fishers in the fishery. GS4a: Rigid operational-choice rules The leaseholder implements formal and informal rules for operating the fishery. While fishers are the entitled users of Bogiani, the leaseholder makes decisions on daily activities (from fostering to harvesting fish) to manage the fishery. They are deprived of both their formal (given by government rules) and informal (approved by local community customs) rights of the fishery. TJMSS committee members follow the leaseholder’s guidance to manage the fishery. Most TJMSS members are working in the fishery as nominal members. The open bidding process and high expenses permit the rich and powerful to establish control over wetland fisheries. GS4b: Rigid collective-choice rules The leaseholder ignores fishers’ collective choices by imposing his own rules for fishery management, but involves them when any conflicts arise. Government officials (UNO, FO, DC, SP) often interfere with fishers’ collective decisions or their modifications to fishery management. The leaseholder maintains good relations with government officials to manage the fishery. GS4c: Rigid constitutional-choice rules Fishers are the legitimate owners to manage the fishery, while the leaseholder alone operates it. This indicates a violation of both formal (government) and informal (community) constitutional-choice rules. Fishers’ legal rights are often violated throughout the entire region. The parliament enacts the constitutional choice rules without involving fishers. GS5a: Inadequate social monitoring Loose interpersonal relations among fishers, despite higher homogeneity, restrict effective social monitoring of the fishery. GS5b: Inadequate biophysical monitoring Fishers lack the ability to monitor how food chain disruptions, rising temperatures, and decreasing rainfall affect the fishery. GS5c: Absence of graduated sanctions Fishers socially try to resolve issues with local people. Likewise, informants identified contradictory formal and local rules-in-use (GS4a, GS4b, GS4c) as key constraints to their limited rights in the fishery. Some VTMSS’s deprived members share in a group discussion: Our participation in fishery management is nominal and ineffective. We obtained the fishery in accordance with government rules, but the leaseholder is illegally depriving us of our legal rights. The lack of avenues enabling fishers to implement rules restricts their ability to co-manage the fishery. Informants underlined the partial engagement of fishers in monitoring (GS5a), biophysical changes (GS5b), and the infrequent enforcement of sanctions (GS5c) as the most critical barriers to effective fishery governance, highlighting the leaseholder’s reluctance to care for fishery resources over maximizing profits. Fisheries rules for monitoring and sanctioning are established through a top-down co-management process, resulting in minimal collective participation among fishers. Challenges for Interactions and Outcomes in the Co-management and Fishers’ Resilience Informants identified overharvesting (I1a) as a substantial threat to the fishery’s long-term ecological stability and fishers’ livelihood, noting that higher management expenses motivated the leaseholder to obtain a quick return from the fishery. The success of co-management can also be restrained by fishers’ limited access to management activities (I2a) and deliberation processes (I3a) for negotiating issues that arise. Fishers’ lack of participation in fishery activities is said to restrict their ability to address co-management challenges. Table 7 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Interactions (I) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges I1a: Adverse effects of harvesting on SES Overharvesting leads to fishery degradation and the extinction of fish species. I2a: Limited access to information TJMSS committee shares limited information with fishers about fish availability, total catch, profit, time of catching and selling fish, and the fishery’s most productive areas. I3a: Issue-specific deliberation TJMSS involves fishers in the deliberation when problems arise with locals in the fishery. I4a: Conflict among fishery users Conflicts among fishers arise due to unequal rights and participation in fishery management. Fishers receive little payment, while committee members receive better payment for maintaining good relations with the leaseholder. The leaseholder provides fishers a sack of rice twice a year for each fisher, cash, funds for home repairs and children’s marriages, and salaried jobs in the fishery to minimize conflicts I4b: Conflict with externals Fishers have conflicts with local groups that demand benefits and illegally catch fish. Fish catching by landowners in the fishery border often creates tension with fishers. The leaseholder controls the larger wetland area beyond the fishery, which leads to conflicts with local people who fish in the open wetlands. He negotiates with local influential people and groups to manage tension. I5a: Lacking self-organization Fishers have failed to form a cooperative to obtain the lease and manage the fishery independently. Their self-organization remains weak due to a lack of effective collective action and engagement. Fishers self-organize ways to monitor the fishery and punish illegal fishing, such as seizing nets, consulting with local people who catch fish without approval, and working with law enforcement agencies to penalize deviators. Informants cited the unequal distribution of power and profits as the primary source of conflict between fishers in co-management (I4a). They also reported that illegal fishing was the primary source of conflict with outsiders (I4b), suggesting that influential local individuals and groups attempted to plunder the fishery. Additionally, neighboring landowners attempted to catch fish from the fishery using chai (bamboo or plastic fish traps) and to obstruct the fishery's water with tarpaulin dams during the dry season. The leaseholder’s exploitative approach further intensifies conflicts within the larger community. The president of VTMSS narrates: The leaseholder is entitled to catch fish within the fishery area, but they forcibly occupy the entire haor. He has managed law enforcement agencies (OC, UNO, SP-Police Superintendent of the district, DC) to support him in controlling the haor in exchange for tributes (fish, money). Many people from 18 villages near Shanir Haor left the area due to violent retribution for fishing. At least 20–25 people have been hospitalized due to this brutality. Co-management has failed to establish local fishers’ rights in wetland fisheries. Fishers, therefore, show low levels of collective action to self-organize the fishery (I5a). Informants considered their limited independence in managing the fishery as a barrier to establishing rights. Table 8 Third-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Outcomes (O) Variables Fishers’ perceived challenges O1a: Inefficiency Absence of collective activities to address the effects of indiscriminate harvesting and habitat destruction. O1b: Inequity Benefits of the fishery are unequally distributed. O1c: Unaccountability Several committee members influence decision-making. O1d: Low socioeconomic sustainability Fishers fail to earn a stable income from fishing to support their families. O2a: Lower environmental sustainability Bogiani fishery’s productivity has been declining. It shows significant species extinction due to insufficient efforts to restore deteriorating ecosystems. O2b: Lower habitat conservation No steps are taken to excavate, prevent water pollution, or restore the natural food cycle. Fish habitat has degraded due to reduced nutrients, broken food chains, and pollution. O2c: Lower resilience Bogiani shows a lower ability to withstand social-ecological disturbances that hamper fish production and fishers’ earnings. Declining resources and habitat damage weaken its resilience. O3a: Lower interchange between Bogiani and other SESs Fishers catch juvenile fish and kill non-fish species (crabs, snails) while fishing. Bogiani has partial interchange with other SESs (e.g., tourism, fish processing plants) in the area. Tourism has not flourished as an enterprise, yet it pollutes the fishery and neighboring areas through plastic and other liquid and solid waste. There are no fishery-based industries in the area. The limited outcomes tied to reduced catches and shared activities addressing ecological changes (O1a), inequality (O1b), partial involvement in the fishery association (O1c), and socioeconomic vulnerability (O1d) reflect fishers’ failure to sustain Bogiani. The president of TJMSS states: If the government provided us with a loan of BDT 9–10 million ( $ 80,000) under TJMSS, we could stand on our own feet. Although we have legs, we cannot walk on our own feet. The leaseholder takes most of the profit, but we cannot raise questions loudly. The weak organization among fishers hinders their ability to address social-ecological challenges in co-management. Fishers’ co-management activities may be restrained by species decline (O2a), damage to the fishery environment (O2b), and the fishery’s diminishing ability to tackle disruptions (O2c), which reflects habitat disruption by environmental factors. Informants considered Bogiani to be ecologically declining, noting its reduced interaction with neighboring fisheries and other SESs (O3a). Discussion The data show that socio-economic-political (S) and ecological (ECO) settings externally constrain fishers’ resilience in the Tahirpur area. Fishers’ ability to lease and manage fisheries is hindered by their low incomes (S2a), limited livelihood diversity (S2c), and broader inequality (S2b) in the area (Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ; Newaz and Rahman, 2019 ). Livelihood insecurity prompts local people (S1a, S1b, S1c) to fish extensively in the larger wetland area for about half a year, resulting in long-term depletion of fishery resources. Overharvesting by a growing population (S1) is said to limit fishers' ability to earn from fisheries (Clay and Olson, 2008 ; Tima et al., 2021 ). Furthermore, fishers receive inadequate government services (S2d) to reduce their economic hardships. It is observed that fishers’ socioeconomic weaknesses in managing leasing and operational expenses allow wealthy and influential individuals (S2) to control fisheries (Allison and Badjeck, 2004 ; Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ). Furthermore, the existing top-down political structure (S3a) and discrepancies between national fisheries resource policy and local practices (S4a) favor influential persons in capturing fisheries (Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ; Sultana et al., 2022 ). The influential often use a local fishers’ cooperative to lease a fishery, which usually leads to contradictions with other local groups (S3c). They evade established rules (S3b) and policies (S4b) governing fisheries. As noted by the UNO, “ Fishers are not able to bear expenses and, even if they can obtain the fishery, they cannot maintain it. ” While the market value (S5a) of fish is rising, the reluctance to take steps to preserve resources (S5b) deteriorates the fishery environment and fishers’ livelihoods. Moreover, ecological changes (ECO1a) and agricultural water pollution (ECO2a) affect the resilience of both fishers and fisheries in the region. These results align with studies (Clay and Olson, 2008 ; Sultana et al., 2022 ) that highlight ecological changes as constraints for co-management. Bogiani has failed to promote (ECO3a) adjoining wetland fisheries in the area. The deteriorating biophysical settings of the fishery (RS), along with unclear borders on two sides and a lack of distinct sanctuaries and harvesting places (RS1a), hinder the fishery’s ability to sustain fish species (RS2a). Fishers cultivate and harvest fish without establishing new amenities (RS3a) in the fishery. Their overharvesting disrupts fish production in the fishery (RS4a). Fishery’s productivity is primarily constrained by fish food scarcity, sedimentation, and rising temperature (RS4b). These repeated threats (RS5a) interrupt fish production, quality, diversity, and nutrition (RS5b) in Bogiani. Fishers cannot connect the decline in fish production to the biophysical changes in the fishery (RS6a). These difficulties weaken fisheries’ ability to regain productivity (RS7a) (Aswani, 2020 ; Clay and Olson, 2008 ). Additionally, restricted fish movement (RU1a) within and outside the fishery during both the rainy and dry seasons slows growth (RU2a) and spawning (RU3a) in Bogiani. Although wetland fish prices (RU4a) are increasing, the environmental and cultural importance of Bogiani (RU4b) is decreasing. Ecological degradation diminishes catches, taste, size, and color of wetland fish (RU6a) in the fishery. Environmental changes hinder fishers' ability to predict shifting fish behavior and distribution throughout the fishery (RU7a). Although the leaseholder overexploits fish (RU5a) for profit, fishers’ earnings remain uncertain. This situation is pressing many fishers to leave their hereditary fishing profession. Despite sharing a common cultural background and interests, hardships and the dominance of non-fishers over fisheries weaken fishers’ ability to co-manage fisheries. These results contrast with existing studies (Carrillo et al., 2019 ; London et al., 2017 ) that consider the absence of cultural homogeneity as a barrier to co-management. Informants feel excluded from co-management (GS1a) because the leaseholder dictates day-to-day activities (GS4a) and collective choices (GS4b), highlighting contradictions between formal and fishers’ customary rules. The lack of mechanisms to resolve conflicts between regulations limits fishers’ rights in the fishery (Allison and Badjeck, 2004 ; Carrillo et al., 2019 ; Hossain and Rabby, 2019 ). Exclusion in the establishment and implementation of rules (GS2a) limits fishers’ organizational capacity for co-management. A non-fisher controls the property rights (GS3a) in Bogiani. The formal rules often ignore informal rules (GS4c) in fisheries co-management. Fishers are not well-organized in administering Bogiani (GS5a). They partially understand the biophysical changes (GS5b) that affect fish production in the fishery. The leaseholder usually applies negotiation (GS5c) to resolve problems with locals in Bogiani. Fishers (A1a) with government officials (A1b) fail to manage the fishery jointly to ensure their livelihoods. The lower social position (A2a, A2b) restricts fishers’ ability to lease and co-manage Bogiani. Fishers encounter declining catch, dispossession of management rights, and clashes with local communities (A3a) in co-managing Bogiani (A3b). They face difficulty maintaining the fishery from several kilometers away from homes (A3a). Informants state that TJMSS leadership assists the leaseholder in managing Bogiani in their own interests (A4a). This exclusion hinders fishers’ development of co-management skills (Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ; Sultana et al., 2022 ). Fishers demonstrate limitations in leveraging their community ties to gather support for co-managing the fishery (A5a) (Hossain and Banik, 2022 ). They apply their local knowledge to maximize profit from fishing (A6a) (Mondal et al., 2010 ; Pukkalla and Rama Mohan, 2021 ). Overharvesting for profit (I1a) damages habitats and species diversity. However, fishers receive a small benefit and work as day laborers for some in the fishery. The leaseholder involves only fishers in resolving conflicts among fishers (I4a) and with locals (I4b) in co-management (Allison and Badjeck, 2004 ; Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ; Sultana et al., 2022 ). Informants reported being detached from information (I2a) and deliberation (I3a) for co-management. This situation constrains fishers from self-organizing the fishery (I5a). Fishery’s inferior social performance (O1d) is the failure to provide fishers with sustainable earnings. They fail to address social-ecological challenges (O1a) in co-managing Bogiani and their livelihoods. The leaseholder, with few TJMSS members, controls the fishery (O1c) and its benefits (O1b). Nevertheless, catches in Bogiani continue to diminish due to environmental degradation (O2a). The fishery habitat (O2b) fails to recover from environmental changes (O2c). Bogiani has limited interactions with other SESs in the Tahirpur area (O3a). These findings are similar to recent studies (Clay and Olson, 2008 ; Fagun and Rishan, 2023 ) that highlight the marginalization of fishers and their socioeconomic challenges in fisheries co-management. Conclusion This study investigated wetland fishers’ resilience to the challenges associated with co-management. Findings revealed that fishers are excluded from the co-management of fisheries due to localized social-economic-political conditions characterized by socioeconomic weaknesses and hierarchical political processes. Fishers’ management ability was also impeded by the declining fishery ecosystem, due to the enduring social-ecological disturbances faced by fishers. The leaseholder showed no desire to prioritize improving the fishery environment over profits, forcing many fishers to seek employment elsewhere because their earnings from fishing were inadequate. The leaseholder’s dominance and hardships have limited fishers’ ability to utilize their cultural unity for co-management. Furthermore, TJMSS leadership supports the leaseholder, undermining the fishers’ potential to manage the fishery. Although fishers are the legitimate users of the Bogiani fishery, the leaseholder has complete control over everyday activities and decisions to maintain the fishery. Existing formal rules supersede local rules in co-management. Fishers’ continued low income and participation indicate the failure of co-management at the Bogiani. However, these results were obtained from a limited number of informants, which may limit their generalizability to broader wetland areas. A larger group of informants representing a wider wetland area may strengthen the generalizability of these results to other wetland fisheries of the country. The policy implications for fishers’ resilience must emphasize the obstacles they face in building the capacity to address the co-management challenges discussed. Future studies can focus on co-management policy issues to generate novel ideas and approaches for enabling fishers to manage wetland fisheries sustainably in the long term. Declarations Author Contribution AH developed the research idea, designed the study framework, and carried out the fieldwork, including interviews and group discussions with the fishing community. He also led the analysis of the qualitative data and prepared all related figures and tables. NHS contributed to shaping the conceptual and theoritical framework including methodological directions of the paper, and provided critical guidance in refining the interpretation of the findings. She also strengthened the clarity, coherence, and academic rigour of the manuscript through several rounds of revision. Both AH and NHS worked closely in drafting and polishing the paper, and both authors approved the final version submitted. References Allen, C. R., Birge, H. E., Angeler, D. G., Arnold, C. A., Chaffin, B. C., DeCaro, D. A., … Gunderson, L. (2018). Quantifying uncertainty and trade-offs in resilience assessments. Ecology and Society , 23 (1). Allison, E. H., & Badjeck, M. C. (2004). Fisheries co-management in inland waters: A review of international experience. Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme: FAO & DFID . Angeler, D. G., & Allen, C. R. (2016). Quantifying resilience. Journal of Applied Ecology , 53 (3), 617–624. Armitage, D. R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R. I., Charles, A. T., Davidson-Hunt, I. J., … Wollenberg, E. K. (2009). Adaptive co-management for social–ecological complexity. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment , 7 (2), 95–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1890/070089 Aswani, S. (2020). New Directions in Maritime and Fisheries Anthropology. American Anthropologist , 122 (3), 473–486. Baggio, J. A., K. Brown, and D. Hellebrandt. (2015). Boundary object or bridging concept? A citation network analysis of resilience. Ecology and Society 20 (2):2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/es-07484-200202 . Banglapedia. (2020). Retrieved from http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Tahirpur_Upazila Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2021). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Bangladesh 2019–2020 (Final). Retrieved from http://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f 1a6e0/2021-08-05-12-21-15e3fce9b1bbffd5bcdba9f0d0bd7fab.pdf Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2020). Poverty maps of Bangladesh 2016: key findings. Retrieved from http://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/5695ab85_1403_483a_afb4_26dfd 767df18/2021-02-22-16-57-c64fb3d272175e7efea0b02de6a23eaa.pdf Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2019). General features and environment: rainfall and temperature. Retrieved from https://bbs. portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b2db8758_8497_412c_a9ec_6bb 299f8b3ab/2020-09-17-15-30-d0e641b2e659019f2aa44cbaf628caa8.pdf Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2017). Preliminary Report on Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016. Retrieved from http://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f1a6e0/HIES%20Preliminary%20Report%202016.pdf Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2013). Population and Housing Census 2011. Retrieved from http://203.112.218.65:8008/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/PopCen2011/COMMUNITY_Sunamganj.pdf Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2013). District Statistics 2011, Sunamganj, Bangladesh. Retrieved from http://203.112.218.65:8008/ WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/District%20Statistics/Sunamganj.pdf Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative research in psychology , 3 (2), 77–101. Carrillo, I. C., Partelow, S., Madrigal-Ballestero, R., Schlüter, A., & Gutierrez-Montes, I. (2019). Do responsible fishing areas work? Comparing collective action challenges in three small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica. International Journal of the Commons , 13 (1). Cinner, J. E., & Barnes, M. L. (2019). Social dimensions of resilience in social-ecological systems. One Earth , 1 (1), 51–56. Clay, P. M., & Olson, J. (2008). Defining" fishing communities": vulnerability and the Magnuson-Stevens fishery conservation and management act. Human Ecology Review , 143–160. DoF. 2018. Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh, 2017-18 . Fisheries Resources Survey System (FRSS), Department of Fisheries. Bangladesh: Ministry of Fisheries, 2018. Volume 35 : p. 129. Fabinyi, M., Evans, L., & Foale, S. J. (2014). Social-ecological systems, social diversity, and power: insights from anthropology and political ecology. Ecology and society , 19 (4). Fagun, I. A., & Rishan, S. T. (2023). 5. Untangling the Complexities of Tanguar Haor Fisheries’ Social-Ecological System through Ostrom’s SES Framework. Small in Scale Big in Contributions , 48. Folke, C. (2016). Resilience (republished). Ecology and Society , 21 (4). Hossain, M. A., & Banik, A. K. (2022). What drives the resilience of wetland-dependent fishermen? Social determinants of co-management in Bangladesh. Environmental Development , 42 , 100668. Hossain, M.A., Rabby, A.A., 2019. Institutional constraints to fishers’ resilience: community based fishery management in Bangladesh. Int. J. Commons 13 (1), 507–527. Islam, G. M. N., Yew, T. S., & Viswanathan, K. K. (2014). Poverty and livelihood impacts of community based fisheries management in Bangladesh. Ocean & coastal management , 96 , 123–129. London, S., Rojas, M., Martin, M. I., Scordo, F., Cisneros, M. A. H., Bustos, M. L., … Piccolo, M. C. (2017). Characterization of an artisanal fishery in Argentina using the social-ecological systems framework. International Journal of the Commons , 11 (1). Lozano, A. J. G., & Heinen, J. T. (2016). Identifying drivers of collective action for the co-management of coastal marine fisheries in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica. Environmental management , 57 (4), 759–769. Marshall, N. A., & Marshall, P. A. (2007). Conceptualizing and operationalizing social resilience within commercial fisheries in northern Australia. Ecology and society , 12 (1). McGinnis, M. D., & Ostrom, E. (2014). Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing challenges. Ecology and Society , 19 (2). Mondal, P., Glaser, M., Nishat, A., & Breckwoldt, A. (2010). Co-management approach on fisher group: A case study on Ramsar site, Tanguar haor in Bangladesh. Bangladesh Journal of Fisheries Research . Newaz, M. W., & Rahman, S. (2019). Wetland resource governance in Bangladesh: An analysis of community-based co-management approach. Environmental Development , 32 , 100446. Partelow, S., & Boda, C. (2015). A modified diagnostic social-ecological system framework for lobster fisheries: case implementation and sustainability assessment in Southern California. Ocean & Coastal Management , 114 , 204–217. Partelow, S., Glaser, M., Solano Arce, S., Barboza, R. S. L., & Schlüter, A. (2018). Mangroves, fishers, and the struggle for adaptive comanagement: applying the social-ecological systems framework to a marine extractive reserve (RESEX) in Brazil. Ecology and Society , 23 (3). Pellowe, K. E., & Leslie, H. M. (2020). The interplay between formal and informal institutions and the potential for co-management in a Mexican small-scale fishery. Marine Policy , 121 , 104179. Pope, K. L., Allen, C. R., & Angeler, D. G. (2014). Fishing for resilience. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society , 143 (2), 467–478. Pukkalla, D., & Rama Mohan, K. R. (2021). Local knowledge and marine livelihoods among the South Indian fishing community. Journal of Asian and African Studies , 56 (3), 549–557. Said, A., Chuenpagdee, R., Aguilar-Perera, A., Arce-Ibarra, M., Gurung, T. B., Bishop, B., … Jentoft, S. (2019). The Principles of Transdisciplinary Research in Small- Scale Fisheries. In R. Chuenpagdee & S. Jentoft (Eds.), Transdisciplinarity for Small-Scale Fisheries Governance (Vol. 21 , pp. 411–431). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94938-3_22 Salomon, A. K., Quinlan, A. E., Pang, G. H., Okamoto, D. K., & Vazquez-Vera, L. (2019). Measuring social-ecological resilience reveals opportunities for transforming environmental governance. Ecology and Society , 24 (3). Satumanatpan, S., & Pollnac, R. (2020). Resilience of small-scale fishers to declining fisheries in the gulf of Thailand. Coastal Management , 48 (1), 1–22. Sultana, M. A., Pandit, D., Barman, S. K., Tikadar, K. K., Tasnim, N., Fagun, I. A., … Kunda, M. (2022). A review of fish diversity, decline drivers, and management of the Tanguar Haor ecosystem: A globally recognized Ramsar site in Bangladesh. Heliyon , 8 (11). Thompson, P. M., Sultana, P., & Islam, N. (2003). Lessons from community based management of floodplain fisheries in Bangladesh. Journal of environmental management , 69 (3), 307–321. Tima, T. A., Schneider, P., Chanda, S. K., Mozumder, M. M. H., Hossain, M. M., Begum, A., & Shamsuzzaman, M. M. (2021). Analyses implementation realities of legal frameworks for sustainable management of Tanguar haor fisheries resources in Bangladesh. Sustainability , 13 (16), 8784. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8160162","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":549223059,"identity":"cc2bdb45-9f45-48bd-83d8-dcec097572f6","order_by":0,"name":"Mohammed Anwar Hossain","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Shah Jalal University of Science and Technology","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Mohammed","middleName":"Anwar","lastName":"Hossain","suffix":""},{"id":549223060,"identity":"886b84fc-4b47-411e-b5a5-02cb94da9900","order_by":1,"name":"Nor Hafizah Selamat","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Universiti Sains Malaysia","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Nor","middleName":"Hafizah","lastName":"Selamat","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-11-20 04:23:12","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8160162/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8160162/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":97140491,"identity":"7c86ed02-a57b-47df-8375-6e377e9799e4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-01 10:05:06","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":948453,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Manuscriptforreview.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/47d57002e1041bcf8d6dca8e.docx"},{"id":97020294,"identity":"fd21edcf-96ec-4190-9f72-bfa2821adf4f","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"json","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":4315,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"cd9e8639acda43c396d802fd4ec376c7.json","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/d6c20eaf30f586dccfb8b930.json"},{"id":97139023,"identity":"4321e6e5-e810-4ad3-9030-4b4345271222","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-01 09:59:33","extension":"xml","order_by":2,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":138152,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"cd9e8639acda43c396d802fd4ec376c71enriched.xml","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/f1b35b3aceb1fba6a4d540b3.xml"},{"id":97020303,"identity":"ea4ccb0a-5b61-46a6-aeb4-0c668a714ad4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"emf","order_by":5,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":903448,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"floatimage3.emf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/26fffebfd05c64b996e074c6.emf"},{"id":97020297,"identity":"cab36637-40b4-43b2-828a-1c643b384415","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"png","order_by":6,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":107060,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Onlinefloatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/01e2c3700547b84b0eda45af.png"},{"id":97020301,"identity":"bf46497a-55f3-45f2-b7a7-1c460d6179ed","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"png","order_by":7,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":208213,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Onlinefloatimage2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/3850b94ab432af0100044d5c.png"},{"id":97020299,"identity":"eded9574-3e11-4687-90d5-469f26f774f9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"png","order_by":8,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":23245,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Onlinefloatimage3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/73ce43c85309c3714e63b7d0.png"},{"id":97020304,"identity":"71ac8bfa-7947-43be-b2ef-56b19f78bd63","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"xml","order_by":9,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":136324,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"cd9e8639acda43c396d802fd4ec376c71structuring.xml","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/a4254709ac701fbc9170b105.xml"},{"id":97139806,"identity":"b0f665aa-4fee-4f6b-a05f-9b4928749cc8","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-01 10:02:32","extension":"html","order_by":10,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":142622,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"earlyproof.html","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/b823e3a132b8eb83c788ea79.html"},{"id":97139783,"identity":"af74332c-2289-40a3-bc2a-f582545eb71d","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-01 10:02:30","extension":"jpeg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":203517,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThe SESF based on McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) for Fishers’ Resilience to Co-management Challenges\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/cd1b0c41108788094ca2835c.jpeg"},{"id":97020296,"identity":"bf977756-fe93-4cc2-972d-b0279e97ce69","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-28 18:16:49","extension":"jpeg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":849049,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eBogiani Wetland Fishery, Tahirpur, Sunamganj, Bangladesh\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/2400fc99643244db8b4d6534.jpeg"},{"id":97140126,"identity":"9ddaa80f-624f-4d92-9116-2df64e6d68ee","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-01 10:03:52","extension":"jpg","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":86818,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eModified SESF for Bogiani Fishery SES Co-management Challenges in Northeastern Bangladesh\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/4c4a0834cda3647b9bc4a1b6.jpg"},{"id":103505889,"identity":"1ca7fda1-ac96-44d5-a72a-885b2a0114c9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-26 13:33:23","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":2083262,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8160162/v1/00a317ed-a319-47d2-aee4-e30b53c532ad.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Social-Ecological Analysis of Resilience to Co-Management Challenges in a Bangladeshi Wetland Fishery Community","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eInland wetland fisheries are an essential source of animal protein, export earnings, and employment for the rural population in Bangladesh (Department of Fisheries (DoF), 2018). Many rural Bangladeshis rely on fishing, fish processing, and fish trading in the area\u0026rsquo;s rivers, estuaries, canals, beels (fisheries), lakes, haors (wetlands), and floodplains for their lives and livelihoods. Fishing has become a vital livelihood for wetland communities, with over two-thirds of people either consuming or selling fish from wetland fisheries (Thompson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). However, this sector\u0026rsquo;s contribution to the national economy has decreased over time, from 62.59 percent in 1983-84 to 28.45 percent in 2017-18 (DoF, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), mainly due to harmful fishing practices, habitat damage, and the exclusion of fishers from fisheries management (Newaz and Rahman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). To address these challenges, the Bangladesh government has adopted a community-based fisheries management (CBFM) strategy to engage fishers in the country's fisheries management (DoF, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). CBMF promotes the sharing of power and responsibilities between fishers and government bodies (e.g., the Department of Fisheries and local governments) for managing fisheries (Newaz and Rahman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCBFM approach aims to ensure that fish resources are managed to safeguard both present and future use by promoting: the delegation of fishing rights to local fishers; the formation of organizations among fishers; collaboration between stakeholders (DoF, local government, fishers, and local people); equitable benefits sharing; and the enhancement of alternative employments and personal skills (Sultana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Thompson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). It also emphasizes resolving conflicts over resources, establishing mutual understanding among fishers to facilitate co-management, developing and conserving sanctuaries, and integrating local knowledges into fishery use strategies (Thompson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). These activities are intended to improve fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to co-manage fisheries and, consequently, their livelihoods (Islam et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Nonetheless, fishers\u0026rsquo; access and declining wetland fisheries resources have yet to be fully restored (Newaz and Rahman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWetland fisheries co-management faces numerous critical social challenges, including conflicts between institutions, a lack of protocols for monitoring institutions and enforcing policies, exclusionary decision-making, power imbalances, absence of conflict-mitigation procedures, scarcity of livelihood redundancy, disregard of shared learning in pursuing continuous improvement, weak leadership, lack of faith and mutuality among actors, and weak collaboration among stakeholders (Allison and Badjeck, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Carrillo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Hossain and Banik, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Tima et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, fisheries co-management also faces ecological challenges, including decreasing species diversity, catch decline, limited resource mobility, inadequate knowledge of local ecology and practices, and environmental changes (Mondal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; London et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Lozano and Heinen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Pukkalla and Rama Mohan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Fishers often fail to adequately address social-ecological challenges, leading to resource degradation, disparities, and conflicts among stakeholders in co-managing wetland fisheries as social-ecological systems (SESs) in Bangladesh (Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, fishing communities must develop resilience, as this will bolster their ability to address the challenges of co-managing fishery SESs (Pellowe and Leslie, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Resilient co-management enables fishers to devise strategies, decisions, and activities to confront the challenges inherent to their particular SES (Satumanatpan and Pollnac, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; resilience within a fishery SES indicates their ability to handle challenges posed by the system\u0026rsquo;s ongoing actions and arrangements (Marshall and Marshall, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Resilient SESs provide resource users with expected outcomes and can respond to unexpected challenges in resource management (Allen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience in fisheries management is influenced by challenges, such as resource scarcity, bans on usage, adaptation to new resource policies, and livelihood uncertainty (Marshall and Marshall, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Resilience analysis remains undeveloped, as most procedures use small-range or inappropriate scales to analyze parts of an SES, participant feedback on personal well-being, and key drivers, rather than employing multiple scales across various arrangements and interests (Angeler and Allen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, current resilience analyses overlook uncertainties and challenges in fishery SESs, as well as the resulting levels of fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience (Salomon et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). While existing literature examines co-management challenges and resilience using specific theoretical approaches (Allen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Armitage et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Cinner and Barnes, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Fabinyi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Said et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), both resilience and co-management are interdisciplinary and multidimensional (Clay and Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Pope et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). An SESF is particularly effective for analyzing social and ecological challenges to fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience in co-managing fishery SESs (Partelow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCo-management challenges and their effects on fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience can be diagnosed using the SESF developed by McGinnis and Ostrom (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) (Carrillo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; London et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). The SESF diagnoses challenges to fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience in fisheries co-management by examining interactions between SES variables and fishers\u0026rsquo; local settings (Partelow and Boda, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Partelow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). It also facilitates qualitative analysis of fisheries\u0026rsquo; SES resilience through data classification (Aswani, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). In this work, SESF is applied using descriptive methods to diagnose co-management challenges and their overall effects on fishers\u0026rsquo; lives, livelihoods, and resilience in the Bogiani fishery in Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s northeastern floodplain, Sunamganj district.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eFramework of the Study\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eResilience, as an interdisciplinary approach, can address a wide range of challenges to the continued functioning of SESs (Folke, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). An SES comprises social (economy, polity, culture, institutions, community, people) and ecological (ecosystems) systems, both of which are interdependent and equally important (Folke, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Resilience theory can combine both systems and explain their nuances in different social contexts (Baggio et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). It describes the ability of individuals, collectivities, social values, and behaviors, or SESs, to adapt to perceived and unpredictable challenges while maintaining current actions, systems, and responses (Folke, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Adaptation, a key component of resilience, encompasses ideas, facts, creativity, and rules to address challenges and build resilience in SESs (Folke, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Resilience depends on the ability of people or SESs to reorganize activities across varying levels of challenge, transform these challenges into opportunities, and replace current unsustainable SESs with new, sustainable ones (Folke, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAn SESF considers a set of interrelated variables in examining social and ecological challenges within SESs (McGinnis and Ostrom, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). It describes \u003cem\u003eactors\u003c/em\u003e as resource users and managers who accumulate \u003cem\u003eresource units\u003c/em\u003e from an ever-changing \u003cem\u003eresource system\u003c/em\u003e maintained by a \u003cem\u003egovernance system\u003c/em\u003e based on diverse formal and informal rules and strategies, \u003cem\u003einteractions\u003c/em\u003e as the procedures of resource accumulation and management, and \u003cem\u003eoutcomes\u003c/em\u003e as the consequences of interactions within \u003cem\u003esocial-political-economic settings\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003erelated ecological systems\u003c/em\u003e (McGinnis and Ostrom, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). The italicized components are considered first-layer variables in describing an SESF. In an SESF, the resource system builds on an environment that generates resource units (e.g., water, fish, food); the governance system comprises interconnected rules that influence and are influenced by the SES; interactions indicate actions, interchanges, and disagreements among actors; outcomes reflect the effects of interactions between other variables; social-political-economic settings represent the external, broader social, political, and economic contexts that influence or are influenced by the SES; and related ecological systems represent interconnections between the SES and adjoining ecosystems (McGinnis and Ostrom \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). An SESF identifies the interactions between relevant social and ecological variables in local settings to assess a fishery\u0026rsquo;s SES ability to address social and ecological challenges in its co-management (London et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eStudy Location\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study area is located within the larger wetlands of northeastern Tahirpur Upazila (sub-district) in Bangladesh, between 25\u0026deg;01' and 25\u0026deg;12' north latitudes and 91\u0026deg;02' and 91\u0026deg;19' east longitudes (Banglapedia, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). This area experiences average annual temperatures ranging from 21.1\u003csup\u003e\u0026deg;\u003c/sup\u003eC to 31.2\u003csup\u003e\u0026deg;\u003c/sup\u003eC and 3,576.96 millimeters of rainfall (BBS, 2019). The Bogiani fishery, covering 1,000.66 acres, comprises eleven interconnected parts, including two sanctuaries and several mini-forests. It connects to the larger Shanir Haor from June to November, but is visibly separated for the rest of the year.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eManagement of Bogiani Fishery\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eTahirpur Jamalgar Motsojibi Sombay Somiti\u003c/em\u003e (Tahirpur Jamalgar Fishers\u0026rsquo; Cooperative Association) (TJMSS), which was established in 1972 by 48 fishers from Jamalgar village, leased the fishery from the government for six years from 2017 to 2023. Previously, the 45-member \u003cem\u003eVati (low-lying) Tahirpur Motsojibi Sombay Somiti\u003c/em\u003e (Vati Tahirpur Fishers\u0026rsquo; Cooperative Association) (VTMSS), which was founded in 2007 from Vati Tahirpur village, leased the fishery from 2010 to 2016. However, TJMSS (current leaseholders) transferred fishery management to a former wealthy leaseholder due to their inability to bear the expenses (yearly leasing fee: BDT 6.2\u0026nbsp;million = \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e68,000; total expenses: BDT 20\u0026nbsp;million = \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e225,000) and manage the fishery. Notably, most fishers are landless and marginalized, with agriculture being the key means of subsistence in the region (Banglapedia, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eStudy Design\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study employs a qualitative approach, utilizing an instrumental case study design to assess co-management challenges and their effects on fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience. The Bogiani fishery is the primary focus of the study, offering a real-world context to better understand broader issues of co-management and resilience. To develop a rich and well-rounded understanding, the study draws on several sources of information, including in-depth interviews (IDIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and document analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eData Collection\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe fieldwork started with twenty online individual conversations with TJMSS (12) and VTMSS (8) members from August 2021, using WhatsApp with the help of assistants from the study area to build rapport with the informants, as the spread of Covid-19 impeded the researcher from traveling from Malaysia to Bangladesh for in-person data collection to complete the study. Additionally, thirty in-person conversations were conducted with TJMSS (17), VTMSS (10) members, and government officials (3) in the study area from November 2021 to build relationships with more informants. This study conducted 18 IDIs with fishers from TJMSS (9) and VTMSS (6), along with government officials (3), and five FGDs with six members each from TJMSS (3) and VTMSS (2) in-person between February and May 2022, using convenience sampling to explore key aspects of fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience to their co-management challenges. It used separate semi-structured interview guides for IDIs and FGDs to collect data using predetermined question sets, which were further refined by asking informants follow-up questions based on their responses. Informants were selected for their experience in co-managing Bogiani and knowledge of how it affects their lives and livelihoods, including their limited participation and the deprivation of benefits in co-management. Government officials were also interviewed to record their experiences and knowledge about co-management.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIDIs obtained information about fishers\u0026rsquo; socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, fishing practices, fish catch, leadership patterns, trust and reciprocity, rules-in-use, family and fishing assets, and their challenges in co-management. FGDs gathered collective insights from fishers on their social, economic, political, cultural, and ecological settings. Additionally, published documents, including the Statistical Yearbooks of Bangladesh 2019 and 2020, the Bangladesh Population and Housing Census Report 2011, and the Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh 2017-18, were used to contextualize wetland fisheries in Bangladesh and in Bogiani, Tahirpur. The unit of analysis for this study was the Bogiani fishery, including all relevant actors, particularly the fishers of TJMSS and VTMSS and government officials (UNO-Upazila Nirbahi (executive) officer, UFO-Upazila fishery officer, and OC-officer in charge of the local police station) in Tahirpur subdistrict. Before IDIs and FGDs, verbal informed consent and availability were ensured. They were conducted in Bengali and then translated and transcribed into English using the back-translation method. IDI and FGD sessions lasted approximately 1 to 1.5 hours.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study used the SESF (McGinnis and Ostrom, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) to organize three tiers of social and ecological variables to identify challenges in co-managing the Bogiani fishery SES. Interview guides were developed around first-, second, and third-tier variables of the SESF. This study employed the thematic analysis framework developed by Braun and Clarke (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e) to review and analyze interview and FGD transcripts, reading them repeatedly and taking essential notes to become familiar with the data. Next, transcripts were organized to generate initial codes, comparing their meanings and trends pertinent to the research questions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAll layer variables were coded using collected data, aligning with research aims and questions. The codes were grouped into major themes related to the Bogiani SES. These themes were then cross-checked for their relevance and accuracy. They were clarified with subthemes and various excerpts from interviews and FGDs. Identified codes and themes were subsequently used to describe fishers\u0026rsquo; challenges in co-managing Bogiani SES from a resilience perspective.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eInformation from interviews, FGDs, field notes, and published documents reveals various challenges for co-managing the Bogiani fishery. The SESF is applied to characterize Bogiani as an SES, focusing on the key challenges for its co-management. It includes eight first-tier variables, along with a set of interconnected second- and third-tier variables derived from each first- and second-tier variable. The focal fishery SES comprises the resource system (RS), resource units (RU), governance system (GS), and actors (A), which influence and are influenced by exogenous social-economic-political settings (S) and related ecosystems (ECO). The outcomes (O) from interactions (I) among relevant actors in the focal fishery SES denote its action situation. The SESF components have been modified based on their definitions in the literature (Carrillo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; London et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Partelow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), research aims, and the SES attributes of Bogiani. The first-tier variables are divided into 41 second- and 67 third-tier variables. These variables are coded in brackets with uppercase letters followed by numerical superscripts and lowercase letters. The entire set of variables (first and second-tier variables summarized in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, third-tier variables listed in Tables\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab8\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e) and outcomes resulting from their interactions determines fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience to co-management challenges in the Bogiani SES.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eExogenous Challenges for the Bogiani Wetland Fishery’s SES and Fishers’ Resilience\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFishery SESs often influence or are influenced by their broader socio-economic-political (S) and ecological (ECO) settings. The broader settings and attributes of the fishery SES are wide-ranging and challenging to clarify in local contexts, often leading to failures in fishery SES co-management. Successful co-management is, therefore, directly related to fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to address social-economic-political-ecological challenges generated outside fisheries. Similarly, fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience to challenges in co-managing the Bogiani SES is influenced by their national and regional socio-economic-political-ecological settings.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fisher\u0026rsquo;s Social-Economic-Political Settings (S)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS1a: High population density\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 2011, Tahirpur\u0026rsquo;s population was 215,200, with a density of 682 people/km\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e (BBS, 2013). Approximately 80% of Tahirpur\u0026rsquo;s population directly or indirectly depends on fishing for livelihood during the rainy season (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS1b: High population growth rate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePopulation growth rate in Tahirpur was 3.27% in 2011, compared to 2.02% in Sunamganj district and 1.47% nationally (BBS 2013). The reliance of most population on fishing for livelihood adversely affects fish production and habitat in the area (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS1c: Population structure\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 2011, the average household in Tahirpur comprised 5.59 people (vs. 4.35 nationally) and the sex ratio was 105 (vs. 100 nationally) (BBS 2013). The dependency ratio for rural areas was 54% in Bangladesh in 2020 (BBS, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS2a: Low per capita income\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePer capita income for 2020-21 in Bangladesh was US\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e2,227 (BBS, 2021); in contrast, the average yearly household income among fishers was below \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1000 (Interviews). In 2016, the poverty rate in Tahirpur Upazila was 26.2%, compared to 26% in Sunamganj district, 16.2% in Sylhet division, and 24.3% at the national level (BBS, 2020). Economic development has remained low in the northeastern wetland areas of Bangladesh over the decades. Fishers report their challenges in bearing leasing and maintenance costs to manage fisheries (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS2b: High income disparity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the Tahirpur region, most resources (land, money, fishery) are occupied by a small group of people, with about 40.66% of the population being landless (Banglapedia, 2021). The Gini coefficient of income for rural areas of Bangladesh was 0.454 in 2016 (BBS, 2017). About 75% of people are poor, 10\u0026ndash;15% have modest wealth, and 5\u0026ndash;7% are affluent (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS2c: Lack of economic diversity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgriculture is the main source of income\u0026nbsp;for 68.05% of people in Tahirpur (Banglapedia, 2021), with other income sources being scarce in the area. There are some seasonal jobs in agriculture (paddy cultivation) and the stone quarry (picking sand and stone) during the dry season. While fishers have the right to catch fish in the open haor water during the rainy season, leaseholders prohibit fishing in the area. Fishers often borrow money from NGOs, moneylenders, and relatives to cover living expenses (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS2d: Limited public services\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 2011, the literacy rate in Tahirpur was 30.4%, compared to 35% in Sunamganj district and 56.09% at the national level. Furthermore, only 17.5% of households in Tahirpur had sanitary latrines (vs. 61.6% nationally), 25.5% had electricity access (vs. 56.6% nationally), and 39 km of roads were paved (BBS, 2013). Tahirpur has only a 31-bed hospital, lacking essential staff and supplies. Important local roads are incomplete and damaged due to regular floods. During the rainy season, people use boats to travel between villages. At least 25\u0026ndash;30 households shared the same tube well for drinking water. Basic government services in this area were considered inadequate (interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS3a: Hierarchical legal structure\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLocal government executives, UNO, and DC (Deputy Commissioner of the district), often lease wetland fisheries to influential individuals, violating government rules and depriving local fishers of their customary fishing rights. Formal rules are established via a top-down process (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS3b: Lack of conformity to norms\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLocal people show minimal compliance with formal fishing norms and rules. Influential individuals evade formal rules to secure leases for fisheries, despite being ineligible to apply for them. They overexploit resources and believe that they will not face punishment for breaching laws and norms (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS3c: Intensity of conflicts\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConflicts originate from disagreements in decisions or interests among fishers, government officials, or influential people to control a fishery (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS4a: Inconsistent fisheries resource policy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRules assign fishing rights to local fishers, but the government allocates fisheries to the highest bidders in the auction (Interviews).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS4b: Lack of conformity to policies\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePeople maintain little compliance with fishery resource policies in the area. There is no mechanism to conserve inland fisheries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS5a: Increasing demand for fish\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLeaseholders overexploit fish due to higher demand in local markets, leading to species extinction and habitat damage.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eS5b: Lack of conservation measures\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRegulations for using and conserving fisheries are not strongly enforced in the area.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e* The latest population and housing data in Bangladesh were captured in the 2011 census.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe northeastern Tahirpur subdistrict in Bangladesh is characterized by numerous nutrient-rich and large wetland fisheries spanning 315.33 km\u003csup\u003e\u0026sup2;\u003c/sup\u003e (BBS, 2013). The availability of wetland resources has contributed to the permanent settlement of local communities in Tahirpur\u0026rsquo;s floodplains. A large and increasing population (S1) directly or indirectly depends on fisheries resources in the Tahirpur area. The ability of local fishers to make decisions and co-manage fisheries is affected by the regional population attributes (S1a, S1b, S1c). Sajal Roy, a 58-year-old member of TJMSS, describes:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlmost three-fourths of the inhabitants in the Tahirpur area earn their livelihood by fishing in larger water bodies during the entire rainy season, from June to November. Most people use destructive kona/ber jal (surrounding net, a type of seine net), current jal (gill net), bhar jal (set bag net), tana jal (dragnet), and mosquito nets to catch fish, including juveniles. We, 48 members, are exclusively dependent on fishing for livelihood. Unrestricted fishing by local people puts pressure on fish stocks and habitats in the area. Many fish species are becoming extinct due to overexploitation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhen a large population depends on fishing for its livelihood, it often leads to a decline in fish stocks. Overfishing hinders fishers from generating profits and maintaining fisheries productivity. This situation hampers fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to co-manage wetland fisheries and, hence, their improvement. Fisheries co-management can also be hindered by the low socioeconomic development (S2a, S2b, S2c, S2d) in the floodplains of Tahirpur. Some VTMSS\u0026rsquo;s deprived members expressed in a group discussion that:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe are the poorest people in the area, possessing less than 5% of the resources. The government has given us fishing rights in wetland fisheries, but our poverty prevents us from obtaining them. We are compelled to rely on wealthy individuals to secure the lease.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe weak socioeconomic situation forces fishers to depend on the rich for leasing fisheries; consequently, the rich capture the fishery. Moreover, the attributes of the region\u0026rsquo;s centralized political system (S3a, S3b, S3c) are not conducive to ensuring fishers\u0026rsquo; participation in co-management. A group discussion with 45-60-year-old informants of TJMSS indicates:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe received support from a local financial elite, who spent money and managed government offices and political leaders to secure the lease for Bogiani. TJMSS handed over the fishery to the elite. The fishery, boats, and nets are ours, but we cannot go to the fishery. If we go to the fishery to catch fish, they seize our nets. Altogether, the leaseholder gives us BDT 100,000 (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1,075) yearly as profit from the fishery. We feel like he bought us for BDT 1 lac, which means we have been sold.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInfluential persons manipulate the leasing process to capture fisheries in association with political leaders and government officials. The competition for leasing fisheries between fishers, political leaders, and power groups often leads to conflict in the Tahirpur area. Similarly, contradictory fisheries resource policies (S4a) and non-compliance with these policies (S4b) restrict local fishers\u0026rsquo; rights to wetland fisheries. UNO of Tahirpur elucidates:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers have a legitimate right to fisheries, but the lease value is so high for poor fishers. They are unable to manage high-level government officials and political leaders to obtain the lease. Power groups lease fisheries year after year.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe existing fisheries resource policy excludes local fishers from their customary fishing rights to wetland fisheries. Informants stated increasing prices of wetland fish in local markets (S5a) and the lack of protective measures (such as payments, levies for services, and fines) (S5b) as crucial drivers of overexploitation and habitat damage in the area, highlighting the distinct taste, smell, and color of the fish and the exploitation of sanctuaries for more profit.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, ecological factors (ECO1a, ECO2a) hinder the nutrient quality and the flow of fish into/out of the Bogiani fishery SES (ECO3a).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fisher\u0026rsquo;s Related Ecosystems (ECO)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eECO1a: Extreme weather events\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIncreasing temperature, unusual precipitation patterns, and floods adversely affect spawning and fries in the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eECO2a: Medium pollution from agricultural production and sedimentation from upstream floods\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePesticides and fertilizers from neighboring agricultural lands hamper the growth of plankton in fisheries. Fish production is also hampered by sedimentation from upstream floods.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eECO3a: Declining flows into and out of the focal SES\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFlows of fish species into or out of the Bogiani fishery are falling due to overexploitation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome traditional fishers of TJMSS shared in a group discussion that:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBogiani fishery is situated in the haor area of Tahirpur, under the Meghalaya hills of India. The alluvial deposits accumulated by flash floods during the rainy season, combined with fluctuating temperatures and rainfall, as well as pesticide and fertilizer substances from nearby agricultural lands in recent years, have impacted fish production during the dry season, from December to May. Bogiani is failing to sustain fish diversity and the flow of fish species toward or away from the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEcological disturbances are likely to reduce fisheries\u0026rsquo; and fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience, undermining the sustainability of fisheries over time.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eBogiani Resource Systems (RS) and Resource Units\u0026rsquo; (RU) Challenges for Fishers\u0026rsquo; Resilience\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers identified unclear boundaries (RS1a) and declining carrying capacity (RS2a) as the two most significant barriers to growing fish in the Bogiani fishery. The discussion with TJMSS\u0026rsquo;s active group brings out:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEarlier, we would see about 150 types of fish in the fishery, but now we see fewer than 100. The main reasons for this decline are the shortage of natural food, sedimentation, water level dropping from 10\u0026ndash;15 feet to 2\u0026ndash;4 feet from February-April, shortage of rainfall, loss of fish eggs and fries due to increasing temperature, spawning in hot water, reduced space for fish to grow, restricted movement of water and fish into and out of the fishery by the dam built to protect paddy fields in the haor, damage to water plants (\u003cem\u003eShapla-water lily, Singra-hornwort, Kochuri pana-Water hyacinth, Hijal-Barringtonia acutangula, Koroch-\u003c/em\u003ePongamia pinnata) that provide nutrients and shelter for fish, pollution of the fishery water by fertilizers and pesticides used in agriculture, and overfishing for profit.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs a result, many fish species, such as Chitol (Clown Knifefish), Minar carp, Nandina (Labeo nandina), Ghonia (Labeo boggut), and Ghagot (Long-whiskered catfish), are missing. Fishers reported that the artificial habitat (RS3a) fails to prevent the decline of fish stocks (RS4a) and the fishery (RS4b). UFO noted a decreasing trend in the size and number of fish, as the central part of the fishery has now been leveled like agricultural lands.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fishery Resource Systems (RS)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS1a: Fuzzy spatial and ecological fishery boundaries\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishery boundaries adjoin private agricultural and marsh lands on two sides. Fish catching areas and sanctuaries are inseparable. Fishing is prohibited in the sanctuaries, yet fishers still catch fish in conservation areas.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS2a: Declining carrying capacity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMany fish species have become extinct or endangered, such as Chitol, Ghagot, Nandina, Kalibaush, Ghonia, Minar carp.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS3a: Limited fishery access facilities\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers use small-mesh nets and boats to catch fish and build temporary cottages in the fishery area for monitoring, catching, and processing fish (drying or selling to traders) from November to May. They constructed an artificial habitat with bamboo and tree branches, planted trees, released fry, and added feeders to grow fish in the fishery. The fishery can be accessed for resource extraction by boat during the rainy season and on foot during the dry season, as there is no road access to the area. Fishers follow ancestral knowledge to cultivate fish and increase income from the fishery. It is challenging to earn from the deteriorating fishery with limited facilities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS4a: Decreasing fish stock\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCatches have been decreasing. Fishers indiscriminately catch fish, and no regulations are enforced to prohibit fishing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS4b: Decreasing biophysical features\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe shortage of phytoplankton, caused by increasing temperatures, shallow water levels, reduced rainfall, and overexploitation, disrupts favorable conditions for fish growth.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS5a: Recurring hazards\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFloods and heavy rainfall promote fish growth during the rainy season (June-November), but low rainfall and high temperatures hamper fish production during the dry season (December-May). The silt carried by floods has filled much of the fishery for fish production in the dry season.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS5b: Past experiences\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSedimentation, pollution from agricultural land, climate change, overharvesting, use of artificial feeds, and release of exotic species are altering the diet, variety, and quality of wetland fish.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS6a: Lack of ability to predict fishery dynamics\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers fail to relate weather events (rainfall, floods, temperature, water level) with fishery development. They understand the presence of fish species in different parts of the fishery from their experience (bubble of fish) during March and April, when water levels are very low. However, they do not understand how ecological changes or overexploitation affect the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRS7a: Disturbances to storage capacity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLow rainfall and water levels during the dry season, rising temperatures, and unregulated fishing hinder the fishery's ability to recover from damage.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSimilarly, the weakening equilibrium (RS5a, RS5b), unpredictable changes (RS6a), and human-natural disturbances (RS7a) have damaged the fishery habitat to the point where it may never naturally restore to its former condition. An experienced fisher group from VTMSS discusses:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe fishery was highly productive 10 to 12 years ago; fish were larger, quantities were huge, and the variety of fish was greater. Now, fish are smaller, numbers are limited, and many fish species have already disappeared. The fishery was very deep earlier. People used to be scared when entering the fishery's water. It is now difficult for fish eggs and fry to survive in a congested, shallow, hot-water area during the dry season. We understand that fish production, the fishery\u0026rsquo;s ability to support diverse fish species, and the ability to recover naturally from damage are declining.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe absence of activities to address ongoing social-ecological disturbances may have long-term adverse effects on the recovery of fishery resources and fishers\u0026rsquo; livelihood.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUFO emphasized that restricted fish movement (RU1a), fluctuating growth (RU2a) due to overexploitation and habitat degradation, and interrupted interactions (such as spawning) (RU3a) are key factors driving declining catch sizes in the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fishery Resource Units (RU)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU1a: Constrained fish unit mobility\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe natural movement of fish is affected when the fishery is separated from the larger wetland area during the dry season (December to May). The migration of fish in the open water of haor during the rainy season is restricted by local fishers using nets in the haor and rivers. The high dam built to prevent flooding of paddy fields during the monsoon also restricts water flow and fish migration within and between fisheries and rivers. These restrictions on natural water movement reduce food availability and affect the spawning of many deep-water and migratory fish species.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU2a: Declining growth rate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers report a declining trend in catches over the years. The fishery growth is decreasing mainly due to overharvesting and environmental factors.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU3a: Interrupted reproduction\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFish units\u0026rsquo; reproduction is becoming vulnerable to food-chain disturbances triggered by human-natural factors. Spawning is affected by low water levels and high temperatures during the peak reproductive months of April to June. Fish units face rivalry and predation in the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU4a: Increasing economic value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrices of fish are ever-increasing. The leaseholder overharvests the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU4b: Decreasing environmental and cultural values\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBogiani can nurture diverse fish species and contribute to other fisheries in the larger wetland area. Its reproductive capacity has been declining due to overharvesting, increased pollution, sedimentation, and extreme weather. Many fishers still consider fishing as their primary identity. It is difficult for them to ensure earnings from fishing, as the leaseholder controls the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU5a: Overexploitation of resources\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003eharvest the maximum units from the fishery, as they may not retain the lease next time.\u003c/span\u003e Therefore, total catch is declining.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU6a: Declining typical qualities\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTypical size, length, color, smell, and taste of wetland fish have been lacking.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRU7a: Inconsistent spatial and temporal distribution patterns of fish units across the fishery\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe spatial and temporal distribution of fish in the fishery is inconsistent. Some species (rohu, boal, catla) are predictable in the fishery from December-May, while others (prawn, chitol, ghagot) are not predictable due to changing ecological conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe higher economic value (RU4a) of fish in local markets enables the leaseholder to make a profit every year. Informants notice that fish from the haor are thought to taste better due to their diet of unrestricted natural food and exposure to abundant light and air. In contrast, the environmental and cultural values of the fishery are declining (RU4b) due to social-ecological reasons. The TJMSS president reiterates Bogiani\u0026rsquo;s declining ability to nurture fish. Similarly, informants emphasized concerns about their identity. Tapan Barman (pseudonym), a professional fisher of TJMSS, describes:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe are traditional fishermen because we have been catching fish since our early ancestors. As the earnings from fishing have become insecure, it is challenging to continue fishing as our profession. We have seen a fishing community since childhood. Our profession is now at risk because the non-fishermen (newly formed fishery associations and powerful leaseholders) have now become fishermen by taking cards from the fishery office. Many fishers are now leaving fishing as they are unable to earn a living from it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; cultural unity and similarity appear to be failing to preserve their identity as fishermen due to uncertain earnings and displacement from fisheries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants highlighted a decline in total catch (RU5a) and fish quality (RU6a), indicating overharvesting with small-mesh nets, draining different parts of the fishery using power pumps by the leaseholder, and reduced nutrient levels. They also suggested that various fish species were randomly present across the fishery at different times (RU7a). Informants acknowledge their inability to predict the movement patterns of fish species due to changes in water temperature, reproductive cycles, biological development stages, and disruptions to the food cycle.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eActors\u0026rsquo; Challenges for Co-managing Bogiani and Their Resilience\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants viewed the lack of coordination between the 48 TJMSS members (A1a) and the responsible government bodies (A1b) as the key obstacle to effective co-management of the Bogiani fishery, mentioning disagreements among members, negligence by TJMSS and government officials (UNO, FO, OC), and the leaseholder\u0026rsquo;s dominance over the fishery as the main factors. They further identified their relative poverty (A2a, A2b) as a significant barrier to establishing TJMSS as a collective organization for co-management. The group discussion with TJMSS\u0026rsquo;s management team revealed:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe come from the same clan of Jamalgar village, and our unity is strong. We, 48 members, are the entitled users of the fishery, but TJMSS is not engaging us in fishery management. TJMSS committee members and the leaseholder collaborate with UNO, FO, OC, and other government officials to manage the fishery, ignoring us.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants report that weak coordination significantly hampers their ability to work together as a team in the Bogiani fishery. TJMSS and the leaseholder apply a divide-and-rule strategy among members to control and manage the fishery smoothly.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Actors (A)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA1a: Similar fishery users\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eForty-eight fishers from similar kinfolks in Jamalgar village are direct users of the fishery. About 100 local people catch fish and support the leaseholder in managing it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA1b: Diverse government bodies\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFive government bodies (i.e., fishery, land, cooperatives, police, UNO) oversee the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA2a: Low socioeconomic condition\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishing is the main source of income for most fishers. Some fishers have little land, and most are landless. Fishers\u0026rsquo; socioeconomic conditions are quite poor, characterized by low-income and subsistence livelihoods.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA2b: Limited access to basic services\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers have inadequate access to government basic services such as education, health, electricity, sanitation, and transportation services in Tahirpur.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA3a: Crisis\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCatch decline is ruining fishers\u0026rsquo; livelihoods and the fishery habitat. The leaseholder dominates TJMSS and keeps most of the profits. Local people attempt to catch fish or demand benefits from the fishery. The leaseholder suppresses threats by engaging local leaders (UP and Upazila chairmen) and law enforcement agencies (UNO, OC).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA3b: Duration\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers reported tense relations with local people throughout the leasing period.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA3c: Living away from the fishery\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers live several kilometers away from the fishery. The resultant extra time, energy, and expense make fishery management stressful and costly.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA4a: Self-interested leadership/entrepreneurship\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe leaseholder is concerned about his benefits from the fishery. He maintains functional relations with fishers for his own gain. TJMSS leaders also maintain good relations with the leaseholder and government bodies to ensure their dominance in the fishery. Entrepreneurial activities are limited to leasing and extracting fishery resources. TJMSS and the leaseholder engage a few members in management. There are no fish processing plants in the Tahirpur area.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA5a: Lower trust and reciprocity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers have working relations to manage the fishery, but they lack trust and reciprocity. Bonding social ties are prevalent because fishers come from the same clan in the same village. They have weak connections with government officials and local residents. They fail to collaborate and collect assistance (money, decisions, law enforcement, and fish extraction) from their relations to manage the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eA6a: Profit-oriented mindset\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers manage the fishery using traditional knowledge with a commercial mindset.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eFishers consider the distance between their residence and the fishery (A3c) and ongoing tensions among themselves and with local people (A3a, A3b) as key challenges to co-managing the fishery. They indicate that the leaseholder and TJMSS intentionally isolate fishers to maximize their profits from the fishery. Responses from informants revealed that a lack of competence and eagerness among leaders to ensure collective participation and initiate commercial enterprises (A4a) inhibits the aim of co-management. Furthermore, the lack of unity among fishers both in belief and action (A5a) and the leaseholder's exploitative attitude (A6a) suggest fishers\u0026rsquo; nominal engagement and the leaseholder\u0026rsquo;s profit-making orientation in co-managing the fishery. A traditional fisher group from TJMSS discusses:\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe president and the secretary of TJMSS are not actively working to establish our rights in the fishery. However, the leaseholder seeks profit, even at the expense of damaging fish diversity and habitat.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTJMSS committee members prioritize leadership positions and benefits over ensuring fishers\u0026rsquo; active participation in fishery governance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eGovernance Challenges for Co-management and Fishers\u0026rsquo; Resilience\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eExclusion from decision-making (GS1a), weak collaboration between fishers\u0026rsquo; cooperatives and government bodies in enforcing rules (GS2a), and limited property rights (GS3a) hinder fishers from organizing for co-management.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab6\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 6\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Fishery Governance Systems (GS)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS1a: Low community participation in fisheries co-management\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlthough the fishery management is community-based, some fishers exercise power. TJMSS members are recruited from chosen circles to ensure their control over the fishery. Governance of the fishery has remained top-down and non-participatory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS2a: Dysfunctional rulemaking and enforcing organizations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere is a lack of collaboration between government bodies and TJMSS in managing the fishery. Government bodies prioritize the interests of the leaseholder. The leaseholder has established complete control over the fishery after fishers handed it over to him for six years.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS3a: Limited property rights\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe leaseholder (non-fisher) controls fishers\u0026rsquo; rights in the fishery. The leasing process limits the rights of local fishers in the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS4a: Rigid operational-choice rules\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe leaseholder implements formal and informal rules for operating the fishery. While fishers are the entitled users of Bogiani, the leaseholder makes decisions on daily activities (from fostering to harvesting fish) to manage the fishery. They are deprived of both their formal (given by government rules) and informal (approved by local community customs) rights of the fishery. TJMSS committee members follow the leaseholder\u0026rsquo;s guidance to manage the fishery. Most TJMSS members are working in the fishery as nominal members. The open bidding process and high expenses permit the rich and powerful to establish control over wetland fisheries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS4b: Rigid collective-choice rules\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe leaseholder ignores fishers\u0026rsquo; collective choices by imposing his own rules for fishery management, but involves them when any conflicts arise. Government officials (UNO, FO, DC, SP) often interfere with fishers\u0026rsquo; collective decisions or their modifications to fishery management. The leaseholder maintains good relations with government officials to manage the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS4c: Rigid constitutional-choice rules\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers are the legitimate owners to manage the fishery, while the leaseholder alone operates it. This indicates a violation of both formal (government) and informal (community) constitutional-choice rules. Fishers\u0026rsquo; legal rights are often violated throughout the entire region. The parliament enacts the constitutional choice rules without involving fishers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS5a: Inadequate social monitoring\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLoose interpersonal relations among fishers, despite higher homogeneity, restrict effective social monitoring of the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS5b: Inadequate biophysical monitoring\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers lack the ability to monitor how food chain disruptions, rising temperatures, and decreasing rainfall affect the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGS5c: Absence of graduated sanctions\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers socially try to resolve issues with local people.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLikewise, informants identified contradictory formal and local rules-in-use (GS4a, GS4b, GS4c) as key constraints to their limited rights in the fishery. Some VTMSS\u0026rsquo;s deprived members share in a group discussion:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOur participation in fishery management is nominal and ineffective. We obtained the fishery in accordance with government rules, but the leaseholder is illegally depriving us of our legal rights.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe lack of avenues enabling fishers to implement rules restricts their ability to co-manage the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants underlined the partial engagement of fishers in monitoring (GS5a), biophysical changes (GS5b), and the infrequent enforcement of sanctions (GS5c) as the most critical barriers to effective fishery governance, highlighting the leaseholder\u0026rsquo;s reluctance to care for fishery resources over maximizing profits. Fisheries rules for monitoring and sanctioning are established through a top-down co-management process, resulting in minimal collective participation among fishers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eChallenges for Interactions and Outcomes in the Co-management and Fishers\u0026rsquo; Resilience\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants identified overharvesting (I1a) as a substantial threat to the fishery\u0026rsquo;s long-term ecological stability and fishers\u0026rsquo; livelihood, noting that higher management expenses motivated the leaseholder to obtain a quick return from the fishery. The success of co-management can also be restrained by fishers\u0026rsquo; limited access to management activities (I2a) and deliberation processes (I3a) for negotiating issues that arise. Fishers\u0026rsquo; lack of participation in fishery activities is said to restrict their ability to address co-management challenges.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab7\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 7\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Interactions (I)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI1a: Adverse effects of harvesting on SES\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverharvesting leads to fishery degradation and the extinction of fish species.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI2a: Limited access to information\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTJMSS committee shares limited information with fishers about fish availability, total catch, profit, time of catching and selling fish, and the fishery\u0026rsquo;s most productive areas.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI3a: Issue-specific deliberation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTJMSS involves fishers in the deliberation when problems arise with locals in the fishery.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI4a: Conflict among fishery users\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConflicts among fishers arise due to unequal rights and participation in fishery management. Fishers receive little payment, while committee members receive better payment for maintaining good relations with the leaseholder. The leaseholder provides fishers a sack of rice twice a year for each fisher, cash, funds for home repairs and children\u0026rsquo;s marriages, and salaried jobs in the fishery to minimize conflicts\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI4b: Conflict with externals\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers have conflicts with local groups that demand benefits and illegally catch fish. Fish catching by landowners in the fishery border often creates tension with fishers. The leaseholder controls the larger wetland area beyond the fishery, which leads to conflicts with local people who fish in the open wetlands. He negotiates with local influential people and groups to manage tension.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eI5a: Lacking self-organization\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers have failed to form a cooperative to obtain the lease and manage the fishery independently. Their self-organization remains weak due to a lack of effective collective action and engagement. Fishers self-organize ways to monitor the fishery and punish illegal fishing, such as seizing nets, consulting with local people who catch fish without approval, and working with law enforcement agencies to penalize deviators.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants cited the unequal distribution of power and profits as the primary source of conflict between fishers in co-management (I4a). They also reported that illegal fishing was the primary source of conflict with outsiders (I4b), suggesting that influential local individuals and groups attempted to plunder the fishery. Additionally, neighboring landowners attempted to catch fish from the fishery using \u003cem\u003echai\u003c/em\u003e (bamboo or plastic fish traps) and to obstruct the fishery's water with tarpaulin dams during the dry season. The leaseholder\u0026rsquo;s exploitative approach further intensifies conflicts within the larger community. The president of VTMSS narrates:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe leaseholder is entitled to catch fish within the fishery area, but they forcibly occupy the entire haor. He has managed law enforcement agencies (OC, UNO, SP-Police Superintendent of the district, DC) to support him in controlling the haor in exchange for tributes (fish, money). Many people from 18 villages near Shanir Haor left the area due to violent retribution for fishing. At least 20\u0026ndash;25 people have been hospitalized due to this brutality.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCo-management has failed to establish local fishers\u0026rsquo; rights in wetland fisheries. Fishers, therefore, show low levels of collective action to self-organize the fishery (I5a). Informants considered their limited independence in managing the fishery as a barrier to establishing rights.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab8\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 8\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird-Tier Variables Derived from Second-Tier Variables of Outcomes (O)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers\u0026rsquo; perceived challenges\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO1a: Inefficiency\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAbsence of collective activities to address the effects of indiscriminate harvesting and habitat destruction.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO1b: Inequity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBenefits of the fishery are unequally distributed.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO1c: Unaccountability\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSeveral committee members influence decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO1d: Low socioeconomic sustainability\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers fail to earn a stable income from fishing to support their families.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO2a: Lower environmental sustainability\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBogiani fishery\u0026rsquo;s productivity has been declining. It shows significant species extinction due to insufficient efforts to restore deteriorating ecosystems.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO2b: Lower habitat conservation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNo steps are taken to excavate, prevent water pollution, or restore the natural food cycle. Fish habitat has degraded due to reduced nutrients, broken food chains, and pollution.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO2c: Lower resilience\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBogiani shows a lower ability to withstand social-ecological disturbances that hamper fish production and fishers\u0026rsquo; earnings. Declining resources and habitat damage weaken its resilience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eO3a: Lower interchange between Bogiani and other SESs\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers catch juvenile fish and kill non-fish species (crabs, snails) while fishing. Bogiani has partial interchange with other SESs (e.g., tourism, fish processing plants) in the area. Tourism has not flourished as an enterprise, yet it pollutes the fishery and neighboring areas through plastic and other liquid and solid waste. There are no fishery-based industries in the area.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eThe limited outcomes tied to reduced catches and shared activities addressing ecological changes (O1a), inequality (O1b), partial involvement in the fishery association (O1c), and socioeconomic vulnerability (O1d) reflect fishers\u0026rsquo; failure to sustain Bogiani. The president of TJMSS states:\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf the government provided us with a loan of BDT 9\u0026ndash;10\u0026nbsp;million (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e80,000) under TJMSS, we could stand on our own feet. Although we have legs, we cannot walk on our own feet. The leaseholder takes most of the profit, but we cannot raise questions loudly.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe weak organization among fishers hinders their ability to address social-ecological challenges in co-management. Fishers\u0026rsquo; co-management activities may be restrained by species decline (O2a), damage to the fishery environment (O2b), and the fishery\u0026rsquo;s diminishing ability to tackle disruptions (O2c), which reflects habitat disruption by environmental factors. Informants considered Bogiani to be ecologically declining, noting its reduced interaction with neighboring fisheries and other SESs (O3a).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe data show that socio-economic-political (S) and ecological (ECO) settings externally constrain fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience in the Tahirpur area. Fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to lease and manage fisheries is hindered by their low incomes (S2a), limited livelihood diversity (S2c), and broader inequality (S2b) in the area (Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Newaz and Rahman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Livelihood insecurity prompts local people (S1a, S1b, S1c) to fish extensively in the larger wetland area for about half a year, resulting in long-term depletion of fishery resources. Overharvesting by a growing population (S1) is said to limit fishers' ability to earn from fisheries (Clay and Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Tima et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, fishers receive inadequate government services (S2d) to reduce their economic hardships. It is observed that fishers\u0026rsquo; socioeconomic weaknesses in managing leasing and operational expenses allow wealthy and influential individuals (S2) to control fisheries (Allison and Badjeck, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, the existing top-down political structure (S3a) and discrepancies between national fisheries resource policy and local practices (S4a) favor influential persons in capturing fisheries (Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Sultana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The influential often use a local fishers\u0026rsquo; cooperative to lease a fishery, which usually leads to contradictions with other local groups (S3c). They evade established rules (S3b) and policies (S4b) governing fisheries. As noted by the UNO, \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eFishers are not able to bear expenses and, even if they can obtain the fishery, they cannot maintain it.\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile the market value (S5a) of fish is rising, the reluctance to take steps to preserve resources (S5b) deteriorates the fishery environment and fishers\u0026rsquo; livelihoods. Moreover, ecological changes (ECO1a) and agricultural water pollution (ECO2a) affect the resilience of both fishers and fisheries in the region. These results align with studies (Clay and Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Sultana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) that highlight ecological changes as constraints for co-management. Bogiani has failed to promote (ECO3a) adjoining wetland fisheries in the area. The deteriorating biophysical settings of the fishery (RS), along with unclear borders on two sides and a lack of distinct sanctuaries and harvesting places (RS1a), hinder the fishery\u0026rsquo;s ability to sustain fish species (RS2a). Fishers cultivate and harvest fish without establishing new amenities (RS3a) in the fishery. Their overharvesting disrupts fish production in the fishery (RS4a). Fishery\u0026rsquo;s productivity is primarily constrained by fish food scarcity, sedimentation, and rising temperature (RS4b). These repeated threats (RS5a) interrupt fish production, quality, diversity, and nutrition (RS5b) in Bogiani. Fishers cannot connect the decline in fish production to the biophysical changes in the fishery (RS6a). These difficulties weaken fisheries\u0026rsquo; ability to regain productivity (RS7a) (Aswani, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Clay and Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdditionally, restricted fish movement (RU1a) within and outside the fishery during both the rainy and dry seasons slows growth (RU2a) and spawning (RU3a) in Bogiani. Although wetland fish prices (RU4a) are increasing, the environmental and cultural importance of Bogiani (RU4b) is decreasing. Ecological degradation diminishes catches, taste, size, and color of wetland fish (RU6a) in the fishery. Environmental changes hinder fishers' ability to predict shifting fish behavior and distribution throughout the fishery (RU7a). Although the leaseholder overexploits fish (RU5a) for profit, fishers\u0026rsquo; earnings remain uncertain. This situation is pressing many fishers to leave their hereditary fishing profession. Despite sharing a common cultural background and interests, hardships and the dominance of non-fishers over fisheries weaken fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to co-manage fisheries. These results contrast with existing studies (Carrillo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; London et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) that consider the absence of cultural homogeneity as a barrier to co-management.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants feel excluded from co-management (GS1a) because the leaseholder dictates day-to-day activities (GS4a) and collective choices (GS4b), highlighting contradictions between formal and fishers\u0026rsquo; customary rules. The lack of mechanisms to resolve conflicts between regulations limits fishers\u0026rsquo; rights in the fishery (Allison and Badjeck, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Carrillo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Hossain and Rabby, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Exclusion in the establishment and implementation of rules (GS2a) limits fishers\u0026rsquo; organizational capacity for co-management. A non-fisher controls the property rights (GS3a) in Bogiani. The formal rules often ignore informal rules (GS4c) in fisheries co-management. Fishers are not well-organized in administering Bogiani (GS5a). They partially understand the biophysical changes (GS5b) that affect fish production in the fishery. The leaseholder usually applies negotiation (GS5c) to resolve problems with locals in Bogiani.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFishers (A1a) with government officials (A1b) fail to manage the fishery jointly to ensure their livelihoods. The lower social position (A2a, A2b) restricts fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to lease and co-manage Bogiani. Fishers encounter declining catch, dispossession of management rights, and clashes with local communities (A3a) in co-managing Bogiani (A3b). They face difficulty maintaining the fishery from several kilometers away from homes (A3a). Informants state that TJMSS leadership assists the leaseholder in managing Bogiani in their own interests (A4a). This exclusion hinders fishers\u0026rsquo; development of co-management skills (Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Sultana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Fishers demonstrate limitations in leveraging their community ties to gather support for co-managing the fishery (A5a) (Hossain and Banik, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). They apply their local knowledge to maximize profit from fishing (A6a) (Mondal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Pukkalla and Rama Mohan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Overharvesting for profit (I1a) damages habitats and species diversity. However, fishers receive a small benefit and work as day laborers for some in the fishery. The leaseholder involves only fishers in resolving conflicts among fishers (I4a) and with locals (I4b) in co-management (Allison and Badjeck, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Sultana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInformants reported being detached from information (I2a) and deliberation (I3a) for co-management. This situation constrains fishers from self-organizing the fishery (I5a). Fishery\u0026rsquo;s inferior social performance (O1d) is the failure to provide fishers with sustainable earnings. They fail to address social-ecological challenges (O1a) in co-managing Bogiani and their livelihoods. The leaseholder, with few TJMSS members, controls the fishery (O1c) and its benefits (O1b). Nevertheless, catches in Bogiani continue to diminish due to environmental degradation (O2a). The fishery habitat (O2b) fails to recover from environmental changes (O2c). Bogiani has limited interactions with other SESs in the Tahirpur area (O3a). These findings are similar to recent studies (Clay and Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Fagun and Rishan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) that highlight the marginalization of fishers and their socioeconomic challenges in fisheries co-management.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study investigated wetland fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience to the challenges associated with co-management. Findings revealed that fishers are excluded from the co-management of fisheries due to localized social-economic-political conditions characterized by socioeconomic weaknesses and hierarchical political processes. Fishers\u0026rsquo; management ability was also impeded by the declining fishery ecosystem, due to the enduring social-ecological disturbances faced by fishers. The leaseholder showed no desire to prioritize improving the fishery environment over profits, forcing many fishers to seek employment elsewhere because their earnings from fishing were inadequate. The leaseholder\u0026rsquo;s dominance and hardships have limited fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to utilize their cultural unity for co-management. Furthermore, TJMSS leadership supports the leaseholder, undermining the fishers\u0026rsquo; potential to manage the fishery. Although fishers are the legitimate users of the Bogiani fishery, the leaseholder has complete control over everyday activities and decisions to maintain the fishery. Existing formal rules supersede local rules in co-management. Fishers\u0026rsquo; continued low income and participation indicate the failure of co-management at the Bogiani. However, these results were obtained from a limited number of informants, which may limit their generalizability to broader wetland areas. A larger group of informants representing a wider wetland area may strengthen the generalizability of these results to other wetland fisheries of the country. The policy implications for fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience must emphasize the obstacles they face in building the capacity to address the co-management challenges discussed. Future studies can focus on co-management policy issues to generate novel ideas and approaches for enabling fishers to manage wetland fisheries sustainably in the long term.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAH developed the research idea, designed the study framework, and carried out the fieldwork, including interviews and group discussions with the fishing community. He also led the analysis of the qualitative data and prepared all related figures and tables. NHS contributed to shaping the conceptual and theoritical framework including methodological directions of the paper, and provided critical guidance in refining the interpretation of the findings. She also strengthened the clarity, coherence, and academic rigour of the manuscript through several rounds of revision. Both AH and NHS worked closely in drafting and polishing the paper, and both authors approved the final version submitted.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAllen, C. R., Birge, H. E., Angeler, D. G., Arnold, C. A., Chaffin, B. C., DeCaro, D. A., \u0026hellip; Gunderson, L. (2018). Quantifying uncertainty and trade-offs in resilience assessments. \u003cem\u003eEcology and Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e23\u003c/em\u003e(1).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAllison, E. H., \u0026amp; Badjeck, M. C. (2004). Fisheries co-management in inland waters: A review of international experience. \u003cem\u003eSustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme: FAO \u0026amp; DFID\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAngeler, D. G., \u0026amp; Allen, C. R. (2016). Quantifying resilience. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Applied Ecology\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e53\u003c/em\u003e(3), 617\u0026ndash;624.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eArmitage, D. R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R. I., Charles, A. T., Davidson-Hunt, I. J., \u0026hellip; Wollenberg, E. K. (2009). Adaptive co-management for social\u0026ndash;ecological complexity. \u003cem\u003eFrontiers in Ecology and the Environment\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e7\u003c/em\u003e(2), 95\u0026ndash;102. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1890/070089\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1890/070089\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAswani, S. (2020). New Directions in Maritime and Fisheries Anthropology. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Anthropologist\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e122\u003c/em\u003e(3), 473\u0026ndash;486.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBaggio, J. A., K. Brown, and D. Hellebrandt. (2015). Boundary object or bridging concept? A citation network analysis of resilience. \u003cem\u003eEcology and Society 20\u003c/em\u003e(2):2. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://dx.doi.org/10.5751/es-07484-200202\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.5751/es-07484-200202\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBanglapedia. (2020).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRetrieved from \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Tahirpur_Upazila\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Tahirpur_Upazila\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2021). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Bangladesh 2019\u0026ndash;2020 (Final). Retrieved from \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e1a6e0/2021-08-05-12-21-15e3fce9b1bbffd5bcdba9f0d0bd7fab.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2020). Poverty maps of Bangladesh 2016: key findings. Retrieved from\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/5695ab85_1403_483a_afb4_26dfd\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/5695ab85_1403_483a_afb4_26dfd\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e767df18/2021-02-22-16-57-c64fb3d272175e7efea0b02de6a23eaa.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2019). General features and environment: rainfall and temperature. Retrieved from\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ehttps://bbs.\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003eportal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b2db8758_8497_412c_a9ec_6bb\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b2db8758_8497_412c_a9ec_6bb\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e299f8b3ab/2020-09-17-15-30-d0e641b2e659019f2aa44cbaf628caa8.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2017). Preliminary Report on Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016. Retrieved from \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f1a6e0/HIES%20Preliminary%20Report%202016.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://bbs.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/bbs.portal.gov.bd/page/b343a8b4_956b_45ca_872f_4cf9b2f1a6e0/HIES%20Preliminary%20Report%202016.pdf\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2013). Population and Housing Census 2011. Retrieved from \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttp://203.112.218.65:8008/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/PopCen2011/COMMUNITY_Sunamganj.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://203.112.218.65:8008/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/PopCen2011/COMMUNITY_Sunamganj.pdf\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). (2013). District Statistics 2011, Sunamganj,\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBangladesh. Retrieved from http://203.112.218.65:8008/\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003eWebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/District%20Statistics/Sunamganj.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/District%20Statistics/Sunamganj.pdf\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBraun, V., \u0026amp; Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. \u003cem\u003eQualitative research in psychology\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e3\u003c/em\u003e(2), 77\u0026ndash;101.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCarrillo, I. C., Partelow, S., Madrigal-Ballestero, R., Schl\u0026uuml;ter, A., \u0026amp; Gutierrez-Montes, I. (2019). Do responsible fishing areas work? Comparing collective action challenges in three small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica. \u003cem\u003eInternational Journal of the Commons\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e13\u003c/em\u003e(1).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCinner, J. E., \u0026amp; Barnes, M. L. (2019). Social dimensions of resilience in social-ecological systems. \u003cem\u003eOne Earth\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e1\u003c/em\u003e(1), 51\u0026ndash;56.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eClay, P. M., \u0026amp; Olson, J. (2008). Defining\" fishing communities\": vulnerability and the Magnuson-Stevens fishery conservation and management act. \u003cem\u003eHuman Ecology Review\u003c/em\u003e, 143\u0026ndash;160.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDoF. 2018. \u003cem\u003eYearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh, 2017-18\u003c/em\u003e. Fisheries Resources Survey System (FRSS), Department of Fisheries. Bangladesh: Ministry of Fisheries, 2018. Volume \u003cem\u003e35\u003c/em\u003e: p. 129.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFabinyi, M., Evans, L., \u0026amp; Foale, S. J. (2014). Social-ecological systems, social diversity, and power: insights from anthropology and political ecology. \u003cem\u003eEcology and society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e19\u003c/em\u003e(4).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFagun, I. A., \u0026amp; Rishan, S. T. (2023). 5. Untangling the Complexities of Tanguar Haor Fisheries\u0026rsquo; Social-Ecological System through Ostrom\u0026rsquo;s SES Framework. \u003cem\u003eSmall in Scale Big in Contributions\u003c/em\u003e, 48.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFolke, C. (2016). Resilience (republished). \u003cem\u003eEcology and Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e21\u003c/em\u003e(4).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHossain, M. A., \u0026amp; Banik, A. K. (2022). What drives the resilience of wetland-dependent fishermen? Social determinants of co-management in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eEnvironmental Development\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e42\u003c/em\u003e, 100668.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHossain, M.A., Rabby, A.A., 2019. Institutional constraints to fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience: community based fishery management in Bangladesh. Int. J. Commons 13 (1), 507\u0026ndash;527.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eIslam, G. M. N., Yew, T. S., \u0026amp; Viswanathan, K. K. (2014). Poverty and livelihood impacts of community based fisheries management in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eOcean \u0026amp; coastal management\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e96\u003c/em\u003e, 123\u0026ndash;129.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLondon, S., Rojas, M., Martin, M. I., Scordo, F., Cisneros, M. A. H., Bustos, M. L., \u0026hellip; Piccolo, M. C. (2017). Characterization of an artisanal fishery in Argentina using the social-ecological systems framework. \u003cem\u003eInternational Journal of the Commons\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e11\u003c/em\u003e(1).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLozano, A. J. G., \u0026amp; Heinen, J. T. (2016). Identifying drivers of collective action for the co-management of coastal marine fisheries in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica. \u003cem\u003eEnvironmental management\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e57\u003c/em\u003e(4), 759\u0026ndash;769.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMarshall, N. A., \u0026amp; Marshall, P. A. (2007). Conceptualizing and operationalizing social resilience within commercial fisheries in northern Australia. \u003cem\u003eEcology and society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e12\u003c/em\u003e(1).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMcGinnis, M. D., \u0026amp; Ostrom, E. (2014). Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing challenges. \u003cem\u003eEcology and Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e19\u003c/em\u003e(2).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMondal, P., Glaser, M., Nishat, A., \u0026amp; Breckwoldt, A. (2010). Co-management approach on fisher group: A case study on Ramsar site, Tanguar haor in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eBangladesh Journal of Fisheries Research\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNewaz, M. W., \u0026amp; Rahman, S. (2019). Wetland resource governance in Bangladesh: An analysis of community-based co-management approach. \u003cem\u003eEnvironmental Development\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e32\u003c/em\u003e, 100446.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePartelow, S., \u0026amp; Boda, C. (2015). A modified diagnostic social-ecological system framework for lobster fisheries: case implementation and sustainability assessment in Southern California. \u003cem\u003eOcean \u0026amp; Coastal Management\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e114\u003c/em\u003e, 204\u0026ndash;217.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePartelow, S., Glaser, M., Solano Arce, S., Barboza, R. S. L., \u0026amp; Schl\u0026uuml;ter, A. (2018). Mangroves, fishers, and the struggle for adaptive comanagement: applying the social-ecological systems framework to a marine extractive reserve (RESEX) in Brazil. \u003cem\u003eEcology and Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e23\u003c/em\u003e(3).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePellowe, K. E., \u0026amp; Leslie, H. M. (2020). The interplay between formal and informal institutions and the potential for co-management in a Mexican small-scale fishery. \u003cem\u003eMarine Policy\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e121\u003c/em\u003e, 104179.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePope, K. L., Allen, C. R., \u0026amp; Angeler, D. G. (2014). Fishing for resilience. \u003cem\u003eTransactions of the American Fisheries Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e143\u003c/em\u003e(2), 467\u0026ndash;478.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePukkalla, D., \u0026amp; Rama Mohan, K. R. (2021). Local knowledge and marine livelihoods among the South Indian fishing community. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Asian and African Studies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e56\u003c/em\u003e(3), 549\u0026ndash;557.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSaid, A., Chuenpagdee, R., Aguilar-Perera, A., Arce-Ibarra, M., Gurung, T. B., Bishop, B., \u0026hellip; Jentoft, S. (2019). The Principles of Transdisciplinary Research in Small- Scale Fisheries. In R. Chuenpagdee \u0026amp; S. Jentoft (Eds.), \u003cem\u003eTransdisciplinarity for Small-Scale Fisheries Governance\u003c/em\u003e (Vol. \u003cem\u003e21\u003c/em\u003e, pp. 411\u0026ndash;431). \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94938-3_22\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1007/978-3-319-94938-3_22\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSalomon, A. K., Quinlan, A. E., Pang, G. H., Okamoto, D. K., \u0026amp; Vazquez-Vera, L. (2019). Measuring social-ecological resilience reveals opportunities for transforming environmental governance. \u003cem\u003eEcology and Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e24\u003c/em\u003e(3).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSatumanatpan, S., \u0026amp; Pollnac, R. (2020). Resilience of small-scale fishers to declining fisheries in the gulf of Thailand. \u003cem\u003eCoastal Management\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e48\u003c/em\u003e(1), 1\u0026ndash;22.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSultana, M. A., Pandit, D., Barman, S. K., Tikadar, K. K., Tasnim, N., Fagun, I. A., \u0026hellip; Kunda, M. (2022). A review of fish diversity, decline drivers, and management of the Tanguar Haor ecosystem: A globally recognized Ramsar site in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eHeliyon\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e8\u003c/em\u003e(11).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThompson, P. M., Sultana, P., \u0026amp; Islam, N. (2003). Lessons from community based management of floodplain fisheries in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eJournal of environmental management\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e69\u003c/em\u003e(3), 307\u0026ndash;321.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTima, T. A., Schneider, P., Chanda, S. K., Mozumder, M. M. H., Hossain, M. M., Begum, A., \u0026amp; Shamsuzzaman, M. M. (2021). Analyses implementation realities of legal frameworks for sustainable management of Tanguar haor fisheries resources in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eSustainability\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e13\u003c/em\u003e(16), 8784.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Co-management challenges, Bogiani Wetland fishery social-ecological system (SES), SESF framework, Fishers’ resilience, Bangladesh","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8160162/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8160162/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eA social-ecological system framework (SESF) is employed to analyze fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience to social-ecological challenges in co-managing the Bogiani fishery\u0026rsquo;s social-ecological system (SES). This study uses in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to provide an in-depth assessment of fishers\u0026rsquo; resilience to co-management challenges. Results indicate that socioeconomic adversities and local hierarchical political processes mainly restrict fishers\u0026rsquo; ability to address these challenges. Specifically, fishers seek assistance from well-off individuals to co-manage the fishery due to their inability to cover high maintenance costs and the competitive leasing process. This allows the wealthy and influential to capture the fishery. Moreover, overharvesting and declining biophysical settings prevent fishers from growing the fishery. Fishers also report minimal participation in fishery governance and the creation of formal rules, ignoring their customary practices. Ultimately, co-management has failed to stimulate joint action among fishers to mitigate ecological challenges and achieve sustainable fishery management.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Social-Ecological Analysis of Resilience to Co-Management Challenges in a Bangladeshi Wetland Fishery Community","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-11-28 18:16:44","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8160162/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"570fc482-d595-40b1-b2ac-f2b3f791c1eb","owner":[],"postedDate":"November 28th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-02-23T02:54:45+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-11-28 18:16:44","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8160162","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8160162","identity":"rs-8160162","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}