Behavioral Public Administration and the Implementation of Performance Contracting in Kenya’s Public Universities

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Public universities, as critical institutions in the knowledge economy, have been required to adopt PC frameworks to align their operations with national development goals and to strengthen managerial accountability. Yet two decades into implementation, the effectiveness of performance contracting in universities remains contested. Evidence suggests that compliance has often been mechanical, with reporting geared more toward meeting bureaucratic requirements than achieving substantive institutional transformation. This paper applies the Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) framework to examine how cognitive biases, bounded rationality, incentives, and perceptions of legitimacy shape the implementation of PC in Kenya’s public universities. By problematizing PC as not merely a managerial or institutional reform but also a behavioral challenge, the study highlights how over-optimism bias, present bias, and status quo inertia among university managers influence outcomes. It further shows how performance targets are often framed in ways that privilege short-term visibility over long-term improvement, and how the erosion of trust between universities and oversight bodies undermines the credibility of the reform. The paper argues that embedding behavioral insights into the design and monitoring of PC could enhance compliance, legitimacy, and impact. Specifically, reframing targets, redesigning incentive structures, and fostering narrative legitimacy may help universities move beyond symbolic adoption toward genuine performance culture. Public Administration Behavioral Public Administration Performance Contracting Public Universities Cognitive Biases Accountability Kenya Introduction Performance contracting (PC) has become a central feature of Kenya’s public sector reform agenda since its introduction in 2004. Inspired by New Public Management (NPM) philosophies and global calls for efficiency in public administration, PC was envisioned as a managerial innovation that would inject accountability, transparency, and performance orientation into the operations of state agencies (Florio, 2014). Public universities, as pivotal institutions in national development, were incorporated into this framework with the expectation that they would not only comply with standardized reporting but also demonstrate improved service delivery, quality teaching, and enhanced research productivity. Two decades later, however, the promise of performance contracting in higher education remains contested. While successive government reports present PC as a success story in the wider public sector, studies on universities suggest a more ambivalent picture (Pollitt, 2013). In many institutions, PC has been embraced at the level of compliance but not necessarily internalized as a transformative practice. Annual target-setting, mid-term reviews, and end-of-year evaluations are performed with bureaucratic regularity, yet their substantive impact on the quality of teaching, research, and institutional culture is less visible. Indeed, critics argue that PC has in many cases degenerated into a ritualized exercise, more concerned with satisfying reporting requirements than improving performance outcomes (Taylor, 2013). This disjuncture between design and implementation raises important questions about the behavioral dimensions of reform. Existing analyses of performance contracting in Kenya largely emphasize institutional capacity, leadership deficits, resource constraints, and weak enforcement mechanisms. While these explanations are valid, they risk overlooking a crucial dimension: the cognitive and behavioral factors that shape how reforms are interpreted, adopted, and sustained. Behavioral Public Administration (BPA), which integrates insights from psychology and behavioral economics into the study of public administration, offers a promising lens for re-examining the challenges of PC in universities. BPA directs attention to bounded rationality, cognitive biases, perceptions of legitimacy, and trust dynamics, all of which profoundly influence how policies are enacted on the ground (Lemus & Kovacic, 2022). Problematizing PC through a behavioral lens allows for fresh theoretical and practical insights. For instance, the recurrent tendency of university managers to set ambitious targets despite resource limitations can be understood through the lens of over-optimism bias. Similarly, the prioritization of easily measurable outputs—such as infrastructural projects or student enrollment numbers—over less visible but equally critical outcomes like research quality or student well-being reflects the influence of salience effects. Moreover, the government’s insistence on annual contracts and short evaluation cycles may unintentionally encourage present bias, where universities privilege short-term compliance over long-term institutional development. Another behavioral dimension is the role of trust. Performance contracting relies heavily on good faith between universities and oversight bodies. Yet, trust deficits—fuelled by political interference, inconsistent funding, and perceptions of unfair evaluation—undermine the credibility of the system. When actors doubt that their efforts was recognized or rewarded, compliance becomes symbolic rather than substantive (Edelman & Talesh, 2011). This erosion of trust not only diminishes motivation but also entrenches cynicism, turning PC into a ritual rather than a tool for transformation. Equally significant is the phenomenon of status quo bias, which makes both managers and staff resistant to changing entrenched practices. Universities, as traditionally hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations, often fall back on established routines even when reforms demand innovation. The persistence of mechanical compliance, despite repeated calls for transformative performance management, illustrates how difficult it is to dislodge organizational inertia without attending to underlying behavioral tendencies. This paper therefore seeks to fill a critical gap in the literature by reframing the challenges of performance contracting in Kenya’s public universities through the lens of Behavioral Public Administration. It argues that while structural and institutional explanations are necessary, they are insufficient for understanding why PC has not realized its transformative potential. By highlighting how bounded rationality, cognitive biases, and trust deficits interact with institutional constraints, the paper opens space for designing interventions that are not only technically sound but also behaviourally realistic. The significance of this study lies in its contribution to both theory and practice. Theoretically, it advances BPA scholarship by applying its principles to a relatively underexplored context in Africa—higher education reform in Kenya. Practically, it offers insights that can inform policymakers, university managers, and faculty on how to reimagine performance contracting in ways that foster genuine ownership, legitimacy, and impact. If PC is to move beyond ritualized compliance and become a driver of innovation, quality, and accountability in universities, then behavioral factors must be deliberately integrated into its design and implementation. In what follows, the paper first reviews relevant literature on performance contracting and behavioral public administration to situate the study within existing debates. It then outlines the methodological approach, focusing on qualitative analysis of policy documents, evaluation reports, and narratives from university managers. Subsequent sections analyze the behavioral dimensions of PC implementation, highlighting the roles of cognitive biases, framing, and trust dynamics. The paper concludes by offering policy implications for embedding behavioral insights into Kenya’s higher education reforms. Origins and Evolution of Performance Contracting Performance contracting (PC) emerged in the late 20th century as a central tool in the global movement toward New Public Management (NPM). Faced with inefficiencies, bloated bureaucracies, and public dissatisfaction, governments in both developed and developing countries sought to introduce private-sector performance logic into public service delivery. Performance contracts were conceived as formal agreements between a government and a public agency, outlining performance targets, indicators, and evaluation criteria (Simpson & Buabeng, 2013). Their core purpose was to shift public administration from input-focused processes to output and outcome-oriented management, thereby enhancing accountability and efficiency. The concept gained early traction in countries such as New Zealand, United Kingdom, and France, where performance agreements between ministries and state-owned enterprises formed part of broader reforms. In Africa, the adoption of performance contracting coincided with the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s, which pushed governments to improve fiscal discipline and service delivery under constrained resources. Kenya embraced PC as part of its public sector reform agenda in 2004, initially targeting state corporations before extending the framework to ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). In the education sector, PC was introduced with the dual aim of improving institutional accountability and aligning universities’ operations with national development goals. It was anticipated that PC would enhance managerial professionalism, foster a performance culture, and ensure that universities contributed more effectively to socio-economic transformation. However, as the literature reveals, implementation has often fallen short of these ideals, especially in higher education institutions. Performance Contracting in Kenya’s Public Sector Kenya’s adoption of performance contracting was driven by a desire to reform a public sector historically characterized by inefficiency, weak accountability, and poor service delivery (Mutembei et al., 2014). Early evaluations of PC implementation in ministries and parastatals reported modest gains, including improved service delivery, clearer role definitions, and enhanced managerial focus. Performance contracting was also credited with promoting transparency by introducing measurable indicators and making results publicly available. However, subsequent research has highlighted significant limitations. Many agencies engage in “target manipulation,” setting easily achievable goals to secure favourable evaluations (Mutembei et al., 2014). Others focus narrowly on meeting contractual obligations while neglecting broader organizational objectives. In some cases, performance reporting has devolved into a box-ticking exercise, detached from substantive improvements in outcomes. These patterns reflect what scholars have called ritualistic compliance, a phenomenon where formal adherence to reform procedures masks the absence of meaningful change (Christensen & Lægreid, 2003). Within public universities, PC adoption has been uneven and often symbolic. While most institutions now have annual performance contracts with the government, the quality and relevance of performance indicators vary widely. Emphasis is frequently placed on quantifiable outputs such as infrastructure projects, student enrolments, or graduation rates, with less attention paid to the more complex dimensions of higher education quality, including research impact, curriculum relevance, and knowledge transfer. This tendency reflects broader challenges in translating managerial tools from the corporate world into complex, mission-driven institutions such as universities (Knudsen et al., 2021). Challenges in Performance Contracting in Higher Education The literature identifies several interrelated challenges that have limited the effectiveness of PC in higher education contexts (Chan et al., 2017). First, universities often operate under severe resource constraints that undermine their capacity to achieve contractual targets. Government funding is unpredictable and frequently inadequate, forcing institutions to rely on student fees and donor support. The misalignment between ambitious performance targets and resource realities fosters frustration and disillusionment among university managers and staff. Second, performance contracting frameworks sometimes fail to capture the complexity of academic work (Brown et al., 2018). Teaching quality, research innovation, and community engagement are difficult to measure using simple quantitative indicators. As a result, universities gravitate toward easily measurable outputs, reinforcing a managerialist bias that prioritizes numbers over substance. Third, political interference and shifting policy priorities erode the credibility of the PC system (Samaratunge et al., 2008). Targets are occasionally revised midstream, evaluations are influenced by non-performance factors, and rewards or sanctions are inconsistently applied. This unpredictability discourages long-term planning and weakens the motivational value of PC. Fourth, organizational culture remains a major obstacle. Universities are traditionally collegial, with significant autonomy vested in faculties and departments. The hierarchical, top-down logic of performance contracting often clashes with these norms, leading to resistance, superficial compliance, or outright rejection. These structural and institutional explanations, while illuminating, do not fully account for the persistence of implementation challenges. A growing body of scholarship suggests that behavioral factors—cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and perceptions of legitimacy—play a pivotal role in shaping how performance contracts are interpreted and enacted (Battaglio et al., 2019). Behavioral Public Administration: An Emerging Framework Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) is an emerging field that integrates insights from psychology, cognitive science, and behavioral economics into the study of public administration (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). It challenges the rational-institutional assumptions that underpin much of public administration theory, arguing that public officials and organizations do not always act as rational maximizers. Instead, they are subject to bounded rationality, cognitive biases, social norms, and heuristic decision-making. Key concepts from BPA include overconfidence (the tendency to overestimate one’s capacity to achieve outcomes), present bias (the preference for immediate rewards over long-term benefits), status quo bias (a preference for existing conditions even when change is beneficial), and loss aversion (greater sensitivity to losses than equivalent gains). BPA also emphasizes the importance of trust, legitimacy, and framing effects in shaping policy compliance and public sector behavior. This behavioral turn has been influential in policy design—particularly in the use of “nudges” to improve public service delivery (John, 2016). However, its application to administrative reforms such as performance contracting remains relatively underexplored, especially in the African context. Incorporating BPA into the study of PC offers an opportunity to better understand why reforms stall, why compliance is often superficial, and how behavioral interventions could improve implementation. Recent scholarship suggests that cognitive biases and behavioral dynamics significantly influence how performance contracts are designed, interpreted, and implemented in universities (Ewert et al., 2021). Several patterns are noteworthy. Gaps in the Literature and Contribution of This Study Despite a growing body of work on performance contracting in Kenya, several gaps remain. Most analyses focus on institutional design, legal frameworks, and resource constraints, with limited attention to behavioral dynamics. Few studies interrogate how cognitive biases shape target setting, compliance, or reporting practices. Even fewer examine how perceptions of legitimacy and trust influence the depth and sustainability of reform adoption. Moreover, the literature often treats universities as passive recipients of PC rather than active agents whose decisions are shaped by bounded rationality and behavioral tendencies. This oversight limits our understanding of why PC outcomes vary so widely across institutions, even under similar regulatory frameworks. This study seeks to address these gaps by applying the Behavioral Public Administration framework to the analysis of performance contracting in Kenya’s public universities. It will explore how behavioral factors—overconfidence, present bias, status quo inertia, salience, and trust—affect the implementation process. By integrating documentary analysis with qualitative insights, the study aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of PC as both a managerial and behavioral challenge. The contribution is threefold. First, it advances the theoretical literature by extending BPA to a new empirical domain—higher education reform in a Global South context. Second, it provides practical insights for policymakers seeking to improve PC implementation by highlighting behavioral levers that can be targeted through design and communication strategies. Third, it enriches the broader debate on public sector reform by demonstrating that technical solutions must be complemented by behavioral interventions if they are to achieve lasting impact. Methodology This study adopts a qualitative research design, appropriate for exploring the complex behavioral and institutional dynamics (Farooq, 2024) that underpin the implementation of performance contracting (PC) in Kenya’s public universities. Unlike quantitative approaches that privilege numerical measurement, qualitative inquiry allows for a deeper understanding of meanings, perceptions, and behaviours as they unfold within their social and organizational contexts (Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). Since the central objective of the study is to examine how principles of Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) can illuminate the challenges and opportunities of PC in higher education, the research design emphasizes interpretive analysis rather than statistical generalization. Qualitative design is particularly suited for interrogating the behavioral dimensions of PC—such as bounded rationality, cognitive biases, trust dynamics, and perceptions of legitimacy—which are not easily reducible to quantitative metrics. By privileging narrative accounts, policy documents, and performance evaluation reports, the study seeks to capture the lived realities of actors engaged in the PC process. In doing so, it situates performance contracting not only as a managerial tool but also as a behavioral practice shaped by psychological tendencies and organizational culture. Case Study Approach The study employs a case study methodology, focusing on Kenya’s public universities as a bounded system of analysis. The case study approach is justified for three reasons. First, performance contracting in universities provides a unique opportunity to investigate how a managerial innovation interacts with academic institutions that are complex, collegial, and mission-driven (Bugge & Siddiq, 2021). Second, case study research enables the integration of multiple data sources—including documentary analysis, interviews, and archival records—thereby enhancing the richness and validity of findings. Third, case studies are particularly useful for theory development, allowing for the contextualized application of BPA principles to a specific reform initiative.The study relies on three primary sources of qualitative data: policy and regulatory documents, institutional records, and interviews with key actors. Policy and Regulatory Documents Documentary analysis constitutes a central component of the methodology. Key documents include government policy papers on performance contracting, guidelines issued by the Performance Contracting Department (PCD), annual evaluation reports, and circulars issued to universities. These texts provide insight into the official framing of PC, the evolution of evaluation criteria, and the expectations placed on universities. Importantly, documentary analysis allows the researcher to trace how PC has been institutionalized over time, as well as how targets and indicators have been framed and revised. Institutional Records Universities themselves generate a wealth of material relevant to PC, including signed performance contracts, annual reports, self-evaluation documents, and internal audits. These records reveal how institutions interpret contractual obligations, prioritize certain targets, and represent their performance to external evaluators. They also provide clues about cognitive biases such as overconfidence in target-setting or salience effects in the choice of indicators. By systematically analyzing institutional records, the study seeks to uncover patterns of ritualistic compliance versus substantive engagement with PC principles. Interviews with Key Actors To complement documentary analysis, the study will conduct semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the PC process. These include senior managers such as vice-chancellors, deputy vice-chancellors, registrars, and deans, as well as mid-level administrators charged with compiling PC reports. Additionally, officials from the Performance Contracting Department and the Ministry of Education was interviewed to capture the oversight perspective. Semi-structured interviews are appropriate because they combine flexibility with structure, allowing respondents to narrate their experiences while ensuring coverage of core themes such as trust, legitimacy, and cognitive biases in decision-making. Through interviews, the study will probe questions such as: How do university managers perceive the fairness and credibility of PC evaluations? What cognitive or psychological factors shape target-setting and reporting practices? How do staff interpret the relevance of PC to academic work? These insights was indispensable for applying BPA principles to the Kenyan context. Data Collection Procedures Documentary analysis wasgin with the retrieval of official documents from government archives, university websites, and publicly available reports. Where necessary, formal requests was made to institutions to access internal records. A document analysis protocol was developed to ensure systematic examination, focusing on language, framing, indicators, and implicit assumptions about performance. For interviews, purposive and snowball sampling was employed to identify respondents with rich knowledge of PC. Approximately 25–30 interviews was conducted, depending on saturation. Interviews was recorded (with consent), transcribed, and anonymized to protect confidentiality. Ethical clearance was obtained from the relevant institutional review boards prior to data collection. Analytical Framework Data analysis was guided by a combination of thematic analysis and documentary analysis techniques. Thematic analysis involves identifying, coding, and interpreting recurrent patterns in the data (Harper & Thompson, 2011). Interview transcripts and institutional documents was imported into qualitative analysis software where they were coded for themes related to behavioral tendencies, trust dynamics, compliance behaviours, and perceptions of legitimacy. For instance, statements reflecting overconfidence in target-setting was coded under “over-optimism bias,” while complaints about unfair evaluations was coded under “trust deficit.” Documentary analysis focused on the language and framing of PC targets and evaluations. This approach allows for the identification of salience effects (emphasis on easily measurable indicators), ritualistic compliance (focus on form rather than substance), and status quo bias (resistance to change). By triangulating themes across interviews and documents, the study enhances the robustness of its findings. Application of Behavioral Public Administration Principles The methodological novelty of this study lies in its explicit application of BPA concepts to the analysis of performance contracting. Instead of treating PC as a purely managerial or institutional reform, the study will analyze it as a behavioral phenomenon shaped by bounded rationality, heuristics, and cognitive biases. For example: Over-optimism bias was examined by analyzing whether performance targets are consistently set higher than what resources permit, and how managers justify such commitments. Present bias was assessed by examining universities’ emphasis on short-term, visible outcomes over long-term investments in research and human capital. Status quo bias was investigated by exploring resistance to adopting new evaluation practices or revising entrenched reporting routines. Trust and legitimacy were analyzed through narratives of university officials regarding their relationship with the PCD and perceptions of fairness in evaluations. This analytical orientation positions BPA not as an afterthought but as a central theoretical and methodological lens. Validity, Reliability, and Ethical Considerations Qualitative research is often critiqued for its perceived lack of rigor compared to quantitative approaches (Morse, 2015). To address such concerns, the study employs several strategies to ensure validity and reliability. Triangulation was achieved by integrating multiple data sources—documents, institutional records, and interviews (Santos et al., 2020). Member checking was conducted by sharing preliminary findings with a small group of respondents to confirm accuracy and resonance (Birt et al., 2016). Thick description was employed to ensure that interpretations are grounded in detailed contextual evidence (Younas et al., 2023). Ethically, the study is guided by principles of informed consent, confidentiality, and non-maleficence. All participants were briefed about the purpose of the research, their right to withdraw, and the measures taken to protect anonymity. Sensitive institutional information was handled with discretion to avoid reputational harm. Limitations of the Methodology While the methodology is designed to maximize insight, it is not without limitations. Documentary analysis may be constrained by incomplete access to internal university records, especially where institutions are reluctant to share information. Interviews may be subject to social desirability bias, with respondents presenting favourable accounts of their institutions. Furthermore, the focus on Kenyan public universities limits generalizability to other contexts. However, these limitations are mitigated by the study’s objective, which is not statistical generalization but rather theoretical and analytical contribution to the literature on BPA and performance contracting. The Existing Situation of Performance Contracting in Kenya’s Public Universities Performance contracting (PC) was formally introduced in Kenya in 2004 as part of a broader wave of public sector reforms rooted in New Public Management (NPM) doctrines. Its stated aim was to improve efficiency, accountability, and transparency in government operations. Initially rolled out in state corporations, PC was extended to ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs), including public universities, in the mid-2000s. The introduction of PC in higher education occurred in a context marked by declining public investment in universities, rising student enrolments, and intensifying demands for accountability. Structural adjustment programs of the 1990s had eroded university funding, forcing institutions to diversify revenue sources through self-sponsored programs and donor support. By the early 2000s, concerns about deteriorating quality, declining research productivity, and weak managerial capacity created pressure for reform. The government sought to deploy PC as a mechanism to align university performance with national development goals, particularly those articulated in Vision 2030. Over the past two decades, performance contracting has become entrenched in the governance of universities. Every public university is required to sign annual contracts with the government, specifying targets in areas such as teaching, research, infrastructure development, financial management, and student welfare. These contracts are evaluated at mid-year and end-year stages, with rankings published to signal performance levels across institutions. In practice, performance contracting in universities has followed a highly standardized cycle. At the beginning of each financial year, universities negotiate targets with the Performance Contracting Department. Once contracts are signed, universities are expected to cascade the targets down to faculties, departments, and individual staff through internal work plans. Mid-year reviews monitor progress, while end-year evaluations—conducted by external teams—generate performance scores and rankings. This cycle has created a rhythm of compliance within universities. Managers dedicate significant time to preparing reports, aligning activities with agreed indicators, and ensuring documentation is complete for evaluation teams. On the surface, this demonstrates institutionalization and routinization of PC. However, beneath this ritualized compliance, deeper challenges persist. Universities often treat PC as an externally imposed requirement rather than an internal tool for strategic transformation. The emphasis on rankings and scores reinforces a compliance mentality, where the goal is to avoid embarrassment rather than achieve genuine performance improvements (Behn, 2002). The situation is further complicated by resource constraints. Many universities operate with severe budget deficits, salary arrears, and inadequate research funding. In such contexts, meeting ambitious PC targets often becomes unrealistic. Managers either downscale targets informally, manipulate reporting, or shift attention to indicators that are achievable with limited resources. This dynamic explains why PC outcomes frequently appear more impressive on paper than in lived institutional realities. Behavioral Dimensions of Implementation Challenges While structural constraints are widely acknowledged, behavioral dynamics also shape the existing situation. Overconfidence bias is visible in the tendency of university managers to commit to targets that far exceed available resources, often driven by the desire to signal competence or avoid appearing unambitious. Present bias manifests in universities’ preference for short-term, visible outputs—such as infrastructure projects—that are easily recognized during evaluations, while long-term investments in research or faculty development are neglected. Salience effects influence reporting practices, with universities prioritizing indicators that are simple to measure, such as enrollment numbers or graduation rates. More complex dimensions like curriculum relevance or research impact are sidelined because they require nuanced assessment. Trust deficits between universities and oversight bodies exacerbate the problem. Many managers perceive evaluations as inconsistent, politically influenced, or unfairly benchmarked, leading to cynicism and symbolic compliance rather than genuine engagement. The behavioral dynamics thus reinforce the ritualization of PC. Instead of transforming institutional culture, PC has become a predictable exercise characterized by compliance, reporting manipulation, and strategic avoidance of risk. The regulatory framework for performance contracting in Kenya is centralized and highly formalized. The Performance Contracting Department (PCD), coordinates the entire process. It develops guidelines, negotiates targets with institutions, organizes evaluation exercises, and publishes performance rankings. The Ministry of Education plays a supporting role in aligning university targets with sectoral priorities. Public universities are legally autonomous entities under the Universities Act, 2012, but they remain financially dependent on government funding and subject to strong regulatory oversight. This hybrid governance structure—autonomy in law but dependence in practice—creates tensions in the PC system. On the one hand, universities are expected to demonstrate initiative, innovation, and responsiveness. On the other, they operate within tight regulatory frameworks that leave little room for contextual adaptation of targets. Oversight has been strengthened by the requirement for universities to publish PC results, enhancing transparency and accountability. However, critics argue that the evaluative process is overly standardized and insensitive to institutional diversity. Smaller universities with limited resources are often assessed using the same criteria as large, research-intensive universities, creating perceptions of inequity. This regulatory rigidity contributes to resistance and strategic compliance behaviours. Historical and Contemporary Outcomes The historical trajectory of PC in Kenyan universities reveals a pattern of initial optimism followed by gradual routinization. In the early years, PC was hailed as a transformative reform that would enhance accountability and reposition universities as engines of national development. Government officials and donor agencies celebrated PC as a success story, pointing to improvements in service delivery and managerial discipline. However, with time, enthusiasm waned. As resource constraints deepened and evaluation processes became predictable, universities increasingly approached PC as a bureaucratic requirement rather than a developmental tool. Today, PC continues to shape university operations, but its transformative impact is widely questioned. Contemporary outcomes include increased documentation and reporting, greater transparency through published rankings, and some improvements in managerial planning. Yet the deeper goals of improving teaching quality, research productivity, and institutional culture remain elusive. Universities continue to struggle with strikes, underfunding, and governance crises—suggesting that PC has not fundamentally altered the trajectory of higher education reform. The current situation demonstrates both the achievements and limitations of PC in Kenya’s public universities. On one hand, PC has introduced a culture of accountability, created a framework for monitoring, and signalled government commitment to reform. On the other hand, it has become a ritualized process, undermined by resource deficits, behavioral biases, and regulatory rigidity. From a behavioral public administration perspective, the existing situation can be characterized as a case of “bounded compliance” (Bird & Park, 2016): universities comply with PC requirements within the limits of their cognitive biases, resource constraints, and trust dynamics. The persistence of ritualistic compliance and symbolic engagement highlights the need for a more nuanced approach that incorporates behavioral insights into reform design and oversight. Analysis and Discussion Performance contracting in Kenya’s public universities is often evaluated through a rational-institutional lens that emphasizes structures, rules, and targets. Yet, as the evidence suggests, this framing fails to explain why universities routinely produce impressive reports but struggle with deeper performance outcomes. By applying a Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) perspective, we move beyond the assumption of hyper-rational actors and examine how cognitive biases, heuristics, emotions, and trust relationships shape implementation. BPA helps us recognize that the PC system is not simply undermined by external resource deficits but also by predictable behavioral tendencies (Chater & Loewenstein, 2023). These include overconfidence in target-setting, present bias in resource allocation, and salience effects in reporting. Understanding PC as a behavioral system clarifies why reforms have produced ritualized compliance rather than genuine transformation. Overconfidence Bias and the Illusion of Capacity One of the most consistent patterns in PC implementation is the gap between ambitious commitments and actual outcomes. University managers often negotiate targets that far exceed the institution’s realistic capacity. From a rational perspective, this appears counterintuitive—why would managers knowingly commit to unrealistic goals? BPA offers an explanation through overconfidence bias, where decision-makers systematically overestimate their capacity to mobilize resources, coordinate staff, and overcome constraints. This bias is amplified by reputational incentives: managers fear appearing weak or unambitious in negotiations with the Performance Contracting Department. Committing to modest targets risks being interpreted as incompetence. The result is a paradoxical dynamic: universities publicly embrace ambitious targets to signal competence, but privately develop coping strategies that range from scaling down expectations to manipulating reporting. Thus, the overconfidence bias directly contributes to the ritualization of PC and undermines its intended transformative effect. Present Bias and the Preference for Visible Outcomes A second behavioral pattern evident in Kenyan universities is the prioritization of short-term, highly visible outputs over long-term, less tangible outcomes. This reflects present bias, the tendency to overvalue immediate benefits and undervalue future ones. PC evaluations reward visible projects such as new lecture halls, student hostels, or ICT infrastructure. These are tangible, photogenic, and easily measured. Conversely, investments in faculty development, research capacity, or curricular innovation produce long-term benefits but lack immediate visibility (Wise et al., 2022). Under conditions of resource scarcity and evaluation pressure, managers naturally gravitate toward the short-term. This dynamic explains why universities may invest heavily in capital projects even while struggling to pay salaries or fund research. It also accounts for the stagnation of Kenya’s research productivity, despite PC’s stated emphasis on innovation and knowledge generation. Behavioral insights thus highlight how the design of performance indicators interacts with cognitive biases to skew institutional priorities. Salience, Metrics, and Strategic Reporting Another striking feature of PC implementation is the selective focus on indicators that are easy to measure and report. BPA interprets this as a salience effect—actors disproportionately attend to information that is most prominent, vivid, or straightforward. In universities, indicators such as student enrollment numbers, graduation rates, or financial surpluses are highly salient because they are quantifiable and comparable across institutions. More complex indicators, such as curriculum relevance, quality of pedagogy, or research impact, are less salient and thus receive less attention (Cadez et al., 2017). The outcome is a distorted performance profile in which what is easiest to measure dominates what is most meaningful. Salience also shapes reporting practices. Managers strategically highlight indicators where progress appears strong while downplaying or reframing areas of weakness. This selective attention sustains an image of success that may not align with underlying realities. Thus, salience effects contribute to the symbolic compliance that characterizes the current PC environment. Trust Deficits and Ritualized Compliance Trust plays a central role in the effectiveness of performance management systems (Maley & Moeller, 2014). Where trust between oversight agencies and implementing institutions is high, compliance tends to be substantive and self-enforcing. Where trust is low, compliance becomes symbolic, aimed at satisfying external scrutiny rather than improving performance. In Kenya, trust deficits pervade the PC environment. Many university managers perceive evaluations as inconsistent, sometimes politically influenced, and insensitive to institutional diversity. Smaller, resource-constrained universities often feel unfairly compared to larger, better-resourced institutions. These perceptions erode trust in the fairness of the system. In turn, universities adopt ritualized compliance strategies: producing voluminous documentation, rehearsing evaluation presentations, and showcasing visible projects while masking deeper challenges. This dynamic has been described by some scholars as institutional decoupling, where formal structures exist largely for external legitimacy rather than internal efficiency (Misangyi, 2016). From a behavioral perspective, trust deficits not only distort compliance but also generate cynicism, reducing intrinsic motivation among managers and staff. Instead of fostering a performance culture, PC risks entrenching bureaucratic gamesmanship. Path Dependence and Institutional Lock-in Despite widespread criticisms, performance contracting remains firmly entrenched in Kenya’s higher education sector. This persistence reflects both path dependence and behavioral lock-in. Once institutions have invested in routines, reporting systems, and evaluation cycles, the cost of reversal becomes high (Vayanos & Woolley, 2013). Staff and managers become accustomed to the PC cycle, even if its transformative effect is minimal. Behavioral inertia compounds this institutional lock-in. Managers and policymakers exhibit a status quo bias, preferring to maintain familiar but imperfect systems rather than embrace uncertain alternatives. As a result, the PC system continues largely unchanged, despite mounting evidence of ritualization and diminishing returns. This lock-in illustrates how behavioral and institutional dynamics reinforce each other. A reform initially introduced to disrupt inefficiency has itself become resistant to change, sustained by both bureaucratic routines and cognitive biases. Situating the Kenyan Case in Comparative Perspective The Kenyan experience resonates with international debates on performance management in the public sector. Scholars have noted similar patterns of ritualization and symbolic compliance in countries ranging from France to South Korea. In higher education, performance contracts in Europe often face criticism for encouraging metric-driven behaviours that distort academic priorities (Badiuzzaman, 2025; Basha, 2020). What makes Kenya distinctive is the combination of severe resource constraints, centralized oversight, and behavioral biases. Unlike wealthier systems where performance contracts supplement robust funding, in Kenya they often function in conditions of scarcity and uncertainty. This amplifies present bias and salience effects, as managers focus on surviving immediate evaluation cycles rather than pursuing long-term transformation. Thus, the Kenyan case contributes to global scholarship by illustrating how behavioral insights enrich our understanding of reform dynamics in resource-constrained settings. It shows that PC failures cannot be attributed solely to lack of funds or weak institutions; they also stem from predictable behavioral responses to incentives and oversight. Towards Behaviourally Informed Performance Contracting The analysis suggests that Kenya’s PC system in public universities has reached a critical juncture. While it has achieved some gains in transparency and accountability, its ritualization undermines transformative potential. A behaviourally informed redesign could address these challenges. First, evaluation frameworks should account for behavioral biases. For example, to counter overconfidence, negotiations could involve independent resource assessments that anchor target-setting in realistic baselines. To mitigate present bias, incentives should reward long-term outcomes such as research productivity or graduate employability. Second, salience effects can be redirected by designing indicators that highlight meaningful but less visible dimensions of performance. Peer reviews, student feedback, and tracer studies could complement quantitative metrics, making pedagogy and research impact more salient. Third, rebuilding trust between oversight agencies and universities is critical. Transparent evaluation processes, differentiated benchmarks for diverse institutions, and consistent feedback mechanisms could enhance perceptions of fairness. Finally, flexibility should be embedded into PC design. Allowing universities to contextualize targets within their unique missions and resource realities would reduce ritualization and enhance ownership. The Behavioral Public Administration lens reveals that the limitations of PC in Kenya’s public universities are not merely technical but behavioral. Overconfidence, present bias, salience, and trust deficits interact with institutional structures to produce ritualized compliance. While the PC system has achieved certain procedural gains, its transformative potential remains unrealized. By situating the Kenyan case within global debates, we see that these challenges are neither unique nor insurmountable. A recalibrated, behaviorally sensitive approach could restore PC’s role as a meaningful reform tool rather than a bureaucratic ritual. The discussion thus underscores the value of integrating behavioral insights into the design, oversight, and evaluation of performance management reforms in higher education. Conclusion Performance contracting remains one of Kenya’s most ambitious public sector reforms, yet its uneven trajectory in universities illustrates both the promise and the pitfalls of managerial innovations in complex settings. By applying Behavioral Public Administration, this paper has illuminated the hidden behavioral logics that underlie implementation gaps—overconfidence, present bias, salience, trust deficits, and inertia. The central lesson is that reformers must move beyond the assumption of hyper-rational actors and instead design systems that are attuned to the cognitive and relational realities of managers and institutions. Only then can PC shift from ritualized compliance to genuine performance culture. If embraced, a behaviourally sensitive reform agenda could revitalize PC, enhancing its legitimacy, deepening its impact, and positioning Kenya’s public universities to play their rightful role in national development. Far from being a peripheral consideration, behavioral insights are central to making performance contracting a credible and transformative tool of public sector governance. Declarations Declaration of Interest The author declares no conflict of interest with respect to the research, authorship, or publication of this article. Funding This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Data Availability Statement All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article. Ethical Approval Statement This study was conducted in accordance with the ethical principles outlined by the Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines for ethical research set forth by Tharaka University, Kenya. The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Tharaka University, Marimanti, Kenya, under approval number ISERC04023 . The IRB determined that the study posed minimal risk to participants and adhered to ethical standards for protecting participant rights, confidentiality, and anonymity. All data collection procedures, including semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and document analysis, were conducted with strict adherence to ethical guidelines to ensure respect for participants' autonomy, dignity, and privacy. Informed Consent Statement All participants in the study provided informed consent prior to their participation. 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Inspired by New Public Management (NPM) philosophies and global calls for efficiency in public administration, PC was envisioned as a managerial innovation that would inject accountability, transparency, and performance orientation into the operations of state agencies (Florio, 2014). Public universities, as pivotal institutions in national development, were incorporated into this framework with the expectation that they would not only comply with standardized reporting but also demonstrate improved service delivery, quality teaching, and enhanced research productivity. Two decades later, however, the promise of performance contracting in higher education remains contested.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile successive government reports present PC as a success story in the wider public sector, studies on universities suggest a more ambivalent picture (Pollitt, 2013). In many institutions, PC has been embraced at the level of compliance but not necessarily internalized as a transformative practice. Annual target-setting, mid-term reviews, and end-of-year evaluations are performed with bureaucratic regularity, yet their substantive impact on the quality of teaching, research, and institutional culture is less visible. Indeed, critics argue that PC has in many cases degenerated into a ritualized exercise, more concerned with satisfying reporting requirements than improving performance outcomes (Taylor, 2013). This disjuncture between design and implementation raises important questions about the behavioral dimensions of reform.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExisting analyses of performance contracting in Kenya largely emphasize institutional capacity, leadership deficits, resource constraints, and weak enforcement mechanisms. While these explanations are valid, they risk overlooking a crucial dimension: the cognitive and behavioral factors that shape how reforms are interpreted, adopted, and sustained. Behavioral Public Administration (BPA), which integrates insights from psychology and behavioral economics into the study of public administration, offers a promising lens for re-examining the challenges of PC in universities. BPA directs attention to bounded rationality, cognitive biases, perceptions of legitimacy, and trust dynamics, all of which profoundly influence how policies are enacted on the ground (Lemus \u0026amp; Kovacic, 2022).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eProblematizing PC through a behavioral lens allows for fresh theoretical and practical insights. For instance, the recurrent tendency of university managers to set ambitious targets despite resource limitations can be understood through the lens of over-optimism bias. Similarly, the prioritization of easily measurable outputs\u0026mdash;such as infrastructural projects or student enrollment numbers\u0026mdash;over less visible but equally critical outcomes like research quality or student well-being reflects the influence of salience effects. Moreover, the government\u0026rsquo;s insistence on annual contracts and short evaluation cycles may unintentionally encourage present bias, where universities privilege short-term compliance over long-term institutional development.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAnother behavioral dimension is the role of trust. Performance contracting relies heavily on good faith between universities and oversight bodies. Yet, trust deficits\u0026mdash;fuelled by political interference, inconsistent funding, and perceptions of unfair evaluation\u0026mdash;undermine the credibility of the system. When actors doubt that their efforts was recognized or rewarded, compliance becomes symbolic rather than substantive (Edelman \u0026amp; Talesh, 2011). This erosion of trust not only diminishes motivation but also entrenches cynicism, turning PC into a ritual rather than a tool for transformation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEqually significant is the phenomenon of status quo bias, which makes both managers and staff resistant to changing entrenched practices. Universities, as traditionally hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations, often fall back on established routines even when reforms demand innovation. The persistence of mechanical compliance, despite repeated calls for transformative performance management, illustrates how difficult it is to dislodge organizational inertia without attending to underlying behavioral tendencies.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper therefore seeks to fill a critical gap in the literature by reframing the challenges of performance contracting in Kenya\u0026rsquo;s public universities through the lens of Behavioral Public Administration. It argues that while structural and institutional explanations are necessary, they are insufficient for understanding why PC has not realized its transformative potential. By highlighting how bounded rationality, cognitive biases, and trust deficits interact with institutional constraints, the paper opens space for designing interventions that are not only technically sound but also behaviourally realistic.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe significance of this study lies in its contribution to both theory and practice. Theoretically, it advances BPA scholarship by applying its principles to a relatively underexplored context in Africa\u0026mdash;higher education reform in Kenya. Practically, it offers insights that can inform policymakers, university managers, and faculty on how to reimagine performance contracting in ways that foster genuine ownership, legitimacy, and impact. If PC is to move beyond ritualized compliance and become a driver of innovation, quality, and accountability in universities, then behavioral factors must be deliberately integrated into its design and implementation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn what follows, the paper first reviews relevant literature on performance contracting and behavioral public administration to situate the study within existing debates. It then outlines the methodological approach, focusing on qualitative analysis of policy documents, evaluation reports, and narratives from university managers. Subsequent sections analyze the behavioral dimensions of PC implementation, highlighting the roles of cognitive biases, framing, and trust dynamics. The paper concludes by offering policy implications for embedding behavioral insights into Kenya\u0026rsquo;s higher education reforms.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eOrigins and Evolution of Performance Contracting\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePerformance contracting (PC) emerged in the late 20th century as a central tool in the global movement toward New Public Management (NPM). Faced with inefficiencies, bloated bureaucracies, and public dissatisfaction, governments in both developed and developing countries sought to introduce private-sector performance logic into public service delivery. Performance contracts were conceived as formal agreements between a government and a public agency, outlining performance targets, indicators, and evaluation criteria (Simpson \u0026amp; Buabeng, 2013). Their core purpose was to shift public administration from input-focused processes to output and outcome-oriented management, thereby enhancing accountability and efficiency.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe concept gained early traction in countries such as New Zealand, United Kingdom, and France, where performance agreements between ministries and state-owned enterprises formed part of broader reforms. In Africa, the adoption of performance contracting coincided with the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s, which pushed governments to improve fiscal discipline and service delivery under constrained resources. Kenya embraced PC as part of its public sector reform agenda in 2004, initially targeting state corporations before extending the framework to ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the education sector, PC was introduced with the dual aim of improving institutional accountability and aligning universities\u0026rsquo; operations with national development goals. It was anticipated that PC would enhance managerial professionalism, foster a performance culture, and ensure that universities contributed more effectively to socio-economic transformation. However, as the literature reveals, implementation has often fallen short of these ideals, especially in higher education institutions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePerformance Contracting in Kenya\u0026rsquo;s Public Sector\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eKenya\u0026rsquo;s adoption of performance contracting was driven by a desire to reform a public sector historically characterized by inefficiency, weak accountability, and poor service delivery (Mutembei et al., 2014). Early evaluations of PC implementation in ministries and parastatals reported modest gains, including improved service delivery, clearer role definitions, and enhanced managerial focus. Performance contracting was also credited with promoting transparency by introducing measurable indicators and making results publicly available.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, subsequent research has highlighted significant limitations. Many agencies engage in \u0026ldquo;target manipulation,\u0026rdquo; setting easily achievable goals to secure favourable evaluations (Mutembei et al., 2014). Others focus narrowly on meeting contractual obligations while neglecting broader organizational objectives. In some cases, performance reporting has devolved into a box-ticking exercise, detached from substantive improvements in outcomes. These patterns reflect what scholars have called ritualistic compliance, a phenomenon where formal adherence to reform procedures masks the absence of meaningful change (Christensen \u0026amp; L\u0026aelig;greid, 2003).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWithin public universities, PC adoption has been uneven and often symbolic. While most institutions now have annual performance contracts with the government, the quality and relevance of performance indicators vary widely. Emphasis is frequently placed on quantifiable outputs such as infrastructure projects, student enrolments, or graduation rates, with less attention paid to the more complex dimensions of higher education quality, including research impact, curriculum relevance, and knowledge transfer. This tendency reflects broader challenges in translating managerial tools from the corporate world into complex, mission-driven institutions such as universities (Knudsen et al., 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eChallenges in Performance Contracting in Higher Education\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe literature identifies several interrelated challenges that have limited the effectiveness of PC in higher education contexts (Chan et al., 2017). First, universities often operate under severe resource constraints that undermine their capacity to achieve contractual targets. Government funding is unpredictable and frequently inadequate, forcing institutions to rely on student fees and donor support. The misalignment between ambitious performance targets and resource realities fosters frustration and disillusionment among university managers and staff.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, performance contracting frameworks sometimes fail to capture the complexity of academic work (Brown et al., 2018). Teaching quality, research innovation, and community engagement are difficult to measure using simple quantitative indicators. As a result, universities gravitate toward easily measurable outputs, reinforcing a managerialist bias that prioritizes numbers over substance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird, political interference and shifting policy priorities erode the credibility of the PC system (Samaratunge et al., 2008). Targets are occasionally revised midstream, evaluations are influenced by non-performance factors, and rewards or sanctions are inconsistently applied. This unpredictability discourages long-term planning and weakens the motivational value of PC.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFourth, organizational culture remains a major obstacle. Universities are traditionally collegial, with significant autonomy vested in faculties and departments. The hierarchical, top-down logic of performance contracting often clashes with these norms, leading to resistance, superficial compliance, or outright rejection.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese structural and institutional explanations, while illuminating, do not fully account for the persistence of implementation challenges. A growing body of scholarship suggests that behavioral factors\u0026mdash;cognitive biases, bounded rationality, and perceptions of legitimacy\u0026mdash;play a pivotal role in shaping how performance contracts are interpreted and enacted (Battaglio et al., 2019).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eBehavioral Public Administration: An Emerging Framework\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBehavioral Public Administration (BPA) is an emerging field that integrates insights from psychology, cognitive science, and behavioral economics into the study of public administration (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). It challenges the rational-institutional assumptions that underpin much of public administration theory, arguing that public officials and organizations do not always act as rational maximizers. Instead, they are subject to bounded rationality, cognitive biases, social norms, and heuristic decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eKey concepts from BPA include overconfidence (the tendency to overestimate one\u0026rsquo;s capacity to achieve outcomes), present bias (the preference for immediate rewards over long-term benefits), status quo bias (a preference for existing conditions even when change is beneficial), and loss aversion (greater sensitivity to losses than equivalent gains). BPA also emphasizes the importance of trust, legitimacy, and framing effects in shaping policy compliance and public sector behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis behavioral turn has been influential in policy design\u0026mdash;particularly in the use of \u0026ldquo;nudges\u0026rdquo; to improve public service delivery (John, 2016). However, its application to administrative reforms such as performance contracting remains relatively underexplored, especially in the African context. Incorporating BPA into the study of PC offers an opportunity to better understand why reforms stall, why compliance is often superficial, and how behavioral interventions could improve implementation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRecent scholarship suggests that cognitive biases and behavioral dynamics significantly influence how performance contracts are designed, interpreted, and implemented in universities (Ewert et al., 2021). Several patterns are noteworthy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eGaps in the Literature and Contribution of This Study\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite a growing body of work on performance contracting in Kenya, several gaps remain. Most analyses focus on institutional design, legal frameworks, and resource constraints, with limited attention to behavioral dynamics. Few studies interrogate how cognitive biases shape target setting, compliance, or reporting practices. Even fewer examine how perceptions of legitimacy and trust influence the depth and sustainability of reform adoption.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the literature often treats universities as passive recipients of PC rather than active agents whose decisions are shaped by bounded rationality and behavioral tendencies. This oversight limits our understanding of why PC outcomes vary so widely across institutions, even under similar regulatory frameworks.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study seeks to address these gaps by applying the Behavioral Public Administration framework to the analysis of performance contracting in Kenya\u0026rsquo;s public universities. It will explore how behavioral factors\u0026mdash;overconfidence, present bias, status quo inertia, salience, and trust\u0026mdash;affect the implementation process. By integrating documentary analysis with qualitative insights, the study aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of PC as both a managerial and behavioral challenge.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe contribution is threefold. First, it advances the theoretical literature by extending BPA to a new empirical domain\u0026mdash;higher education reform in a Global South context. Second, it provides practical insights for policymakers seeking to improve PC implementation by highlighting behavioral levers that can be targeted through design and communication strategies. Third, it enriches the broader debate on public sector reform by demonstrating that technical solutions must be complemented by behavioral interventions if they are to achieve lasting impact.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study adopts a qualitative research design, appropriate for exploring the complex behavioral and institutional dynamics (Farooq, 2024) that underpin the implementation of performance contracting (PC) in Kenya’s public universities. Unlike quantitative approaches that privilege numerical measurement, qualitative inquiry allows for a deeper understanding of meanings, perceptions, and behaviours as they unfold within their social and organizational contexts (Garcia \u0026amp; Gluesing, 2013). Since the central objective of the study is to examine how principles of Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) can illuminate the challenges and opportunities of PC in higher education, the research design emphasizes interpretive analysis rather than statistical generalization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eQualitative design is particularly suited for interrogating the behavioral dimensions of PC—such as bounded rationality, cognitive biases, trust dynamics, and perceptions of legitimacy—which are not easily reducible to quantitative metrics. By privileging narrative accounts, policy documents, and performance evaluation reports, the study seeks to capture the lived realities of actors engaged in the PC process. In doing so, it situates performance contracting not only as a managerial tool but also as a behavioral practice shaped by psychological tendencies and organizational culture.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eCase Study Approach\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study employs a case study methodology, focusing on Kenya’s public universities as a bounded system of analysis. The case study approach is justified for three reasons. First, performance contracting in universities provides a unique opportunity to investigate how a managerial innovation interacts with academic institutions that are complex, collegial, and mission-driven (Bugge \u0026amp; Siddiq, 2021). Second, case study research enables the integration of multiple data sources—including documentary analysis, interviews, and archival records—thereby enhancing the richness and validity of findings. Third, case studies are particularly useful for theory development, allowing for the contextualized application of BPA principles to a specific reform initiative.The study relies on three primary sources of qualitative data: policy and regulatory documents, institutional records, and interviews with key actors.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePolicy and Regulatory Documents\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDocumentary analysis constitutes a central component of the methodology. Key documents include government policy papers on performance contracting, guidelines issued by the Performance Contracting Department (PCD), annual evaluation reports, and circulars issued to universities. These texts provide insight into the official framing of PC, the evolution of evaluation criteria, and the expectations placed on universities. Importantly, documentary analysis allows the researcher to trace how PC has been institutionalized over time, as well as how targets and indicators have been framed and revised.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eInstitutional Records\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUniversities themselves generate a wealth of material relevant to PC, including signed performance contracts, annual reports, self-evaluation documents, and internal audits. These records reveal how institutions interpret contractual obligations, prioritize certain targets, and represent their performance to external evaluators. They also provide clues about cognitive biases such as overconfidence in target-setting or salience effects in the choice of indicators. By systematically analyzing institutional records, the study seeks to uncover patterns of ritualistic compliance versus substantive engagement with PC principles.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eInterviews with Key Actors\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo complement documentary analysis, the study will conduct semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the PC process. These include senior managers such as vice-chancellors, deputy vice-chancellors, registrars, and deans, as well as mid-level administrators charged with compiling PC reports. Additionally, officials from the Performance Contracting Department and the Ministry of Education was interviewed to capture the oversight perspective. Semi-structured interviews are appropriate because they combine flexibility with structure, allowing respondents to narrate their experiences while ensuring coverage of core themes such as trust, legitimacy, and cognitive biases in decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThrough interviews, the study will probe questions such as: How do university managers perceive the fairness and credibility of PC evaluations? What cognitive or psychological factors shape target-setting and reporting practices? How do staff interpret the relevance of PC to academic work? These insights was indispensable for applying BPA principles to the Kenyan context.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Collection Procedures\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDocumentary analysis wasgin with the retrieval of official documents from government archives, university websites, and publicly available reports. Where necessary, formal requests was made to institutions to access internal records. A document analysis protocol was developed to ensure systematic examination, focusing on language, framing, indicators, and implicit assumptions about performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor interviews, purposive and snowball sampling was employed to identify respondents with rich knowledge of PC. Approximately 25–30 interviews was conducted, depending on saturation. Interviews was recorded (with consent), transcribed, and anonymized to protect confidentiality. Ethical clearance was obtained from the relevant institutional review boards prior to data collection.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAnalytical Framework\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eData analysis was guided by a combination of thematic analysis and documentary analysis techniques. Thematic analysis involves identifying, coding, and interpreting recurrent patterns in the data (Harper \u0026amp; Thompson, 2011). Interview transcripts and institutional documents was imported into qualitative analysis software where they were coded for themes related to behavioral tendencies, trust dynamics, compliance behaviours, and perceptions of legitimacy. For instance, statements reflecting overconfidence in target-setting was coded under “over-optimism bias,” while complaints about unfair evaluations was coded under “trust deficit.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDocumentary analysis focused on the language and framing of PC targets and evaluations. This approach allows for the identification of salience effects (emphasis on easily measurable indicators), ritualistic compliance (focus on form rather than substance), and status quo bias (resistance to change). By triangulating themes across interviews and documents, the study enhances the robustness of its findings.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eApplication of Behavioral Public Administration Principles\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe methodological novelty of this study lies in its explicit application of BPA concepts to the analysis of performance contracting. Instead of treating PC as a purely managerial or institutional reform, the study will analyze it as a behavioral phenomenon shaped by bounded rationality, heuristics, and cognitive biases.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor example:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eOver-optimism bias was examined by analyzing whether performance targets are consistently set higher than what resources permit, and how managers justify such commitments.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003ePresent bias was assessed by examining universities’ emphasis on short-term, visible outcomes over long-term investments in research and human capital.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eStatus quo bias was investigated by exploring resistance to adopting new evaluation practices or revising entrenched reporting routines.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eTrust and legitimacy were analyzed through narratives of university officials regarding their relationship with the PCD and perceptions of fairness in evaluations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis analytical orientation positions BPA not as an afterthought but as a central theoretical and methodological lens.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eValidity, Reliability, and Ethical Considerations\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eQualitative research is often critiqued for its perceived lack of rigor compared to quantitative approaches (Morse, 2015). To address such concerns, the study employs several strategies to ensure validity and reliability. Triangulation was achieved by integrating multiple data sources—documents, institutional records, and interviews (Santos et al., 2020). Member checking was conducted by sharing preliminary findings with a small group of respondents to confirm accuracy and resonance (Birt et al., 2016). Thick description was employed to ensure that interpretations are grounded in detailed contextual evidence (Younas et al., 2023).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Ethically, the study is guided by principles of informed consent, confidentiality, and non-maleficence. All participants were briefed about the purpose of the research, their right to withdraw, and the measures taken to protect anonymity. Sensitive institutional information was handled with discretion to avoid reputational harm.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eLimitations of the Methodology\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile the methodology is designed to maximize insight, it is not without limitations. Documentary analysis may be constrained by incomplete access to internal university records, especially where institutions are reluctant to share information. Interviews may be subject to social desirability bias, with respondents presenting favourable accounts of their institutions. Furthermore, the focus on Kenyan public universities limits generalizability to other contexts. However, these limitations are mitigated by the study’s objective, which is not statistical generalization but rather theoretical and analytical contribution to the literature on BPA and performance contracting.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe Existing Situation of Performance Contracting in Kenya’s Public Universities\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerformance contracting (PC) was formally introduced in Kenya in 2004 as part of a broader wave of public sector reforms rooted in New Public Management (NPM) doctrines. Its stated aim was to improve efficiency, accountability, and transparency in government operations. Initially rolled out in state corporations, PC was extended to ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs), including public universities, in the mid-2000s.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe introduction of PC in higher education occurred in a context marked by declining public investment in universities, rising student enrolments, and intensifying demands for accountability. Structural adjustment programs of the 1990s had eroded university funding, forcing institutions to diversify revenue sources through self-sponsored programs and donor support. By the early 2000s, concerns about deteriorating quality, declining research productivity, and weak managerial capacity created pressure for reform. The government sought to deploy PC as a mechanism to align university performance with national development goals, particularly those articulated in Vision 2030.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOver the past two decades, performance contracting has become entrenched in the governance of universities. Every public university is required to sign annual contracts with the government, specifying targets in areas such as teaching, research, infrastructure development, financial management, and student welfare. These contracts are evaluated at mid-year and end-year stages, with rankings published to signal performance levels across institutions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn practice, performance contracting in universities has followed a highly standardized cycle. At the beginning of each financial year, universities negotiate targets with the Performance Contracting Department. Once contracts are signed, universities are expected to cascade the targets down to faculties, departments, and individual staff through internal work plans. Mid-year reviews monitor progress, while end-year evaluations—conducted by external teams—generate performance scores and rankings.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis cycle has created a rhythm of compliance within universities. Managers dedicate significant time to preparing reports, aligning activities with agreed indicators, and ensuring documentation is complete for evaluation teams. On the surface, this demonstrates institutionalization and routinization of PC. However, beneath this ritualized compliance, deeper challenges persist. Universities often treat PC as an externally imposed requirement rather than an internal tool for strategic transformation. The emphasis on rankings and scores reinforces a compliance mentality, where the goal is to avoid embarrassment rather than achieve genuine performance improvements (Behn, 2002).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe situation is further complicated by resource constraints. Many universities operate with severe budget deficits, salary arrears, and inadequate research funding. In such contexts, meeting ambitious PC targets often becomes unrealistic. Managers either downscale targets informally, manipulate reporting, or shift attention to indicators that are achievable with limited resources. This dynamic explains why PC outcomes frequently appear more impressive on paper than in lived institutional realities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eBehavioral Dimensions of Implementation Challenges\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile structural constraints are widely acknowledged, behavioral dynamics also shape the existing situation. Overconfidence bias is visible in the tendency of university managers to commit to targets that far exceed available resources, often driven by the desire to signal competence or avoid appearing unambitious. Present bias manifests in universities’ preference for short-term, visible outputs—such as infrastructure projects—that are easily recognized during evaluations, while long-term investments in research or faculty development are neglected.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSalience effects influence reporting practices, with universities prioritizing indicators that are simple to measure, such as enrollment numbers or graduation rates. More complex dimensions like curriculum relevance or research impact are sidelined because they require nuanced assessment. Trust deficits between universities and oversight bodies exacerbate the problem. Many managers perceive evaluations as inconsistent, politically influenced, or unfairly benchmarked, leading to cynicism and symbolic compliance rather than genuine engagement.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe behavioral dynamics thus reinforce the ritualization of PC. Instead of transforming institutional culture, PC has become a predictable exercise characterized by compliance, reporting manipulation, and strategic avoidance of risk. The regulatory framework for performance contracting in Kenya is centralized and highly formalized. The Performance Contracting Department (PCD), coordinates the entire process. It develops guidelines, negotiates targets with institutions, organizes evaluation exercises, and publishes performance rankings. The Ministry of Education plays a supporting role in aligning university targets with sectoral priorities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic universities are legally autonomous entities under the Universities Act, 2012, but they remain financially dependent on government funding and subject to strong regulatory oversight. This hybrid governance structure—autonomy in law but dependence in practice—creates tensions in the PC system. On the one hand, universities are expected to demonstrate initiative, innovation, and responsiveness. On the other, they operate within tight regulatory frameworks that leave little room for contextual adaptation of targets.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOversight has been strengthened by the requirement for universities to publish PC results, enhancing transparency and accountability. However, critics argue that the evaluative process is overly standardized and insensitive to institutional diversity. Smaller universities with limited resources are often assessed using the same criteria as large, research-intensive universities, creating perceptions of inequity. This regulatory rigidity contributes to resistance and strategic compliance behaviours.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eHistorical and Contemporary Outcomes\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe historical trajectory of PC in Kenyan universities reveals a pattern of initial optimism followed by gradual routinization. In the early years, PC was hailed as a transformative reform that would enhance accountability and reposition universities as engines of national development. Government officials and donor agencies celebrated PC as a success story, pointing to improvements in service delivery and managerial discipline.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, with time, enthusiasm waned. As resource constraints deepened and evaluation processes became predictable, universities increasingly approached PC as a bureaucratic requirement rather than a developmental tool. Today, PC continues to shape university operations, but its transformative impact is widely questioned.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eContemporary outcomes include increased documentation and reporting, greater transparency through published rankings, and some improvements in managerial planning. Yet the deeper goals of improving teaching quality, research productivity, and institutional culture remain elusive. Universities continue to struggle with strikes, underfunding, and governance crises—suggesting that PC has not fundamentally altered the trajectory of higher education reform.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe current situation demonstrates both the achievements and limitations of PC in Kenya’s public universities. On one hand, PC has introduced a culture of accountability, created a framework for monitoring, and signalled government commitment to reform. On the other hand, it has become a ritualized process, undermined by resource deficits, behavioral biases, and regulatory rigidity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrom a behavioral public administration perspective, the existing situation can be characterized as a case of “bounded compliance” (Bird \u0026amp; Park, 2016): universities comply with PC requirements within the limits of their cognitive biases, resource constraints, and trust dynamics. The persistence of ritualistic compliance and symbolic engagement highlights the need for a more nuanced approach that incorporates behavioral insights into reform design and oversight.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Analysis and Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003ePerformance contracting in Kenya’s public universities is often evaluated through a rational-institutional lens that emphasizes structures, rules, and targets. Yet, as the evidence suggests, this framing fails to explain why universities routinely produce impressive reports but struggle with deeper performance outcomes. By applying a Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) perspective, we move beyond the assumption of hyper-rational actors and examine how cognitive biases, heuristics, emotions, and trust relationships shape implementation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBPA helps us recognize that the PC system is not simply undermined by external resource deficits but also by predictable behavioral tendencies (Chater \u0026amp; Loewenstein, 2023). These include overconfidence in target-setting, present bias in resource allocation, and salience effects in reporting. Understanding PC as a behavioral system clarifies why reforms have produced ritualized compliance rather than genuine transformation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eOverconfidence Bias and the Illusion of Capacity\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne of the most consistent patterns in PC implementation is the gap between ambitious commitments and actual outcomes. University managers often negotiate targets that far exceed the institution’s realistic capacity. From a rational perspective, this appears counterintuitive—why would managers knowingly commit to unrealistic goals?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBPA offers an explanation through overconfidence bias, where decision-makers systematically overestimate their capacity to mobilize resources, coordinate staff, and overcome constraints. This bias is amplified by reputational incentives: managers fear appearing weak or unambitious in negotiations with the Performance Contracting Department. Committing to modest targets risks being interpreted as incompetence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe result is a paradoxical dynamic: universities publicly embrace ambitious targets to signal competence, but privately develop coping strategies that range from scaling down expectations to manipulating reporting. Thus, the overconfidence bias directly contributes to the ritualization of PC and undermines its intended transformative effect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePresent Bias and the Preference for Visible Outcomes\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eA second behavioral pattern evident in Kenyan universities is the prioritization of short-term, highly visible outputs over long-term, less tangible outcomes. This reflects present bias, the tendency to overvalue immediate benefits and undervalue future ones.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePC evaluations reward visible projects such as new lecture halls, student hostels, or ICT infrastructure. These are tangible, photogenic, and easily measured. Conversely, investments in faculty development, research capacity, or curricular innovation produce long-term benefits but lack immediate visibility (Wise et al., 2022). Under conditions of resource scarcity and evaluation pressure, managers naturally gravitate toward the short-term.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis dynamic explains why universities may invest heavily in capital projects even while struggling to pay salaries or fund research. It also accounts for the stagnation of Kenya’s research productivity, despite PC’s stated emphasis on innovation and knowledge generation. Behavioral insights thus highlight how the design of performance indicators interacts with cognitive biases to skew institutional priorities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eSalience, Metrics, and Strategic Reporting\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAnother striking feature of PC implementation is the selective focus on indicators that are easy to measure and report. BPA interprets this as a salience effect—actors disproportionately attend to information that is most prominent, vivid, or straightforward.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn universities, indicators such as student enrollment numbers, graduation rates, or financial surpluses are highly salient because they are quantifiable and comparable across institutions. More complex indicators, such as curriculum relevance, quality of pedagogy, or research impact, are less salient and thus receive less attention (Cadez et al., 2017). The outcome is a distorted performance profile in which what is easiest to measure dominates what is most meaningful.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSalience also shapes reporting practices. Managers strategically highlight indicators where progress appears strong while downplaying or reframing areas of weakness. This selective attention sustains an image of success that may not align with underlying realities. Thus, salience effects contribute to the symbolic compliance that characterizes the current PC environment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eTrust Deficits and Ritualized Compliance\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTrust plays a central role in the effectiveness of performance management systems (Maley \u0026amp; Moeller, 2014). Where trust between oversight agencies and implementing institutions is high, compliance tends to be substantive and self-enforcing. Where trust is low, compliance becomes symbolic, aimed at satisfying external scrutiny rather than improving performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn Kenya, trust deficits pervade the PC environment. Many university managers perceive evaluations as inconsistent, sometimes politically influenced, and insensitive to institutional diversity. Smaller, resource-constrained universities often feel unfairly compared to larger, better-resourced institutions. These perceptions erode trust in the fairness of the system.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn turn, universities adopt ritualized compliance strategies: producing voluminous documentation, rehearsing evaluation presentations, and showcasing visible projects while masking deeper challenges. This dynamic has been described by some scholars as institutional decoupling, where formal structures exist largely for external legitimacy rather than internal efficiency (Misangyi, 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrom a behavioral perspective, trust deficits not only distort compliance but also generate cynicism, reducing intrinsic motivation among managers and staff. Instead of fostering a performance culture, PC risks entrenching bureaucratic gamesmanship.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePath Dependence and Institutional Lock-in\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDespite widespread criticisms, performance contracting remains firmly entrenched in Kenya’s higher education sector. This persistence reflects both path dependence and behavioral lock-in. Once institutions have invested in routines, reporting systems, and evaluation cycles, the cost of reversal becomes high (Vayanos \u0026amp; Woolley, 2013). Staff and managers become accustomed to the PC cycle, even if its transformative effect is minimal.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBehavioral inertia compounds this institutional lock-in. Managers and policymakers exhibit a status quo bias, preferring to maintain familiar but imperfect systems rather than embrace uncertain alternatives. As a result, the PC system continues largely unchanged, despite mounting evidence of ritualization and diminishing returns.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis lock-in illustrates how behavioral and institutional dynamics reinforce each other. A reform initially introduced to disrupt inefficiency has itself become resistant to change, sustained by both bureaucratic routines and cognitive biases.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eSituating the Kenyan Case in Comparative Perspective\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Kenyan experience resonates with international debates on performance management in the public sector. Scholars have noted similar patterns of ritualization and symbolic compliance in countries ranging from France to South Korea. In higher education, performance contracts in Europe often face criticism for encouraging metric-driven behaviours that distort academic priorities (Badiuzzaman, 2025; Basha, 2020).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhat makes Kenya distinctive is the combination of severe resource constraints, centralized oversight, and behavioral biases. Unlike wealthier systems where performance contracts supplement robust funding, in Kenya they often function in conditions of scarcity and uncertainty. This amplifies present bias and salience effects, as managers focus on surviving immediate evaluation cycles rather than pursuing long-term transformation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThus, the Kenyan case contributes to global scholarship by illustrating how behavioral insights enrich our understanding of reform dynamics in resource-constrained settings. It shows that PC failures cannot be attributed solely to lack of funds or weak institutions; they also stem from predictable behavioral responses to incentives and oversight.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eTowards Behaviourally Informed Performance Contracting\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe analysis suggests that Kenya’s PC system in public universities has reached a critical juncture. While it has achieved some gains in transparency and accountability, its ritualization undermines transformative potential. A behaviourally informed redesign could address these challenges.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirst, evaluation frameworks should account for behavioral biases. For example, to counter overconfidence, negotiations could involve independent resource assessments that anchor target-setting in realistic baselines. To mitigate present bias, incentives should reward long-term outcomes such as research productivity or graduate employability.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, salience effects can be redirected by designing indicators that highlight meaningful but less visible dimensions of performance. Peer reviews, student feedback, and tracer studies could complement quantitative metrics, making pedagogy and research impact more salient.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird, rebuilding trust between oversight agencies and universities is critical. Transparent evaluation processes, differentiated benchmarks for diverse institutions, and consistent feedback mechanisms could enhance perceptions of fairness.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, flexibility should be embedded into PC design. Allowing universities to contextualize targets within their unique missions and resource realities would reduce ritualization and enhance ownership.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Behavioral Public Administration lens reveals that the limitations of PC in Kenya’s public universities are not merely technical but behavioral. Overconfidence, present bias, salience, and trust deficits interact with institutional structures to produce ritualized compliance. While the PC system has achieved certain procedural gains, its transformative potential remains unrealized.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBy situating the Kenyan case within global debates, we see that these challenges are neither unique nor insurmountable. A recalibrated, behaviorally sensitive approach could restore PC’s role as a meaningful reform tool rather than a bureaucratic ritual. The discussion thus underscores the value of integrating behavioral insights into the design, oversight, and evaluation of performance management reforms in higher education.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003ePerformance contracting remains one of Kenya\u0026rsquo;s most ambitious public sector reforms, yet its uneven trajectory in universities illustrates both the promise and the pitfalls of managerial innovations in complex settings. By applying Behavioral Public Administration, this paper has illuminated the hidden behavioral logics that underlie implementation gaps\u0026mdash;overconfidence, present bias, salience, trust deficits, and inertia.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe central lesson is that reformers must move beyond the assumption of hyper-rational actors and instead design systems that are attuned to the cognitive and relational realities of managers and institutions. Only then can PC shift from ritualized compliance to genuine performance culture.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf embraced, a behaviourally sensitive reform agenda could revitalize PC, enhancing its legitimacy, deepening its impact, and positioning Kenya\u0026rsquo;s public universities to play their rightful role in national development. Far from being a peripheral consideration, behavioral insights are central to making performance contracting a credible and transformative tool of public sector governance.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDeclaration of Interest\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe author declares no conflict of interest with respect to the research, authorship, or publication of this article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statement\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical Approval Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study was conducted in accordance with the ethical principles outlined by the Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines for ethical research set forth by Tharaka University, Kenya. The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Tharaka University, Marimanti, Kenya, under approval number \u003cstrong\u003eISERC04023\u003c/strong\u003e. The IRB determined that the study posed minimal risk to participants and adhered to ethical standards for protecting participant rights, confidentiality, and anonymity. All data collection procedures, including semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and document analysis, were conducted with strict adherence to ethical guidelines to ensure respect for participants' autonomy, dignity, and privacy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInformed Consent Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll participants in the study provided informed consent prior to their participation. Participants were fully informed about the purpose of the study, the nature of their involvement, and the intended use of the data collected.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"REFERENCES","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBadiuzzaman, M. D. (2025). \u003cem\u003eUnpacking the metrics: A critical\u003c/em\u003e. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Md-Badiuzzaman-2/publication/393730150_Unpacking_the_metrics_a_critical_analysis_of_the_2025_QS_World_University_Rankings_\u003cbr\u003eusing_Australian_university_data/links/68774f3248b248477c1eeff0/Unpacking-the-metrics-a-critical-analysis-of-the-2025-QS-World-University-Rankings-using-Australian-university-data.pdf\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBasha, F. H. H. (2020). \u003cem\u003eMultiple Dimensions of University Governance and Performance: The Case of UK Higher Education\u003c/em\u003e [PhD Thesis, University of Huddersfield]. https://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/35348/\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBattaglio, R. 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Proposing the \u0026ldquo;MIRACLE\u0026rdquo; Narrative Framework for Providing Thick Description in Qualitative Research. \u003cem\u003eInternational Journal of Qualitative Methods\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e22\u003c/em\u003e, 16094069221147162. https://doi.org/10.1177/16094069221147162\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Behavioral Public Administration, Performance Contracting, Public Universities, Cognitive Biases, Accountability, Kenya","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7891886/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7891886/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003ePerformance contracting (PC) was introduced in Kenya\u0026rsquo;s public sector in the early 2000s as part of a broader effort to enhance efficiency, accountability, and service delivery. Public universities, as critical institutions in the knowledge economy, have been required to adopt PC frameworks to align their operations with national development goals and to strengthen managerial accountability. Yet two decades into implementation, the effectiveness of performance contracting in universities remains contested. Evidence suggests that compliance has often been mechanical, with reporting geared more toward meeting bureaucratic requirements than achieving substantive institutional transformation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper applies the Behavioral Public Administration (BPA) framework to examine how cognitive biases, bounded rationality, incentives, and perceptions of legitimacy shape the implementation of PC in Kenya\u0026rsquo;s public universities. By problematizing PC as not merely a managerial or institutional reform but also a behavioral challenge, the study highlights how over-optimism bias, present bias, and status quo inertia among university managers influence outcomes. It further shows how performance targets are often framed in ways that privilege short-term visibility over long-term improvement, and how the erosion of trust between universities and oversight bodies undermines the credibility of the reform.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe paper argues that embedding behavioral insights into the design and monitoring of PC could enhance compliance, legitimacy, and impact. Specifically, reframing targets, redesigning incentive structures, and fostering narrative legitimacy may help universities move beyond symbolic adoption toward genuine performance culture.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Behavioral Public Administration and the Implementation of Performance Contracting in Kenya’s Public Universities","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-10-21 08:14:56","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7891886/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"bb4c197d-83cb-4d32-bc81-47aeff927ce9","owner":[],"postedDate":"October 21st, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":56513480,"name":"Public Administration"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-10-21T08:14:56+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-10-21 08:14:56","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7891886","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7891886","identity":"rs-7891886","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}