A Fight Against All Odds? The Causal Effects of Perceived Political Efficacy and Protest Repression on Motivation to Engage in Normative and Non-normative Climate Protest

A Fight Against All Odds? The Causal Effects of Perceived Political Efficacy and Protest Repression on Motivation to Engage in Normative and Non-normative Climate Protest | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article A Fight Against All Odds? The Causal Effects of Perceived Political Efficacy and Protest Repression on Motivation to Engage in Normative and Non-normative Climate Protest Marcos Dono, Arin Ayanian, Nicole Tausch This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-4294040/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Despite increasing concern about climate change and widespread demonstrations demanding urgent action, governments worldwide are failing to meet climate pledges and many have introduced anti-protest laws that limit citizens’ ability to hold them accountable. We investigate the impacts of the political efficacy of climate protests and the risks of protest repression on people’s motivation to engage in both conventional, normative and radical, non-normative pro-environmental collective action. We ran two experiments (total N = 443) among residents in the UK, where recent legislative changes have severely restricted climate protests. Using fabricated news articles, we manipulated political efficacy and repression in a 2x2 between-subjects design. Our manipulations successfully shifted perceptions of political efficacy and the risks of repression, however they did not produce direct effects on action intentions. Rather, these factors impacted action intentions indirectly by shaping other motives. Specifically, political efficacy exerted a positive indirect effect on normative (but not non-normative) action intentions by shifting people’s beliefs about the value of their own contribution (Study 1) and the likelihood that taking action will strengthen the movement (Study 2). In line with a backlash effect, and suggesting that restrictions on protest could radicalize action, repression exerted a positive indirect effect on both normative and non-normative action intentions by generating moral outrage. Moderation of effects by climate change concern and politicized identity lend further nuance to these findings. Our research provides scarce evidence of the causal effects of efficacy and repression on protest intentions and has implications for mobilization efforts of climate movements. Introduction After decades of research and civil society advocacy, it seems that in 2024, a collective conscience about climate change and its consequences has finally developed. Most people surveyed in the European Union and China state that they feel the impact of climate change in their daily lives (80% and 91%, respectively; EIB/BVA, 2023). People around the globe also tend to agree that drastic action is needed to avoid a climate-related global catastrophe (84% EU, 88% China, 83% UK, 72% U.S.). In Europe, a notable 66% of the public is in favour of governments passing stricter climate-related laws (EIB/BVA, 2023). Nonetheless, data from the European Values Study analysing the 2017-2022 period show that 41.4% of people would never participate in lawful demonstrations, with only 18% of the population ever participating (EVS, 2022). The latter figures concern protests on behalf of all causes, so we can assume that collective action participation for climate-related issues is even lower. Hence, we are facing a conundrum: people seem to be convinced about the critical situation we are in, yet they are not mobilizing to push for the policy changes they seem to support. This lack of engagement may have crucial consequences. Throughout history, social movements and protests have served as indispensable instruments for a vast array of groups to defend their interests and engender social change (Della Porta & Diani, 2020). It is hard to imagine that the advancements made in matters of race and gender equality, decolonization, LGTBIQ+ rights, or even the strides made so far in climate change mitigation would have existed without sustained pressure from collective action (Hunt-Hendrix & Taylor, 2024; Malm, 2021; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020). Therefore, it seems that protest is a critical tool to hold governments accountable and pressure them to implement impactful climate policies. The pro-environmental movement has gained some momentum in recent years. This spark has been most notable among young people, responsible for creating initiatives like Fridays for Future or the Sunrise Movement, but also among a broader range of citizens represented by groups such as Extinction Rebellion, 350.org, and Citizens’ Climate Lobby (Extinction Rebellion, 2019; Sorce, 2022). Movements such as these have been critical in raising public awareness and in exerting political influence that led to policy changes such as the adoption of renewable energy targets (see Fisher et al., 2023; Gulliver et al., 2022). Nonetheless, the impact of these movements still falls short of what is required to avert irreversible climate breakdown. Many governments continue to actively support the fossil fuel industry and, in the face of conflicting priorities, have started to backpedal on climate pledges (Lakhani & Rushe, 2024). In fact, countries all over the globe are failing to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement (Bearak & Popovich, 2022), leading to increasing pessimism about our ability to limit global warming to 1.5 °C (Scranton, 2015). Disconcertingly, these trends have been accompanied by a wave of anti-protest legislation and police repression of climate protests in countries such as the UK, which have criminalized non-violent protest and restricted citizens’ rights to demand action by policymakers (Forst, 2024). How does the current landscape of seemingly limited effectiveness and increasing repression of climate protests impact people’s motivation to engage in action against climate change? Does a perceived lack of efficacy and repression of protest demobilize engagement, or might it instigate a shift to more confrontational, radical action? In the present research, we aim to shed light on these issues by experimentally examining the roles of the perceived political efficacy of climate action and the likelihood that climate protests are being repressed by the authorities in influencing people’s willingness to engage in collective action. In line with previous research, we define collective action as any action one engages in "as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group" (Wright et al., 1990, p. 995). Thus, collective action ranges from signing petitions and participating in peaceful demonstrations or marches, to more disruptive forms of action such as blocking roads and buildings or damaging property. The question of what motivates people to engage in collective action has been of great interest across the social sciences and has received a substantial amount of research attention in social psychology (for reviews see Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021; Becker & Tausch, 2015; Thomas et al., 2022; van Zomeren et al., 2008). This work has attested to the complexity of this phenomenon and demonstrated that people’s willingness to participate in collective action is shaped by a range of psychological factors. Key among these are a sense of injustice and resulting emotions such as anger and moral outrage (van Zomeren et al., 2008), identification with a social movement (i.e., politicized identification; Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and a strong belief in the efficacy of collective action in achieving the desired change (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2004). Beyond the political efficacy of collective action, research has also highlighted that other considerations, such as the efficacy of protest in building or consolidating a social movement (identity consolidation efficacy; Hornsey et al., 2006; Saab et al., 2015) as well as belief in the value of one’s individual contribution to the cause (participative efficacy; van Zomeren et al., 2013), motivate participation. Recent accounts have further emphasized the importance of moral beliefs that operate largely independently of external rewards, costs, or sanctions (Sabucedo et al., 2018), showing that a sense of moral obligation to act is one of the most potent motives underlying action intentions (Ayanian et al., 2021; Sabucedo et al., 2019; Sabucedo et al., 2018). There is substantial overlap in the predictors of engagement in different forms of collective action as these often emerge dynamically and frequently co-occur during protests (Uysal et al., 2023). Nonetheless, social movement organizations expend much energy debating the efficacy, ethics, risks and legal implications of different actions, as well as whether the direness of the situation calls for more drastic methods (Malm, 2021). Different groups within the climate movement have taken different approaches. For example, Extinction Rebellion, who previously advocated for non-violent, disruptive civil disobedience (Extinction Rebellion, 2019), have recently shifted away from disruptive action in an attempt to limit a backlash from the public (Extinction Rebellion, 2023), while other organizations such as Just Stop Oil have adopted more radical (though non-violent) direct actions such as occupying construction sites, blocking key roads, or attacking famous artworks (BBC, 2019). The variability in strategic approaches underlines the importance of understanding the psychological drivers of intentions to engage in different forms of collective action. Previous research studying factors that explain the (de-)radicalization of collective action has distinguished actions in terms of their normativity concerning societal rules and conventions and suggested that radical forms of collective action are more likely to occur as the perceived efficacy of conventional action drops (Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2014). Thus, as did prior work, we differentiate normative (i.e., action that conforms to the rules and norms of society) from non-normative action (i.e., action that violates these rules; Wright et al., 1990). Social-psychological research has only begun to understand the factors predicting different types of collective action (Li et al., 2023; Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) and none, as far as we know, has experimentally investigated the factors underlying support for non-normative action in the context of the climate movement. The Current Research The present studies experimentally examine the impacts of the expected political efficacy and the expected repression of climate protest on intentions to engage in normative and non-normative climate action. Our research is conducted in the UK, which has several active climate movements and has seen both frequent climate protests and severe repressive measures over the last few years (BBC, 2023; Gayle, 2023 ). We test both the direct causal effects of efficacy and repression on normative and non-normative collective action intentions, as well as their indirect effects through the other key motivators, specifically identification with the climate movement, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, a sense of moral obligation to act for climate change mitigation, and moral outrage as a key emotional antecedent of engagement (Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Lodewijkx et al., 2008 ; Thomas & McGarty, 2009 ). Below we give an overview of key findings regarding the roles of political efficacy and repression in shaping collective action intentions and outline our predictions. Political Efficacy as a Predictor of Collective Action The importance of instrumental motives has long been emphasized in models of collective action (Gamson, 1992 ; Klandermans, 1997 ; Zald & McCarthy, 1979 ). Social psychological research has focused on the belief that one’s group can promote the desired goal and demonstrated that the perceived efficacy of collective action predicts intentions to get engaged (see van Zomeren et al., 2008 , for meta-analytic evidence). As noted above, the anticipated effectiveness of protest can be evaluated along a range of different dimensions (see Hornsey et al., 2006 ; Saab et al., 2015 ). Our main focus here is on the political efficacy of collective action, that is, the belief that collective action will be effective in addressing the movement’s political grievances and achieving the desired policy change (Saab et al., 2014). There is extensive evidence that a sense of the political efficacy of collective action increases motivation to engage (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1999 ; Sabucedo et al., 2019 ; Thomas et al., 2012 ; van Zomeren et al., 2004 ). However, some research found political efficacy to be unrelated or even negatively related to action intentions (Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Cichocka et al., 2018 ; Osborne et al., 2015 ; Tausch et al., 2011 ), suggesting that a sense of political efficacy can activate different motives. For example, the classical literature on mobilization suggested that a sense that protests are effective could generate a free-riding effect, meaning that those who believe that the movement will succeed expect to benefit from the action without having to contribute themselves (Olson, 1965 ). Moreover, studies of collective action intentions in authoritarian countries where there the likelihood that the authorities will give in to the protesters’ demands is remote, found political efficacy to be unrelated to action intentions, while other forms of efficacy (identity consolidation and participative efficacies) played a greater role in predicting engagement (Ayanian et al., 2021 ). Finally, research has demonstrated that political efficacy is negatively related to intentions to engage in non-normative action (Tausch et al., 2011 ), suggesting that a perceived lack of efficacy can have a radicalizing effect. In sum, while much research suggests that a sense of political efficacy is important in mobilising individuals to participate in collective action, there is also conflicting evidence demonstrating that a lack of political efficacy does not necessarily disincentivise participation and may even promote the adoption of more radical, non-normative forms of action. We will consider these alternative possibilities in the present research by experimentally manipulating the political efficacy of pro-environmental collective action. Experimental manipulations of the motivators of collective action are rare in the literature (see Bäck et al., 2013 ; van Zomeren et al., 2004 , for exceptions) and, to our knowledge, have never been applied in the context of climate action. Understanding the impact of information about the political impact of protest on intentions to participate has important implications for the communication and mobilization efforts of social movements. We will also assess the potential indirect effects of efficacy on action intentions, which might operate in opposing directions. For example, low political efficacy of climate protest might produce moral outrage, an established positive predictor of collective action (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016 ; Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Pozzi et al., 2022 ; Sabucedo et al., 2019 ), but might simultaneously reduce a sense of participative efficacy, which undermines engagement (van Zomeren et al., 2013 ). Finally, we will examine whether the extent to which people are concerned about climate change, and the extent to which they are psychologically invested in the climate movement (i.e., their politicized identification) moderate the direct and indirect effects of our manipulation. The Impact of Repression on Collective Action Broadly speaking, repression can be conceptualized as any measure that seeks to "prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional collective action (e.g., protest), including its initiation" (Earl, 2011 , p. 263). This typically refers to institutional structures and actions that restrict political opportunities available to those who challenge the established system (Tarrow, 1993 ). Repression can entail the introduction of laws limiting or prohibiting certain activities, restrictions on the freedom of expression and association, and the introduction of hurdles to the formation of oppositional groups (V-Dem, 2024 ). For individuals, repressive measures increase the potential costs and risks of engagement in collective action through fines, arrests and imprisonment, or physical threats (see Ayanian et al., 2021 ). Repressive measures have always been central in protecting authoritarian regimes (Sika, 2019 ), however, a wave of popular protests in recent years over a range of issues such as austerity measures, women’s rights, and racism (Clayton, 2018 ; Emejulu, 2018 ; Karyotis & Rüdig, 2018 ) have been accompanied by an increase in repression of protests by many governments in democratic countries. Repression has been particularly severe and disproportionate for environmental protests. It has included actions such as the use of water cannons, pepper spray and other painful methods against protesters, the creation of new criminal offences to prohibit certain forms of protest, the use of counter-terrorism laws to enable surveillance, strip searches and extended periods in police custody, as well as harsh sentencing (see Forst, 2024 , for extensive documentation of repression). How do repressive measures impact people’s willingness to participate in collective action? Research on the psychological effects of protest repression on activists and potential sympathizers is relatively novel (see Anisin, 2016 ; Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Ayanian & Tausch, 2016 ; Honari et al., 2018; Uysal et al., 2022 , 2023 ) and has thus far yielded mixed findings. On the one hand, and consistent with the intuitive reasoning about its deterrent effects, repression can undermine protest by reducing perceptions of political opportunity (Klandermans, 1984 ) and instilling fear (Honari, 2018 ), collective action on climate issues was found to be less common among concerned people in more repressive countries (Uysal et al., 2023 ). Nevertheless, research has also supported the opposite relationship, referred to as the 'repression paradox' (Brockett, 1993 ). According to this idea, attempts to repress social movements can produce a backlash effect and fuel rather than deter protest participation when repressive measures are perceived as illegitimate restrictions of fundamental rights (Ayanian et al., 2021 ). Specifically, illegitimate repressive measures create a sense of moral outrage (for evidence, see Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Ayanian & Tausch, 2016 ; Aytaç et al., 2018 ; Brockett, 1993 ; Li et al., 2023 ), an action-oriented emotional reaction felt when something is perceived to violate one’s moral values (Batson et al., 2007 ). Moral outrage is likely to be an even stronger driver of action than other, non-moral emotions (see Lodewijkx et al., 2008 ; Thomas & McGarty, 2009 ) due to the strong defensive drive that perceived moral transgressions generate (Skitka, 2002 ). Furthermore, the violation of critical moral values can prompt people towards more subversive courses of action (Dono et al., 2018 ; Fiske & Rai, 2014 ). Recent research has provided initial support for this idea, showing that repression can radicalize movements (Li et al., 2023 ). Thus, we might expect repression to increase willingness to engage in both normative and non-normative collective actions, and that this effect is at least partially mediated by moral outrage. The present studies experimentally investigate whether perceived repression disincentivises or galvanises environmental protest by manipulating participants’ expectations of repression. Experimental manipulations of perceived repression are scarce (see Aytaç et al., 2018 ; Uysal et al., 2022 , for exceptions) and have, to our knowledge, never been applied to understand the effect of repression on environmental protest. We examine the direct effects of repression on both normative and non-normative collective action intentions, consider its effects on the other motivating variables (moral outrage, moral obligation, identification with the climate movement, and identity consolidation and participative efficacies), and test for repression’s indirect effects on action tendencies via these variables. Based on prior correlational evidence (Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Uysal et al., 2023 ), we expect that repression increases action tendencies by inducing moral outrage. In addition, as prior research demonstrated that moral outrage and moral obligation are linked (Ayanian et al., 2021 ), we will also test for a serial mediation model whereby moral outrage increases action tendencies via a heightened sense of moral obligation to act. Again, we will examine whether the extent to which people are concerned about climate change and the extent to which they identify with the climate movement moderate the direct and indirect effects of repression. Both studies included in the present work received ethical approval from the ethics committee of [BLINDED]. All study materials and measures, and data are publicly available online ( https://osf.io/9fm4x/?view_only=342986a736b8400784c7e53526da80f7 ). Study 1 In the context of current environmental protests in the UK, we conducted an online study with British residents. Our study employed a bifactorial, 2 (lower v. higher repression) x 2 (lower v. higher political efficacy) between-subjects experimental design. We assessed pre-manipulation concern about climate change, the perceived political efficacy of climate protests and the likelihood of risks associated with protesting as manipulation checks, intentions to participate in normative and non-normative collective action as focal outcome variables, and identification with the climate movement, participative efficacy and identity-consolidation efficacy, and moral outrage and moral obligation as additional outcomes and potential mediating variables. Method Sampling We recruited participants by means of diffusion through university websites and social media announcements and allowed participants to enter a raffle for 3 vouchers worth £50. We thus employed an effect size sensitivity analysis, maximizing the available resources and then calculating the minimum effect size that is to be obtained from that sample (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2019 ). Of 175 respondents, six were excluded as they failed an attention check, resulting in a final sample of 169 participants (78.1% female, M age = 21.12; SD = 4.79). A sensitivity analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul et al., 2018 ) for an ANOVA (main effects and interactions), one numerator degree of freedom and four groups, yielded a minimum detectable effect size of f = .021 at β = .80. Procedure Participants entered an online survey using the Qualtrics software. The research was introduced as a study about people’s reactions to political news related to climate change. After consenting to participate, participants responded to sociodemographic questions (age, gender, nationality, and ethnicity). Then, participants were told they were about to be exposed to two random news articles about climate change and shown a graphic representing a ‘ loading screen ’ to improve credibility. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two repression and one of the two efficacy conditions. The order of these manipulations was counterbalanced 1 . For the repression manipulation, participants read a fabricated news article covering pro-environmental protests. In the high repression condition, police were described as overly aggressive and this was stated to be intentional and part of a new approach for future protest. In the low repression, police were said to be respectful and to have escorted protesters, again in the frame of a novel treatment of protest for the future. Each of the descriptions was ratified by an alleged protester. To manipulate efficacy, we included actual examples of (un)successful past pro-environmental actions, combined with fabricated testimonies of experts on the political impacts of protest. The high efficacy condition included reports of real successful actions backed by the opinion of an expert on protest effectiveness. While the low efficacy condition showed examples of unsuccessful protests again supported by the expert. Next, participants answered basic comprehension checks and responded to the scales measuring the variables of interest 2 . Finally, they were debriefed about the fabricated nature of the stimuli and were given resources for climate anxiety. Measures To measure the variables of interest, we used a series of psychometric scales adapted from previous works. All constructs were measured with five-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree or similar label) to 5 (totally agree or similar label). All full scales can be consulted openly in the online materials section referred above. To assess the efficacy of our manipulations we used a political efficacy (ω = .89) scale and a scale that measured the perceived risk of repression (ω = .89) adapted from Ayanian et al. ( 2021 ). We also measured concern about climate change with a scale adapted from Jylhä et al. (ω = .89 2023). Additionally, we measured predictors of collective action with scales adapted from previous research: participative efficacy (ω = .89; van Zomeren et al., 2013 ), identity consolidation efficacy (ω = .89; Saab et al., 2015 ), politicised identity ( ω = .85; van Zomeren et al., 2012), moral outrage ( ω = .94; Thomas & McGarty, 2009 ), and moral obligation ( ω = .87 Sabucedo et al., 2018 ). Finaly, we measure collective action intentions with two separate scales, as qualitatively different forms of participation (Becker & Tausch, 2015 ). The items were adapted from different works (Becker & Tausch, 2015 ; Sabucedo et al., 2019 ; van Zomeren et al., 2012) and the distinction between items measuring normative collective action intentions (ω = .87) and non-normative collective action intentions (ω = .92) was informed by an Exploratory Factor Analysis that can be consulted in the Supplementary Materials. Results and Discussion Descriptive statistics and correlational analyses are reported as part of the Supplementary Materials. Manipulation checks Our manipulations worked in the intended fashion, as participants in the high efficacy condition displayed significantly higher political efficacy compared to participants in the low efficacy condition t (167) = 3.98, p < .001, d = .61, and those in the high-repression condition reported a significantly greater likelihood of risk than those in the low-repression condition t (167) = 6.90, p < .001, d = 1.06. Manipulation effects on collective action intentions We conducted two separate 2x2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) for intentions to participate in normative and non-normative collective action. For normative collective action intentions, we did not find a statistically significant main effect of efficacy F (1, 156) = 3.47, p = .057). Similarly, was no significant effect of the repression manipulation ( F (1, 156) = .13, p = .718), nor was there a significant interaction between efficacy and repression ( F (1, 156) = 1.27, p = .261). For non-normative collective action, no significant effects were found for efficacy ( F (1, 161) = 1.42, p = .235), repression ( F (1, 161) = .81, p = .332) or their interaction ( F (1, 161) = 2.32, p = .102). Manipulation effects on collective action motives A series of 2x2 ANOVAs assessed the effects of our manipulations on collective action predictors. We also conducted a simple ANOVA to test the effect of repression on moral outrage. These tests yielded significant effects of efficacy on identity consolidation efficacy ( F (1, 165) = 6.01, p = .015, η p 2 = .035) where scores were higher in the high ( M = 3.58) compared to the lower ( M = 3.23) political efficacy condition. Moreover, levels of moral outrage were higher ( F (1, 167) = 50.51, p < .001, η p 2 = .234) in the high ( M = 4.22) compared to the lower repression ( M = 2.63) condition. Additionally, participants in the high repression condition also showed lower participative efficacy ( M = 2.89) than those in the low repression condition ( M = 3.16; F (1, 165) = 4.37, p = .038, η p 2 = .026). For details of nonsignificant effects, see the Supplement. Mediation analyses Next, we examined whether our manipulations affected action intentions indirectly, through collective action motives, by running a series of mediation analyses on 5,000 bootstrapped samples, with 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The efficacy manipulation predicted normative ( B = .18, SE = .08, p = .025) but not non-normative ( B = .04, SE = .03, p = .240) collective action intentions via increased identity consolidation efficacy. Additionally, the efficacy manipulation also exerted indirect effects for normative ( B = .24, SE = .11, p = .037) but not non-normative ( B = .09, SE = .05, p = .101) collective action by increasing a sense of moral obligation. Repression had significant indirect effects on both normative ( B = .58, SE = .11, p < .001) and non-normative ( B = .26, SE = .08, p < .001) collective action via moral outrage, indicating that repression indirectly increased both normative and non-normative action intentions by arousing moral outrage. There were no further significant indirect effects (see Supplementary Materials for details). Informed by previous research (Ayanian et al., 2021 ) we also tested a serial mediational model whereby repression predicts moral outrage, which in turn predicts moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action. These tests yielded significant serial indirect effects for both normative ( B = .36, SE = .08, p < .001) and non-normative ( B = .18, SE = .06, p = .003) collective action. Moderation analyses A final set of analyses examined whether the extent to which climate change concern and identification with the climate movement moderate the direct and indirect effects of our manipulations to assess the possibility that the collective action motives may be impacted differently by the manipulations as a function of the degree of engagement (Thomas, 2012, 2022). There were no significant interactions for the direct effects of the manipulations on normative or non-normative collective action intentions (see Supplement for details). A series of moderated mediation analyses (PROCESS Model 7; Hayes, 2022 ) tested whether climate change concern and politicised identity moderate the indirect effects of the manipulations on action tendencies via collective action motives. The results were statistically significant only for the effects of repression on action tendencies via moral outrage. Specifically, climate change concern enhanced the indirect effect of repression condition via moral outrage on both normative, as shown by the index of moderated mediation ( b = .19, SE = .07, LLCI = .049, ULCI = .343) and non-normative ( b = .10, SE = .04, LLCI = .031, ULCI = .194) collective action intentions. Simple slopes of the effects of the manipulation on moral outrage were significant and positive at different levels of concern (-1SD, mean, +1SD) steadily increasing from low ( B = 1.22, SE = .28, p < .001), to average ( B = 1.70, SE = .19, p < .001) and high ( B = 2.19, SE = .28, p < .001), indicating an enhancing effect of the moderator. Similarly, politicised identity also catalysed the indirect effect of repression through moral outrage on both normative ( b = .29, SE = .08, LLCI = .145, ULCI = .454) and non-normative ( b = .14, SE = .05, LLCI = .055, ULCI = .252) action intentions. Again, the effects of the repression manipulation on moral outrage increased from low ( B = .93, SE = .28, p = .001), to average ( B = 1.69, SE = .19, p < .001), to high ( B = 2.46, SE = .28, p < .001) levels of politicised identity. In sum, although we did not observe any direct effects of our manipulations on action intentions, we obtained causal effects on several established motives of participation and found significant indirect effects via these variables on action intentions. Specifically, compared to the low efficacy condition, participants in the high efficacy condition reported higher levels of identity consolidation efficacy while those participants in the high repression condition showed higher levels of moral outrage and participative efficacy. These effects resulted in statistically significant indirect effects of political efficacy via identity consolidation efficacy and repression through moral outrage. This latter finding supports recent research on the galvanizing effects of repression (Ayanian et al. 2021 ). Finally, both climate change concern and politicised identity positively moderated the indirect effects of the repression manipulation via moral outrage, suggesting that repression generates more outrage, and in turn stronger action intentions, among those highly invested in the climate movement. Our second study aimed to replicate this in a sample of British adults from the general population. Both the study design, the main hypotheses and analysis (ANCOVA) and the questionnaire were pre-registered. However the analyses presented contain further tests as other variables were considered at a later stage ( https://osf.io/qb7se/?view_only=a0ef5d8827814000bc4fc0bec7371297 ). Due to a coding error, the moral outrage measure was presented in between the repression and efficacy manipulations and thus the effects of the latter on outrage will not be examined. Study 2 Method Sampling British participants were recruited via Prolific and completed a survey presented via Qualtrics. An a priori power analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul et al., 2018 ) with an expected effect size at a small-to-medium value ( f = .18) main effects and interactions tested with an ANOVA, at β = .80, df = 1 and four groups yielded a suggested the sample size of n = 245. We collected data from 268 participants. One participant was excluded due to a failed the attention check, so the final sample comprised 267 participants (60.5% female, M age = 40.65; SD = 13.30). Procedure The procedure was virtually identical to that of Study 1, albeit we adapted the repression condition to refer to more recent protests. We also corrected the misplacement of the moral outrage measure in Study 1. Again, participants were randomly assigned to each level of the experimental factors, completed the relevant scales, and were debriefed. Measures We used the same measures as in Study 1. However, as scale reliabilities were very high, and in order to shorten the questionnaire, some of the items were cut. Full measures and scale reliabilities are available online. Results and Discussion Manipulation checks As in Study 1, manipulation checks confirmed the success of the efficacy ( t (265) = 5.68, p < .001, d = .69) and repression ( t (266) = 5.25, p < .001, d = .64) manipulations. We again ran descriptive and correlational analyses (see Supplement). Manipulation effects on collective action intentions Again there were no significant effects on intentions to participate in normative collective action, as neither efficacy ( F (1, 263) = .18, p = .670), repression ( F (1, 263) = .37 p = .542), nor their interaction terms ( F (1, 263) = .03, p = .868) had significant effects. The findings were similar for non-normative collective action, with null effects of efficacy ( F (1, 263) = .90, p = .341), repression ( F (1, 263) = .02, p = .892), and their interaction ( F (1, 263) = .48, p = .485). Manipulation effects on collective action motives We observed a statistically significant effect of the efficacy manipulation on participative efficacy ( F (1, 263) = 8.97, p = .003, η p 2 = .033) with participative efficacy being higher in the high political efficacy condition ( M = 3.14) than in the lower political efficacy condition ( M = 2.76). High repression again caused higher levels of moral outrage ( M = 3.38 v. M = 2.72; F(1, 263) = 11.99, p < .001, η p 2 = .044), but this time also lower levels of identity consolidation efficacy ( M = 2.92 v. M = 3.16; F (1, 263) = 3.98, p = .047, η p 2 = .015). All other results were non-significant and are reported in the Supplement. Mediation analyses Again we examined whether our manipulations affected action intentions indirectly by running mediation analyses. For the efficacy manipulation, we observed statistically significant indirect effects on both normative ( B = .24, SE = .08, p = .005) and non-normative ( B = .10, SE = .04, p = .007) collective action intentions through participative efficacy. The repression manipulation exerted positive indirect effects via moral outrage when predicting both normative ( B = .22, SE = .07, p = .002) and non-normative ( B = .13, SE = .04, p = .003) collective action. All other mediations were not statistically significant (see Supplement). We also again found evidence for a serial indirect effect for the effect of repression through moral outrage and moral obligation for both normative ( B = .14, SE = .04, p = .001) and non-normative ( B = .05, SE = .01, p = .003) collective action intentions. Moderation analyses As in Study 1, we found no interaction effects for climate change concern or politicized identification with the manipulations when predicting either normative or non-normative action intentions. However, results indicated that these variables moderated several indirect effects. For the efficacy manipulation, we found that political efficacy decreased moral obligation for those with a weak politicised identity, generating statistically significant moderated mediation effects for both normative ( b = .10, SE = .04, LLCI = .020, ULCI = .198) and non-normative ( b = .05, SE = .02, LLCI = .007, ULCI = .086). The effects of the simple slopes analysis show that those with low politicised identity displayed reduced moral obligation as a function of efficacy ( B = − .33, SE = .10, p = .001), those with average politicised identity levels also reported reduced moral obligation, although to a lesser degree ( B = − .15, SE = .07, p = .040). For those high in politicised identity, the slope was not statistically significant ( B = .02, SE = .10, p = .806). Moderation effects were also obtained for the repression manipulation, such that the positive effect of repression on moral outrage was exacerbated for those who were strongly identified, yielding significant moderated mediation effects for both normative ( b = .10, SE = .04, LLCI = .011, ULCI = .194) and non-normative ( b = .06, SE = .03, LLCI = .008, ULCI = .116) collective action intentions. Similar to Study 1, simple slopes analysis indicates that outrage grew gradually as identification levels increased from low ( B = .48, SE = .22, p = .032) to average ( B = .83, SE = .15, p < .001), to high ( B = 1.19, SE = .22, p < .001). The remaining moderated mediation analyses were non-significant and can be consulted in the Supplement. Overall, this study replicated the pattern of results of Study 1 in a general population sample. Although our manipulations of efficacy and repression were successful in shifting participants’ perceptions of political efficacy of protesting and the risks of repression, they again did not produce statistically significant main effects of action tendencies. Rather, these factors impacted action tendencies indirectly by shaping collective action motives. While the efficacy manipulation exerted a positive effect on action intentions by raising identity consolidation efficacy in Study 1, a similar indirect effect emerged via participative efficacy in the current study. Results on the positive indirect impact of repression on both normative and non-normative action intentions via moral outrage replicated those of Study 1. Also replicating Study 1, we found that the indirect effects of our manipulations via collective action motives were moderated by identification with the climate movement, but this time not by climate change concern. Again, politicised identity enhanced the indirect effects of repression on normative and non-normative action via moral outrage. Moreover, we found that politicised identity moderated the indirect effect of the efficacy manipulation on collective action intentions via moral obligation, such that those who manifested weaker politicised identities were less prone to experience moral obligation and therefore reported weaker intentions to act when efficacy was high, compared to high identifiers. This indicates that strong identification might act as a buffering factor for the ‘free rider’ effect (Olson, 1965 ) described in the introduction. General Discussion The present research aimed to examine the causal evidence of the impact of political efficacy and repression on people’s willingness to engage in both normative and more radical, non-normative collective action to address the climate crisis. We aimed to provide novel insights into how these factors might impact the climate movement, with potential implications for communication and mobilization efforts of climate movements. Moreover, our experimental design also contributes to the literature on collective action in general, as causal tests of the roles of efficacy and repression are scarce. To our knowledge, the present studies are the first to simultaneously manipulate these factors and the first to experimentally examine the roles of efficacy and repression in the context of collective action on climate issues. The two studies yielded a consistent pattern of findings. We showed that our manipulations of efficacy and repression successfully shifted perceptions of the political efficacy of climate protests and the risks of repression. While the manipulations did not produce direct effects on action tendencies, we obtained several indirect effects. First, we found that political efficacy seems to produce ‘spill-over’ effects on the other forms of efficacy, such that participants who were made to believe in the high (as opposed to low) political efficacy of climate protests reported stronger beliefs in the ability of protests to build a strong social movement (identity consolidation efficacy; Saab et al., 2015 ) in Study 1 and greater beliefs in their own participative efficacy (van Zomeren et al., 2013 ) in Study 2, both of which positively predicted normative collective action intentions. Interestingly, findings from Study 2 also suggest that identification with the climate movement moderates the effect of political efficacy on moral obligation, such that low (compared to high) identifiers were less prone to experience moral obligation and therefore reported weaker action intentions when efficacy was high. This suggests that strong identification might act as a buffering factor for the so-called ‘free rider’ effect and expands on previous correlational findings demonstrating a negative link between political efficacy and moral obligation (Ayanian et al., 2021 ). The repression manipulation produced several indirect effects by generating moral outrage, as well as serially via moral outrage and moral obligation. These findings suggest that repression can act as a catalyst for action as it elicits emotional reactions that generate a sense of moral obligation to participate. Hence, our research supports previous literature that posited that repression could stimulate rather than deter protest (Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Li et al., 2023 ; Uysal et al., 2022 ) by offering what is, to our knowledge, the first experimental evidence of this. Moreover, this effect was found both for normative and non-normative actions, suggesting that repression could have a radicalizing effect on the climate movement. Further extending prior findings, we demonstrate that the galvanizing effect of repression is strongest among those who are most invested in the issue. Why did our manipulations not have direct effects on action intentions? As noted earlier, collective action is a markedly multifaceted process, determined by the joint action and interaction of a range of motives (Ayanian et al., 2021 ; Osborne et al., 2019 ; Sabucedo et al., 2019 ; Thomas et al., 2012 ; van Zomeren et al., 2012). This means that affecting only a subset of these variables might not be enough to produce a meaningful, observable impact on intentions to participate directly. Moreover, although our studies only present tentative evidence in that respect, political efficacy and repression are likely to have varied and potentially opposing effects on action tendencies through different psychological mechanisms, and work differently among different groups of people. For example, repression generated moral outrage, in particular among people who are highly identified with the climate movement, while also reducing participative efficacy in Study 1 and identity consolidation efficacy in Study 2. Thus, more complex experimental designs are needed to fully address the mechanisms underlying engagement in collective action. Aside from its impact – direct or indirect – on collective action intentions, we also believe that our research provides additional findings that advance some current debates in the literature. For example, the literature on moral obligation posits that moral factors function independently of instrumental concerns such as efficacy considerations (Sabucedo et al., 2019 ). While we do not find overall effects of our political efficacy manipulation on moral obligation, in Study 2 we observe that high political efficacy caused a reduced sense of moral obligation to among those who were not strongly identified with the climate movement, but this did not occur among high identifiers. This seems to suggest that perceiving the movement as already efficacious would prevent less mobilized people from forming a moral commitment to the cause and joining, and confirms the view that a sense of moral obligation is closely bound to important identities (Ayanian et al., 2021 ). Further evidence for the fact that politicized identity influences the moral dynamics of collective action is the fact that we obtained robust evidence for another moderated mediation in which politicized identity catalyzed the moral outrage caused by higher levels of repression. This suggests that those more strongly identified with the movement interpret repression as a more severe transgression. Overall, our research presents the first experimental evidence of the impact of political efficacy and repression perceptions on the environmental movement. It provides valuable insights to the study of environmental protest (and collective action in general) that could help stimulate further much-needed experimental work on the causal effects of these factors. Our research might also have practical implications that can inform environmental movements looking to encourage people to join their efforts. Our findings suggests, for instance, that stressing repression as an unfair and immoral deed may prompt people to join as moral outrage and moral obligation increase. Furthermore, optimistic messages about the effectiveness of protest may backfire when trying to gain new recruits for the cause, as those less identified with the movement could feel less morally obligated to contribute. The discourse on efficacy is especially delicate, as we have also observed that political inefficacy has negative consequences for mobilization. Perhaps, a more personal approach that focuses on what someone can contribute as an individual within the movement would be a better option when trying to convince a disengaged public. Limitations and Future Directions As with every piece of research, our work is not exempt from certain limitations. First, our research was conducted exclusively in the context of the United Kingdom, suggesting caution when trying to generalize these findings to other contexts, especially those outside the so-called WEIRD countries. In this sense, recent research on environmental collective action suggests that people are less likely to act in contexts that are more repressive and with less efficacious environmental policies (Uysal et al., 2023 ). Thus, macro-level conditions may interact with attitudes and perceptions in shaping participation. Moreover, our research focused on the intention to participate in collective action and did not assess actual participation, which could affect our conclusions due to the so-called intention behaviour gap (Sheeran & Webb, 2016 ). However, our focus on general intentions could also have limited the observed effects. Perhaps the impact of learning about efficacy or repression could be better translated in the short term if we asked about intended participation in a specific upcoming demonstration, as this would provide a concrete political opportunity to participants who would normally be unaware of engagement opportunities. Despite these limitations, we believe this novel research opens up many avenues for future research, of which we will highlight those that we deem most important. As engagement in collective action is a multi-causal and multi-level phenomenon (see Thomas et al., 2022 ), further study of other potential variables that moderate the effects observed here are of particular interest. For instance, it is possible that system justification beliefs (Jost, 2019 ) could also play a moderating role, as those high on these beliefs may see the repressive actions as more justifiable. Regarding political efficacy, we argue that awareness about the tangible benefits of actions against climate change could moderate the impact of this variable on intentions to act. Because climate change is a structural process, the demands of the movement may not be perceived by people as tangible improvements, but rather as preventive measures regarding future catastrophes. For instance, even if people think that the government may be forced to ban emissions due to collective pressure, they may not perceive this as an improvement of the current situation. In fact, models that promote environmental action have focused on highlighting risks (Bradley et al., 2020 ) and stressing the importance of both delayed gratification (Arbuthnott, 2010 ) and the problem that focusing on hedonic values and gains reasoning pose (Steg et al., 2014 ). Nevertheless, the improvement of the climatic situation could be framed in terms of tangible benefits like cleaner air that positively affects health (Xue et al., 2022 ) or cleaner, more enjoyable natural spaces (Williams et al., 2016 ). We argue that focusing on such tangible benefits could enhance the positive effects of political efficacy. Conclusion As Zinn’s observed in the quote we presented at the begining of this paper, a problem of our time is that people often fail to challenge what they know is wrong. Unearthing the factors that move people to act collectively against injustices remains one of the elemental tasks in social sciences. Our experimental approach shows promise in identifying meaningful causal effects, but our findings also attest to the multifaceted nature of collective action motives and highlight that participation is likely to be initiated through a causal chain of factors that might differ for different groups, rather than a single factor that directly prompts people to act. This complexity makes this research endeavour more interesting but also more urgent. In a world where people seem convinced that a climatic crisis with dire consequences is impending, too few are acting collectively to hold governments and companies to account. By uncovering what transforms people’s worries into organized collective action, we can hopefully propel a much-needed global collective movement before climatic change has progressed to the extent that results in irrevocable damage. Declarations Competing interests: The authors declare no competing interests regarding the present article. “ Our problem is not civil disobedience, our problem is civil obedience. Our problem is that people are obedient all over the world, in the face of poverty and starvation and stupidity and war and cruelty” – Howard Zinn Data Availability Statement All study materials and measures, and data used in the present research are publicly available online at the Open Science Framework Repository (https://osf.io/9fm4x/?view_only=342986a736b8400784c7e53526da80f7). References Agostini M, van Zomeren M (2021) Toward a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of four motivations and structural constraints. Psychol Bull 147(7):667–700. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000256 Anisin A (2016) Repression, spontaneity, and collective action: The 2013 Turkish Gezi protests. 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Arnove, Voices of a People’s History of the United States, 10th Anniversary Edition: 10 Anniversary Edition Supplementary Files SupplementaryAnalysesdfvfs.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-4294040","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":311909818,"identity":"b871b6c1-f8e5-493d-946b-ecc9aab58c5c","order_by":0,"name":"Marcos Dono","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6895-2433","institution":"University of Santiago de Compostela: Universidade de Santiago de Compostela","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Marcos","middleName":"","lastName":"Dono","suffix":""},{"id":311909819,"identity":"3d64cd60-af9e-4679-ab7c-6266d898449a","order_by":1,"name":"Arin Ayanian","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"YSU: Yerevan State University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Arin","middleName":"","lastName":"Ayanian","suffix":""},{"id":311909820,"identity":"0e483934-7ca2-4c50-9379-966fdce8cd1a","order_by":2,"name":"Nicole Tausch","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of St Andrews","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Nicole","middleName":"","lastName":"Tausch","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2024-04-19 15:27:07","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4294040/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4294040/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":61264193,"identity":"356055e7-464b-4f29-bdad-16f7089bb387","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-28 20:14:06","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":670835,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4294040/v1/6fd2e3fc-b138-46d9-9434-ce8567d1e3c4.pdf"},{"id":58828940,"identity":"29a3725f-b56c-4337-93be-9c9838ebb2d3","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-06-21 17:34:04","extension":"docx","order_by":6,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":123768,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryAnalysesdfvfs.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4294040/v1/5cb08f0c64821f77b643d1e5.docx"}],"financialInterests":"","formattedTitle":"A Fight Against All Odds? The Causal Effects of Perceived Political Efficacy and Protest Repression on Motivation to Engage in Normative and Non-normative Climate Protest","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eAfter decades of research and civil society advocacy, it seems that in 2024, a collective conscience about climate change and its consequences has finally developed. Most people surveyed in the European Union and China state that they feel the impact of climate change in their daily lives (80% and 91%, respectively;\u0026nbsp;EIB/BVA, 2023). People around the globe also tend to agree that drastic action is needed to avoid a climate-related global catastrophe (84% EU, 88% China, 83% UK, 72% U.S.). In Europe, a notable 66% of the public is in favour of governments passing stricter climate-related laws (EIB/BVA, 2023). Nonetheless, data from the European Values Study analysing the 2017-2022 period show that 41.4% of people would never participate in lawful demonstrations, with only 18% of the population ever participating\u0026nbsp;(EVS, 2022). The latter figures concern protests on behalf of all causes, so we can assume that collective action participation for climate-related issues is even lower. Hence, we are facing a conundrum: people seem to be convinced about the critical situation we are in, yet they are not mobilizing to push for the policy changes they seem to support.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis lack of engagement may have crucial consequences. Throughout history, social movements and protests have served as indispensable instruments for a vast array of groups to defend their interests and engender social change\u0026nbsp;(Della Porta \u0026amp; Diani, 2020). It is hard to imagine that the advancements made in matters of race and gender equality, decolonization, LGTBIQ+ rights, or even the strides made so far in climate change mitigation would have existed without sustained pressure from collective action\u0026nbsp;(Hunt-Hendrix \u0026amp; Taylor, 2024; Malm, 2021; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2020). Therefore, it seems that protest is a critical tool to hold governments accountable and pressure them to implement impactful climate policies.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe pro-environmental movement has gained some momentum in recent years. This spark has been most notable among young people, responsible for creating initiatives like Fridays for Future or the Sunrise Movement, but also among a broader range of citizens represented by groups such as Extinction Rebellion, 350.org, and Citizens\u0026rsquo; Climate Lobby\u0026nbsp;(Extinction Rebellion, 2019; Sorce, 2022). Movements such as these have been critical in raising public awareness and in exerting political influence that led to policy changes such as the adoption of renewable energy targets (see\u0026nbsp;Fisher et al., 2023; Gulliver et al., 2022). Nonetheless, the impact of these movements still falls short of what is required to avert irreversible climate breakdown. Many governments continue to actively support the fossil fuel industry and, in the face of conflicting priorities, have started to backpedal on climate pledges\u0026nbsp;(Lakhani \u0026amp; Rushe, 2024). In fact, countries all over the globe are failing to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement\u0026nbsp;(Bearak \u0026amp; Popovich, 2022), leading to increasing pessimism about our ability to limit global warming to 1.5\u0026nbsp;\u0026deg;C\u0026nbsp;(Scranton, 2015). Disconcertingly, these trends have been accompanied by a wave of anti-protest legislation and police repression of climate protests in countries such as the UK, which have criminalized non-violent protest and restricted citizens\u0026rsquo; rights to demand action by policymakers\u0026nbsp;(Forst, 2024).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;How does the current landscape of seemingly limited effectiveness and increasing repression of climate protests impact people\u0026rsquo;s motivation to engage in action against climate change? Does a perceived lack of efficacy and repression of protest demobilize engagement, or might it instigate a shift to more confrontational, radical action? In the present research, we aim to shed light on these issues by experimentally examining the roles of the perceived political efficacy of climate action and the likelihood that climate protests are being repressed by the authorities in influencing people\u0026rsquo;s willingness to engage in collective action. In line with previous research, we define collective action as any action one engages in \u0026quot;as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group\u0026quot;\u0026nbsp;(Wright et al., 1990, p. 995). Thus, collective action ranges from signing petitions and participating in peaceful demonstrations or marches, to more disruptive forms of action such as blocking roads and buildings or damaging property.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe question of what motivates people to engage in collective action has been of great interest across the social sciences and has received a substantial amount of research attention in social psychology (for reviews see\u0026nbsp;Agostini \u0026amp; van Zomeren, 2021; Becker \u0026amp; Tausch, 2015; Thomas et al., 2022; van Zomeren et al., 2008).\u0026nbsp;This work has attested to the complexity of this phenomenon and demonstrated that people\u0026rsquo;s willingness to participate in collective action is shaped by a range of psychological factors. Key among these are a sense of injustice and resulting emotions such as anger and moral outrage (van Zomeren et al., 2008), identification with a social movement (i.e., politicized identification;\u0026nbsp;Simon \u0026amp; Klandermans, 2001), and a strong belief in the efficacy of collective action in achieving the desired change (e.g.,\u0026nbsp;van Zomeren et al., 2004). Beyond the political efficacy of collective action, research has also highlighted that other considerations, such as the efficacy of protest in building or consolidating a social movement (identity consolidation efficacy;\u0026nbsp;Hornsey et al., 2006; Saab et al., 2015)\u0026nbsp;as well as belief in the\u0026nbsp;value of one\u0026rsquo;s individual contribution to the cause\u0026nbsp;(participative efficacy; van Zomeren et al., 2013), motivate participation. Recent accounts have further emphasized the importance of moral beliefs that operate largely independently of external rewards, costs, or sanctions (Sabucedo et al., 2018), showing that a sense of moral obligation to act is one of the most potent motives underlying action intentions\u0026nbsp;(Ayanian et al., 2021; Sabucedo et al., 2019; Sabucedo et al., 2018).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is substantial overlap in the predictors of engagement in different forms of collective action as these often emerge dynamically and frequently co-occur during protests\u0026nbsp;(Uysal et al., 2023). Nonetheless, social movement organizations expend much energy debating the efficacy, ethics, risks and legal implications of different actions, as well as whether the direness of the situation calls for more drastic methods\u0026nbsp;(Malm, 2021). Different groups within the climate movement have taken different approaches. For example, Extinction Rebellion, who previously advocated for non-violent, disruptive civil disobedience\u0026nbsp;(Extinction Rebellion, 2019), have recently shifted away from disruptive action in an attempt to limit a backlash from the public\u0026nbsp;(Extinction Rebellion, 2023), while other organizations such as Just Stop Oil have adopted more radical (though non-violent) direct actions such as occupying construction sites, blocking key roads, or attacking famous artworks\u0026nbsp;(BBC, 2019).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe variability in strategic approaches underlines the importance of understanding the psychological drivers of intentions to engage in different forms of collective action. Previous research studying factors that explain the (de-)radicalization of collective action has distinguished actions in terms of their normativity concerning societal rules and conventions and suggested that radical forms of collective action are more likely to occur as the perceived efficacy of conventional action drops (Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2014). Thus, as did prior work, we differentiate normative (i.e., action that conforms to the rules and norms of society) from non-normative action (i.e., action that violates these rules; Wright et al., 1990). Social-psychological research has only begun to understand the factors predicting different types of collective action (Li et al., 2023; Saab et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) and none, as far as we know, has experimentally investigated the factors underlying support for non-normative action in the context of the climate movement.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"The Current Research","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe present studies experimentally examine the impacts of the expected political efficacy and the expected repression of climate protest on intentions to engage in normative and non-normative climate action. Our research is conducted in the UK, which has several active climate movements and has seen both frequent climate protests and severe repressive measures over the last few years (BBC, 2023; Gayle, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). We test both the direct causal effects of efficacy and repression on normative and non-normative collective action intentions, as well as their indirect effects through the other key motivators, specifically identification with the climate movement, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, a sense of moral obligation to act for climate change mitigation, and moral outrage as a key emotional antecedent of engagement (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Lodewijkx et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Thomas \u0026amp; McGarty, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Below we give an overview of key findings regarding the roles of political efficacy and repression in shaping collective action intentions and outline our predictions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePolitical Efficacy as a Predictor of Collective Action\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe importance of instrumental motives has long been emphasized in models of collective action (Gamson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1992\u003c/span\u003e; Klandermans, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e; Zald \u0026amp; McCarthy, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1979\u003c/span\u003e). Social psychological research has focused on the belief that one\u0026rsquo;s group can promote the desired goal and demonstrated that the perceived efficacy of collective action predicts intentions to get engaged (see van Zomeren et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e, for meta-analytic evidence). As noted above, the anticipated effectiveness of protest can be evaluated along a range of different dimensions (see Hornsey et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e; Saab et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Our main focus here is on the political efficacy of collective action, that is, the belief that collective action will be effective in addressing the movement\u0026rsquo;s political grievances and achieving the desired policy change (Saab et al., 2014).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere is extensive evidence that a sense of the political efficacy of collective action increases motivation to engage (e.g., Mummendey et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Sabucedo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Thomas et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; van Zomeren et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). However, some research found political efficacy to be unrelated or even negatively related to action intentions (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Cichocka et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Osborne et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Tausch et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e), suggesting that a sense of political efficacy can activate different motives. For example, the classical literature on mobilization suggested that a sense that protests are effective could generate a free-riding effect, meaning that those who believe that the movement will succeed expect to benefit from the action without having to contribute themselves (Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1965\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, studies of collective action intentions in authoritarian countries where there the likelihood that the authorities will give in to the protesters\u0026rsquo; demands is remote, found political efficacy to be unrelated to action intentions, while other forms of efficacy (identity consolidation and participative efficacies) played a greater role in predicting engagement (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, research has demonstrated that political efficacy is \u003cem\u003enegatively\u003c/em\u003e related to intentions to engage in non-normative action (Tausch et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e), suggesting that a perceived lack of efficacy can have a radicalizing effect.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, while much research suggests that a sense of political efficacy is important in mobilising individuals to participate in collective action, there is also conflicting evidence demonstrating that a lack of political efficacy does not necessarily disincentivise participation and may even promote the adoption of more radical, non-normative forms of action. We will consider these alternative possibilities in the present research by experimentally manipulating the political efficacy of pro-environmental collective action. Experimental manipulations of the motivators of collective action are rare in the literature (see B\u0026auml;ck et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; van Zomeren et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e, for exceptions) and, to our knowledge, have never been applied in the context of climate action. Understanding the impact of information about the political impact of protest on intentions to participate has important implications for the communication and mobilization efforts of social movements.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe will also assess the potential indirect effects of efficacy on action intentions, which might operate in opposing directions. For example, low political efficacy of climate protest might produce moral outrage, an established positive predictor of collective action (Ayanian \u0026amp; Tausch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Pozzi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Sabucedo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), but might simultaneously reduce a sense of participative efficacy, which undermines engagement (van Zomeren et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, we will examine whether the extent to which people are concerned about climate change, and the extent to which they are psychologically invested in the climate movement (i.e., their politicized identification) moderate the direct and indirect effects of our manipulation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eThe Impact of Repression on Collective Action\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBroadly speaking, repression can be conceptualized as any measure that seeks to \"prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional collective action (e.g., protest), including its initiation\" (Earl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e, p. 263). This typically refers to institutional structures and actions that restrict political opportunities available to those who challenge the established system (Tarrow, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1993\u003c/span\u003e). Repression can entail the introduction of laws limiting or prohibiting certain activities, restrictions on the freedom of expression and association, and the introduction of hurdles to the formation of oppositional groups (V-Dem, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). For individuals, repressive measures increase the potential costs and risks of engagement in collective action through fines, arrests and imprisonment, or physical threats (see Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRepressive measures have always been central in protecting authoritarian regimes (Sika, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), however, a wave of popular protests in recent years over a range of issues such as austerity measures, women\u0026rsquo;s rights, and racism (Clayton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Emejulu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Karyotis \u0026amp; R\u0026uuml;dig, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) have been accompanied by an increase in repression of protests by many governments in democratic countries. Repression has been particularly severe and disproportionate for environmental protests. It has included actions such as the use of water cannons, pepper spray and other painful methods against protesters, the creation of new criminal offences to prohibit certain forms of protest, the use of counter-terrorism laws to enable surveillance, strip searches and extended periods in police custody, as well as harsh sentencing (see Forst, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e, for extensive documentation of repression).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow do repressive measures impact people\u0026rsquo;s willingness to participate in collective action? Research on the psychological effects of protest repression on activists and potential sympathizers is relatively novel (see Anisin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Ayanian \u0026amp; Tausch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Honari et al., 2018; Uysal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) and has thus far yielded mixed findings. On the one hand, and consistent with the intuitive reasoning about its deterrent effects, repression can undermine protest by reducing perceptions of political opportunity (Klandermans, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1984\u003c/span\u003e) and instilling fear (Honari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), collective action on climate issues was found to be less common among concerned people in more repressive countries (Uysal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNevertheless, research has also supported the opposite relationship, referred to as the 'repression paradox' (Brockett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1993\u003c/span\u003e). According to this idea, attempts to repress social movements can produce a backlash effect and fuel rather than deter protest participation when repressive measures are perceived as illegitimate restrictions of fundamental rights (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Specifically, illegitimate repressive measures create a sense of moral outrage (for evidence, see Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Ayanian \u0026amp; Tausch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Ayta\u0026ccedil; et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Brockett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1993\u003c/span\u003e; Li et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), an action-oriented emotional reaction felt when something is perceived to violate one\u0026rsquo;s moral values (Batson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Moral outrage is likely to be an even stronger driver of action than other, non-moral emotions (see Lodewijkx et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Thomas \u0026amp; McGarty, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) due to the strong defensive drive that perceived moral transgressions generate (Skitka, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, the violation of critical moral values can prompt people towards more subversive courses of action (Dono et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Fiske \u0026amp; Rai, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Recent research has provided initial support for this idea, showing that repression can radicalize movements (Li et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, we might expect repression to increase willingness to engage in both normative and non-normative collective actions, and that this effect is at least partially mediated by moral outrage.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe present studies experimentally investigate whether perceived repression disincentivises or galvanises environmental protest by manipulating participants\u0026rsquo; expectations of repression. Experimental manipulations of perceived repression are scarce (see Ayta\u0026ccedil; et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Uysal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e, for exceptions) and have, to our knowledge, never been applied to understand the effect of repression on environmental protest. We examine the direct effects of repression on both normative and non-normative collective action intentions, consider its effects on the other motivating variables (moral outrage, moral obligation, identification with the climate movement, and identity consolidation and participative efficacies), and test for repression\u0026rsquo;s indirect effects on action tendencies via these variables.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBased on prior correlational evidence (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Uysal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), we expect that repression increases action tendencies by inducing moral outrage. In addition, as prior research demonstrated that moral outrage and moral obligation are linked (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e), we will also test for a serial mediation model whereby moral outrage increases action tendencies via a heightened sense of moral obligation to act. Again, we will examine whether the extent to which people are concerned about climate change and the extent to which they identify with the climate movement moderate the direct and indirect effects of repression.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e Both studies included in the present work received ethical approval from the ethics committee of [BLINDED]. All study materials and measures, and data are publicly available online (\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://osf.io/9fm4x/?view_only=342986a736b8400784c7e53526da80f7\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://osf.io/9fm4x/?view_only=342986a736b8400784c7e53526da80f7\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e "},{"header":"Study 1","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn the context of current environmental protests in the UK, we conducted an online study with British residents. Our study employed a bifactorial, 2 (lower v. higher repression) x 2 (lower v. higher political efficacy) between-subjects experimental design. We assessed pre-manipulation concern about climate change, the perceived political efficacy of climate protests and the likelihood of risks associated with protesting as manipulation checks, intentions to participate in normative and non-normative collective action as focal outcome variables, and identification with the climate movement, participative efficacy and identity-consolidation efficacy, and moral outrage and moral obligation as additional outcomes and potential mediating variables.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMethod\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eSampling\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e We recruited participants by means of diffusion through university websites and social media announcements and allowed participants to enter a raffle for 3 vouchers worth \u0026pound;50. We thus employed an effect size sensitivity analysis, maximizing the available resources and then calculating the minimum effect size that is to be obtained from that sample (Giner-Sorolla et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Of 175 respondents, six were excluded as they failed an attention check, resulting in a final sample of 169 participants (78.1% female, \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003eage\u003c/sub\u003e= 21.12; \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.79). A sensitivity analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) for an ANOVA (main effects and interactions), one numerator degree of freedom and four groups, yielded a minimum detectable effect size of \u003cem\u003ef\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.021 at β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.80.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eProcedure\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants entered an online survey using the Qualtrics software. The research was introduced as a study about people\u0026rsquo;s reactions to political news related to climate change. After consenting to participate, participants responded to sociodemographic questions (age, gender, nationality, and ethnicity). Then, participants were told they were about to be exposed to two random news articles about climate change and shown a graphic representing a \u0026lsquo;\u003cem\u003eloading screen\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rsquo; to improve credibility. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two repression and one of the two efficacy conditions. The order of these manipulations was counterbalanced \u003ca class=\"FNLink\" href=\"#Fn1\" id=\"#FNLinkFn1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor the repression manipulation, participants read a fabricated news article covering pro-environmental protests. In the high repression condition, police were described as overly aggressive and this was stated to be intentional and part of a new approach for future protest. In the low repression, police were said to be respectful and to have escorted protesters, again in the frame of a novel treatment of protest for the future. Each of the descriptions was ratified by an alleged protester. To manipulate efficacy, we included actual examples of (un)successful past pro-environmental actions, combined with fabricated testimonies of experts on the political impacts of protest. The high efficacy condition included reports of real successful actions backed by the opinion of an expert on protest effectiveness. While the low efficacy condition showed examples of unsuccessful protests again supported by the expert. Next, participants answered basic comprehension checks and responded to the scales measuring the variables of interest\u003ca class=\"FNLink\" href=\"#Fn2\" id=\"#FNLinkFn2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e. Finally, they were debriefed about the fabricated nature of the stimuli and were given resources for climate anxiety.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMeasures\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo measure the variables of interest, we used a series of psychometric scales adapted from previous works. All constructs were measured with five-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree or similar label) to 5 (totally agree or similar label). All full scales can be consulted openly in the online materials section referred above. To assess the efficacy of our manipulations we used a \u003cem\u003epolitical efficacy\u003c/em\u003e (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.89) scale and a scale that measured the \u003cem\u003eperceived risk of repression\u003c/em\u003e (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.89) adapted from Ayanian et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). We also measured \u003cem\u003econcern about climate change\u003c/em\u003e with a scale adapted from Jylh\u0026auml; et al. (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.89 2023). Additionally, we measured predictors of collective action with scales adapted from previous research: \u003cem\u003eparticipative efficacy\u003c/em\u003e (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.89; van Zomeren et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e), \u003cem\u003eidentity consolidation efficacy\u003c/em\u003e (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.89; Saab et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e), \u003cem\u003epoliticised identity\u003c/em\u003e ( ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.85; van Zomeren et al., 2012), \u003cem\u003emoral outrage\u003c/em\u003e ( ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.94; Thomas \u0026amp; McGarty, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e), and \u003cem\u003emoral obligation\u003c/em\u003e ( ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.87 Sabucedo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Finaly, we measure collective action intentions with two separate scales, as qualitatively different forms of participation (Becker \u0026amp; Tausch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). The items were adapted from different works (Becker \u0026amp; Tausch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Sabucedo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; van Zomeren et al., 2012) and the distinction between items measuring \u003cem\u003enormative collective action intentions\u003c/em\u003e (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.87) and \u003cem\u003enon-normative collective action intentions\u003c/em\u003e (ω\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.92) was informed by an Exploratory Factor Analysis that can be consulted in the Supplementary Materials.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResults and Discussion\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescriptive statistics and correlational analyses are reported as part of the Supplementary Materials.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eManipulation checks\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur manipulations worked in the intended fashion, as participants in the high efficacy condition displayed significantly higher political efficacy compared to participants in the low efficacy condition \u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e(167)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.98, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, \u003cem\u003ed\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.61, and those in the high-repression condition reported a significantly greater likelihood of risk than those in the low-repression condition \u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e(167)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;6.90, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, \u003cem\u003ed\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.06.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eManipulation effects on collective action intentions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e We conducted two separate 2x2 analyses of variance (ANOVA) for intentions to participate in normative and non-normative collective action. For normative collective action intentions, we did not find a statistically significant main effect of efficacy \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 156)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.47, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.057). Similarly, was no significant effect of the repression manipulation (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 156)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.13, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.718), nor was there a significant interaction between efficacy and repression (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 156)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.27, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.261). For non-normative collective action, no significant effects were found for efficacy (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 161)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.42, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.235), repression (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 161)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.81, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.332) or their interaction (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 161)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.32, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.102).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eManipulation effects on collective action motives\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA series of 2x2 ANOVAs assessed the effects of our manipulations on collective action predictors. We also conducted a simple ANOVA to test the effect of repression on moral outrage. These tests yielded significant effects of efficacy on identity consolidation efficacy (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 165)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;6.01, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.015, η\u003csub\u003ep\u003c/sub\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.035) where scores were higher in the high (\u003cem\u003eM\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;3.58) compared to the lower (\u003cem\u003eM\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;3.23) political efficacy condition. Moreover, levels of moral outrage were higher (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 167)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;50.51, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001, η\u003csub\u003ep\u003c/sub\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.234) in the high (\u003cem\u003eM\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;4.22) compared to the lower repression (\u003cem\u003eM\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;2.63) condition. Additionally, participants in the high repression condition also showed lower participative efficacy (\u003cem\u003eM\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;2.89) than those in the low repression condition (\u003cem\u003eM\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;3.16; \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 165)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.37, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.038, η\u003csub\u003ep\u003c/sub\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.026). For details of nonsignificant effects, see the Supplement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMediation analyses\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eNext, we examined whether our manipulations affected action intentions indirectly, through collective action motives, by running a series of mediation analyses on 5,000 bootstrapped samples, with 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The efficacy manipulation predicted normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.18, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.08, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.025) but not non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.04, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.03, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.240) collective action intentions via increased identity consolidation efficacy. Additionally, the efficacy manipulation also exerted indirect effects for normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.24, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.11, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.037) but not non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.09, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.05, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.101) collective action by increasing a sense of moral obligation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRepression had significant indirect effects on both normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.58, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.11, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.001) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.26, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.08, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.001) collective action via moral outrage, indicating that repression indirectly increased both normative and non-normative action intentions by arousing moral outrage. There were no further significant indirect effects (see Supplementary Materials for details). Informed by previous research (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) we also tested a serial mediational model whereby repression predicts moral outrage, which in turn predicts moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action. These tests yielded significant serial indirect effects for both normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.36, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.08, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.001) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.18, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.06, \u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;=\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;.003) collective action.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eModeration analyses\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA final set of analyses examined whether the extent to which climate change concern and identification with the climate movement moderate the direct and indirect effects of our manipulations to assess the possibility that the collective action motives may be impacted differently by the manipulations as a function of the degree of engagement (Thomas, 2012, 2022). There were no significant interactions for the direct effects of the manipulations on normative or non-normative collective action intentions (see Supplement for details). A series of moderated mediation analyses (PROCESS Model 7; Hayes, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) tested whether climate change concern and politicised identity moderate the indirect effects of the manipulations on action tendencies via collective action motives. The results were statistically significant only for the effects of repression on action tendencies via moral outrage. Specifically, climate change concern enhanced the indirect effect of repression condition via moral outrage on both normative, as shown by the index of moderated mediation (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.19, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.07, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.049, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.343) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.10, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.04, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.031, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.194) collective action intentions. Simple slopes of the effects of the manipulation on moral outrage were significant and positive at different levels of concern (-1SD, mean, +1SD) steadily increasing from low (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.22, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.28, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001), to average (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.70, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.19, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001) and high (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.19, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.28, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001), indicating an enhancing effect of the moderator. Similarly, politicised identity also catalysed the indirect effect of repression through moral outrage on both normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.29, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.08, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.145, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.454) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.14, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.05, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.055, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.252) action intentions. Again, the effects of the repression manipulation on moral outrage increased from low (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.93, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.28, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.001), to average (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.69, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.19, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001), to high (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.46, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;.28, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;.001) levels of politicised identity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, although we did not observe any direct effects of our manipulations on action intentions, we obtained causal effects on several established motives of participation and found significant indirect effects via these variables on action intentions. Specifically, compared to the low efficacy condition, participants in the high efficacy condition reported higher levels of identity consolidation efficacy while those participants in the high repression condition showed higher levels of moral outrage and participative efficacy. These effects resulted in statistically significant indirect effects of political efficacy via identity consolidation efficacy and repression through moral outrage. This latter finding supports recent research on the galvanizing effects of repression (Ayanian et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, both climate change concern and politicised identity positively moderated the indirect effects of the repression manipulation via moral outrage, suggesting that repression generates more outrage, and in turn stronger action intentions, among those highly invested in the climate movement. Our second study aimed to replicate this in a sample of British adults from the general population.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \n\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Both the study design, the main hypotheses and analysis (ANCOVA) and the questionnaire were pre-registered. However the analyses presented contain further tests as other variables were considered at a later stage (\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://osf.io/qb7se/?view_only=a0ef5d8827814000bc4fc0bec7371297\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://osf.io/qb7se/?view_only=a0ef5d8827814000bc4fc0bec7371297\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003e).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Due to a coding error, the moral outrage measure was presented in between the repression and efficacy manipulations and thus the effects of the latter on outrage will not be examined.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Study 2","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMethod\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section4\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eSampling\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBritish participants were recruited via Prolific and completed a survey presented via Qualtrics. An a priori power analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) with an expected effect size at a small-to-medium value (\u003cem\u003ef\u003c/em\u003e = .18) main effects and interactions tested with an ANOVA, at β = .80, \u003cem\u003edf\u003c/em\u003e = 1 and four groups yielded a suggested the sample size of \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003e = 245. We collected data from 268 participants. One participant was excluded due to a failed the attention check, so the final sample comprised 267 participants (60.5% female, \u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003eage\u003c/sub\u003e= 40.65; \u003cem\u003eSD\u003c/em\u003e = 13.30).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eProcedure\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe procedure was virtually identical to that of Study 1, albeit we adapted the repression condition to refer to more recent protests. We also corrected the misplacement of the moral outrage measure in Study 1. Again, participants were randomly assigned to each level of the experimental factors, completed the relevant scales, and were debriefed.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMeasures\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe used the same measures as in Study 1. However, as scale reliabilities were very high, and in order to shorten the questionnaire, some of the items were cut. Full measures and scale reliabilities are available online.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResults and Discussion\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eManipulation checks\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs in Study 1, manipulation checks confirmed the success of the efficacy (\u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e(265) = 5.68, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, \u003cem\u003ed\u003c/em\u003e = .69) and repression (\u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e(266) = 5.25, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, \u003cem\u003ed\u003c/em\u003e = .64) manipulations. We again ran descriptive and correlational analyses (see Supplement).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eManipulation effects on collective action intentions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgain there were no significant effects on intentions to participate in normative collective action, as neither efficacy (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 263) = .18, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .670), repression (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 263) = .37 \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .542), nor their interaction terms (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 263) = .03, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .868) had significant effects. The findings were similar for non-normative collective action, with null effects of efficacy (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 263) = .90, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .341), repression (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 263) = .02, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .892), and their interaction (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e (1, 263) = .48, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .485).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eManipulation effects on collective action motives\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe observed a statistically significant effect of the efficacy manipulation on participative efficacy (\u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 263) = 8.97, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .003, η\u003csub\u003ep\u003c/sub\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e = .033) with participative efficacy being higher in the high political efficacy condition (\u003cem\u003eM\u003c/em\u003e = 3.14) than in the lower political efficacy condition (\u003cem\u003eM =\u003c/em\u003e 2.76). High repression again caused higher levels of moral outrage (\u003cem\u003eM =\u003c/em\u003e 3.38 v. \u003cem\u003eM =\u003c/em\u003e 2.72; F(1, 263) = 11.99, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001, η\u003csub\u003ep\u003c/sub\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e = .044), but this time also lower levels of identity consolidation efficacy (\u003cem\u003eM =\u003c/em\u003e 2.92 v. \u003cem\u003eM =\u003c/em\u003e 3.16; \u003cem\u003eF\u003c/em\u003e(1, 263) = 3.98, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .047, η\u003csub\u003ep\u003c/sub\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e = .015). All other results were non-significant and are reported in the Supplement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMediation analyses\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgain we examined whether our manipulations affected action intentions indirectly by running mediation analyses. For the efficacy manipulation, we observed statistically significant indirect effects on both normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .24, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .08, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .005) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .10, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .04, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .007) collective action intentions through participative efficacy. The repression manipulation exerted positive indirect effects via moral outrage when predicting both normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .22, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .07, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .002) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .13, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .04, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .003) collective action. All other mediations were not statistically significant (see Supplement). We also again found evidence for a serial indirect effect for the effect of repression through moral outrage and moral obligation for both normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .14, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .04, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .001) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .05, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .01, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .003) collective action intentions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eModeration analyses\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs in Study 1, we found no interaction effects for climate change concern or politicized identification with the manipulations when predicting either normative or non-normative action intentions. However, results indicated that these variables moderated several indirect effects. For the efficacy manipulation, we found that political efficacy decreased moral obligation for those with a weak politicised identity, generating statistically significant moderated mediation effects for both normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e = .10, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .04, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e = .020, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e = .198) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e = .05, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .02, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e = .007, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e = .086). The effects of the simple slopes analysis show that those with low politicised identity displayed reduced moral obligation as a function of efficacy (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = − .33, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .10, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .001), those with average politicised identity levels also reported reduced moral obligation, although to a lesser degree (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = − .15, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .07, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .040). For those high in politicised identity, the slope was not statistically significant (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .02, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .10, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e = .806).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eModeration effects were also obtained for the repression manipulation, such that the positive effect of repression on moral outrage was exacerbated for those who were strongly identified, yielding significant moderated mediation effects for both normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e = .10, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .04, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e = .011, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e = .194) and non-normative (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e = .06, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .03, \u003cem\u003eLLCI\u003c/em\u003e = .008, \u003cem\u003eULCI\u003c/em\u003e = .116) collective action intentions. Similar to Study 1, simple slopes analysis indicates that outrage grew gradually as identification levels increased from low (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .48, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .22, \u003cem\u003ep =\u003c/em\u003e .032) to average (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = .83, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .15, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001), to high (\u003cem\u003eB\u003c/em\u003e = 1.19, \u003cem\u003eSE\u003c/em\u003e = .22, \u003cem\u003ep\u003c/em\u003e \u0026lt; .001). The remaining moderated mediation analyses were non-significant and can be consulted in the Supplement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, this study replicated the pattern of results of Study 1 in a general population sample. Although our manipulations of efficacy and repression were successful in shifting participants’ perceptions of political efficacy of protesting and the risks of repression, they again did not produce statistically significant main effects of action tendencies. Rather, these factors impacted action tendencies indirectly by shaping collective action motives. While the efficacy manipulation exerted a positive effect on action intentions by raising identity consolidation efficacy in Study 1, a similar indirect effect emerged via participative efficacy in the current study. Results on the positive indirect impact of repression on both normative and non-normative action intentions via moral outrage replicated those of Study 1.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlso replicating Study 1, we found that the indirect effects of our manipulations via collective action motives were moderated by identification with the climate movement, but this time not by climate change concern. Again, politicised identity enhanced the indirect effects of repression on normative and non-normative action via moral outrage. Moreover, we found that politicised identity moderated the indirect effect of the efficacy manipulation on collective action intentions via moral obligation, such that those who manifested weaker politicised identities were less prone to experience moral obligation and therefore reported weaker intentions to act when efficacy was high, compared to high identifiers. This indicates that strong identification might act as a buffering factor for the ‘free rider’ effect (Olson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1965\u003c/span\u003e) described in the introduction.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec27\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"General Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe present research aimed to examine the causal evidence of the impact of political efficacy and repression on people’s willingness to engage in both normative and more radical, non-normative collective action to address the climate crisis. We aimed to provide novel insights into how these factors might impact the climate movement, with potential implications for communication and mobilization efforts of climate movements. Moreover, our experimental design also contributes to the literature on collective action in general, as causal tests of the roles of efficacy and repression are scarce. To our knowledge, the present studies are the first to simultaneously manipulate these factors and the first to experimentally examine the roles of efficacy and repression in the context of collective action on climate issues.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe two studies yielded a consistent pattern of findings. We showed that our manipulations of efficacy and repression successfully shifted perceptions of the political efficacy of climate protests and the risks of repression. While the manipulations did not produce direct effects on action tendencies, we obtained several indirect effects. First, we found that political efficacy seems to produce ‘spill-over’ effects on the other forms of efficacy, such that participants who were made to believe in the high (as opposed to low) political efficacy of climate protests reported stronger beliefs in the ability of protests to build a strong social movement (identity consolidation efficacy; Saab et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) in Study 1 and greater beliefs in their own participative efficacy (van Zomeren et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) in Study 2, both of which positively predicted normative collective action intentions. Interestingly, findings from Study 2 also suggest that identification with the climate movement moderates the effect of political efficacy on moral obligation, such that low (compared to high) identifiers were less prone to experience moral obligation and therefore reported weaker action intentions when efficacy was high. This suggests that strong identification might act as a buffering factor for the so-called ‘free rider’ effect and expands on previous correlational findings demonstrating a negative link between political efficacy and moral obligation (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe repression manipulation produced several indirect effects by generating moral outrage, as well as serially via moral outrage and moral obligation. These findings suggest that repression can act as a catalyst for action as it elicits emotional reactions that generate a sense of moral obligation to participate. Hence, our research supports previous literature that posited that repression could stimulate rather than deter protest (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Li et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Uysal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) by offering what is, to our knowledge, the first experimental evidence of this. Moreover, this effect was found both for normative and non-normative actions, suggesting that repression could have a radicalizing effect on the climate movement. Further extending prior findings, we demonstrate that the galvanizing effect of repression is strongest among those who are most invested in the issue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhy did our manipulations not have direct effects on action intentions? As noted earlier, collective action is a markedly multifaceted process, determined by the joint action and interaction of a range of motives (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Osborne et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Sabucedo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Thomas et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; van Zomeren et al., 2012). This means that affecting only a subset of these variables might not be enough to produce a meaningful, observable impact on intentions to participate directly. Moreover, although our studies only present tentative evidence in that respect, political efficacy and repression are likely to have varied and potentially opposing effects on action tendencies through different psychological mechanisms, and work differently among different groups of people. For example, repression generated moral outrage, in particular among people who are highly identified with the climate movement, while also reducing participative efficacy in Study 1 and identity consolidation efficacy in Study 2. Thus, more complex experimental designs are needed to fully address the mechanisms underlying engagement in collective action.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAside from its impact – direct or indirect – on collective action intentions, we also believe that our research provides additional findings that advance some current debates in the literature. For example, the literature on moral obligation posits that moral factors function independently of instrumental concerns such as efficacy considerations (Sabucedo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). While we do not find overall effects of our political efficacy manipulation on moral obligation, in Study 2 we observe that high political efficacy caused a reduced sense of moral obligation to among those who were not strongly identified with the climate movement, but this did not occur among high identifiers. This seems to suggest that perceiving the movement as already efficacious would prevent less mobilized people from forming a moral commitment to the cause and joining, and confirms the view that a sense of moral obligation is closely bound to important identities (Ayanian et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Further evidence for the fact that politicized identity influences the moral dynamics of collective action is the fact that we obtained robust evidence for another moderated mediation in which politicized identity catalyzed the moral outrage caused by higher levels of repression. This suggests that those more strongly identified with the movement interpret repression as a more severe transgression.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, our research presents the first experimental evidence of the impact of political efficacy and repression perceptions on the environmental movement. It provides valuable insights to the study of environmental protest (and collective action in general) that could help stimulate further much-needed experimental work on the causal effects of these factors. Our research might also have practical implications that can inform environmental movements looking to encourage people to join their efforts. Our findings suggests, for instance, that stressing repression as an unfair and immoral deed may prompt people to join as moral outrage and moral obligation increase. Furthermore, optimistic messages about the effectiveness of protest may backfire when trying to gain new recruits for the cause, as those less identified with the movement could feel less morally obligated to contribute. The discourse on efficacy is especially delicate, as we have also observed that political inefficacy has negative consequences for mobilization. Perhaps, a more personal approach that focuses on what someone can contribute as an individual within the movement would be a better option when trying to convince a disengaged public.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eLimitations and Future Directions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs with every piece of research, our work is not exempt from certain limitations. First, our research was conducted exclusively in the context of the United Kingdom, suggesting caution when trying to generalize these findings to other contexts, especially those outside the so-called \u003cem\u003eWEIRD\u003c/em\u003e countries. In this sense, recent research on environmental collective action suggests that people are less likely to act in contexts that are more repressive and with less efficacious environmental policies (Uysal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, macro-level conditions may interact with attitudes and perceptions in shaping participation. Moreover, our research focused on the intention to participate in collective action and did not assess actual participation, which could affect our conclusions due to the so-called intention behaviour gap (Sheeran \u0026amp; Webb, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). However, our focus on general intentions could also have limited the observed effects. Perhaps the impact of learning about efficacy or repression could be better translated in the short term if we asked about intended participation in a specific upcoming demonstration, as this would provide a concrete political opportunity to participants who would normally be unaware of engagement opportunities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDespite these limitations, we believe this novel research opens up many avenues for future research, of which we will highlight those that we deem most important. As engagement in collective action is a multi-causal and multi-level phenomenon (see Thomas et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), further study of other potential variables that moderate the effects observed here are of particular interest. For instance, it is possible that system justification beliefs (Jost, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) could also play a moderating role, as those high on these beliefs may see the repressive actions as more justifiable. Regarding political efficacy, we argue that awareness about the tangible benefits of actions against climate change could moderate the impact of this variable on intentions to act. Because climate change is a structural process, the demands of the movement may not be perceived by people as tangible improvements, but rather as preventive measures regarding future catastrophes. For instance, even if people think that the government may be forced to ban emissions due to collective pressure, they may not perceive this as an improvement of the current situation. In fact, models that promote environmental action have focused on highlighting risks (Bradley et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) and stressing the importance of both delayed gratification (Arbuthnott, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) and the problem that focusing on hedonic values and gains reasoning pose (Steg et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, the improvement of the climatic situation could be framed in terms of tangible benefits like cleaner air that positively affects health (Xue et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) or cleaner, more enjoyable natural spaces (Williams et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). We argue that focusing on such tangible benefits could enhance the positive effects of political efficacy.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eAs Zinn\u0026rsquo;s observed in the quote we presented at the begining of this paper, a problem of our time is that people often fail to challenge what they know is wrong. Unearthing the factors that move people to act collectively against injustices remains one of the elemental tasks in social sciences. Our experimental approach shows promise in identifying meaningful causal effects, but our findings also attest to the multifaceted nature of collective action motives and highlight that participation is likely to be initiated through a causal chain of factors that might differ for different groups, rather than a single factor that directly prompts people to act. This complexity makes this research endeavour more interesting but also more urgent. In a world where people seem convinced that a climatic crisis with dire consequences is impending, too few are acting collectively to hold governments and companies to account. By uncovering what transforms people\u0026rsquo;s worries into organized collective action, we can hopefully propel a much-needed global collective movement before climatic change has progressed to the extent that results in irrevocable damage.\u003c/p\u003e "},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests regarding the present article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eOur problem is not civil disobedience, our problem is civil obedience. Our problem is that people are obedient all over the world, in the face of poverty and starvation and stupidity and war and cruelty\u0026rdquo; \u0026ndash;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eHoward Zinn\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll study materials and measures, and data used in the present research are publicly available online at the Open Science Framework Repository (https://osf.io/9fm4x/?view_only=342986a736b8400784c7e53526da80f7).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAgostini M, van Zomeren M (2021) Toward a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of four motivations and structural constraints. 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Arnove, \u003cem\u003eVoices of a People\u0026rsquo;s History of the United States, 10th Anniversary Edition: 10 Anniversary Edition\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4294040/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4294040/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eDespite increasing concern about climate change and widespread demonstrations demanding urgent action, governments worldwide are failing to meet climate pledges and many have introduced anti-protest laws that limit citizens\u0026rsquo; ability to hold them accountable. We investigate the impacts of the political efficacy of climate protests and the risks of protest repression on people\u0026rsquo;s motivation to engage in both conventional, normative and radical, non-normative pro-environmental collective action. We ran two experiments (total \u003cem\u003eN\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;443) among residents in the UK, where recent legislative changes have severely restricted climate protests. Using fabricated news articles, we manipulated political efficacy and repression in a 2x2 between-subjects design. Our manipulations successfully shifted perceptions of political efficacy and the risks of repression, however they did not produce direct effects on action intentions. Rather, these factors impacted action intentions indirectly by shaping other motives. Specifically, political efficacy exerted a positive indirect effect on normative (but not non-normative) action intentions by shifting people\u0026rsquo;s beliefs about the value of their own contribution (Study 1) and the likelihood that taking action will strengthen the movement (Study 2). In line with a backlash effect, and suggesting that restrictions on protest could radicalize action, repression exerted a positive indirect effect on both normative and non-normative action intentions by generating moral outrage. Moderation of effects by climate change concern and politicized identity lend further nuance to these findings. Our research provides scarce evidence of the causal effects of efficacy and repression on protest intentions and has implications for mobilization efforts of climate movements.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"A Fight Against All Odds? The Causal Effects of Perceived Political Efficacy and Protest Repression on Motivation to Engage in Normative and Non-normative Climate Protest","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2024-06-21 16:27:05","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4294040/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"91c1b2a8-b527-4b0f-8a11-c9cb78a19c40","owner":[],"postedDate":"June 21st, 2024","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2024-07-28T20:06:00+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2024-06-21 16:27:05","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-4294040","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-4294040","identity":"rs-4294040","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"qtupq5eGEP_6zYnWcrvyt","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}