Decentralizing environmental public spending: from political platforms to actual policies in the EU countries | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Decentralizing environmental public spending: from political platforms to actual policies in the EU countries Federica Lanterna, Giovanni Marin, Agnese Sacchi This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-9466849/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Environmental challenges increasingly shape political discourses across Europe, yet their influence on actual environmental governance remains unclear. This paper examines the political economy mechanisms linking environmental change, party platforms, and the decentralization of environmental protection expenditure in 27 EU member states from 2002 to 2022. We distinguish between political signalling - the commitments parties make in electoral manifestos - and policy implementation, measured through actual decentralized environmental spending. Our results reveal a sharp asymmetry: while extreme events substantially increase the salience of environmental protection in party platforms, they do not translate into changes in the territorial allocation of environmental expenditure. Political orientations of governing coalitions show no systematic association with environmental spending outcomes. Taken together, these findings highlight a persistent gap between electoral incentives and policy implementation in multilevel environmental governance. This is consistent with public choice theories on institutional inertia and limited political responsiveness beyond the stage of platform competition. JEL: H70, H72, H77, Q54, Q58 Decentralisation environmental protection natural disasters political announcements voters preferences Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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