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Guided by the Exclusion Mechanism Theory, the study examines if the gender and corruption nexus present in global literature remains true within the context of the Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999–2023), without establishing a strict causal relationship. The study adopts a quantitative descriptive research design, relying on secondary time-series data for the proportion of women in the National Assembly, including appointed female ministers in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Also, annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores and rankings for Nigeria were sourced from the online database of Transparency International. Analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics and graphical analytical tools to visualize patterns and inflection points across electoral cycles. Evidence from the graphical analysis reveals that the average women's representation in the National Assembly is just 5.4 percent across both chambers. Furthermore, the peak of women representation (2007–2014) corresponds with the period when Nigeria had a modest CPI score progress. Similarly, the decrease in women political representation in 2019–2023, aligned with anti-corruption stagnation. Nonetheless, CPI scores never exceeded 30 points even when female representation peaked. The study concludes that there is a weak positive correlation between women's political representation and reduced corruption in Nigeria, but structural barriers critically impedes on this relationship, hence, complementing gender parity with institutional reform is key to combating corruption. Consequently, the study recommends legislative quotas for women, while also strengthening the anti-corruption institutions for seamless operation. Political representation Nigeria Corruption Fourth Republic Gender–governance Exclusion Mechanism Theory Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Introduction There is a consensus among liberal scholars that, the progress of any modern democratic society is anchored on how well their citizens regardless of their gender affinity, directly or indirectly participate in politics. Though recent studies show that half of the world’s population is made up of women who also play important roles, contributing to the growth and development of the society they are part of (Okungbaye, 2021; Daniel and Faith 2013 in Salau et al., 2024). Nevertheless despite the immense contribution of women in the society, they are still being relegated from to performing certain roles in most societies, particularly holding political offices. For the past three decades, the gender and governance nexus has dominated a key position in the fields of comparative political science, public administration, and development economics. In the midst of this quagmire lies a pertinent question that has been begging for an answer: will governance outcome improve in terms of corruption reduction if more women are given the opportunity to hold political offices? The work of Dollar et al. (2001) laid the empirical foundation in this intellectual discourse. Drawing on a large state-wide dataset, they discovered that when women have a good number of political representations in the parliament, it leads to lower levels of corruption. This led them to a conclusively state that, when it comes to moral and public administration, women may be the "fairer sex" when compared to men (Dollar et al., 2001). This finding was further consolidated by Swamy et al. (2001), when they used numerous independent datasets to show that nation-states where women holds larger share of political and bureaucratic positions, corruption levels tends to be low in such places (Swamy et al., 2001). These foundational studies by the aforementioned scholars, ignited a global debate on gender–corruption nexus among scholars, one that has since been made rich, complicated, and mostly antagonized by subsequent studies. In Africa, particularly Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the attention of many scholars has been drawn to the political misrepresentation of women and systemic corruption that has been eating the country like cancer. Orokpo et al. (2017) contends that, though historically, political consciousness have been demonstrated by women in Nigeria in the past, yet, they have faced serious political marginalisation with regards to holding any meaningful political positions, a pattern that successive democratic administrations has consistently maintained. This claim has been corroborated by quantitative evidence: as Likinyo and Arum (2025) noted in their analyses that, since the the Fourth Republic began in 1999, women political representation in the Nigerian legislature has never exceeded 10 Percent. The highest recorded proportion of female lawmakers in the Senate between 2007 and 2011 peaked at 8.3 Percent. On the other hand, the highest share recorded for women in the House of Representatives was between 2011 and 2015, and it peaked at 7.2 Percent (Likinyo and Arum, 2025). The underrepresentation of women in politics became worse in the 2023 general elections, producing the lowest number of women in the National legislation since the emergence of the Fourth Republic, recording only fourteen female members in the Federal House of Representative and just three women in the Senate (iKNOW Politics, 2024). In the light of this, Esidene and Abdul (2013) contended that women ostracization from Nigeria's politics has its roots in the legacies of colonialism which projected the male gender as being superior in leadership, an argument that resonates with the studies of Arowolo and Aluko (2010) and Omoregie (2025), who discovered that, regardless of the political consciousness of women in Nigeria, they remain extremely marginalised when it comes to holding political offices. Studies has shown that the average for women's political participation at the federal level, including both contested positions and political appointees like ministers, is around 6.7 Percent, a figure which is a departure from the 22.5 Percent global average, 23.4 Percent African regional average, and even the 15 Percent average for West African sub-region (Likinyo and Arum, 2025). The Intellectual discourse on the relationship between women and corruption has grown substantially beyond the cross-national paradigm which was established initially by Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), with more contemporary studies rigorously probing the conditionalities, apparatus and direction of the correlation. The accountability-based theory which was advanced by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2018) argues that, political systems that holds accountability to the highest esteem, women occupying political offices tends to show low rates of corruption. On the contrary, in societies with low-accountability, corruption rate intensifies regardless of the gender occupying a political position (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2018). The findings of their study has serious implications for Nigeria, where, money-based politics, weak electoral processes and compromized democratic institutions, sabotage accountability mechanisms that ordinarily could have reinforce women's anti-corruption effects. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2019) probes the directionality of causation using instrumental variable methods. They discovered that causality runs in both directions: women's political representation leads to decrease in corruption, and corruption concurrently dwindle women's political participation (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019). Similarly, in a study carried out by Bauhr and Charron (2019) utilizing dataset across 182 European regions, it shows what they termed an 'exclusion mechanism', where politicians of the female extraction have stronger incentives to combat grand corruption but are being systematically shut out from patrimonial networks dominated by their male counterparts (Bauhr & Charron, 2019). Sung (2012) offered a partially divergent view, by carrying out a longitudinal panel analysis of 204 countries. He discovered that the reasonable percentage of women occupying political offices or otherwise has nothing to do with corruption trends; for him, the determinant of corruption outcomes is how strong liberal democratic institutions are, insinuating that the gender–corruption nexus just be largely exaggerated (Sung, 2012). Furthermore, Merkle and Wong (2020) critical examined the discourse of gender and corruption by approaching it using different lens. According to them, power is the central theme of this subject matter, adding that, corruption and male-dominated political systems work hand-in-hand to subdue women's political representation, ultimately creating an atmosphere where corrupt political environments needlessly ostracize female aspirants (Merkle & Wong, 2020). Examining this issue from Nigeria, Ette and Akpan-Obong (2022) critically evaluated how female politicians in Nigeria try to come to consensus with the patronage-based structures that is male-dominated, by leveraging on their femininity as a tactical tool, thus showcasing their wit and resilience against a system that is built to politically ostracize them (Ette & Akpan-Obong, 2022). Within the ambits of this discourse, the continued poor performance of Nigeria as far as corruption indices is concerned, shows the urgency and the need to particularly examine the extent to which women political underrepresentation intersects with endemic corruption. Though several scholars have significantly contributed to the discourse of gender-corruption nexus, nonetheless, a deligent review of literature particularly the ones examined thus far, shows critical gaps that our current study intends to fill. First, the dominant literature on the subject matter in the current body of knowledge (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2018, 2019; Sung, 2012), heavily rely on cross-national, quantitative analyses deploying panel or cross-sectional data, primarily focusing on Asia, Europe and the Americas; Africa as a whole, particularly Nigeria, remains understudied. Secondly, studies that specifically focused on Nigeria like those carried out by Akpan-Obong (2022), Esidene and Abdul (2013), and Ette and Orokpo et al. (2017), did not empirically probe the nexus between corruption and women misrepresentation within the specific temporal and institutional context of the Fourth Republic, but rather, they tend to merely study the two concepts separately as independent variables. Thirdly, though Sung (2012), including Bauhr and Charron (2019) made significant inputs, however their findings are constrained by the fact that, they only based their analyses on regions with strong mechanisms for democratic accountability already in place—conditions that negates what is realistically obtainable in Nigeria's political terrain, dominated by godfatherism, violence and compromized institutions. Fourthly, a graphical analytical approach that visually maps and tracks the concurrent paths of women political representation and corruption indices across the electoral cycles of Nigeria's Fourth Republic is mostly missing from the literature, as current studies predominantly relied on methods that are either econometric, qualitative or Likert-scale survey instruments. These gaps in knowledge broadly points to the need for a study that integrates time-series visual evidence to critically evaluate women's political representation and corruption in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. In the light of these gaps, our current study position itself as a contribution to filling the identified vacuum in the current body of knowledge. By utilizing a graphical analytical methodology, one that takes advantage of longitudinal data on the percentage of elective and appointed positions held by women in Nigeria's Fourth Republic across successive electoral cycles, along side with annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Nigeria from Transparency International for Nigeria over the same period. Unlike other studies that rely on regression and purely qualitative approaches, graphical analysis makes these two variables conveniently available and accessible, thereby enabling both policy makers and other researchers to quickly spot patterns, points of inflection, as well as trend reversals that purely statistical models may not be able to capture. In furtherance of these aims, the following objectives guides the study: (i) to examine the trend in women's political representation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic across electoral cycles (1999–2023) utilizing statistical and graphical evidence; and (ii) to evalue wether if the empirical gender–corruption nexus that was established in global literature holds in the Nigerian Fourth Republic context when evaluated through graphical evidence. Methodology A quantitative descriptive research design is adopted by this study to evaluate women’s political representation and corruption nexus in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999–2023). The research relies on descriptive statistics and graphical approach to comprehensively show and explore patterns over time, rather than to establish strict causal relationships. Data Sources and Collection Data on women's political representation were collected from secondary sources such as peer reviewed journals and European Union SDGN. Just to be specific, we carefully put together the propositions (%) of women (past and present) holding political positions in Nigeria's National Assembly, including appointed female ministers, for each election cycle from 1999 to 2023. Also, we collected secondary data on Nigeria's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from the online database of Transparency International. The data on corruption clearly shows the annual time series of corruption rank and scores for Nigeria over the years, with 0 signifying very high corruption and 100 signifying very low corruption. All the data were obtained from publicly available sources that are verifiable, thereby maintaining transparency and replicability. Descriptive statistics like simple percentages, and averages which were manually calculated for all key variables. Specifically: Proportions of women in each legislative body, including female ministers are calculated for every electoral cycle in the Fourth Republic. The statistical formula applied for the calculation of the mean is as follows: WHERE Xi = Each individual value in the dataset n = Total number of the values ∑ = Summation of all the values Furthermore, given the limitation in graphical mapping of trends in current body of knowledge, our analysis places high premium on visual representation, as a result, the study utilized time‑series line graphs, bar charts and clustered bar charts to clearly visualize representation of women holding political offices and corruption index. The fusion of both descriptive statistics and graphical approaches enables the study to (i) record clear patterns in women’s political representation that is comprehensive, (ii) trace corresponding movements in corruption indicators, and (iii) visually show whether periods that has higher women's political representation coincide with lower (or higher) levels of corruption. Ethical Considerations This study exclusively used on data from secondary sources that are publicly available, with no human subject directly involved. As a result, ethhical concerns are therefore minimal; nonetheless, the study carefully utilized data from official and reputable sources; report accurately and interpret the findings of the study without being bias;, as well as clearly state data limitations and avoid overstating causal claims. The Exclusion Mechanism: Theoretical Adaptations The Exclusion Mechanism Theory was propounded by Bauhr et al. (2019). This theory is empirically grounded for explaining female political representation and corruption nexus. Rooted in the broader political economy of gender and governance, the theory notes that political systems, especially those at their nascent stage, are characterized with partisanship, nepotism and godfatherism which were systematically and deliberately made to be dominated by men (Bauhr et al., 2019). Critical among its assumptions is that, structural exclusion shapes incentive structures: this is due to the fact that female politicians are systematically ostracized from the male-dominated informal organizations that are used to perpetuate corruption, their inability to access or take part in these arrangements, structurally deter them from partaking in corrupt tendencies (Bauhr et al., 2019). Secondly, the theory assumes that corrupt environments are gendered environments : meaning that, corruption and male-dominated environments mutually reinforce each other to deny women from accessing political power (Merkle & Wong, 2020). The third assumption of the theory distinguishes between petty and grand corruption : through empirical analysis across 182 European regions, Bauhr et al. (2019) shows that when women are adequately representated, it has aa way of mitigating stronger effect on grand corruption due to the fact that, exclusion from male patronage organizations matter most at this level. Fourthly, a bidirectional causal logic is further assume by the theory: the ostracization of women from corrupt companies not only reduce the tendencies of female political office holders to be partakers of corruption, but corruption on its own, by consolidating the male-dominated frameworks which ostracize women from politics, concurrently suppress female representation, a trend that has been systematically validated by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2019) through instrumental variable estimations. As a whole, the assumptions put forward by this theory intersect on a common theoretical proposition: allowing more women to hold political offices on its own have a way of mitigating corruption, not just because they are saints or more morally upright, but because their structural positioning by the system outside organized corrupt elements, incentivise them as well as gives them the legitimacy and the impetus to question and unmask such nefarious practices (Bauhr et al., 2024). Be that as it may, the above theory resonates with our current research in several ways. For instance, the first structural exclusion assumption put forward by the theory, perfectly fits the context of Nigeria's Fourth Republic, where women political representation particularly in the Senate and House of Representative, has never gone beyond the threshold of 10 Percent, averaging just at 5.4 Percent across the two legislative chambers within the last 26 years (Likinyo and Arum, 2025). This critical ostracization of women is not a mere accident, but an outcome of a broken political framework that that was deliberatly orchestrated by male-dominated patronage networks, which the theory identifies as breeding ground backed by institutions for corrupt practices to ensue (Ette & Akpan-Obong, 2022; Orokpo et al., 2017). Secondly, the submission of the theory that corruption and patriarchy coexist and mutually reinforce each other is evident in the Nigerian political environment, where the patriarchal elite networks institutionalize corruption (Esidene & Abdul, 2013; iKNOW Politics, 2024). Thirdly, the bidirectional causality assumption put forward by the theory, provides the fundamental framework needed to interprete the graphical evidence presented in this study. Furthermore, the theory's accountability-conditionality dimension provides the theoretical scaffolding for explaining why Nigeria's persistently weak democratic institutions, characterised by compromised electoral processes and under-enforced anti-corruption legislation, have diluted and complicated the potential governance dividend of female representation. Conceptual Analytical Framework: Women Representation and Corruption Conceptualizing Women Representation In the field Political Science, the concept of women political representation has been a subject of intense theoretical debate due to its multifaceted nature. The primary framework for the comprehension of this concept was first established by the German-born scholar, Hanna Pitkin (1967), who in her work revealed at least four distinguishable variables namely, descriptive representation, formalistic representation, substantive representation, and symbolic representation. In her seminal work, "The Concept of Representation" (1967), Pitkin expound these dimensions as thus: substantive representation has to do with the preferences of public policy and interests; while formalistic representation is concerned with the legal frameworks guiding the conduct of representative democracy; descriptive representation on the other hand, refers to the extent to which citizens and their representatives bear same semblance in various social categories; and finally, symbolic representation is closely linked with issues that partains identity. When specifically applied to women, descriptive representation concerns itself with numerical representation of the population, where key representatives mirror the population with respect to common attributes like gender. Notwithstanding, female political representation has been widely defined as the process by which women register their presence in politics by participating and occupying key positions of leadership scattered across several institutions where they have been historically marginalized and underrepresented when compared to their male contemporaries (Salau et al., 2024). In an attempt to consolidate the framework of Pitkin (1967), Schwindt-Bayer (2010) comprehensively articulated a theory of women representation which put forward a broad and unified model that links formal, substantive, symbolic and descriptive representation. This unified model suggests that one cannot reduce women political representation to a single dimension but must be comprehended as a phenomenon that is complex and interrelated. Nonetheless, there is a consensus among scholars that when more women occupy political offices, it gives room for a better representation of the society as a whole. Hence, it is paramount to properly address the issue of gender imbalance as far as political representation is concerned, particularly as women underrepresentation have the tendency of showing long-term effects which extends beyond immediate or temporary symbolic effects on policies. Collectively, the conceptualization of women political representation by this body of scholarship shows that conceptualizing the variable requires keen attention to who is present, what they do, how they are perceived, as well as the prevailing structural conditions that either support or impede on their effectiveness. Conceptualizing Corruption For year, the meaning of the concept of corruption has been contested by many scholars due to its multifaceted nature in social science scholarship. Due to its manifestations across political economic, and social-cultutal contexts, a universally accept definition have been resisted among academics. Consequently its conceptualization has been traditionally approached by scholars from three predominant analytical dimensions as thus. The first is the public-office-centred definition which was championed by Nye (1967). Nye operationalizes corruption as "behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding pecuniary or status gains." This definition highlights the violation of formal norms and responsibilities as the defining yardstick. On the other hand, the market-centred tradition which is associated with scholars like van Klaveren (1989), defines corruption as a situation where corrupt officials maximizes their income by exploitating and treating the public offices they occupy as business. Supporting these, the public-interest-centred approach contended that corruption occurs when occupiers of public offices who are by default expected to serve the interest of the people, use such offices to pursue their personal interests in ways that harm the general public (Friedrich, 1966). Nonetheless, contemporary studies that are interdisciplinary in nature, tries to harmonize these definitions. For example, Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) lay emphasis on the institutional and transactional dimensions of corruption, situating it within frail governance frameworks where mechanisms for formal accountability are overturned. In a similar vein, Johnston (2005) added that, there is a need to understand corruption in terms of the exploitation of opportunities which is created by the interrelation of public authority and private interest, warning scholars against definitions that lay much emphasis on legal context while ignoring the norms and cultural aspects. Moving from the complexity in defining the concept, corruption is further classified based on its scale, form, and systemic intricacies. Grand corruption is the process where by senior government officials and political elites influence legislations and policies for their selfish interests at the expense of the public. Petty corruption on the other hand, describes the bribery and abuse of power that the common man encounters everyday as they relate with bureaucrats within the mid and low level of government (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], N.D). Meanwhile, political corruption as opposed to bureaucratic corruption, is when political leaders manipulate political institutions, established rules, and regulations for the purpose of enriching themselves or retaining political power (Philp, 2002). Contrastingly, systemic or endemic corruption happens when citizens including established public and private institutions see corruption as a normal way of life, such that, it is not regarded as a criminal behaviour (Rothstein, 2011). Be that as it may, in consolidating these classifications, Elijah et al. (2025) contended that, corruption exists in all facets of the society regardless of the type of government in place or level of development, adding that corruption does not discriminate against social class or gender. Results and Discussion Table 1 shows complete dataset for female political representation, CPI rank and CPI scores across different election circles Election Circle Female Senators (%) Female House Members (%) ) Female Ministers (%) ) CPI Rank CPI S CPI Score Core 1999 2000 2001 2002 2.8 3.3 19.1 98 90 90 101 16 12 10 16 2003 2004 2005 2006 3.7 5.8 15.1 132 144 152 142 14 16 19 22 2007 2008 2009 2010 8.3 6.9 17.9 147 121 130 134 22 27 25 24 2011 2012 2013 2014 6.4 7.2 31.7 143 139 144 136 24 27 25 27 2015 2016 2017 2018 6.4 6.1 16.6 136 136 148 144 26 28 27 27 2019 2020 2021 2022 7.3 3.6 15.9 146 149 154 150 26 25 24 24 2023 2.7 4.7 25.0 145 25 Source: Abatta, (2023); EU-SDGN (2023); Igariwey (N.D); Transparency International (2026) The above (table 1) serves as the fundamental time series dataset for this research, which captures several metrics based on their annual fluctuation. The table shows that, female senators revolves between 2.7 percent and 8.3 percent reaching its all time high in 2007, and revealing slight growth and even decrease in subsequent years. While House of representative climaxes at 7.2 percent in 2011 election cycle, but however decreases to 3.6 percent in 2019 election year. Ministerial positions on the other hand witnessed more volatility, but declining to starting moderately at 15.1 percent in 2003, peaking at 31.7 percent in 2011, and further decline to 15.9 percent in 2019 with a leap to 25 percent in 2023. On all, women political representation remains low, unable to cross the 10 percent threshold in legislative bodies and varying more in executive roles. Meanwhile, Nigeria's CPI score shows a general progression from 16 in 1999 to 24-27 in recent years, revealing that modest breakthrough is being made in corruption perception. Nonetheless, a more complex story is being told by the global ranking, with Nigeria's ranking in the leadership board declining from 98th in 1999 to rank between 136th and 154th in the years going forward. Fig. 1 reveals just a slight movement to the up side from 1999–2003 (low base around 3–5 percent in legislature) peaking in the 2007–2011 cycles. This is followed by stagnation in post-2015. The dips in 2019–2023 indicate a reduction in house of representative. The above graph reveals continuous marginalization, with no any viable hope toward gender parity. The bars in fig. 2 reveal the extent to which women occupying legislative positions consistently underperform in comparison with their ministerial counterparts. For instance, the proportion of women in legislative seats between 2011 to 2014 is 6–7 percent while for ministerial position is 31.7 percent that same period, suggesting that it is easier to get executive appointments than to secure electoral wins. Women political representation remains flat and low, with senate moderately dominant female house of representative members in some cycles (e.g., 8.3 percent versus 6.9 percent in 2007–2010). This visualization clearly highlights the gender imbalance in representation, suggesting that women are more dominant in positions that are based on appointment, even though the overall women representation in the cluster bar is less than 30 percent. This development shows that there is an entrenched gender disparity in the overall political power structures. The line in fig 3 begins low between 10 to 16 in 2000s, increases gradually to 27–28 between 2016 to 2018, and then slightly reduces to 24–25 in the 2020s. The graph illustrates moderate growth but high corruption rate that is consistently increasing, suggest that systemic issues such as institutional weakness supercedes the ongoing effort of anti-corruption agencies. The above chart visualizes an increasing trend of corruption over time, with ranks rising in 1999 from 98 to 150 and 154 in mid-2010s to 2020s. The momentary improvements like droping to 121 in 2008 did not last long. This visual map illustrates a downward momentum in the global leadership board, antagonizing the minor score gains in Fig. 3, implying that other nations recover faster when compared to Nigeria. The chart above concurrently shows different periods when women were highly represented with rising Corruption Perception Index scores. For example, between 2007 to 2014, the chart shows that women have elevated ministerial and senate shares while Nigeria's corruption score witnessed a dramatic increase between 22 to 27 that same period. In a similar development, the chart shows that between 1999–2006 and 2019–2023, women representation was low, while Nigeria's corruption score was weaker (10–22 and 24–26) that same periods. This development is as potential pointer to the fact that, corruption levels and female political representation could have a positive link. Nonetheless, the graph visually investigates the relationship between these two variables without claiming causality, implying that gender parity in politics might lead to better governance. Table 2 shows average female political representation, CPI scores and ranks by election circle (1999 – 2023) Election Circle Average Female Senators Average Female House Members Average Female Ministers CPI Score CPI Rank 1999 – 2003 3.2% 4.5% 17.1% 15 115 2003 – 2007 6.% 6.3% 16.5% 18 140 2007 – 2011 7.4% 7.1% 24.8% 23 145 2011 – 2011 6.4% 6.7% 24.1% 25 140 2015 – 2019 6.8% 4.8% 16.2% 26 141 2019 - 2023 5% 4.2% 20.4% 25.5 146 Overall Average 5.4% 5.4% 20.2% 21.9 135 Source: Authors calculation The above summary table put together the data in Table 1 into cycle averages for the purpose of streamlining comparison. The table shows that, average for women representation in the senate reached a zenith point of 7.4 percent in 2007–2011 election circle, but the overall average stood at 5.4 percent that same period. Female political representation for House of Representative on the other hand was at 5.4 percent with a low of 4.2 percent in 2019–2023 election circle. While for ministers, the overall average was 20.2 percent, peaking at 24.8 percent in 2007–2011 election circle. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores shows improvement from 15 in 1999–2003 circle to 26 for 2015–2019 circle, and then slightly declined to 25.5 in 2019–2023 election circle. While the CPI rank plummeted from 115 to 146. Overall averages: legislature was 5.4 percent, female ministers were 20.2 percent, average CPI score was 21.9, and 135 for CPI rank. Averages show gradual growth in women representation and and CPI scores in 2007–2015 election period with reasonable decline subsequently. The table shows the numerical baseline for women representation (under 6 percent in legislature) against insignificant improvement in corruption index, thus allowing the study to document key patterns without causation. The bars in the above graph for women in the Senate and House of Representative rose from low averages of 3–4 percent in 1999–2003 to 7–24 percent in 2007–2011 election circles. The proportion however plummeted in post-2015, with ministers driving variability. The graph highlights recurring movements which is linked to elections, emphasizing no direct progress and potential retrogression of gender parity under recent administrations. The above bar chart indicates that between 1999/2003 and 2015/2019 election circles, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score surged from 15 to 26, suggesting that the fight against corruption is gaining momentum, while CPI rank bars show signs of deterioration by increasing to 146 in 2019–2023 election circle. This difference emphasizes that there is a relative global decrease irrespective of the domestic gains, visually stressing the challenges of Nigeria in surpassing global improvements in governance. Summary of Findings Taken together, the graphical evidence from this study suggests that there is a general connection between women's political participation and lower corruption levels as shown in global literature like Dollar et al., (2001) and Swamy (2001), even though this connection seems to be a bit weaker in the context of Nigeria. This weakness stems from the fact that the political environment in Nigeria is largely shaped by structural issues that has taken deep roots. These issues include ethnic and religious patronage networks, electoral violence, godfatherism and systemic setbacks that deter women from becoming deeply involved in politics (Esidene & Abdul, 2013; Ette & Akpan-Obong, 2022; Merkle & Wong, 2020). Conclusion and Policy Recommendations This study critically examined the nexus between women’s political representation and corruption in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999–2023) through a statistical and graphical lens. Evidence from the graphical analysis in this study suggests that the inclusion of women in politics and governance integrity are like two sides of a coin, meaning that, corruption levels and female political representation have a positive link. The period when women had highest women political visibility in governance (2007–2014) in Nigeria, coincided with the period when Nigeria's Fourth Republic’s witnessed the most sustained and modest improvements in Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores. On the contrary, the glaring decline in women political representation seen in the electoral cycle of 2019–2023 coincided with the period when anti-corruption performance also witnessed stagnation and deterioration in Nigeria’s global Corruption Perception ranking. This development consolidate the basic assumption of the Exclusion Mechanism Theory, which postulates that the structural exclusion of women from the patriarchal patronage networks of "godfatherism" better positions them as well as gives them the legitimacy and the impetus to question and unmask nefarious practices in governance. Be that as it may, the study concludes that gender parity alone may not be enough to totally eradicate corruption in Nigeria. The fact that Corruption Perception Index scores never crossed the 30-point threshold even when women political representation was at its all time high, suggests that the "fairer sex" assumption promoted by Dollar et al (2001), is critically jeopardized by compromized institutions that are marred by systemic corruption. As seen in the analysis of our study, the momentary CPI score increase which was recorded between 2015 and 2019 irrespective of stale women political representation, implies that resilient liberal institutions and law enforcement agencies are very key in the fight against corruption. Therefore, while it is important to increase women's political representation for the consolidation of Nigeria's democracy, that alone is not sufficient to put an end the systemic and patrimonial corruption that has spread its roots over the years. Consequent upon these, the following policy interventions are proposed by the study. First, given that the overall average of women’s political representation in the Nigerian National Assembly is merely 5.4 percent since 1999, lawmakers in the National Assembly should prioritize the passage of the "Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill." To be more specific, a provisional legislative quota system that will reserve 35 percent of legislative positions for women should be passed into law in order to dismantle the structural barriers that has excluded women for years. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) can also help in addressing the "Exclusion Mechanism" from its root, by mandating political parties to amend their internal selection processes such that, it relegates the nomination fees in favour of female aspirants in their political party. Secondly, acknowledging that gender parity must go hand-in-hand with accountability, the policy makers in Nigeria must ensure that the autonomy of anti-corruption agencies is being consolidated and fortified so as to enable them fight corruption seamlessly. Strengthening these institutions will ensure that the "accountability environment" is safe enough for politicians of the female extraction to fearlessly showcase their anti-corruption potential, as theorized by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer. This study acknowledges the following limitations in accordance with transparent scholarly practice. First, study majorly used secondary data, a development that has the potential of introducing bias into the final outcome of the research. Secondly, while this study leveraged graphical analysis to map broad trends, it did not establish any causal relationships. Thirdly, while ministerial appointments as a proxy for executive-level female inclusion is being incorporated by the study, the dataset does not capture female representation in sub-national legislatures, the judiciary, or the civil service, areas in which gender dynamics may differ meaningfully from the patterns observed at the federal level. Consequently, future research can leverage on these gaps by employing instrumental variable methods, disaggregated state-level analysis, quantitative models or mixed-methods designs, to considerably widen the understanding of the dynamics through which gender parity shapes the outcome of governance in Nigeria or other climes. Declarations Funding The authors did not receive any financial support from any organization for the submitted work. Competing interests We declare that there is no competing of interest of any kind amongst us. Ethics approval This is an observational study. The Nigerian Defence Academy Research Ethics Committee has confirmed that no ethical approval is required for study of this nature. Consent to participate Not applicable Data and/or Code availability The author confirms that all data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this article. Furthermore, the secondary data supporting the findings of this study is publicly available at the time of submission. Authors’ contribution statements All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by Hassana Bishir Mohammed, Emmanuel Elijah and Abdullahi Ahmed Musa. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Hassana Bishir Mohammed and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. References Abatta, A. (2023). Table: Women Ministers in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Foundation for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from https://fij.ng/article/table-women-ministers-in-nigerias-fourth-republic/ (accessed 6 February, 2026). Arowolo, D. & Aluko, F.S. (2010). Women and political participation in Nigeria. European Journal of Social Sciences, 14(4), 581-593. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294419383_Women_and_political_participation_in_Nigeria (accessed February 21, 2026) Bauhr, M., Charron, N., & Wangnerud, L. (2019). Exclusion or interests? Why females in elected office reduce petty and grand corruption. European Journal of Political Research, 58(4), 1043–1065. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12300 Bauhr, M., Charron, N. & Wängnerud, L. (2024). Will Women’s Representation Reduce Bribery? Trends in Corruption and Public Service Delivery Across European Regions. Political Behavior. 46, 2427–2450 (2024). Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09925-x Omoregie, E. (2025). Implications of Women and Youths’ Participation for Political Development in Nigeria Fourth Republic. , 9(10), 2248 - 2257 DOI: https://doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.910000185 Likinyo, S.O. & Arum, I. (2025). Women and Political Participation in the Nigerian Fourth Republic, 2019-2023," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, 9(4), 323-337, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2025.90400026 Daniel, E.G & Faith, O.O (2013). Women in Governance and Suitable Democracy inNigeria, 1992 – 2012. Economics and Sociology, 6 (1) 89 – 107 Retrieved from https://www.economics-sociology.eu/files/13_Daniel.pdf (accessed 21 February, 2026). Dollar, D., Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2001). Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 46(4), 423–429. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00169-X Elijah, E., Musa, A.A. & Isa, M.I. (2025). Governance in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Issues and Pathways to Reforms. KASU Journal of Security & International Relations, 1(1), 55-70. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392502180_GOVERNANCE_IN_NIGERIA'S_FOURTH_REPUBLIC_ISSUES_AND_PATHWAYS_TO_REFORMS (accessed February 21, 2026). EU-SDGN, (2023). Nigeria 2023 Female Candidacy Analysis꞉ Where Are the Women? An ElectHER publication under the European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria (EU‑SDGNII) Programme. Retrieved from https꞉//www.yiaga.org/updated/sites/default/files/portfolio/No ‑ Country ‑ Without ‑ Women ‑ original%20 ‑ %20copyedited.pdf (accessed 6 February, 2026). Esarey, J., & Chirillo, G. (2013). "Fairer sex" or purity myth? Corruption, gender, and institutional context. Politics & Gender, 9(4), 361–389. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X13000378 Esarey, J., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2018). Women's representation, accountability and corruption in democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 659–690. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000478 Esarey, J., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2019). Estimating causal relationships between women's representation in government and corruption. Comparative Political Studies, 52(11), 1713–1741. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019830744 Esidene, E. C., & Abdul, S. U. (2013). The role of women in Nigerian politics: Interrogating the gender question for an enhanced political representation in the Fourth Republic. Semantic Scholar. Retrieved from https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:7510662 (accessed 18 February, 2026) Ette, M., & Akpan-Obong, P. (2022). Negotiating Access and Privilege: Politics of Female Participation and Representation in Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 58(7), 1291-1306. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221084253 Friedrich, C. J. (1966). Political Pathology. Political Quarterly, 37 (1), 70–85. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1966.tb00184.x Igariwey, W. (N.D). Meet The Women of the 10th Assembly. Retrieved from https://naltf.gov.ng/meet-the-women-of-the-10th-assembly/ (accessed 6 February, 2026). iKNOW Politics. (2024). Corruption as bane of women in politics, economic leadership spaces. International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics. Retrieved from https://iknowpolitics.org/en/news/corruption-bane-women-politics-economic-leadership-spaces (accessed 18 February, 2026) Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of corruption: Wealth, power, and democracy . Cambridge University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490965 Merkle, O., & Wong, P. H. (2020). It is all about power: Corruption, patriarchy and the political participation of women. In O. Merkle & R. Reinsberg (Eds.), Corruption and norms: Why informal rules matter (pp. 389–412). Springer, Cham. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14935-2_20 Nye, J. S. (1967). Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. American Political Science Review, 61 (2), 417–427. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1953254 Philp, M. (2002). Conceptualizing political corruption. In Heidenheimer, A.J. & Johnston, M. (Eds.), Political corruption: Concepts and contexts (pp. 41–57). Transaction Publishers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315126647 Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The Concept of Representation . University of California Press. Okungbaye, R. (2021). Why Women Are Important To The Prosperity Of The World. Retrieved from https://flutterwave.com/us/blog/why-women-are-important-to-the-prosperity-of-the-world?ref=dishapages (accessed 21 February, 2026). Orokpo, O. F. E., Maha, I., & Enojo, K. (2017). Women and political participation in Nigeria: A discourse. International Journal of Gender Studies, 3(1), 1–15. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325514657 (accessed 18 February, 2026) Rothstein, B. (2011). The quality of government: Corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective . University of Chicago Press. DOI https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226729589.001.0001 Salau, J. Mamudu, G. & Vitowanu, G. (2024). Women and Political Participation in Nigeria: A Critical Assessment and the Way Forward. Humanities & Language: International Journal of Linguistics, Humanities, and Education, 1(5), 308-323. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32734/wree6559. Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2010). Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America. Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199731954.003.0001 Sung, H.-E. (2012). Women in government, public corruption, and liberal democracy: A panel analysis. Crime, Law and Social Change, 58(3), 195–219. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-012-9381-2 Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., & Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 25–55. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00123-1\ Transparency International (2026). Corruption Perception Index. Retrieved from https://transparencit.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Nigerias-Scores-on-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-from-1996-2021.xlsx (accessed 6 February, 2026). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (N.D). What is Corruption? The Meaning of "Corruption" and a Survey of Its Most Common Forms. UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/toolkit/AC_Toolkit_chap1.pdfhe_Concept.pdf (accessed 19 February, 2026) Van Klaveren, J. (1989). Corruption as a Historical Phenomenon. In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, & V. T. LeVine (Eds.), Political corruption: A handbook Transaction Publishers (pp. 73–86). DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003575658 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8994138","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":598926027,"identity":"4f6261da-e2ff-4dea-90b8-ac66a61c1030","order_by":0,"name":"Hassana Bashir Mohammed","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Nigerian Defence Academy","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Hassana","middleName":"Bashir","lastName":"Mohammed","suffix":""},{"id":598926028,"identity":"b0a3f02f-5616-4188-85a3-3172176af845","order_by":1,"name":"Emmanuel Elijah","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Nigerian Defence Academy","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Emmanuel","middleName":"","lastName":"Elijah","suffix":""},{"id":598926029,"identity":"31323802-8bd0-4611-8774-25d6b2318db2","order_by":2,"name":"Abdullahi Ahmed Musa","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Federal University of Education","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Abdullahi","middleName":"Ahmed","lastName":"Musa","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-02-28 09:54:38","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8994138/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8994138/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":104403747,"identity":"1aacc15c-4699-4dce-86bc-3369ddcbb9f7","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:18:58","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":44990,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows trend in Women's political representation in Nigerian politics (1999 - 2023) by election cycle. Source: Plotted by authors with data obtained from table 1\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/9fbe406dd4347134714c6b36.png"},{"id":104179424,"identity":"48a69552-0f7e-4950-9d9d-ea44ee76a702","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-08 17:05:05","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":22929,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows women's representation across political positions (1999 - 2023)\u003cstrong\u003e. \u003c/strong\u003eSource: plotted by authors with data obtained from table 1\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/9f51d4452036d3771eb8e9e2.png"},{"id":104179430,"identity":"c9fcccac-7466-433c-a9f5-25483276cff3","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-08 17:05:05","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":25919,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index over time (1999 - 2023). Source: plotted by authors with data obtained from table 1\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/4209ee67105452709c5cc18c.png"},{"id":104404195,"identity":"67f30381-f2ff-46be-9143-9d4299280e6b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:19:48","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":24571,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows Corruption Perception Index Global Ranking (1999 – 2023). Source: Plotted by authors with data obtained from table 1\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/cf16e551f0dda9e7806afc3b.png"},{"id":104179427,"identity":"6f16f017-c381-46ef-9904-30ab54b7409a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-08 17:05:05","extension":"png","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":50536,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows Women's Political representation and Corruption Perception Index. Source: Plotted by authors with data obtained from table 1\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"5.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/5904f35995f0e671fae5bb4a.png"},{"id":104404743,"identity":"3754b6bb-8e2c-4e1f-af61-8213f477fa0a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:21:00","extension":"png","order_by":6,"title":"Figure 6","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":25145,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows\u003cstrong\u003e \u003c/strong\u003eaverage women's representation by election cycle. Source: Plotted by authors with data obtained from table 2\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"6.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/41ebf3682f57f402d2ed3d89.png"},{"id":104404017,"identity":"c095fb9f-a649-4bb4-b58e-50d09c2d074c","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:19:36","extension":"png","order_by":7,"title":"Figure 7","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":24562,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eshows\u003cstrong\u003e \u003c/strong\u003eaverage CPI score and CPI rank by election cycle. Source: Plotted by authors with data obtained from table 2\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"7.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/c0d80bca99ccc279eb027f05.png"},{"id":104410818,"identity":"433bc9ec-d151-42d1-a7d8-57884e803036","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:54:04","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":946543,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8994138/v1/95de5ec4-3a9a-4f86-8c1a-ea81ffe30080.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Women's Political Representation and Corruption Nexus in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Evidence from Statistical and Graphical Analysis","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThere is a consensus among liberal scholars that, the progress of any modern democratic society is anchored on how well their citizens regardless of their gender affinity, directly or indirectly participate in politics. Though recent studies show that half of the world\u0026rsquo;s population is made up of women who also play important roles, contributing to the growth and development of the society they are part of (Okungbaye, 2021; Daniel and Faith 2013 in Salau et al., 2024). Nevertheless despite the immense contribution of women in the society, they are still being relegated from to performing certain roles in most societies, particularly holding political offices. For the past three decades, the gender and governance nexus has dominated a key position in the fields of comparative political science, public administration, and development economics. In the midst of this quagmire lies a pertinent question that has been begging for an answer: will governance outcome improve in terms of corruption reduction if more women are given the opportunity to hold political offices? The work of Dollar et al. (2001) laid the empirical foundation in this intellectual discourse. Drawing on a large state-wide dataset, they discovered that when women have a good number of political representations in the parliament, it leads to lower levels of corruption. This led them to a conclusively state that, when it comes to moral and public administration, women may be the \u0026quot;fairer sex\u0026quot; when compared to men (Dollar et al., 2001). This finding was further consolidated by Swamy et al. (2001), when they used numerous independent datasets to show that nation-states where women holds larger share of political and bureaucratic positions, corruption levels tends to be low in such places (Swamy et al., 2001). These foundational studies by the aforementioned scholars, ignited a global debate on gender\u0026ndash;corruption nexus among scholars, one that has since been made rich, complicated, and mostly antagonized by subsequent studies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn Africa, particularly Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic, the attention of many scholars has been drawn to the political misrepresentation of women and systemic corruption that has been eating the country like cancer. Orokpo et al. \u0026nbsp;(2017) contends that, though historically, political consciousness have been demonstrated by women in Nigeria in the past, yet, they have faced serious political marginalisation with regards to holding any meaningful political positions, a pattern that successive democratic administrations has consistently maintained. This claim has been corroborated by quantitative evidence: as Likinyo and Arum (2025) noted in their analyses that, since the the Fourth Republic began in 1999, women political representation in the Nigerian legislature has never exceeded 10 Percent. The highest recorded proportion of female lawmakers in the Senate between 2007 and 2011 peaked at 8.3 Percent. On the other hand, the highest share recorded for women in the House of Representatives was between 2011 and 2015, and it peaked at 7.2 Percent (Likinyo and Arum, 2025). The underrepresentation of women in politics became worse in the 2023 general elections, producing the lowest number of women in the National legislation since the emergence of the Fourth Republic, recording only fourteen female members in the Federal House of Representative and just three women in the Senate (iKNOW Politics, 2024). In the light of this, Esidene and Abdul (2013) contended that women ostracization from Nigeria\u0026apos;s politics has its roots in the legacies of colonialism which projected the male gender as being superior in leadership, an argument that resonates with the studies of Arowolo and Aluko (2010) and Omoregie (2025), who discovered that, regardless of the political consciousness of women in Nigeria, they remain extremely marginalised when it comes to holding political offices. Studies has shown that the average for women\u0026apos;s political participation at the federal level, including both contested positions and political appointees like ministers, is around 6.7 Percent, a figure which is a departure from the 22.5 Percent global average, 23.4 Percent African regional average, and even the 15 Percent average for West African sub-region \u0026nbsp; (Likinyo and Arum, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Intellectual discourse on the relationship between women and corruption has grown substantially beyond the cross-national paradigm which was established initially by Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), with more contemporary studies rigorously probing the conditionalities, apparatus and direction of the correlation. \u0026nbsp;The accountability-based theory which was advanced by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2018) argues that, political systems that holds accountability to the highest esteem, women occupying political offices tends to show low rates of corruption. On the contrary, in societies with low-accountability, corruption rate intensifies regardless of the gender occupying a political position (Esarey \u0026amp; Schwindt-Bayer, 2018). The findings of their study has serious implications for Nigeria, where, money-based politics, weak electoral processes and compromized democratic institutions, sabotage accountability mechanisms that ordinarily could have reinforce women\u0026apos;s anti-corruption effects. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2019) probes the directionality of causation using instrumental variable methods. They discovered that causality runs in both directions: women\u0026apos;s political representation leads to decrease in corruption, and corruption concurrently dwindle women\u0026apos;s political participation (Esarey \u0026amp; Schwindt-Bayer, 2019). Similarly, in a study carried out by Bauhr and Charron (2019) utilizing dataset across 182 European regions, it shows what they termed an \u0026apos;exclusion mechanism\u0026apos;, where politicians of the female extraction have stronger incentives to combat grand corruption but are being systematically shut out from patrimonial networks dominated by their male counterparts (Bauhr \u0026amp; Charron, 2019). Sung (2012) offered a partially divergent view, \u0026nbsp;by carrying out a longitudinal panel analysis of 204 countries. He discovered that the reasonable percentage of women occupying political offices or otherwise has nothing to do with corruption trends; for him, the determinant of corruption outcomes is how strong liberal democratic institutions are, insinuating that the gender\u0026ndash;corruption nexus just be largely exaggerated (Sung, 2012). Furthermore, Merkle and Wong (2020) critical examined the discourse of gender and corruption by approaching it using different lens. According to them, power is the central theme of this subject matter, adding that, corruption and male-dominated political systems work hand-in-hand to subdue women\u0026apos;s political representation, ultimately creating an atmosphere where corrupt political environments needlessly ostracize female aspirants (Merkle \u0026amp; Wong, 2020). Examining this issue from Nigeria, Ette and Akpan-Obong (2022) critically evaluated how female politicians in Nigeria try to come to consensus with the patronage-based structures that is male-dominated, by leveraging on their femininity as a tactical tool, thus showcasing their wit and resilience against a system that is built to politically ostracize them (Ette \u0026amp; Akpan-Obong, 2022). Within the ambits of this discourse, the continued poor performance of Nigeria as far as corruption indices is concerned, \u0026nbsp; shows the urgency and the need to particularly examine the extent to which women political underrepresentation intersects with endemic corruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThough several scholars have significantly contributed to the discourse of gender-corruption nexus, nonetheless, a deligent review of literature particularly the ones examined thus far, shows critical gaps that our current study intends to fill. First, the dominant literature on the subject matter in the current body of knowledge (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Esarey \u0026amp; Schwindt-Bayer, 2018, 2019; Sung, 2012), heavily rely on cross-national, quantitative analyses deploying panel or cross-sectional data, primarily focusing on Asia, Europe and the Americas; Africa as a whole, particularly Nigeria, remains understudied. Secondly, studies that specifically focused on Nigeria like those carried out by Akpan-Obong (2022), Esidene and Abdul (2013), and Ette and Orokpo et al. (2017), did not empirically probe the nexus between corruption and women misrepresentation within the specific temporal and institutional context of the Fourth Republic, but rather, they tend to merely study the two concepts separately as independent variables. Thirdly, though Sung (2012), including Bauhr and Charron (2019) made significant inputs, however their findings are constrained by the fact that, they only based their analyses on regions with strong mechanisms for democratic accountability already in place\u0026mdash;conditions that negates what is realistically obtainable in Nigeria\u0026apos;s political terrain, dominated by godfatherism, violence and compromized institutions. Fourthly, a graphical analytical approach that visually maps and tracks the concurrent paths of women political representation and corruption indices across the electoral cycles of Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic is mostly missing from the literature, as current studies predominantly relied on methods that are either econometric, qualitative or Likert-scale survey instruments. These gaps in knowledge broadly points to the need for a study that integrates time-series visual evidence to critically evaluate women\u0026apos;s political representation and corruption in Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the light of these gaps, our current study position itself as a contribution to filling the identified vacuum in the current body of knowledge. By utilizing a graphical analytical methodology, one that takes advantage of longitudinal data on the percentage of elective and appointed positions held by women in Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic across successive electoral cycles, along side with annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Nigeria from Transparency International for Nigeria over the same period. Unlike other studies that rely on regression and purely qualitative approaches, graphical analysis makes these two variables conveniently available and accessible, thereby enabling both policy makers and other researchers to quickly spot patterns, points of inflection, as well as trend reversals that purely statistical models may not be able to capture. In furtherance of these aims, the following objectives guides the study: (i) to examine the trend in women\u0026apos;s political representation in Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic across electoral cycles (1999\u0026ndash;2023) utilizing statistical and graphical evidence; and (ii) to evalue wether if the empirical gender\u0026ndash;corruption nexus that was established in global literature holds in the Nigerian Fourth Republic context when evaluated through graphical evidence.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eA quantitative descriptive research design is adopted by this study to evaluate women\u0026rsquo;s political representation and corruption nexus in Nigeria\u0026rsquo;s Fourth Republic (1999\u0026ndash;2023). The research relies on descriptive statistics and graphical approach to comprehensively show and explore patterns over time, rather than to establish strict causal relationships.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Sources and Collection\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData on women\u0026apos;s political representation were collected from secondary sources such as peer reviewed journals and European Union SDGN. Just to be specific, we carefully put together the propositions (%) of women (past and present) holding political positions in Nigeria\u0026apos;s National Assembly, including appointed female ministers, for each election cycle from 1999 to 2023. Also, we collected secondary data on Nigeria\u0026apos;s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from the online database of Transparency International. The data on corruption clearly shows the annual time series of corruption rank and scores for Nigeria over the years, with 0 signifying very high corruption and 100 signifying very low corruption. All the data were obtained from publicly available sources that are verifiable, thereby maintaining transparency and replicability.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDescriptive statistics like simple percentages, and averages which were manually calculated for all key variables. Specifically: Proportions of women in each legislative body, including female ministers are calculated for every electoral cycle in the Fourth Republic.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe statistical formula applied for the calculation of the mean is as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cimg src=\"https://myfiles.space/user_files/58895_8739fc6c57c1c19a/58895_custom_files/img1772693614.png\" width=\"160\" height=\"77\"\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWHERE\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eXi = Each individual value in the dataset\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003en = Total number of the values\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026sum; = Summation of all the values\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, given the limitation in graphical mapping of trends in current body of knowledge, our analysis places high premium on visual representation, as a result, the study utilized time‑series line graphs, bar charts and clustered bar charts to clearly visualize representation of women holding political offices and corruption index. The fusion of both descriptive statistics and graphical approaches enables the study to (i) record clear patterns in women\u0026rsquo;s political representation that is comprehensive, (ii) trace corresponding movements in corruption indicators, and (iii) visually show whether periods that has higher women\u0026apos;s political representation coincide with lower (or higher) levels of corruption.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical Considerations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study exclusively used on data from secondary sources that are publicly available, with no human subject directly involved. As a result, ethhical concerns are therefore minimal; nonetheless, the study carefully utilized data from official and reputable sources; report accurately and interpret the findings of the study without being bias;, as well as clearly state data limitations and avoid overstating causal claims.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe Exclusion Mechanism: Theoretical Adaptations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Exclusion Mechanism Theory was propounded by Bauhr et al. (2019). This theory is empirically grounded for explaining female political representation and corruption nexus. Rooted in the broader political economy of gender and governance, the theory notes that political systems, especially those at their nascent stage, are characterized with partisanship, nepotism and godfatherism which were systematically and deliberately made to be dominated by men (Bauhr et al., 2019). Critical among its assumptions is that, \u003cem\u003estructural exclusion\u003c/em\u003e shapes incentive structures: this is due to the fact that female politicians are systematically ostracized from the male-dominated informal organizations that are used to perpetuate corruption, their inability to access or take part in these arrangements, structurally deter them from partaking in corrupt tendencies (Bauhr et al., 2019). Secondly, the theory assumes that \u003cem\u003ecorrupt environments are gendered environments\u003c/em\u003e: meaning that, corruption and male-dominated environments mutually reinforce each other to deny women from accessing political power (Merkle \u0026amp; Wong, 2020). The third assumption of the theory distinguishes between \u003cem\u003epetty and grand corruption\u003c/em\u003e: through empirical analysis across 182 European regions, Bauhr et al. (2019) shows that when women are adequately representated, it has aa way of mitigating stronger effect on grand corruption due to the fact that, exclusion from male patronage organizations matter most at this level. Fourthly, a bidirectional causal logic is further assume by the theory: the ostracization of women from corrupt companies not only reduce the tendencies of female political office holders to be partakers of corruption, but corruption on its own, by consolidating the male-dominated frameworks which ostracize women from politics, concurrently suppress female representation, a trend that has been systematically validated by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2019) through instrumental variable estimations. As a whole, the assumptions put forward by this theory intersect on a common theoretical proposition: allowing more women to hold political offices on its own have a way of mitigating corruption, not just because they are saints or more morally upright, but because their structural positioning by the system outside organized corrupt elements, incentivise them as well as gives them the legitimacy and the impetus to question and unmask such nefarious practices (Bauhr et al., 2024).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBe that as it may, the above theory resonates with our current research in several ways. For instance, the first structural exclusion assumption put forward by the theory, perfectly fits the context of Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic, where women political representation particularly in the Senate and House of Representative, has never gone beyond the threshold of 10\u0026nbsp;Percent, averaging just at 5.4\u0026nbsp;Percent across the two legislative chambers within the last 26 years (Likinyo and Arum, 2025). This critical ostracization of women is not a mere accident, but an outcome of a broken political framework that that was deliberatly orchestrated by male-dominated patronage networks, which the theory identifies as breeding ground backed by institutions for corrupt practices to ensue (Ette \u0026amp; Akpan-Obong, 2022; Orokpo et al., 2017). Secondly, the submission of the theory that corruption and patriarchy coexist and mutually reinforce each other is evident in the Nigerian political environment, where the patriarchal elite networks institutionalize corruption (Esidene \u0026amp; Abdul, 2013; iKNOW Politics, 2024). Thirdly, the bidirectional causality assumption put forward by the theory, provides the fundamental framework needed to interprete the graphical evidence presented in this study. Furthermore, the theory\u0026apos;s accountability-conditionality dimension provides the theoretical scaffolding for explaining why Nigeria\u0026apos;s persistently weak democratic institutions, characterised by compromised electoral processes and under-enforced anti-corruption legislation, have diluted and complicated the potential governance dividend of female representation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConceptual Analytical Framework: Women Representation and Corruption\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConceptualizing Women Representation\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the field Political Science, the concept of women political representation has been a subject of intense theoretical debate due to its multifaceted nature. The primary framework for the comprehension of this concept was first established by the German-born scholar, Hanna Pitkin (1967), who in her work revealed at least four distinguishable variables namely, descriptive representation, formalistic representation, substantive representation, and symbolic representation. In her seminal work, \u0026quot;The Concept of Representation\u0026quot; (1967), Pitkin expound these dimensions as thus: substantive representation has to do with the preferences of public policy and interests; while formalistic representation is concerned with the legal frameworks guiding the conduct of representative democracy; descriptive representation on the other hand, refers to the extent to which citizens and their representatives bear same semblance in various social categories; and finally, symbolic representation is closely linked with issues that partains identity. When specifically applied to women, descriptive representation concerns itself with numerical representation of the population, where key representatives mirror the population with respect to common attributes like gender.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNotwithstanding, female political representation has been widely defined as the process by which women register their presence in politics by participating and occupying key positions of leadership scattered across several institutions where they have been historically marginalized and underrepresented when compared to their male contemporaries (Salau et al., 2024). In an attempt to consolidate the framework of Pitkin (1967), Schwindt-Bayer (2010) comprehensively articulated a theory of women representation which put forward a broad and unified model that links formal, substantive, symbolic and descriptive representation. This unified model suggests that one cannot reduce women political representation to a single dimension but must be comprehended as a phenomenon that is complex and interrelated.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNonetheless, there is a consensus among scholars that when more women occupy political offices, it gives room for a better representation of the society as a whole. Hence, it is paramount to properly address the issue of gender imbalance as far as political representation is concerned, particularly as women underrepresentation have the tendency of showing long-term effects which extends beyond immediate or temporary symbolic effects on policies. Collectively, the conceptualization of women political representation by this body of scholarship shows that conceptualizing the variable requires keen attention to who is present, what they do, how they are perceived, as well as the prevailing structural conditions that either support or impede on their effectiveness.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConceptualizing Corruption\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor year, the meaning of the concept of corruption has been contested by many scholars due to its multifaceted nature in social science scholarship. Due to its manifestations across political economic, and social-cultutal contexts, a universally accept definition have been resisted among academics. Consequently its conceptualization has been traditionally approached by scholars from three predominant analytical dimensions as thus. The first is the public-office-centred definition which was championed by Nye (1967). Nye operationalizes corruption as \u0026quot;behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding pecuniary or status gains.\u0026quot; This definition highlights the violation of formal norms and responsibilities as the defining yardstick. On the other hand, the market-centred tradition which is associated with scholars like van Klaveren (1989), defines corruption as a situation where corrupt officials maximizes their income by exploitating and treating the public offices they occupy as business. Supporting these, the public-interest-centred approach contended that corruption occurs when occupiers \u0026nbsp;of public offices who are by default expected to serve the interest of the people, use such offices to pursue their personal interests in ways that harm the general public (Friedrich, 1966). Nonetheless, contemporary studies that are interdisciplinary in nature, tries to harmonize these definitions. For example, Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) lay emphasis on the institutional and transactional dimensions of corruption, situating it within frail governance frameworks where mechanisms for formal accountability are overturned. In a similar vein, Johnston (2005) added that, there is a need to understand corruption in terms of the exploitation of opportunities which is created by the interrelation of public authority and private interest, warning scholars against definitions that lay much emphasis on legal context while ignoring the norms and cultural aspects.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoving from the complexity in defining the concept, corruption is further classified based on its scale, form, and systemic intricacies. Grand corruption is the process where by senior government officials and political elites influence legislations and policies for their selfish interests at the expense of the public. Petty corruption on the other hand, describes the bribery and abuse of power that the common man encounters everyday as they relate with bureaucrats within the mid and low level of government (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], N.D). Meanwhile, political corruption as opposed to bureaucratic corruption, is when political leaders manipulate political institutions, established rules, and regulations for the purpose of enriching themselves or retaining political power (Philp, 2002). Contrastingly, systemic or endemic corruption happens when citizens including established public and private institutions see corruption as a normal way of life, such that, it is not regarded as a criminal behaviour (Rothstein, 2011). Be that as it may, in consolidating these classifications, Elijah et al. (2025) contended that, corruption exists in all facets of the society regardless of the type of government in place or level of development, adding that corruption does not discriminate against social class or gender.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 1\u003c/strong\u003e shows complete dataset for female political representation, CPI rank and CPI scores across different election circles\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"640\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eElection Circle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFemale Senators (%) \u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFemale House Members (%)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFemale Ministers (%)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCPI Rank\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCPI S\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;CPI Score\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCore\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1999\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2000\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2001\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2002\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e98\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e90\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e90\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e101\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2003\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2004\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2005\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2006\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e132\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e144\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e152\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e142\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2007\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2008\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2009\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2010\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e17.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e147\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e121\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e130\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e134\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2011\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2012\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2013\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2014\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e31.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e143\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e139\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e144\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e136\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2015\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2016\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2017\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2018\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e136\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e136\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e148\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e144\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2019\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2020\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2021\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2022\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.6\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e146\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e149\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e154\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e150\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.0312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2023\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.7\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.5312%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25.0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.875%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e145\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.5%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSource:\u003c/strong\u003e Abatta, (2023); EU-SDGN (2023); Igariwey (N.D); Transparency International (2026)\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe above (table 1) serves as the fundamental time series dataset for this research, which captures several metrics based on their annual fluctuation. The table shows that, female senators revolves between 2.7 percent and 8.3 percent reaching its all time high in 2007, and revealing slight growth and even decrease in subsequent years. While House of representative climaxes at 7.2 percent in 2011 election cycle, but however decreases to 3.6 percent in 2019 election year. Ministerial positions on the other hand witnessed more volatility, but declining to starting moderately at 15.1 percent in 2003, peaking at 31.7 percent in 2011, and further decline to 15.9 percent in 2019 with a leap to 25 percent in 2023. On all, women political representation remains low, unable to cross the 10 percent threshold in legislative bodies and varying more in executive roles. Meanwhile, Nigeria\u0026apos;s CPI score shows a general progression from 16 in 1999 to 24-27 in recent years, revealing that modest breakthrough is being made in corruption perception. Nonetheless, a more complex story is being told by the global ranking, with Nigeria\u0026apos;s ranking in the leadership board declining from 98th in 1999 to rank between 136th and 154th in the years going forward.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFig. 1 reveals just a slight movement to the up side from 1999\u0026ndash;2003 (low base around 3\u0026ndash;5 percent in legislature) peaking in the 2007\u0026ndash;2011 cycles. This is followed by stagnation in \u0026nbsp;post-2015. The dips in 2019\u0026ndash;2023 indicate a reduction in house of representative. The above graph reveals continuous marginalization, with no any viable hope toward gender parity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe bars in fig. 2 reveal the extent to which women occupying legislative positions consistently underperform in comparison with their ministerial counterparts. For instance, the proportion of women in legislative seats between 2011 to 2014 is 6\u0026ndash;7 percent while for ministerial position is 31.7 percent that same period, suggesting that it is easier to get executive appointments than to secure electoral wins. Women political representation remains flat and low, with senate moderately dominant female house of representative members in some cycles (e.g., 8.3 percent versus 6.9 percent in 2007\u0026ndash;2010). This visualization clearly highlights the gender imbalance in representation, suggesting that women are more dominant in positions that are based on appointment, even though the overall women representation in the cluster bar is less than 30 percent. This development shows that there is an entrenched gender disparity in the overall political power structures.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe line in fig 3 begins low between 10 to 16 in 2000s, increases gradually to 27\u0026ndash;28 between 2016 to 2018, and then slightly reduces to 24\u0026ndash;25 in the 2020s. The graph illustrates moderate growth but high corruption rate that is consistently increasing, suggest that systemic issues such as institutional weakness supercedes the ongoing effort of anti-corruption agencies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe above chart visualizes an increasing trend of corruption over time, with ranks rising in 1999 from 98 to 150 and 154 in mid-2010s to 2020s. The momentary improvements like droping to 121 in 2008 did not last long. This visual map illustrates a downward momentum in the global leadership board, antagonizing the minor score gains in Fig. 3, implying that other nations recover faster when compared to Nigeria.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe chart above concurrently shows different periods when women were highly represented with rising Corruption Perception Index scores. For example, between 2007 to 2014, the chart shows that women have elevated ministerial and senate shares while Nigeria\u0026apos;s corruption score witnessed a dramatic increase between 22 to 27 that same period. In a similar development, the chart shows that between 1999\u0026ndash;2006 and 2019\u0026ndash;2023, women representation was low, while Nigeria\u0026apos;s corruption score was weaker (10\u0026ndash;22 and 24\u0026ndash;26) that same periods. This development is as potential pointer to the fact that, corruption levels and female political representation could have a positive link. Nonetheless, the graph visually investigates the relationship between these two variables without claiming causality, implying that gender parity in politics might lead to better governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2\u003c/strong\u003e shows average female political representation, CPI scores and ranks by election circle (1999 \u0026ndash; 2023)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"624\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eElection Circle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAverage Female Senators\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAverage Female House Members\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAverage Female Ministers\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCPI Score\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCPI Rank\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1999 \u0026ndash; 2003\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.2%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.5%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e17.1%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e115\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2003 \u0026ndash; 2007\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.3%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16.5%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e140\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2007 \u0026ndash; 2011\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.4%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.1%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24.8%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e23\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e145\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2011 \u0026ndash; 2011\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.4%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.7%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24.1%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e140\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2015 \u0026ndash; 2019\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.8%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.8%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16.2%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e141\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2019 - 2023\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.2%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e20.4%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25.5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e146\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOverall Average\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 14.9038%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.4%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.7051%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.4%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 15.3846%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e20.2%\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 21.6346%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21.9\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 17.4679%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e135\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSource:\u003c/strong\u003e Authors calculation\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe above summary table put together the data in Table 1 into cycle averages for the purpose of streamlining comparison. The table shows that, average for women representation in the senate reached a zenith point of 7.4 percent in 2007\u0026ndash;2011 election circle, but the overall average stood at 5.4 percent that same period. Female political representation for House of Representative on the other hand was at 5.4 percent with a low of 4.2 percent in 2019\u0026ndash;2023 election circle. While for ministers, the overall average was 20.2 percent, peaking at 24.8 percent in 2007\u0026ndash;2011 election circle. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores shows improvement from 15 in 1999\u0026ndash;2003 circle to 26 for 2015\u0026ndash;2019 circle, and then slightly declined to 25.5 in 2019\u0026ndash;2023 election circle. While the CPI rank plummeted from 115 to 146. Overall averages: legislature was 5.4 percent, female ministers were 20.2 percent, average CPI score was 21.9, and 135 for CPI rank. Averages show gradual growth in women representation and and CPI scores in 2007\u0026ndash;2015 election period with reasonable decline subsequently. The table shows the numerical baseline for women representation (under 6 percent in legislature) against insignificant improvement in corruption index, thus allowing the study to document key patterns without causation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe bars in the above graph for women in the Senate and House of Representative rose from low averages of 3\u0026ndash;4 percent in 1999\u0026ndash;2003 to 7\u0026ndash;24 percent in 2007\u0026ndash;2011 election circles. The proportion however plummeted in post-2015, with ministers driving variability. The graph highlights recurring movements which is linked to elections, emphasizing no direct progress and potential retrogression of gender parity under recent administrations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe above bar chart indicates that between 1999/2003 and 2015/2019 election circles, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score surged from 15 to 26, suggesting that the fight against corruption is gaining momentum, while CPI rank bars show signs of deterioration by increasing to 146 in 2019\u0026ndash;2023 election circle. This difference emphasizes that there is a relative global decrease irrespective of the domestic gains, visually stressing the challenges of Nigeria in surpassing global improvements in governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSummary of Findings\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTaken together, the graphical evidence from this study suggests that there is a general connection between women\u0026apos;s political participation and lower corruption levels as shown in global literature like Dollar et al., (2001) and Swamy (2001), even though this connection seems to be a bit weaker in the context of Nigeria. This weakness stems from the fact that the political environment in Nigeria is largely shaped by structural issues that has taken deep roots. These issues include ethnic and religious patronage networks, electoral violence, godfatherism and systemic setbacks that deter women from becoming deeply involved in politics (Esidene \u0026amp; Abdul, 2013; Ette \u0026amp; Akpan-Obong, 2022; Merkle \u0026amp; Wong, 2020).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion and Policy Recommendations","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study critically examined the nexus between women\u0026rsquo;s political representation and corruption in Nigeria\u0026rsquo;s Fourth Republic (1999\u0026ndash;2023) through a statistical and graphical lens. Evidence from the graphical analysis in this study suggests that the inclusion of women in politics and governance integrity are like two sides of a coin, meaning that, corruption levels and female political representation have a positive link. The period when women had highest women political visibility in governance (2007\u0026ndash;2014) in Nigeria, coincided with the period when Nigeria\u0026apos;s Fourth Republic\u0026rsquo;s witnessed the most sustained and modest improvements in Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores. On the contrary, the glaring decline in women political representation seen in the electoral cycle of 2019\u0026ndash;2023 coincided with the period when anti-corruption performance also witnessed stagnation and deterioration in Nigeria\u0026rsquo;s global Corruption Perception ranking. This development consolidate the basic assumption of the Exclusion Mechanism Theory, which postulates that the structural exclusion of women from the patriarchal patronage networks of \u0026quot;godfatherism\u0026quot; better positions them as well as gives them the legitimacy and the impetus to question and unmask nefarious practices in governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBe that as it may, the study concludes that gender parity alone may not be enough to totally eradicate corruption in Nigeria. The fact that Corruption Perception Index scores never crossed the 30-point threshold even when women political representation was at its all time high, suggests that the \u0026quot;fairer sex\u0026quot; assumption promoted by Dollar et al (2001), is critically jeopardized by compromized institutions that are marred by systemic corruption. As seen in the analysis of our study, the momentary CPI score increase which was recorded between 2015 and 2019 irrespective of stale women political representation, implies that resilient liberal institutions and law enforcement agencies are very key in the fight against corruption. Therefore, while it is important to increase women\u0026apos;s political representation for the consolidation of Nigeria\u0026apos;s democracy, that alone is not sufficient to put an end the systemic and patrimonial corruption that has spread its roots over the years.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConsequent upon these, the following policy interventions are proposed by the study. First, given that the overall average of women\u0026rsquo;s political representation in the Nigerian National Assembly is merely 5.4 percent since 1999, lawmakers in the National Assembly should prioritize the passage of the \u0026quot;Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill.\u0026quot; To be more specific, a provisional legislative quota system that will reserve 35 percent of legislative positions for women should be passed into law in order to dismantle the structural barriers that has excluded women for years. \u0026nbsp;The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) can also help in addressing the \u0026quot;Exclusion Mechanism\u0026quot; from its root, by mandating political parties to amend their internal selection processes such that, it relegates the nomination fees in favour of female aspirants in their political party. Secondly, acknowledging that gender parity must go hand-in-hand with accountability, the policy makers in Nigeria must ensure that the autonomy of anti-corruption agencies is being consolidated and fortified so as to enable them fight corruption seamlessly. Strengthening these institutions will ensure that the \u0026quot;accountability environment\u0026quot; is safe enough for politicians of the female extraction to fearlessly showcase their anti-corruption potential, as theorized by Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study acknowledges the following limitations in accordance with transparent scholarly practice. First, study majorly used secondary data, a development that has the potential of introducing bias into the final outcome of the research. Secondly, while this study leveraged graphical analysis to map broad trends, it did not establish any causal relationships. Thirdly, while ministerial appointments as a proxy for executive-level female inclusion is being incorporated by the study, the dataset does not capture female representation in sub-national legislatures, the judiciary, or the civil service, areas in which gender dynamics may differ meaningfully from the patterns observed at the federal level. Consequently, future research can leverage on these gaps by employing instrumental variable methods, disaggregated state-level analysis, quantitative models or mixed-methods designs, to considerably widen the understanding of the dynamics through which gender parity shapes the outcome of governance in Nigeria or other climes.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors did not receive any financial support from any organization for the submitted work.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe declare that there is no competing of interest of any kind amongst us.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics approval\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis is an observational study. The Nigerian Defence Academy Research Ethics Committee has confirmed that no ethical approval is required for study of this nature.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to participate\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNot applicable\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData and/or Code availability\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe author confirms that all data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this article. Furthermore, the secondary data supporting the findings of this study is publicly available at the time of submission.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthors\u0026rsquo; contribution statements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by Hassana Bishir Mohammed, Emmanuel Elijah and Abdullahi Ahmed Musa. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Hassana Bishir Mohammed and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAbatta, A. (2023). Table: Women Ministers in Nigeria\u0026rsquo;s Fourth Republic. Foundation for Investigative Journalism. Retrieved from \u003cu\u003ehttps://fij.ng/article/table-women-ministers-in-nigerias-fourth-republic/\u003c/u\u003e (accessed 6 February, 2026).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eArowolo, D. \u0026amp; Aluko, F.S. (2010). Women and political participation in Nigeria. European Journal of Social Sciences, 14(4), 581-593. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294419383_Women_and_political_participation_in_Nigeria (accessed February 21, 2026)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBauhr, M., Charron, N., \u0026amp; Wangnerud, L. (2019). Exclusion or interests? 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Semantic Scholar. Retrieved from https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:7510662 (accessed 18 February, 2026)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEtte, M., \u0026amp; Akpan-Obong, P. (2022). Negotiating Access and Privilege: Politics of Female Participation and Representation in Nigeria. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 58(7), 1291-1306. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221084253\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFriedrich, C. J. (1966). Political Pathology. Political Quarterly,\u003cem\u003e 37\u003c/em\u003e(1), 70\u0026ndash;85. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1966.tb00184.x\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIgariwey, W. (N.D). Meet The Women of the 10th Assembly. Retrieved from \u003cu\u003ehttps://naltf.gov.ng/meet-the-women-of-the-10th-assembly/\u003c/u\u003e (accessed 6 February, 2026).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eiKNOW Politics. (2024). Corruption as bane of women in politics, economic leadership spaces. International Knowledge Network of Women in Politics. 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Women in government, public corruption, and liberal democracy: A panel analysis. Crime, Law and Social Change, 58(3), 195\u0026ndash;219. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-012-9381-2\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSwamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., \u0026amp; Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and corruption. Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 25\u0026ndash;55. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00123-1\\\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTransparency International (2026). Corruption Perception Index. Retrieved from \u003cu\u003ehttps://transparencit.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Nigerias-Scores-on-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-from-1996-2021.xlsx\u003c/u\u003e (accessed 6 February, 2026).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (N.D). What is Corruption? The Meaning of \u0026quot;Corruption\u0026quot; and a Survey of Its Most Common Forms. UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/toolkit/AC_Toolkit_chap1.pdfhe_Concept.pdf (accessed 19 February, 2026)\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVan Klaveren, J. (1989). Corruption as a Historical Phenomenon. In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, \u0026amp; V. T. LeVine (Eds.), \u003cem\u003ePolitical corruption: A handbook\u003c/em\u003e Transaction Publishers (pp. 73\u0026ndash;86). DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003575658\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"
[email protected]","identity":"society","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Society](https://link.springer.com/journal/12115)","snPcode":"12115","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/12115/3","title":"Society","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Political representation, Nigeria, Corruption, Fourth Republic, Gender–governance, Exclusion Mechanism Theory","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8994138/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8994138/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis research critically probes the trajectories of political representation of women across different electoral cycles. Guided by the Exclusion Mechanism Theory, the study examines if the gender and corruption nexus present in global literature remains true within the context of the Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999–2023), without establishing a strict causal relationship. The study adopts a quantitative descriptive research design, relying on secondary time-series data for the proportion of women in the National Assembly, including appointed female ministers in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Also, annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores and rankings for Nigeria were sourced from the online database of Transparency International. Analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics and graphical analytical tools to visualize patterns and inflection points across electoral cycles. Evidence from the graphical analysis reveals that the average women's representation in the National Assembly is just 5.4 percent across both chambers. Furthermore, the peak of women representation (2007–2014) corresponds with the period when Nigeria had a modest CPI score progress. Similarly, the decrease in women political representation in 2019–2023, aligned with anti-corruption stagnation. Nonetheless, CPI scores never exceeded 30 points even when female representation peaked. The study concludes that there is a weak positive correlation between women's political representation and reduced corruption in Nigeria, but structural barriers critically impedes on this relationship, hence, complementing gender parity with institutional reform is key to combating corruption. Consequently, the study recommends legislative quotas for women, while also strengthening the anti-corruption institutions for seamless operation.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Women's Political Representation and Corruption Nexus in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Evidence from Statistical and Graphical Analysis","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-03-08 17:05:00","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8994138/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-03-21T00:57:02+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-03-13T06:49:49+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2026-03-13T06:49:08+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Society","date":"2026-02-28T09:39:31+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"
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