Organizational Form, Tariff Protection and Free Trade in Port Competition

Organizational Form, Tariff Protection and Free Trade in Port Competition | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Organizational Form, Tariff Protection and Free Trade in Port Competition kangsik choi This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6181569/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Incorporating public port ownership structures and port usage fees into the reciprocal trade model, we analyze the endogenous firms' choice of organization form facing trade policies. When ports are in public ownership under free trade, U-form emerges as an equilibrium even though choosing M-form for governments is socially desirable. These results are reversed (i.e., M-form is an equilibrium) in public port ownership under the tariff regime when choosing the organization form. However, choosing M-form under the tariff regime is Pareto efficiency for firms and social welfare. Contrast to previous results, in the case of Cournot competition, social welfare, consumer surplus and firm's profit under the tariff regime are greater than those under free trade. Full Text Supplementary Files 202538PortOrganizationPaperAppendix.pdf Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6181569","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":515206860,"identity":"ba7e571c-4620-4589-8b90-196ef9c8bf36","order_by":0,"name":"kangsik 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