A Computational Analysis of Strategic Nominations: Modeling Equilibrium and Complexity in Organizational Elections

A Computational Analysis of Strategic Nominations: Modeling Equilibrium and Complexity in Organizational Elections | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article A Computational Analysis of Strategic Nominations: Modeling Equilibrium and Complexity in Organizational Elections Chuang-Chieh Lin, Chi-Jen Lu, Po-An Chen, Chih-Chieh Hung This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7572357/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This paper models organizational electoral competition as an election game with strategic organizations in a macro level. Members of the organization derive utility from the elected candidate. Each organization nominates exactly one candidate to compete against candidates from other organizations and the payoff of each organization is the expected utility its members receive. By simulating the voting outcomes in the competitions between two and three organizations, we reveal and validate the monotone correspondence between the utility received by the voters and the chance of winning in the competition. Next, we show that pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) do not always exist for the election games with three or more groups, even under egoistic conditions, and prove that determining the PSNE existence is {\sf NP}-complete in general-form representation. Addressing this, we propose sufficient conditions for PSNE existence and develop a fixed-parameter tractable algorithm to compute equilibria, parameterized by irresolute groups and nominating depth. We also show that the price of anarchy for egoistic election games is upper bounded by the number of competing groups. These findings highlight how stability and efficiency can deteriorate with increased group participation, offering computational insights into multi-group strategic decision-making. Election game Nash equilibrium Price of anarchy Monotonicity Fixed-parameter tractability Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7572357","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":534893183,"identity":"844a3a73-f7df-4e83-9fa3-4fd1c75cc9e9","order_by":0,"name":"Chuang-Chieh Lin","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"National Taiwan Ocean University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Chuang-Chieh","middleName":"","lastName":"Lin","suffix":""},{"id":534893185,"identity":"f5decb8a-ad2f-43ee-a0fe-527f5f3062f4","order_by":1,"name":"Chi-Jen Lu","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Academia Sinica","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Chi-Jen","middleName":"","lastName":"Lu","suffix":""},{"id":534893187,"identity":"6d974d67-4550-46a4-80d5-4722d96289b0","order_by":2,"name":"Po-An Chen","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Po-An","middleName":"","lastName":"Chen","suffix":""},{"id":534893189,"identity":"17cfba7f-de60-4b87-86fa-4a953ae01bd9","order_by":3,"name":"Chih-Chieh Hung","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"National Chung Hsing University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Chih-Chieh","middleName":"","lastName":"Hung","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-09-09 09:53:29","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7572357/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7572357/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":94630031,"identity":"01d59f28-cea1-43fa-9a43-064ea6df070b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-29 05:54:03","extension":"json","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":5860,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"ea9933f20f3c429baa0137f29a881db6.json","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7572357/v1/f8c29675b0546f18cfa02c19.json"},{"id":99798098,"identity":"64a7e373-3041-47fb-80be-cf98615a4bda","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-08 13:47:15","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1596859,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"electiongameJAAMAS.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7572357/v1_covered_52505cfa-6e11-4245-9aac-1e1b7775bc59.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"A Computational Analysis of Strategic Nominations: Modeling Equilibrium and Complexity in Organizational Elections","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Election game, Nash equilibrium, Price of anarchy, Monotonicity, Fixed-parameter tractability","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7572357/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7572357/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"This paper models organizational electoral competition as an election game with strategic organizations in a macro level. 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