Quantum-Resilient Access Control Protocols for Cloud-Native Infrastructures in Post-Quantum Security Contexts

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Abstract

Quantum computing poses a critical threat to existing cryptographic primitives, rendering current access control mechanisms in cloud-native infrastructures vulnerable to compromise. This paper introduces a comprehensive quantum-resilient access control framework specifically engineered for distributed, containerized, and zero-trust environments. The proposed system integrates post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) primitives—specifically lattice-based key encapsulation (Kyber) and digital signatures (Dilithium)—with a hybrid key exchange protocol to maintain crypto-agility and backward compatibility. We design a secure token issuance and verification process employing PQC-based authentication, ensuring resistance to both classical and quantum adversaries. A prototype implementation demonstrates that our hybrid PQC approach incurs a moderate computational overhead of approximately 10–30\% while preserving horizontal scalability and interoperability across Kubernetes clusters. Security analysis under the post-quantum adversary model confirms resistance to key compromise, replay, and forgery attacks. The results highlight that quantum-resilient access control protocols can be efficiently integrated into modern cloud infrastructures without sacrificing scalability, performance, or operational flexibility.

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last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00