Truth as Consistent Assertion

This paper presents four key results in the philosophy of language. Firstly, it distinguishes between partial and consistent assertion of a sentence, and introduces the concept of an equivocal sentence, which is both partially asserted and partially denied. Secondly, it proposes a novel definition of truth, stating that a true sentence is one that is consistently asserted. This definition avoids the Liar paradox, does not restrict classical logic, and applies to declarative sentences in the language used by any particular person. Thirdly, the paper introduces an epistemic model of language, called assertional language, which formalizes the definition of truth. Finally, it provides an argument for the falsity of so-called Liar sentences. The proposed definition of truth can be viewed as a formal account of the correspondence theory. The epistemic model is a powerful concept that allows for combining different languages in a meaningful way. This model is uniquely capable of reflecting on epistemic inconsistencies, such as logical paradoxes, in a consistent manner and without resorting to non-classical solutions.