Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks in FrodoKEM: An Implementation Study

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Abstract FrodoKEM is a lattice-based Public-Key Encryption (PKE)/Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme selected as a third-round candidate in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography standardization process. It has also been recommended by the German Federal Office for Information Security and the Dutch National Communications Security Agency as a long-term confidential encryption algorithm and has been included in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 2 draft international standard for post-quantum cryptography. To address the threats of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA, including timing attacks, power analysis attacks, and fault attacks) against FrodoKEM, this paper proposes a security-enhanced implementation scheme. Specifically, during the sampling phase and ciphertext comparison, isochronous operations are adopted to eliminate timing sensitivity and mitigate timing attack risks. In public key computation, masking techniques are introduced to obscure critical data and operations, thereby resisting power analysis attacks. Additionally, a sampling calibration mechanism is implemented to detect and circumvent fault attacks. Under the same parameter sets, a performance comparison between the SCA-resistant scheme and the original FrodoKEM demonstrates that the computational overhead increase is less than 0.8%. The scheme’s strengthened resilience against SCA is further validated through Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), achieving a balance between enhanced security and minimal performance degradation.
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Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks in FrodoKEM: An Implementation Study | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks in FrodoKEM: An Implementation Study Aoyang Zhou, Haiying Gao, Mingdeng Wang, Bin Hu This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7530666/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 10 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract FrodoKEM is a lattice-based Public-Key Encryption (PKE)/Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme selected as a third-round candidate in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography standardization process. It has also been recommended by the German Federal Office for Information Security and the Dutch National Communications Security Agency as a long-term confidential encryption algorithm and has been included in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 2 draft international standard for post-quantum cryptography. To address the threats of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA, including timing attacks, power analysis attacks, and fault attacks) against FrodoKEM, this paper proposes a security-enhanced implementation scheme. Specifically, during the sampling phase and ciphertext comparison, isochronous operations are adopted to eliminate timing sensitivity and mitigate timing attack risks. In public key computation, masking techniques are introduced to obscure critical data and operations, thereby resisting power analysis attacks. Additionally, a sampling calibration mechanism is implemented to detect and circumvent fault attacks. Under the same parameter sets, a performance comparison between the SCA-resistant scheme and the original FrodoKEM demonstrates that the computational overhead increase is less than 0.8%. The scheme’s strengthened resilience against SCA is further validated through Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), achieving a balance between enhanced security and minimal performance degradation. FrodoKEM Post-Quantum Cryptography Side-Channel Attack CDT Sampler Masking Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 12 Jan, 2026 Reviews received at journal 09 Jan, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 01 Dec, 2025 Reviews received at journal 10 Nov, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 20 Sep, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 20 Sep, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 20 Sep, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 05 Sep, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 05 Sep, 2025 First submitted to journal 03 Sep, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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