Election Dates and Voter Knowledge

Election Dates and Voter Knowledge | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Election Dates and Voter Knowledge Zoltan Hajnal, Michael Hartney, Alex Zhao, David Houston This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-9307318/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract A large literature shows that consolidating local elections with federal contests substantially increases turnout and makes the electorate more representative. However, some argue that these “democratic” gains may come at a cost, bringing less informed voters into local elections and reducing the attention voters devote to local affairs. We test this participation–knowledge tradeoff across multiple contexts using multiple sources of evidence on local political knowledge and behavior. Combining three surveys of knowledge about city government, education policy, and local politics with detailed data on local election timing, we examine whether voters in on-cycle elections are less informed or attentive to local affairs than their off-cycle counterparts. We find little evidence that on-cycle voters are less knowledgeable than voters in off-cycle races. Using changes in election timing, we further show that incumbency advantages decline in on-cycle elections, suggesting less reliance on heuristic voting. Overall, our findings indicate that the benefits of election consolidation are unlikely to come at the expense of voter knowledge or attention to local affairs. Introduction States possess a powerful institutional lever over American democracy: the authority to set the timing of local elections. Across most of the United States, local elections are held off-cycle, when the ballot is largely limited to local contests (Sightline 2024). But over the past decade, legislators in several states—including Arizona, California, Nevada, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia—have mandated consolidated elections, requiring local contests to coincide with statewide or federal elections. Many more states are now considering similar reforms. Election timing matters because it fundamentally shapes who participates in politics. Every one of the more than a dozen academic studies that has looked at the link between election timing and turnout has found that moving local elections on-cycle dramatically increases turnout – often doubling or more than doubling voter participation (Marschall and Lappie 2025, Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Anzia 2014, Holbrook and Weinschenk 2013, Hajnal 2010, Caren 2007, Wood 2002). If state legislators want to impact local voter participation, election timing is the single largest lever they have. Research also shows that a shift in election dates changes the composition of the vote and makes it more representative of the underlying population (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Einstein et al 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018). In particular, voters in on-cycle elections tend to be younger, more racially diverse, and less skewed toward the wealthy. More representative electorates have been linked to more representative elected officials, declines in racial gaps in representation, and policies that are more in line with the median resident’s preferences (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2024, Schaffner et al 2020, Dynes et al 2021). In short, reforms to election dates are among the most powerful tools state governments can use to shape democracy. Legislators not only have the power to change dates and to change local democracy, they also have an incentive to do so. Most of the public favors the move to consolidated elections. Surveys show that roughly two-thirds prefer voting in one election on one day rather than in voting in multiple elections on different days for different offices (Anzia 2014, Manhattan Institute 2024). Moreover, that support is bipartisan. Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all favor the move (Anzia 2014, Manhattan Institute 2024). But is there a downside to election consolidation? While on-cycle elections have clear, wide-ranging benefits, they also raise concerns about a participation-knowledge tradeoff in the electorate. Wherever consolidation is considered, a common worry is that moving to on-cycle elections will reduce the attention voters give to local affairs. Some say that local contests and candidates may be overshadowed by higher-profile races for president, governor, or Congress. With less media coverage and attention, voters may have less information about local candidates. The end result is that voters may make poor decisions that could negatively impact local governance. Unfortunately, despite growing attention to election timing, researchers have not been able to systematically study the effects of election dates on voter knowledge. With national surveys rarely asking about local candidates and local issues and with data on election timing around the country relatively limited until recently, empirical tests that compare knowledge in on- and off-cycle tests are rare. One study of suburban elections did include questions about local knowledge, but it ultimately offered few clear conclusions about the effects of timing (Oliver and Ha 2007). We still don’t know if aligning local elections with national contests ultimately reduces voter attention and knowledge in local affairs. Scholarship examining the effects of election timing on local vote choice has also been limited. A range of studies has examined vote choice in local elections but none has been able to see if the issues that shape the vote differ between on- and off-cycle cities. One area that has received some attention is incumbent reelection rates. But even here the results are mixed with one study finding that incumbents run less and win less in on-cycle contests, another finding that incumbents fare better in close on-cycle contests than in close off-cycle contests, and a third revealing that the fate of incumbents was more dependent on their performance in on-cycle contests than it was in off-cycle elections (Trounstine 2012, de Benedictis-Kessner 2017, Payson 2017). Important questions remain about the vote in on- and off-cycle contests. To better understand how election dates impact knowledge and electoral choice, we utilize a newer, more comprehensive data set on local elections that provides information on 78,000 candidates running for mayor, city council, and school board across 57,000 electoral contests from 1989 to 2021 (de Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). That allows us to conduct a series of difference-in-differences tests comparing cities and school districts that move to on-cycle dates with those that do not. A 2015 California law that mandated changes to on-cycle elections also allows us to conduct a difference-in-difference test under conditions of exogenous and staggered shifts in timing. We also merge data from three different surveys that together ask a range of concrete questions about local knowledge in city and school board elections. Since the surveys focus on different aspects of city politics and education policy, they help us to garner some additional insight on voter knowledge across different contexts. The analysis shows that local voters in on-cycle elections are as knowledgeable than local voters in off-cycle elections. On most measures we find few significant differences in knowledge. On some measures, on-cycle voters actually express more interest and engagement in local affairs. There are also signs that on-cycle voters rely less on incumbency when they vote. Combined, this suggests that the wide-ranging benefits to on-cycle elections are not offset by steep decreases in voter attention to local public affairs. Background Research has demonstrated a range of benefits from moving local elections to the same days as federal contests. Moving to on-cycle dates alters who votes, who wins office, and how governments govern. A range of studies have found that moving to November even year elections doubles or even triples turnout (Marschall and Lappie 2018, Kogan et al. 2018, Anzia 2014). The move to November even year contests also brings in younger and more diverse voters and makes the electorate more representative of the age, race, and class distribution of the underlying local population (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Einstein et al 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018). All of this ultimately reduces inequalities in representation and makes government policy more responsive to the median resident (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2024, Schaffner et al 2020, Dynes et al 2021). On-cycle elections are, however, a relatively new phenomenon. Until 2015, only 4 states had laws requiring on-cycle municipal contests (Sightline 2025). Most other states still outlaw on-cycle elections (Sightline 2025). While several others allowed cities to choose on-cycle dates, most cities in those states ended up choosing an off-cycle alternative (Sightline 2025). As a consequence, research has been limited and questions remain. A Decline in Voter Knowledge? Chief among these is the question of how on-cycle elections impact voter knowledge and voter choice. Many worry that moving local elections to the bottom of a long and complicated ballot will lead to a local electorate that is far less knowledgeable about the candidates and issues that drive local politics. That concern was echoed by opponents of a Michigan bill that attempted to consolidate local school district elections: “Perhaps not many voters turn up for school elections, but they are likely to be interested and informed voters. Combining elections might lead to more voters but many will have no connection to or knowledge about school districts.” (quoted in Anzia 2013, 104). There are certainly reasons to fear that outcome. Putting local elections for mayor, city council, and school boards on the same days as contests for President, the House, and the Senate means that local contests will be competing with much higher profile contests for voters’ time and attention. Higher costs for media space during the national campaign period could also make it more difficult for local candidates to reach local voters. The result could be a local electorate that is less knowledgeable about local politics. In fact, this concern over less informed electorates is one of the main reasons that Progressives pushed over a century ago for most of America’s local elections to be moved off-cycle, away from federal elections (Bridges 1997). They quietly claimed – as many continue to do today – that the extra work required to vote in off-cycle elections means that local contests would be decided by the most interested and knowledgeable voters (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002). There is, however, little evidence showing that holding consolidated elections reduce the amount of attention paid to local issues and local elections. An early study of suburban voters by Oliver and Ha (2007) suggested that on-cycle voters may be less informed than off-cycle voters about some aspects of municipal affairs. But the differences the study found did not appear to be statistically significant. With surveys rarely asking concrete questions about local candidates and local contests and with little comprehensive data on when cities and school districts hold their elections, no other studies of the topic have emerged. We simply don’t know if the move to on-cycle elections leads to declines in local knowledge. A lack of attention to local politics could in turn affect local residents and local governance in other important ways. Residents who are less informed about and less connected to local candidates may become less interested and less engaged in the electoral process. All of this could impact vote choice. With limited information from campaigns, voters may not know enough about local candidates to accurately assess their abilities and to gauge which will better serve their interests. All of this could negatively impact local governance. A poorly informed electorate could choose less effective leaders. Less effective leaders could then generate declines in local economic and social conditions. If true, on-cycle elections could hurt residents and their cities. On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that on-cycle elections could increase voter knowledge and lead to better, more informed decisions in local contests. By encouraging a larger and more diverse set of residents to vote, on-cycle elections could draw in new voters who bring with them a greater diversity of experiences and perspectives with which to judge local candidates (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Kogan et al 2018). With twice as many voters involved and a with broader range of local residents choosing candidates, overall knowledge is likely to increase rather than decrease. All of this suggests that consolidated elections might actually facilitate local government accountability. Unfortunately, we do not yet know which of these different theories better fits reality. While there is a reasonably extensive literature on vote choice in local elections, studies rarely compare vote choice in on and off-cycle contests. We know that a range of factors like partisanship, ideology, and race have an impact on local electoral contests (Sances 2018, Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014, Hajnal and Trounstine 2013). But we don’t know if these factors matter more or less in on-cycle contests. The only systematic research on vote choice and election timing focuses specifically on whether incumbents win reelection. Here we know that incumbents have an advantage in the American electoral context (Jacobson 2015). But it is less clear whether the move to on-cycle elections helps or hurts incumbents. Trounstine (2012) found that higher turnout contests tended to reduce both the proportion of incumbents who run and the proportion who win. By contrast, de Benedictis-Kessner (2017) found that on-cycle elections provide incumbents with a larger advantage than off-cycle elections do (de Benedictis-Kessner 2017). A third study of school district elections and academic achievement in California found that election results were more closely tied to school district performance when elections were held on-cycle – a sign that voters may have had more insight into what was happening in local schools in on-cycle elections (Payson 2017; see also Scherer 2014 for a similar finding). Despite the importance of these questions for reformers and despite the growing attention that election timing has received, few have systematically examined voting knowledge or voter decision making in the context of election timing. For Americans interested in local democracy – both those who seek to move to on-cycle elections and those who worry about the consequences of that move – the need more information is clear. Of course, there are also those who will argue that regardless of what we find about election timing and voter knowledge, it should not matter. Because every citizen has a right to vote, the ability to vote should not be dependent on how much a voter does or does not know. Indeed, the judicial system has long viewed measures that limit participation to the most knowledgeable as unconstitutional. Since the 1970s, the Voting Rights Act and its extensions have outlawed literacy tests and other tools that use knowledge tests to limit participation. From this perspective, low levels of knowledge are not a problem that should be addressed with increased barriers to participation but rather as a problem that can and should be rectified with greater efforts at education and inclusion. Research Design We bring together an idiosyncratic mix of data and tests to try to answer questions about the impact of election timing on voter knowledge and voter decision making. Individually, each data set is limited. None offers a definitive causal test of election timing and knowledge. But by bringing together a range of different surveys with diverse questions on distinct aspects of local elections, we may be able to offer rough guide to how much knowledge is or is not connected to election timing. In addition, by employing a newer and much more comprehensive data set with the vote for tens of thousands of local candidates across the country, we are to offer a more telling causal test of how timing impacts election outcomes. The main barrier to assessing voter knowledge about local affairs is a dearth of survey data with specific and concrete questions about local affairs. Because the issues and candidates that shape the local political arena can and often do differ from municipality to municipality, national surveys rarely include questions about local politics. To address that barrier, we bring together all of the different surveys that we could find with two characteristics. Each survey had to ask concrete questions about local candidates or local issues and each survey also had to be conducted across a wide array of municipalities, school districts, or states. That led to us three surveys. The first was a 2018 study of 11,000 California voters that resided in 500 different municipalities in the state. Voters in the study were tested on their knowledge about city government. The second, the Study of Suburban Voters (SSV), was designed to understand suburban elections surveyed over 1400 voters in 30 different suburban communities across five different states (California, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, and North Carolina). Residents in these communities were surveyed shortly after their suburban communities held local contests in 2004 and 2005. The SSV asked voters about their knowledge of and engagement with suburban politics. The third focused specifically on school districts and knowledge of the local educational policy environment. These Education Next (EN) polls were conducted in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. They surveyed almost 5000 respondents across a representative set of school districts around the country. The EN surveys expand our understanding of local knowledge by asking specific questions about different aspects of education policy . Combined, these three surveys include enough concrete questions on different aspects of local political affairs to offer a relatively broad assessment of local knowledge. To try to determine if these surveys accurately identified local residents who voted in local contests, we performed a series of additional tests. First, we found that aggregate turnout rates roughly matched expectations. Only 40 percent of California respondents reported voting regularly in local elections, a figure that is only slightly elevated from official turnout statistics. Similarly, estimated local turnout across the EN studies was 39 percent. Also, in the California study, self-reported local voter turnout was 34 percentage points lower than self-reported Presidential turnout – a difference that matches previous research (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002). 1 Second, the factors shaping local participation in these studies conformed to existing studies of participation (Verba et al 1995). In both the California data and the SSV study, local voters scored high on most measures of socioeconomic status. Local voters were also much more likely than nonvoters to be older, to be White, to be male, and to have lived at their current address for a longer period of time (see also Collins, Lucero, and Trounstine 2020). In the California study, local voters were also much more likely than nonvoters to have strong partisan attachments, to believe that voting is a duty, and to feel that local governments are important. Almost all of the local voters (98 percent) also claimed to have voted in the most recent presidential election. Nevertheless, as voters in these surveys could not be validated, self-reported turnout likely contains some error and is likely to be inflated. See the supplementary appendix for more details The biggest limitation of these three surveys is that they are all cross-sectional in nature. They don’t track changes in knowledge as individual Americans experience the transition from off-cycle contests to on-cycle elections. Thus, they do not allow for a definitive causal test of election timing. They can only be used to evaluate the correlation between timing and local knowledge. However, to try to ensure that factors other than election timing are not driving any differences in knowledge that we do find, we control from a range of individual demographic factors like age, race, gender, education, and income that could be correlated with voter knowledge. Since each survey asks about a slightly different set of demographic characteristics, the exact list of covariates we include varies from survey to survey. 2 To help overcome the limitations of the survey data and to allow for a more telling test of election timing, we turn to the Local Elections Database (LED) (de Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). LED includes information on 78,000 candidates running for mayor, city council, and school board across 57,000 electoral contests from 1989 to 2021 (de Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). The LED data allow us to assess the effects of election timing on incumbent reelection rates. Relying on the panel data in the data base, we can conduct a series of difference-in-differences tests that compare changes in incumbent reelection rates in cities and school districts that move to on-cycle dates with changes in places that did not shift timing. To further test the effects of timing, in subsequent tests we do additional analysis that is limited to cities in California, where a 2015 law mandated changes to on-cycle elections. Since the law required changes in timing and did so at different times in different localities, we can conduct a difference-in-difference test under conditions of exogenous and staggered shifts in timing. Data on election timing come from several sources. To code city timing for respondents in the 2018 California survey, we rely on the California Elections Data Archive. Oliver and Ha (2007) provide information on the election dates for each suburban community included in SSV held on-cycle elections. Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner (2024) also provide over time data on election timing in cities and school districts included in the LED. To gauge the effects of school district timing in the EN survey, respondents are matched to their local school district. We then created an original database of school board election timing using Anzia’s (2014) database and additional online searchers of states’ secretary of elections websites and the National Conference of State Legislatures election consolidation news database to identify any subsequent changes in school board timing. As is common in studies of election timing, we classify cities and school districts as holding on-cycle elections if their general elections are held on the first Tuesday of November on the same day as federal elections. All elections that do not occur on one of these statewide general election dates are coded as being off-cycle. 3 Timing and Voter Knowledge Do voters in on-cycle elections know more or less about local affairs than voters in off-cycle elections? We turn to three surveys that ask a range of concrete questions about city government, local politics, and school districts to provide a preliminary answer. Specifically, in Table 1 we look to see if there are any gaps in knowledge between voters in the two types of contests. The data are cross-sectional but in each case we control for a range of demographic characteristics at the individual and local level. Details and full regression results are included in the Supplementary Appendix. Table 1. Election Dates and Knowledge About Local Affairs City Government Local Gov’t Responsibilities 1 Know the Mayor’s Party 2 On-Cycle .23 (.09)* -.04 (.03) N 3479 1,468 School Finance 3 Per Pupil Spending Teacher Salaries Local Share of Funding On-Cycle 1104 (475)* -2324 (631)* 2.37 (2.02) N 4983 4983 1212 School Achievement 3 Average Level Average Growth On-Cycle 2.41 (2.42) 2.32 (2.72) N 1212 1212 Charter Schools 3 In District Hold Religious Services On-Cycle .03 (.04) .02 (.03) N 1212 1212 ** p<.01, * p<.05, ^ p<.10 1 Trounstine (2018) 2 Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) 3 Education Next Poll (2018-2021) The results are somewhat mixed, but taken together they offer no evidence that voters in off-cycle elections are systematically more knowledgeable about local politics or public affairs than those in on-cycle elections. In fact, on some of the measures, voters in on-cycle elections have significantly greater knowledge than voters in off-cycle elections. For example, on-cycle voters are more likely than off-cycle voters to be able to correctly determine which level of government is most responsible for the placement of stop signs. On-cycle voters are also better able than their off-cycle counterparts to be able to estimate per pupil spending in their local school district. Both on-cycle and off-cycle voters tend to underestimate local educational spending per pupil, but on-cycle voters underestimate spending by a substantially lower figure than do off-cycle voters (about $1100 less on average). Greater knowledge on school spending may be due to the fact that on-cycle contests bring in a much larger share of younger voters who are more likely to have children in schools (Kogan et al 2018). 4 At the same time, there is one case where the reverse is true. On-cycle voters are less knowledgeable than off-cycle voters about teacher’s salaries. Both groups of voters offer estimates that are wide of the mark, but on-cycle voters tend to underestimate teacher salaries by a greater extent (a difference of about $2300). However, the conclusion that most matches the data is that there is no clear knowledge gap between on- and off-cycle voters. On seven of the ten measures, we find no significant difference between the two types of voters. On-cycle voters are no more or less likely than off-cycle voters to know if the mayor is elected or appointed. We also do not observe any additional differences in knowledge of local students’ academic performance. Timing does not appear to impact knowledge about how well students in their school district perform on standardized tests—either their current level of performance or their rate of growth over time—relative to other districts. There are also no observable differences between on-cycle and off-cycle voters with respect to their knowledge about charter schools. In sum, there is little systematic evidence that the move to on-cycle elections leads to substantial drops in local knowledge. It is also worth noting that we find no election timing effects where we should not expect to find them. In the California study, there was no relationship between municipal election timing and knowledge about state or federal politics. We also found no connection between municipal election timing and local knowledge among non-voters in the state. Details and full regression results are included in the Supplementary Appendix. Timing, Interest, and Engagement Knowledge is only one measure of engagement with local affairs. To further assess potential differences, we looked for questions that measured interest and engagement in local affairs. We were able to examine differences between voters in on- and off-cycle cities on four indicators of local engagement. The SSV asked respondents to gauge their interest in local political campaigns, the extent to which they read the local newspaper, how often they discuss the local election with friends, and how important they feel local elections are. In each case, we compare interest and engagement among voters in on-cycle cities with interest and engagement among voters in off-cycle cities while controlling for a range of individual level characteristics and city demographics. Here the pattern is clearer. On all four measures voters in on-cycle elections report being as engaged as their counterparts in off-cycle places. There are no declines in terms of reading the local paper, expressing interest in local campaigns, or discussing local campaigns. On-cycle voters are, in fact, more likely than off-cycle voters to believe that local elections are important. Detailed models can be found in the Supplementary Appendix. Table 2. Election Dates and Interest and Engagement Read Local Paper Interest in Local Campaign Discuss Local Campaign Believe Local Elections are Important On-Cycle 0.21 (.12)^ 0.11 (.08) 0.95 (.19)** 0.93 (.11)** N 1465 1,459 1458 1447 **p<.01 * p<.05, ^ p<.10 Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) Timing, Voting, and Local Outcomes While the results to this point suggest that voters in on-cycle elections are as engaged or even at times more engaged than voters in off-cycle elections, nothing we have looked at so far has examined the vote itself. The concern is that if local contests are overshadowed by higher profile contests for president, governor, or Congress, then voters in on-cycle elections will not have enough information to make effective choices. That could negatively impact local governance. To begin to assess the vote, we return to the SSV which has questions that ask both about the candidates in the elections and about governance after the election. In terms of the election itself, we find that on-cycle voters are more likely than off-cycle voters to believe that there are real differences between the mayoral candidates. They are also more likely to believe that issues matter when voting in local contests. These patterns suggest that on-cycle voters may be relatively well informed about the candidates and that they care enough about local contests to at least try to vote effectively. Table 3. Election Dates, Voting, and Governance Assessing the Vote Assessing Local Conditions Mayoral Candidates Differ Issues Matter Local Government Working Well Local Economic Conditions Have Improved On-Cycle 0.72 (.10)** 0.24 (.10)* 0.40 (.08)** 0.16 (.07)* N 1445 1282 1439 1442 **p<.01 * p<.05, ^ p<.10 Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) Fortunately, with the SSV survey data we can take the analysis one step further. We can begin to look at local outcomes – or at least at local voters’ perceptions of local outcomes. Specifically, in the last two columns of Table 3, we look to see whether election timing is associated with local voters’ evaluations of their cities and their city governments. On both measures, we find that, net a range of controls, voters in on-cycle cities are more satisfied with local conditions than voters in off-cycle cities. As the second half of Table 3 reveals, on-cycle voters are more apt than off-cycle voters to believe that local government is working well. They are also more likely to say that local economic conditions in the city have improved over the last year. At least on these two admittedly subjective measures, on-cycle cities are outperforming off-cycle municipalities. This last set of results suggests not only that fears about coupling local elections with statewide elections may be overstated, but also that moving on-cycle might be leading to more effective governance. Our test – both because it is based on subjective measures and because it is cross sectionally in nature – is hardly definitive. But these results do raise a question. Why would we expect outcomes to improve – rather than decline – after the move to on-cycle elections? Part of the answer may stem directly from changes in who votes when elections are moved on-cycle. By encouraging a larger and more diverse set of residents to vote, on-cycle elections could draw in new voters who bring with them a greater diversity of experiences and perspectives with which to judge local candidates (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Kogan et al 2018). With twice as many voters involved and with a broader range of local residents choosing candidates, overall knowledge could actually increase. Voting in local elections could also spur new information gathering. Having local elections on the federal ballot could convince some voters who may not have participated in local elections in the past to attempt to learn more about the local contests that they may be seeing for the first time. On-cycle elections could affect positive local change in a more indirect manner as well. Existing research shows that on-cycle elections not only have consequences for who votes, they also have consequences for who wins those elections (Hajnal et al 2024, Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021, Hartney and Hayes 2021). A larger and more diverse set of voters tends to lead to a more diverse set of elected officials and in particular to greater representation for communities of color (Hajnal et al 2024, Schaffner, Rhodes, and La Raja 2020). Studies also show that a larger and more diverse set of voters leads to an elected body whose views and policies are more responsive to the public and in particular to government policy that is more in line with the views of the median resident (Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021, Hartney and Hayes 2021). A more representative and more responsive local government could, in turn, shape local voters’ assessments. In that sense it may not be surprising to find that on-cycle elections are associated with a belief that local government is working well. It may also not be surprising to discover that voters in on-cycle cities believe that local economic conditions have improved. While this pathway between on-cycle elections and more positive local outcomes may be predictable, it is far from proven. Our results only suggest that local attitudes may be different. They do not directly test for shifts in the economic standing of municipalities. Nor do they seek to test the impact of election timing on the overall effectiveness of local government. More tests are definitely warranted on this particular topic before any convincing claims about the long term impacts of election dates on governance and the health of local economies can be made. Timing and Incumbent Success The results so far tend to point to a relatively reassuring assessment of on-cycle elections. Voters in places that hold their local elections under the shadow of national and statewide contest do not appear to suffer from a lack of knowledge or a broad disinterest in local campaigns. And at least by voters’ subjective evaluations, municipalities that run their elections at the same time as Presidential, Gubernatorial, or Congressional contests tend to perform better than their off-cycle counterparts. But the results so far are limited in two important ways. First, everything we have looked at so far rests on subjective measures – in each case we have asked voters what they think about local politics. Second, our empirical tests have been relatively limited – basic regressions using cross-sectional data. As a consequence, we cannot be confident that the differences we have seen between on-cycle and off-cycle cities are real and are caused by the timing of local elections. To try to get around both of these limitations, we turn to a more concrete, objective measure of local electoral outcomes and we use a more telling test that gets us closer to causality. Our new test focuses on incumbent reelection rates. If concerns about on-cycle elections are accurate, voters in these types of elections are likely to be disengaged from the local political arena and to have little concrete information about candidates and their abilities, and attributes. With little other than incumbency to go on, on-cycle voters may be apt to favor an incumbent who they can at least recognize. With more on-cycle voters forced to rely on incumbency, the electoral advantage is likely to skew even further towards incumbents. All of that could mean that on-cycle elections will almost ensure victory for incumbents – regardless of whether or not they have performed well in office. To test this possibility, we utilize a newer, more comprehensive data set on local elections. That new data set provides electoral outcomes for 78,000 candidates running for mayor, city council, and school board across 57,000 electoral contests from 1989 to 2021 (Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). The size and structure of the data are critical because they allows us to conduct a series of difference-in-differences tests comparing cities and school districts that move to on-cycle dates with those that do not. We undertake two distinct tests. The first offers a broad assessment of the effects of election timing by incorporating all candidates across the nation. Our analysis employs a differences-in-differences approach using over time changes in election timing within places and fixed effects models. The second focuses on electoral contests in California. We single out California, because of a 2015 election timing law that was passed in that state. The law, the California Voter Participation Act, mandated changes to on-cycle elections but it did so in a way that led different cities and school boards to shift their timing in different years. That means that we can conduct a difference-in-difference test in California under conditions of exogenous and staggered shifts in timing. A number of other studies have leveraged this state-level reform to causally identify the impact of election timing on a range of outcomes( Hajnal et al. 2022, Hajnal et al 2024). With this more extensive data set, we can also distinguish between the effects of consolidating with a midterm or presidential general election. As Table 4 shows, both sets of tests lead to the same conclusion. Incumbents win less of the vote and they win less often when elections are held on-cycle. That is true across the nation and within California. The effects of timing are not massive. Across the nation, shifting to on-cycle dates reduces the advantages of incumbency but only marginally. In the national level analysis, the incumbent advantage is only about 5 percent smaller in on-cycle contests. Table 4. Timing and Support for Incumbents Vote Share Win National California National California Presidential Incumbent -.06(.02)** -.16 (.03)** -.05 (.02)* -.13 (.05)* Midterm Incumbent -.05 (.01)** -.16 (.03)** -.05 (.02)* -.07 (.05) Incumbent .26 (.01)*8 .30 (.02)** .50 (.02)** .52 (.03)** N 43,675 5,109 43,675 5,109 **p<.01 * p<.05, ^ p<.10 Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) Interestingly, when we isolate California and focus on a more telling case, the estimated effects of election timing are more pronounced. Shifting to on-cycle dates reduces the electoral advantage of incumbents everywhere, but in a state where shifts in timing are more clearly exogenous, the estimated size of the timing effect is two or three times as large – a pattern that increases the confidence in our results and in the effects of timing on electoral outcomes. These results both match and contradict existing work. They closely fit with a study by Trounstine (2012). Using a different data set and method, that study found that higher turnout contests tend to reduce both the proportion of incumbents who run for office and the proportion who win. But the results here differ from de Benedictis-Kessner (2017), a study which found that incumbents fare better in close on-cycle contests than they do in close off-cycle contests on-cycle. These divergent findings could certainly be due to the use of different data sets, a focus on different contexts, or the different research designs that each study employed. The truth may, however, be somewhere in the middle. Indeed, additional work by Payson (2017) suggests that incumbency can sometimes be an advantage and sometimes be a disadvantage and that whether and to what extent incumbency points in either direction may be contingent on election timing. Her study, which focused on school district contests in California, found that election results were more closely tied to school district performance when elections were held on-cycle. In low-turnout off-cycle elections, there was no connection between district test scores and support for incumbents. But in higher turnout on-cycle elections, incumbents were rewarded or punished based on whether student test scores went up or down during their tenures. That pattern suggests not only that voters may have more insight into what was happening in local schools in on-cycle elections but also that the fate of incumbents in on-cycle elections will vary based on whether or not they perform well. Conclusion and Discussion Despite the public’s interest in moving to on-cycle elections and the clear benefits of on-cycle contests, the move to consolidated elections continues to provoke a deep seated concern that higher turnout in on-cycle elections will come at the expense of a less informed electorate. Indeed, wherever the move to consolidated elections is being considered, one of the most frequently heard concerns is that moving to on-cycle elections will decrease the amount of attention that voters will pay to local affairs and that this will ultimately lead to poor decisions that negatively impact local governance. With that concern in mind, this article aimed to provide the first significant empirical evidence about whether there is, in fact, a knowledge-participation tradeoff. We find no clear and convincing evidence that on-cycle voters are less informed and engaged than off-cycle ones. There are, however, signs of improvement after the move to on-cycle elections. On some measures, voters in consolidated elections are significantly more engaged in local political affairs than their off-cycle brethren. And there are indications that consolidated elections are associated with a vote that may be more focused on local issues and candidate quality. Ultimately, we find greater satisfaction with local government performance after the move. Altogether, there is no clear or compelling reason to conclude that further election consolidation will increase voter ignorance in down ballot contests. There is more work to be done on this topic. Much of our analysis is based on relatively small surveys across a relatively small set of cities and school districts. Moreover, because of the cross sectional nature of those surveys, we can offer few clear causal conclusions from that analysis. But there are few signs in those surveys that the worst fears of voter ignorance in on-cycle elections are being realized. And more telling causal analysis of candidate reelection efforts demonstrates that fears of incumbents being almost guaranteed reelection in on-cycle elections are not borne out. In fact, we see the opposite – slightly lower odds of reelection when candidates run in on-cycle contests than when they run off-cycle. Why have the worst fears of Progressives and others not been realized? Why are on-cycle voters as knowledgeable or even more knowledgeable than off-cycle voters? We can offer no direct empirical tests of the mechanism in this article. But we can offer a plausible explanation based on the wide ranging research on election timing that already exists. That research tells us that the most likely explanation for why information does not fall and may, in fact, increase is a change in makeup of the electorate. We know that on-cycle elections draw in a much larger and a much more diverse set of voters (Marschall and Lappie 2025, Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018 ). If a democracy doubles the number of its participants and if those new participants have a much broader and more representative set of experiences than the old participants, it would not be surprising to learn that those new voters bring new and different information to bear on local elections. Take as an example school board elections – the one case where we probably have the most relevant research. Moving those elections on-cycle dramatically increases the share of voters who are under age 35 and dramatically decreases the share of voters who are over age 55 (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018). That shift in the demographics of the vote means that on-cycle elections will have a much larger share of voters who still have children in school – a group of voters who are more likely to know what is currently happening in local schools. It is no wonder that the younger and more informed voters in on-cycle elections are more likely to kick school board incumbents out when student test scores decline (Payson 2017, Scherer 2014). If those new and more diverse voters elect more representative and more responsive elected officials – as research shows they do – then it is perhaps not surprising to find that the move to on-cycle elections is associated with gains in satisfaction and governance, rather than declines (Hajnal et al 2024, Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021, Hartney and Hayes 2021, Schaffner, Rhodes, and La Raja 2020). By enticing a larger, more diverse, and perhaps more discerning set of residents to vote, on-cycle elections may actually be improving local democracy. These findings have significant implications for American democracy. Despite recent reforms around the country, most of America remains off-cycle (Sightline 2025, Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024). Over 60 percent of America’s cities continue to hold stand alone local contests when little other than local candidates are on the ballot and when a small and extremely set of residents participate (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022). Most Americans would like that to change. Surveys show that roughly two-thirds of the public – Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike – prefer voting for multiple offices in one election over voting multiple times on multiple different dates (Manhattan Institute 2024, Anzia 2014 ). And legislators have been listening. Six states have moved to mandate consolidated elections and many more are actively considering new legislation to move on-cycle. Most of America’s local elections could soon become entwined with statewide and federal contests. These findings are important because they lay to rest one of the last concerns related to a change in date. What we learn here – that voters in on-cycle local elections are as knowledgeable or perhaps even more knowledgeable than voters in off-cycle contests – tells us that the wide ranging benefits to on-cycle elections are not offset by steep decreases in voter attention to local public affairs. Legislators can now move forward knowing skeptics’ worst fears are unlikely to become reality. Declarations Author Contribution ZH, MH, DH, and AZ contributed to all of the different stages of the project including the design of the study, the analysis of the data, and the writeup of the manuscript. Data Availability All data and replication materials required to perform the analysis in this manuscript are publicly available on Dataverse References Anzia, Sarah. 2014. Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups . New York: Cambridge. Benedictis-Kessner, Justin. 2017. "Off-Cycle and out of Office: Election Timing and the Incumbency Advantage." The Journal of Politics 80: 119-32. Benedictis-Kessner, Justin de, Diana Da In Lee, Yamil R Velez, and Christopher Warshaw. 2023. "American Local Government Elections Database." Scientific Data 10: 912-19. Bridges, Amy. 1997. Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Caren, Neal. 2007. "Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral Participation in American Cities." Journal of Urban Affairs 29: 31-46. Collins, J., Lucero, E., & Trounstine, J. 2020. "Will Concurrent Elections Reshape the Electorate?". California Journal of Politics and Policy 12. Dynes, Adam M., Michael T. Hartney, and Sam D. Hayes. 2021. "Off-Cycle and Off Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government." American Political Science Review 115: 1097-103. Einstein, Katherine, Maxwell Palmer, Ellis Hamilton, and Ethan Singer. 2024. "The Gray Vote: How Older Home-Owning Voters Dominate Local Elections.". Hajnal, Zoltan. 2010. America’s Uneven Democracy: Turnout, Race, and Representation in City Politics . New York: Cambridge University Press. Hajnal, Zoltan L., Vladimir Kogan, and G. Agustin Markarian. 2022. "Who Votes: City Election Timing and Voter Composition." American Political Science Review 116: 374-83. Hajnal, Zoltan L., Paul G. Lewis, and Hugh Louch. 2002. Municipal Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition . San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California. Hajnal, Zoltan L. and Jessica L. Trounstine 2013. "What Underlies Urban Politics? Race, Class, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Urban Vote." Urban Affairs Review 49. Hartney, Michael, and Sam Hayes. 2021. "Off-Cycle and out of Sync: How Election Timing Influences Political Representation." State Politics & Policy Quarterly March: 1-20. Holbrook, Thomas, and Aaron Weinschenk. 2014. "Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in Mayoral Elections." Political Research Quarterly 67: 42-55. Jacobson, Gary C. 2015. "It’s Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in Us House Elections." The Journal of Politics 77: 861-73. Kogan, Vladimir, Stéphane Lavertu, and Zachary Peskowitz. 2018. "Election Timing, Electorate Composition, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from School Districts." American Journal of Political Science 62: 637-51. Manhattan Institute. 2024. "Polling Nyc Survey Analysis of 2025 Likely Mayoral Voters on Politics, Crime, Migrants, and Electoral Reform." Marschall, Melissa, and John Lappie. 2018. "Turnout in Local Elections: Is Timing Really Everything?". Election Law Journal 17. Oliver, J. Eric, and Shang E. Ha. 2007. "Vote Choice in Suburban Elections." American Political Science Review 101: 393-408. Payson, Julia. 2017. "When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance? Evidence from Us School Districts." Legislative Studies Quarterly 42: 421-48. Sances, Michael W. 2018. "Ideology and Vote Choice in U.S. Mayoral Elections: Evidence from Facebook Surveys." Political Behavior 40: 737-62. Schaffner, Brian F., Jesse H. Rhodes, and Raymond J. La Raja. 2020. Hometown Inequality: Race, Class, and Representation in American Local Politics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scherer, Ethan. 2014. "Three Essays on Education Reform in the United States." In Secondary Three Essays on Education Reform in the United States , ed Secondary Scherer, Ethan. Rand Corporation. Reprint, Reprint. Sightline Institute. 2025. When Do Cities Hold Elections? https://www.sightline.org/2024/06/10/when-do-cities-hold-elections/ Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. "Representation in Municipal Goverment." American Political Science Review 108: 605-41. Trounstine, Jessica. 2012. "Turnout and Incumbency in Local Elections." Urban Affairs Review 49: 167-89. Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Warshaw, Christopher and Justin de Benedictis-Kessner. 2024. "The Electoral and Policy Effects of Election Timing in City and County Governments." Wood, Curtis. 2002. "Voter Turnout in City Elections." Urban Affairs Review 38: 209-31. Footnotes The SSV study only sampled local voters, thus we cannot estimate a turnout rate among those respondents. However, as with the other two studies, the respondents in the SSV who all indicated that they were local voters tended to be highly educated (67% with at least some college), older (median age of 54), and married (66 percent married) and the overwhelming majority (84 percent) were homeowners – all patterns that fit with our knowledge of who votes (Verba et al 1995 ). Specifically, the California survey analysis controls for gender, race, age, and educational attainment. The SSN survey analysis has controls for gender, race, age, educational attainment, homeownership, marital status as well as measures of local electoral structure (mayoral elections, nonpartisan elections) and city level demographics. The EN analysis includes controls for gender, race, income, educational attainment, parent status, teacher status, home-ownership, party identification, and political ideology. It also uses yearly fixed effects. Research shows that November on-cycle election dates have by far the biggest impact on voter turnout and the composition of the vote (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Hajnal 2010 ). Aligning with federal and statewide primaries tends to be less consequential for the size and composition of the vote. Existing research shows that the move to on-cycle elections increases the share of voters who have children in the household by almost 10 percent (Kogan et al 2018 ). Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Across most of the United States, local elections are held off-cycle, when the ballot is largely limited to local contests (Sightline 2024). But over the past decade, legislators in several states\u0026mdash;including Arizona, California, Nevada, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia\u0026mdash;have mandated consolidated elections, requiring local contests to coincide with statewide or federal elections. Many more states are now considering similar reforms.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eElection timing matters because it fundamentally shapes who participates in politics.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEvery one of the more than a dozen academic studies that has looked at the link between election timing and turnout has found that moving local elections on-cycle dramatically increases turnout \u0026ndash; often doubling or more than doubling voter participation (Marschall and Lappie 2025, Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Anzia 2014, Holbrook and Weinschenk 2013, Hajnal 2010, Caren 2007, Wood 2002). If state legislators want to impact local voter participation, election timing is the single largest lever they have.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eResearch also shows that a shift in election dates changes the composition of the vote and makes it more representative of the underlying population (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Einstein et al 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018). \u0026nbsp;In particular, voters in on-cycle elections tend to be younger, more racially diverse, and less skewed toward the wealthy. \u0026nbsp;More representative electorates have been linked to more representative elected officials, declines in racial gaps in representation, and policies that are more in line with the median resident\u0026rsquo;s preferences (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2024, Schaffner et al 2020, Dynes et al 2021). In short, reforms to election dates are among the most powerful tools state governments can use to shape democracy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLegislators not only have the power to change dates and to change local democracy, they also have an incentive to do so. Most of the public favors the move to consolidated elections. \u0026nbsp;Surveys show that roughly two-thirds prefer voting in one election on one day rather than in voting in multiple elections on different days for different offices (Anzia 2014, Manhattan Institute 2024). Moreover, that support is bipartisan. \u0026nbsp;Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all favor the move (Anzia 2014, Manhattan Institute 2024).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut is there a downside to election consolidation?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile on-cycle elections have clear, wide-ranging benefits, they also raise concerns about a participation-knowledge tradeoff in the electorate. Wherever consolidation is considered, a common worry is that moving to on-cycle elections will reduce the attention voters give to local affairs. Some say that local contests and candidates may be overshadowed by higher-profile races for president, governor, or Congress. With less media coverage and attention, voters may have less information about local candidates. The end result is that voters may make poor decisions that could negatively impact local governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnfortunately, despite growing attention to election timing, researchers have not been able to systematically study the effects of election dates on voter knowledge. With national surveys rarely asking about local candidates and local issues and with data on election timing around the country relatively limited until recently, empirical tests that compare knowledge in on- and off-cycle tests are rare. One study of suburban elections did include questions about local knowledge, but it ultimately offered few clear conclusions about the effects of timing (Oliver and Ha 2007). We still don\u0026rsquo;t know if aligning local elections with national contests ultimately reduces voter attention and knowledge in local affairs. \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eScholarship examining the effects of election timing on local vote choice has also been limited. A range of studies has examined vote choice in local elections but none has been able to see if the issues that shape the vote differ between on- and off-cycle cities. \u0026nbsp;One area that has received some attention is incumbent reelection rates. \u0026nbsp;But even here the results are mixed with one study finding that incumbents run less and win less in on-cycle contests, another finding that incumbents fare better in close on-cycle contests than in close off-cycle contests, and a third revealing that the fate of incumbents was more dependent on their performance in on-cycle contests than it was in off-cycle elections (Trounstine 2012, de Benedictis-Kessner 2017, Payson 2017). Important questions remain about the vote in on- and off-cycle contests.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo better understand how election dates impact knowledge and electoral choice, we utilize a newer, more comprehensive data set on local elections that provides information on 78,000 candidates running for mayor, city council, and school board across 57,000 electoral contests from 1989 to 2021 (de Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). \u0026nbsp;That allows us to conduct a series of difference-in-differences tests comparing cities and school districts that move to on-cycle dates with those that do not. A 2015 California law that mandated changes to on-cycle elections also allows us to conduct a difference-in-difference test under conditions of exogenous and staggered shifts in timing. We also merge data from three different surveys that together ask a range of concrete questions about local knowledge in city and school board elections. \u0026nbsp;Since the surveys focus on different aspects of city politics and education policy, they help us to garner some additional insight on voter knowledge across different contexts.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe analysis shows that local voters in on-cycle elections are as knowledgeable than local voters in off-cycle elections. \u0026nbsp; On most measures we find few significant differences in knowledge. On some measures, on-cycle voters actually express more interest and engagement in local affairs. There are also signs that on-cycle voters rely less on incumbency when they vote. \u0026nbsp;Combined, this suggests that the wide-ranging benefits to on-cycle elections are not offset by steep decreases in voter attention to local public affairs.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBackground\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eResearch has demonstrated a range of benefits from moving local elections to the same days as federal contests. Moving to on-cycle dates alters who votes, who wins office, and how governments govern. A range of studies have found that moving to November even year elections doubles or even triples turnout (Marschall and Lappie 2018, Kogan et al. 2018, Anzia 2014). \u0026nbsp;The move to November even year contests also brings in younger and more diverse voters and makes the electorate more representative of the age, race, and class distribution of the underlying local population (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Einstein et al 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018). All of this ultimately reduces inequalities in representation and makes government policy more responsive to the median resident (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2024, Schaffner et al 2020, Dynes et al 2021).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn-cycle elections are, however, a relatively new phenomenon. \u0026nbsp;Until 2015, only 4 states had laws requiring on-cycle municipal contests (Sightline 2025). Most other states still outlaw on-cycle elections (Sightline 2025). While several others allowed cities to choose on-cycle dates, most cities in those states ended up choosing an off-cycle alternative (Sightline 2025). \u0026nbsp;As a consequence, research has been limited and questions remain. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eA Decline in Voter Knowledge?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eChief among these is the question of how on-cycle elections impact voter knowledge and voter choice. Many worry that moving local elections to the bottom of a long and complicated ballot will lead to a local electorate that is far less knowledgeable about the candidates and issues that drive local politics. That concern was echoed by opponents of a Michigan bill that attempted to consolidate local school district elections: \u0026ldquo;Perhaps not many voters turn up for school elections, but they are likely to be interested and informed voters. \u0026nbsp;Combining elections might lead to more voters but many will have no connection to or knowledge about school districts.\u0026rdquo; (quoted in Anzia 2013, 104).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere are certainly reasons to fear that outcome. \u0026nbsp; Putting local elections for mayor, city council, and school boards on the same days as contests for President, the House, and the Senate means that local contests will be competing with much higher profile contests for voters\u0026rsquo; time and attention. \u0026nbsp;Higher costs for media space during the national campaign period could also make it more difficult for local candidates to reach local voters. \u0026nbsp;The result could be a local electorate that is less knowledgeable about local politics.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact, this concern over less informed electorates is one of the main reasons that Progressives pushed over a century ago for most of America\u0026rsquo;s local elections to be moved off-cycle, away from federal elections (Bridges 1997). They quietly claimed \u0026ndash; as many continue to do today \u0026ndash; that the extra work required to vote in off-cycle elections means that local contests would be decided by the most interested and knowledgeable voters (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, however, little evidence showing that holding consolidated elections reduce the amount of attention paid to local issues and local elections. An early study of suburban voters by Oliver and Ha (2007) suggested that on-cycle voters may be less informed than off-cycle voters about some aspects of municipal affairs. But the differences the study found did not appear to be statistically significant. \u0026nbsp;With surveys rarely asking concrete questions about local candidates and local contests and with little comprehensive data on when cities and school districts hold their elections, no other studies of the topic have emerged. We simply don\u0026rsquo;t know if the move to on-cycle elections leads to declines in local knowledge. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA lack of attention to local politics could in turn affect local residents and local governance in other important ways. \u0026nbsp; Residents who are less informed about and less connected to local candidates may become less interested and less engaged in the electoral process. \u0026nbsp;All of this could impact vote choice. \u0026nbsp;With limited information from campaigns, voters may not know enough about local candidates to accurately assess their abilities and to gauge which will \u0026nbsp; better serve their interests. All of this could negatively impact local governance. A poorly informed electorate could choose less effective leaders. \u0026nbsp;Less effective leaders could then generate declines in local economic and social conditions. If true, on-cycle elections could hurt residents and their cities.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, there are reasons to believe that on-cycle elections could increase voter knowledge and lead to better, more informed decisions in local contests. \u0026nbsp;By encouraging a larger and more diverse set of residents to vote, on-cycle elections \u0026nbsp;could draw in new voters who bring with them a greater diversity of experiences and perspectives with which to judge local candidates (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Kogan et al 2018). With twice as many voters involved and a with broader range of local residents choosing candidates, overall knowledge is likely to increase rather than decrease. \u0026nbsp;All of this suggests that consolidated elections might actually facilitate local government accountability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnfortunately, we do not yet know which of these different theories better fits reality. \u0026nbsp;While there is a reasonably extensive literature on vote choice in local elections, studies rarely compare vote choice in on and off-cycle contests. We know that a range of factors like partisanship, ideology, and race have an impact on local electoral contests (Sances 2018, Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014, Hajnal and Trounstine 2013). \u0026nbsp;But we don\u0026rsquo;t know if these factors matter more or less in on-cycle contests. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe only systematic research on vote choice and election timing focuses specifically on whether incumbents win reelection. Here we know that incumbents have an advantage in the American electoral context (Jacobson 2015). \u0026nbsp;But it is less clear whether the move to on-cycle elections helps or hurts incumbents. Trounstine (2012) found that higher turnout contests tended to reduce both the proportion of incumbents who run and the proportion who win. \u0026nbsp;By contrast, de Benedictis-Kessner (2017) found that on-cycle elections provide incumbents with a larger advantage than off-cycle elections do (de Benedictis-Kessner 2017). \u0026nbsp;A third study of school district elections and academic achievement in California found that election results were more closely tied to school district performance when elections were held on-cycle \u0026ndash; a sign that voters may have had more insight into what was happening in local schools in on-cycle elections (Payson 2017; see also Scherer 2014 for a similar finding). \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite the importance of these questions for reformers and despite the growing attention that election timing has received, few have systematically examined voting knowledge or voter decision making in the context of election timing. For Americans interested in local democracy \u0026ndash; both those who seek to move to on-cycle elections and those who worry about the consequences of that move \u0026ndash; the need more information is clear.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, there are also those who will argue that regardless of what we find about election timing and voter knowledge, it should not matter. Because every citizen has a right to vote, the ability to vote should not be dependent on how much a voter does or does not know. \u0026nbsp;Indeed, the judicial system has long viewed measures that limit participation to the most knowledgeable as unconstitutional. \u0026nbsp;Since the 1970s, the Voting Rights Act and its extensions have outlawed literacy tests and other tools that use knowledge tests to limit participation. \u0026nbsp;From this perspective, low levels of knowledge are not a problem that should be addressed with increased barriers to participation but rather as a problem that can and should be rectified with greater efforts at education and inclusion.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Research Design","content":"\u003cp\u003eWe bring together an idiosyncratic mix of data and tests to try to answer questions about the impact of election timing on voter knowledge and voter decision making. \u0026nbsp; Individually, each data set is limited. None offers a definitive causal test of election timing and knowledge. \u0026nbsp; But by bringing together a range of different surveys with diverse questions on distinct aspects of local elections, we may be able to offer rough guide to how much knowledge is or is not connected to election timing. \u0026nbsp;In addition, by employing a newer and much more comprehensive data set with the vote for tens of thousands of local candidates across the country, we are to offer a more telling causal test of how timing impacts election outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe main barrier to assessing voter knowledge about local affairs is a dearth of survey data with specific and concrete questions about local affairs. Because the issues and candidates that shape the local political arena can and often do differ from municipality to municipality, national surveys rarely include questions about local politics.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo address that barrier, we bring together all of the different surveys that we could find with two characteristics. Each survey had to \u0026nbsp;ask concrete questions about local candidates or local issues and each survey \u0026nbsp;also had to be conducted across a wide array of municipalities, school districts, or states. \u0026nbsp; That led to us three surveys. \u0026nbsp;The first was a 2018 study of 11,000 California voters that resided in 500 different municipalities in the state. \u0026nbsp; Voters in the study were tested on their knowledge about city government. The second, the \u0026nbsp;Study of Suburban Voters (SSV), was designed to understand suburban elections surveyed over 1400 voters in 30 different suburban communities across five different states (California, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, and North Carolina). \u0026nbsp;Residents in these communities were surveyed shortly after their suburban communities held local contests in 2004 and 2005.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe SSV asked voters about their knowledge of and engagement with suburban politics. The third focused specifically on school districts and knowledge of the local educational policy environment. \u0026nbsp;These \u003cem\u003eEducation Next\u003c/em\u003e (EN) polls were conducted in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. \u0026nbsp;They surveyed almost 5000 respondents across a representative set of school districts around the country. \u0026nbsp;The EN surveys expand our understanding of local knowledge by asking specific questions about different aspects of education policy . Combined, these three surveys include enough concrete questions on different aspects of local political affairs to offer a relatively broad assessment of local knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo try to determine if these surveys accurately identified local residents who voted in local contests, we performed a series of additional tests. \u0026nbsp;First, we found that aggregate turnout rates roughly matched expectations. Only 40 percent of California respondents reported voting regularly in local elections, a figure that is only slightly elevated from official turnout statistics. Similarly, estimated local turnout across the EN studies was \u0026nbsp;39 percent. \u0026nbsp; Also, in the California study, self-reported local voter turnout was 34 percentage points lower than self-reported Presidential turnout \u0026ndash; a difference that matches previous research (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002).\u003ca href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\" title=\"\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, the factors shaping local participation in these studies conformed to existing studies of participation (Verba et al 1995). In both the California data and the SSV study, local voters scored high on most measures of socioeconomic status. \u0026nbsp;Local voters were also much more likely than nonvoters to be older, to be White, to be male, and to have lived at their current address for a longer period of time (see also Collins, Lucero, and Trounstine 2020). In the California study, local voters were also much more likely than nonvoters to have strong partisan attachments, to believe that voting is a duty, and to feel that local governments are important. \u0026nbsp;Almost all of the local voters (98 percent) also claimed to have voted in the most recent presidential election. \u0026nbsp;Nevertheless, as voters in these surveys could not be validated, self-reported turnout likely contains some error and is likely to be inflated. See the supplementary appendix for more details\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe biggest limitation of these three surveys is that they are all cross-sectional in nature. \u0026nbsp;They don\u0026rsquo;t track changes in knowledge as individual Americans experience the transition from off-cycle contests to on-cycle elections. \u0026nbsp;Thus, they do not allow for a definitive causal test of election timing. \u0026nbsp;They can only be used to evaluate the correlation between timing and local knowledge. \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, to try to ensure that factors other than election timing are not driving any differences in knowledge that we do find, we control from a range of individual demographic factors like age, race, gender, education, and income that could be correlated with voter knowledge. \u0026nbsp; Since each survey asks about a slightly different set of demographic characteristics, the exact list of covariates we include varies from survey to survey.\u003ca href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\" title=\"\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo help overcome the limitations of the survey data and to allow for a more telling test of election timing, we turn to the Local Elections Database \u0026nbsp;(LED) (de Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). \u0026nbsp;LED includes information on 78,000 candidates running for mayor, city council, and school board across 57,000 electoral contests from 1989 to 2021 (de Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). \u0026nbsp;The LED data allow us to assess the effects of election timing on incumbent reelection rates. Relying on the panel data in the data base, we can conduct a series of difference-in-differences tests that compare changes in incumbent reelection rates in cities and school districts that move to on-cycle dates with changes in places that did not shift timing. To further test the effects of timing, in subsequent tests we do additional analysis that is limited to cities in California, where a 2015 law mandated changes to on-cycle elections. \u0026nbsp;Since the law required changes in timing and did so at different times in different localities, we can conduct a difference-in-difference test under conditions of exogenous and staggered shifts in timing.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData on election timing come from \u0026nbsp;several sources. To code city timing for respondents in the 2018 California survey, we rely on the California Elections Data Archive. \u0026nbsp;Oliver and Ha (2007) provide information on the election dates for each suburban community included in SSV held on-cycle elections. \u0026nbsp;Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner (2024) also provide over time data on election timing in cities and school districts included in the LED. \u0026nbsp;To gauge the effects of school district timing in the EN survey, respondents are matched to their local school district. \u0026nbsp;We then created an original database of school board election timing using Anzia\u0026rsquo;s (2014) database and additional online searchers of states\u0026rsquo; secretary of elections websites and the National Conference of State Legislatures election consolidation news database to identify any subsequent changes in school board timing. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs is common in studies of election timing, we classify cities and school districts as holding on-cycle elections if their general elections are held on the first Tuesday of November on the same day as federal elections. All elections that do not occur on one of these statewide general election dates are coded as being off-cycle.\u003ca href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\" title=\"\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTiming and Voter Knowledge\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDo voters in on-cycle elections know more or less about local affairs than voters in off-cycle elections? \u0026nbsp;We turn to three surveys that ask a range of concrete questions about city government, local politics, and school districts to provide a preliminary answer. Specifically, in Table 1 we look to see if there are any gaps in knowledge between voters in the two types of contests. The data are cross-sectional but in each case we control for a range of demographic characteristics at the individual and local level. \u0026nbsp;Details and full regression results are included in the Supplementary Appendix.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"5\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 623px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 1. Election Dates and Knowledge About Local Affairs\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 505px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCity Government\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLocal Gov\u0026rsquo;t Responsibilities\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eKnow the Mayor\u0026rsquo;s Party\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn-Cycle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.23 (.09)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.04 (.03)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3479\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1,468\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 505px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 505px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSchool Finance \u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 146px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePer Pupil Spending\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTeacher Salaries\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 210px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLocal Share of Funding\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn-Cycle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 146px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1104 (475)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-2324 (631)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 210px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.37 (2.02)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 146px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4983\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4983\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 210px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1212\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 505px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 505px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSchool Achievement \u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAverage Level\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAverage Growth\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn-Cycle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.41 (2.42)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.32 (2.72)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1212\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1212\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"4\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 505px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCharter Schools\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIn District\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHold Religious Services\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn-Cycle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.03 (.04)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.02 (.03)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 118px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 269px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1212\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1212\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 82px;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 133px;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 91px;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 15px;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 131px;\"\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e** p\u0026lt;.01, * p\u0026lt;.05, ^ p\u0026lt;.10\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Trounstine \u0026nbsp;(2018) \u0026nbsp;\u003csup\u003e2 \u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) \u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e Education Next Poll (2018-2021) \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe results are somewhat mixed, but taken together they offer no evidence that voters in off-cycle elections are systematically more knowledgeable about local politics or public affairs than those in on-cycle elections. In fact, on \u0026nbsp;some of the measures, voters in on-cycle elections have significantly greater knowledge than voters in off-cycle elections. \u0026nbsp;For example, on-cycle voters are more likely than off-cycle voters to be able to correctly determine which level of government is most responsible for the placement of stop signs. \u0026nbsp;On-cycle voters are also better able than their off-cycle counterparts to be able to estimate per pupil spending in their local school district. \u0026nbsp;Both on-cycle and off-cycle voters tend to underestimate local educational spending per pupil, but on-cycle voters underestimate spending by a substantially lower figure than do off-cycle voters (about $1100 less on average). \u0026nbsp;Greater knowledge on school spending may be due to the fact that on-cycle contests bring in a much larger share of younger voters who are more likely to have children in schools (Kogan et al 2018).\u003ca href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\" title=\"\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003csup\u003e4\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt the same time, there is one case where the reverse is true. \u0026nbsp;On-cycle voters are less knowledgeable than off-cycle voters about teacher\u0026rsquo;s salaries. \u0026nbsp; Both groups of voters offer estimates that are wide of the mark, but on-cycle voters tend to underestimate teacher salaries by a greater extent (a difference of about $2300).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, the conclusion that most matches the data is that there is no clear knowledge gap between on- and off-cycle voters. \u0026nbsp;On seven of the ten measures, we find no significant difference between the two types of voters. \u0026nbsp;On-cycle voters are no more or less likely than off-cycle voters to know if the mayor is elected or appointed. \u0026nbsp;We also do not observe any additional differences in knowledge of local students\u0026rsquo; academic performance. \u0026nbsp;Timing does not appear to impact knowledge about how well students in their school district perform on standardized tests\u0026mdash;either their current level of performance or their rate of growth over time\u0026mdash;relative to other districts. There are also no observable differences between on-cycle and off-cycle voters with respect to their knowledge about charter schools. In sum, there is little systematic evidence that the move to on-cycle elections leads to substantial drops in local knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is also worth noting that we find no election timing effects where we should not expect to find them. In the California study, there was no relationship between municipal election timing and knowledge about state or federal politics. We also found no connection between municipal election timing and local knowledge among non-voters in the state. \u0026nbsp;Details and full regression results are included in the Supplementary Appendix.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTiming, Interest, and Engagement\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eKnowledge is only one measure of engagement with local affairs. To further assess potential differences, we looked for questions that measured interest and engagement in local affairs. We were able to examine differences between voters in on- and off-cycle cities on four indicators of local engagement. \u0026nbsp;The SSV asked respondents to gauge their interest in local political campaigns, the extent to which they read the local newspaper, how often they discuss the local election with friends, and how important they feel local elections are. \u0026nbsp;In each case, we compare interest and engagement among voters in on-cycle cities with interest and engagement among voters in off-cycle cities while controlling for a range of individual level characteristics and city demographics. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHere the pattern is clearer. \u0026nbsp;On all four measures voters in on-cycle elections report being as engaged as their counterparts in off-cycle places. There are no declines in terms of reading the local paper, expressing interest in local campaigns, or discussing local campaigns. \u0026nbsp;On-cycle voters are, in fact, more likely than off-cycle voters to believe that local elections are important. \u0026nbsp;Detailed models can be found in the Supplementary Appendix.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"5\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 606px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2. Election Dates and Interest and Engagement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 105px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 109px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRead Local Paper\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 116px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInterest in Local Campaign\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 126px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDiscuss Local Campaign\u003csup\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBelieve Local Elections are Important\u003csup\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 105px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn-Cycle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 109px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.21 (.12)^\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 116px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.11 (.08)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 126px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.95 (.19)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.93 (.11)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 105px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 109px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1465\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 116px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1,459\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 126px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1458\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1447\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e**p\u0026lt;.01 * p\u0026lt;.05, ^ p\u0026lt;.10 \u0026nbsp; Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTiming, Voting, and Local Outcomes\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the results to this point suggest that voters in on-cycle elections are as engaged or even at times more engaged than voters in off-cycle elections, nothing we have looked at so far has examined the vote itself. \u0026nbsp;The concern is that if local contests are overshadowed by higher profile contests for president, governor, or Congress, then voters in on-cycle elections will not have enough information to make effective choices. \u0026nbsp;That could negatively impact local governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo begin to assess the vote, we return to the SSV which has questions that ask both about the candidates in the elections and about governance after the election. In terms of the election itself, we find that on-cycle voters are more likely than off-cycle voters to believe that there are real differences between the mayoral candidates. \u0026nbsp;They are also more likely to believe that issues matter when voting in local contests. These patterns suggest that on-cycle voters may be relatively well informed about the candidates and that they care enough about local contests to at least try to vote effectively. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"5\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 610px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 3. Election Dates, Voting, and Governance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 226px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAssessing the Vote\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 298px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAssessing Local Conditions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 130px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMayoral Candidates Differ\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 97px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIssues Matter\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 139px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLocal Government Working Well\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 159px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLocal Economic Conditions Have Improved\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOn-Cycle\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 130px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.72 (.10)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 97px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.24 (.10)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 139px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.40 (.08)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 159px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.16 (.07)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 130px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1445\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 97px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1282\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 139px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1439\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 159px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1442\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e**p\u0026lt;.01 * p\u0026lt;.05, ^ p\u0026lt;.10 \u0026nbsp; Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005) \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFortunately, with the SSV survey data we can take the analysis one step further. \u0026nbsp; We can begin to look at local outcomes \u0026ndash; or at least at local voters\u0026rsquo; perceptions of local outcomes. Specifically, in the last two columns of Table 3, we look to see whether election timing is associated with local voters\u0026rsquo; evaluations of their cities and their city governments. \u0026nbsp;On both measures, we find that, net a range of controls, voters in on-cycle cities are more satisfied with local conditions than voters in off-cycle cities. As the second half of Table 3 reveals, on-cycle voters are more apt than off-cycle voters to believe that local government is working well. \u0026nbsp;They are also more likely to say that local economic conditions in the city have improved over the last year. At least on these two admittedly subjective measures, on-cycle cities are outperforming off-cycle municipalities.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis last set of results suggests not only that fears about coupling local elections with statewide elections may be overstated, but also that moving on-cycle might be leading to more effective governance. \u0026nbsp;Our test \u0026ndash; both because it is based on subjective measures and because it is cross sectionally in nature \u0026ndash; is hardly definitive. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut these results do raise a question. \u0026nbsp;Why would we expect outcomes to improve \u0026ndash; rather than decline \u0026ndash; after the move to on-cycle elections? Part of the answer may stem directly from changes in who votes when elections are moved on-cycle. By encouraging a larger and more diverse set of residents to vote, on-cycle elections \u0026nbsp;could draw in new voters who bring with them a greater diversity of experiences and perspectives with which to judge local candidates (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Kogan et al 2018). With twice as many voters involved and with a broader range of local residents choosing candidates, overall knowledge could actually increase. \u0026nbsp;Voting in local elections could also spur new information gathering. Having local elections on the federal ballot could convince some voters who may not have participated in local elections in the past to attempt to learn more about the local contests that they may be seeing for the first time.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn-cycle elections could affect positive local change in a more indirect manner as well. Existing research shows that on-cycle elections not only have consequences for who votes, they also have consequences for who wins those elections (Hajnal et al 2024, Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021, Hartney and Hayes 2021). \u0026nbsp;A larger and more diverse set of voters tends to lead to a more diverse set of elected officials and in particular to greater representation for communities of color (Hajnal et al 2024, Schaffner, Rhodes, and La Raja 2020). \u0026nbsp;Studies also show that a larger and more diverse set of voters leads to an elected body whose views and policies are more responsive to the public and in particular to government policy that is more in line with the views of the median resident (Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021, Hartney and Hayes 2021). A more representative and more responsive local government could, in turn, shape local voters\u0026rsquo; assessments. In that sense it may not be surprising to find that on-cycle elections are associated with a belief that local government is working well. It may also not be surprising to discover that voters in on-cycle cities believe that local economic conditions have improved.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile this pathway between on-cycle elections and more positive local outcomes may be predictable, it is far from proven. Our results only suggest that local attitudes may be different. \u0026nbsp;They do not directly test for shifts in the economic standing of municipalities. \u0026nbsp;Nor do they seek to test the impact of election timing on the overall effectiveness of local government. More tests are definitely warranted on this particular topic before any convincing claims about the long term impacts of election dates on governance and the health of local economies can be made.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTiming and Incumbent Success\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe results so far tend to point to a relatively reassuring assessment of on-cycle elections. Voters in places that hold their local elections under the shadow of national and statewide contest do not appear to suffer from a lack of knowledge or a broad disinterest in local campaigns. \u0026nbsp; And at least by voters\u0026rsquo; subjective evaluations, municipalities that run their elections at the same time as Presidential, Gubernatorial, or Congressional contests tend to perform better than their off-cycle counterparts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBut the results so far are limited in two important ways. \u0026nbsp; First, everything we have looked at so far rests on subjective measures \u0026ndash; in each case we have asked voters what they think about local politics. \u0026nbsp;Second, our empirical tests have been relatively limited \u0026ndash; basic regressions using cross-sectional data. As a consequence, we cannot be confident that the differences we have seen between on-cycle and off-cycle cities are real and are caused by the timing of local elections. To try to get around both of these limitations, we turn to a more concrete, objective measure of local electoral outcomes and we use a more telling test that gets us closer to causality. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur new test focuses on incumbent reelection rates. \u0026nbsp;If concerns about on-cycle elections are accurate, voters in these types of elections are likely to be disengaged from the local political arena and to have little concrete information about candidates and their abilities, and attributes. With little other than incumbency to go on, on-cycle voters may be apt to favor an incumbent who they can at least recognize. With more on-cycle voters forced to rely on incumbency, the electoral advantage is likely to skew even further towards incumbents. All of that could mean that on-cycle elections will almost ensure victory for incumbents \u0026ndash; regardless of whether or not they have performed well in office.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo test this possibility, we utilize a newer, more comprehensive data set on local elections. \u0026nbsp;That new data set provides electoral outcomes for 78,000 candidates running for mayor, city council, and school board across 57,000 electoral contests from 1989 to 2021 (Benedictis-Kessner , In Lee, Velez, and Warshaw 2023). \u0026nbsp;The size and structure of the data are critical because they allows us to conduct a series of difference-in-differences tests comparing cities and school districts that move to on-cycle dates with those that do not.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe undertake two distinct tests. The first offers a broad assessment of the effects of election timing by incorporating all candidates across the nation. Our analysis employs a differences-in-differences approach using over time changes in election timing within places and fixed effects models. \u0026nbsp;The second focuses on electoral contests in California. \u0026nbsp;We single out California, because of a 2015 election timing law that was passed in that state. \u0026nbsp; The law, the California Voter Participation Act, mandated changes to on-cycle elections but it did so in a way that led different cities and school boards to shift their timing in different years. \u0026nbsp;That means that we can conduct a difference-in-difference test in California under conditions of exogenous and staggered shifts in timing. A number of other studies have leveraged this state-level reform to causally identify the impact of election timing on a range of outcomes( Hajnal et al. 2022, Hajnal et al 2024). With this more extensive data set, we can also distinguish between the effects of consolidating with a midterm or presidential general election.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs Table 4 shows, both sets of tests lead to the same conclusion. \u0026nbsp; Incumbents win less of the vote and they win less often when elections are held on-cycle. \u0026nbsp;That is true across the nation and within California. \u0026nbsp;The effects of timing are not massive. \u0026nbsp; Across the nation, shifting to on-cycle dates reduces the advantages of incumbency but only marginally. In the national level analysis, the incumbent advantage is only about 5 percent smaller in on-cycle contests.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"5\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 623px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 4. Timing and Support for Incumbents\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 108px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 308px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eVote Share\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWin\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 108px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 160px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNational\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 148px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCalifornia\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNational\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCalifornia\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 108px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePresidential Incumbent\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 160px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.06(.02)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 148px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.16 (.03)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.05 (.02)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.13 (.05)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 108px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMidterm Incumbent\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 160px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.05 (.01)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 148px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.16 (.03)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.05 (.02)*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-.07 (.05)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 108px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIncumbent\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 160px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.26 (.01)*8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 148px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.30 (.02)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.50 (.02)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e.52 (.03)**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 108px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 160px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e43,675\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 148px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5,109\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e43,675\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 103px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5,109\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e**p\u0026lt;.01 * p\u0026lt;.05, ^ p\u0026lt;.10 \u0026nbsp; Study of the Suburban Voter (2004/2005)\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInterestingly, when we isolate California and focus on a more telling case, the estimated effects of election timing are more pronounced. Shifting to on-cycle dates reduces the electoral advantage of incumbents everywhere, but in a state where shifts in timing are more clearly exogenous, the estimated size of the timing effect is two or three times as large \u0026ndash; a pattern that increases the confidence in our results and in the effects of timing on electoral outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese results both match and contradict existing work. \u0026nbsp;They closely fit with a study by Trounstine (2012). \u0026nbsp; Using a different data set and method, that study found that higher turnout contests tend to reduce both the proportion of incumbents who run for office and the proportion who win. But the results here differ from de Benedictis-Kessner (2017), a study which found that incumbents fare better in close on-cycle contests than they do in close off-cycle contests on-cycle. These divergent findings could certainly be due to the use of different data sets, a focus on different contexts, or the different research designs that each study employed.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth may, however, be somewhere in the middle. Indeed, additional work by Payson (2017) suggests that incumbency can sometimes be an advantage and sometimes be a disadvantage and that whether and to what extent incumbency points in either direction may be contingent on election timing. \u0026nbsp; Her study, which focused on school district contests in California, found that election results were more closely tied to school district performance when elections were held on-cycle. \u0026nbsp;In low-turnout off-cycle elections, there was no connection between district test scores and support for incumbents. \u0026nbsp;But in higher turnout on-cycle elections, incumbents were rewarded or punished based on whether student test scores went up or down during their tenures. \u0026nbsp;That pattern suggests not only that voters may have more insight into what was happening in local schools in on-cycle elections but also that the fate of incumbents in on-cycle elections will vary based on whether or not they perform well. \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion and Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eDespite the public\u0026rsquo;s interest in moving to on-cycle elections and the clear benefits of on-cycle contests, the move to consolidated elections continues to provoke a deep seated concern that higher turnout in on-cycle elections will come at the expense of a less informed electorate. \u0026nbsp;Indeed, wherever the move to consolidated elections is being considered, one of the most frequently heard concerns is that moving to on-cycle elections will decrease the amount of attention that voters will pay to local affairs and that this will ultimately lead to poor decisions that negatively impact local governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWith that concern in mind, this article aimed to provide the first significant empirical evidence about whether there is, in fact, a knowledge-participation tradeoff. \u0026nbsp;We find no clear and convincing evidence that on-cycle voters are less informed and engaged than off-cycle ones. \u0026nbsp;There are, however, signs of improvement after the move to on-cycle elections. \u0026nbsp;On some measures, voters in consolidated elections are significantly more engaged in local political affairs than their off-cycle brethren. And there are indications that consolidated elections are associated with a vote that may be more focused on local issues and candidate quality. \u0026nbsp;Ultimately, we find greater satisfaction with local government performance after the move. Altogether, there is no clear or compelling reason to conclude that further election consolidation will increase voter ignorance in down ballot contests.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is more work to be done on this topic. Much of our analysis is based on relatively small surveys across a relatively small set of cities and school districts. \u0026nbsp;Moreover, because of the cross sectional nature of those surveys, we can offer few clear causal conclusions from that analysis. But there are few signs in those surveys that the worst fears of voter ignorance in on-cycle elections are being realized. And more telling causal analysis of candidate reelection efforts demonstrates that fears of incumbents being almost guaranteed reelection in on-cycle elections are not borne out. \u0026nbsp;In fact, we see the opposite \u0026ndash; slightly lower odds of reelection when candidates run in on-cycle contests than when they run off-cycle. \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhy have the worst fears of Progressives and others not been realized? \u0026nbsp;Why are on-cycle voters as knowledgeable or even more knowledgeable than off-cycle voters? \u0026nbsp; We can offer no direct empirical tests of the mechanism in this article. But we can offer a plausible explanation based on the wide ranging research on election timing that already exists. That research tells us that the most likely explanation for why information does not fall and may, in fact, increase is a change in makeup of the electorate. \u0026nbsp; We know that on-cycle elections draw in a much larger and a much more diverse set of voters (Marschall and Lappie 2025, Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018 ). \u0026nbsp; If a democracy doubles the number of its participants and if those new participants have a much broader and more representative set of experiences than the old participants, it would not be surprising to learn that those new voters bring new and different information to bear on local elections. \u0026nbsp;Take as an example school board elections \u0026ndash; the one case where we probably have the most relevant research. \u0026nbsp;Moving those elections on-cycle dramatically increases the share of voters who are under age 35 \u0026nbsp;and dramatically decreases the share of voters who are over age 55 (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Kogan et al 2018). That shift in the demographics of the vote means that on-cycle elections will have a much larger share of voters who still have children in school \u0026ndash; a group of voters who are more likely to know what is currently happening in local schools. \u0026nbsp;It is no wonder that the younger and more informed voters in on-cycle elections are more likely to kick school board incumbents out when student test scores decline (Payson 2017, Scherer 2014). If those new and more diverse voters elect more representative and more responsive elected officials \u0026ndash; as research shows they do \u0026ndash; then it is perhaps not surprising to find that the move to on-cycle elections is associated with gains in satisfaction and governance, rather than declines (Hajnal et al 2024, Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021, Hartney and Hayes 2021, Schaffner, Rhodes, and La Raja 2020). By enticing a larger, more diverse, and perhaps more discerning set of residents to vote, on-cycle elections may actually be \u0026nbsp;improving local democracy.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese findings have significant implications for American democracy. \u0026nbsp;Despite recent reforms around the country, most of America remains off-cycle (Sightline 2025, Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024). Over 60 percent of America\u0026rsquo;s cities continue to hold stand alone local contests when little other than local candidates are on the ballot and when a small and extremely set of residents participate (Warshaw and de Benedictis-Kessner 2024, Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMost Americans would like that to change. Surveys show that roughly two-thirds of the public \u0026ndash; Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike \u0026ndash; prefer voting for multiple offices in one election over voting multiple times on multiple different dates (Manhattan Institute 2024, Anzia 2014 ). And legislators have been listening. Six states have moved to mandate consolidated elections and many more are actively considering new legislation to move on-cycle. Most of America\u0026rsquo;s local elections could soon become entwined with statewide and federal contests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese findings are important because they lay to rest one of the last concerns related to a change in date. \u0026nbsp;What we learn here \u0026ndash; that voters in on-cycle local elections are as knowledgeable or perhaps even more knowledgeable than voters in off-cycle contests \u0026ndash; tells us that the wide ranging benefits to on-cycle elections are not offset by steep decreases in voter attention to local public affairs. \u0026nbsp;Legislators can now move forward knowing skeptics\u0026rsquo; worst fears are unlikely to become reality.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eZH, MH, DH, and AZ contributed to all of the different stages of the project including the design of the study, the analysis of the data, and the writeup of the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAll data and replication materials required to perform the analysis in this manuscript are publicly available on Dataverse\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAnzia, Sarah. 2014. \u003cem\u003eTiming and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups\u003c/em\u003e. New York: Cambridge.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBenedictis-Kessner, Justin. 2017. \u0026quot;Off-Cycle and out of Office: Election Timing and the Incumbency Advantage.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eThe Journal of Politics\u003c/em\u003e 80: 119-32.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBenedictis-Kessner, Justin de, Diana Da In Lee, Yamil R Velez, and Christopher Warshaw. 2023. \u0026quot;American Local Government Elections Database.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eScientific Data\u003c/em\u003e 10: 912-19.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBridges, Amy. 1997. \u003cem\u003eMorning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest\u003c/em\u003e. Princeton: Princeton University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCaren, Neal. 2007. \u0026quot;Big City, Big Turnout? Electoral Participation in American Cities.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eJournal of Urban Affairs\u003c/em\u003e 29: 31-46.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCollins, J., Lucero, E., \u0026amp; Trounstine, J. 2020. \u0026quot;Will Concurrent Elections Reshape the Electorate?\u0026quot;.\u003cem\u003e California Journal of Politics and Policy\u003c/em\u003e 12.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDynes, Adam M., Michael T. Hartney, and Sam D. Hayes. 2021. \u0026quot;Off-Cycle and Off Center: Election Timing and Representation in Municipal Government.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eAmerican Political Science Review\u003c/em\u003e 115: 1097-103.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEinstein, Katherine, Maxwell Palmer, Ellis Hamilton, and Ethan Singer. 2024. \u0026quot;The Gray Vote: How Older Home-Owning Voters Dominate Local Elections.\u0026quot;.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHajnal, Zoltan. 2010. \u003cem\u003eAmerica\u0026rsquo;s Uneven Democracy: Turnout, Race, and Representation in City Politics\u003c/em\u003e. New York: Cambridge University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHajnal, Zoltan L., Vladimir Kogan, and G. Agustin Markarian. 2022. \u0026quot;Who Votes: City Election Timing and Voter Composition.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eAmerican Political Science Review\u003c/em\u003e 116: 374-83.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHajnal, Zoltan L., Paul G. Lewis, and Hugh Louch. 2002. \u003cem\u003eMunicipal Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition\u003c/em\u003e. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHajnal, Zoltan L. and Jessica L. Trounstine 2013. \u0026quot;What Underlies Urban Politics? Race, Class, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Urban Vote.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eUrban Affairs Review\u003c/em\u003e 49.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHartney, Michael, and Sam Hayes. 2021. \u0026quot;Off-Cycle and out of Sync: How Election Timing Influences Political Representation.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eState Politics \u0026amp; Policy Quarterly\u003c/em\u003e March: 1-20.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHolbrook, Thomas, and Aaron Weinschenk. 2014. \u0026quot;Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in Mayoral Elections.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003ePolitical Research Quarterly\u003c/em\u003e 67: 42-55.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eJacobson, Gary C. 2015. \u0026quot;It\u0026rsquo;s Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in Us House Elections.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eThe Journal of Politics\u003c/em\u003e 77: 861-73.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eKogan, Vladimir, St\u0026eacute;phane Lavertu, and Zachary Peskowitz. 2018. \u0026quot;Election Timing, Electorate Composition, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from School Districts.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eAmerican Journal of Political Science\u003c/em\u003e 62: 637-51.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eManhattan Institute. 2024. \u0026quot;Polling Nyc Survey Analysis of 2025 Likely Mayoral Voters on Politics, Crime, Migrants, and Electoral Reform.\u0026quot; \u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMarschall, Melissa, and John Lappie. 2018. \u0026quot;Turnout in Local Elections: Is Timing Really Everything?\u0026quot;. \u003cem\u003eElection Law Journal\u003c/em\u003e 17.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eOliver, J. Eric, and Shang E. Ha. 2007. \u0026quot;Vote Choice in Suburban Elections.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eAmerican Political Science Review\u003c/em\u003e 101: 393-408.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePayson, Julia. 2017. \u0026quot;When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance? Evidence from Us School Districts.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eLegislative Studies Quarterly\u003c/em\u003e 42: 421-48.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSances, Michael W. 2018. \u0026quot;Ideology and Vote Choice in U.S. Mayoral Elections: Evidence from Facebook Surveys.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003ePolitical Behavior\u003c/em\u003e 40: 737-62.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSchaffner, Brian F., Jesse H. Rhodes, and Raymond J. La Raja. 2020. \u003cem\u003eHometown Inequality: Race, Class, and Representation in American Local Politics\u003c/em\u003e. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eScherer, Ethan. 2014. \u0026quot;Three Essays on Education Reform in the United States.\u0026quot; In \u003cem\u003eSecondary Three Essays on Education Reform in the United States\u003c/em\u003e, ed Secondary Scherer, Ethan. Rand Corporation. Reprint, Reprint.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSightline Institute. 2025. When Do Cities Hold Elections? https://www.sightline.org/2024/06/10/when-do-cities-hold-elections/\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2014. \u0026quot;Representation in Municipal Goverment.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eAmerican Political Science Review\u003c/em\u003e 108: 605-41.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTrounstine, Jessica. 2012. \u0026quot;Turnout and Incumbency in Local Elections.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eUrban Affairs Review\u003c/em\u003e 49: 167-89.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eVerba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. \u003cem\u003eVoice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics\u003c/em\u003e. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWarshaw, Christopher and Justin de Benedictis-Kessner. 2024. \u0026quot;The Electoral and Policy Effects of Election Timing in City and County Governments.\u0026quot;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eWood, Curtis. 2002. \u0026quot;Voter Turnout in City Elections.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eUrban Affairs Review\u003c/em\u003e 38: 209-31.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Footnotes","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e The SSV study only sampled local voters, thus we cannot estimate a turnout rate among those respondents. However, as with the other two studies, the respondents in the SSV who all indicated that they were local voters tended to be highly educated (67% with at least some college), older (median age of 54), and married (66 percent married) and the overwhelming majority (84 percent) were homeowners \u0026ndash; all patterns that fit with our knowledge of who votes (Verba et al \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Specifically, the California survey analysis controls for gender, race, age, and educational attainment. The SSN survey analysis has controls for gender, race, age, educational attainment, homeownership, marital status as well as measures of local electoral structure (mayoral elections, nonpartisan elections) and city level demographics. The EN analysis includes controls for gender, race, income, educational attainment, parent status, teacher status, home-ownership, party identification, and political ideology. It also uses yearly fixed effects.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Research shows that November on-cycle election dates have by far the biggest impact on voter turnout and the composition of the vote (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, Hajnal \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Aligning with federal and statewide primaries tends to be less consequential for the size and composition of the vote.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Existing research shows that the move to on-cycle elections increases the share of voters who have children in the household by almost 10 percent (Kogan et al \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9307318/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9307318/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eA large literature shows that consolidating local elections with federal contests substantially increases turnout and makes the electorate more representative. However, some argue that these \u0026ldquo;democratic\u0026rdquo; gains may come at a cost, bringing less informed voters into local elections and reducing the attention voters devote to local affairs. We test this participation\u0026ndash;knowledge tradeoff across multiple contexts using multiple sources of evidence on local political knowledge and behavior. Combining three surveys of knowledge about city government, education policy, and local politics with detailed data on local election timing, we examine whether voters in on-cycle elections are less informed or attentive to local affairs than their off-cycle counterparts. We find little evidence that on-cycle voters are less knowledgeable than voters in off-cycle races. Using changes in election timing, we further show that incumbency advantages decline in on-cycle elections, suggesting less reliance on heuristic voting. Overall, our findings indicate that the benefits of election consolidation are unlikely to come at the expense of voter knowledge or attention to local affairs.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Election Dates and Voter Knowledge","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-05-04 15:56:58","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9307318/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"86c008f7-b306-406d-a77e-2ea4a602b8d8","owner":[],"postedDate":"May 4th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-05-13T01:20:10+00:00","index":17,"fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"274680777319784567824497188455644715732","date":"2026-05-01T15:09:15+00:00","index":16,"fulltext":""}],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-04T15:56:58+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-05-04 15:56:58","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-9307318","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-9307318","identity":"rs-9307318","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}