Breaking Barriers: Exploring the Impact of the Glass Ceiling Index on Female Representation in the Judiciary

Breaking Barriers: Exploring the Impact of the Glass Ceiling Index on Female Representation in the Judiciary | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Breaking Barriers: Exploring the Impact of the Glass Ceiling Index on Female Representation in the Judiciary Yasin Caglar Kaya, Hasret Kaya, Abdullah Kayar This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6013471/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This study seeks to answer the question of whether there are barriers to women in the judiciary and to examine the relationship between the glass ceiling index and representation rates of female judges with a view to revealing whether the barriers observed in the judiciary are sector-specific. The study examines the glass ceiling index scores published in ‘The Economist’ for OECD countries between 2010- 2020 and the representation rates of female judges in courts for the same years. The panel data method was used to reveal this relationship. The glass ceiling index had a negative coefficient and was statistically significant at a significance level of 1 percent for first instance courts. The probability values obtained from the models applied to test the relationship between the glass ceiling index and the representation rates of female judges in courts of second instance and supreme courts showed no statistically significant relationship between the variables. This study differs from the literature in that it establishes a relationship between the barriers to women in the public and private sectors and the barriers to women in the judiciary across countries, thus seeking an answer to the question of whether or not the barriers in the judiciary are sector-specific. glass-ceiling female representation in judiciary panel data analysis random effects model 1 Introduction Today, women have more rights than ever before in human history. However, despite all these rights and entitlements claimed over the course of centuries, women still face discrimination in many aspects of social life. The literature defines this discrimination as “social gender inequality”. The female population represents almost half of the society, yet they are not represented in social life at the same rate. The reason for this is not the physiological or biological differences between genders, but the social and cultural roles that have been assigned to women by society throughout history. As a result of these socially coded differences, women have for years been preoccu- pied with housework and childcare. Although these roles have been shaken today, they have not been completely shattered. These roles continue to be reproduced in both the social and private spheres. The roles assigned to women are accepted through their experiences in both family and social life. Gender inequality is not only an obstacle to the existence of women in social life, but also the main source of many problems expe- rienced by women. For example, violence against women is one of the most important consequences of this inequality (Ba¸sar and Demirci, 2015 , pp. 43–44). Along with the rights claimed, the industrial revolution made the proportion of women in the labor force reach unprecedented levels. However, even though women’s participation in the labor force has increased, female presence is usually concentrated in a limited number of work areas, with the number of women in senior management positions remaining strikingly low to the present day. Women managers are compelled to take up lower positions with less responsibility and authority, rather than senior management positions, simply because of the gender roles assigned to them. These difficulties faced by women are referred to in the literature as the glass ceiling. The term “glass ceiling” was coined by Hymowitz and Schellhardt (1986) in The Wall Street Journal to describe the problems women face in promotion and other workplace issues. “Glass ceiling” was not coined with the sole intent of conceptualizing the discrimination that women get exposed to in the workplace but to define “a barrier so subtle that it is transparent, yet so strong that it prevents women and minorities from moving up in the management hierarchy” (Morrison and von Glinow, 1990 , p. 200). As such, the term describes not only discrimination against women but also discrimination against other marginalized groups (Karakılı¸c, 2019, p. 215). The barriers to women have been removed to a great extent in the private and public sectors over the course of time. However, it is seen that the major obstacles in the main organs of the state, i.e., the judiciary, the legislative, and the executive, still persist. As the legislative, judicial and executive branches function as the main organs of the state, improvements at the social level are expected to have a minimal impact on these areas. Instead, all three branches are influenced by their own internal dynamics in both appointment and promotion. While the barriers to women continue to decrease, we still live in a male-dominated world. Hence, these branches continue to be dominated by men, mainly due to the critical functions assigned to them. For these reasons, in our study it is hypothesized that breaking the barriers to women in society will, of course, also bring about breaking of the barriers in the judiciary as well, but this breaking will not be as prominent as in other areas, due to the special role of the judiciary in the state. 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Background Although there are many studies in the literature on women’s representation in the legislative ([ ? ]Childs and Krook, 2006; Paxton et al., 2007; Parlaktuna, 2010; Dion and Mitchell, 2019; Park and Liang, 2019; Bulut and I˙lter, 2019; Bulut, 2020) and executive (Bayes, 1991; Stiver, 1995; Philips et al., 1997; Fox and Schuhmann, 1999; Dolan, 2004; Schachter, 2016; Jacobson et al., 2019; Rubin, 2020) branches, most of the studies on women in the judiciary focus on the decision-making of female judges rather than their representation. Cook (1978) identified three distinct patterns in women’s representation within the judiciary: the ladder, the bell, and the pyramid. The ladder pattern suggests that women participate equally at all levels of the judicial system. A good example of this can be seen in Armenia, where women hold a relatively balanced presence across different court levels. In Armenia, women account for 25 percent of judges in first- instance courts, 36 percent in second instance courts, and 29 percent in the Supreme Court. The bell pattern reflects a structure where women are more prevalent in lower and higher courts but are less represented in intermediate courts. This trend is evident in Ireland, where women make up 36 percentof judges in first-instance courts and 44 percent in the Supreme Court, yet their representation in second-instance courts drops to 20 percent. The pyramid pattern, which is the most common, shows that the proportion of women in the judiciary declines as court hierarchy rises. This trend is visible when examining global averages: women constitute 57 percent of judges in first- instance courts, 50 percent in second-instance courts, and only 37 percent in higher courts. Countries such as Spain, France, Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia exemplify this pattern. Goldar (2020) expanded on Cook’s framework by introducing two additional pat- terns of women’s representation in the judiciary: the bell pattern and the inverted pyramid pattern. In the bell pattern, women are most strongly represented at the inter- mediate court level, with lower proportions in both first instance and higher courts. In contrast, the inverted pyramid pattern describes a structure where women’s represen- tation increases as the court hierarchy rises, meaning they hold a greater presence in higher courts compared to lower ones. Goldar gives Sweden and Romania as examples of these patterns. In Sweden, as an example of the balloon pattern, there is 49 percent female representation in the first instance courts, 58 percent in the second instance courts and 33 percent in the higher courts. In Romania, in line with the inverted pyramid pattern, the representation of women in the judiciary increases as the level of courts increases (72 percent in first instance courts, 74 percent in second instance courts, 83 percent in high courts). Davis (1993) explores the relationship between feminist legal theory and particu- larly Gilligan’s theory of women’s different voice, from a perspective that centers on the decision-making of female judges. The study draws attention to the challenges in applying the concept of different voices and emphasizes that simplistic applications of Gilligan’s framework should be avoided. Furthermore, the study concludes that women do not differ much from men in their decision-making, and that differences, if any, may be quite subtle and context-dependent. The study also addresses the fact that judicial decision-making processes are not solely in the hands of judges, pointing out the importance of institutional factors and the difficulties in comparing the decision- making processes of male and female judges. The study concludes with a discussion of feminist practical reasoning and the criteria for analyzing Ninth Circuit judges and suggests different criteria for evaluating female judges. McCormick and Job (1993) investigate the influence of female judges on judicial decisions in criminal appeals in the Alberta Court of Appeal between 1985 and 1992, concluding that there is no difference between the judicial decisions of male and female judges even on major issues such as sexual offenses. The study highlights the advan- tages of using judicial behavior as a case study in decision-making as it is functionally specialized, discrete and focused in both time and space. The study draws on statis- tical analysis to compare the behavior of male and female judges in both trials and appeals, and the statistical categories created based on these objective distinctions provide a logical basis for analysis. Songer and Cross-Meyer (2000) investigate the impact of gender on judicial deci- sions by taking state supreme courts as a case study. Using a quantitative methodology, the study analyses data of death penalty and obscenity cases in state supreme courts between 1982 and 1993. The study uses maximum-likelihood estimation to estimate the contribution of independent variables to the probability of a judge’s vote. Unlike other studies, the study found that female judges voted differently than male judges and that female judges were more likely to support liberal positions, especially on civil liberty issues. The authors provide seminal insight into the significant role of female judges in judicial systems and highlight the importance of discussing the gender factor in decision-making processes. Collins et al. (2010) similarly examine the impact of gender on judicial decisions in U.S. federal district courts, focusing on the role of critical mass theory. Using logistic regression, the study analyses U.S. district court judges’ case decisions on labour, economics, civil rights and liberties. The study found that the role of gender on judicial decision-making differed across case types, with both genders making similar decisions in labour and economic cases, but critical mass effects played a more decisive role in criminal justice cases. Methodologically, the study involved the collection and analysis of quantitative data on judicial decision-making, with the authors underlining that their results provide important policy implications for gender representation in legal systems. While there are numerous other studies (Steffensmeier and Hebert, 1999; Elaine and Pylee, 2000; Westergren, 2004; Peresie, 2005; McCall and McCall, 2007; Addadzi- Koom and Nkansah, 2021; Glazebrook, 2023) evaluating the decision-making of female judges, there is only a limited number of studies that examine the representation of women in the judiciary and whether there are barriers to their advancement in the judiciary. Cook (1984) provides a historical overview of the challenges faced and progress made by female judges in the United States. The author uses an analytical approach to examine the many challenges faced by women, including difficulties in accessing legal education and the gatekeeping role of law schools and prestigious courts. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of female judges in the judiciary and the need for continued efforts to achieve gender equality in the judiciary. Kenney (2002) examines the gender dynamics in the European Court of Justice and the consequences of gender mainstreaming in judicial appointments. Using a qualitative methodology combining legal analysis, historical analysis and policy evaluation, the author explores the gender composition of the ECJ and the impact of gender and gender politics. The study delves into the historical context of judicial decisions, feminist movements and meetings such as the 1995 UN Beijing conference and examines their impact on demands for gender-balanced decision-making and further scrutinizes the role of the European Parliament in advocating for greater representation of women in the ECJ. The study concludes by analysing the importance and broader implications of gender dynamics in the ECJ and gender mainstreaming in judicial appointments. Moran (2013) discusses the challenges and barriers to building a judiciary based on greater gender equality and diversity. The author emphasizes the unavailability of official data on the gender composition of the judiciary and the neglect of sexual orientation as a category of diversity. Hence, the study draws attention to the need for further research and study of this important aspect of diversity. To fill the gap in JAC Barriers research, the study uses and analyses various surveys, including in particular the JAC Barriers survey. The study also compares data from different subgroups within the LGBT population and provides valuable insights into the relevance of, and the perceptions and experiences on, judicial appointments. Davis and William (2016) examine the underrepresentation of women in Australia’s judiciary, with a particular focus on the High Court of Australia. They highlight the importance of a more gender-diverse legal system and explore how increased represen- tation of women in the judiciary could influence legal decision-making and institutional dynamics. Using a quantitative approach, the study analyzes the gender composition of the judiciary and underscores the need to consider factors beyond legal expertise when making judicial appointments. Elements such as political context, geographical background, and the perspectives of sitting judges are also emphasized as influential in the selection process. Overall, the study offers key insights into gender inequality within Australia’s judicial system and its broader implications. Masengu (2016) investigates the structural barriers hindering gender transforma- tion in South Africa’s judiciary, drawing on the perspectives of female judges and legal professionals. The study highlights the challenges women face, including unequal case distribution and biases about their capabilities, which contribute to their underrepre- sentation. Employing a multi-method approach, the research incorporates legal sector discussions, observations of judicial appointment processes, desk research, and statis- tical analysis. The primary data includes presentations from 23 speakers and over two years of discussions involving 140 participants. Additionally, the author observes Judi- cial Service Commission (JSC) interview proceedings and conducts interviews with judges and prosecutors. By examining the systemic obstacles to gender equality in the South African judiciary, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the difficulties women encounter in the field. Finally, Oder (2019) examines women’s representation in the judiciary on the exam- ple of Tu¨rkiye. The method of analysis used in the study involves an extensive review of available literature, legal documents and statistical data on gender representation in the judiciary. The author provides an in-depth analysis of gender inequality in the Turkish judiciary and highlights the challenges and opportunities of gender equal- ity in this area. The study also critically examines the impact of gender on judicial decision-making and the overall functioning of the judiciary. Drawing on comparative research and international perspectives, the study aims to provide a broader context for discussions on women’s representation in the judiciary in general. When we look at the literature, it is seen that all studies conclude that there are glass ceilings on women in the judiciary. However, almost all of these studies address the judiciary of one country only (Schafran 2005; Tøraasen, 2022; Kholiq and Halimatusa’diyah, 2022; Mittal and Jain, 2023; Laczo and Madarasi, 2023; Ash, 2024) and most of them base their conclusion on surveys with female lawyers and judges (Martin, 1989; Yadav, 1999; Palmer, 2001; Feenan, 2008; Mack and Anleu, 2008; Rackley, 2013; Duarte et al., 2014). The lack of women’s representation in the judiciary, especially in higher courts, is a major problem worldwide. Although the proportion of women in the judiciary is high in some countries, higher courts are gaining more and more power regardless of the level of democracy in countries. Therefore, in order for women to have a voice in judi- cial decision-making, both women and men must be represented in the higher courts (Escobar-Lemmon et al., 2021; Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008). Another reason why women’s representation in higher courts is important is that women’s representation in these bodies increases their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. When a woman is appointed to a high court, this influences other women and encourages them to decide to become judges, thus enabling them to participate more in law-making and legal decision-making. For example, Escobar-Lemmon, Hoekstra, Kang, and Kittilson (2016) found that the first female judge appointed in Argentina, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United States received considerable public attention and media coverage. Finally, studies show that the presence of women judges affects both deci- sions and processes in courts (e.g., Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010; Gryski, Ma¨ın, and Dixon 1986; Harris and Sen 2019; Moyer and Tankersley 2012; Peresie 2005). Unfortunately, despite all these advantages, the representation of women decreases as one moves up the ranks of higher judicial bodies worldwide. Moreover, women’s rep- resentation in the higher judiciary is a very recent phenomenon, and in many countries around the world, including the most advanced democracies, the first appointment of a woman to the higher judiciary was rather delayed. Studies delving into the representation of women in the judiciary on a proportional basis analyse the judiciary independently from other sectors. We disagree with this perspective. If there are barriers to women’s advancement in all sectors in a country, there will be glass ceilings in the judiciary as well. If we are to answer the question of whether there are glass ceilings specific to the judiciary, glass ceilings for women should be evaluated in all sectors across countries and the judiciary should be examined within the whole context. Studies that address the judiciary alone, based on a comparison of the proportion of female and male representation within the judiciary, can therefore give limited and misleading results. The reasons that reduce the representation of women in the higher judiciary can be explained by gender role theory (Garc´ıa Goldar, 2020, pp. 191–192). In gender role theory, sex and gender are two different concepts. Sex is used to describe the chromo- somal pattern that people have and is related to their reproductive functions and is usually determined at birth. Gender, on the other hand, goes beyond sex to describe the psychological characteristics associated with this biological state (Schneider and Bos, 2019, pp. 174–176). This psychological and cultural difference, which can be referred to as “masculinity” and “femininity”, has over time established a hierarchical difference between women and men, and anything coded as “subject/active/positive” has been identified with masculinity, and anything coded as “other/passive/negative” has been identified with femininity, which is seen as the main factor preventing women from being preferred for high positions (Cranny-Francis et al., 2003, pp. 1-4). However, this is not the only explanation offered by scholars as to why the obstacles faced by women continue to be reproduced and perpetuated. Another explanation is that women quit work at the beginning or at some point in their working lives in favor of more traditional cultural roles such as motherhood. This reduces the number of women in certain jobs and eliminates them before they face any barriers (Purcell et al., 2010, p. 709). According to Stone (2007), this is not a choice, and women are forced to leave the workforce. Another explanation is cultural capital and homophily. Men have more cultural capital than women due to upbringing and biological reasons and this has an impact on the glass ceiling. Homophily, on the other hand, explains people’s tendency to associate with people who are culturally and socially close to them, which is a major obstacle to women’s advancement, especially in male-dominated work environments. Related to these two concepts, women are less likely to network than men. Due to homophily and cultural capital, women have fewer chances for homosocial reproduction and therefore it is difficult for them to gain power in the workplace through networking (Purcell et al., 2010, pp. 710-711). Finally, organizational characteristics also make it difficult for women to advance. Recruitment methods are particularly important in this regard. Studies have shown that covert recruitment methods, such as networking referrals, tend to produce a higher proportion of male employees, while overt recruitment methods, such as posting job advertisements or using employment agencies, reduce gender segregation in hiring (Reskin and McBrier, 2000). To better understand the broader landscape of gender inequality and the barri- ers that exist beyond just recruitment practices, it’s essential to look at systematic measures that quantify these challenges. The Economist publishes the Glass Ceiling Index every year to quantify these barriers against women in OECD countries. The index attempts to quantify the invisible barriers against women in countries using 10 different indicators, including the gender pay gap, parental leave, the cost of child- care, educational attainment, and representation in senior management and political positions. In the light of the foregoing, this study seeks to answer the question of whether there are glass ceilings specific to the judiciary in OECD countries, based on a regres- sion analysis between the glass ceiling index published in The Economist for all sectors across OECD countries and the representation rates of female judges working in first instance, second instance and supreme courts of these countries. The study also seeks to answer the question of whether there are actually glass ceilings blocking women’s advancement in the judiciary or, as Menkel-Meadow put it, whether it is the women themselves who choose not to climb the career ladder in the judiciary because their family life is more important to them. To this end, the research will compare the number of cases per judge in first instance, second instance and supreme courts on an annual basis and investigate whether the workload of women increases as their position ascends in the judiciary. 3 Data and Method The study tests the relationship between the glass ceiling index and the promotion of women in the judiciary of OECD countries. Due to limited data availability, two-year data covering the period 2010–2020 for the countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Israel, Italy, Switzerland, Türkiye, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Greece and Ireland were used. Table 1 Dependent (Explanatory) and Independent Variables Variables Description Source GCI Glass ceiling index scores The Economist FIC Ratio of female judges serving in first degree courts Eurostat SIC Ratio of female judges serving in second degree courts Eurostat SC Ratio of female judges serving in supreme courts Eurostat Table 1 presents the dependent and independent variables used in the study. The Glass Ceiling Index (GCI), used as the independent variable of the study, is an index published by The Economist on an annual basis, evaluating ten different indicators of glass ceilings on women in OECD countries. The dependent variables FIC, SIC and SC were calculated based on the ratio of the number of female judges to the number of all judges in first instance, second instance and supreme courts, respectively. The database published by Eurostat gives two-year data on the number of judges in OECD countries, and hence, the glass ceiling index data included in the analysis covered the relevant two years. The study is based on the hypothesis that GCI has a positive outlook on FIC, SIC and SC. 3.1 Economic Specification In general terms, panel data is defined as the gathering of cross-sectional observations of units such as individuals, countries, firms, households in a certain period of time. Panel data consists of N units and T number of observations corresponding to each unit. The panel data model can generally be formulated as follows: Y it = α it + β it X it + µ it , i = 1, .. ., N ; t = 1, .. ., T (1) Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable, α is the constant parameter, β is the slope parameter, µ is the error term. The subscript i denotes units (individual, firm, country, city, etc.) and the subscript t denotes time (day, month, year, etc.) (Tato˘glu, 2021 ). On the other hand, when using panel data, there may be unobserved unit effects for each unit, which are divided into fixed effects and random effects. If these unit effects are treated as a parameter estimated for each cross-sectional observation, they are called fixed effects , and if they are treated as a random variable such as an error term, they are called random effects . The random effects model, which is more appropriate when the cross-section size is selected randomly from a large main population, seems to be more appropriate for the data set used in this study. Since the unit effect in the random effects model is not constant, it is not included in the fixed parameter but in the error margin. Therefore, the error term is denoted as: v it = u it + µ it (2) Here, u it denotes residual errors, while µ it denotes unit error. Based upon the information on panel data models, the researchers built the models for the relationship between the glass ceiling index and the proportion of female judges in the judiciary as follows; Model 1: FIC it = β 0 + β 1 GCI it + v it (3) Model 2: SIC it = β 0 + β 1 GCI it + v it (4) Model 3: SC it = β 0 + β 1 GCI it + v it (5) Since the variables in the models are expressed as percentages, they were used in their raw form. A panel data set was created by obtaining two-year data covering the period 2010–2020 for the aforementioned variables. In addition, it was observed that data of some countries were missing for some years. The missing data were completed with the help of data imputation methods and a balanced panel data set was obtained. 3.2 Empirical Findings Three different panel models were estimated to determine the relationship between the independent variable GCI and the dependent variables FIC, SIC and SC. Since the time dimension of the estimated models was short, no unit root test was required. Then, Breusch-Pagan LM and Hausman tests were applied to select the appropriate models. Hausman test helps researchers to choose between fixed effects model and random effects model in panel data analysis. Hausman test is also used to determine whether there is a relationship between independent variables and individual effects. In the Table 2 Hausman Test Result Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Dependent Variable: FIC Dependent Variable: SIC Dependent Variable: SC Prob > chi2 > 0.3179 Prob > chi2 > 0.6370 Eurostat Result: Random Effects Result: Random Effects Eurostat test, fixed effects model is chosen if hypothesis H 0 (i.e., random effects preferred) is not confirmed, and random effects model is chosen if it is confirmed (Clark and Linzer, 2014 ). Table 2 presents the Hausman test results and shows that the random effects model is the appropriate model for this study. Table 3 Diagnostic Test Results Heteroscedasticity Autocorrelation Inter-unit Correlation Levene, Brown-Forsythe Test Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson Pesaran Model 1 W0 = 5.435 ( p > 0.000) 0.697 0.000 W50 = 2.507 ( p > 0.001) W10 = 5.435 ( p > 0.000) Baltagi-Wu LBI Friedman 1.183 0.022 Result : Heteroscedasticity Exists Autocorrelation Exists Inter-unit Correlation Exists Model 2 W0 = 6.629 ( p > 0.000) 1.013 0.026 W50 = 1.866 ( p > 0.022) W10 = 6.629 ( p > 0.000) Baltagi-Wu LBI Friedman 1.446 0.929 Result : Heteroscedasticity Exists Autocorrelation Exists Inter-unit Correlation Exists Model 3 W0 = 5.070 ( p > 0.000) 1.005 0.000 W50 = 2.973 ( p > 0.000) W10 = 5.070 ( p > 0.000) Baltagi-Wu LBI Friedman 1.397 0.344 Result : Heteroscedasticity Exists Autocorrelation Exists Inter-unit Correlation Exists As a result of Hausman tests, the random effects model was estimated for all three models and subjected to basic economic assumptions. The problems of heteroskedas- ticity, autocorrelation and inter-unit correlation were all found to be present in the random effects models. The tests and results for the relevant assumptions are presented in Table 3 . To overcome these problems, final random effects models were estimated using robust estimators. The results are presented in Table 4 . The results of the analysis showed that according to Model 1, which tested the relationship between GCI and the proportion of female judges working in first instance courts, the coefficient of GCI was found to be negative and statistically significant at 1 percent significance level, suggesting that a one-unit increase in the glass ceiling index Table 4 Random Effects Model Estimation Results will lead to a decrease of approximately 0.001 in the representation rate of female judges in courts of first instance. According to the probability values obtained from Model 2 and Model 3, which tested the relationship between GCI and the proportion of female judges work- ing in second instance and supreme courts, respectively, no statistically significant relationship was found between the variables. Before proceeding to the examination of the relationship between GCI and the glass ceilings in the judiciary, the question of whether there are actually obstacles to the promotion of women in the judiciary or whether women do not choose to climb the career ladder in the judiciary because they want to make more time for their family, children, and private life as set forth by the choice theory had to be answered first. For this, the researchers examined the biannual number of cases per judge in first instance, second instance, and supreme courts in the OECD countries included in the analysis. Table 6 Court Data from 2010 to 2020 Court Type 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 1st Degree Courts 1542 1450 1439 1520 1272 1389 2nd Degree Courts 134 177 240 260 167 181 Supreme Courts 264 274 247 187 191 158 Table 5 clearly shows that the number of cases handled by judges decreases as their position ascends in the court. This proves that the view that women do not choose to climb the career ladder so that they can make more time for their homes, children and family does not apply to the judiciary, because according to the choice theory, female judges who want to make more time for home, work and private life would be expected to strive to work their way up as quickly as possible as their workload will decrease as they rise in the judiciary. Hence, it can be said that the decrease in the representation rates of female judges in the judiciary is due to the obstacles put in front of them rather than women’s choice. 4 Discussion and Conclusion The study’s primary objective was to investigate the relationship between the GCI and the representation of female judges in first instance, second instance, and supreme courts. The findings indicate a negative correlation between the GCI and the appoint- ment of female judges to first instance courts, suggesting that as barriers to women’s advancement decrease, the rate of female appointments does not necessarily increase. Furthermore, the analysis found no significant relationship between the GCI and the promotion of women to higher judicial positions, such as second instance and supreme courts. These results challenge the initial hypothesis that a higher score in GCI would correlate with higher representation of women in the judiciary. Instead, they suggest that the dynamics of gender representation in the judiciary operate independently from broader societal trends affecting women’s participation in other sectors. The unexpected negative correlation between the GCI and the appointment of female judges raises important questions about the structural and cultural barri- ers that persist within the judiciary. One possible explanation is that the judiciary may have its own unique set of challenges that are not fully addressed by general advancements in gender equality in other sectors. For instance, the judiciary is often characterized by a conservative culture that may resist changes in gender representation, regardless of improvements in societal attitudes towards women in leadership roles. Additionally, the lack of significant promotion of women to higher judicial positions may reflect entrenched biases and systemic barriers that are not easily dismantled by external pressures or reforms. Moreover, the findings suggest that simply increasing the number of women in the workforce does not automatically translate to their advancement in key decision- making roles. This aligns with existing literature that highlights the concept of the ”glass ceiling,” which refers to invisible barriers that prevent women from reaching top positions, even when they are qualified and capable. The findings of this study have several implications for policymakers and stakehold- ers in the judiciary. First, there is a need for targeted interventions that specifically address the barriers women face within the judicial system. This could include mentor- ship programs, training initiatives, and policies that promote work-life balance, which may help to create a more supportive environment for female judges. Second, the judiciary should actively engage in self-assessment and reform to identify and eliminate biases in hiring and promotion practices. This could involve implementing transparent criteria for appointments and promotions, as well as regular audits of gender representation at all levels of the judiciary. Lastly, the study underscores the importance of fostering a culture of inclusivity within the judiciary. Efforts to raise awareness about gender biases and to promote diversity in decision-making processes are crucial for breaking down the barriers that women face in advancing their careers. While this study provides valuable insights, it is not without limitations. The reliance on data from Eurostat and the GCI may not capture all nuances of gender representation in the judiciary. Future research could benefit from qualitative studies that explore the experiences of female judges and the specific challenges they encounter in their careers. Additionally, comparative studies across different countries could provide a broader understanding of how cultural, legal, and institutional factors influence gender rep- resentation in the judiciary. Such research could help to identify best practices and successful strategies for promoting gender equality in judicial systems worldwide. In conclusion, this study highlights the complex dynamics of gender representa- tion in the judiciary and the persistent barriers that women face in achieving equality. The findings challenge the assumption that societal progress in gender equality auto- matically translates to advancements in the judiciary. Instead, they call for a more nuanced understanding of the unique challenges within the judicial system and the need for targeted interventions to promote women’s representation in key decision- making roles. By addressing these barriers, we can work towards a more equitable and just judicial system that reflects the diversity of society. Declarations All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organiza- tion or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. Author Contribution Y.C.K has found the idea and topic, collected the data, written the introduction, and discussion and conclusion. Y.C.K also made the editing and final manusicript.H.K has done the analysis, written the methodology and empirical part and given instructions for the discussion and conclusion part.A.K has written the theoretical background and literature review.All authors reviewed the manuscript. Data Availability All the data we use is accessible online.Glass ceiling index scores is found in the economist journal. Since it is a paid content I cannot give a link.Data supporting the female representation in court can be found on : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_just_job/default/table?lang=enhttps://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/LFSI_EMP_A $ DV_881/default/table?lang=enData supporting the workload for courts can be found on : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/explore/all/popul?lang=en&subtheme=crim&display=list&sort=category References Addadzi-Koom, M., & Nkansah, L. (2021). Women at the bench: Does it make a difference? assessing the impact of women judges in addressing gender- based issues in ghana. On˜ati Socio-Legal Series . Akpinar-Sposito, C. (2013). Career barriers for women executives and the glass ceiling syndrome: The case study comparison between french and turk- ish women executives. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences , 75 (1), 488–497. Ash, E., Chen, D. L., & Ornaghi, A. (2024). Gender attitudes in the judiciary: Evidence from us circuit courts. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics , 16 (1), 314–350. Barnett, R. C., & Hyde, J. S. (2001). Women, men, work, and family: An ex- pansionist theory. American Psychologist , 56 (10), 781–796. Barutcugil, I. (2002). Is Hayatında kadın yonetici . Kariyer Yayıncılık. Ba¸sar, F., & Demirci, N. (2015). Toplumsal cinsiyet e¸sitsizli˘gi ve S¸iddet. Kadın Sa˘glı˘gı Hem¸sireli˘gi Dergisi , 1 (41), 41–52. Bayes, J. H. (1991). Women and public administration: International perspectives . Haworth. Bulut, A. T. (2020). What drives women’s substantive representation in muslim- majority countries? lessons from turkey. Political Research Quarterly , 74 (4), 913–926. Bulut, A. T., & I˙lter, E. (2019). Understanding legislative speech in the turk- ish parliament: Reconsidering the electoral connection under proportional representation. Parliamentary Affairs , 73 (1), 147–165. Childs, S., & Krook, M. L. (2006). Gender and politics: The state of the art, Politics , vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 18–28. Clark, T. S., & Linzer, D. A. (2014). Should i use fixed or random effects? Political Science Research and Methods , 3 (2), 399–408. CollinsJr., P. M., Manning, K. L., & Carp, R. A. (2010). Gender, critical mass, and judicial decision making. Law Policy , 32 (2), 260–281. Cook, B. B. (1984). Women judges: A preface to their history. Golden Gate U L Rev , 14 (3), 572–610. Cranny-Francis, A., Waring, W., Stavropoulos, P., & Kirkby, J. (2003). Gender Studies: Terms and Debates . Macmillan. Davis, R., & Williams, G. (2003). A century of appointments but only one woman. Alternative Law Journal , 28 (2), 54–58. Davis, S. (1993). Do women judges speak in a different voice–carol gilligan, femi- nist legal theory, and the ninth circuit. University of Wisconsin Law School Law Journal , 8 (1), 143–172. Dion, M. L., & Mitchell, S. M. (2019). How many citations to women is enough? estimates of gender representation in political science. Political Science Politics , 53 (1), 107–113. Dolan, J. (2004). Gender equity: Illusion or reality for women in the federal exec- utive service? Public Administration Review , 64 (3), 299–308. Duarte, M., Fernando, P., Gomes, C., & Oliveira, A. (2014). The feminization of the judiciary in portugal: Dilemmas and paradoxes. Utrecht Law Review , 10 (1), 29. Elaine, M., & Pyle, B. (2000). Gender, race, and partisanship on the michigan supreme court. Albany Law Review , 63 (4), 1205–1236. Fox, R. L., & Schuhmann, R. A. (1999). Gender and local government: A com- parison of women and men city managers. Public Administration Review , 59 (3), 231. Glazebrook, S. (2023). Achieving holistic feminisation: A review of women and the judiciary in the asia-pacific. International Journal of Constitutional Law , 21 (2), 691–695. Hakim, C. (2006). Women, careers, and work-life preferences. British Journal of Guidance Counselling , 34 (3), 279–294. Hays, S., & Hochschild, A. R. (1998). Reconsidering the choice: Do americans really prefer the workplace over home? Contemporary Sociology , 27 (1), 28. Hymowitz, C., & Schelhardt, T. D. (1986). Why women can’t seem to break the invisible barrier that blocks them from top jobs. The Wall Street Journal , 24 (1), 1573–1592. Jacobson, W. S., Palus, C. K., & Bowling, C. J. (2009). A woman’s touch? gen- dered management and performance in state administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory , 20 (2), 477–504. Kenney, S. J. (2002). Breaking the silence: Gender mainstreaming and the com- position of the european court of justice. Feminist Legal Studies , 10 (3), 257–270. Kholiq, A., & Halimatusa’diyah, I. (2022). Does gender blindness improve gender equality? female judges and the glass ceiling effect in the islamic judicial system in indonesia. Social Legal Studies , 32 (1), 139–158. Laczo, A., & Madarasi, A. (2023). Dominance of female judges in the courts of hungary – a different path to the development of women’s equality. Trayectorias Humanas Trascontinentales , 10 (1), 73–88. Mack, K., & Anleu, S. R. (2008). The national survey of australian judges: An overview of findings. Journal of Judicial Administration , 18 (1), 1–21. Martin, E. (1989). Differences in men and women judges: Perspectives on gender. Journal of Political Science , 17 (1), 74–85. Masengu, T. (2016). It’s a man’s world: barriers to gender transformation in the south african judiciary. perspectives from women advocates and attorneys. International Journal of the Legal Profession , 23 (3), 305–319. McCall, M., & McCall, M. A. (2007). How far does the gender gap extend? The Social Science Journal , 44 (1), 67–82. McCormick, P., & Job, T. (1993). Do women judges make a difference? an anal- ysis by appeal court data. Canadian Journal of Law and Society , 8 (1), 135–148. Menkel-Meadow, C. (1989). Exploring a research agenda of the feminization of the legal profession: Theories of gender and social change. Law Social Inquiry , 14 (2), 289–319. Mızrahı, R., & Aracı, H. (2010). Kadın y¨oneticiler ve cam tavan sendromu U¨ zerine bir ara¸stırma. Organizasyon ve Y¨onetim Bilimleri Dergisi , 2 (1), 149–156. Mittal, G., & Jain, D. (2023). Women’s equal representation in the higher ju- diciary: A case for judicial diversity in india. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice , 47 (2), 185–199. Moran, L. (2013). Sexual diversity in the judiciary in england and wales; research on barriers to judicial careers. Laws , 2 (4), 512–538. Morrison, A. M., & von Glinow, M. A. (1990). Women and minorities in man- agement. American Psychologist , 45 (2), 200–208. Oder, B. E. (2019). Yargıda kadın temsili ve tu¨rkiye. Tesev De˘gerlendirme Not- ları , 1 (1), 1–6. Palmer, B. (2001). Women in the american judiciary. Women & Politics , 23 (3), 91–101. Park, S., & Liang, J. (2019). A comparative study of gender representation and social outcomes: The effect of political and bureaucratic representation. Public Administration Review , 81 (2), 321–332. Parlaktuna, I. (2010). Tu¨rkiye de cinsiyete dayalı mesleki ayrımcılı˘gın analizi. Ege Academic Review , 10 (4), 1217–1217. Paxton, P., Kunovich, S., & Hughes, M. M. (2007). Gender in politics. Annual Review of Sociology , 33 (1), 263–284. Rackley, E. (2013). Women, judging, and the judiciary: From difference to diver- sity . Routledge. Stone, P. (2008). Opting out? Why women really quit careers and head home . University of California Press. Tato˘glu, F. Y. (2021). Panel Veri Ekonometrisi . Beta Publishing. Tøraasen, M. (2022). Women’s judicial representation in haiti: Unintended gains of state-building efforts. Politics & Gender , 19 (1), 34–65. Karakılıc¸, N. Y. (2019). Evaluation of glass ceiling syndrome in terms of gen- der discrimination perception. Management Economics , 17 (2), 214–233. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6013471","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":415166932,"identity":"d417709f-162a-41db-a5be-bd97b8011336","order_by":0,"name":"Yasin Caglar Kaya","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Karadeniz Technical University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Yasin","middleName":"Caglar","lastName":"Kaya","suffix":""},{"id":415166933,"identity":"508e899b-c6ad-49dd-b56c-10946d3a8f01","order_by":1,"name":"Hasret Kaya","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Karadeniz Technical University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Hasret","middleName":"","lastName":"Kaya","suffix":""},{"id":415166934,"identity":"fb4e8e66-93d4-4aaf-833d-f2d634df0b4b","order_by":2,"name":"Abdullah Kayar","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Karadeniz Technical University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Abdullah","middleName":"","lastName":"Kayar","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-02-12 08:53:33","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6013471/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6013471/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":81826429,"identity":"82b854eb-4014-4cd3-8a74-7c57c3ffb9e9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-05-02 12:38:54","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":758309,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6013471/v1/c70f12e8-0936-498d-8edd-9ccde399fd1d.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003eBreaking Barriers: Exploring the Impact of the Glass Ceiling Index on Female Representation in the Judiciary\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"1 Introduction","content":"\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eToday, women have more rights than ever before in human history. However, despite all these rights and entitlements claimed over the course of centuries, women still face discrimination in many aspects of social life. The literature defines this discrimination as \u0026ldquo;social gender inequality\u0026rdquo;. The female population represents almost half of the society, yet they are not represented in social life at the same rate. The reason for this is not the physiological or biological differences between genders, but the social and cultural roles that have been assigned to women by society throughout history.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAs a result of these socially coded differences, women have for years been preoccu- pied with housework and childcare. Although these roles have been shaken today, they have not been completely shattered. These roles continue to be reproduced in both the social and private spheres. The roles assigned to women are accepted through their experiences in both family and social life. Gender inequality is not only an obstacle to the existence of women in social life, but also the main source of many problems expe- rienced by women. For example, violence against women is one of the most important consequences of this inequality (Ba\u0026cedil;sar and Demirci, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 43\u0026ndash;44).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAlong with the rights claimed, the industrial revolution made the proportion of women in the labor force reach unprecedented levels. However, even though women\u0026rsquo;s participation in the labor force has increased, female presence is usually concentrated in a limited number of work areas, with the number of women in senior management positions remaining strikingly low to the present day. Women managers are compelled to take up lower positions with less responsibility and authority, rather than senior management positions, simply because of the gender roles assigned to them. These difficulties faced by women are referred to in the literature as the glass ceiling.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe term \u0026ldquo;glass ceiling\u0026rdquo; was coined by Hymowitz and Schellhardt (1986) in The Wall Street Journal to describe the problems women face in promotion and other workplace issues. \u0026ldquo;Glass ceiling\u0026rdquo; was not coined with the sole intent of conceptualizing the discrimination that women get exposed to in the workplace but to define \u0026ldquo;a barrier so subtle that it is transparent, yet so strong that it prevents women and minorities from moving up in the management hierarchy\u0026rdquo; (Morrison and von Glinow, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1990\u003c/span\u003e, p. 200). As such, the term describes not only discrimination against women but also discrimination against other marginalized groups (Karakılı\u0026cedil;c, 2019, p. 215).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe barriers to women have been removed to a great extent in the private and public sectors over the course of time. However, it is seen that the major obstacles in the main organs of the state, i.e., the judiciary, the legislative, and the executive, still persist. As the legislative, judicial and executive branches function as the main organs of the state, improvements at the social level are expected to have a minimal impact on these areas. Instead, all three branches are influenced by their own internal dynamics in both appointment and promotion. While the barriers to women continue to decrease, we still live in a male-dominated world. Hence, these branches continue to be dominated by men, mainly due to the critical functions assigned to them. For these reasons, in our study it is hypothesized that breaking the barriers to women in society will, of course, also bring about breaking of the barriers in the judiciary as well, but this breaking will not be as prominent as in other areas, due to the special role of the judiciary in the state.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"2 Literature Review and Theoretical Background","content":"\u003cp\u003eAlthough there are many studies in the literature on women\u0026rsquo;s representation in the legislative ([\u003cstrong\u003e?\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e]Childs and Krook, 2006; Paxton et al., 2007; Parlaktuna, 2010; Dion and Mitchell, 2019; Park and Liang, 2019; Bulut and I˙lter, 2019; Bulut, 2020) and executive (Bayes, 1991; Stiver, 1995; Philips et al., 1997; Fox and Schuhmann, 1999;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDolan, 2004; Schachter, 2016; Jacobson et al., 2019; Rubin, 2020) branches, most of the studies on women in the judiciary focus on the decision-making of female judges rather than their representation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCook (1978) identified three distinct patterns in women\u0026rsquo;s representation within the judiciary: the ladder, the bell, and the pyramid. The ladder pattern suggests that women participate equally at all levels of the judicial system. A good example of this can be seen in Armenia, where women hold a relatively balanced presence across different court levels. In Armenia, women account for 25 percent of judges in first- instance courts, 36 percent in second instance courts, and 29 percent in the Supreme Court. The bell pattern reflects a structure where women are more prevalent in lower and higher courts but are less represented in intermediate courts. This trend is evident in Ireland, where women make up 36 percentof judges in first-instance courts and 44 percent in the Supreme Court, yet their representation in second-instance courts drops to 20 percent. The pyramid pattern, which is the most common, shows that the proportion of women in the judiciary declines as court hierarchy rises. This trend is visible when examining global averages: women constitute 57 percent of judges in first- instance courts, 50 percent in second-instance courts, and only 37 percent in higher courts. Countries such as Spain, France, Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia exemplify this pattern.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGoldar (2020) expanded on Cook\u0026rsquo;s framework by introducing two additional pat- terns of women\u0026rsquo;s representation in the judiciary: the bell pattern and the inverted pyramid pattern. In the bell pattern, women are most strongly represented at the inter- mediate court level, with lower proportions in both first instance and higher courts. In contrast, the inverted pyramid pattern describes a structure where women\u0026rsquo;s represen- tation increases as the court hierarchy rises, meaning they hold a greater presence in higher courts compared to lower ones. Goldar gives Sweden and Romania as examples of these patterns. In Sweden, as an example of the balloon pattern, there is 49 percent female representation in the first instance courts, 58 percent in the second instance courts and 33 percent in the higher courts. In Romania, in line with the inverted pyramid pattern, the representation of women in the judiciary increases as the level of courts increases (72 percent in first instance courts, 74 percent in second instance courts, 83 percent in high courts).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDavis (1993) explores the relationship between feminist legal theory and particu- larly Gilligan\u0026rsquo;s theory of women\u0026rsquo;s different voice, from a perspective that centers on the decision-making of female judges. The study draws attention to the challenges in applying the concept of different voices and emphasizes that simplistic applications of Gilligan\u0026rsquo;s framework should be avoided. Furthermore, the study concludes that women do not differ much from men in their decision-making, and that differences, if any, may be quite subtle and context-dependent. The study also addresses the fact that judicial decision-making processes are not solely in the hands of judges, pointing out the importance of institutional factors and the difficulties in comparing the decision- making processes of male and female judges. The study concludes with a discussion of feminist practical reasoning and the criteria for analyzing Ninth Circuit judges and suggests different criteria for evaluating female judges.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMcCormick and Job (1993) investigate the influence of female judges on judicial decisions in criminal appeals in the Alberta Court of Appeal between 1985 and 1992, concluding that there is no difference between the judicial decisions of male and female judges even on major issues such as sexual offenses. The study highlights the advan- tages of using judicial behavior as a case study in decision-making as it is functionally specialized, discrete and focused in both time and space. The study draws on statis- tical analysis to compare the behavior of male and female judges in both trials and appeals, and the statistical categories created based on these objective distinctions provide a logical basis for analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSonger and Cross-Meyer (2000) investigate the impact of gender on judicial deci- sions by taking state supreme courts as a case study. Using a quantitative methodology, the study analyses data of death penalty and obscenity cases in state supreme courts between 1982 and 1993. The study uses maximum-likelihood estimation to estimate the contribution of independent variables to the probability of a judge\u0026rsquo;s vote. Unlike other studies, the study found that female judges voted differently than male judges and that female judges were more likely to support liberal positions, especially on civil liberty issues. The authors provide seminal insight into the significant role of female judges in judicial systems and highlight the importance of discussing the gender factor in decision-making processes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCollins et al. (2010) similarly examine the impact of gender on judicial decisions in U.S. federal district courts, focusing on the role of critical mass theory. Using logistic regression, the study analyses U.S. district court judges\u0026rsquo; case decisions on labour, economics, civil rights and liberties. The study found that the role of gender on judicial decision-making differed across case types, with both genders making similar decisions in labour and economic cases, but critical mass effects played a more decisive role in criminal justice cases. Methodologically, the study involved the collection and analysis of quantitative data on judicial decision-making, with the authors underlining that their results provide important policy implications for gender representation in legal systems.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile there are numerous other studies (Steffensmeier and Hebert, 1999; Elaine and Pylee, 2000; Westergren, 2004; Peresie, 2005; McCall and McCall, 2007; Addadzi- Koom and Nkansah, 2021; Glazebrook, 2023) evaluating the decision-making of female judges, there is only a limited number of studies that examine the representation of women in the judiciary and whether there are barriers to their advancement in the judiciary.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCook (1984) provides a historical overview of the challenges faced and progress made by female judges in the United States. The author uses an analytical approach to examine the many challenges faced by women, including difficulties in accessing legal education and the gatekeeping role of law schools and prestigious courts. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of female judges in the judiciary and the need for continued efforts to achieve gender equality in the judiciary. Kenney (2002) examines the gender dynamics in the European Court of Justice and the consequences of gender mainstreaming in judicial appointments. Using a qualitative methodology combining legal analysis, historical analysis and policy evaluation, the author explores the gender composition of the ECJ and the impact of gender and gender politics. The study delves into the historical context of judicial decisions, feminist movements and meetings such as the 1995 UN Beijing conference and examines their impact on demands for gender-balanced decision-making and further scrutinizes the role of the European Parliament in advocating for greater representation of women in the ECJ. The study concludes by analysing the importance and broader implications of gender dynamics in the ECJ and gender mainstreaming in judicial appointments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMoran (2013) discusses the challenges and barriers to building a judiciary based on greater gender equality and diversity. The author emphasizes the unavailability of official data on the gender composition of the judiciary and the neglect of sexual orientation as a category of diversity. Hence, the study draws attention to the need for further research and study of this important aspect of diversity. To fill the gap in JAC Barriers research, the study uses and analyses various surveys, including in particular the JAC Barriers survey. The study also compares data from different subgroups within the LGBT population and provides valuable insights into the relevance of, and the perceptions and experiences on, judicial appointments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDavis and William (2016) examine the underrepresentation of women in Australia\u0026rsquo;s judiciary, with a particular focus on the High Court of Australia. They highlight the importance of a more gender-diverse legal system and explore how increased represen- tation of women in the judiciary could influence legal decision-making and institutional dynamics. Using a quantitative approach, the study analyzes the gender composition of the judiciary and underscores the need to consider factors beyond legal expertise when making judicial appointments. Elements such as political context, geographical background, and the perspectives of sitting judges are also emphasized as influential in the selection process. Overall, the study offers key insights into gender inequality within Australia\u0026rsquo;s judicial system and its broader implications.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMasengu (2016) investigates the structural barriers hindering gender transforma- tion in South Africa\u0026rsquo;s judiciary, drawing on the perspectives of female judges and legal professionals. The study highlights the challenges women face, including unequal case distribution and biases about their capabilities, which contribute to their underrepre- sentation. Employing a multi-method approach, the research incorporates legal sector discussions, observations of judicial appointment processes, desk research, and statis- tical analysis. The primary data includes presentations from 23 speakers and over two years of discussions involving 140 participants. Additionally, the author observes Judi- cial Service Commission (JSC) interview proceedings and conducts interviews with judges and prosecutors. By examining the systemic obstacles to gender equality in the South African judiciary, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of the difficulties women encounter in the field.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, Oder (2019) examines women\u0026rsquo;s representation in the judiciary on the exam- ple of Tu\u0026uml;rkiye. The method of analysis used in the study involves an extensive review of available literature, legal documents and statistical data on gender representation in the judiciary. The author provides an in-depth analysis of gender inequality in the\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTurkish judiciary and highlights the challenges and opportunities of gender equal- ity in this area. The study also critically examines the impact of gender on judicial decision-making and the overall functioning of the judiciary. Drawing on comparative research and international perspectives, the study aims to provide a broader context for discussions on women\u0026rsquo;s representation in the judiciary in general.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we look at the literature, it is seen that all studies conclude that there are glass ceilings on women in the judiciary. However, almost all of these studies address the judiciary of one country only (Schafran 2005; T\u0026oslash;raasen, 2022; Kholiq and Halimatusa\u0026rsquo;diyah, 2022; Mittal and Jain, 2023; Laczo and Madarasi, 2023; Ash, 2024) and most of them base their conclusion on surveys with female lawyers and judges (Martin, 1989; Yadav, 1999; Palmer, 2001; Feenan, 2008; Mack and Anleu, 2008; Rackley, 2013; Duarte et al., 2014).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe lack of women\u0026rsquo;s representation in the judiciary, especially in higher courts, is a major problem worldwide. Although the proportion of women in the judiciary is high in some countries, higher courts are gaining more and more power regardless of the level of democracy in countries. Therefore, in order for women to have a voice in judi- cial decision-making, both women and men must be represented in the higher courts (Escobar-Lemmon et al., 2021; Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008). Another reason why women\u0026rsquo;s representation in higher courts is important is that women\u0026rsquo;s representation in these bodies increases their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. When a woman is appointed to a high court, this influences other women and encourages them to decide to become judges, thus enabling them to participate more in law-making and legal decision-making. For example, Escobar-Lemmon, Hoekstra, Kang, and Kittilson (2016) found that the first female judge appointed in Argentina, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United States received considerable public attention and media coverage. Finally, studies show that the presence of women judges affects both deci- sions and processes in courts (e.g., Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010; Gryski, Ma\u0026uml;ın, and Dixon 1986; Harris and Sen 2019; Moyer and Tankersley 2012; Peresie 2005).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnfortunately, despite all these advantages, the representation of women decreases as one moves up the ranks of higher judicial bodies worldwide. Moreover, women\u0026rsquo;s rep- resentation in the higher judiciary is a very recent phenomenon, and in many countries around the world, including the most advanced democracies, the first appointment of a woman to the higher judiciary was rather delayed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStudies delving into the representation of women in the judiciary on a proportional basis analyse the judiciary independently from other sectors. We disagree with this perspective. If there are barriers to women\u0026rsquo;s advancement in all sectors in a country, there will be glass ceilings in the judiciary as well. If we are to answer the question of whether there are glass ceilings specific to the judiciary, glass ceilings for women should be evaluated in all sectors across countries and the judiciary should be examined within the whole context. Studies that address the judiciary alone, based on a comparison of the proportion of female and male representation within the judiciary, can therefore give limited and misleading results.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe reasons that reduce the representation of women in the higher judiciary can be explained by gender role theory (Garc\u0026acute;ıa Goldar, 2020, pp. 191\u0026ndash;192). In gender role theory, sex and gender are two different concepts. Sex is used to describe the chromo- somal pattern that people have and is related to their reproductive functions and is usually determined at birth. Gender, on the other hand, goes beyond sex to describe the psychological characteristics associated with this biological state (Schneider and Bos, 2019, pp. 174\u0026ndash;176). This psychological and cultural difference, which can be referred to as \u0026ldquo;masculinity\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;femininity\u0026rdquo;, has over time established a hierarchical difference between women and men, and anything coded as \u0026ldquo;subject/active/positive\u0026rdquo; has been identified with masculinity, and anything coded as \u0026ldquo;other/passive/negative\u0026rdquo; has been identified with femininity, which is seen as the main factor preventing women from being preferred for high positions (Cranny-Francis et al., 2003, pp. 1-4).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, this is not the only explanation offered by scholars as to why the obstacles faced by women continue to be reproduced and perpetuated. Another explanation is that women quit work at the beginning or at some point in their working lives in favor of more traditional cultural roles such as motherhood. This reduces the number of women in certain jobs and eliminates them before they face any barriers (Purcell et al., 2010, p. 709). According to Stone (2007), this is not a choice, and women are forced to leave the workforce.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAnother explanation is cultural capital and homophily. Men have more cultural capital than women due to upbringing and biological reasons and this has an impact on the glass ceiling. Homophily, on the other hand, explains people\u0026rsquo;s tendency to associate with people who are culturally and socially close to them, which is a major obstacle to women\u0026rsquo;s advancement, especially in male-dominated work environments. Related to these two concepts, women are less likely to network than men. Due to homophily and cultural capital, women have fewer chances for homosocial reproduction and therefore it is difficult for them to gain power in the workplace through networking (Purcell et al., 2010, pp. 710-711).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, organizational characteristics also make it difficult for women to advance. Recruitment methods are particularly important in this regard. Studies have shown that covert recruitment methods, such as networking referrals, tend to produce a higher proportion of male employees, while overt recruitment methods, such as posting job advertisements or using employment agencies, reduce gender segregation in hiring (Reskin and McBrier, 2000).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo better understand the broader landscape of gender inequality and the barri- ers that exist beyond just recruitment practices, it\u0026rsquo;s essential to look at systematic measures that quantify these challenges. The Economist publishes the Glass Ceiling Index every year to quantify these barriers against women in OECD countries. The index attempts to quantify the invisible barriers against women in countries using 10 different indicators, including the gender pay gap, parental leave, the cost of child- care, educational attainment, and representation in senior management and political positions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the light of the foregoing, this study seeks to answer the question of whether there are glass ceilings specific to the judiciary in OECD countries, based on a regres- sion analysis between the glass ceiling index published in The Economist for all sectors across OECD countries and the representation rates of female judges working in first instance, second instance and supreme courts of these countries. The study also seeks to answer the question of whether there are actually glass ceilings blocking women\u0026rsquo;s advancement in the judiciary or, as Menkel-Meadow put it, whether it is the women themselves who choose not to climb the career ladder in the judiciary because their family life is more important to them. To this end, the research will compare the number of cases per judge in first instance, second instance and supreme courts on an annual basis and investigate whether the workload of women increases as their position ascends in the judiciary.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3 Data and Method","content":"\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe study tests the relationship between the glass ceiling index and the promotion of women in the judiciary of OECD countries. Due to limited data availability, two-year data covering the period 2010\u0026ndash;2020 for the countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Israel, Italy, Switzerland, T\u0026uuml;rkiye, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Greece and Ireland were used.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ctable id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDependent (Explanatory) and Independent Variables\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDescription\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSource\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGCI\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eGlass ceiling index scores\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe Economist\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFIC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRatio of female judges serving in first degree courts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEurostat\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSIC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRatio of female judges serving in second degree courts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEurostat\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRatio of female judges serving in supreme courts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEurostat\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTable \u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e presents the dependent and independent variables used in the study. The Glass Ceiling Index (GCI), used as the independent variable of the study, is an index published by The Economist on an annual basis, evaluating ten different indicators of glass ceilings on women in OECD countries. The dependent variables FIC, SIC and SC were calculated based on the ratio of the number of female judges to the number of all judges in first instance, second instance and supreme courts, respectively. The database published by Eurostat gives two-year data on the number of judges in OECD countries, and hence, the glass ceiling index data included in the analysis covered the relevant two years. The study is based on the hypothesis that GCI has a positive outlook on FIC, SIC and SC.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e3.1 Economic Specification\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn general terms, panel data is defined as the gathering of cross-sectional observations of units such as individuals, countries, firms, households in a certain period of time. Panel data consists of N units and T number of observations corresponding to each unit. The panel data model can generally be formulated as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eY\u003c/em\u003e \u003csub\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026alpha;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003eX\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026micro;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e, \u003cem\u003ei\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1, \u003cem\u003e.. ., N\u003c/em\u003e ; \u003cem\u003et\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1, \u003cem\u003e.. ., T\u003c/em\u003e (1)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eY\u003c/em\u003e is the dependent variable,\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eX\u003c/em\u003e is the independent variable,\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026alpha;\u003c/em\u003e is the constant parameter,\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e is the slope parameter,\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026micro;\u003c/em\u003e is the error term.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/li\u003e\n \u003c/ul\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe subscript \u003cem\u003ei\u003c/em\u003e denotes units (individual, firm, country, city, etc.) and the subscript t denotes time (day, month, year, etc.) (Tato˘glu, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, when using panel data, there may be unobserved unit effects for each unit, which are divided into fixed effects and random effects. If these unit effects are treated as a parameter estimated for each cross-sectional observation, they are called \u003cem\u003efixed effects\u003c/em\u003e, and if they are treated as a random variable such as an error term, they are called \u003cem\u003erandom effects\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe random effects model, which is more appropriate when the cross-section size is selected randomly from a large main population, seems to be more appropriate for the data set used in this study. Since the unit effect in the random effects model is not constant, it is not included in the fixed parameter but in the error margin. Therefore, the error term is denoted as:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ev\u003c/em\u003e \u003csub\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/sub\u003e = \u003cem\u003eu\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026micro;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e (2)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHere, \u003cem\u003eu\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e denotes residual errors, while \u003cem\u003e\u0026micro;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e denotes unit error.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBased upon the information on panel data models, the researchers built the models for the relationship between the glass ceiling index and the proportion of female judges in the judiciary as follows;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003ctable id=\"Taba\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 1:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFIC\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e0\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003eGCI\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e + \u003cem\u003ev\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 2:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSIC\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e0\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003eGCI\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e + \u003cem\u003ev\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 3:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSC\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e0\u003c/sub\u003e\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026beta;\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003eGCI\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e + \u003cem\u003ev\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(5)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSince the variables in the models are expressed as percentages, they were used in their raw form. A panel data set was created by obtaining two-year data covering the period 2010\u0026ndash;2020 for the aforementioned variables. In addition, it was observed that data of some countries were missing for some years. The missing data were completed with the help of data imputation methods and a balanced panel data set was obtained.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Empirical Findings\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThree different panel models were estimated to determine the relationship between the independent variable GCI and the dependent variables FIC, SIC and SC. Since the time dimension of the estimated models was short, no unit root test was required. Then, Breusch-Pagan LM and Hausman tests were applied to select the appropriate models.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHausman test helps researchers to choose between fixed effects model and random effects model in panel data analysis. Hausman test is also used to determine whether there is a relationship between independent variables and individual effects. In the\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ctable id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHausman Test Result\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDependent Variable: FIC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDependent Variable: SIC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDependent Variable: SC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProb\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;chi2\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.3179\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProb\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;chi2\u0026thinsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.6370\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEurostat\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eResult: Random Effects\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eResult: Random Effects\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEurostat\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003etest, fixed effects model is chosen if hypothesis \u003cem\u003eH\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e0\u003c/sub\u003e (i.e., random effects preferred) is not confirmed, and random effects model is chosen if it is confirmed (Clark and Linzer, \u003cspan class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Table \u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e presents the Hausman test results and shows that the random effects model is the appropriate model for this study.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ctable id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDiagnostic Test Results\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHeteroscedasticity\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAutocorrelation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eInter-unit Correlation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLevene, Brown-Forsythe Test\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBhargava et al. Durbin-Watson\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePesaran\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW0\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.435 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.697\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW50\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.507 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.001)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW10\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.435 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBaltagi-Wu LBI\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFriedman\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.183\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.022\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResult\u003c/strong\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHeteroscedasticity Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAutocorrelation Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInter-unit Correlation Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW0\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;6.629 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.013\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.026\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW50\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1.866 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.022)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW10\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;6.629 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBaltagi-Wu LBI\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFriedman\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.446\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.929\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResult\u003c/strong\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHeteroscedasticity Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAutocorrelation Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInter-unit Correlation Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eModel 3\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW0\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.070 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.005\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW50\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.973 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eW10\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.070 (\u003cem\u003ep\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u003c/em\u003e\u0026thinsp;0.000)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBaltagi-Wu LBI\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFriedman\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.397\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.344\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResult\u003c/strong\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHeteroscedasticity Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAutocorrelation Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInter-unit Correlation Exists\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAs a result of Hausman tests, the random effects model was estimated for all three models and subjected to basic economic assumptions. The problems of heteroskedas- ticity, autocorrelation and inter-unit correlation were all found to be present in the random effects models. The tests and results for the relevant assumptions are presented in Table \u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e. To overcome these problems, final random effects models were estimated using robust estimators. The results are presented in Table \u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe results of the analysis showed that according to Model 1, which tested the relationship between GCI and the proportion of female judges working in first instance courts, the coefficient of GCI was found to be negative and statistically significant at 1 percent significance level, suggesting that a one-unit increase in the glass ceiling index\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;4\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eRandom Effects Model Estimation Results\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cimg src=\"\"\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ewill lead to a decrease of approximately 0.001 in the representation rate of female judges in courts of first instance.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAccording to the probability values obtained from Model 2 and Model 3, which tested the relationship between GCI and the proportion of female judges work- ing in second instance and supreme courts, respectively, no statistically significant relationship was found between the variables.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBefore proceeding to the examination of the relationship between GCI and the glass ceilings in the judiciary, the question of whether there are actually obstacles to the promotion of women in the judiciary or whether women do not choose to climb the career ladder in the judiciary because they want to make more time for their family, children, and private life as set forth by the choice theory had to be answered first. For this, the researchers examined the biannual number of cases per judge in first instance, second instance, and supreme courts in the OECD countries included in the analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ctable id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 6\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCourt Data from 2010 to 2020\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/caption\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCourt Type\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2010\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2012\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2014\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2016\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2018\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003cth align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2020\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/th\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1st Degree Courts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1542\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1450\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1439\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1520\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1272\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1389\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2nd Degree Courts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e134\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e177\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e240\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e260\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e167\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e181\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"left\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSupreme Courts\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e264\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e274\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e247\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e187\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e191\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd align=\"char\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e158\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTable 5 clearly shows that the number of cases handled by judges decreases as their position ascends in the court. This proves that the view that women do not choose to climb the career ladder so that they can make more time for their homes, children and family does not apply to the judiciary, because according to the choice theory, female judges who want to make more time for home, work and private life would be expected to strive to work their way up as quickly as possible as their workload will decrease as they rise in the judiciary. Hence, it can be said that the decrease in the representation rates of female judges in the judiciary is due to the obstacles put in front of them rather than women\u0026rsquo;s choice.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4 Discussion and Conclusion","content":"\u003cdiv\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe study’s primary objective was to investigate the relationship between the GCI and the representation of female judges in first instance, second instance, and supreme courts. The findings indicate a negative correlation between the GCI and the appoint- ment of female judges to first instance courts, suggesting that as barriers to women’s advancement decrease, the rate of female appointments does not necessarily increase.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFurthermore, the analysis found no significant relationship between the GCI and the promotion of women to higher judicial positions, such as second instance and supreme courts.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThese results challenge the initial hypothesis that a higher score in GCI would correlate with higher representation of women in the judiciary. Instead, they suggest that the dynamics of gender representation in the judiciary operate independently from broader societal trends affecting women’s participation in other sectors.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe unexpected negative correlation between the GCI and the appointment of female judges raises important questions about the structural and cultural barri- ers that persist within the judiciary. One possible explanation is that the judiciary may have its own unique set of challenges that are not fully addressed by general advancements in gender equality in other sectors.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFor instance, the judiciary is often characterized by a conservative culture that may resist changes in gender representation, regardless of improvements in societal attitudes towards women in leadership roles. Additionally, the lack of significant promotion of women to higher judicial positions may reflect entrenched biases and systemic barriers that are not easily dismantled by external pressures or reforms.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMoreover, the findings suggest that simply increasing the number of women in the workforce does not automatically translate to their advancement in key decision- making roles. This aligns with existing literature that highlights the concept of the ”glass ceiling,” which refers to invisible barriers that prevent women from reaching top positions, even when they are qualified and capable.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe findings of this study have several implications for policymakers and stakehold- ers in the judiciary. First, there is a need for targeted interventions that specifically address the barriers women face within the judicial system. This could include mentor- ship programs, training initiatives, and policies that promote work-life balance, which may help to create a more supportive environment for female judges.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSecond, the judiciary should actively engage in self-assessment and reform to identify and eliminate biases in hiring and promotion practices. This could involve implementing transparent criteria for appointments and promotions, as well as regular audits of gender representation at all levels of the judiciary.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLastly, the study underscores the importance of fostering a culture of inclusivity within the judiciary. Efforts to raise awareness about gender biases and to promote diversity in decision-making processes are crucial for breaking down the barriers that women face in advancing their careers.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWhile this study provides valuable insights, it is not without limitations. The reliance on data from Eurostat and the GCI may not capture all nuances of gender representation in the judiciary. Future research could benefit from qualitative studies that explore the experiences of female judges and the specific challenges they encounter in their careers.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAdditionally, comparative studies across different countries could provide a broader understanding of how cultural, legal, and institutional factors influence gender rep- resentation in the judiciary. Such research could help to identify best practices and successful strategies for promoting gender equality in judicial systems worldwide.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, this study highlights the complex dynamics of gender representa- tion in the judiciary and the persistent barriers that women face in achieving equality. The findings challenge the assumption that societal progress in gender equality auto- matically translates to advancements in the judiciary. Instead, they call for a more nuanced understanding of the unique challenges within the judicial system and the need for targeted interventions to promote women’s representation in key decision- making roles. By addressing these barriers, we can work towards a more equitable and just judicial system that reflects the diversity of society.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003eAll authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organiza- tion or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eY.C.K has found the idea and topic, collected the data, written the introduction, and discussion and conclusion. Y.C.K also made the editing and final manusicript.H.K has done the analysis, written the methodology and empirical part and given instructions for the discussion and conclusion part.A.K has written the theoretical background and literature review.All authors reviewed the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll the data we use is accessible online.Glass ceiling index scores is found in the economist journal. Since it is a paid content I cannot give a link.Data supporting the female representation in court can be found on : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_just_job/default/table?lang=enhttps://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/LFSI_EMP_A\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003eDV_881/default/table?lang=enData supporting the workload for courts can be found on : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/explore/all/popul?lang=en\u0026amp;subtheme=crim\u0026amp;display=list\u0026amp;sort=category\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAddadzi-Koom, M., \u0026amp; Nkansah, L. (2021). Women at the bench: Does it make a difference? assessing the impact of women judges in addressing gender- based issues in ghana. \u003cem\u003eOn˜ati Socio-Legal Series\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAkpinar-Sposito, C. (2013). Career barriers for women executives and the glass ceiling syndrome: The case study comparison between french and turk- ish women executives. \u003cem\u003eProcedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e75\u003c/em\u003e(1), 488\u0026ndash;497.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAsh, E., Chen, D. L., \u0026amp; Ornaghi, A. (2024). Gender attitudes in the judiciary: Evidence from us circuit courts. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Economic Journal: Applied Economics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e16\u003c/em\u003e(1), 314\u0026ndash;350.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBarnett, R. C., \u0026amp; Hyde, J. S. (2001). Women, men, work, and family: An ex- pansionist theory. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Psychologist\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e56\u003c/em\u003e(10), 781\u0026ndash;796.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBarutcugil, I. (2002). \u003cem\u003eIs Hayatında kadın yonetici\u003c/em\u003e. Kariyer Yayıncılık.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBa\u0026cedil;sar, F., \u0026amp; Demirci, N. (2015). Toplumsal cinsiyet e\u0026cedil;sitsizli˘gi ve S\u0026cedil;iddet. \u003cem\u003eKadın Sa˘glı˘gı Hem\u0026cedil;sireli˘gi Dergisi\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e1\u003c/em\u003e(41), 41\u0026ndash;52.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBayes, J. H. (1991). \u003cem\u003eWomen and public administration: International perspectives\u003c/em\u003e. Haworth.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBulut, A. T. (2020). What drives women\u0026rsquo;s substantive representation in muslim- majority countries? lessons from turkey. \u003cem\u003ePolitical Research Quarterly\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e74\u003c/em\u003e(4), 913\u0026ndash;926.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBulut, A. T., \u0026amp; I˙lter, E. (2019). Understanding legislative speech in the turk- ish parliament: Reconsidering the electoral connection under proportional representation. \u003cem\u003eParliamentary Affairs\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e73\u003c/em\u003e(1), 147\u0026ndash;165.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChilds, S., \u0026amp; Krook, M. L. (2006). Gender and politics: The state of the art, \u003cem\u003ePolitics\u003c/em\u003e, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 18\u0026ndash;28.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eClark, T. S., \u0026amp; Linzer, D. A. (2014). Should i use fixed or random effects? \u003cem\u003ePolitical Science Research and Methods\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e3\u003c/em\u003e(2), 399\u0026ndash;408.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCollinsJr., P. M., Manning, K. L., \u0026amp; Carp, R. A. (2010). Gender, critical mass, and judicial decision making. \u003cem\u003eLaw Policy\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e32\u003c/em\u003e(2), 260\u0026ndash;281.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCook, B. B. (1984). Women judges: A preface to their history. \u003cem\u003eGolden Gate U L Rev\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e14\u003c/em\u003e(3), 572\u0026ndash;610.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCranny-Francis, A., Waring, W., Stavropoulos, P., \u0026amp; Kirkby, J. (2003). \u003cem\u003eGender Studies: Terms and Debates\u003c/em\u003e. Macmillan.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDavis, R., \u0026amp; Williams, G. (2003). A century of appointments but only one woman. \u003cem\u003eAlternative Law Journal\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e28\u003c/em\u003e(2), 54\u0026ndash;58.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDavis, S. (1993). Do women judges speak in a different voice\u0026ndash;carol gilligan, femi- nist legal theory, and the ninth circuit. \u003cem\u003eUniversity of Wisconsin Law School Law Journal\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e8\u003c/em\u003e(1), 143\u0026ndash;172.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDion, M. L., \u0026amp; Mitchell, S. M. (2019). How many citations to women is enough? estimates of gender representation in political science. \u003cem\u003ePolitical Science Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e53\u003c/em\u003e(1), 107\u0026ndash;113.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDolan, J. (2004). Gender equity: Illusion or reality for women in the federal exec- utive service? \u003cem\u003ePublic Administration Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e64\u003c/em\u003e(3), 299\u0026ndash;308.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDuarte, M., Fernando, P., Gomes, C., \u0026amp; Oliveira, A. (2014). The feminization of the judiciary in portugal: Dilemmas and paradoxes. \u003cem\u003eUtrecht Law Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e10\u003c/em\u003e(1), 29.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eElaine, M., \u0026amp; Pyle, B. (2000). Gender, race, and partisanship on the michigan supreme court. \u003cem\u003eAlbany Law Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e63\u003c/em\u003e(4), 1205\u0026ndash;1236.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFox, R. L., \u0026amp; Schuhmann, R. A. (1999). Gender and local government: A com- parison of women and men city managers. \u003cem\u003ePublic Administration Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e59\u003c/em\u003e(3), 231.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGlazebrook, S. (2023). Achieving holistic feminisation: A review of women and the judiciary in the asia-pacific. \u003cem\u003eInternational Journal of Constitutional Law\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e21\u003c/em\u003e(2), 691\u0026ndash;695.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHakim, C. (2006). Women, careers, and work-life preferences. \u003cem\u003eBritish Journal of Guidance Counselling\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e34\u003c/em\u003e(3), 279\u0026ndash;294.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHays, S., \u0026amp; Hochschild, A. R. (1998). Reconsidering the choice: Do americans really prefer the workplace over home? \u003cem\u003eContemporary Sociology\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e27\u003c/em\u003e(1), 28.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHymowitz, C., \u0026amp; Schelhardt, T. D. (1986). Why women can\u0026rsquo;t seem to break the invisible barrier that blocks them from top jobs. \u003cem\u003eThe Wall Street Journal\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e24\u003c/em\u003e(1), 1573\u0026ndash;1592.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eJacobson, W. S., Palus, C. K., \u0026amp; Bowling, C. J. (2009). A woman\u0026rsquo;s touch? gen- dered management and performance in state administration. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e20\u003c/em\u003e(2), 477\u0026ndash;504.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKenney, S. J. (2002). Breaking the silence: Gender mainstreaming and the com- position of the european court of justice. \u003cem\u003eFeminist Legal Studies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e10\u003c/em\u003e(3), 257\u0026ndash;270.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKholiq, A., \u0026amp; Halimatusa\u0026rsquo;diyah, I. (2022). Does gender blindness improve gender equality? female judges and the glass ceiling effect in the islamic judicial system in indonesia. \u003cem\u003eSocial Legal Studies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e32\u003c/em\u003e(1), 139\u0026ndash;158.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLaczo, A., \u0026amp; Madarasi, A. (2023). Dominance of female judges in the courts of hungary \u0026ndash; a different path to the development of women\u0026rsquo;s equality. \u003cem\u003eTrayectorias Humanas Trascontinentales\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e10\u003c/em\u003e(1), 73\u0026ndash;88.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMack, K., \u0026amp; Anleu, S. R. (2008). The national survey of australian judges: An overview of findings. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Judicial Administration\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e18\u003c/em\u003e(1), 1\u0026ndash;21.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMartin, E. (1989). Differences in men and women judges: Perspectives on gender. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Political Science\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e17\u003c/em\u003e(1), 74\u0026ndash;85.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMasengu, T. (2016). It\u0026rsquo;s a man\u0026rsquo;s world: barriers to gender transformation in the south african judiciary. perspectives from women advocates and attorneys. \u003cem\u003eInternational Journal of the Legal Profession\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e23\u003c/em\u003e(3), 305\u0026ndash;319.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMcCall, M., \u0026amp; McCall, M. A. (2007). How far does the gender gap extend? \u003cem\u003eThe Social Science Journal\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e44\u003c/em\u003e(1), 67\u0026ndash;82.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMcCormick, P., \u0026amp; Job, T. (1993). Do women judges make a difference? an anal- ysis by appeal court data. \u003cem\u003eCanadian Journal of Law and Society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e8\u003c/em\u003e(1), 135\u0026ndash;148.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMenkel-Meadow, C. (1989). Exploring a research agenda of the feminization of the legal profession: Theories of gender and social change. \u003cem\u003eLaw Social Inquiry\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e14\u003c/em\u003e(2), 289\u0026ndash;319.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMızrahı, R., \u0026amp; Aracı, H. (2010). Kadın y\u0026uml;oneticiler ve cam tavan sendromu U\u0026uml; zerine bir ara\u0026cedil;stırma. \u003cem\u003eOrganizasyon ve Y\u0026uml;onetim Bilimleri Dergisi\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e(1), 149\u0026ndash;156.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMittal, G., \u0026amp; Jain, D. (2023). Women\u0026rsquo;s equal representation in the higher ju- diciary: A case for judicial diversity in india. \u003cem\u003eInternational Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e47\u003c/em\u003e(2), 185\u0026ndash;199.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMoran, L. (2013). Sexual diversity in the judiciary in england and wales; research on barriers to judicial careers. \u003cem\u003eLaws\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e(4), 512\u0026ndash;538.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMorrison, A. M., \u0026amp; von Glinow, M. A. (1990). Women and minorities in man- agement. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Psychologist\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e45\u003c/em\u003e(2), 200\u0026ndash;208.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOder, B. E. (2019). Yargıda kadın temsili ve tu\u0026uml;rkiye. \u003cem\u003eTesev De˘gerlendirme Not- ları\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e1\u003c/em\u003e(1), 1\u0026ndash;6.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePalmer, B. (2001). Women in the american judiciary. \u003cem\u003eWomen \u0026amp; Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e23\u003c/em\u003e(3), 91\u0026ndash;101.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePark, S., \u0026amp; Liang, J. (2019). A comparative study of gender representation and social outcomes: The effect of political and bureaucratic representation. \u003cem\u003ePublic Administration Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e81\u003c/em\u003e(2), 321\u0026ndash;332.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eParlaktuna, I. (2010). Tu\u0026uml;rkiye de cinsiyete dayalı mesleki ayrımcılı˘gın analizi. \u003cem\u003eEge Academic Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e10\u003c/em\u003e(4), 1217\u0026ndash;1217.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePaxton, P., Kunovich, S., \u0026amp; Hughes, M. M. (2007). Gender in politics. \u003cem\u003eAnnual Review of Sociology\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e33\u003c/em\u003e(1), 263\u0026ndash;284.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eRackley, E. (2013). \u003cem\u003eWomen, judging, and the judiciary: From difference to diver- sity\u003c/em\u003e. Routledge.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eStone, P. (2008). \u003cem\u003eOpting out? Why women really quit careers and head home\u003c/em\u003e. University of California Press.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eTato˘glu, F. Y. (2021). \u003cem\u003ePanel Veri Ekonometrisi\u003c/em\u003e. Beta Publishing.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eT\u0026oslash;raasen, M. (2022). Women\u0026rsquo;s judicial representation in haiti: Unintended gains of state-building efforts. \u003cem\u003ePolitics \u0026amp; Gender\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e19\u003c/em\u003e(1), 34\u0026ndash;65.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKarakılıc\u0026cedil;, N. Y. (2019). Evaluation of glass ceiling syndrome in terms of gen- der discrimination perception. \u003cem\u003eManagement Economics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e17\u003c/em\u003e(2), 214\u0026ndash;233.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"glass-ceiling, female representation in judiciary, panel data analysis, random effects model","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6013471/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6013471/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis study seeks to answer the question of whether there are barriers to women in the judiciary and to examine the relationship between the glass ceiling index and representation rates of female judges with a view to revealing whether the barriers observed in the judiciary are sector-specific. The study examines the glass ceiling index scores published in ‘The Economist’ for OECD countries between 2010- 2020 and the representation rates of female judges in courts for the same years. The panel data method was used to reveal this relationship. The glass ceiling index had a negative coefficient and was statistically significant at a significance level of 1 percent for first instance courts. The probability values obtained from the models applied to test the relationship between the glass ceiling index and the representation rates of female judges in courts of second instance and supreme courts showed no statistically significant relationship between the variables. This study differs from the literature in that it establishes a relationship between the barriers to women in the public and private sectors and the barriers to women in the judiciary across countries, thus seeking an answer to the question of whether or not the barriers in the judiciary are sector-specific.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Breaking Barriers: Exploring the Impact of the Glass Ceiling Index on Female Representation in the Judiciary","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-02-20 05:01:22","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6013471/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"f5021abb-c521-4515-a525-0dd2f2adbfc8","owner":[],"postedDate":"February 20th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-05-02T12:38:42+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-02-20 05:01:22","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6013471","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6013471","identity":"rs-6013471","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}