The Age of Legislators and Public Debt

The Age of Legislators and Public Debt | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The Age of Legislators and Public Debt Etsubdin Sileshi This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8630653/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Do older legislators increase public debt via borrowing? This study examines the existence of systemic relationship between average age of national legislators and the size of public debt by assembling panel data from OECD and IPU(age). The results from the two-step GMM model show a robust association between the average age of parliamentarians and public debt. A one year increase in the average of legislators raises public debt by 1--1.5. More specifically, a one standard--deviation increase in the average age of law makers(2.1 years) is associated with a rise of adjusted public debt by about 2.4 percentage points and that of gross public debt by about 3.1 percentage points. To explain the mechanism through which legislator age affects public debt, the study develops a simple tractable political--economy model. In this model legislators' su.bjective discount factor vary with age, reflecting effective differences in planning horizons. Older legislators rationally attach lower weights to future fiscal costs--leading to higher equilibrium public debt. The results from the model calibration corroborate the empirical results, differences in age related discounting factors of law-- makers result in varying responses to public debt accumulation. These results highlight legislator demographics as an indispensable channel in inter--temporal fiscal choices, distinct from the well documented factors such as population aging JEL Codes: H63; D72; J11 Public debt legislator age political economy fiscal policy dynamic panel models Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8630653","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":581346533,"identity":"25659fee-08d7-4995-8a59-4ce72992576c","order_by":0,"name":"Etsubdin Sileshi","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Oxford University and Minitry of Finance, Ethiopia","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Etsubdin","middleName":"","lastName":"Sileshi","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-01-18 10:38:18","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8630653/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8630653/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":104742605,"identity":"157f9f10-e7ab-49c1-b653-66f44f34b227","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-16 16:41:23","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":372910,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"AgeofLegislatorsandPublicDebt.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8630653/v1_covered_ecfc29f7-175a-48be-8b4b-cdf9e878f369.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The Age of Legislators and Public Debt","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Public debt, legislator age, political economy, fiscal policy, dynamic panel models","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8630653/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8630653/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eDo older legislators increase public debt via borrowing? This study examines the existence of systemic relationship between average age of national legislators and the size of public debt by assembling panel data from OECD \u0026nbsp;and IPU(age). The results from the two-step GMM model show a robust association between the average age of parliamentarians and public debt. A one year increase in the average of legislators raises public debt by 1--1.5. More specifically, a one standard--deviation increase in the average age of law makers(2.1 years) is associated with \u0026nbsp;a rise of adjusted public debt by about 2.4 percentage points and \u0026nbsp;that of gross public debt by \u0026nbsp;about 3.1 percentage points. To explain the mechanism through which legislator age affects public debt, the study develops a simple tractable political--economy model. \u0026nbsp;In this model legislators' su.bjective discount factor vary with age, reflecting effective differences in planning horizons. Older legislators rationally attach lower weights to future fiscal costs--leading to higher \u0026nbsp;equilibrium public debt. The results from the model calibration corroborate the empirical results, differences in \u0026nbsp;age related discounting factors of law-- makers \u0026nbsp;result in varying responses to public debt accumulation. These results highlight legislator demographics as an indispensable channel in inter--temporal fiscal \u0026nbsp;choices, distinct from the well documented factors such as population aging\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJEL Codes: H63; D72; J11\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The Age of Legislators and Public Debt","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-01-29 04:55:46","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8630653/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"9d3a807e-99ea-4647-a331-6aa6535bf8ea","owner":[],"postedDate":"January 29th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-03-16T16:40:57+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-01-29 04:55:46","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8630653","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8630653","identity":"rs-8630653","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}