Confirmation bias in decision making for fingerprints, DNA and eyewitness evidence cannot be explained by cognitive style or thinking dispositions.

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Abstract

Pre-existing beliefs about the background or guilt of a suspect can bias the subsequent evaluation of evidence for forensic examiners and lay people alike. This biasing effect, called the confirmation bias, has influenced legal proceedings in prominent court cases such as that of Brandon Mayfield. Today many forensic providers attempt to train their examiners against these cognitive biases. Nine hundred and forty-two participants read a fictional criminal case and received either neutral, incriminating or exonerating evidence (fingerprint, eyewitness, or DNA) before providing an initial rating of guilt. Participants then viewed ambiguous evidence (alibi, facial composite, handwriting sample or informant statement) before providing a final rating of guilt. Final guilt ratings were higher for all evidence conditions (neutral, incriminating or exonerating) following exposure to the ambiguous evidence. This provides evidence that the confirmation bias influences the evaluation of evidence.

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last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00