ETFs, Illiquid Assets, and Fire Sales

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Abstract

Can ETFs trigger fire sales in illiquid assets? We develop and empirically examine a model where an authorized participant (AP) holds bond inventory and connects the ETF to the underlying bond market. For redemptions, the AP acts as a buffer between the two markets, holding redeemed bonds to preserve the mark-to-market value of her inventory and avoid a fire sale. The AP behaves asymmetrically for creation and transmits ETF purchases to the bond market to boost mark-to-market values. The AP’s costs of handling creations/redemptions are paid by liquidity-demanding ETF investors via premiums/discounts. We document new empirical facts motivated by the model, and provide a novel explanation for why ETFs holding more liquid bonds traded at larger discounts than those holding illiquid bonds during the COVID-induced sell-off in March 2020. Our findings show that ETFs have advantages over mutual funds in managing illiquid assets.

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last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00