Does Being Confronted with Internal Attributions for an Ingroup’s Sufferings Foster the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories?

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Abstract

Conspiracy theories are often viewed as a means to externally attribute ingroup sufferings by blaming them on the actions of powerful groups. Building on this assumption, we tested the hypothesis that the threat induced by facing an internal (vs. external) attribution for an ingroup’s sufferings would result in increased endorsement of an alternative, conspiracy attribution. We also examined how being confronted with an internal attribution for an ingroup’s sufferings impacts people’s sympathy for the author of a conspiracy attribution. In five preregistered experiments (Ntotal = 2,695), being confronted with an internal attribution for an ingroup’s sufferings did not increase the endorsement of conspiracy attributions (BF01 = 37.88, very strong evidence for the null), sympathy for the conspiracy advocate (BF01 = 4.38, some evidence for the null), or self-reported agreement with them (BF01 = 17.70, strong evidence for the null). A potential explanation for these results is the social stigma surrounding conspiracy beliefs – which may result in participants being reluctant to endorse conspiracy attributions. In contrast, stable propensities to internally attribute inequalities (political orientation in Study 1, meritocracy beliefs in Studies 2–3) were negatively associated with all three dependent variables.

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last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00