Game Analysis of Cooperation Behaviours of Stakeholders in Platform Supply Chain | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Game Analysis of Cooperation Behaviours of Stakeholders in Platform Supply Chain zheng he This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7718527/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Purpose-The platform supply chain involves different types of stakeholders, and the formation of mutually beneficial symbiotic cooperative relationship among the stakeholders is the key to the smooth operation and development of the platform supply chain. Design-In this paper, based on the analysis of mutually beneficial symbiotic cooperation behaviours of stakeholders in platform supply chain, a three-party evolution game model of stakeholders' cooperation behaviours in platform supply chain based on mutually beneficial symbiosis mode is established to analyse the evolution paths of cooperation behaviours of stakeholders, and the cooperative behaviors of the three participants are analyzed by system dynamics simulation. Research limitations-The results show that: (1) manufacturing enterprise, platform service provider, and customer can spontaneously form a stable state of mutual cooperation (ecological cooperation, ecological cooperation, ecological cooperation). (2) The initial willingness of the stakeholders will affect the evolution direction of platform supply chain cooperation in the mutually beneficial symbiosis mode, and also influence the strategic choices of other stakeholders. (3) The degree of synergy, the degree of symbiosis, the ecological cooperative outputs, and the coefficient of distribution of ecological incomes play a positive role in the platform supply chain stakeholders to reach cooperation. (4) Platform empowerment cost coefficient, enterprise adaptation cost, cooperation risk coefficient, and resource spillover income are the blocking factors for stakeholders to participate in platform supply chain ecological cooperation. platform supply chain stakeholders cooperative behaviour evolutionary game Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. 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