Fodor's Self-Concept: Conceptual Atomism and its Implications for Self-Categorization Theory

Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987; 1994) has proven itself to be one of the most influential and robust explanatory theories in social cognition. Its two foundational texts have been cited almost 25,000 times and it has spurred theoretical, empirical, and applied research across a wide array of topics. Despite its successes, I will argue in this talk that its theoretical commitment to a “Roschian” prototype view of categorization holds it back. In particular, I will argue that its reliance on the “principle of meta-contrast” for category discrimination (1) renders it computationally intractable; and (2) saddles it with a model of semantic content that does not meet the criterion of naturalness. I will propose instead that Fodor’s (1995; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 2015) “conceptual atomism” should be adopted. I will outline Fodor’s critiques of what he refers to as the “inferential role semantics” of prototype models and discuss their relevance to self-categorization. I will then explore the implications for Self-Categorization Theory of adopting a conceptual atomism approach, with a particular emphasis on issues of context dependence, prototypicality, and perceiver readiness.