Global Connectivity: The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study

Global Connectivity: The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Global Connectivity: The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study Lojain Suliman, XU Yujun, Zhào yuánqí This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7853544/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 14 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Amid contemporary shifts in global power relations, investment in large-scale connectivity networks has become a decisive instrument of geopolitical rivalry. Since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved into the most extensive cross-border infrastructure program worldwide, integrating over 150 states and numerous international organizations, while domestically reinforcing China’s westward development model through centralized planning and coordinated implementation. In contrast, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled during the 2023 G20 Summit with strong backing from the United States, India, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, proposes a multi-modal transport and energy system linking South Asia to Europe via the Gulf and the Levant. Whereas the BRI projects are primarily framed as development-driven, IMEC carries a more overtly strategic orientation designed to balance Beijing’s growing influence. This article analyzes the interaction between these two competing frameworks with particular emphasis on the Middle East, and Syria as a focal case. The results show that even Syria is very important for the corridors. However, there are many factors which play role in the corridors conflict. Belt and Road Indo-Europe corridor Syria Middle east 1. Introduction In recent years, global infrastructure development has evolved into a central axis of international competition, reflecting deeper shifts in the geopolitical and economic order. As states and regional blocs seek to consolidate influence and secure long-term development pathways, large-scale infrastructure initiatives have emerged as both instruments of connectivity and tools of strategic positioning. Among these, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become the most ambitious and far-reaching program of its kind. Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has extended across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America, positioning itself not only as a vehicle for transnational integration but also as a model of China’s distinctive development approach. At the same time, the international environment in which the BRI operates has grown increasingly contested. The rise of competing frameworks, most notably the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, highlights the extent to which infrastructure is no longer merely a technical or economic undertaking but a deeply political arena. Whereas the BRI reflects China’s centralized governance structure, rapid mobilization of resources, and ability to deliver large-scale projects, initiatives such as IMEC are explicitly framed as counterbalances to China’s expanding global role. This emerging rivalry underscores the extent to which infrastructure corridors now function as instruments of geopolitical realignment, shaping not only trade flows and energy networks but also the balance of power in the international system. Against this backdrop, it becomes essential to examine the dynamics of competition between the BRI and IMEC. Understanding the extent to which China’s domestic development model can be replicated abroad, and whether alternative corridors such as IMEC provide viable and sustainable frameworks, is crucial for evaluating the future of global infrastructure governance. This study addresses this critical issue by analyzing the structural, political, and strategic factors that shape the evolution of these competing initiatives, with particular attention to their implications for developing countries caught between rival spheres of influence. 2.Literature review Geopolitical Risk in the Middle East The Middle East has long been characterized as one of the world’s most geopolitically volatile regions, where structural instability intersects with global competition for energy resources and strategic corridors. Geopolitical Risk Theory highlights how the region’s strategic chokepoints—such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab el-Mandeb—function as critical nodes of international trade and energy supply, making them persistent arenas of global contestation (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022 ). The region’s geopolitical risks are further amplified by overlapping rivalries: U.S.–Iranian tensions, Saudi–Iranian competition, and the increasing involvement of external powers such as Russia and China (Alterman, 2020 ; Khadduri, 2021 ). Recent studies also underscore how energy dependency continues to shape geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East. The reliance of global markets on Gulf oil and gas supplies, combined with regional conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, create systemic risks that extend beyond the region itself (Luft, 2018 ). Moreover, the growing involvement of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the U.S.-backed India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) reflects how infrastructure corridors have become both instruments of development and arenas of geopolitical competition (Fulton, 2019 ). This has heightened regional uncertainty, as states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates adopt hedging strategies to maximize autonomy while navigating between competing global powers (Hokayem, 2022 ). Overall, the literature converges on the argument that the Middle East epitomizes the entanglement of economic, political, and security risks, where global and regional rivalries magnify uncertainty. However, gaps remain in understanding how middle powers in the region employ adaptive strategies to mitigate these risks and shape the evolving geopolitical order. The geopolitical risk and Corridors The intensifying competition between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) has elevated geopolitical risk as a central dimension of global infrastructure politics. Geopolitical Risk Theory posits that connectivity projects are not only economic ventures but also strategic tools that alter power balances, trade dependencies, and security dynamics (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022 ). The BRI, launched in 2013, has expanded China’s influence through investments in ports, railways, pipelines, and digital infrastructure, thereby consolidating its structural power in Asia, Africa, and Europe (Fulton, 2019 ). Conversely, IMEC, unveiled at the 2023 G20 Summit, has been explicitly framed as a counterweight to BRI, with the United States, India, and the European Union presenting it as a “high-standard” alternative aimed at diversifying connectivity routes and reducing dependence on Chinese-led infrastructure (Blah, 2024 ). The overlap between BRI and IMEC in strategic regions such as the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean underscores the heightened risks of geopolitical friction. Ports like Jeddah, Abu Dhabi, Haifa, and Piraeus have emerged as contested nodes of influence, reflecting the “co-opetition” dynamic in which cooperation and competition coexist in infrastructure development (Wang, 2022 ). For Middle Eastern states, this rivalry exacerbates geopolitical uncertainty by compelling them to navigate between competing great-power agendas. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have adopted hedging strategies, simultaneously deepening ties with China through the BRI while endorsing IMEC to maintain alignment with Western partners (Hokayem, 2022 ). This paper examines geopolitical risk in the Middle East through the lens of the ongoing competition between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India–Europe Corridor (IMEC). The analysis situates these competing connectivity frameworks within the broader dynamics of regional and global power struggles, highlighting how their divergent logics—developmental–economic in the case of BRI and security–political in the case of IMEC—shape patterns of cooperation and contestation. All of the aforementioned issues will be explored within the conceptual framework of geopolitical risk theory, thereby providing a systematic assessment of how infrastructure-driven rivalries influence stability, security, and strategic alignments in the Middle East. 3.Problem statement (Beyond the paths) In the current era of strategic geopolitical realignment, global infrastructure investment has emerged as a critical arena of international competition. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated in 2013, has rapidly expanded to become the largest transnational infrastructure development program in the world, encompassing over 152 countries and 32 international organizations by 2025. With more than $ 1 trillion in cumulative investments and over 2,600 infrastructure projects completed globally, the BRI has not only bolstered connectivity across continents but has also significantly contributed to regional development, particularly within China's historically underdeveloped western regions such as Chongqing, Sichuan, and Xinjiang. Domestically, the BRI has demonstrated a highly successful development model premised on centralized governance, seamless coordination between central and local authorities, rapid resource mobilization, and an absence of internal political fragmentation. Furthermore, the emergence of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), launched during the 2023 G20 Summit and supported by the U.S., India, EU, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, has introduced a strategically motivated alternative to the BRI. IMEC’s multi-modal infrastructure plan—linking Indian ports to Europe via the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel—promises not only to reduce logistics costs and transit times but also to deepen energy and digital interconnectivity through power grids, fiber optics, and hydrogen pipelines. More importantly, IMEC reflects a broader geopolitical calculus aimed at curbing China’s global influence by offering competing states a Western-aligned infrastructure framework. This geopolitical competition places developing countries in a position of strategic ambivalence, often forced to navigate between rival partnerships, and compromises their ability to pursue long-term, coherent development strategies. As a result, infrastructure initiatives risk being instrumentalized as tools of influence rather than platforms for economic transformation. In this context, it becomes crucial to understand the nature of competition between the BRI and IMEC, identify the zones of strategic overlap, and evaluate whether initiatives like IMEC offer sustainable alternatives or merely fragment the global development landscape. This paper examines the competition between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing on the Middle East in general and Syria in particular. It also seeks to explore the potential trajectories of the conflict arising from this competition and the consequent shifts in global alignments. As two similar cross-continental infrastructure projects, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-European Economic Corridor not only have a high degree of overlap in geographical space, but also compete in strategic goals, cooperation mechanisms and regional influence. The following will analyze the strategic intersection and competitive interaction between the two initiatives around the dimensions of geographical intersection, project layout, strategic choices of participating countries and development concepts. 3.I. Geographical overlap and path intersection The overlap of geographical paths constitutes the basis for the competition and interaction between BRI and IMEC. The BRI initiative promotes the land economic corridor and the Maritime Silk Road in a coordinated manner, building an interconnected network from China to Europe and Africa through Central Asia and South Asia, including extending to the Persian Gulf countries through the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" and the "China-Arab Capacity Cooperation Demonstration Park"; while IMEC plans a channel starting from India, through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and finally reaching Greece and Southern Europe. The two have obvious overlaps in the Middle East and Southern Europe. In terms of the intersection area, the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea region constitute a strategic intersection hub. As a strategic region connecting the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, the Arabian Peninsula naturally becomes the key competition and cooperation area of the two initiatives. China's cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and other countries, including port construction and energy cooperation, has penetrated into the Arabian Peninsula. The peninsula, as the middle section of IMEC and the junction of land and sea routes, will undoubtedly become the primary strategic intersection. At the same time, the Red Sea runs through Egypt and Saudi Arabia and is one of the busiest maritime trade routes in the world. Most of the energy transportation in the Middle East and trade between Asia and Europe pass through this waterway. BRI has included the Red Sea region as one of the core areas of its Maritime Silk Road, and IMEC is also inseparable from the Red Sea waterway, especially in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Even if IMEC plans to build alternative routes, it will still rely on the Red Sea waterway to maintain connectivity between India and Europe in the short term. In terms of the specific nodes where the two intersect, the overlapping hubs in the Middle East include Saudi Arabia's Jeddah Port, UAE's Abu Dhabi Port and Fujairah Port, Israel's Haifa Port, Egypt's Suez Canal, etc., and in southern Europe, it is mainly Greece's Piraeus Port. As important trade transit points between China and the Middle East, key ports and transportation hubs such as Jeddah Port, Abu Dhabi Port and Fujairah Port have become important parts of China's "Belt and Road Initiative", especially in the transportation of goods between China and the Gulf countries. IMEC plans to strengthen the connectivity of the Eurasian Channel through Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There is no doubt that Jeddah Port, Abu Dhabi Port and Fujairah Port will also become one of the core nodes of the channel. The Greek Port of Piraeus is an important land-sea connection point between China and Europe in the "Belt and Road Initiative", especially the investment and operation of China's China Ocean Shipping Company has made it a hub for the southern line of the China-Europe Express. IMEC also pays attention to this port and plans to make it the first entry port in Europe to connect the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is a key shipping node of IMEC. These ports have not only become important nodes of BRI, carrying energy and cargo transportation between China and the Middle East, but will also be included in IMEC's core channel design. This path overlap means that the two sides have a "co-opetition" relationship in infrastructure construction, and have formed a substantial competition in geopolitical influence and channel control. Finally, the very fact that middle powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt serve as overlapping hubs reinforces the strategic hedging dilemma. Their participation in both initiatives may enhances their economic leverage, but it also exposes them to geopolitical pressures from competing great powers. This structural condition exemplifies how infrastructure overlap produces geopolitical risk, not only through the material vulnerability of trade corridors but also through the political contestation over rules, standards, and alignments in the international system. 3.2. Strategic choices and geopolitical balance of participating countries In the overlapping areas of BRI and IMEC, most countries have not clearly "chosen sides", but have adopted a flexible strategy of "two-pronged approach" to maximize their benefits. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the most typical representatives: on the one hand, they actively participate in the launch of IMEC and establish closer strategic cooperation with the United States and India; on the other hand, they continue to deepen cooperation with China in energy, digital economy, logistics and other fields. Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in both project routes, aiming to build an important logistics and trade center and become a bridge connecting the East and the West. The UAE is also committed to playing an active role in shaping global trade dynamics, focusing on reshaping supply chains and eager to promote participation worldwide (Akbulut, G,2024). Therefore, out of practical considerations of maximizing their own interests and minimizing risks, both countries choose to participate in both projects at the same time. Other countries also mostly adopt bilateral participation strategies. For example, although Israel is an important part of IMEC, it also maintains prudent investment and cooperation with China; while Egypt, Greece, Italy and other countries have carried out balanced diplomacy between IMEC and BRI, trying to attract foreign investment and promote their own development by leveraging the two initiatives. This "multilateral optionism" reflects the realistic orientation of middle-sized countries and geopolitical key countries in the region: they are not passively attached to the game of great powers, but independently seek maximum interests and attach importance to economic returns and strategic autonomy. As a summary, a state’s attempt to maintain balance in its relations with major powers can turn into a geopolitical conflict when its balanced policies are interpreted as alignment with rival blocs, or when its efforts to diversify partnerships are seen as undermining the interests of other actors who perceive this as a threat to their influence. In such cases, a country’s pursuit of independent decision-making through balancing between competing great powers may trigger suspicion and indirect confrontations, as these powers employ economic, political, or even military pressure to redirect its course. Consequently, a policy of neutrality or balance can transform into a contested arena that reflects the broader struggle over the redistribution of influence in the international order. 3.3. Differences in project attributes and development concepts China’s approach to international relations is grounded in the principle of economic diversification and the establishment of partnerships based on a win–win framework, steering clear of competitive dynamics that may weaken states or push them into destructive conflicts. China also places emphasis on the economic dimension of its external relations, deliberately avoiding involvement in domestic political issues or interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries. In contrast, the United States adopts a foreign policy approach centered on alliances and military intervention, leveraging its military superiority. Following such interventions and wars, it often seeks to open markets in line with the principles of economic liberalism. This divergence in conceptual approaches may lead to the emergence of an indirect geopolitical conflict, whose features initially appear ambiguous but gradually become more evident once strategic corridors transform into key instruments of contention. In the context of competition over influence and resources, these corridors serve as focal points that expose the underlying divergence in visions among major powers, ultimately becoming central arenas of geopolitical rivalry. This dynamic reflects the interplay between the economic and security dimensions in shaping the contours of the international order. 4. The proposed theory Geopolitical Risk Theory posits that political crises, armed conflicts, and diplomatic tensions generate heightened levels of uncertainty, commonly referred to as “geopolitical risks,” which exert profound effects on economic and financial systems. Elevated geopolitical risk often results in the postponement or reduction of investment activities, the reconfiguration of global supply chains to mitigate exposure to unstable regions, and an increase in financing costs stemming from higher risk premiums demanded by lenders and investors. The conceptualization and empirical measurement of this phenomenon have been advanced by Caldara and Iacoviello ( 2022 ), who developed the Geopolitical Risk Index (GPR Index) as a systematic tool to quantify fluctuations in geopolitical risk and to assess its implications for global economic stability and strategic decision-making. 5. Methodology The in-depth interview methodology was employed in this research to capture nuanced expert perspectives on the evolving dynamics of global power competition and the strategic role of the Middle East within it. This qualitative approach allowed for a flexible yet structured dialogue with selected experts, enabling them to elaborate on their insights, experiences, and interpretations beyond the constraints of standardized survey instruments. Semi-structured interview guides were designed to ensure thematic consistency across discussions while allowing participants the freedom to expand on issues of particular relevance to their expertise. Each interview was conducted with the objective of eliciting detailed, context-rich responses that reveal underlying assumptions, strategic considerations, and interpretive frameworks often absent from quantitative data. The method thus provided an opportunity to explore not only what experts think, but also how they construct their arguments and situate them within broader geopolitical debates. Through this approach, the study was able to generate a layered understanding of the subject matter, grounded in both empirical observations and expert judgment. In this paper, three in-depth-interviews have been conducted with three experts in order to answer the following question: To what extent can it be argued that the root of the ongoing conflict in Syria is fundamentally a struggle over U.S.–China corridors? And if we extend this very question to the broader Middle East, would the same logic apply? Who regulates or orchestrates the competition between these corridors? Is a long-term U.S.–China agreement the only viable solution? Some studies have suggested that the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor is primarily a security-political project designed to consolidate U.S. interests, whereas the Belt and Road Initiative is characterized by a developmental and economic orientation. To what degree is this claim accurate, and to what extent does each corridor reflect the underlying logic and worldview of the states that promote them? Is this primarily a clash of ideologies, or rather a struggle over interests? Finally, will these corridors ultimately result in a reconfiguration of global alignments? The experts are: Table (1). Names of Experts Participating in the In-Depth Interviews Name Position Dr. Samir Al-taqi Researcher at the Middle East Institute in Washington Dr. Hassan Mukalled Expert in economic and politics Dr. Faysal Jalloul Researcher in international relation 6.Results 6.1 The Struggle over Syria The preceding text reflects the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with three experts—Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul—who provided comprehensive insights into the geopolitical and strategic significance of Syria within the contemporary international system. Dr. Al-Taqi highlighted Syria’s emergence as a contested arena for competing global powers, emphasizing Russia’s strategic initiative aimed at repositioning Turkey outside the Western alliance system, particularly NATO and the European Union, by transforming it into an energy hub through the port of Ceyhan. He argued that the outbreak of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict undermined this plan, compelling Europe to reduce reliance on Russian energy. For him, competition over maritime corridors and global trade routes remains primarily strategic–economic, as reflected in initiatives like the “Spice Route” and the “Silk Road,” while developments such as the Armenian–Azerbaijani corridor illustrate Moscow’s declining regional role. He concluded that the primary axis of rivalry lies in the United States–China dyad, though without amounting to an existential confrontation. Dr. Mukalled, in turn, underscored Syria’s exceptional strategic importance, rooted in its geographic position between East and West and its role as a hub for gas pipelines, with Homs serving as a central node—an element he identified as a key driver of the 2011 crisis. He traced Syria’s historic importance to Aleppo and Damascus on the Silk Road and examined alternative projects such as the “Indian Corridor” and the “David Corridor,” along with renewed possibilities for a Syrian–Turkish or maritime route to Europe. He further situated these dynamics within the broader competition between China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative and the “India–Europe Corridor,” noting India’s shifting stance toward greater openness to China, as revealed during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. According to his view, despite the appearance of American–Israeli victories, neither the United States—due to structural crises—nor Israel—due to internal fragility—has been able to translate these into lasting strategic advantages. Finally, Dr. Jalloul emphasized that although competition over transit routes has influenced the Syrian conflict, the war transcends this dimension, being deeply connected to the Arab–Israeli conflict, NATO–Russia rivalry, and broader regional geopolitics. He argued that U.S. efforts to mobilize India as a counterbalance to China remain ineffective, as India’s economic scale is minor compared to China’s, whose competitive capacity ensures that no single actor can monopolize the open global market. Collectively, the three experts’ perspectives affirm Syria’s centrality in international rivalries, shaped by overlapping economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions. 6.2 Struggle over the middle east The preceding text presents the results of in-depth interviews conducted with three experts—Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul—who offered complementary perspectives on the shifting dynamics of global and regional power structures, with particular emphasis on the Middle East. Dr. Al-Taqi highlighted the United States’ gradual retreat from some of its traditional roles, such as safeguarding maritime navigation routes that do not directly affect its interests, illustrated by its hesitant response to attacks from Yemen and its withdrawal from Somalia. He argued that Washington is signaling to the international community that such routes are no longer strategic priorities, given their minimal relevance to U.S. trade. Despite retaining the most powerful navy globally, the United States has shifted its orientation away from preserving maritime prestige toward consolidating a strategic–economic sphere centered on technological and military advancement. Within this context, he observed Europe’s renewed interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, driven by new rivalries and, more recently, by the repercussions of the Ukraine war, which refocused Western attention on securing energy routes. He further noted a reversion to reliance on conventional energy sources, reinforcing the strategic centrality of the Gulf states and restoring the Middle East’s importance in shaping international balances. Dr. Mukalled, by contrast, underscored the divergent trajectories unfolding in Europe, the Gulf, and the broader global arena. He pointed to Europe’s economic decline, reflected in contraction in Germany and fiscal crises in France, Italy, and Spain, which collectively diminish Europe’s capacity to present itself as a major power. In the Gulf, he emphasized the economic shift toward China, citing trade figures and investment flows that far surpass those with the United States. This has created a “disjunction” between political structures still tied to Washington and economic realities increasingly oriented toward Beijing, Moscow, and emerging platforms such as BRICS. On the global scale, he noted that China has become the leading trading partner of 149 countries, illustrating the failure of U.S. measures to curb its rise. At the same time, the United States lacks the capacity to wage large-scale wars that could alter these trends, while cross-border transport and energy projects are rapidly expanding across Asia, in contrast to the slower pace of change in the Gulf and Levant. For him, the world is in a profound but unresolved transitional phase, characterized by contradictions and accumulations without a definitive outcome. Dr. Jalloul, in turn, emphasized that Sino–American relations cannot be described as a traditional conflict leading toward armed confrontation, as such an outcome would imply world war, which neither Washington nor Beijing can accept. Regarding the Middle East, he contended that, despite its importance, the region is unlikely to serve as a trigger for global war. Instead, China enjoys advantages over the United States in economic influence, market penetration, and balanced relations with regional powers, including Israel, the largest importer of Chinese goods. He noted that China’s regional strategy is centered on promoting stability and peaceful solutions rather than instigating conflict. Although competition is evident, cases of military coexistence, such as in Djibouti where Chinese, American, French, and other bases operate side by side, demonstrate that rivalry remains within a competitive framework rather than escalating into direct confrontation. Taken together, these perspectives underscore the enduring strategic significance of the Middle East within shifting global power dynamics, the relative decline of Europe and the United States, and the growing economic and geopolitical leverage of China, all within a competitive yet non-confrontational framework. 6.3 Conflict Management The foregoing text presents the insights of three experts—Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul—derived from in-depth interviews conducted for academic research, each addressing different dimensions of the evolving Sino–American rivalry and its global implications. Dr. Al-Taqi underscored that China’s strategy revolves around establishing “economic capsules” that intersect, compete, and overlap without necessarily being constrained by zero-sum dynamics. In his view, this approach may foster a form of international division of labor in which competition and cooperation coexist simultaneously. Dr. Mukalled expanded on the long-term nature of the Sino–American rivalry, contending that its essence lies not only in economic or military superiority but more fundamentally in how the competition is managed and ultimately resolved. He argued that the Trump administration introduced a new paradigm premised on the belief that technological supremacy could serve as a decisive “magic wand,” enabling Washington to impose its conditions on the international system through tariffs and coercive economic measures rather than direct military force. However, practical outcomes exposed the limitations of this approach: China demonstrated technological readiness sufficient to challenge U.S. superiority and to provide more efficient, cost-effective alternatives. Whereas Washington estimated the cost of certain technological projects at one trillion dollars, Beijing presented practical alternatives costing no more than 12 million dollars. This revealed a structural flaw in U.S. strategic assumptions, showing that technological primacy was not an unassailable tool of hegemony, but rather one subject to competition. On the economic and commercial front, he noted that the balance currently tilts toward the axis led by China, though Beijing refrains from overtly positioning itself as the leader of this bloc. Nevertheless, the management of disputes among great powers is unlikely without further demonstrations of strength and direct or indirect confrontations, whether in geopolitical arenas such as Ukraine and Taiwan or in strategic sectors such as technology and defense. He cited the superiority of certain Chinese weapons systems deployed by Pakistan against India as evidence of the competition’s expansion into increasingly complex domains. From this perspective, the United States appears unwilling to accept the current state of affairs, while the opposing side will not concede without achieving further gains. Thus, the trajectory of this rivalry remains protracted and unresolved. He further emphasized that the “India–Europe Corridor” represents, at its core, a security–political project aimed at consolidating American interests, whereas China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” is fundamentally an economic–developmental project focused on infrastructure and trade integration. Each corridor, therefore, reflects the distinct strategic rationale of its proponent. Finally, Dr. Jalloul concluded that competition remains the decisive factor, and that it is likely China will emerge as the winning party without the rivalry escalating into an open conflict with India over the Belt and Road Initiative or the so-called Indian route. Collectively, these perspectives highlight the multidimensional nature of global competition, its varied manifestations across economic, technological, and geopolitical arenas, and the enduring significance of China’s strategic posture within it. 6.4 Infrastructure, Power, and Ideology: The Belt and Road Initiative versus the India–Europe Corridor The preceding text synthesizes the results of in-depth interviews conducted with three experts—Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul—each of whom provided critical perspectives on the evolving dynamics of global competition and the strategic role of China within it. Dr. Al-Taqi emphasized that contemporary attempts to construct new “Silk Roads,” both by land and sea, resemble a thread extending from China to London, with multiple actors, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, attempting to redirect its course while insisting that it pass through Syria. He highlighted the significance of local factors—stability, alliances, and political signaling—in shaping these routes, pointing to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as an illustration of how instability derailed plans for an energy corridor from Central Asia, ultimately leaving unresolved challenges for others to address. He underscored the inseparability of security and development, noting that projects such as the “India–Europe Corridor” are primarily security–political in nature, while the “Silk Road” is presented as an economic–developmental initiative, yet both require protective mechanisms in the form of military power or security alliances. He argued that China’s reliance on “strategic partnerships” rather than alliances in the Western sense may prove insufficient unless reinforced by instruments of power and security, recalling the failure of COMECON as a cautionary precedent. Dr. Mukalled situated the discussion within a broader historical trajectory, tracing U.S. dominance from 1945 through the post-Cold War period, when it emerged as the sole superpower, to its subsequent decline in productive capacity and growing reliance on financial instruments and coercive power through sanctions. He contrasted this trajectory with China’s rise, rooted in its productive economy and global trade network, which now positions it as the leading trading partner for 149 countries. For him, this divergence suggests that the United States represents a “waning empire,” while China embodies a rising power based on production, trade, and sustained growth. He illustrated this shift through the contrast between U.S. and Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia, noting that the latter far surpass the former. Yet he also raised the critical question of whether China can continue to restrict itself to the economic sphere. He observed that U.S. pressures have accelerated Beijing’s entry into political and security domains, evidenced by its frequent use of the veto in the UN Security Council, its alignment with Russia, and major agreements with Iran, all aimed at safeguarding its expanding global interests. China’s recent military parade and accompanying political discourse, he argued, mark a turning point toward a more assertive political and military presence on the world stage. Dr. Jalloul, meanwhile, argued that regional alignments will ultimately be determined by interests, with China holding a clear advantage over other actors. He noted that China’s competitive edge in American and Western markets naturally extends to the Middle East, and that attempts by the United States to counterbalance this advantage through India or via an Emirati–Indian–Gulf–American axis will remain within a competitive framework. Nonetheless, he concluded that the balance of power in this arena is most likely to tip in favor of China. Taken together, these perspectives underscore the interdependence of security and development, the relative decline of American influence, the consolidation of China’s global economic leadership, and the likelihood that competition, rather than direct confrontation, will remain the dominant mode of interaction shaping both regional and global orders. 6.5 Shifting Global Alignments The preceding text encapsulates the findings of in-depth interviews with three experts—Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul—each offering critical perspectives on shifting global alignments and the evolving role of China within them. Dr. Al-Taqi emphasized that Chinese foreign policy is built not upon “alliances” in the Western sense, but rather on “strategic partnerships,” which, however, cannot endure without reinforcement through instruments of power and security. Dr. Mukalled highlighted the changing nature of transatlantic relations, noting that the past harmony between the United States and Europe—once constituting a hegemonic pole—has diminished, raising questions about the implications for global alignments. He drew on the Levantine proverb, “Bilād al-Shām gives birth to disputes,” to illustrate how disagreements among major powers have become more pronounced in the current era, unlike in the past when hegemonic trajectories prevailed despite underlying tensions. From his perspective, former President Donald Trump’s central concern has been to postpone the eruption of America’s financial and economic crisis by redistributing its burdens to others. This approach has entailed avoiding costly global wars while shifting economic losses onto allies, much as occurred during the 2008–2010 financial crisis. Consequently, resource constraints and declining capacities have sharpened disputes among allies, with Trump pressing NATO members to increase their defense budgets. He contrasted this with America’s earlier ascendant phase, during which it promoted globalization, free trade, and the movement of people, whereas in its current phase of decline it has imposed financial restrictions, tariffs, and restrictive immigration policies, even toward entire nationalities. He concluded that empires behave differently in ascent and decline, a reality now reflected in the fragmentation of alliances and the narrowing of priorities to immediate interests—a shift also affecting Israel in terms of aid and support. Dr. Jalloul reinforced the view that regional alignments are determined by interests, asserting that China holds a clear comparative advantage. If China maintains a competitive edge in American and Western markets, he argued, this advantage naturally extends to the Middle East, where attempts by the United States to counterbalance China through India or an Emirati–Indian–Gulf–American axis will remain confined to competition, with the balance of power in all likelihood tipping in favor of China. Collectively, these perspectives highlight the interplay between structural decline in U.S. global leadership, the rise of China’s strategic and economic influence, and the reconfiguration of alliances on the basis of pragmatic interests. 8. Discussion in the frame of the theory In light of Geopolitical Risk Theory, it can be argued that the conflict associated with Syria is not, at its core, a struggle over corridors but rather a struggle over the strategic location itself. However, the introduction of the corridor concept into the equation has contributed to deepening geopolitical uncertainty. Although corridors were initially proposed as projects of a commercial and developmental nature, they gradually transformed into one of the manifestations of international rivalry, reshaping geopolitical fault lines and rendering the conflict more visible and intense. Accordingly, corridors can be seen not merely as instruments of economic connectivity but also as mechanisms that reproduce strategic balances, thereby adding further complexity to the Syrian and regional landscape. Experts argue that energy resources in the Middle East constitute the primary driver fueling corridor competition; however, despite its complexities and geopolitical entanglements, this conflict is unlikely to escalate into a full-scale war. While the energy file intensifies regional and international tensions, assessments indicate that such tensions will remain confined within frameworks of strategic and political rivalry, without sliding into conventional military confrontation. Despite the profound transformations currently reshaping the international system, the likelihood of a traditional war in this context remains limited, reflecting the nature of the present conflict as one defined more by complexity and interdependence than by direct confrontation. The experts concur that the current state of geopolitical uncertainty is embodied in the manner through which the international division of labor will be reshaped and redistributed among the major contending powers. However, future manifestations of geopolitical uncertainty may transcend this structural level, potentially materializing in forms of direct or indirect confrontations, thereby reflecting the possibility of competition shifting from its primarily economic and institutional dimensions to more acute strategic and security-oriented levels. In light of the findings of the aforementioned in-depth interviews, it becomes evident that each proposed corridor reflects different strategic orientation. The Belt and Road Initiative is characterized by an economic–developmental dimension, focusing on infrastructure and trade integration, whereas the India–Europe Corridor is fundamentally political–security in nature, reflecting priorities tied to geopolitical alliances and the protection of strategic interests. This divergence in orientations exacerbates the state of geopolitical uncertainty and rivalry, as security and developmental considerations increasingly intersect in shaping the trajectories and outcomes of these corridors. The experts emphasized that the essence of this competition lies in the recognition that economic development cannot be achieved in isolation from a protective security framework, rendering security a necessary condition for the sustainability of cross-border development and infrastructure projects. Current evidence indicates that the shifts in state alignments are not fundamentally driven by the establishment of corridors per se, but rather by the structural nature of conflict within the international system. Corridors, however, have played an organizational role in managing and channeling these conflicts, transforming into axes around which states coalesce. This suggests that the roots of conflict and the state of geopolitical uncertainty have existed since the transition from a unipolar order to the rise of other global powers. Corridor projects have subsequently crowned and intensified this conflict, further dividing states and contributing to the emergence of new alignments. 9.Conclusion and recommendation This paper has examined geopolitical risk in the Middle East within the framework of geopolitical risk theory. To support the analysis, in-depth interviews were conducted with experts in the field. The findings indicate that corridors function as instruments for managing geopolitical risk, and, as a result, new alignments among states have begun to emerge. However, the study also suggests that these alignments are unlikely to escalate into direct military conflict, instead reflecting shifts in strategic partnerships and regional cooperation dynamics. Declarations Acknowledgment There is no funding. There is no conflict of interests. Ethical Approval and Accordance Mr. Xu Yujun engaged in writing the “Global Connectivity： The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study”. The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the [School of Foreign Languages of ethics committee ，Jimei Univetsity/ IRB] under approval number [20251109]. All research procedures were carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines and regulations issued by the committee. Consent to Publish All participants provided informed consent to publish their anonymized responses in this study. No participants were under 18 years of age. Consent to participate All participants provided freely given, informed consent to participate in this study. All participants were adults aged 18 years or older, and no individuals under the age of 16 were involved. Data Availability Statement The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. References Alterman JB. The new geopolitics of the Middle East: America’s role in a changing region. Rowman & Littlefield; 2020. Caldara D, Iacoviello M. Measuring geopolitical risk. Am Econ Rev. 2022;112(4):1194–225. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191823 . Fulton J. (2019). China’s changing role in the Middle East. Atlantic Council Issue Brief. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org Hokayem E. Strategic hedging in the Gulf: The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s balancing act. Int Affairs. 2022;98(3):873–90. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac080 . Khadduri M. Geopolitical dynamics of conflict in the Middle East. Middle East Policy. 2021;28(2):42–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12529 . Luft G. Energy insecurity and the future of geopolitics in the Middle East. J Energy Secur. 2018;10(3):15–28. Blah T. Competing corridors: The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative. J Contemp Asia. 2024;54(2):215–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2023 . Caldara D, Iacoviello M. Measuring geopolitical risk. Am Econ Rev. 2022;112(4):1194–225. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191823 . Fulton J. (2019). China’s changing role in the Middle East. Atlantic Council Issue Brief . Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org Hokayem E. Strategic hedging in the Gulf: The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s balancing act. Int Affairs. 2022;98(3):873–90. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac080 . Wang H. Infrastructure co-opetition: Strategic overlaps in BRI and alternative connectivity frameworks. Global Stud Q. 2022;2(3):1–12. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac035 . Akbulut G. Connecting continents: The proposed IMEC–India. Middle East and European Economic Corridor. DPE. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.org.tr/connecting-continents-the-proposed-imec-india-middle-east-and-european-economic-corridor (2024). Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files floatimage1.png Graphical Abstract Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 05 Feb, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 17 Jan, 2026 Reviews received at journal 17 Jan, 2026 Reviews received at journal 16 Jan, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 14 Jan, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 09 Jan, 2026 Reviews received at journal 20 Dec, 2025 Reviews received at journal 17 Dec, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 13 Dec, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 12 Dec, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 12 Dec, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 26 Nov, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 26 Nov, 2025 First submitted to journal 26 Nov, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7853544","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":560202547,"identity":"452bd9fe-e50d-4345-abf5-b482923bd39a","order_by":0,"name":"Lojain Suliman","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Chongqing university","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Lojain","middleName":"","lastName":"Suliman","suffix":""},{"id":560202548,"identity":"356b90be-581d-4e56-853d-cdf6ae151835","order_by":1,"name":"XU Yujun","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Middle East at Jimei University’s Area \u0026 Country Institute","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"XU","middleName":"","lastName":"Yujun","suffix":""},{"id":560202549,"identity":"196ee789-e3e5-4c79-bd13-85c851fe6afb","order_by":2,"name":"Zhào yuánqí","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"School of Oriental Languages and Literature, Zhejiang Gongshang University, China, Hangzhou","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Zhào","middleName":"","lastName":"yuánqí","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-10-14 03:23:13","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7853544/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7853544/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":98623057,"identity":"dfc6acb4-1d06-46de-b033-a1ca5ae56463","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-19 17:04:20","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":74549,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Article.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/d4c333888591e75581030cef.docx"},{"id":98454580,"identity":"624f0b7c-6f8a-4011-bece-8d0991cf33d4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-17 18:10:28","extension":"json","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":4643,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"322ad831c74443308b7d9dfa0d7d5268.json","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/ac2300cc36309a6775c73721.json"},{"id":98454586,"identity":"8dcfdfe7-f778-494a-a991-5a278d4d3579","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-17 18:10:29","extension":"xml","order_by":2,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":72166,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"322ad831c74443308b7d9dfa0d7d52681enriched.xml","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/37332ba5d84180a75835a4f5.xml"},{"id":98454582,"identity":"9a356e54-6a14-4195-b4e8-54383be94958","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-17 18:10:28","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":13240,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Onlinefloatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/e3658a6e226c550335e5d5a2.png"},{"id":98454584,"identity":"c6839b25-81ee-4b41-948c-19c9f2d289dc","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-17 18:10:29","extension":"xml","order_by":5,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":67575,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"322ad831c74443308b7d9dfa0d7d52681structuring.xml","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/5845c03f5ca836cd4aaf8d8d.xml"},{"id":98454585,"identity":"15df265e-1b21-49ed-b5a7-7bafed457e9a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-17 18:10:29","extension":"html","order_by":6,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":78035,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"earlyproof.html","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/bfcd3ecda80c10d85d4a9daf.html"},{"id":98631600,"identity":"ef226f06-5b8d-4d09-9356-b183bf1eb095","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-19 17:20:13","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":669592,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/ba9ca162-ebfb-4e2d-8a8a-c925551ef40e.pdf"},{"id":98623776,"identity":"b8f5cce6-0793-4db4-bea6-6e806ce2db31","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-19 17:07:33","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":35277,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eGraphical Abstract\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7853544/v1/f204187651665de7330e28c8.png"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Global Connectivity: The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn recent years, global infrastructure development has evolved into a central axis of international competition, reflecting deeper shifts in the geopolitical and economic order. As states and regional blocs seek to consolidate influence and secure long-term development pathways, large-scale infrastructure initiatives have emerged as both instruments of connectivity and tools of strategic positioning. Among these, China\u0026rsquo;s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become the most ambitious and far-reaching program of its kind. Since its launch in 2013, the BRI has extended across Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America, positioning itself not only as a vehicle for transnational integration but also as a model of China\u0026rsquo;s distinctive development approach.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAt the same time, the international environment in which the BRI operates has grown increasingly contested. The rise of competing frameworks, most notably the India\u0026ndash;Middle East\u0026ndash;Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, highlights the extent to which infrastructure is no longer merely a technical or economic undertaking but a deeply political arena. Whereas the BRI reflects China\u0026rsquo;s centralized governance structure, rapid mobilization of resources, and ability to deliver large-scale projects, initiatives such as IMEC are explicitly framed as counterbalances to China\u0026rsquo;s expanding global role. This emerging rivalry underscores the extent to which infrastructure corridors now function as instruments of geopolitical realignment, shaping not only trade flows and energy networks but also the balance of power in the international system.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgainst this backdrop, it becomes essential to examine the dynamics of competition between the BRI and IMEC. Understanding the extent to which China\u0026rsquo;s domestic development model can be replicated abroad, and whether alternative corridors such as IMEC provide viable and sustainable frameworks, is crucial for evaluating the future of global infrastructure governance. This study addresses this critical issue by analyzing the structural, political, and strategic factors that shape the evolution of these competing initiatives, with particular attention to their implications for developing countries caught between rival spheres of influence.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2.Literature review","content":"\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eGeopolitical Risk in the Middle East\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Middle East has long been characterized as one of the world\u0026rsquo;s most geopolitically volatile regions, where structural instability intersects with global competition for energy resources and strategic corridors. Geopolitical Risk Theory highlights how the region\u0026rsquo;s strategic chokepoints\u0026mdash;such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Bab el-Mandeb\u0026mdash;function as critical nodes of international trade and energy supply, making them persistent arenas of global contestation (Caldara \u0026amp; Iacoviello, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The region\u0026rsquo;s geopolitical risks are further amplified by overlapping rivalries: U.S.\u0026ndash;Iranian tensions, Saudi\u0026ndash;Iranian competition, and the increasing involvement of external powers such as Russia and China (Alterman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Khadduri, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecent studies also underscore how energy dependency continues to shape geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East. The reliance of global markets on Gulf oil and gas supplies, combined with regional conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, create systemic risks that extend beyond the region itself (Luft, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, the growing involvement of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the U.S.-backed India\u0026ndash;Middle East\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor (IMEC) reflects how infrastructure corridors have become both instruments of development and arenas of geopolitical competition (Fulton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). This has heightened regional uncertainty, as states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates adopt hedging strategies to maximize autonomy while navigating between competing global powers (Hokayem, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, the literature converges on the argument that the Middle East epitomizes the entanglement of economic, political, and security risks, where global and regional rivalries magnify uncertainty. However, gaps remain in understanding how middle powers in the region employ adaptive strategies to mitigate these risks and shape the evolving geopolitical order.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eThe geopolitical risk and Corridors\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe intensifying competition between China\u0026rsquo;s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India\u0026ndash;Middle East\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor (IMEC) has elevated geopolitical risk as a central dimension of global infrastructure politics. Geopolitical Risk Theory posits that connectivity projects are not only economic ventures but also strategic tools that alter power balances, trade dependencies, and security dynamics (Caldara \u0026amp; Iacoviello, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The BRI, launched in 2013, has expanded China\u0026rsquo;s influence through investments in ports, railways, pipelines, and digital infrastructure, thereby consolidating its structural power in Asia, Africa, and Europe (Fulton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Conversely, IMEC, unveiled at the 2023 G20 Summit, has been explicitly framed as a counterweight to BRI, with the United States, India, and the European Union presenting it as a \u0026ldquo;high-standard\u0026rdquo; alternative aimed at diversifying connectivity routes and reducing dependence on Chinese-led infrastructure (Blah, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe overlap between BRI and IMEC in strategic regions such as the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean underscores the heightened risks of geopolitical friction. Ports like Jeddah, Abu Dhabi, Haifa, and Piraeus have emerged as contested nodes of influence, reflecting the \u0026ldquo;co-opetition\u0026rdquo; dynamic in which cooperation and competition coexist in infrastructure development (Wang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). For Middle Eastern states, this rivalry exacerbates geopolitical uncertainty by compelling them to navigate between competing great-power agendas. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have adopted hedging strategies, simultaneously deepening ties with China through the BRI while endorsing IMEC to maintain alignment with Western partners (Hokayem, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis paper examines geopolitical risk in the Middle East through the lens of the ongoing competition between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor (IMEC). The analysis situates these competing connectivity frameworks within the broader dynamics of regional and global power struggles, highlighting how their divergent logics\u0026mdash;developmental\u0026ndash;economic in the case of BRI and security\u0026ndash;political in the case of IMEC\u0026mdash;shape patterns of cooperation and contestation. All of the aforementioned issues will be explored within the conceptual framework of geopolitical risk theory, thereby providing a systematic assessment of how infrastructure-driven rivalries influence stability, security, and strategic alignments in the Middle East.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3.Problem statement (Beyond the paths)","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn the current era of strategic geopolitical realignment, global infrastructure investment has emerged as a critical arena of international competition. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated in 2013, has rapidly expanded to become the largest transnational infrastructure development program in the world, encompassing over 152 countries and 32 international organizations by 2025. With more than \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1 trillion in cumulative investments and over 2,600 infrastructure projects completed globally, the BRI has not only bolstered connectivity across continents but has also significantly contributed to regional development, particularly within China's historically underdeveloped western regions such as Chongqing, Sichuan, and Xinjiang. Domestically, the BRI has demonstrated a highly successful development model premised on centralized governance, seamless coordination between central and local authorities, rapid resource mobilization, and an absence of internal political fragmentation. Furthermore, the emergence of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), launched during the 2023 G20 Summit and supported by the U.S., India, EU, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, has introduced a strategically motivated alternative to the BRI. IMEC\u0026rsquo;s multi-modal infrastructure plan\u0026mdash;linking Indian ports to Europe via the Gulf, Jordan, and Israel\u0026mdash;promises not only to reduce logistics costs and transit times but also to deepen energy and digital interconnectivity through power grids, fiber optics, and hydrogen pipelines. More importantly, IMEC reflects a broader geopolitical calculus aimed at curbing China\u0026rsquo;s global influence by offering competing states a Western-aligned infrastructure framework. This geopolitical competition places developing countries in a position of strategic ambivalence, often forced to navigate between rival partnerships, and compromises their ability to pursue long-term, coherent development strategies. As a result, infrastructure initiatives risk being instrumentalized as tools of influence rather than platforms for economic transformation. In this context, it becomes crucial to understand the nature of competition between the BRI and IMEC, identify the zones of strategic overlap, and evaluate whether initiatives like IMEC offer sustainable alternatives or merely fragment the global development landscape. This paper examines the competition between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India\u0026ndash;Middle East\u0026ndash;Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing on the Middle East in general and Syria in particular. It also seeks to explore the potential trajectories of the conflict arising from this competition and the consequent shifts in global alignments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs two similar cross-continental infrastructure projects, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-European Economic Corridor not only have a high degree of overlap in geographical space, but also compete in strategic goals, cooperation mechanisms and regional influence. The following will analyze the strategic intersection and competitive interaction between the two initiatives around the dimensions of geographical intersection, project layout, strategic choices of participating countries and development concepts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e3.I. Geographical overlap and path intersection\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe overlap of geographical paths constitutes the basis for the competition and interaction between BRI and IMEC. The BRI initiative promotes the land economic corridor and the Maritime Silk Road in a coordinated manner, building an interconnected network from China to Europe and Africa through Central Asia and South Asia, including extending to the Persian Gulf countries through the \"China-Pakistan Economic Corridor\" and the \"China-Arab Capacity Cooperation Demonstration Park\"; while IMEC plans a channel starting from India, through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and finally reaching Greece and Southern Europe. The two have obvious overlaps in the Middle East and Southern Europe.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn terms of the intersection area, the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea region constitute a strategic intersection hub. As a strategic region connecting the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, the Arabian Peninsula naturally becomes the key competition and cooperation area of the two initiatives. China's cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and other countries, including port construction and energy cooperation, has penetrated into the Arabian Peninsula. The peninsula, as the middle section of IMEC and the junction of land and sea routes, will undoubtedly become the primary strategic intersection. At the same time, the Red Sea runs through Egypt and Saudi Arabia and is one of the busiest maritime trade routes in the world. Most of the energy transportation in the Middle East and trade between Asia and Europe pass through this waterway. BRI has included the Red Sea region as one of the core areas of its Maritime Silk Road, and IMEC is also inseparable from the Red Sea waterway, especially in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Even if IMEC plans to build alternative routes, it will still rely on the Red Sea waterway to maintain connectivity between India and Europe in the short term.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn terms of the specific nodes where the two intersect, the overlapping hubs in the Middle East include Saudi Arabia's Jeddah Port, UAE's Abu Dhabi Port and Fujairah Port, Israel's Haifa Port, Egypt's Suez Canal, etc., and in southern Europe, it is mainly Greece's Piraeus Port. As important trade transit points between China and the Middle East, key ports and transportation hubs such as Jeddah Port, Abu Dhabi Port and Fujairah Port have become important parts of China's \"Belt and Road Initiative\", especially in the transportation of goods between China and the Gulf countries. IMEC plans to strengthen the connectivity of the Eurasian Channel through Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There is no doubt that Jeddah Port, Abu Dhabi Port and Fujairah Port will also become one of the core nodes of the channel. The Greek Port of Piraeus is an important land-sea connection point between China and Europe in the \"Belt and Road Initiative\", especially the investment and operation of China's China Ocean Shipping Company has made it a hub for the southern line of the China-Europe Express. IMEC also pays attention to this port and plans to make it the first entry port in Europe to connect the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is a key shipping node of IMEC. These ports have not only become important nodes of BRI, carrying energy and cargo transportation between China and the Middle East, but will also be included in IMEC's core channel design. This path overlap means that the two sides have a \"co-opetition\" relationship in infrastructure construction, and have formed a substantial competition in geopolitical influence and channel control.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, the very fact that middle powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt serve as overlapping hubs reinforces the strategic hedging dilemma. Their participation in both initiatives may enhances their economic leverage, but it also exposes them to geopolitical pressures from competing great powers. This structural condition exemplifies how infrastructure overlap produces geopolitical risk, not only through the material vulnerability of trade corridors but also through the political contestation over rules, standards, and alignments in the international system.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2. Strategic choices and geopolitical balance of participating countries\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the overlapping areas of BRI and IMEC, most countries have not clearly \"chosen sides\", but have adopted a flexible strategy of \"two-pronged approach\" to maximize their benefits.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSaudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the most typical representatives: on the one hand, they actively participate in the launch of IMEC and establish closer strategic cooperation with the United States and India; on the other hand, they continue to deepen cooperation with China in energy, digital economy, logistics and other fields. Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in both project routes, aiming to build an important logistics and trade center and become a bridge connecting the East and the West. The UAE is also committed to playing an active role in shaping global trade dynamics, focusing on reshaping supply chains and eager to promote participation worldwide (Akbulut, G,2024). Therefore, out of practical considerations of maximizing their own interests and minimizing risks, both countries choose to participate in both projects at the same time. Other countries also mostly adopt bilateral participation strategies. For example, although Israel is an important part of IMEC, it also maintains prudent investment and cooperation with China; while Egypt, Greece, Italy and other countries have carried out balanced diplomacy between IMEC and BRI, trying to attract foreign investment and promote their own development by leveraging the two initiatives.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis \"multilateral optionism\" reflects the realistic orientation of middle-sized countries and geopolitical key countries in the region: they are not passively attached to the game of great powers, but independently seek maximum interests and attach importance to economic returns and strategic autonomy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs a summary, a state\u0026rsquo;s attempt to maintain balance in its relations with major powers can turn into a geopolitical conflict when its balanced policies are interpreted as alignment with rival blocs, or when its efforts to diversify partnerships are seen as undermining the interests of other actors who perceive this as a threat to their influence. In such cases, a country\u0026rsquo;s pursuit of independent decision-making through balancing between competing great powers may trigger suspicion and indirect confrontations, as these powers employ economic, political, or even military pressure to redirect its course. Consequently, a policy of neutrality or balance can transform into a contested arena that reflects the broader struggle over the redistribution of influence in the international order.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3. Differences in project attributes and development concepts\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eChina\u0026rsquo;s approach to international relations is grounded in the principle of economic diversification and the establishment of partnerships based on a win\u0026ndash;win framework, steering clear of competitive dynamics that may weaken states or push them into destructive conflicts. China also places emphasis on the economic dimension of its external relations, deliberately avoiding involvement in domestic political issues or interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries. In contrast, the United States adopts a foreign policy approach centered on alliances and military intervention, leveraging its military superiority. Following such interventions and wars, it often seeks to open markets in line with the principles of economic liberalism.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis divergence in conceptual approaches may lead to the emergence of an indirect geopolitical conflict, whose features initially appear ambiguous but gradually become more evident once strategic corridors transform into key instruments of contention. In the context of competition over influence and resources, these corridors serve as focal points that expose the underlying divergence in visions among major powers, ultimately becoming central arenas of geopolitical rivalry. This dynamic reflects the interplay between the economic and security dimensions in shaping the contours of the international order.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. The proposed theory","content":"\u003cp\u003eGeopolitical Risk Theory posits that political crises, armed conflicts, and diplomatic tensions generate heightened levels of uncertainty, commonly referred to as \u0026ldquo;geopolitical risks,\u0026rdquo; which exert profound effects on economic and financial systems. Elevated geopolitical risk often results in the postponement or reduction of investment activities, the reconfiguration of global supply chains to mitigate exposure to unstable regions, and an increase in financing costs stemming from higher risk premiums demanded by lenders and investors. The conceptualization and empirical measurement of this phenomenon have been advanced by Caldara and Iacoviello (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), who developed the Geopolitical Risk Index (GPR Index) as a systematic tool to quantify fluctuations in geopolitical risk and to assess its implications for global economic stability and strategic decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"5. Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe in-depth interview methodology was employed in this research to capture nuanced expert perspectives on the evolving dynamics of global power competition and the strategic role of the Middle East within it. This qualitative approach allowed for a flexible yet structured dialogue with selected experts, enabling them to elaborate on their insights, experiences, and interpretations beyond the constraints of standardized survey instruments. Semi-structured interview guides were designed to ensure thematic consistency across discussions while allowing participants the freedom to expand on issues of particular relevance to their expertise. Each interview was conducted with the objective of eliciting detailed, context-rich responses that reveal underlying assumptions, strategic considerations, and interpretive frameworks often absent from quantitative data. The method thus provided an opportunity to explore not only what experts think, but also how they construct their arguments and situate them within broader geopolitical debates. Through this approach, the study was able to generate a layered understanding of the subject matter, grounded in both empirical observations and expert judgment. In this paper, three in-depth-interviews have been conducted with three experts in order to answer the following question:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what extent can it be argued that the root of the ongoing conflict in Syria is fundamentally a struggle over U.S.\u0026ndash;China corridors? And if we extend this very question to the broader Middle East, would the same logic apply?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eWho regulates or orchestrates the competition between these corridors? Is a long-term U.S.\u0026ndash;China agreement the only viable solution?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eSome studies have suggested that the India\u0026ndash;Middle East\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor is primarily a security-political project designed to consolidate U.S. interests, whereas the Belt and Road Initiative is characterized by a developmental and economic orientation. To what degree is this claim accurate, and to what extent does each corridor reflect the underlying logic and worldview of the states that promote them? Is this primarily a clash of ideologies, or rather a struggle over interests?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, will these corridors ultimately result in a reconfiguration of global alignments?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe experts are:\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;(1). Names of Experts Participating in the In-Depth Interviews\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Taba\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eName\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePosition\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Samir Al-taqi\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eResearcher at the Middle East Institute in Washington\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Hassan Mukalled\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExpert in economic and politics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Faysal Jalloul\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eResearcher in international relation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"6.Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.1 The Struggle over Syria\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe preceding text reflects the findings of in-depth interviews conducted with three experts\u0026mdash;Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul\u0026mdash;who provided comprehensive insights into the geopolitical and strategic significance of Syria within the contemporary international system. Dr. Al-Taqi highlighted Syria\u0026rsquo;s emergence as a contested arena for competing global powers, emphasizing Russia\u0026rsquo;s strategic initiative aimed at repositioning Turkey outside the Western alliance system, particularly NATO and the European Union, by transforming it into an energy hub through the port of Ceyhan. He argued that the outbreak of the Russian\u0026ndash;Ukrainian conflict undermined this plan, compelling Europe to reduce reliance on Russian energy. For him, competition over maritime corridors and global trade routes remains primarily strategic\u0026ndash;economic, as reflected in initiatives like the \u0026ldquo;Spice Route\u0026rdquo; and the \u0026ldquo;Silk Road,\u0026rdquo; while developments such as the Armenian\u0026ndash;Azerbaijani corridor illustrate Moscow\u0026rsquo;s declining regional role. He concluded that the primary axis of rivalry lies in the United States\u0026ndash;China dyad, though without amounting to an existential confrontation. Dr. Mukalled, in turn, underscored Syria\u0026rsquo;s exceptional strategic importance, rooted in its geographic position between East and West and its role as a hub for gas pipelines, with Homs serving as a central node\u0026mdash;an element he identified as a key driver of the 2011 crisis. He traced Syria\u0026rsquo;s historic importance to Aleppo and Damascus on the Silk Road and examined alternative projects such as the \u0026ldquo;Indian Corridor\u0026rdquo; and the \u0026ldquo;David Corridor,\u0026rdquo; along with renewed possibilities for a Syrian\u0026ndash;Turkish or maritime route to Europe. He further situated these dynamics within the broader competition between China\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;Belt and Road\u0026rdquo; Initiative and the \u0026ldquo;India\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor,\u0026rdquo; noting India\u0026rsquo;s shifting stance toward greater openness to China, as revealed during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. According to his view, despite the appearance of American\u0026ndash;Israeli victories, neither the United States\u0026mdash;due to structural crises\u0026mdash;nor Israel\u0026mdash;due to internal fragility\u0026mdash;has been able to translate these into lasting strategic advantages. Finally, Dr. Jalloul emphasized that although competition over transit routes has influenced the Syrian conflict, the war transcends this dimension, being deeply connected to the Arab\u0026ndash;Israeli conflict, NATO\u0026ndash;Russia rivalry, and broader regional geopolitics. He argued that U.S. efforts to mobilize India as a counterbalance to China remain ineffective, as India\u0026rsquo;s economic scale is minor compared to China\u0026rsquo;s, whose competitive capacity ensures that no single actor can monopolize the open global market. Collectively, the three experts\u0026rsquo; perspectives affirm Syria\u0026rsquo;s centrality in international rivalries, shaped by overlapping economic, strategic, and geopolitical dimensions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.2 Struggle over the middle east\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe preceding text presents the results of in-depth interviews conducted with three experts\u0026mdash;Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul\u0026mdash;who offered complementary perspectives on the shifting dynamics of global and regional power structures, with particular emphasis on the Middle East. Dr. Al-Taqi highlighted the United States\u0026rsquo; gradual retreat from some of its traditional roles, such as safeguarding maritime navigation routes that do not directly affect its interests, illustrated by its hesitant response to attacks from Yemen and its withdrawal from Somalia. He argued that Washington is signaling to the international community that such routes are no longer strategic priorities, given their minimal relevance to U.S. trade. Despite retaining the most powerful navy globally, the United States has shifted its orientation away from preserving maritime prestige toward consolidating a strategic\u0026ndash;economic sphere centered on technological and military advancement. Within this context, he observed Europe\u0026rsquo;s renewed interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, driven by new rivalries and, more recently, by the repercussions of the Ukraine war, which refocused Western attention on securing energy routes. He further noted a reversion to reliance on conventional energy sources, reinforcing the strategic centrality of the Gulf states and restoring the Middle East\u0026rsquo;s importance in shaping international balances.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Mukalled, by contrast, underscored the divergent trajectories unfolding in Europe, the Gulf, and the broader global arena. He pointed to Europe\u0026rsquo;s economic decline, reflected in contraction in Germany and fiscal crises in France, Italy, and Spain, which collectively diminish Europe\u0026rsquo;s capacity to present itself as a major power. In the Gulf, he emphasized the economic shift toward China, citing trade figures and investment flows that far surpass those with the United States. This has created a \u0026ldquo;disjunction\u0026rdquo; between political structures still tied to Washington and economic realities increasingly oriented toward Beijing, Moscow, and emerging platforms such as BRICS. On the global scale, he noted that China has become the leading trading partner of 149 countries, illustrating the failure of U.S. measures to curb its rise. At the same time, the United States lacks the capacity to wage large-scale wars that could alter these trends, while cross-border transport and energy projects are rapidly expanding across Asia, in contrast to the slower pace of change in the Gulf and Levant. For him, the world is in a profound but unresolved transitional phase, characterized by contradictions and accumulations without a definitive outcome.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Jalloul, in turn, emphasized that Sino\u0026ndash;American relations cannot be described as a traditional conflict leading toward armed confrontation, as such an outcome would imply world war, which neither Washington nor Beijing can accept. Regarding the Middle East, he contended that, despite its importance, the region is unlikely to serve as a trigger for global war. Instead, China enjoys advantages over the United States in economic influence, market penetration, and balanced relations with regional powers, including Israel, the largest importer of Chinese goods. He noted that China\u0026rsquo;s regional strategy is centered on promoting stability and peaceful solutions rather than instigating conflict. Although competition is evident, cases of military coexistence, such as in Djibouti where Chinese, American, French, and other bases operate side by side, demonstrate that rivalry remains within a competitive framework rather than escalating into direct confrontation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, these perspectives underscore the enduring strategic significance of the Middle East within shifting global power dynamics, the relative decline of Europe and the United States, and the growing economic and geopolitical leverage of China, all within a competitive yet non-confrontational framework.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.3 Conflict Management\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe foregoing text presents the insights of three experts\u0026mdash;Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul\u0026mdash;derived from in-depth interviews conducted for academic research, each addressing different dimensions of the evolving Sino\u0026ndash;American rivalry and its global implications. Dr. Al-Taqi underscored that China\u0026rsquo;s strategy revolves around establishing \u0026ldquo;economic capsules\u0026rdquo; that intersect, compete, and overlap without necessarily being constrained by zero-sum dynamics. In his view, this approach may foster a form of international division of labor in which competition and cooperation coexist simultaneously. Dr. Mukalled expanded on the long-term nature of the Sino\u0026ndash;American rivalry, contending that its essence lies not only in economic or military superiority but more fundamentally in how the competition is managed and ultimately resolved. He argued that the Trump administration introduced a new paradigm premised on the belief that technological supremacy could serve as a decisive \u0026ldquo;magic wand,\u0026rdquo; enabling Washington to impose its conditions on the international system through tariffs and coercive economic measures rather than direct military force. However, practical outcomes exposed the limitations of this approach: China demonstrated technological readiness sufficient to challenge U.S. superiority and to provide more efficient, cost-effective alternatives. Whereas Washington estimated the cost of certain technological projects at one trillion dollars, Beijing presented practical alternatives costing no more than 12\u0026nbsp;million dollars. This revealed a structural flaw in U.S. strategic assumptions, showing that technological primacy was not an unassailable tool of hegemony, but rather one subject to competition. On the economic and commercial front, he noted that the balance currently tilts toward the axis led by China, though Beijing refrains from overtly positioning itself as the leader of this bloc. Nevertheless, the management of disputes among great powers is unlikely without further demonstrations of strength and direct or indirect confrontations, whether in geopolitical arenas such as Ukraine and Taiwan or in strategic sectors such as technology and defense. He cited the superiority of certain Chinese weapons systems deployed by Pakistan against India as evidence of the competition\u0026rsquo;s expansion into increasingly complex domains. From this perspective, the United States appears unwilling to accept the current state of affairs, while the opposing side will not concede without achieving further gains. Thus, the trajectory of this rivalry remains protracted and unresolved. He further emphasized that the \u0026ldquo;India\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor\u0026rdquo; represents, at its core, a security\u0026ndash;political project aimed at consolidating American interests, whereas China\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;Belt and Road Initiative\u0026rdquo; is fundamentally an economic\u0026ndash;developmental project focused on infrastructure and trade integration. Each corridor, therefore, reflects the distinct strategic rationale of its proponent. Finally, Dr. Jalloul concluded that competition remains the decisive factor, and that it is likely China will emerge as the winning party without the rivalry escalating into an open conflict with India over the Belt and Road Initiative or the so-called Indian route. Collectively, these perspectives highlight the multidimensional nature of global competition, its varied manifestations across economic, technological, and geopolitical arenas, and the enduring significance of China\u0026rsquo;s strategic posture within it.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.4 Infrastructure, Power, and Ideology: The Belt and Road Initiative versus the India\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe preceding text synthesizes the results of in-depth interviews conducted with three experts\u0026mdash;Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul\u0026mdash;each of whom provided critical perspectives on the evolving dynamics of global competition and the strategic role of China within it. Dr. Al-Taqi emphasized that contemporary attempts to construct new \u0026ldquo;Silk Roads,\u0026rdquo; both by land and sea, resemble a thread extending from China to London, with multiple actors, including Russia and Saudi Arabia, attempting to redirect its course while insisting that it pass through Syria. He highlighted the significance of local factors\u0026mdash;stability, alliances, and political signaling\u0026mdash;in shaping these routes, pointing to the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as an illustration of how instability derailed plans for an energy corridor from Central Asia, ultimately leaving unresolved challenges for others to address. He underscored the inseparability of security and development, noting that projects such as the \u0026ldquo;India\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor\u0026rdquo; are primarily security\u0026ndash;political in nature, while the \u0026ldquo;Silk Road\u0026rdquo; is presented as an economic\u0026ndash;developmental initiative, yet both require protective mechanisms in the form of military power or security alliances. He argued that China\u0026rsquo;s reliance on \u0026ldquo;strategic partnerships\u0026rdquo; rather than alliances in the Western sense may prove insufficient unless reinforced by instruments of power and security, recalling the failure of COMECON as a cautionary precedent.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Mukalled situated the discussion within a broader historical trajectory, tracing U.S. dominance from 1945 through the post-Cold War period, when it emerged as the sole superpower, to its subsequent decline in productive capacity and growing reliance on financial instruments and coercive power through sanctions. He contrasted this trajectory with China\u0026rsquo;s rise, rooted in its productive economy and global trade network, which now positions it as the leading trading partner for 149 countries. For him, this divergence suggests that the United States represents a \u0026ldquo;waning empire,\u0026rdquo; while China embodies a rising power based on production, trade, and sustained growth. He illustrated this shift through the contrast between U.S. and Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia, noting that the latter far surpass the former. Yet he also raised the critical question of whether China can continue to restrict itself to the economic sphere. He observed that U.S. pressures have accelerated Beijing\u0026rsquo;s entry into political and security domains, evidenced by its frequent use of the veto in the UN Security Council, its alignment with Russia, and major agreements with Iran, all aimed at safeguarding its expanding global interests. China\u0026rsquo;s recent military parade and accompanying political discourse, he argued, mark a turning point toward a more assertive political and military presence on the world stage.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDr. Jalloul, meanwhile, argued that regional alignments will ultimately be determined by interests, with China holding a clear advantage over other actors. He noted that China\u0026rsquo;s competitive edge in American and Western markets naturally extends to the Middle East, and that attempts by the United States to counterbalance this advantage through India or via an Emirati\u0026ndash;Indian\u0026ndash;Gulf\u0026ndash;American axis will remain within a competitive framework. Nonetheless, he concluded that the balance of power in this arena is most likely to tip in favor of China. Taken together, these perspectives underscore the interdependence of security and development, the relative decline of American influence, the consolidation of China\u0026rsquo;s global economic leadership, and the likelihood that competition, rather than direct confrontation, will remain the dominant mode of interaction shaping both regional and global orders.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.5 Shifting Global Alignments\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe preceding text encapsulates the findings of in-depth interviews with three experts\u0026mdash;Dr. Samir Al-Taqi, Dr. Hassan Mukalled, and Dr. Faysal Jalloul\u0026mdash;each offering critical perspectives on shifting global alignments and the evolving role of China within them. Dr. Al-Taqi emphasized that Chinese foreign policy is built not upon \u0026ldquo;alliances\u0026rdquo; in the Western sense, but rather on \u0026ldquo;strategic partnerships,\u0026rdquo; which, however, cannot endure without reinforcement through instruments of power and security. Dr. Mukalled highlighted the changing nature of transatlantic relations, noting that the past harmony between the United States and Europe\u0026mdash;once constituting a hegemonic pole\u0026mdash;has diminished, raising questions about the implications for global alignments. He drew on the Levantine proverb, \u0026ldquo;Bilād al-Shām gives birth to disputes,\u0026rdquo; to illustrate how disagreements among major powers have become more pronounced in the current era, unlike in the past when hegemonic trajectories prevailed despite underlying tensions. From his perspective, former President Donald Trump\u0026rsquo;s central concern has been to postpone the eruption of America\u0026rsquo;s financial and economic crisis by redistributing its burdens to others. This approach has entailed avoiding costly global wars while shifting economic losses onto allies, much as occurred during the 2008\u0026ndash;2010 financial crisis. Consequently, resource constraints and declining capacities have sharpened disputes among allies, with Trump pressing NATO members to increase their defense budgets. He contrasted this with America\u0026rsquo;s earlier ascendant phase, during which it promoted globalization, free trade, and the movement of people, whereas in its current phase of decline it has imposed financial restrictions, tariffs, and restrictive immigration policies, even toward entire nationalities. He concluded that empires behave differently in ascent and decline, a reality now reflected in the fragmentation of alliances and the narrowing of priorities to immediate interests\u0026mdash;a shift also affecting Israel in terms of aid and support. Dr. Jalloul reinforced the view that regional alignments are determined by interests, asserting that China holds a clear comparative advantage. If China maintains a competitive edge in American and Western markets, he argued, this advantage naturally extends to the Middle East, where attempts by the United States to counterbalance China through India or an Emirati\u0026ndash;Indian\u0026ndash;Gulf\u0026ndash;American axis will remain confined to competition, with the balance of power in all likelihood tipping in favor of China. Collectively, these perspectives highlight the interplay between structural decline in U.S. global leadership, the rise of China\u0026rsquo;s strategic and economic influence, and the reconfiguration of alliances on the basis of pragmatic interests.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"8. Discussion in the frame of the theory","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn light of Geopolitical Risk Theory, it can be argued that the conflict associated with Syria is not, at its core, a struggle over corridors but rather a struggle over the strategic location itself. However, the introduction of the corridor concept into the equation has contributed to deepening geopolitical uncertainty. Although corridors were initially proposed as projects of a commercial and developmental nature, they gradually transformed into one of the manifestations of international rivalry, reshaping geopolitical fault lines and rendering the conflict more visible and intense. Accordingly, corridors can be seen not merely as instruments of economic connectivity but also as mechanisms that reproduce strategic balances, thereby adding further complexity to the Syrian and regional landscape.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExperts argue that energy resources in the Middle East constitute the primary driver fueling corridor competition; however, despite its complexities and geopolitical entanglements, this conflict is unlikely to escalate into a full-scale war. While the energy file intensifies regional and international tensions, assessments indicate that such tensions will remain confined within frameworks of strategic and political rivalry, without sliding into conventional military confrontation. Despite the profound transformations currently reshaping the international system, the likelihood of a traditional war in this context remains limited, reflecting the nature of the present conflict as one defined more by complexity and interdependence than by direct confrontation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe experts concur that the current state of geopolitical uncertainty is embodied in the manner through which the international division of labor will be reshaped and redistributed among the major contending powers. However, future manifestations of geopolitical uncertainty may transcend this structural level, potentially materializing in forms of direct or indirect confrontations, thereby reflecting the possibility of competition shifting from its primarily economic and institutional dimensions to more acute strategic and security-oriented levels.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn light of the findings of the aforementioned in-depth interviews, it becomes evident that each proposed corridor reflects different strategic orientation. The Belt and Road Initiative is characterized by an economic\u0026ndash;developmental dimension, focusing on infrastructure and trade integration, whereas the India\u0026ndash;Europe Corridor is fundamentally political\u0026ndash;security in nature, reflecting priorities tied to geopolitical alliances and the protection of strategic interests. This divergence in orientations exacerbates the state of geopolitical uncertainty and rivalry, as security and developmental considerations increasingly intersect in shaping the trajectories and outcomes of these corridors. The experts emphasized that the essence of this competition lies in the recognition that economic development cannot be achieved in isolation from a protective security framework, rendering security a necessary condition for the sustainability of cross-border development and infrastructure projects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCurrent evidence indicates that the shifts in state alignments are not fundamentally driven by the establishment of corridors per se, but rather by the structural nature of conflict within the international system. Corridors, however, have played an organizational role in managing and channeling these conflicts, transforming into axes around which states coalesce. This suggests that the roots of conflict and the state of geopolitical uncertainty have existed since the transition from a unipolar order to the rise of other global powers. Corridor projects have subsequently crowned and intensified this conflict, further dividing states and contributing to the emergence of new alignments.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"9.Conclusion and recommendation","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper has examined geopolitical risk in the Middle East within the framework of geopolitical risk theory. To support the analysis, in-depth interviews were conducted with experts in the field. The findings indicate that corridors function as instruments for managing geopolitical risk, and, as a result, new alignments among states have begun to emerge. However, the study also suggests that these alignments are unlikely to escalate into direct military conflict, instead reflecting shifts in strategic partnerships and regional cooperation dynamics.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAcknowledgment\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no funding. There is no conflict of interests.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical Approval and Accordance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cbr\u003eMr. Xu Yujun engaged in writing the \u0026ldquo;Global Connectivity：\u0026nbsp;The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study\u0026rdquo;. The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the [School of Foreign Languages of ethics committee\u0026nbsp;，Jimei Univetsity/ IRB] under approval number [20251109]. All research procedures were carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines and regulations issued by the committee.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to Publish\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll participants provided informed consent to publish their anonymized responses in this study. No participants were under 18 years of age.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to participate\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll participants provided freely given, informed consent to participate in this study. All participants were adults aged 18 years or older, and no individuals under the age of 16 were involved.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlterman JB. The new geopolitics of the Middle East: America\u0026rsquo;s role in a changing region. Rowman \u0026amp; Littlefield; 2020.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCaldara D, Iacoviello M. Measuring geopolitical risk. Am Econ Rev. 2022;112(4):1194\u0026ndash;225. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191823\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1257/aer.20191823\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFulton J. (2019). China\u0026rsquo;s changing role in the Middle East. Atlantic Council Issue Brief. Atlantic Council. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://www.atlanticcouncil.org\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHokayem E. Strategic hedging in the Gulf: The UAE and Saudi Arabia\u0026rsquo;s balancing act. Int Affairs. 2022;98(3):873\u0026ndash;90. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac080\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1093/ia/iiac080\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eKhadduri M. Geopolitical dynamics of conflict in the Middle East. Middle East Policy. 2021;28(2):42\u0026ndash;57. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12529\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1111/mepo.12529\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLuft G. Energy insecurity and the future of geopolitics in the Middle East. J Energy Secur. 2018;10(3):15\u0026ndash;28.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBlah T. Competing corridors: The India\u0026ndash;Middle East\u0026ndash;Europe Economic Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative. J Contemp Asia. 2024;54(2):215\u0026ndash;33. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2023\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1080/00472336.2023\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCaldara D, Iacoviello M. Measuring geopolitical risk. Am Econ Rev. 2022;112(4):1194\u0026ndash;225. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191823\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1257/aer.20191823\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFulton J. (2019). China\u0026rsquo;s changing role in the Middle East. \u003cem\u003eAtlantic Council Issue Brief\u003c/em\u003e. Atlantic Council. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://www.atlanticcouncil.org\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHokayem E. Strategic hedging in the Gulf: The UAE and Saudi Arabia\u0026rsquo;s balancing act. Int Affairs. 2022;98(3):873\u0026ndash;90. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac080\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1093/ia/iiac080\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWang H. Infrastructure co-opetition: Strategic overlaps in BRI and alternative connectivity frameworks. Global Stud Q. 2022;2(3):1\u0026ndash;12. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac035\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1093/isagsq/ksac035\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAkbulut G. Connecting continents: The proposed IMEC\u0026ndash;India. Middle East and European Economic Corridor. DPE. Retrieved from \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://foreignpolicy.org.tr/connecting-continents-the-proposed-imec-india-middle-east-and-european-economic-corridor\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://foreignpolicy.org.tr/connecting-continents-the-proposed-imec-india-middle-east-and-european-economic-corridor\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (2024).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-global-society","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Global Society](https://www.springer.com/journal/44282)","snPcode":"44282","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/44282/3","title":"Discover Global Society","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Belt and Road, Indo-Europe corridor, Syria, Middle east","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7853544/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7853544/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eAmid contemporary shifts in global power relations, investment in large-scale connectivity networks has become a decisive instrument of geopolitical rivalry. Since its launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved into the most extensive cross-border infrastructure program worldwide, integrating over 150 states and numerous international organizations, while domestically reinforcing China’s westward development model through centralized planning and coordinated implementation. In contrast, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled during the 2023 G20 Summit with strong backing from the United States, India, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, proposes a multi-modal transport and energy system linking South Asia to Europe via the Gulf and the Levant. Whereas the BRI projects are primarily framed as development-driven, IMEC carries a more overtly strategic orientation designed to balance Beijing’s growing influence. This article analyzes the interaction between these two competing frameworks with particular emphasis on the Middle East, and Syria as a focal case. The results show that even Syria is very important for the corridors. However, there are many factors which play role in the corridors conflict.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Global Connectivity: The Interaction of BRI and IMEC in the Middle East with Syria as a Case Study","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-12-17 18:10:24","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7853544/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-02-05T05:01:18+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"309819155253532624087033680083418776402","date":"2026-01-17T18:07:01+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-01-17T14:50:18+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-01-16T11:43:43+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"60170161927902109091753128569621128986","date":"2026-01-14T17:34:49+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"293156850894899801387030298180980885010","date":"2026-01-10T00:20:57+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-12-20T13:45:13+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-12-17T20:13:16+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"274547192041170132950140298357989048004","date":"2025-12-13T20:06:12+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"118767767984468749340400712457732990457","date":"2025-12-12T11:48:50+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-12-12T11:36:31+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-11-26T15:54:53+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-11-26T07:10:37+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Discover Global Society","date":"2025-11-26T06:57:43+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-global-society","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Global Society](https://www.springer.com/journal/44282)","snPcode":"44282","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/44282/3","title":"Discover Global Society","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"07f1cde8-404b-46af-8c0d-8a9f9f2b7daa","owner":[],"postedDate":"December 17th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-08T16:15:18+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-12-17 18:10:24","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7853544","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7853544","identity":"rs-7853544","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}