Gendered Protest in Europe: EU Norm Diffusion, Conservative Backlash, and Attitudinal Hybridization

Gendered Protest in Europe: EU Norm Diffusion, Conservative Backlash, and Attitudinal Hybridization | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Gendered Protest in Europe: EU Norm Diffusion, Conservative Backlash, and Attitudinal Hybridization Olga Lavrinenko This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7829158/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 9 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The paper examines how EU gender equality norm diffusion, conservative counter-mobilization, and multidimensional gender role attitudes influence gendered protest participation across Europe and neighboring states. It advances two hypotheses. The Backlash Amplification Hypothesis expects that EU-driven equality norms correspond to narrower gender gaps where conservative mobilization is weak and to wider gaps where it is strong. The Hybridization Hypothesis posits that hybrid attitudinal profiles, combining egalitarian and traditional orientations, gain political relevance in contexts of intense conservative counter-mobilization and high EU norms diffusion. The harmonized data includes the last three waves of the European Values Study and Varieties of Democracy indicators. Latent class analysis is used to model gender-role attitudes and multinomial logistic regressions with cross-level interactions to estimate protest participation. The results provide partial support for both hypotheses. They indicate that gender gaps in protest participation narrow under weak conservative counter-mobilization but widen when conservative movements are strong. Hybrid attitudinal profiles are relevant mainly for low- and mixed-effort protest, where their responsiveness to conservative counter-mobilization becomes visible. The paper contributes to comparative debates on Europeanization and conservative backlash by demonstrating how relations between transnational norms, domestic conservative counter-mobilization, and multidimensional gender-role attitudes influence the gender gaps in protest participation. Europeanization EU-norm diffusion protest gender gender-role attitudes Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Introduction The European Union positions gender equality as a core value and has developed a broad acquis of directives, legal frameworks, and funding instruments to advance it (Jacquot, 2015 ; European Commission, 2025 ; EIGE, 2023). During their EU accession processes, candidate countries adopt major gender equality reforms aligned with EU standards, especially in employment and anti-discrimination frameworks (Krizsán and Roggeband, 2018 ; de Silva and Tepliakova, 2024 ; Roggeband and Krizsán, 2018 ). At the same time, family law, covering marriage, divorce, and parental responsibilities, remains outside the EU’s substantive competence and is firmly within national competence (Boele-Woelki, 2005 ; Öberg and Tryfonidou, 2024 ). The legal boundary also had a noticeable impact on the individual gender-role attitudes. If public-sphere equality was formally advanced through Europeanization, norms governing the private sphere of family and caregiving were left largely intact (Kantola, 2010 ; Jacquot, 2015 ; Krizsán and Roggeband, 2018 ). The advancement of EU-driven gender equality in the public sphere with nationally preserved family law contributed to the segmentation of individual gender-role attitudes. As a result, support for women’s employment and political participation often coexists with persistent private-sphere traditionalism (Grunow and Begall, 2019; Nennstiel and Hudde, 2025 ). Conservative actors portrayed gender equality and LGBTQ + rights as foreign impositions that endanger national traditions and sovereignty (Paternotte and Kuhar, 2017 ; Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Korolczuk and Graff, 2018 ). They intensified the tensions between European norms diffusion and conservative resistance by mobilizing people against so-called “gender ideology.” As a result, gender became one of the most visible lines of political conflict in contemporary Europe: while progressive actors invoke EU frameworks to push reforms, conservative movements portray them as cultural threats (Verloo, 2018). Policies once considered technical, such as childcare provision or sex education, became highly contentious, causing parliamentary stand-offs and mass street protests (Kantola et al., 2021; Szelewa, 2019 ). The contradictions between progressive and conservative actors led to the differentiation of the protest topics and repertoires between women and men. Women frequently mobilize when private-sphere rights such as reproductive autonomy or childcare provisions are threatened (Korolczuk, 2016 ; Roth, 2007 ; Farris and Marchetti, 2017 ), while men are more visible in conservative mobilizations defending the “traditional family,” turning the family domain into a central site of political contestation (Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017 ; Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ). Central and Eastern Europe illustrates how such conflicts build on older legacies. State socialism brought women into the labor market but left household norms largely untouched, producing an incomplete transformation of the private sphere (Einhorn, 1993 ; Gal and Kligman, 2000 ). Today, studies show strong support for women’s equality in work and politics but also widespread private-sphere traditionalism and enduring essentialist assumptions about “natural” gender roles (Saxonberg, 2014 ; Grunow and Begall, 2019). These segmented orientations matter politically: egalitarian commitments can drive women into public protest, while essentialist views blunt support for institutional reforms such as quotas or shared parental leave (Krizsán and Roggeband, 2018 ). Explanation of the observed relationships calls for a multidimensional view of gender-role attitudes. Research increasingly distinguishes three dimensions of gender-role attitudes: views on women’s roles in the public sphere (education, work, politics); norms governing the private sphere (caregiving, household labor, family authority); and essentialist beliefs about innate gender differences (Davis, 2016 ; Grunow et al., 2018 ; Lappegård et al., 2021 ). Many individuals hold ambivalent or hybrid profiles, i.e., supporting equality in public life while maintaining traditional or essentialist beliefs about the family gender roles. Taken together, these observations suggest that gendered political participation in Europe is conditioned by three interlocking forces: (1) the diffusion of EU gender equality norms, (2) the national conservative-populist backlash they provoke, and (3) the individual multidimensional character of gender-role attitudes. The gendered participation gaps arise not because women are disengaged, but because the forces at play create different motivational climates for men and women. Against this background, two hypotheses guide the analysis. Hypothesis 1. Backlash Amplification Hypothesis. The diffusion of EU gender-equality norms has heterogeneous effects on gender gaps in protest participation: in contexts of strong conservative counter-mobilization, these norms amplify gender gaps; in contexts of moderate counter-mobilization, they sustain existing gaps; and in contexts of weak counter-mobilization, they narrow gaps. H2: Hybridization Hypothesis. The EU norms diffusion strengthens the effects of hybrid attitudinal profiles on gender gaps in protest participation, which become especially consequential under conditions of conservative counter-mobilization. Empirically, the study draws on the last three waves of the European Values Study (1999, 2008, and 2017/2018) combined with country-level indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project, covering more than 160,000 respondents across 45 European and neighboring states. Gender-role attitudes are measured using latent class analysis (LCA), which distinguishes between five attitudinal profiles. To examine how these orientations interact with broader political environments, I estimate multinomial logistic regression models of protest participation that incorporate cross-level interactions. Specifically, the models test whether the diffusion of EU gender-equality norms and the strength of conservative counter-mobilization condition gender gaps in protest activism (Hypothesis 1) and whether these dynamics vary across attitudinal profiles (Hypothesis 2). The results provide partial support for the Backlash Amplification Hypothesis, showing that EU norms narrow gender gaps under weak conservative mobilization, sustain them under moderate mobilization, and widen them under strong mobilization, but most clearly only in low-effort protest. They also lend selective support to the Hybridization Hypothesis: hybrid ideological profiles matter in low- and mixed-effort protest, where their responsiveness to conservative mobilization is conditioned by the diffusion of EU norms, while effects are weak or absent in abstention and high-effort protest. Theoretical Framework EU Norm Diffusion and Conservative-Populist Backlash Scholars note that top-down Europeanization significantly influenced post-communist states, many of which had to “catch up” with EU standards on issues like workplace equality and parental leave (Bego, 2015 ; Krizsán and Roggeband, 2021 ; Saxonberg and Sirovátka, 2010 ; Sedelmeier, 2014 ). For example, Hungary and Poland ratified the Istanbul Convention on violence against women partly under international pressure and as a signal of “European” orientation, even amid domestic opposition (Gwiazda and Minkova, 2024; Krizsán and Roggeband, 2021 ). While Europeanization has articulated shared standards for gender equality, in practice Central and Eastern Europe, particularly non-EU member neighboring states, continues to display more gender-inequitable outcomes and, arguably, more traditionalist norms than Western or Nordic Europe (Krizsán, 2014; Lombardo and Forest, 2015 ). At the same time, EU influence has supplied discursive and financial resources to domestic gender-equality advocates, from women’s NGOs to liberal political parties, who draw on European norms to promote policy change (for instance, through EU Equal Pay Day campaigns or compliance with EU directives on workplace gender discrimination) (Isailović, 2024 ; Martinsen, 2007 ). In response to these changes, a strong counter-movement has formed in parts of Central-East Europe, presenting gender equality (together with LGBTQ + rights and sexual education) as an alien ideology that threatens the country (Grzebalska and Pető, 2018 ; Kováts and Pető, 2017 ; Verloo, 2018). The phenomenon is widely referred to as mobilization against so-called “gender ideology,” a polemical umbrella term that ultraconservatives use to delegitimize feminist and LGBTQ + gains (Krizsán and Roggeband, 2021 ; Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017 ). In the Central European context, scholars describe it as a “gender counter-revolution,” characterized by transnational networks of conservative NGOs and church organizations that disseminate anti-feminist discourse and legislative initiatives (Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Kováts, 2018 ; Paternotte and Kuhar, 2017 ). The conflict between these two forces, EU-driven liberalization and conservative populist retrenchment, means that gender became a highly salient political cleavage in Central-East Europe and neighboring states (Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017 ). Far from being a niche or “soft” issue, it is entangled with questions of national identity, religion, and democratic values. We observe these issues in political discourse. Conservatives mobilize their supporters, referring to safeguarding the “traditional family” and depicting Brussels as the source of “corrupting” gender and sexuality norms (Kováts, 2018 ; Mejstřík and Handl, 2021 ; Pető, 2021 ). In turn, progressive and feminist organizations invoke European human rights frameworks to justify demands for women’s and minority rights (Krizsán and Roggeband, 2021 ; Roth, 2007 ). Consequently, even measures like preschool childcare reform or sex education become flashpoints for acrimonious debates in parliament and large-scale demonstrations in the streets. The gender-role attitudes become political declarations that reflect one’s broader worldview and cultural alignment (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 ; Norris and Inglehart, 2019 ). The politicization of gender-role attitudes has direct implications for political participation. Issues like abortion or parental leave galvanize large numbers of citizens, especially women, who might otherwise stay away from political participation (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 ; Korolczuk, 2016 ). A noticeable example of it is the rise of grassroots movements such as the All-Polish Women’s Strike and similar initiatives, which have drawn previously apolitical people into activism in response to perceived threats to gender equality (Korolczuk, 2016 ; Graff and Korolczuk, 2017 ). Thus, as Graff and Korolczuk (2022) suggest, the current populist moment in Central Europe has given rise to what they call a form of ‘populist feminism,’ in which feminist mass mobilizations emerge as a counterforce to right-wing populist attacks on gender and sexuality rights. On the other side, traditionalist men (and some women) have been mobilized by national-conservative parties and the church to defend the status quo, for instance, by attending anti-abortion rallies or supporting referenda against same-sex marriage (Kováts, 2018 ; Paternotte and Kuhar, 2017 ). In sum, gender norms have become a symbolic glue that binds together various political attitudes, meaning that one’s stance on gender issues often correlates with one’s broader political behavior (voting, protesting, etc.) (Norris and Inglehart, 2019 ; Weldon, 2011 ). Context-Dependent Gender Gaps in Political Participation According to comparative studies, national gender egalitarianism and cultural context have a systematic impact on gender gaps in political participation. Isaacson ( 2024 ) demonstrates that in countries with higher levels of gender equality, women participate in environmental activism equally or even more than men, whereas in more gender-traditionalist contexts, women are less active except in gender-specific domains (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010 ). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart ( 2019 ) emphasize the gendered nature of right-wing populism, interpreting its rise in Europe as a “cultural backlash” against progressive values, especially gender equality, with women more frequently siding with the opposition and men disproportionately represented among its supporters. Political participation that boosts conservative causes (such as voting for illiberal parties or attending anti-gender rallies) skews male, whereas participation opposing them (voting for liberal parties, attending pro-gender equality protests) often skews female, an ideological sorting that manifests as a gender gap (Norris and Inglehart, 2019 ; Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Kováts, 2018 ). These observations underscore the context-dependency of the gender gaps in political participation. In a highly patriarchal environment, progressive women may opt out of formal politics (seeing it as hostile) or channel their activism elsewhere, whereas in a more gender-equal environment, women may be more empowered to engage through all channels, sometimes surpassing men (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010 ; Isaacson, 2024 ). Furthermore, women are more likely than men to take part in “private-sphere” civic actions. For example, mobilizing around education or fighting for social welfare demonstrates how the “traditionalist” model portrays women’s caregiving roles as naturally spreading into specific forms of activism (Burns et al., 2001 ; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010 ; Verba et al., 1995 ). Men, conversely, are more present in confrontational and partisan arenas (rallies of political parties, demonstrations, and union strikes), which aligns with “traditionalist” men’s roles in the public sphere (Hooghe and Stolle, 2004 ; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012 ; Verba et al., 1995 ). These tendencies echo the enduring public–private split in gender norms with a twist that women have extended the “private” (caring, community-oriented) labor into a form of political expression. What happens when gender equality norms become a contentious political issue? If a woman supports egalitarian attitudes but lives in a society where the patriarchal rhetoric dominates politics, she may feel alienated from institutional politics (leading to lower participation in elections) yet strongly motivated to protest or engage in civil society to advocate for change (Isaacson, 2024 ; Krizsán and Roggeband, 2021 ; Weldon, 2011 ). On the flip side, a man with very traditional views in a context of rising gender equality may withdraw from certain participatory acts he sees as “feminized” or, alternatively, might double down and join conservative movements (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 ; Kováts, 2018 ). In short, divergent gender-role attitudes can produce different motivational climates for political action. For example, in Central Europe’s current political climate, labeling the gender gap in protest participation as an “ideological tension” means recognizing that many women are not politically disengaged but rather differently engaged, often in direct response to political issues, which directly affect their fundamental rights (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010 ; Weldon, 2011 ). In 2020, women in Poland mobilized against the abortion ban (Graff and Korolczuk, 2022; Korolczuk, 2016 ). Similarly, in Hungary, women civil society leaders fought against media repression to defend academic freedom (Kováts, 2018 ). Ambivalence and Hybridization of the Gender-Role Attitudes in Europe Earlier frameworks conceptualized gender-role attitudes as a unidimensional continuum from traditionalist to egalitarian attitudes (Davis, 2016 ; Knight and Brinton, 2017 ; Scarborough et al., 2019 ). Now theories distinguish at least two key dimensions: attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere (e.g., participation in the labor force and politics) versus the private sphere (e.g., issues of caregiving and housework responsibilities) (Lappegård et al., 2021 ). A third important component involves essentialist beliefs about gender, i.e., the extent to which one believes in inherent, natural differences between women and men that also dictate a vision of public and private roles (Charles and Grusky 2004; Grunow et al., 2018 ). Many studies find that individuals can be egalitarian in one sphere but not the other (Grunow et al., 2018 ; Lappegård et al., 2021 ; Scarborough et al., 2019 ). In Europe, acceptance of women’s equal role in public life grew markedly in recent decades, yet traditional views about family roles remain more persistent (Knight and Brinton, 2017 ; Lappegård et al., 2021 ). In other words, large segments of the population endorse gender equality in the workplace and politics but still envision a gender-specialized division of labor at home. This pattern has been labeled ambivalent or segmented gender ideology (Lappegård et al., 2021 ): men’s and women’s roles are seen as equal in one arena and differentiated in another. Prior research confirms that such ambivalence is widespread. Sjöberg ( 2010 ), for instance, documents that in European countries it is common for people to support women’s employment in principle while also favoring policies that encourage women (rather than men) to take parental leave or remain home with children. The roots of this duality lie partly in historical change: the so-called “first stage” of the gender revolution integrated women into public institutions earlier and more completely than the “second stage” transformed expectations for men in the private sphere (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015 ; Goldscheider et al., 2015 ; Lappegård et al., 2021 ). Central and Eastern Europe provide clear evidence for the unfinished gender revolution. Former state socialist regimes pushed women into full-time employment (thus, achieving the first stage), but domestic gender norms and actual divisions of housework saw little change, leaving the second stage largely incomplete (Lappegård et al., 2021 ). Even today, decades after communism, many Central Europeans hold egalitarian attitudes about women earning money or holding leadership positions, yet continue to believe that a “woman’s primary fulfillment comes from motherhood” or that men should be the main breadwinners (attitudes reflecting private-sphere traditionalism) (Grunow et al., 2018 ). The distinction between egalitarian versus essentialist attitudinal domains adds further nuances (Knight and Brinton, 2017 ). Some individuals conceptually support equality but attribute gender gaps to innate differences in talents or preferences. The scholars name such a mindset as “egalitarian essentialism” (Charles and Grusky, 2004). Egalitarian essentialism is the “new cultural frame” of gender in post-industrial societies: a hybrid ideology blending feminist egalitarian rhetoric with neo-traditional assumptions about natural gender differences (e.g., that women are inherently more nurturing) (Charles and Grusky, 2004; Knight and Brinton, 2017 ). In Central-East Europe, we likewise find evidence of essentialist underpinnings in gender attitudes. Knight and Brinton ( 2017 ), analyzing two decades of European attitude data, identified distinct “ideological classes” rather than a single spectrum of opinion. Alongside a fully egalitarian cluster and a fully traditional cluster, they found a mixed cluster wherein respondents supported many gender-equal rights but agreed with statements like “what women really want is a home and children”—a quintessential essentialist sentiment (women are naturally fulfilled by motherhood) (Knight and Brinton, 2017 ). These nuances matter because someone with essentialist leanings might support, say, women’s political participation in general yet oppose policies like gender quotas or men taking parental leave, believing that different outcomes simply reflect natural gendered interests. The preceding discussion suggests that gendered political participation in Europe cannot be explained by a simple opposition between egalitarians and traditionalists since the gender-role attitudes are multidimensional, cutting across private and public spheres and essentialism (Lappegård et al., 2021 ; Grunow et al., 2018 ). At the same time, the diffusion of EU gender-equality norms has unfolded unevenly across the region. While these norms have empowered feminist and egalitarian actors, they have also provoked conservative counter-mobilization in some countries (Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Verloo, 2018). The dual process of the EU norm diffusion and conservative counter-mobilization creates the conditions under which multidimensional gender-role attitudes manifest in distinct patterns of political participation. Against this background, two hypotheses follow. H1: Backlash Amplification Hypothesis. The diffusion of EU norms has heterogeneous effects on gender gaps in protest participation: in contexts of strong conservative counter-mobilization, these norms amplify gender gaps; in contexts of moderate counter-mobilization, they sustain existing gaps; and in contexts of weak counter-mobilization, they narrow gaps. H2: Hybridization Hypothesis. The diffusion of EU norms strengthens the effects on hybrid attitudinal profiles on gender gaps in protest participation that become especially consequential for protest participation under conditions of conservative counter-mobilization. Data and methods The individual-level data come from the European Values Study (EVS), and the country-level administrative data come from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. I use the 1999, 2008, and 2017/2018 waves of the European Values Study. The merged dataset includes 165,830 respondents aged 18–65 + from 45 counties in Europe and its neighborhood, extending to the South Caucasus. Political participation serves as the dependent variable. It is measured as a multinomial outcome distinguishing between four groups: those who report no activity; those who engage only in low-effort acts such as signing petitions or joining boycotts; those who take part only in high-effort activities such as demonstrations or strikes; and those who combine both types. This operationalization indicates not only whether citizens are politically active but also the intensity and type of their engagement, from no involvement to minimal involvement and more demanding, contentious forms of action. The central explanatory factor is respondents’ gender-role attitude class, derived from a latent class analysis (LCA) of seven items, such as relationships with working mothers, housewives as fulfilling, dual-earner families, childcare needs, women’s job independence, father involvement, and child well-being. They are harmonized on a 1–4 traditional–egalitarian scale. Because some items are structurally absent in the last wave, only these seven were multiply imputed using multinomial chained equations with a wave-restricted mask. Twelve imputations with eight iterations were generated, with wave, country, year, sex, age, and survey weights included as predictors (weights entered as predictors, not as estimation weights). All other variables remained unimputed, preserving the missing-by-design pattern. Pooled LCAs were then estimated on the imputed data, testing 4–5 class solutions and selecting the final specification by BIC and interpretability. Individuals were assigned by maximum posterior probability. Class profiles were summarized across three domains: public sphere (dual earners, job independence, working mothers), private sphere (housewives, childcare needs), and essentialism (father involvement, child well-being), and labeled accordingly (e.g., Traditional, Public-egalitarian/Private-traditional, Mixed-egalitarian, Ambivalent-traditional, Egalitarian). Temporal change is assessed using weighted posterior probabilities (“soft shares”) of class membership across survey waves. Table 1 reports the number of respondents, their percentage in the total sample, and the average posterior probabilities (APPs) for each latent class. Table 1 Class proportions and average posterior probabilities (APPs) Latent class N % of sample APP Traditional 28,703 20.30 0.731 Public-egalitarian / Private-traditional 7,876 5.57 0.788 Mixed-egalitarian 48,998 34.65 0.734 Ambivalent-traditional 31,014 21.93 0.728 Egalitarian 24,833 17.56 0.824 Note. The table reports the number of respondents, their percentage in the total sample, and the average posterior probabilities (APPs) for each latent class. Higher APP values indicate stronger certainty of assignment. Egalitarians display a consistently pro-equality orientation in every sphere: they favor women’s employment, dual-earner households, and active paternal caregiving, while rejecting claims that children inevitably lose out when mothers work. Traditionalists represent the opposite tendency. They regard the housewife role as personally fulfilling, resist dual-income contribution to the household, and endorse essentialist assumptions about gender differences. The transitionalist cluster occupies a more ambivalent position. Their attitudes point toward some support for equality in both public and private domains, but the distinction is not so pronounced as compared with other clusters. A different configuration appears among public-egalitarian/private-traditional respondents, who strongly endorse women’s independence and labor market participation but continue to uphold traditionalist expectations regarding motherhood and family roles. Ambivalent traditionalists form a further group; their attitudes reveal only limited support for equality and inconsistent responses across items, suggesting a more unsettled or unstable orientation. Difference feminists, finally, advocate equal treatment in the public sphere while affirming essentialist assumptions that justify differentiated family roles for men and women. The models also account for a range of controls. At the individual level, I include education, employment status, gender, and age. Education (from primary to postgraduate levels) reflects the civic competencies and political knowledge that facilitate participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 ). Employment status, classified into eight categories (full-time, part-time, self-employed, student, housewife, retired, unemployed, other), controls for individuals’ access to material resources and social networks. Gender and age remain key sources of inequality: women and younger citizens tend to participate less, whereas men and middle-aged groups engage more consistently (Inglehart and Norris 2003 ). These patterns are closely linked to gender-role attitudes, which makes it necessary to account for them when assessing the independent effect of such attitudes. The analysis also includes two cognitive variables—political interest and social trust. On a four-point scale from “none” to “high,” political interest indicates both incentive for action and cognitive involvement (Dalton, 2008 ). Social trust captures whether respondents believe most people can be trusted (dummy variable), and it signals a readiness to join collective efforts (Putnam, 2000 ). Both variables correlate with gender-role attitudes. Egalitarian respondents tend to be more politically interested and more supportive of collective action. So, controlling for them ensures a conservative test of the association between gender-ideology classes and participation. At the macro level, five contextual indicators are included. Four of them come from V-Dem: the conservative anti-system mobilization, conservative seat shares, the liberal democracy, and the GDP per capita, PPP. Conservative anti-system mobilization serves as a key explanatory variable, measuring the activity of extra-parliamentary movements with a conservative orientation. It refers to mobilization that takes place outside formal institutions and contests political systems from the right. It is particularly relevant for gender gaps in protest participation since conservative anti-system movements often rally against gender-equality initiatives and promote traditional family roles. In addition, the conservative parliamentary seat share, i.e., the proportion of legislative seats held by conservative parties, represents the institutional strength of conservatism. Conservative mobilization can also exist in the institutional framework, and it is important for gender gaps in protest participation, as higher conservative influence is frequently associated with opposition to equality norms and support for traditional gender-role assumptions. For operationalization of the EU-norms diffusion, I use the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) instead of specialized gender-equality indices because the broader measure more adequately captures the mechanisms of EU-driven norm diffusion in the post-communist region. In the state-socialist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, gender equality was proclaimed as an official doctrine: women were guaranteed access to employment, education, and political office. However, these provisions were often symbolic, built under authoritarian systems that lacked independent courts, free elections, or enforceable civil rights. Therefore, formal gender equality rights did not translate into genuine empowerment or durable institutional guarantees. Indeed, the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) helps to overcome the problem of treating formal gender provisions as genuine empowerment, as it measures not only electoral competition but also clean elections, checks on executive power, and protections of rights. The reforms and alignment of national legislation, mandated by the EU accession process, expanded institutional safeguards and widened opportunities for women’s participation, making LDI a particularly suitable measure of the democratic environment. Logged GDP per capita is used as an indicator of economic development. Beyond material prosperity, higher economic development levels are linked to broader mobilization resources and to the rise of post-materialist values supportive of equality and activism (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 ). In addition, I include the time elapsed since each country’s accession to the European Union, coded at zero for non-member states. Membership has been linked to institutional reforms, the strengthening of civil society, and the diffusion of equality norms (Sedelmeier 2014 ). Accounting for this variable makes it possible to trace the longer-term transformative effects of European integration on gender gaps in participation and the role of gender-role attitudes. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Political participation (multicategory) 144,756 2.86 1.30 1 4 Gender-role attitudes (cluster ID) 141,424 3.11 1.33 1 5 Liberal democracy index 154,061 0.65 0.23 0.04 0.90 Conservative anti-system mobilization 149,875 0.34 0.26 0 1 Gender (1 = female) 164,795 0.55 0.50 0 1 GDP per capita (log) 149,692 62.35 32.33 6.18 181.07 Parliamentary seats – conservatives 96,077 15.93 17.08 0 71.20 Years since EU accession 165,830 6.79 8.24 0 31 Employment status (1–8) 163,760 3.17 2.16 1 8 Education (1–8) 163,476 5.05 1.99 1 8 Age (continuous) 164,843 45.89 15.34 18 65 Political interest (1–4) 153,961 2.36 0.95 1 4 Social trust (0–1) 159,294 0.32 0.47 0 1 Sources European Values Study (EVS) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). Analytical Strategy To evaluate the hypotheses, I estimate multinomial logistic regression models predicting different forms of protest participation. For H1 (Backlash Amplification Hypothesis), the key specification includes a three-way interaction between gender, the level of anti-system conservative mobilization, and the diffusion of EU norms. Because the interpretation of higher-order interaction terms in nonlinear models is not straightforward, I do not rely on the raw logit coefficients. Instead, I compute and plot average marginal effects and predicted probabilities, which provide an interpretable measure of how the probability of participation changes across gender, normative, and mobilizational contexts. Specifically, I present predicted probabilities of participation for women and men across the range of EU-norm diffusion under conditions of weak and strong conservative mobilization. This enables a direct assessment of whether gender gaps in protest participation narrow, persist, or widen in different mobilizational contexts. In addition, complementary marginal effect plots illustrate how the impact of EU norms varies by gender and by the strength of conservative mobilization. For H2 (Hybridization Hypothesis), the models account for interactions among attitudinal classes, EU-norm dissemination, and anti-system conservative mobilization, with gender gaps assessed independently across attitudinal profiles. Again, the models report marginal predicted probabilities and marginal effects rather than coefficients to describe the substantive consequences of these complicated connections. It focuses on predicted probabilities of protest participation by gender and attitudinal class under conditions of high EU norms and high conservative mobilization, where the hybridization mechanism should be most visible. I also compute the class-specific marginal effects of gender and anti-system mobilization at high EU norms levels to isolate the conditions under which hybrid attitudinal profiles become especially consequential for protest participation. The analysis in the paper focuses on average marginal effects, while the multinomial regression tables are reported in the Appendices: Appendix 1 for Hypothesis 1 and Appendix 2 for Hypothesis 2. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities are the most substantively meaningful way to interpret nonlinear interaction models. They are directly comparable across models, outcomes, and specifications, which ensures the results can be interpreted in substantive ways rather than in terms of raw log-odds ratios, which often obscure the size and direction of effects. Analysis Figures 1–4 present predicted probabilities of protest participation (panels a–c) and marginal effects of EU-norm diffusion (panel d) across varying levels of conservative mobilization. These results address the Backlash Amplification Hypothesis 1, which anticipates that EU norms diffusion narrows gender gaps under weak conservative mobilization, sustains them under moderate conservative mobilization, and amplifies them under strong conservative mobilization. Abstention from participation (Fig. 1) decreases significantly with EU-norm diffusion for both men and women, and this decline is broadly parallel across contexts. Women begin with slightly higher probabilities of abstention, but this difference narrows as liberal democracy rises. The interaction effects are not significant, indicating that EU norms reduce abstention in a largely gender-neutral fashion. In this domain, therefore, the hypothesis does not find support: instead of differentiated effects, EU norms lower abstention symmetrically. Low-effort protest (Fig. 2) provides the clearest evidence for the expected conditional dynamics. Under weak conservative counter-mobilization, women’s participation rises more steeply than men’s, producing a widening female advantage. Under moderate mobilization, both men and women increase participation in parallel, sustaining the gender gap rather than altering it. Under strong mobilization, men’s participation increases while women’s stagnates, reversing the gender gap. The marginal effects confirm this sequence: positive for women in weak contexts, neutral in moderate ones, and negative in strong contexts. This pattern is consistent with backlash amplification, where moderate mobilization sustains existing gaps and strong mobilization amplifies them. High-effort protest (Fig. 3) displays a weaker version of the same dynamics. Under weak and moderate conservative counter-mobilization, men maintain a modest advantage, while women’s participation does not increase significantly with EU norms. Under strong mobilization, men’s participation rises while women’s declines, widening the gap. Here again, marginal effects indicate stability in moderate conservative contexts and amplification in strong contexts, aligning with the first hypothesis, albeit less strongly than in the low-effort participatory types. Conservative counter-mobilization significantly increases participation overall for mixed-effort protest (Fig. 4), and EU norms condition these effects in gendered ways. Under weak mobilization, men benefit more strongly, producing a modest male advantage. In the case of moderate mobilization, both men and women increase participation in parallel, leaving the gap unchanged. Strong conservative mobilization again benefits men disproportionately, amplifying gender gaps. The marginal effects trace this progression, with stability under moderate conservative mobilization and widening gaps for mixed-effort protest in strong conservative mobilization. To further test how EU norms influence gendered protest participation, the Hybridization Hypothesis (H2) posits that hybrid attitudinal profiles, those combining egalitarian and traditional orientations, become especially consequential in influencing protest participation once EU norms diffuse, and that their effects intensify under conditions of conservative counter-mobilization. The results for non-participation show no statistically significant effects (Fig. 5a). Across attitudinal groups, the marginal effects of conservative counter-mobilization remain close to zero, and the confidence intervals overlap, indicating that neither hybrid nor consistent profiles are decisive in structuring abstention. In this respect, EU-norm diffusion lowers non-participation in general but does not operate through differentiated effects across attitudinal categories. The picture changes when turning to low-effort protest, where the significance of hybridization becomes evident (Fig. 5b). Mixed-egalitarian profiles, as well as consistently egalitarian groups, show significant positive effects of conservative mobilization. Traditional and ambivalent profiles, by contrast, remain unaffected. Importantly, as EU norms increase, the responsiveness of mixed-egalitarian and egalitarian groups is reduced, suggesting that the diffusion of liberal democracy dampens the mobilizing potential of conservative pressures among these profiles. This pattern indicates that low-cost protest is the domain where hybridization most clearly conditions the interplay between EU norms and conservative mobilization. High-effort protest displays a different dynamic (Fig. 5c). Here, none of the marginal effects of conservative mobilization reach statistical significance, and confidence intervals consistently include zero. This suggests that in more demanding forms of protest participation, hybrid and consistent profiles alike are not strongly mobilized by conservative forces, even under varying levels of EU-norm diffusion. In the case of mixed-effort protest, hybridization again proves relevant (Fig. 5d). Conservative counter-mobilization has a statistically significant positive effect for mixed-egalitarian profiles, while the effects for traditional, ambivalent, and consistently egalitarian groups remain insignificant. Unlike in the low-effort domain, EU-norm diffusion does not markedly dampen these effects, which remain relatively stable across levels of liberal democracy. Thus, the results of Hypothesis 2 testing show that hybrid attitudinal profiles matter selectively. They play no role in influencing abstention from participation or high-effort protest, but they exhibit statistically significant responsiveness to conservative mobilization in low- and mixed-effort participation. EU-norm diffusion further conditions these dynamics by weakening responsiveness in the low-effort participation while leaving mixed-effort mobilization relatively stable. These results provide partial support for H2, highlighting hybrid profiles as the attitudinal settings where EU norms and conservative mobilization intersect most visibly in influencing gendered protest participation. To sum up, the findings provide partial evidence for both hypotheses. For the backlash amplification perspective, the predicted sequence is visible in low-effort protest, where gender gaps narrow under weak mobilization, persist under moderate mobilization, and widen under strong mobilization. In high-effort and mixed-effort protests, similar tendencies appear, but some effects are weak or statistically insignificant. Non-participation, by contrast, shows no differentiated effects, as EU norms reduce abstention broadly and symmetrically. For the hybridization perspective, hybrid profiles matter significantly in low- and mixed-effort protest, while effects in abstention and high-effort protest remain insignificant. Taken together, the results point to a conditional but uneven influence of EU-norm diffusion: it interacts with mobilizational contexts and hybrid attitudinal structures in ways that are sometimes statistically robust, but in other cases do not reach significance. Conclusion This paper reveals that the interactions between the EU norms diffusion, conservative counter-mobilization, and multidimensional gender-role attitudes condition gendered protest participation in Europe. The findings provide partial support for both the backlash amplification and hybridization hypotheses. They contribute to the comparative politics debates on the EU norm diffusion, conservative backlash politics, and the political participatory implications of ambivalent gender-role attitudes in three ways. First, the paper contributes to the literature on EU norm diffusion and its effects on national policies (Jacquot, 2015 ; Lombardo and Forest, 2015 ; Martinsen, 2007 ; Sedelmeier, 2014 ), moving focus from norm adoption and compliance toward contentious politics and protest participation (Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Korolczuk, 2016 ; Weldon, 2011 ). The results demonstrate that the EU norm diffusion effects on protest participation are conditional on the conservative backlash and gender role attitudes rather than remaining uniform. Norm diffusion narrows gender gaps in contexts of weak conservative mobilization but sustains or widens them where conservative forces are strong. Depending on how individual gender-role attitudes refract EU gender-equality norms, they produce divergent outcomes across Europe, far from generating linear convergence. The relations between progressive mobilization and conservative backlash turn gender equality into a contested terrain (Graff and Korolczuk, 2021 ; Paternotte and Kuhar, 2017 ; Verloo, 2018). Second, the study contributes to the literature on conservative backlash politics. Scholars have highlighted the rise of a “gender counter-revolution” in Central and Eastern Europe (Grzebalska and Pető, 2018 ; Krizsán and Roggeband, 2018 ), but the analysis here demonstrates that backlash has systematic behavioral consequences for political participation across the continent. Under strong conservative mobilization, men’s participation increases across low-effort, high-effort, and mixed-effort protests, while women’s participation stagnates or declines, producing widening gender gaps. In this way, the study suggests that backlash has observable consequences for participation gaps, situating gender within broader comparative debates on how contentious politics responds to norm diffusion and institutional change (Inglehart and Norris, 2003 , 2019 ). Third, the findings advance theories of the gender-role attitudes’ multidimensionality and their impact on protest participation. Research has already documented that attitudes toward gender roles are segmented across the public sphere, private sphere, and essentialist beliefs (Charles and Grusky, 2004; Grunow et al., 2018 ; Knight and Brinton, 2017 ; Lappegård et al., 2021 ). The present study demonstrates that hybrid attitudinal profiles, particularly the mixed-egalitarian orientations identified in the analysis, are politically consequential because they condition how individuals respond to conservative mobilization once EU gender-equality norms diffuse. Such findings resonate with theories of “egalitarian essentialism” (Charles and Grusky, 2004; Grunow et al., 2018 ; Knight and Brinton, 2017 ), which emphasize the ambivalent political implications of multidimensional gender-role attitudes. In low- and mixed-effort protest, the hybrid attitudinal clusters amplify or dampen gender gaps in protest participation depending on the contextual characteristics (i.e., level of liberal democracy, conservative counter-mobilization), whereas in abstention from protest and high-effort protest, their influence is minimal. It resonates with theories of the incomplete gender revolution (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015 ; Goldscheider et al., 2015 ) and suggests that attitudinal ambivalence translates into different protests. Taken together, the results point to gendered participation gaps in Europe as contingent on the interaction of EU gender-equality norm diffusion, conservative backlash, and ambivalent gender-role attitudes. 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2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":5473979,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSee image above for figure legend\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/81f06b782c8d5082a7deec41.png"},{"id":93391576,"identity":"8c5932d5-56d0-492a-94a8-f0dacb7cf6da","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-13 10:51:56","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":5435481,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSee image above for figure legend\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/9a3cd16d08f8f49e7593d582.png"},{"id":93391196,"identity":"5ffb43f4-cdc7-48eb-8f88-8666f8b77ca4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-13 10:43:55","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":5490530,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSee image above for figure legend\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/74092bd62d5016f99b719a47.png"},{"id":93391199,"identity":"f8ae372a-5fa2-44d8-b1dd-fa4241773ac1","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-13 10:43:55","extension":"png","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":5429589,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSee image above for figure legend\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure5.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/be8fff2d57b1b399458027ed.png"},{"id":93393018,"identity":"96e721b1-8ef2-4a0a-8bbc-efe6422afa3d","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-13 11:08:20","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":25350345,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/04cf385d-8e15-458b-95e6-1826d6c274ce.pdf"},{"id":93391234,"identity":"ec197d74-d151-43ee-a470-2be8f0b879c9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-13 10:43:59","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":18555,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Appendix1RegressionHyp.1.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/753d5fa34eb8319e9d684426.docx"},{"id":93391193,"identity":"bcaf64b5-fdcb-4c87-991e-255983db8ec7","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-13 10:43:55","extension":"docx","order_by":2,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":20727,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Appendix2RegressionHyp2.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7829158/v1/9fd12652464102c269b8c976.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Gendered Protest in Europe: EU Norm Diffusion, Conservative Backlash, and Attitudinal Hybridization","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe European Union positions gender equality as a core value and has developed a broad acquis of directives, legal frameworks, and funding instruments to advance it (Jacquot, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; European Commission, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; EIGE, 2023). During their EU accession processes, candidate countries adopt major gender equality reforms aligned with EU standards, especially in employment and anti-discrimination frameworks (Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; de Silva and Tepliakova, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Roggeband and Krizs\u0026aacute;n, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). At the same time, family law, covering marriage, divorce, and parental responsibilities, remains outside the EU\u0026rsquo;s substantive competence and is firmly within national competence (Boele-Woelki, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; \u0026Ouml;berg and Tryfonidou, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe legal boundary also had a noticeable impact on the individual gender-role attitudes. If public-sphere equality was formally advanced through Europeanization, norms governing the private sphere of family and caregiving were left largely intact (Kantola, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Jacquot, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). The advancement of EU-driven gender equality in the public sphere with nationally preserved family law contributed to the segmentation of individual gender-role attitudes. As a result, support for women\u0026rsquo;s employment and political participation often coexists with persistent private-sphere traditionalism (Grunow and Begall, 2019; Nennstiel and Hudde, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eConservative actors portrayed gender equality and LGBTQ\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;rights as foreign impositions that endanger national traditions and sovereignty (Paternotte and Kuhar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Korolczuk and Graff, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). They intensified the tensions between European norms diffusion and conservative resistance by mobilizing people against so-called \u0026ldquo;gender ideology.\u0026rdquo; As a result, gender became one of the most visible lines of political conflict in contemporary Europe: while progressive actors invoke EU frameworks to push reforms, conservative movements portray them as cultural threats (Verloo, 2018). Policies once considered technical, such as childcare provision or sex education, became highly contentious, causing parliamentary stand-offs and mass street protests (Kantola et al., 2021; Szelewa, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe contradictions between progressive and conservative actors led to the differentiation of the protest topics and repertoires between women and men. Women frequently mobilize when private-sphere rights such as reproductive autonomy or childcare provisions are threatened (Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Roth, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Farris and Marchetti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e), while men are more visible in conservative mobilizations defending the \u0026ldquo;traditional family,\u0026rdquo; turning the family domain into a central site of political contestation (Kuhar and Paternotte, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCentral and Eastern Europe illustrates how such conflicts build on older legacies. State socialism brought women into the labor market but left household norms largely untouched, producing an incomplete transformation of the private sphere (Einhorn, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1993\u003c/span\u003e; Gal and Kligman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). Today, studies show strong support for women\u0026rsquo;s equality in work and politics but also widespread private-sphere traditionalism and enduring essentialist assumptions about \u0026ldquo;natural\u0026rdquo; gender roles (Saxonberg, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Grunow and Begall, 2019). These segmented orientations matter politically: egalitarian commitments can drive women into public protest, while essentialist views blunt support for institutional reforms such as quotas or shared parental leave (Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExplanation of the observed relationships calls for a multidimensional view of gender-role attitudes. Research increasingly distinguishes three dimensions of gender-role attitudes: views on women\u0026rsquo;s roles in the public sphere (education, work, politics); norms governing the private sphere (caregiving, household labor, family authority); and essentialist beliefs about innate gender differences (Davis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Many individuals hold ambivalent or hybrid profiles, i.e., supporting equality in public life while maintaining traditional or essentialist beliefs about the family gender roles.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTaken together, these observations suggest that gendered political participation in Europe is conditioned by three interlocking forces: (1) the diffusion of EU gender equality norms, (2) the national conservative-populist backlash they provoke, and (3) the individual multidimensional character of gender-role attitudes. The gendered participation gaps arise not because women are disengaged, but because the forces at play create different motivational climates for men and women.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgainst this background, two hypotheses guide the analysis. Hypothesis 1. Backlash Amplification Hypothesis. The diffusion of EU gender-equality norms has heterogeneous effects on gender gaps in protest participation: in contexts of strong conservative counter-mobilization, these norms amplify gender gaps; in contexts of moderate counter-mobilization, they sustain existing gaps; and in contexts of weak counter-mobilization, they narrow gaps. H2: Hybridization Hypothesis. The EU norms diffusion strengthens the effects of hybrid attitudinal profiles on gender gaps in protest participation, which become especially consequential under conditions of conservative counter-mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmpirically, the study draws on the last three waves of the European Values Study (1999, 2008, and 2017/2018) combined with country-level indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project, covering more than 160,000 respondents across 45 European and neighboring states. Gender-role attitudes are measured using latent class analysis (LCA), which distinguishes between five attitudinal profiles. To examine how these orientations interact with broader political environments, I estimate multinomial logistic regression models of protest participation that incorporate cross-level interactions. Specifically, the models test whether the diffusion of EU gender-equality norms and the strength of conservative counter-mobilization condition gender gaps in protest activism (Hypothesis 1) and whether these dynamics vary across attitudinal profiles (Hypothesis 2).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe results provide partial support for the Backlash Amplification Hypothesis, showing that EU norms narrow gender gaps under weak conservative mobilization, sustain them under moderate mobilization, and widen them under strong mobilization, but most clearly only in low-effort protest. They also lend selective support to the Hybridization Hypothesis: hybrid ideological profiles matter in low- and mixed-effort protest, where their responsiveness to conservative mobilization is conditioned by the diffusion of EU norms, while effects are weak or absent in abstention and high-effort protest.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Theoretical Framework","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eEU Norm Diffusion and Conservative-Populist Backlash\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eScholars note that top-down Europeanization significantly influenced post-communist states, many of which had to \u0026ldquo;catch up\u0026rdquo; with EU standards on issues like workplace equality and parental leave (Bego, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Saxonberg and Sirov\u0026aacute;tka, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Sedelmeier, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). For example, Hungary and Poland ratified the Istanbul Convention on violence against women partly under international pressure and as a signal of \u0026ldquo;European\u0026rdquo; orientation, even amid domestic opposition (Gwiazda and Minkova, 2024; Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile Europeanization has articulated shared standards for gender equality, in practice Central and Eastern Europe, particularly non-EU member neighboring states, continues to display more gender-inequitable outcomes and, arguably, more traditionalist norms than Western or Nordic Europe (Krizs\u0026aacute;n, 2014; Lombardo and Forest, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). At the same time, EU influence has supplied discursive and financial resources to domestic gender-equality advocates, from women\u0026rsquo;s NGOs to liberal political parties, who draw on European norms to promote policy change (for instance, through EU Equal Pay Day campaigns or compliance with EU directives on workplace gender discrimination) (Isailović, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Martinsen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn response to these changes, a strong counter-movement has formed in parts of Central-East Europe, presenting gender equality (together with LGBTQ\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;rights and sexual education) as an alien ideology that threatens the country (Grzebalska and Pető, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Kov\u0026aacute;ts and Pető, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Verloo, 2018). The phenomenon is widely referred to as mobilization against so-called \u0026ldquo;gender ideology,\u0026rdquo; a polemical umbrella term that ultraconservatives use to delegitimize feminist and LGBTQ\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;gains (Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Kuhar and Paternotte, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). In the Central European context, scholars describe it as a \u0026ldquo;gender counter-revolution,\u0026rdquo; characterized by transnational networks of conservative NGOs and church organizations that disseminate anti-feminist discourse and legislative initiatives (Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Kov\u0026aacute;ts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Paternotte and Kuhar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe conflict between these two forces, EU-driven liberalization and conservative populist retrenchment, means that gender became a highly salient political cleavage in Central-East Europe and neighboring states (Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Kuhar and Paternotte, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). Far from being a niche or \u0026ldquo;soft\u0026rdquo; issue, it is entangled with questions of national identity, religion, and democratic values. We observe these issues in political discourse. Conservatives mobilize their supporters, referring to safeguarding the \u0026ldquo;traditional family\u0026rdquo; and depicting Brussels as the source of \u0026ldquo;corrupting\u0026rdquo; gender and sexuality norms (Kov\u0026aacute;ts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Mejstř\u0026iacute;k and Handl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Pető, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). In turn, progressive and feminist organizations invoke European human rights frameworks to justify demands for women\u0026rsquo;s and minority rights (Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Roth, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, even measures like preschool childcare reform or sex education become flashpoints for acrimonious debates in parliament and large-scale demonstrations in the streets. The gender-role attitudes become political declarations that reflect one\u0026rsquo;s broader worldview and cultural alignment (Inglehart and Norris, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e; Norris and Inglehart, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe politicization of gender-role attitudes has direct implications for political participation. Issues like abortion or parental leave galvanize large numbers of citizens, especially women, who might otherwise stay away from political participation (Inglehart and Norris, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e; Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). A noticeable example of it is the rise of grassroots movements such as the All-Polish Women\u0026rsquo;s Strike and similar initiatives, which have drawn previously apolitical people into activism in response to perceived threats to gender equality (Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, as Graff and Korolczuk (2022) suggest, the current populist moment in Central Europe has given rise to what they call a form of \u0026lsquo;populist feminism,\u0026rsquo; in which feminist mass mobilizations emerge as a counterforce to right-wing populist attacks on gender and sexuality rights. On the other side, traditionalist men (and some women) have been mobilized by national-conservative parties and the church to defend the status quo, for instance, by attending anti-abortion rallies or supporting referenda against same-sex marriage (Kov\u0026aacute;ts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Paternotte and Kuhar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). In sum, gender norms have become a symbolic glue that binds together various political attitudes, meaning that one\u0026rsquo;s stance on gender issues often correlates with one\u0026rsquo;s broader political behavior (voting, protesting, etc.) (Norris and Inglehart, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Weldon, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eContext-Dependent Gender Gaps in Political Participation\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to comparative studies, national gender egalitarianism and cultural context have a systematic impact on gender gaps in political participation. Isaacson (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrates that in countries with higher levels of gender equality, women participate in environmental activism equally or even more than men, whereas in more gender-traditionalist contexts, women are less active except in gender-specific domains (Coff\u0026eacute; and Bolzendahl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) emphasize the gendered nature of right-wing populism, interpreting its rise in Europe as a \u0026ldquo;cultural backlash\u0026rdquo; against progressive values, especially gender equality, with women more frequently siding with the opposition and men disproportionately represented among its supporters.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePolitical participation that boosts conservative causes (such as voting for illiberal parties or attending anti-gender rallies) skews male, whereas participation opposing them (voting for liberal parties, attending pro-gender equality protests) often skews female, an ideological sorting that manifests as a gender gap (Norris and Inglehart, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Kov\u0026aacute;ts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). These observations underscore the context-dependency of the gender gaps in political participation. In a highly patriarchal environment, progressive women may opt out of formal politics (seeing it as hostile) or channel their activism elsewhere, whereas in a more gender-equal environment, women may be more empowered to engage through all channels, sometimes surpassing men (Coff\u0026eacute; and Bolzendahl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Isaacson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, women are more likely than men to take part in \u0026ldquo;private-sphere\u0026rdquo; civic actions. For example, mobilizing around education or fighting for social welfare demonstrates how the \u0026ldquo;traditionalist\u0026rdquo; model portrays women\u0026rsquo;s caregiving roles as naturally spreading into specific forms of activism (Burns et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e; Coff\u0026eacute; and Bolzendahl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Verba et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Men, conversely, are more present in confrontational and partisan arenas (rallies of political parties, demonstrations, and union strikes), which aligns with \u0026ldquo;traditionalist\u0026rdquo; men\u0026rsquo;s roles in the public sphere (Hooghe and Stolle, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Verba et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). These tendencies echo the enduring public\u0026ndash;private split in gender norms with a twist that women have extended the \u0026ldquo;private\u0026rdquo; (caring, community-oriented) labor into a form of political expression.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhat happens when gender equality norms become a contentious political issue? If a woman supports egalitarian attitudes but lives in a society where the patriarchal rhetoric dominates politics, she may feel alienated from institutional politics (leading to lower participation in elections) yet strongly motivated to protest or engage in civil society to advocate for change (Isaacson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Weldon, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). On the flip side, a man with very traditional views in a context of rising gender equality may withdraw from certain participatory acts he sees as \u0026ldquo;feminized\u0026rdquo; or, alternatively, might double down and join conservative movements (Inglehart and Norris, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e; Kov\u0026aacute;ts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). In short, divergent gender-role attitudes can produce different motivational climates for political action.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor example, in Central Europe\u0026rsquo;s current political climate, labeling the gender gap in protest participation as an \u0026ldquo;ideological tension\u0026rdquo; means recognizing that many women are not politically disengaged but rather differently engaged, often in direct response to political issues, which directly affect their fundamental rights (Coff\u0026eacute; and Bolzendahl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Weldon, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). In 2020, women in Poland mobilized against the abortion ban (Graff and Korolczuk, 2022; Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, in Hungary, women civil society leaders fought against media repression to defend academic freedom (Kov\u0026aacute;ts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAmbivalence and Hybridization of the Gender-Role Attitudes in Europe\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEarlier frameworks conceptualized gender-role attitudes as a unidimensional continuum from traditionalist to egalitarian attitudes (Davis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Scarborough et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Now theories distinguish at least two key dimensions: attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere (e.g., participation in the labor force and politics) versus the private sphere (e.g., issues of caregiving and housework responsibilities) (Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA third important component involves essentialist beliefs about gender, i.e., the extent to which one believes in inherent, natural differences between women and men that also dictate a vision of public and private roles (Charles and Grusky 2004; Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMany studies find that individuals can be egalitarian in one sphere but not the other (Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Scarborough et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). In Europe, acceptance of women\u0026rsquo;s equal role in public life grew markedly in recent decades, yet traditional views about family roles remain more persistent (Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn other words, large segments of the population endorse gender equality in the workplace and politics but still envision a gender-specialized division of labor at home. This pattern has been labeled ambivalent or segmented gender ideology (Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e): men\u0026rsquo;s and women\u0026rsquo;s roles are seen as equal in one arena and differentiated in another. Prior research confirms that such ambivalence is widespread. Sj\u0026ouml;berg (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e), for instance, documents that in European countries it is common for people to support women\u0026rsquo;s employment in principle while also favoring policies that encourage women (rather than men) to take parental leave or remain home with children.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe roots of this duality lie partly in historical change: the so-called \u0026ldquo;first stage\u0026rdquo; of the gender revolution integrated women into public institutions earlier and more completely than the \u0026ldquo;second stage\u0026rdquo; transformed expectations for men in the private sphere (Esping-Andersen and Billari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Goldscheider et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Central and Eastern Europe provide clear evidence for the unfinished gender revolution. Former state socialist regimes pushed women into full-time employment (thus, achieving the first stage), but domestic gender norms and actual divisions of housework saw little change, leaving the second stage largely incomplete (Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Even today, decades after communism, many Central Europeans hold egalitarian attitudes about women earning money or holding leadership positions, yet continue to believe that a \u0026ldquo;woman\u0026rsquo;s primary fulfillment comes from motherhood\u0026rdquo; or that men should be the main breadwinners (attitudes reflecting private-sphere traditionalism) (Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between egalitarian versus essentialist attitudinal domains adds further nuances (Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). Some individuals conceptually support equality but attribute gender gaps to innate differences in talents or preferences. The scholars name such a mindset as \u0026ldquo;egalitarian essentialism\u0026rdquo; (Charles and Grusky, 2004). Egalitarian essentialism is the \u0026ldquo;new cultural frame\u0026rdquo; of gender in post-industrial societies: a hybrid ideology blending feminist egalitarian rhetoric with neo-traditional assumptions about natural gender differences (e.g., that women are inherently more nurturing) (Charles and Grusky, 2004; Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). In Central-East Europe, we likewise find evidence of essentialist underpinnings in gender attitudes. Knight and Brinton (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e), analyzing two decades of European attitude data, identified distinct \u0026ldquo;ideological classes\u0026rdquo; rather than a single spectrum of opinion. Alongside a fully egalitarian cluster and a fully traditional cluster, they found a mixed cluster wherein respondents supported many gender-equal rights but agreed with statements like \u0026ldquo;what women really want is a home and children\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;a quintessential essentialist sentiment (women are naturally fulfilled by motherhood) (Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). These nuances matter because someone with essentialist leanings might support, say, women\u0026rsquo;s political participation in general yet oppose policies like gender quotas or men taking parental leave, believing that different outcomes simply reflect natural gendered interests.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe preceding discussion suggests that gendered political participation in Europe cannot be explained by a simple opposition between egalitarians and traditionalists since the gender-role attitudes are multidimensional, cutting across private and public spheres and essentialism (Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). At the same time, the diffusion of EU gender-equality norms has unfolded unevenly across the region. While these norms have empowered feminist and egalitarian actors, they have also provoked conservative counter-mobilization in some countries (Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Verloo, 2018). The dual process of the EU norm diffusion and conservative counter-mobilization creates the conditions under which multidimensional gender-role attitudes manifest in distinct patterns of political participation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgainst this background, two hypotheses follow.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eH1: Backlash Amplification Hypothesis. The diffusion of EU norms has heterogeneous effects on gender gaps in protest participation: in contexts of strong conservative counter-mobilization, these norms amplify gender gaps; in contexts of moderate counter-mobilization, they sustain existing gaps; and in contexts of weak counter-mobilization, they narrow gaps.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eH2: Hybridization Hypothesis. The diffusion of EU norms strengthens the effects on hybrid attitudinal profiles on gender gaps in protest participation that become especially consequential for protest participation under conditions of conservative counter-mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Data and methods","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe individual-level data come from the European Values Study (EVS), and the country-level administrative data come from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. I use the 1999, 2008, and 2017/2018 waves of the European Values Study. The merged dataset includes 165,830 respondents aged 18\u0026ndash;65\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;from 45 counties in Europe and its neighborhood, extending to the South Caucasus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePolitical participation serves as the dependent variable. It is measured as a multinomial outcome distinguishing between four groups: those who report no activity; those who engage only in low-effort acts such as signing petitions or joining boycotts; those who take part only in high-effort activities such as demonstrations or strikes; and those who combine both types. This operationalization indicates not only whether citizens are politically active but also the intensity and type of their engagement, from no involvement to minimal involvement and more demanding, contentious forms of action.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe central explanatory factor is respondents\u0026rsquo; gender-role attitude class, derived from a latent class analysis (LCA) of seven items, such as relationships with working mothers, housewives as fulfilling, dual-earner families, childcare needs, women\u0026rsquo;s job independence, father involvement, and child well-being. They are harmonized on a 1\u0026ndash;4 traditional\u0026ndash;egalitarian scale. Because some items are structurally absent in the last wave, only these seven were multiply imputed using multinomial chained equations with a wave-restricted mask. Twelve imputations with eight iterations were generated, with wave, country, year, sex, age, and survey weights included as predictors (weights entered as predictors, not as estimation weights). All other variables remained unimputed, preserving the missing-by-design pattern.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePooled LCAs were then estimated on the imputed data, testing 4\u0026ndash;5 class solutions and selecting the final specification by BIC and interpretability. Individuals were assigned by maximum posterior probability. Class profiles were summarized across three domains: public sphere (dual earners, job independence, working mothers), private sphere (housewives, childcare needs), and essentialism (father involvement, child well-being), and labeled accordingly (e.g., Traditional, Public-egalitarian/Private-traditional, Mixed-egalitarian, Ambivalent-traditional, Egalitarian). Temporal change is assessed using weighted posterior probabilities (\u0026ldquo;soft shares\u0026rdquo;) of class membership across survey waves. Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e reports the number of respondents, their percentage in the total sample, and the average posterior probabilities (APPs) for each latent class.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eClass proportions and average posterior probabilities (APPs)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLatent class\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e% of sample\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAPP\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTraditional\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e28,703\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.731\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic-egalitarian / Private-traditional\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7,876\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.57\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.788\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMixed-egalitarian\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e48,998\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e34.65\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.734\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAmbivalent-traditional\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31,014\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.93\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.728\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEgalitarian\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e24,833\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.56\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.824\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNote. The table reports the number of respondents, their percentage in the total sample, and the average posterior probabilities (APPs) for each latent class. Higher APP values indicate stronger certainty of assignment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEgalitarians display a consistently pro-equality orientation in every sphere: they favor women\u0026rsquo;s employment, dual-earner households, and active paternal caregiving, while rejecting claims that children inevitably lose out when mothers work. Traditionalists represent the opposite tendency. They regard the housewife role as personally fulfilling, resist dual-income contribution to the household, and endorse essentialist assumptions about gender differences. The transitionalist cluster occupies a more ambivalent position. Their attitudes point toward some support for equality in both public and private domains, but the distinction is not so pronounced as compared with other clusters. A different configuration appears among public-egalitarian/private-traditional respondents, who strongly endorse women\u0026rsquo;s independence and labor market participation but continue to uphold traditionalist expectations regarding motherhood and family roles. Ambivalent traditionalists form a further group; their attitudes reveal only limited support for equality and inconsistent responses across items, suggesting a more unsettled or unstable orientation. Difference feminists, finally, advocate equal treatment in the public sphere while affirming essentialist assumptions that justify differentiated family roles for men and women.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe models also account for a range of controls. At the individual level, I include education, employment status, gender, and age. Education (from primary to postgraduate levels) reflects the civic competencies and political knowledge that facilitate participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Employment status, classified into eight categories (full-time, part-time, self-employed, student, housewife, retired, unemployed, other), controls for individuals\u0026rsquo; access to material resources and social networks.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender and age remain key sources of inequality: women and younger citizens tend to participate less, whereas men and middle-aged groups engage more consistently (Inglehart and Norris \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). These patterns are closely linked to gender-role attitudes, which makes it necessary to account for them when assessing the independent effect of such attitudes. The analysis also includes two cognitive variables\u0026mdash;political interest and social trust. On a four-point scale from \u0026ldquo;none\u0026rdquo; to \u0026ldquo;high,\u0026rdquo; political interest indicates both incentive for action and cognitive involvement (Dalton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSocial trust captures whether respondents believe most people can be trusted (dummy variable), and it signals a readiness to join collective efforts (Putnam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). Both variables correlate with gender-role attitudes. Egalitarian respondents tend to be more politically interested and more supportive of collective action. So, controlling for them ensures a conservative test of the association between gender-ideology classes and participation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the macro level, five contextual indicators are included. Four of them come from V-Dem: the conservative anti-system mobilization, conservative seat shares, the liberal democracy, and the GDP per capita, PPP.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eConservative anti-system mobilization serves as a key explanatory variable, measuring the activity of extra-parliamentary movements with a conservative orientation. It refers to mobilization that takes place outside formal institutions and contests political systems from the right. It is particularly relevant for gender gaps in protest participation since conservative anti-system movements often rally against gender-equality initiatives and promote traditional family roles.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, the conservative parliamentary seat share, i.e., the proportion of legislative seats held by conservative parties, represents the institutional strength of conservatism. Conservative mobilization can also exist in the institutional framework, and it is important for gender gaps in protest participation, as higher conservative influence is frequently associated with opposition to equality norms and support for traditional gender-role assumptions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor operationalization of the EU-norms diffusion, I use the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) instead of specialized gender-equality indices because the broader measure more adequately captures the mechanisms of EU-driven norm diffusion in the post-communist region. In the state-socialist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, gender equality was proclaimed as an official doctrine: women were guaranteed access to employment, education, and political office. However, these provisions were often symbolic, built under authoritarian systems that lacked independent courts, free elections, or enforceable civil rights. Therefore, formal gender equality rights did not translate into genuine empowerment or durable institutional guarantees. Indeed, the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) helps to overcome the problem of treating formal gender provisions as genuine empowerment, as it measures not only electoral competition but also clean elections, checks on executive power, and protections of rights. The reforms and alignment of national legislation, mandated by the EU accession process, expanded institutional safeguards and widened opportunities for women\u0026rsquo;s participation, making LDI a particularly suitable measure of the democratic environment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLogged GDP per capita is used as an indicator of economic development. Beyond material prosperity, higher economic development levels are linked to broader mobilization resources and to the rise of post-materialist values supportive of equality and activism (Inglehart and Norris, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, I include the time elapsed since each country\u0026rsquo;s accession to the European Union, coded at zero for non-member states. Membership has been linked to institutional reforms, the strengthening of civil society, and the diffusion of equality norms (Sedelmeier \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Accounting for this variable makes it possible to trace the longer-term transformative effects of European integration on gender gaps in participation and the role of gender-role attitudes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e reports the descriptive statistics.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDescriptive Statistics\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStd. Dev.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMin\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMax\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePolitical participation (multicategory)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e144,756\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.86\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender-role attitudes (cluster ID)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e141,424\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.11\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLiberal democracy index\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e154,061\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.65\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.23\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.04\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.90\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConservative anti-system mobilization\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e149,875\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.34\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.26\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender (1\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;female)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e164,795\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.55\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.50\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGDP per capita (log)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e149,692\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e62.35\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e32.33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e6.18\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e181.07\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParliamentary seats \u0026ndash; conservatives\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e96,077\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.93\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.08\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e71.20\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYears since EU accession\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e165,830\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e6.79\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.24\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e31\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployment status (1\u0026ndash;8)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e163,760\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.17\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.16\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEducation (1\u0026ndash;8)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e163,476\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.05\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.99\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAge (continuous)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e164,843\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e45.89\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.34\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e65\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePolitical interest (1\u0026ndash;4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e153,961\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.36\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.95\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSocial trust (0\u0026ndash;1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e159,294\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.32\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.47\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSources\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eEuropean Values Study (EVS) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAnalytical Strategy\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo evaluate the hypotheses, I estimate multinomial logistic regression models predicting different forms of protest participation. For H1 (Backlash Amplification Hypothesis), the key specification includes a three-way interaction between gender, the level of anti-system conservative mobilization, and the diffusion of EU norms. Because the interpretation of higher-order interaction terms in nonlinear models is not straightforward, I do not rely on the raw logit coefficients. Instead, I compute and plot average marginal effects and predicted probabilities, which provide an interpretable measure of how the probability of participation changes across gender, normative, and mobilizational contexts. Specifically, I present predicted probabilities of participation for women and men across the range of EU-norm diffusion under conditions of weak and strong conservative mobilization. This enables a direct assessment of whether gender gaps in protest participation narrow, persist, or widen in different mobilizational contexts. In addition, complementary marginal effect plots illustrate how the impact of EU norms varies by gender and by the strength of conservative mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor H2 (Hybridization Hypothesis), the models account for interactions among attitudinal classes, EU-norm dissemination, and anti-system conservative mobilization, with gender gaps assessed independently across attitudinal profiles. Again, the models report marginal predicted probabilities and marginal effects rather than coefficients to describe the substantive consequences of these complicated connections. It focuses on predicted probabilities of protest participation by gender and attitudinal class under conditions of high EU norms and high conservative mobilization, where the hybridization mechanism should be most visible. I also compute the class-specific marginal effects of gender and anti-system mobilization at high EU norms levels to isolate the conditions under which hybrid attitudinal profiles become especially consequential for protest participation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe analysis in the paper focuses on average marginal effects, while the multinomial regression tables are reported in the Appendices: Appendix 1 for Hypothesis 1 and Appendix 2 for Hypothesis 2. Marginal effects and predicted probabilities are the most substantively meaningful way to interpret nonlinear interaction models. They are directly comparable across models, outcomes, and specifications, which ensures the results can be interpreted in substantive ways rather than in terms of raw log-odds ratios, which often obscure the size and direction of effects.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAnalysis\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFigures 1\u0026ndash;4 present predicted probabilities of protest participation (panels a\u0026ndash;c) and marginal effects of EU-norm diffusion (panel d) across varying levels of conservative mobilization. These results address the Backlash Amplification Hypothesis 1, which anticipates that EU norms diffusion narrows gender gaps under weak conservative mobilization, sustains them under moderate conservative mobilization, and amplifies them under strong conservative mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAbstention from participation (Fig.\u0026nbsp;1) decreases significantly with EU-norm diffusion for both men and women, and this decline is broadly parallel across contexts. Women begin with slightly higher probabilities of abstention, but this difference narrows as liberal democracy rises. The interaction effects are not significant, indicating that EU norms reduce abstention in a largely gender-neutral fashion. In this domain, therefore, the hypothesis does not find support: instead of differentiated effects, EU norms lower abstention symmetrically.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLow-effort protest (Fig.\u0026nbsp;2) provides the clearest evidence for the expected conditional dynamics. Under weak conservative counter-mobilization, women\u0026rsquo;s participation rises more steeply than men\u0026rsquo;s, producing a widening female advantage. Under moderate mobilization, both men and women increase participation in parallel, sustaining the gender gap rather than altering it. Under strong mobilization, men\u0026rsquo;s participation increases while women\u0026rsquo;s stagnates, reversing the gender gap. The marginal effects confirm this sequence: positive for women in weak contexts, neutral in moderate ones, and negative in strong contexts. This pattern is consistent with backlash amplification, where moderate mobilization sustains existing gaps and strong mobilization amplifies them.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHigh-effort protest (Fig.\u0026nbsp;3) displays a weaker version of the same dynamics. Under weak and moderate conservative counter-mobilization, men maintain a modest advantage, while women\u0026rsquo;s participation does not increase significantly with EU norms. Under strong mobilization, men\u0026rsquo;s participation rises while women\u0026rsquo;s declines, widening the gap. Here again, marginal effects indicate stability in moderate conservative contexts and amplification in strong contexts, aligning with the first hypothesis, albeit less strongly than in the low-effort participatory types.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eConservative counter-mobilization significantly increases participation overall for mixed-effort protest (Fig.\u0026nbsp;4), and EU norms condition these effects in gendered ways. Under weak mobilization, men benefit more strongly, producing a modest male advantage. In the case of moderate mobilization, both men and women increase participation in parallel, leaving the gap unchanged. Strong conservative mobilization again benefits men disproportionately, amplifying gender gaps. The marginal effects trace this progression, with stability under moderate conservative mobilization and widening gaps for mixed-effort protest in strong conservative mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo further test how EU norms influence gendered protest participation, the Hybridization Hypothesis (H2) posits that hybrid attitudinal profiles, those combining egalitarian and traditional orientations, become especially consequential in influencing protest participation once EU norms diffuse, and that their effects intensify under conditions of conservative counter-mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe results for non-participation show no statistically significant effects (Fig.\u0026nbsp;5a). Across attitudinal groups, the marginal effects of conservative counter-mobilization remain close to zero, and the confidence intervals overlap, indicating that neither hybrid nor consistent profiles are decisive in structuring abstention. In this respect, EU-norm diffusion lowers non-participation in general but does not operate through differentiated effects across attitudinal categories.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe picture changes when turning to low-effort protest, where the significance of hybridization becomes evident (Fig.\u0026nbsp;5b). Mixed-egalitarian profiles, as well as consistently egalitarian groups, show significant positive effects of conservative mobilization. Traditional and ambivalent profiles, by contrast, remain unaffected. Importantly, as EU norms increase, the responsiveness of mixed-egalitarian and egalitarian groups is reduced, suggesting that the diffusion of liberal democracy dampens the mobilizing potential of conservative pressures among these profiles. This pattern indicates that low-cost protest is the domain where hybridization most clearly conditions the interplay between EU norms and conservative mobilization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHigh-effort protest displays a different dynamic (Fig.\u0026nbsp;5c). Here, none of the marginal effects of conservative mobilization reach statistical significance, and confidence intervals consistently include zero. This suggests that in more demanding forms of protest participation, hybrid and consistent profiles alike are not strongly mobilized by conservative forces, even under varying levels of EU-norm diffusion.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the case of mixed-effort protest, hybridization again proves relevant (Fig.\u0026nbsp;5d). Conservative counter-mobilization has a statistically significant positive effect for mixed-egalitarian profiles, while the effects for traditional, ambivalent, and consistently egalitarian groups remain insignificant. Unlike in the low-effort domain, EU-norm diffusion does not markedly dampen these effects, which remain relatively stable across levels of liberal democracy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThus, the results of Hypothesis 2 testing show that hybrid attitudinal profiles matter selectively. They play no role in influencing abstention from participation or high-effort protest, but they exhibit statistically significant responsiveness to conservative mobilization in low- and mixed-effort participation. EU-norm diffusion further conditions these dynamics by weakening responsiveness in the low-effort participation while leaving mixed-effort mobilization relatively stable. These results provide partial support for H2, highlighting hybrid profiles as the attitudinal settings where EU norms and conservative mobilization intersect most visibly in influencing gendered protest participation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo sum up, the findings provide partial evidence for both hypotheses. For the backlash amplification perspective, the predicted sequence is visible in low-effort protest, where gender gaps narrow under weak mobilization, persist under moderate mobilization, and widen under strong mobilization. In high-effort and mixed-effort protests, similar tendencies appear, but some effects are weak or statistically insignificant. Non-participation, by contrast, shows no differentiated effects, as EU norms reduce abstention broadly and symmetrically. For the hybridization perspective, hybrid profiles matter significantly in low- and mixed-effort protest, while effects in abstention and high-effort protest remain insignificant. Taken together, the results point to a conditional but uneven influence of EU-norm diffusion: it interacts with mobilizational contexts and hybrid attitudinal structures in ways that are sometimes statistically robust, but in other cases do not reach significance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper reveals that the interactions between the EU norms diffusion, conservative counter-mobilization, and multidimensional gender-role attitudes condition gendered protest participation in Europe. The findings provide partial support for both the backlash amplification and hybridization hypotheses. They contribute to the comparative politics debates on the EU norm diffusion, conservative backlash politics, and the political participatory implications of ambivalent gender-role attitudes in three ways.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirst, the paper contributes to the literature on EU norm diffusion and its effects on national policies (Jacquot, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Lombardo and Forest, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Martinsen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Sedelmeier, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e), moving focus from norm adoption and compliance toward contentious politics and protest participation (Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Weldon, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). The results demonstrate that the EU norm diffusion effects on protest participation are conditional on the conservative backlash and gender role attitudes rather than remaining uniform. Norm diffusion narrows gender gaps in contexts of weak conservative mobilization but sustains or widens them where conservative forces are strong. Depending on how individual gender-role attitudes refract EU gender-equality norms, they produce divergent outcomes across Europe, far from generating linear convergence. The relations between progressive mobilization and conservative backlash turn gender equality into a contested terrain (Graff and Korolczuk, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Paternotte and Kuhar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Verloo, 2018).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, the study contributes to the literature on conservative backlash politics. Scholars have highlighted the rise of a \u0026ldquo;gender counter-revolution\u0026rdquo; in Central and Eastern Europe (Grzebalska and Pető, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Krizs\u0026aacute;n and Roggeband, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), but the analysis here demonstrates that backlash has systematic behavioral consequences for political participation across the continent. Under strong conservative mobilization, men\u0026rsquo;s participation increases across low-effort, high-effort, and mixed-effort protests, while women\u0026rsquo;s participation stagnates or declines, producing widening gender gaps. In this way, the study suggests that backlash has observable consequences for participation gaps, situating gender within broader comparative debates on how contentious politics responds to norm diffusion and institutional change (Inglehart and Norris, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird, the findings advance theories of the gender-role attitudes\u0026rsquo; multidimensionality and their impact on protest participation. Research has already documented that attitudes toward gender roles are segmented across the public sphere, private sphere, and essentialist beliefs (Charles and Grusky, 2004; Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Lappeg\u0026aring;rd et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). The present study demonstrates that hybrid attitudinal profiles, particularly the mixed-egalitarian orientations identified in the analysis, are politically consequential because they condition how individuals respond to conservative mobilization once EU gender-equality norms diffuse. Such findings resonate with theories of \u0026ldquo;egalitarian essentialism\u0026rdquo; (Charles and Grusky, 2004; Grunow et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Knight and Brinton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e), which emphasize the ambivalent political implications of multidimensional gender-role attitudes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn low- and mixed-effort protest, the hybrid attitudinal clusters amplify or dampen gender gaps in protest participation depending on the contextual characteristics (i.e., level of liberal democracy, conservative counter-mobilization), whereas in abstention from protest and high-effort protest, their influence is minimal. It resonates with theories of the incomplete gender revolution (Esping-Andersen and Billari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Goldscheider et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) and suggests that attitudinal ambivalence translates into different protests.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTaken together, the results point to gendered participation gaps in Europe as contingent on the interaction of EU gender-equality norm diffusion, conservative backlash, and ambivalent gender-role attitudes. Gender offers a useful lens for examining how transnational norms interact with domestic politics, producing uneven patterns of protest. More broadly, the analysis suggests that participation gaps reflect public attitudes toward gender roles as much as the specificity of the institutional arrangements.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDr. Olga Lavrinenko is the sole author of this manuscript and was responsible for the conception, analysis, and writing of the paper.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData Availability\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe research is based on the secondary data analysis. All the data sources are referenced in the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBego, I. (2015) \u003cem\u003eGender equality policy in the European Union: A fast track to parity for the new member states.\u003c/em\u003e London: Palgrave Macmillan.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBoele-Woelki, K. 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(2011) \u003cem\u003eWhen protest makes policy: How social movements represent disadvantaged groups.\u003c/em\u003e Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"comparative-european-politics","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Comparative European Politics](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/journal/41295)","snPcode":"41295","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41295/3","title":"Comparative European Politics","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer SNAPPs","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Europeanization, EU-norm diffusion, protest, gender, gender-role attitudes","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7829158/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7829158/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe paper examines how EU gender equality norm diffusion, conservative counter-mobilization, and multidimensional gender role attitudes influence gendered protest participation across Europe and neighboring states. It advances two hypotheses. The Backlash Amplification Hypothesis expects that EU-driven equality norms correspond to narrower gender gaps where conservative mobilization is weak and to wider gaps where it is strong. The Hybridization Hypothesis posits that hybrid attitudinal profiles, combining egalitarian and traditional orientations, gain political relevance in contexts of intense conservative counter-mobilization and high EU norms diffusion. The harmonized data includes the last three waves of the European Values Study and Varieties of Democracy indicators. Latent class analysis is used to model gender-role attitudes and multinomial logistic regressions with cross-level interactions to estimate protest participation. The results provide partial support for both hypotheses. They indicate that gender gaps in protest participation narrow under weak conservative counter-mobilization but widen when conservative movements are strong. Hybrid attitudinal profiles are relevant mainly for low- and mixed-effort protest, where their responsiveness to conservative counter-mobilization becomes visible. The paper contributes to comparative debates on Europeanization and conservative backlash by demonstrating how relations between transnational norms, domestic conservative counter-mobilization, and multidimensional gender-role attitudes influence the gender gaps in protest participation.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Gendered Protest in Europe: EU Norm Diffusion, Conservative Backlash, and Attitudinal Hybridization","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-10-13 10:43:50","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7829158/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-11-29T10:11:56+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-11-28T23:29:20+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-11-17T16:59:26+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"148458137801680596187650311826422829841","date":"2025-10-23T01:22:27+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"167319062792306549340422253539831648422","date":"2025-10-21T14:51:26+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-10-21T08:19:34+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-10-21T08:13:58+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-10-14T08:38:57+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Comparative European Politics","date":"2025-10-10T16:45:50+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"comparative-european-politics","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Comparative European Politics](https://www.palgrave.com/gp/journal/41295)","snPcode":"41295","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41295/3","title":"Comparative European Politics","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer SNAPPs","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"a214b278-ffb1-4380-9f1e-d0bd98153075","owner":[],"postedDate":"October 13th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-04-14T10:38:44+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-10-13 10:43:50","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7829158","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7829158","identity":"rs-7829158","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}