The Circular Economy Mirage: A Lifecycle Systems Analysis of India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy          

The Circular Economy Mirage: A Lifecycle Systems Analysis of India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The Circular Economy Mirage: A Lifecycle Systems Analysis of India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy Aladdin H.M Shaker, Puneet Pathak This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-9361254/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 5 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract India's Vehicle Scrappage Policy (Voluntary Vehicle Fleet Modernization Program) is a fundamental element of the circular economy transition in the transportation sector, emphasizing recycling, formalization, and emission reduction. Nonetheless, its systemic ramifications for resource efficiency are still little examined. This study rigorously assesses the strategy from a lifecycle systems viewpoint, transcending traditional measures of recycling efficiency and tailpipe emissions. The article employs a qualitative, doctrinal, and conceptual methodology to establish a five-dimensional analytical framework encompassing durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon, traceability, and incentive structures. The study uncovers a series of structural conflicts inherent in the policy design. Initially, age-dependent scrappage regulations and financial incentives compromise product durability, resulting in a durability shortfall. Secondly, enhanced recycling may paradoxically increase the need for raw materials, illustrating a waste-resource contradiction. The policy overlooks upstream emissions, leading to the displacement of embedded carbon from increased vehicle production. Fourth, inadequate traceability and the prevalence of informal dismantling sectors undermine assertions of circularity. Ultimately, incentive frameworks are oriented towards market expansion rather than resource protection. The study characterizes these dynamics as a "circular economy mirage," wherein formal recycling benefits conceal increasing material throughput and lifecycle emissions. It argues that recycling-focused policy frameworks are inadequate without concurrent efforts to reduce demand and manage lifecycles. The paper closes by recommending policy approaches focused on durability criteria, condition-based retirement, lifecycle-based incentives, and supply chain decarbonization. These findings enhance the broader discussion on circular economy policy in emerging economies by emphasizing the necessity for systematic, lifecycle-focused regulatory frameworks. Circular economy vehicle scrappage policy lifecycle assessment resource efficiency embedded carbon extended producer responsibility Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 1. Introduction India’s 2021 Vehicle Scrappage Policy (also known as the Voluntary Vehicle Fleet Modernization Program, V-VMP) was heralded as a major step toward cleaner transportation and material circularity. (Kumari 2025 ). Under this umbrella, a suite of regulations has been rolled out over the past few years. In September 2021, the Motor Vehicles (Registration and Functions of Vehicle Scrapping Facility) Rules, 2021 (G.S.R. 653(E), Sep 2021) were gazetted to register and regulate Registered Vehicle Scrapping Facilities (RVSFs) (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). In parallel, the government amended motor vehicle rules to require mandatory fitness tests via Automated Testing Stations (ATS). For example, from April 2023, all heavy commercial vehicles must pass ATS fitness tests, with lighter vehicles to follow in mid-2024 ((TERI) 2026 ). These measures supplement existing AIS-129 guidelines on environmentally sound dismantling and depollution. Importantly, generous incentives were attached to the policy: owners of old vehicles receive a “certificate of deposit” (CoD) redeemable against a new purchase, plus waivers or rebates. For instance, the 2021 rules waive new-registration fees for CoD-backed purchases and offer motor-vehicle tax rebates up to 25% for non-transport vehicles (15% for commercial. (Drishti IAS 2024 a). By early 2025, the policy ecosystem expanded further. The Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change finalized the Environment Protection (End-of-Life Vehicles) Rules, 2025 , effective 1 April 2025 (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2025 a). These rules formally establish Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for vehicles, meaning manufacturers (including importers) must ensure their vehicles are scrapped in an “environmentally sound manner” and can obtain EPR certificates by participating in the RVSF system. (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2025 a). In sum, India now has a flagship circular-economy initiative for vehicles: through a combination of age-based retirement laws, automated testing, formal scrap facilities, and producer obligations, the policy explicitly aims to capture value in scrapped vehicles and promote recycling. As one government press note puts it, the scrappage policy will “reduce pollution from old and unfit vehicles in an environment-friendly manner through a scientific scrapping process.” (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). It even seeks to integrate informal dismantlers into the formal sector, treating them as partners in this new system. This framing – of phasing out the old to supply feedstock for reuse – reflects a broader policy shift toward resource circularity in India’s environmental governance. (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025). Despite its recycling-oriented rhetoric, the vehicle scrappage policy poses a paradox. Conventional wisdom holds that recycling end-of-life vehicles conserves resources and reduces emissions. However, accelerating fleet turnover (i.e., retiring vehicles early) may undermine these goals. (Singh et al. 2021 a). Scrap-driven renewal means more new vehicles must be produced – driving demand for metals, plastics, batteries, and the energy to make them. In effect, every scrapped car or bus is a double-edged sword: it supplies scrap material (e.g., steel) but also prompts the manufacture of a replacement vehicle with substantial embodied resource use. (Sharma and Pandey 2020 a). This trade-off challenges the dominant assumption that increased recycling inherently equates to sustainability. Even well-intentioned scrappage programs can yield only modest net carbon savings when manufacturing emissions are accounted for (James et al. 2023a ). Put differently, recycling the old may inadvertently stimulate new production, risking a “widening loop” of material throughput rather than its reduction. In practice, the current policy may accelerate vehicle obsolescence. An owner deciding between costly repairs and a scrapping incentive may scrap a vehicle that could have otherwise lasted for years more. Over time, this creates a self-reinforcing cycle of early disposal: the policy makes new purchases more attractive and lowers the bar for scrapping. (Malhotra 2023 ). Thus, a key concern arises: can accelerated vehicle turnover ever be reconciled with reducing absolute resource consumption? This study critically evaluates that assumption. We ask whether formal scrapping and recycling, as structured in the policy, truly align with a circular-economy objective of reducing total material throughput, or whether they merely perpetuate (or even increase) resource use through induced demand. Existing research on India’s scrappage policy has largely focused on emissions and recycling efficiency rather than on systemic resource flows. Several studies emphasize reductions in tailpipe pollution, safety improvements (e.g., the phase-out of high-emitting vehicles), and improvements in collection and dismantling processes. (James et al. 2023a ). Likewise, analysts have noted challenges in formalizing the recycling industry, which is fraught with informality and technological gaps. (Molla et al. 2023 a). However, few studies adopt a full life-cycle perspective that links policy design to overall material and carbon footprints. In particular, the literature lacks a critical analysis of whether mandated scrappage truly “closes loops” on materials use, or whether it generates offsetting upstream impacts (such as embodied emissions in new vehicles). A lifecycle viewpoint would account for embedded carbon in production and track how much virgin material is still demanded under the policy. As WRI (Tasaki & Jaeger 2025) emphasizes, a genuine circular-economy strategy requires examining all stages of a product’s journey, including manufacturing and disposal, rather than focusing solely on end-of-life recycling metrics. (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025). This gap means policy evaluation often treats recycling tonnage or emission intensities in isolation, without questioning whether total resource throughput is actually declining. In short, while recycling efficiency in India’s ELV sector has been studied (Molla et al. 2023 a)The net systemic outcomes of the scrappage rules remain unexplored. No prior analysis has systematically assessed the contradictions between the policy’s recycling rhetoric and its lifecycle effects on resource use and emissions. Recent meta-analyses of circular economy definitions indicate that the concept predominantly focuses on waste management and recycling, often neglecting broader lifecycle, climate, and resource-use aspects. This conceptual bias threatens to limit policy design to end-of-life therapies rather than to systemic resource reduction (Sardianou et al. 2024 ). Moreover, the shift to a circular economy is recognized as a multifaceted, resource-intensive endeavor that requires considerable organizational adjustments, systemic reconfiguration, and the cultivation of new competencies. Current research indicates that this transformation entails substantial configuration costs, restricted access to information, and the need for synchronized changes across multiple tiers of production and governance (Dos Santos and Gohr 2026 ). Current studies on India's scrappage policy have predominantly concentrated on emissions reduction, fleet modernization, and recycling efficiency, rather than on systemic resource dynamics.(Mishra et al. 2024 ) Numerous studies highlight reductions in tailpipe emissions, safety improvements, and advancements in collection and dismantling procedures.(Singh et al. 2021 a; Hu 2022 ; Shui et al. 2024 ) Although these contributions offer significant operational insights, they mostly evaluate outcomes using limited metrics such as emission intensity or material recovery rates. Recent developments in circular economy and resource governance literature have increasingly scrutinized the sufficiency of existing metrics, emphasizing the significance of lifecycle-based assessment, rebound effects, and absolute resource diminution. (De Pascale et al. 2021 ; Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2022 ; Jerome et al. 2022 ; Lowe et al. 2025 ). Recent research in industrial ecology indicates that recycling-focused policies may not diminish overall material throughput if upstream production dynamics and demand growth are neglected. (Milios 2018 ; Sasmoko et al. 2022 ; Nguyen et al. 2025 ) Nonetheless, the methodical implementation of lifecycle systems thinking in automotive scrappage policies—especially in emerging economies—remains insufficient. No previous research in the Indian context has specifically investigated the impact of policy design on total material throughput, embedded carbon fluxes, and systemic feedback effects throughout the vehicle lifecycle. (Harun et al. 2022 ; Aggrawal et al. 2025 a). This gap limits the ability to assess whether scrappage programs deliver genuine circular-economy outcomes or merely shift resource use patterns. In response to these constraints, this investigation establishes and implements a lifecycle systems analytical framework to evaluate the structural compatibility between India's vehicle scrappage policy and circular economy objectives. Instead of utilizing recycling as a proxy for sustainability, the analysis evaluates whether the policy's design and incentive mechanisms contribute to decreases in absolute material throughput and lifecycle emissions. The investigation emphasizes five critical dimensions that surpass conventional tailpipe-based evaluations: incentive structures, embedded carbon emissions, material flow dynamics, and product durability. The paper, by employing this framework, identifies systemic contradictions between the policy's declared circular economy objectives and its potential material and environmental consequences. In terms of methodology, the investigation employs a qualitative, doctrinal approach that is grounded in the examination of policy instruments, regulatory texts, and pertinent academic literature, all of which are interpreted through a lifecycle systems perspective. By incorporating these components, the paper offers a structured, systems-based critique of the scrappage policy, with a particular emphasis on the discrepancy between the intended policy objectives and the actual resource implications. This research offers three main contributions. First, it talks about the "circular economy mirage" in the context of car policy. This is when things that seem to be circular, including structured recycling systems and certification procedures, really hide the fact that resources are still being used or used more. By emphasizing lifespan dynamics and rebound effects, the paper contests reductionist views that equate recycling efficacy with sustainability. Second, the study develops a multidimensional analytical framework encompassing durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon emissions, supply chain traceability, and incentive structures. This paradigm enables systematic evaluation of policy design and uncovers fundamental trade-offs that are not apparent in traditional assessments. It can also be used in other resource-heavy industries that are putting circular economy principles into action. Third, the article outlines several approaches to reform policies so that they reduce the total amount of material that passes through them and ensure that regulatory tools follow the reduce–reuse–recycle hierarchy. These suggestions, which include standards that prioritize durability and lifecycle-based incentive systems, offer India a practical way to revise its automobile scrappage policy to prioritize real resource conservation. 2. Methodology: Conceptual and Systems-Based Policy Analysis 2.1 Research Design This study utilizes a qualitative lifecycle-informed systems analysis to assess the environmental and resource impacts of India's automobile scrappage legislation. Rather than relying on quantitative life-cycle assessment (LCA), it employs a conceptual lifecycle systems perspective to analyze the impact of policy design on material throughput, embedded emissions, and system-wide feedback effects. (McAvoy et al. 2021 ). This method is especially suitable for policy study, as material flows, regulatory frameworks, institutional dynamics, and behavioral reactions influence environmental outcomes. Current research indicates that although Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) effectively quantifies environmental impacts, it frequently neglects systemic interactions, rebound effects, and governance frameworks that affect actual outcomes (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2022 ; Greer et al. 2021 ). A qualitative lifecycle systems approach enables a comprehensive assessment of how policy mechanisms influence resource use across the production, use, and disposal phases (Milios 2018 ). The research methodologically combines doctrinal policy analysis with systems-based evaluation, utilizing regulatory texts, policy papers, and secondary literature. This study establishes a five-dimensional analytical framework that includes durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon, traceability, and incentive structures to implement this strategy. Decision-making in resource-intensive systems necessarily entails many, frequently conflicting criteria—encompassing environmental, economic, technological, and social dimensions—necessitating systematic analytical methods to assess trade-offs and priorities (Bajwa et al. 2025 ). These characteristics serve as analytical proxies for lifetime performance, enabling a structured evaluation of policy impacts across the production, use, and end-of-life stages. This paradigm facilitates the detection of systemic inconsistencies that are concealed by traditional policy indicators centered on recycling rates or tailpipe emissions (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2022 ). 2.2 Lifecycle Systems Perspective Our analysis adopts a full lifecycle perspective on vehicles. That means evaluating impacts from the vehicle’s “cradle-to-grave” path – from extraction of raw materials to manufacturing, use, and final disposal – rather than focusing narrowly on tailpipe emissions. Circular economy (CE) thinking emphasizes that overconsumption is the root problem. (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2022 ). In a holistic CE, the priority is to reduce and extend product life, not merely to recycle, as a true circular model “considers all stages of a product’s journey” and designs products to last longer. (Sahajwalla and Hossain 2023 ). By contrast, if policy metrics only track how much scrap is processed or how much recycled content is obtained, they may miss leakages outside the system. The Ellen MacArthur Foundation similarly warns that lifecycle analyses can incentivize short-term fixes (e.g., marginally more efficient but still disposable products) rather than systemic change. Motivated by this, our perspective includes upstream effects (such as mining and manufacturing emissions) and downstream realities (such as informal sector practices), rather than focusing solely on the legislative endpoint of scrapping. In line with previous studies on automotive battery systems, circular economy solutions should be understood across multiple lifecycle phases, encompassing reuse, repurposing, and recycling rather than as discrete end-of-life measures (Rönkkö et al. 2024 ). We explicitly critique narrow metrics, e.g., “percent recycled” or annual emissions improvements, and instead ask whether the scrappage rules actually lower total resource throughput and lifecycle emissions . 2.3 Analytical Framework To systematically interrogate the policy, we apply a five-dimensional framework. See Figure. 1 below. Each dimension represents a key facet of vehicle circularity: Durability (Product Lifespan) . Does policy design encourage vehicles to live longer or shorter lives? This dimension examines incentives or disincentives for extended use. CE theory stresses longevity: products should be “designed from the start to last longer. (Nakamoto and Kagawa 2022 ). We assess whether scrappage rules undermine durability (e.g., via age-based retirements). Material Flow Dynamics . How does recycling interact with raw material demand? We analyze whether increased scrap recovery actually displaces virgin inputs or instead stimulates overall demand. The literature on the waste-resource paradox is relevant: turning waste into a commodity can create new demand and even perpetuate production. (Greer et al. 2021 ). This dimension examines supply chain feedback, market responses, and the potential for rebound effects. Embedded Carbon (Upstream Emissions) . We track the carbon footprint of new-vehicle production (including batteries, components, and steel). Policy evaluations often ignore these upstream emissions, but they can be large. For example, manufacturing an 80 kWh EV battery can emit 2.4–16 metric tons of CO₂. (MIT Climate Portal 2022 ). We ask whether replacing old vehicles is truly carbon-saving when their embedded emissions are factored in. Traceability (Chain-of-Custody) . We consider the transparency and coverage of material flows in practice. Formal RVSFs may account for a fraction of scrapped vehicles, while informal breakers process the rest. Weak tracing results in incomplete circular loops and uncontrolled waste leaks. We examine policy provisions for tracking (e.g., CoD accounting, IT portals) and known gaps, e.g., the large informal sector. (Molla et al. 2023 a). Incentive Structures . This captures how financial and regulatory incentives shape stakeholder behavior. It includes subsidies for new vehicle sales, fees for continued vehicle use, and rewards for recycling output. We analyze whether these incentives align with resource conservation (e.g., rewarding long use and high recycled content) or instead favor higher throughput (e.g., subsidizing replacements). To improve analytical transparency and replicability, each part of the framework is implemented using clear evaluative criteria. The durability dimension examines whether the rules in a policy encourage products to last longer or to retire sooner. Material flow dynamics examine whether recycling systems actually minimize the need for new materials and reduce overall material flows. Embedded carbon is evaluated by determining if upstream production emissions and global supply chain effects are incorporated into policy formulation. Traceability assesses whether systems are in place to track the flow of materials between formal and informal sectors, and how well they work. Lastly, incentive structures are examined by considering how financial and regulatory tools affect stakeholders' behavior regarding consumption, replacement cycles, and resource use. The results section rigorously applies each dimension, comparing individual policy measures to these criteria to find systemic consequences and conflicts. This systematic approach allows the framework to be adapted and applied to other policy areas that require significant resources. The results section rigorously applies each dimension, mapping policy mechanisms against these criteria to uncover related systemic consequences and conflicts. This systematic methodology enables the framework to be applied to alternative policy scenarios in resource-intensive sectors. 3. India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy: Architecture and Objectives 3.1 Regulatory Framework India’s vehicle scrappage framework consists of layered regulations across ministries. The cornerstone is the Vehicle Scrappage Policy (VSP) , announced in 2021 and officially titled the Voluntary Vehicle Modernization Program. Its legal components include: RVSF Rules (2021) (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024b) – The Motor Vehicles (Registration and Functions of Vehicle Scrapping Facility) Rules, 2021 (G.S.R. 653[E], 23 Sep 2021) set up the system of licensed scrapping centers. RVSFs must register with state transport authorities and comply with technical standards (e.g., AIS-129) for depollution. These rules specify that scrapping centers issue “certificate of deposit” documents when they shred a vehicle. They also require environmentally sound handling of hazardous materials (fluids, batteries) in accordance with CPCB guidelines (The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) 2022 ). Fitness and ATS Rules (2022–2024) – The Central Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Rules, 2022 introduced Automated Testing Stations (ATS) for vehicle fitness, phasing them in by category: from April 2023 for Heavy Goods and Passenger Vehicles, and from June 2024 for other classes. (TERI 2026). These rules also created a digital portal for ATS operations, fixed RC renewals to 10-year cycles, and mandated periodic calibration of testing equipment. ((TERI) 2026 ). Under these rules, an old vehicle failing its ATS tests is effectively declared an End-of-Life Vehicle (ELV) and must be scrapped. The Motor Vehicles (First Amendment) Rules, 2023 further capped the lifetimes of government vehicles, no RC renewal beyond 15 years (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2025). Tax and Registration Incentives (2021–2025) – In October 2021, two key notifications offered financial incentives for turnover: G.S.R. 720(E) allowed a Motor Vehicle tax rebate of up to 25% (personal vehicles) or 15% (commercial) if registered against a CoD. (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). G.S.R. 714(E) waived all registration fees for such vehicles (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2021). In 2025, further amendments (e.g., G.S.R. 200[E], Mar 2025) extended concessions to vehicles of older emissions norms (TERI 2026). In practice, these incentives package scrap value with tax/fee savings and even small OEM discounts (e.g., MoRTH recommended a 5% automaker rebate for new purchases under VSP) (James et al. 2023a ). ELV Rules and EPR (2024–2025) – The Ministry of Environment notified the End-of-Life Vehicles (Management) Rules, 2024 in Jan 2024 (gazetted 6 Jan 2025) (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2025 b). These rules extend EPR to the vehicle sector. Under Rule 2, vehicle manufacturers (and importers) must register as EPR-obligated producers and can discharge their obligation by purchasing EPR certificates from RVSFs. Crucially, an EPR certificate is generated only when a registered facility processes scrap steel from a demolished vehicle. (PSR Compliance 2026 ). Thus, the law ties producer compliance to the actual recovery of vehicle materials (steel) by formal centers. Producers must meet annual scrapping targets (100% of liability initially, rising to 130% by 2030) based on kilograms of steel in sold vehicles. (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2025). This framework effectively outsources material recycling to the network of RVSFs – formalizing the “recycle” leg of CE into law. Together, these regulations constitute a structured program: an age-based retirement regime enforced via fitness tests, coupled with formal scrapping centers and incentives for renewal. For example, under the 2021 policy, personal vehicles over 15 years old (and commercial vehicles over 10 years old) must pass ATS fitness testing or be scrapped. (Kumari 2025 ). Owners are nudged to surrender end-of-life vehicles in exchange for CoDs redeemable against new purchases with tax breaks and fee waivers. (James et al. 2023a ). Officials expect this will generate a steady stream of scrap into certified facilities, where hazardous materials are pre-removed, and bulk metals are shredded or reused in accordance with standards. 3.2 Circular Economy Promise The policy narrative underscores circular-economy benefits of these measures. Government statements and expert commentary highlight several formal objectives. First, environmental protection – scrapping unfit vehicles is promised to improve air quality and road safety. An S&P analysis notes that one old truck can emit as much as 14 new ones, so turning over fleets could substantially cut pollution. (Ghosh et al. 2021 ). Second, recycling and resource recovery – RVSFs are intended to channel secondary raw materials back into industry. The rules explicitly require hazardous parts to be removed in accordance with CPCB guidelines. (Nama et al. 2025 ), implying that the remaining steel, aluminum, and other metals will be recycled to support the circular economy. In practice, the government envisions RVSFs as hubs that collect and sort ELVs, then compress scrap metal for sale; plastics and glass can also be recovered where economically viable. Official documents tout this as a way to reduce reliance on imported raw materials and conserve finite resources – for example, one policy brief notes that 40 + million vehicles globally reach the end of their life each year, representing a significant potential source of recyclable metals. (Aggrawal et al. 2025 b). A third promise is the formalization of the sector . The policy explicitly invites informal dismantlers to join the formal chain; 22 of the first 62 RVSFs were former scrap dealers. (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). By bringing untaxed scrap operations under regulatory oversight, authorities aim to improve worker safety and environmental compliance. To this end, CPCB issued guidelines (Mar 2023) for eco-friendly depollution at RVSFs, including guidelines on oil storage and the use of wet/shear processes to minimize emissions. Fourth, economic and social benefits are cited: proponents argue that formal scrapping will create skilled jobs and new businesses (in testing, recycling technology, and remanufacturing), while giving owners an incentive to value their scrap. For instance, one study projects the creation of “allied services” in vehicle health monitoring and maintenance as a result of the policy. (James et al. 2023a ). The policy narrative characterizes VSP as "scientific scrapping" that completes cycles. This is proposed as a cohesive strategy: eliminate the obsolete for ecological benefit, reclaim its materials for repurposing, and invigorate a domestic recycling sector. Certification and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) are designed to ensure the monitoring of material flows. The policy is framed not merely as environmental legislation, but as a fundamental element of India’s developing circular economy for autos. It is essential to recognize that these commitments primarily emphasize outputs (e.g., formalization, recycled tonnage, number of scrapped vehicles) rather than comprehensive, system-wide goals. The policy design presupposes that enhanced recycling and fleet renewal inherently result in sustainability - a presumption we will examine further later. 3.3 Policy Design Logic The logic underlying India’s scrappage policy can be unpacked in three parts: age-based retirement, incentive alignment, and a recycling-centric approach. First, the age-based rul e requires older vehicles to go. In essence, the policy equates vehicle age with environmental obsolescence. As noted, private cars beyond 15 years (and most trucks beyond 10) are flagged as candidates for scrapping. (Kumari 2025 ). Increasing maintenance costs and poorer emission performance of aging vehicles technically justify this rule. However, it is a blunt instrument: it ignores actual condition, usage, or technology. By mandating retirement at a fixed horizon, the policy ensures a large retirement wave, regardless of whether those vehicles still have functional life or could be upgraded. In practice, this pushes owners to scrap even marginally serviceable vehicles, accelerating turnover. (Singh et al. 2021 b). Second, the incentive structure is specifically designed to boost fleet renewal. Owners of old vehicles are enticed not only by the disposal of scrap but by material rewards to buy new ones. The CoD system effectively gives cash value for the old vehicle, which can cover 4–6% of a new car’s ex-showroom price on average. (James et al. 2023a ). On top of that, new vehicles earned under CoD enjoy waived registration fees and large tax concessions (15–25% of the price) (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024b). State governments were also urged to extend road-tax rebates. Together, these fiscal incentives resemble a subsidy for new vehicle sales. Indeed, experience from other scrappage programs (e.g., the US “Cash for Clunkers” or Germany’s 2009 scheme) shows that such incentives primarily boost sales volumes. (James et al. 2023a ). Implicitly, the policy treats vehicle manufacturing and sale as desirable outcomes – industrial growth and GDP gains – so much so that it redirects scrap proceeds into new purchases. Third, the policy’s framing is recycling-centric. Establishing RVSFs, issuing CoDs, and specifying steel recovery targets assume that circularity equates to the recovery of physical materials. Implicitly, the designers assume that processing every old car at a formal center will maximize scrap recovery, thereby reducing the need for virgin material. Thus, the policy invests heavily in the downstream “end-of-life” segment (certified shredding, steel accounting) and less in upstream demand management. The policy narrative makes no mention of measures to reduce vehicle sales or to encourage vehicle retention – the core of CE's “reduce” and “reuse” principles. (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025). Instead, scrapping and recycling are treated as self-evident goods. This can be seen in statements like the claim that shifting an aging fleet to formal recycling will “complement [India’s] circular economy by recycling materials.” (Molla et al. 2022 )– The only implied material saving is from recycling, not from consuming less. In summary, India’s scrappage architecture rests on an implicit assumption: that more recycling and more frequent fleet renewal automatically equals sustainability. In practice, this means constructing a system that channels as many old vehicles as possible through RVSFs, while simultaneously stimulating as many new sales as possible. As we will show, this logic creates tensions. For example, by incentivizing scrapping after 15 years, the policy devalues durability and planned longevity. Subsidizing new vehicle purchases risks inflating total consumption. By focusing on material recovery, it overlooks embedded emissions and potential market rebound. In the next section, we apply our five-dimensional framework to examine these contradictions in detail. 4. Results: Systemic Contradictions in Circular Economy Design The analysis applies the five elements of the analytical framework—durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon, traceability, and incentive structures—to assess the internal coherence of India's automobile scrappage policy. Each subsection corresponds to a framework dimension and outlines the policy's structural ramifications within that domain. 4.1 Durability Deficit From the durability dimension of the analytical framework, the policy reveals a structural tendency towards shorter product lifespans, as it offers no incentives to extend vehicle lifetimes . Because age thresholds trigger scrapping, vehicle longevity is actively discouraged. In fact, by making it rewarding to replace a still-functional 15-year-old vehicle, the policy effectively mandates shorter useful lives. As WRI notes, CE ideally requires designing products “to last longer.” (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025), but here the opposite is true. Owners know that at year 15 (car) or 10 (truck), their vehicle will face stringent tests or inspections; at that point, even a well-maintained vehicle is economically better to scrap (due to incentives) than to keep running. There is literally no program component that encourages the maintenance or repair of older vehicles. To the contrary, the higher post-15-year renewal fees and the upfront benefit of a CoD make it financially appealing to trade in a functioning vehicle. Evidence from electric car battery systems corroborates this assertion, since batteries that attain their nominal end-of-life in vehicles typically retain 60–80% of their original capacity and remain viable for secondary applications. This underscores that "end-of-life" is often a functionally and policy-defined criterion rather than a genuine depletion of material or product value. (Rönkkö et al. 2024 ). This creates a “durability deficit”: any implicit value in a long-lived vehicle is undermined. Instead of innovation in repairability or modular upgrades, manufacturers may lean into producing vehicles that last exactly until the scrappage threshold. Consumers may habitually treat age 15 as the vessel’s endpoint. In short, the scrappage policy turns durability into a liability rather than an asset. From a durability perspective, the policy accelerates planned obsolescence. Vehicle longevity is effectively penalized, making “built to last” designs economically irrational under the program. 4.2 Virgin Material Paradox From a material flow perspective within the analytical framework, the policy demonstrates a mismatch between recycling mechanisms and virgin material demand. One might assume that more recycling means less virgin mining. However, paradoxically, recycling can create demand for more material. Greer et al. ( 2021 ) describe a “waste-resource paradox”: converting waste streams into commodities can encourage their continued production. (Greer et al. 2021 ). Applied here, clearing old vehicles to supply scrap could sustain or even grow steel demand. In India’s case, recycled auto scrap will become widely available and relatively cheap if the scrappage policy succeeds. But unless new vehicles are made with very high recycled content, automakers may increase production, consuming additional virgin steel and other inputs to meet overall demand growth. Indeed, early studies of global scrappage programs find that industrial output (e.g., for steel and auto parts) often rises alongside vehicle turnover. Put differently, recycling does not guarantee substitution: any scrap recovered only slightly offsets the immense upstream demand. India’s auto industry is expanding rapidly; new vehicle sales were projected to double in the 2020s. Even if thousands of tons of scrap flow back, the incremental demand from millions of new vehicles may swamp those savings (Sharma and Pandey 2020 b). Worse, because scrap supply is more assured, mills may decouple from scrap availability and continue mining. The policy offers no mechanism to throttle raw material use, so the net effect could be neutral or even increase virgin consumption. As Greer et al. caution, a naive circular strategy can “sustain waste (over)production” by locking in linear growth patterns. (Greer et al. 2021 ). Furthermore, research on electric vehicle battery systems indicates that recycling procedures are often technically complex, resource-intensive, and constrained by product design, especially when batteries are not engineered for disassembly or material reclamation.(Rönkkö et al. 2024 ) From a material flow perspective, the policy risks the waste-resource paradox: increasing scrap availability could paradoxically maintain or grow virgin material demand. Recycling alone, without demand reduction, may reinforce the linear production cycle. 4.3 Embedded Carbon Displacement From the embedded carbon perspective, the policy fails to adequately account for upstream emissions associated with production and the global supply chain, focusing on tailpipe pollutants while ignoring the carbon and energy used to manufacture new vehicles. Yet vehicle production – especially of large cars and EVs – can be extremely emissions-intensive. For instance, producing an 80 kWh EV battery emits on the order of 2.4–16 tonnes of CO₂. (MIT Climate Portal 2022 ). Conventional vehicles also require steel (for which recycling saves ~ 75% of the energy required for virgin production), and aluminum recycling saves ~ 95% (Aggrawal et al. 2025 b). Rapid turnover means many batteries and new steel billets are used, often powered by coal-fired plants and iron mines abroad. Thus, each new car carries a large “embedded carbon” debt. For example, one Tesla Model 3’s battery (80 kWh) may embody ~ 3–16 tCO₂ (MIT Climate Portal 2022 ). In comparison, the typical gasoline car emits roughly 1 tCO₂ per 4,000–5,000 km of driving. Thus, an EV can “spend” several years of tailpipe emissions before breaking even on its battery. If India’s grid remains coal-heavy in the near term, these manufacturing emissions are non-trivial. (MIT Climate Portal 2022 ). The scrappage policy offers no accounting of this upstream burden. Indeed, one Indian study notes that past scrappage schemes often achieved only modest net carbon reductions because the emissions from producing new vehicles and their increased use offset much of the tailpipe gains. (James et al. 2023a ). Moreover, many vehicles and parts are imported, displacing domestic emissions onto exporting countries. If an old car is scrapped and its replacement uses components from high-carbon supply chains (e.g., steel from coal-intensive mills, EVs from factories powered by brown power), India’s overall carbon footprint may hardly budge. In other words, the policy displaces emissions into the supply chain without mandating cleaner production. From a CE standpoint, reducing lifecycle carbon is as important as closing material loops, and here the design assumes that replacing old vehicles with nominally cleaner ones (even if new) is an unqualified win. In reality, unless new vehicles are produced in a decarbonized manner, the “hidden” carbon may erode or even negate claimed benefits. (Poschmann et al. 2023 ). From an embedded-carbon perspective, turning over the fleet can dramatically raise lifecycle emissions. Without measures to green manufacturing and imports, the upstream carbon footprint of new vehicles is likely to offset much of any tailpipe improvement. 4.4 Traceability Gap From a traceability perspective, the policy exhibits limitations in tracking material flows across formal and informal sectors. Additionally, the policy presumes that scrapped vehicles flow through certified channels, but in practice, many ELVs bypass the system. In India, a large informal network of dismantlers still dominates ELV recycling. (Molla et al. 2023 a). Despite RVSF registration, we lack a mechanism to ensure that every scrapped vehicle is taken to a licensed facility. Owners of older cars may sell them to local junkyards rather than pursue the bureaucratic CoD route. Even RVSFs might covertly buy scrap without issuing proper certificates. In short, material flows are largely untraceable under current governance. (James et al. 2023b ). This opacity carries two consequences. First, the actual recovery rates of scrap materials are unknown. Official tallies (e.g., CoDs issued) could dramatically undercount or overcount real flows. Second, environmental standards are compromised: informal breakers often use rudimentary methods (acid baths, open burning) to remove parts, releasing toxins in the process. The formal CPCB guidelines and RVSF standards won’t apply to these flows. (Zhou et al. 2022 ). Thus, a significant fraction of end-of-life material likely enters uncontrolled cycles, robbing the policy of its intended circular loop. Formal tracking (VIN monitoring, digital CoD registry) is still rudimentary, and no policy mandates linking each vehicle’s end-of-life to an RVSF record. From a traceability standpoint, the policy leaves a large gap. Many end-of-life vehicles may never enter the formal circular chain, undermining any claimed tracking of recycled content or pollution controls. 4.5 Incentive Misalignment From the perspective of the incentive structure dimension, the policy reflects a misalignment between economic incentives and resource-conservation objectives. The current incentive design aligns economic actors toward churn, not conservation. For owners, the financial inducements (cash-for-clunkers, tax breaks) are often insufficient to offset the sunk cost of a working vehicle. In practice, adoption has been slow: by mid-2025, only ~ 180,000 vehicles had been scrapped against a 500,000-annual target. S&P Global notes that “limited incentive, and the financial burden on owners,” continue to slow the program (Kumari 2025 ). Many owners postpone scrapping, waiting for better deals. This suggests that incentives may be too weak to spur owners or may be unevenly communicated. On the producer side, incentives are misdirected. Automakers (and dealers) benefit enormously from higher replacement sales, yet have little motivation to prioritize durability. Indeed, MoRTH’s inclusion of a recommended 5% discount on new cars undercuts the value of the CoD scrap payment, steering incentives toward consumption. (Kumari 2025 ). Meanwhile, the scrapping fees themselves are not penalized – owners pay nothing beyond normal taxes until heavy fines apply after years of delay – so there’s little push for owners to hold onto cars for maintenance or upgrade. In effect, the policy subsidizes new-car acquisition rather than rewarding lower throughput. This misalignment is further seen in how EPR works: producers can buy EPR certificates (based on recycled steel weight) to meet obligations, which caps their responsibility at a fixed percentage. In other words, once they pay for recycling a fraction of steel, they have little to lose by selling more cars. (Drishti IAS 2024 b). Incentives are skewed toward driving turnover rather than conserving stock. Consumers and firms are rewarded for scrapping and buying, not for reducing consumption or extending use. Table 1 summarizes the correlation among the analytical aspects, policy processes, and the systemic inconsistencies uncovered in the investigation. It emphasizes how each dimension reveals a distinct disintegration in the policy's circular-economy rationale. Table 1 Summary of Lifecycle Dimensions and Resulting Policy Contradictions. Analytical Dimension Policy Mechanism Observed System Effect Resulting Contradiction Durability Age-based scrappage rules Reduced vehicle lifespan Durability deficit Material Flow Dynamics Recycling incentives Sustained/increased material demand Virgin material paradox Embedded Carbon Lack of upstream accounting Increased production emissions Carbon displacement Traceability Weak monitoring systems Informal sector leakage Traceability gap Incentive Structures Purchase subsidies & CoD Accelerated turnover Incentive misalignment 5. Discussion: Rethinking Circular Economy in Vehicle Policy The above results highlight a fundamental mismatch between the scrappage policy’s rhetoric and systemic impact. In effect, India’s vehicle policy exemplifies a “recycling-first” paradigm that must give way to a true circular economy approach emphasizing reduction. In this discussion, we draw out broader lessons for policy. The findings indicate a significant discrepancy between the policy's planned circular-economy principles and its actual systemic lifecycle outcomes. Figure 2 illustrates this gap, conceptualizing the disparity between recycling-based assumptions and the real dynamics of materials and emissions. 5.1 From Recycling to Resource Reduction A fundamental tenet of circular economy philosophy is the emphasis on resource reduction rather than recycling, as indicated by the reduce–reuse–recycle hierarchy. Recent literature underscores the need to reduce total material throughput to achieve sustainability objectives, especially amid the rapidly increasing global demand for resources (Islam et al. 2024). In this context, recycling is deemed essential yet inadequate unless supplemented by initiatives that curtail output and consumption. The results of this analysis demonstrate that India's car scrappage policy effectively reverses this hierarchy by prioritizing end-of-life processing over reducing vehicle manufacturing or extending product lifespans. The policy, centered on the methodical retirement and recycling of automobiles, tacitly posits that material recovery can offset the effects of heightened manufacturing cycles. This assumption neglects the comprehensive lifespan dynamics of resource utilization, especially the ongoing dependence on virgin materials and energy-intensive production methods. This attitude reveals a fundamental structural paradox in circular economy policy design: recycling is regarded as the principal avenue to sustainability, despite its limited potential to reduce overall resource throughput. Guo et al. (2019) emphasize that, under specific circumstances, the valorization of waste streams may perpetuate their production rather than reduce it. In this environment, the scrappage policy may foster a self-perpetuating cycle of production and disposal, resulting in what this study terms a “circular economy mirage.” From a lifecycle standpoint, substantial circularity necessitates a transition towards reduced vehicle demand, longer product lifespans, and enhanced resource utilization across the entire system. (Chapman et al. 2024 ) The lack of such measures in the existing policy framework suggests that recycling-focused strategies, although ostensibly consistent with circular-economy principles, may not deliver significant environmental benefits. 5.2 Structural Limits of Recycling-Centric Models The results of this study indicate a more extensive structural constraint within recycling-focused circular economy models. As illustrated in Section 4 , enhancements to end-of-life processing do not inherently reduce total material throughput, especially as production volumes continue to increase. This illustrates a basic paradox in circular economy policy design: recycling is often regarded as a principal sustainability measure, despite its limited ability to mitigate upstream resource exploitation. The current literature emphasizes that recycling operates within systemic constraints, such as material losses, quality deterioration, and rising demand for virgin inputs in expanding economies. The "waste–resource paradox" indicates that the economic valorization of waste streams may unintentionally perpetuate, rather than diminish, output. (Greer et al. 2021 ). The findings of this analysis suggest that India's scrappage policy could perpetuate this dynamic by formalizing an ongoing cycle of vehicle replacement and material recovery, while failing to tackle the fundamental demand drivers. (Singh et al. 2021 b). Moreover, the international structure of automotive supply chains hinders the efficacy of recycling-oriented methods. Although materials can be sourced domestically, the manufacturing of new automobiles continues to rely on energy-intensive methods and imported parts; therefore, it transfers rather than alleviates environmental impacts. (Baars et al. 2020 ; Llamas-Orozco et al. 2023 ). This underscores the constraint of policy frameworks that focus solely on end-of-life management, neglecting lifecycle issues. Collectively, these conclusions indicate that recycling, while essential, is inadequate as the primary foundation of circular economy strategy. In the absence of supplementary initiatives that reduce production intensity, extend product lifespans, and reconfigure material use, recycling-focused methods may inadvertently sustain linear resource consumption patterns while masquerading as circularity. 5.3 Lifecycle vs. Tailpipe Governance The results of this study underscore a fundamental limitation of tailpipe-centered regulatory approaches in evaluating environmental performance. The scrappage policy, as illustrated in Section 4 , assesses vehicle sustainability primarily through operational emissions while largely disregarding the environmental impacts of production processes and global supply chains. This results in a governance blind spot, in which policy interventions may appear environmentally advantageous at the point of use, while significant environmental burdens are shifted upstream. These methods are inherently inadequate from a lifecycle perspective, as they do not account for the full range of emissions and resource consumption associated with product systems. The circular economy and sustainability literature increasingly emphasizes that the use of easily quantifiable indicators, such as emissions per kilometer, can obscure broader environmental effects, including those associated with material extraction, manufacturing, and supply chain dynamics (Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2022 ). Consequently, policies based solely on tailpipe metrics may exaggerate environmental benefits and underestimate systemic trade-offs. The analysis indicates that a transition from tailpipe-based regulation to lifecycle-oriented frameworks that incorporate both operational and embedded environmental impacts is necessary for effective circular economy governance. (Das and Bhat 2022 ; Molla et al. 2023 a). This change would necessitate redefining policy metrics to account for total lifecycle emissions and resource consumption, rather than focusing solely on the use-phase performance. In practice, this approach would ensure that regulatory incentives align with the broader system-level sustainability objectives, including enhanced supply chain accountability, reduced material intensity, and cleaner production processes. This limitation illustrates a broader issue in sustainable decision-making: reliance on single indicators does not adequately capture the intricacies of environmental systems. Current research underscores the need for effective material and policy decisions that concurrently incorporate multiple variables, thereby reflecting trade-offs among environmental, economic, and social dimensions (Bajwa et al. 2025 ). 5.4 Broader Policy Implications The results of this study transcend the Indian context and underscore wider issues in the execution of circular economy strategies in emerging economies. As seen in Section 4 , policies focused on end-of-life processing, while neglecting production intensity and consumption growth, may struggle to achieve significant reductions in resource use. This is especially pertinent in the Global South, where rapid economic growth and rising mobility demands may outweigh the environmental benefits of recycling-focused initiatives. (Ahuja and N Khanna 2019 ; Molla et al. 2023 b). India's example demonstrates that using circular-economy language without corresponding structural changes to production and consumption systems may yield limited or adverse effects. (Molla et al. 2022 ). Policies formulated in high-income environments with steady or declining consumption trends may not be applicable in contexts marked by rising material demand and changing industrial frameworks. This highlights the necessity for context-specific policy formulation that incorporates lifetime issues and acknowledges developmental trajectories. Moreover, it underscores significant equity consequences. Scrappage incentives predominantly benefit higher-income individuals who can afford new automobiles, potentially reallocating resources away from other sustainable options such as public transit or shared mobility networks. (Dwivedi et al. 2024 ). The existence of informal recycling sectors in numerous emerging nations hinders the establishment of established circular economy models, prompting concerns regarding inclusiveness, labor conditions, and governance ability. (Kala et al. 2022 ). The transnational character of material supply chains underscores the need for harmonized international circular-economy initiatives. When production processes and resource flows cross national borders, strategies that focus exclusively on domestic recycling may externalize environmental impacts rather than mitigate them (Gregson and Crang 2015 ; Liu et al. 2018 ). This study's conclusion advocates a transition to lifecycle-oriented, system-wide strategies in circular economy governance, especially in rapidly growing economies. These findings align with extensive studies showing that effective transitions to a circular economy rely on the cultivation of resilience capacities, enabling systems to foresee, adapt to, and recover from shocks. Such capabilities require systemic policy support and cannot arise solely from end-of-life interventions (Dos Santos and Gohr 2026 ). 6. Policy Pathways for Genuine Circularity Building on the identified contradictions, we outline policy pathways that reorient India’s vehicle policy toward true circularity. The key is to shift incentives from renewal to resource conservation, and to embed life-cycle criteria into regulatory design. 6.1 Design-for-Durability Policymakers could mandate durability standards (e.g., requiring corrosion protection, rebuildable key components, or minimum warranty periods of more than 15 years). For example, tax incentives could be offered for vehicles that pass stricter age-based inspections, rewarding those that remain safe and efficient well beyond 15 years. Encouraging modular design and the “right to repair” (e.g., by making spare parts readily available) would ensure that vehicles can be maintained rather than scrapped. Aggrawal et al. ( 2025 ) highlight “modular vehicle design” as a circular solution for the automotive sector (Aggrawal et al. 2025 b). Under such an approach, OEMs would compete to build longer-lived, serviceable cars, aligning engineering incentives with CE principles. In short, promoting durability counteracts the durability deficit: it would make a 20-year-old car valuable rather than obsolete, thereby directly reducing material throughput. 6.2 Condition-Based Retirement The National Green Tribunal’s Delhi order (diesels > 10y, petrol > 15y banned) was already a step toward this logic by effectively setting a lower lifetime for most cars. Going further, scrappage should trigger only when a vehicle is demonstrably polluting or unsafe, not automatically at a fixed age. For instance, the policy could scrap vehicles only after they fail pollutant emission thresholds or structural safety tests, regardless of age. As S&P Global reported, the government is already considering such a shift for certain urban fleets. (Kumari 2025 ). In practice, this means strengthening and expanding ATS checks: vehicles that meet emission norms continue on the road, while gross polluters (old or new) are retired. This would directly address premature obsolescence: a well-maintained 16-year-old vehicle could stay in use if it meets standards. It also incentivizes owners to keep vehicles clean and well-serviced. By tying retirement to condition rather than calendar , the policy would conserve durable assets and ensure that scrapping actually removes the worst emitters, improving the policy’s target alignment. 6.3 Lifecycle-Based Incentives Currently, incentives are blunt (e.g., a flat CoD) and favor replacement. Instead, the government could introduce lifecycle assessment (LCA)-based incentives. For example, vehicles could be rated by their cradle-to-grave carbon footprint or material usage, and subsidies/penalties applied accordingly. (Trovato et al. 2020 ). Buyers of low-lifecycle-impact vehicles (for instance, high-recycled-content EVs made with green energy) could receive larger rebates, while those of high-impact vehicles would receive smaller rebates. Similarly, scrap values could vary with a vehicle’s material intensity: scrapping a heavy steel SUV yields less credit than scrapping a lightweight or partially recycled car, to discourage unnecessarily bulky designs. The ELV rules’ EPR certificate scheme is a start (linking obligations to steel recovered), but could be broadened. For instance, extending EPR to include batteries and electronics (currently governed by separate rules) would internalize the fate of non-metal components. More innovatively, the government could allow EPR certificates to be traded with a premium for higher-grade recycling (e.g., certificates for properly recycled battery metals). All such measures would shift the economic calculus: manufacturers and consumers would pay more attention to embedded impacts. Ultimately, this links the incentives directly to the policy problems identified (carbon and material use) rather than to intermediate outputs (new car sales). 6.4 Domestic Supply Chain Reform A circular vehicle economy is not just about end-of-life – it requires resource-efficient manufacturing. India should promote local production of recycled materials and green steel/aluminum. For example, encouraging steel mills to use high-percentage scrap and renewable energy would reduce the carbon intensity of new vehicles. Similarly, building domestic battery recycling and cell production facilities (powered by solar or hydropower) can lower lifecycle emissions. Policy tools could include preferential-purchase regulations (e.g., requiring government vehicle fleets to use only auto parts with a certain level of recycled content) or carbon tariffs on imported auto parts. Domestic R&D should be funded to develop lightweight materials (e.g., biocomposites) to reduce overall material throughput. Finally, integrating RVSFs into industrial clusters with access to remanufacturing facilities (such as engines or transmissions) would capture more value. These supply-chain reforms complement demand-side measures: by reducing the footprint of each new vehicle, they mitigate the paradox that replacement vehicles generate large emissions. In effect, they address the “embedded carbon displacement” by making each turn of the fleet as clean as possible. When tied to EPR targets (for instance, mandating a percentage of an OEM’s output to contain recycled steel from RVSFs), such reforms can create a virtuous loop: scrap becomes feedstock for local industry, further displacing virgin materials. In sum, greening the supply chain ensures that renewals are greener, making the circular economy claim more credible. Each of the above pathways directly tackles a dimension of the problem: durability measures reverse the durability deficit ; condition-based rules counter premature obsolescence ; LCA-based incentives address both material flow and embedded carbon paradoxes; and supply-chain reforms reduce the embedded carbon in new vehicles. By aligning policy tools with the identified contradictions, India can transform its scrappage policy into a genuine circular-economy instrument rather than a linear stimulus. 6.5 Limitations of the Study This study has significant limitations. Initially, as a conceptual and qualitative analysis, it excludes quantitative assessments of material flows or lifecycle emissions related to the scrappage program. Secondly, the analysis relies on secondary data and policy papers, which may not accurately reflect the dynamics of implementation in the informal sector. Third, although the analytical framework is intended to be generalizable, its implementation in this study is confined to the Indian automobile sector and may necessitate modification for other sectors. The study does not empirically investigate the behavioral responses of essential stakeholders, such as consumers, manufacturers, and recyclers, which could affect the practical efficacy of policy interventions. Notwithstanding these constraints, the study offers a solid conceptual framework for assessing circular economy initiatives through a lifecycle systems lens. 7. Conclusion India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy is undeniably a landmark in environmental policy. It mobilizes regulatory energy, finance, and technology toward building a formal recycling regime. However, our lifecycle analysis uncovers a circular-economy mirage: beneath the surface, gains in formal scrap processing mask fundamental inconsistencies. The policy’s age-based retirements, generous purchase incentives, and narrow recycling focus implicitly promote greater material throughput, not less. In effect, vehicles are slated to retire before the end of life, and the fleet is turned over at an accelerated rate. While this may lower tailpipe emissions per vehicle, the absolute resource demand – for steel, plastics, minerals, and carbon – may actually rise or stagnate. (Gao et al. 2025 ). This finding holds considerable importance. It serves as a reminder to policymakers that recycling rates by themselves do not ensure sustainability. A circular economy should emphasize minimizing overall consumption and prolonging product lifespan, rather than merely completing a loop within the supply chain. In the automotive sector, this entails formulating policies that emphasize reducing the number of vehicles or improving their efficient use, with recycling as a supplementary measure. For India, this may entail reevaluating scrappage policies in favor of condition-based retirement, enhancing repair markets, and promoting sustainability throughout the automotive supply chain. The nation can only escape the illusion and attain the genuine circularity its policies seek by doing so. In conclusion, in the absence of lifecycle-based governance, recycling-focused policies may inadvertently perpetuate, rather than mitigate, resource-intensive development patterns. Furthermore, we emphasize that circular economy policy should be assessed not by the efficacy of recycling systems, but by its ability to diminish overall material throughput and environmental impact. India's automotive industry needs to augment the current scrappage program with structural reforms that promote longevity and deter excessive turnover. Global policymakers must recognize that a lifelong perspective is crucial for ensuring that circular economy objectives transcend mere rhetoric inside an expanding consumer economy. Future research should address this study's limitations and findings by empirically evaluating the lifetime consequences of vehicle scrappage rules using integrated lifecycle assessment and system dynamics methodologies. Specifically, quantitative examination of material throughput, embedded carbon, and rebound effects would facilitate the validation and expansion of the conceptual framework established in this paper. Additional study is required to analyze stakeholder behavior, encompassing consumer decision-making, manufacturer strategies, and recycling sector dynamics, to enhance comprehension of how policy incentives manifest in practical consequences. Moreover, subsequent research might investigate integrating informal recycling systems into formal circular value chains and establish monitoring methods to track material flows within intricate supply networks. (Harun et al. 2022 ). Comparative evaluations across countries and regions would yield insights into the impact of varying policy designs on resource efficiency, lifetime emissions, and circular-economy performance under different economic circumstances. Declarations Competing interests . The authors declare no competing interests. Funding: The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Author Contribution Author Contributions: Aladdin H.M. Shaker conceptualized the study, established the analytical framework, conducted the analysis, and drafted the initial manuscript. Puneet Pathak assisted in supervision, critical evaluation, and manuscript editing. Both writers reviewed and endorsed the final article. Data Availability: No datasets were generated or analyzed during the study. The research is based on publicly available policy documents, legal texts, and secondary literature. References India as a model for circular economy in automotive sector. J Environ Manage 394:127386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2025.127386 Ahuja V, N Khanna S (2019) End-of-Life Vehicles in India-Regulatory Perspectives. Manesar, India, pp 2019-28–2580 Baars J, Domenech T, Bleischwitz R, et al (2020) Circular economy strategies for electric vehicle batteries reduce reliance on raw materials. Nat Sustain 4:71–79. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-00607-0 Bajwa AUR, Siriwardana C, Shahzad W, Naeem MA (2025) Material selection in the construction industry: a systematic literature review on multi-criteria decision making. Environ Syst Decis 45:8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-025-10001-w Chapman DA, Eyckmans J, Van Acker K (2024) The impact of demand-side strategies to enable a more circular economy in private car mobility. Sustain Prod Consum 49:263–275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2024.06.029 Das PK, Bhat MY (2022) Global electric vehicle adoption: implementation and policy implications for India. Environ Sci Pollut Res 29:40612–40622. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-18211-w De Pascale A, Arbolino R, Szopik-Depczyńska K, et al (2021) A systematic review for measuring circular economy: The 61 indicators. J Clean Prod 281:124942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.124942 Dos Santos JEA, Gohr CF (2026) Resilience capability for the circular economy: a conceptual framework. Environ Syst Decis 46:16. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-026-10079-w Drishti IAS (2024) Discount on New Vehicles Against Scrapping Certificates. In: Dly. Updat. - Drishti IAS. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/discount-on-new-vehicles-against-scrapping-certificates Dwivedi A, Kumar R, Goel V, et al (2024) A move toward environmental sustainability: an analysis of the impact of state-level incentive policy improving the adoption of electric vehicles in India. J Therm Anal Calorim 149:12489–12502. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10973-024-13683-7 Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2022) Life Cycle Assessment for the Circular Economy. In: Ellen MacArthur Found. https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/life-cycle-assessment-for-the-circular-economy Gao H, Liu J, Daigo I (2025) Methodology development for estimating the impact of restriction factors to promote national steel recycling. Resour Conserv Recycl 215:108052. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2024.108052 Ghosh SK, Ghosh SK, Baidya R (2021) Circular Economy in India: Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle Through Policy Framework. In: Ghosh SK, Ghosh SK (eds) Circular Economy: Recent Trends in Global Perspective. Springer Nature Singapore, Singapore, pp 183–217 Greer R, Von Wirth T, Loorbach D (2021) The Waste-Resource Paradox: Practical dilemmas and societal implications in the transition to a circular economy. J Clean Prod 303:126831. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126831 Gregson N, Crang M (2015) From Waste to Resource: The Trade in Wastes and Global Recycling Economies. Annu Rev Environ Resour 40:151–176. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-102014-021105 Harun Z, Molla AH, Mansor MRA, Ismail R (2022) Development, Critical Evaluation, and Proposed Framework: End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling in India. Sustainability 14:15441. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215441 Hu S (2022) Multicriteria analysis on environmental impacts of accelerated vehicle retirement program from a life-cycle perspective: A case study of Beijing. J Environ Manage 314:115041. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.115041 James AT, Asjad M, Kumar G, et al (2023a) Analyzing barriers for implementing new vehicle scrap policy in India. Transp Res Part Transp Environ 114:103568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103568 James AT, Asjad M, Kumar G, et al (2023b) Analyzing barriers for implementing new vehicle scrap policy in India. Transp Res Part Transp Environ 114:103568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103568 Jerome A, Helander H, Ljunggren M, Janssen M (2022) Mapping and testing circular economy product-level indicators: A critical review. Resour Conserv Recycl 178:106080. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.106080 Kala K, Bolia NB, Sushil (2022) Analysis of informal waste management using system dynamic modelling. Heliyon 8:e09993. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e09993 Kumari V (2025) India’s vehicle scrappage policy: Key insights for 2025. In: SP Glob. Mobil. Automot. Insights. https://www.spglobal.com/automotive-insights/en/blogs/2025/09/india-vehicle-scrappage-policy-insights Liu Z, Adams M, Walker TR (2018) Are exports of recyclables from developed to developing countries waste pollution transfer or part of the global circular economy? Resour Conserv Recycl 136:22–23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.04.005 Llamas-Orozco JA, Meng F, Walker GS, et al (2023) Estimating the environmental impacts of global lithium-ion battery supply chain: A temporal, geographical, and technological perspective. PNAS Nexus 2:pgad361. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad361 Lowe BH, Genovese A, Vivanco DF, Zink T (2025) Revisiting circular economy rebound: Market dynamics, policy implications, and future research directions. J Ind Ecol 29:1936–1945. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.70121 Malhotra V (2023) Impact of Voluntary Vehicle Scrappage Policy 2021 on the Household Spending and Demand for New Vehicles. SSRN Electron J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4335143 McAvoy S, Grant T, Smith C, Bontinck P (2021) Combining Life Cycle Assessment and System Dynamics to improve impact assessment: A systematic review. J Clean Prod 315:128060. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128060 Milios L (2018) Advancing to a Circular Economy: three essential ingredients for a comprehensive policy mix. Sustain Sci 13:861–878. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0502-9 Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (2025) Environment Protection (End-of-Life Vehicles) Rules, 2025 Mishra NB, Pani A, Bansal P, et al (2024) Towards sustainable logistics in India: Forecasting freight transport emissions and policy evaluations. Transp Res Part Transp Environ 133:104267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2024.104267 MIT Climate Portal (2022) How much CO2 is emitted by manufacturing batteries? In: MIT Clim. Portal. https://climate.mit.edu/ask-mit/how-much-co2-emitted-manufacturing-batteries Molla AH, Shams H, Harun Z, et al (2023) Evaluation of end-of-life vehicle recycling system in India in responding to the sustainability paradigm: an explorative study. Sci Rep 13:4169. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-30964-7 Molla AH, Shams H, Harun Z, et al (2022) An Assessment of Drivers and Barriers to Implementation of Circular Economy in the End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Sector in India. Sustainability 14:13084. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142013084 Nakamoto Y, Kagawa S (2022) A generalized framework for analyzing car lifetime effects on stock, flow, and carbon footprint. J Ind Ecol 26:433–447. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.13190 Nama DDK, Sharma DS, Sharma DM, Sharma DD (2025) The Regulatory Tapestry of India’s Circular Economy. Int J Environ Sci 667–676. https://doi.org/10.64252/j1826884 Nguyen T, Van Nguyen T, Zhou L, et al (2025) Assessing the impact of EU policies on recycling supply chain: a system dynamics perspective on advancing packaging recycling capacity. Ann Oper Res 355:2017–2069. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-06438-y Poschmann J, Bach V, Finkbeiner M (2023) Decarbonization Potentials for Automotive Supply Chains: Emission-Intensity Pathways of Carbon-Intensive Hotspots of Battery Electric Vehicles. Sustainability 15:11795. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511795 Press Information Bureau, Government of India (2024) Vehicle Scrappage Policy, 2021. In: Press Inf. Bur. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2042966®=3&lang=2 Press Information Bureau, Government of India (2025) Compliance of End-of-Life Vehicles Rules, 2025. In: Press Inf. Bur. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2099130®=3&lang=2 Press Information Bureau, Government of India (2021) Year End Review 2021: Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. In: Press Inf. Bur. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=1786527®=3&lang=2 PSR Compliance (2026) EPR Registration under Vehicle Scrappage Policy India. In: PSR Compliance Blog. https://www.psrcompliance.com/blog/epr-registration-vehicle-scrappage-policy-india Rönkkö P, Majava J, Hyvärinen T, et al (2024) The circular economy of electric vehicle batteries: a Finnish case study. Environ Syst Decis 44:100–113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-023-09916-z Sahajwalla V, Hossain R (2023) Rethinking circular economy for electronics, energy storage, and solar photovoltaics with long product life cycles. MRS Bull 48:375–385. https://doi.org/10.1557/s43577-023-00519-2 Sardianou E, Nikou V, Evangelinos K, Nikolaou I (2024) What are the key dimensions that CE emphasizes on? A systematic analysis of circular economy definitions. Environ Syst Decis 44:547–562. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-023-09956-5 Sasmoko S, Akhtar MZ, Khan HUR, et al (2022) How Do Industrial Ecology, Energy Efficiency, and Waste Recycling Technology (Circular Economy) Fit into China’s Plan to Protect the Environment? Up to Speed. Recycling 7:83. https://doi.org/10.3390/recycling7060083 Sharma L, Pandey S (2020) Recovery of resources from end-of-life passenger cars in the informal sector in India. Sustain Prod Consum 24:1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2020.06.005 Shui B, Xu M, Luo X (2024) Wheels of Change: The Environmental Paradox of Accelerating Vehicle Retirement Program. Environ Sci Technol 58:20412–20423. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.4c05009 Singh N, Mishra T, Banerjee R (2021) Analysis of Retrofit and Scrappage Policies for the Indian Road Transport Sector in 2030. Transp Res Rec J Transp Res Board 2675:233–246. https://doi.org/10.1177/03611981211028867 Tasaki T, Jaeger J (2025) 9 Key Findings on Global Progress Toward a Circular Economy. In: World Resour. Inst. https://www.wri.org/insights/circular-economy-global-progress (TERI) (2026) Enhancing Circular Economy of End-of-Life Vehicles (ELVs) in India. NITI Aayog, Government of India, New Delhi The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) (2022) Vehicle Scrappage Policy. The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi Trovato MR, Nocera F, Giuffrida S (2020) Life-Cycle Assessment and Monetary Measurements for the Carbon Footprint Reduction of Public Buildings. Sustainability 12:3460. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083460 Zhou W, Feng R, Han M, Chen M (2022) Evolution characters and regulation impacts within the global scrap rubber trade network. Resour Conserv Recycl 181:106201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106201 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Reviewers agreed at journal 09 May, 2026 Reviewers invited by journal 04 May, 2026 Editor assigned by journal 26 Apr, 2026 Submission checks completed at journal 26 Apr, 2026 First submitted to journal 23 Apr, 2026 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-9361254","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":640482195,"identity":"fcd418dc-20c3-4d9a-856c-f86dcd24defa","order_by":0,"name":"Aladdin H.M Shaker","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Central University of Punjab","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Aladdin","middleName":"H.M","lastName":"Shaker","suffix":""},{"id":640482197,"identity":"1f952ad5-b07a-4409-9df8-8150d62555f5","order_by":1,"name":"Puneet Pathak","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Central University of Punjab","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Puneet","middleName":"","lastName":"Pathak","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-04-08 22:08:17","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9361254/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9361254/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":109288931,"identity":"05ff34eb-c3f1-4ddc-8ff0-64867a13a4bd","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-05-15 06:03:45","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":287166,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eFive-Dimensional Lifecycle Systems for Policy Analysis\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9361254/v1/078d2f07418320f769d61406.png"},{"id":109288932,"identity":"781be8f4-9dbb-4b9c-b342-0fd42d6ce74e","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-05-15 06:03:45","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":100299,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCircular Economy Assumption vs Lifecycle Reality in Vehicle Scrappage Policy.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9361254/v1/8618535ed3f1923305d87cc4.png"},{"id":109296650,"identity":"72ded067-c7c3-4098-83e8-6f1bf42d9919","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-05-15 08:48:57","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":645117,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9361254/v1/81091b40-5121-4596-9e0d-25db20641864.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The Circular Economy Mirage: A Lifecycle Systems Analysis of India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy ","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIndia\u0026rsquo;s 2021 Vehicle Scrappage Policy (also known as the Voluntary Vehicle Fleet Modernization Program, V-VMP) was heralded as a major step toward cleaner transportation and material circularity. (Kumari \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Under this umbrella, a suite of regulations has been rolled out over the past few years. In September 2021, the Motor Vehicles \u003cem\u003e(Registration and Functions of Vehicle Scrapping Facility)\u003c/em\u003e Rules, 2021 (G.S.R. 653(E), Sep 2021) were gazetted to register and regulate Registered Vehicle Scrapping Facilities (RVSFs) (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). In parallel, the government amended motor vehicle rules to require mandatory fitness tests via Automated Testing Stations (ATS). For example, from April 2023, all heavy commercial vehicles must pass ATS fitness tests, with lighter vehicles to follow in mid-2024 ((TERI) \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2026\u003c/span\u003e). These measures supplement existing AIS-129 guidelines on environmentally sound dismantling and depollution. Importantly, generous incentives were attached to the policy: owners of old vehicles receive a \u0026ldquo;certificate of deposit\u0026rdquo; (CoD) redeemable against a new purchase, plus waivers or rebates. For instance, the 2021 rules waive new-registration fees for CoD-backed purchases and offer motor-vehicle tax rebates up to 25% for non-transport vehicles (15% for commercial. (Drishti IAS \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003ea).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBy early 2025, the policy ecosystem expanded further. The Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change finalized the \u003cem\u003eEnvironment Protection (End-of-Life Vehicles) Rules, 2025\u003c/em\u003e, effective 1 April 2025 (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003ea). These rules formally establish Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for vehicles, meaning manufacturers (including importers) must ensure their vehicles are scrapped in an \u0026ldquo;environmentally sound manner\u0026rdquo; and can obtain EPR certificates by participating in the RVSF system. (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003ea). In sum, India now has a \u003cem\u003eflagship circular-economy initiative\u003c/em\u003e for vehicles: through a combination of age-based retirement laws, automated testing, formal scrap facilities, and producer obligations, the policy explicitly aims to capture value in scrapped vehicles and promote recycling. As one government press note puts it, the scrappage policy will \u0026ldquo;reduce pollution from old and unfit vehicles in an environment-friendly manner through a scientific scrapping process.\u0026rdquo; (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). It even seeks to integrate informal dismantlers into the formal sector, treating them as partners in this new system. This framing \u0026ndash; of phasing out the old to supply feedstock for reuse \u0026ndash; reflects a broader policy shift toward resource circularity in India\u0026rsquo;s environmental governance. (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite its recycling-oriented rhetoric, the vehicle scrappage policy poses a paradox. Conventional wisdom holds that recycling end-of-life vehicles conserves resources and reduces emissions. However, accelerating fleet turnover (i.e., retiring vehicles early) may undermine these goals. (Singh et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003ea). Scrap-driven renewal means more new vehicles must be produced \u0026ndash; driving demand for metals, plastics, batteries, and the energy to make them. In effect, every scrapped car or bus is a double-edged sword: it supplies scrap material (e.g., steel) but also prompts the manufacture of a replacement vehicle with substantial embodied resource use. (Sharma and Pandey \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003ea). This trade-off challenges the dominant assumption that increased recycling inherently equates to sustainability. Even well-intentioned scrappage programs can yield only modest net carbon savings when manufacturing emissions are accounted for (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e). Put differently, recycling the old may inadvertently stimulate new production, risking a \u0026ldquo;widening loop\u0026rdquo; of material throughput rather than its reduction.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn practice, the current policy may accelerate vehicle obsolescence. An owner deciding between costly repairs and a scrapping incentive may scrap a vehicle that could have otherwise lasted for years more. Over time, this creates a self-reinforcing cycle of early disposal: the policy makes new purchases more attractive and lowers the bar for scrapping. (Malhotra \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, a key concern arises: \u003cem\u003ecan accelerated vehicle turnover ever be reconciled with reducing absolute resource consumption?\u003c/em\u003e This study critically evaluates that assumption. We ask whether formal scrapping and recycling, as structured in the policy, truly align with a circular-economy objective of reducing total material throughput, or whether they merely perpetuate (or even increase) resource use through induced demand.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExisting research on India\u0026rsquo;s scrappage policy has largely focused on emissions and recycling efficiency rather than on systemic resource flows. Several studies emphasize reductions in tailpipe pollution, safety improvements (e.g., the phase-out of high-emitting vehicles), and improvements in collection and dismantling processes. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e). Likewise, analysts have noted challenges in formalizing the recycling industry, which is fraught with informality and technological gaps. (Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003ea). However, few studies adopt a full life-cycle perspective that links policy design to overall material and carbon footprints. In particular, the literature lacks a critical analysis of whether mandated scrappage truly \u0026ldquo;closes loops\u0026rdquo; on materials use, or whether it generates offsetting upstream impacts (such as embodied emissions in new vehicles). A lifecycle viewpoint would account for embedded carbon in production and track how much virgin material is still demanded under the policy. As WRI (Tasaki \u0026amp; Jaeger 2025) emphasizes, a genuine circular-economy strategy requires examining all stages of a product\u0026rsquo;s journey, including manufacturing and disposal, rather than focusing solely on end-of-life recycling metrics. (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025). This gap means policy evaluation often treats recycling tonnage or emission intensities in isolation, without questioning whether total resource throughput is actually declining. In short, while recycling efficiency in India\u0026rsquo;s ELV sector has been studied (Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003ea)The \u003cem\u003enet systemic outcomes\u003c/em\u003e of the scrappage rules remain unexplored. No prior analysis has systematically assessed the contradictions between the policy\u0026rsquo;s recycling rhetoric and its lifecycle effects on resource use and emissions. Recent meta-analyses of circular economy definitions indicate that the concept predominantly focuses on waste management and recycling, often neglecting broader lifecycle, climate, and resource-use aspects. This conceptual bias threatens to limit policy design to end-of-life therapies rather than to systemic resource reduction (Sardianou et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, the shift to a circular economy is recognized as a multifaceted, resource-intensive endeavor that requires considerable organizational adjustments, systemic reconfiguration, and the cultivation of new competencies. Current research indicates that this transformation entails substantial configuration costs, restricted access to information, and the need for synchronized changes across multiple tiers of production and governance (Dos Santos and Gohr \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2026\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCurrent studies on India's scrappage policy have predominantly concentrated on emissions reduction, fleet modernization, and recycling efficiency, rather than on systemic resource dynamics.(Mishra et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) Numerous studies highlight reductions in tailpipe emissions, safety improvements, and advancements in collection and dismantling procedures.(Singh et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003ea; Hu \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Shui et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) Although these contributions offer significant operational insights, they mostly evaluate outcomes using limited metrics such as emission intensity or material recovery rates.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecent developments in circular economy and resource governance literature have increasingly scrutinized the sufficiency of existing metrics, emphasizing the significance of lifecycle-based assessment, rebound effects, and absolute resource diminution. (De Pascale et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Ellen MacArthur Foundation \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Jerome et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Lowe et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Recent research in industrial ecology indicates that recycling-focused policies may not diminish overall material throughput if upstream production dynamics and demand growth are neglected. (Milios \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Sasmoko et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Nguyen et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNonetheless, the methodical implementation of lifecycle systems thinking in automotive scrappage policies\u0026mdash;especially in emerging economies\u0026mdash;remains insufficient. No previous research in the Indian context has specifically investigated the impact of policy design on total material throughput, embedded carbon fluxes, and systemic feedback effects throughout the vehicle lifecycle. (Harun et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Aggrawal et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003ea). This gap limits the ability to assess whether scrappage programs deliver genuine circular-economy outcomes or merely shift resource use patterns.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn response to these constraints, this investigation establishes and implements a lifecycle systems analytical framework to evaluate the structural compatibility between India's vehicle scrappage policy and circular economy objectives. Instead of utilizing recycling as a proxy for sustainability, the analysis evaluates whether the policy's design and incentive mechanisms contribute to decreases in absolute material throughput and lifecycle emissions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe investigation emphasizes five critical dimensions that surpass conventional tailpipe-based evaluations: incentive structures, embedded carbon emissions, material flow dynamics, and product durability. The paper, by employing this framework, identifies systemic contradictions between the policy's declared circular economy objectives and its potential material and environmental consequences.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn terms of methodology, the investigation employs a qualitative, doctrinal approach that is grounded in the examination of policy instruments, regulatory texts, and pertinent academic literature, all of which are interpreted through a lifecycle systems perspective. By incorporating these components, the paper offers a structured, systems-based critique of the scrappage policy, with a particular emphasis on the discrepancy between the intended policy objectives and the actual resource implications.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis research offers three main contributions. First, it talks about the \"circular economy mirage\" in the context of car policy. This is when things that seem to be circular, including structured recycling systems and certification procedures, really hide the fact that resources are still being used or used more. By emphasizing lifespan dynamics and rebound effects, the paper contests reductionist views that equate recycling efficacy with sustainability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, the study develops a multidimensional analytical framework encompassing durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon emissions, supply chain traceability, and incentive structures. This paradigm enables systematic evaluation of policy design and uncovers fundamental trade-offs that are not apparent in traditional assessments. It can also be used in other resource-heavy industries that are putting circular economy principles into action.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, the article outlines several approaches to reform policies so that they reduce the total amount of material that passes through them and ensure that regulatory tools follow the reduce\u0026ndash;reuse\u0026ndash;recycle hierarchy. These suggestions, which include standards that prioritize durability and lifecycle-based incentive systems, offer India a practical way to revise its automobile scrappage policy to prioritize real resource conservation.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Methodology: Conceptual and Systems-Based Policy Analysis","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Research Design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study utilizes a qualitative lifecycle-informed systems analysis to assess the environmental and resource impacts of India's automobile scrappage legislation. Rather than relying on quantitative life-cycle assessment (LCA), it employs a conceptual lifecycle systems perspective to analyze the impact of policy design on material throughput, embedded emissions, and system-wide feedback effects. (McAvoy et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis method is especially suitable for policy study, as material flows, regulatory frameworks, institutional dynamics, and behavioral reactions influence environmental outcomes. Current research indicates that although Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) effectively quantifies environmental impacts, it frequently neglects systemic interactions, rebound effects, and governance frameworks that affect actual outcomes (Ellen MacArthur Foundation \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Greer et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). A qualitative lifecycle systems approach enables a comprehensive assessment of how policy mechanisms influence resource use across the production, use, and disposal phases (Milios \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe research methodologically combines doctrinal policy analysis with systems-based evaluation, utilizing regulatory texts, policy papers, and secondary literature. This study establishes a five-dimensional analytical framework that includes durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon, traceability, and incentive structures to implement this strategy. Decision-making in resource-intensive systems necessarily entails many, frequently conflicting criteria\u0026mdash;encompassing environmental, economic, technological, and social dimensions\u0026mdash;necessitating systematic analytical methods to assess trade-offs and priorities (Bajwa et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese characteristics serve as analytical proxies for lifetime performance, enabling a structured evaluation of policy impacts across the production, use, and end-of-life stages. This paradigm facilitates the detection of systemic inconsistencies that are concealed by traditional policy indicators centered on recycling rates or tailpipe emissions (Ellen MacArthur Foundation \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Lifecycle Systems Perspective\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur analysis adopts a full lifecycle perspective on vehicles. That means evaluating impacts from the vehicle\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;cradle-to-grave\u0026rdquo; path \u0026ndash; from extraction of raw materials to manufacturing, use, and final disposal \u0026ndash; rather than focusing narrowly on tailpipe emissions. Circular economy (CE) thinking emphasizes that \u003cem\u003eoverconsumption\u003c/em\u003e is the root problem. (Ellen MacArthur Foundation \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). In a holistic CE, the priority is to reduce and extend product life, not merely to recycle, as a true circular model \u0026ldquo;considers all stages of a product\u0026rsquo;s journey\u0026rdquo; and designs products to last longer. (Sahajwalla and Hossain \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). By contrast, if policy metrics only track how much scrap is processed or how much recycled content is obtained, they may miss leakages outside the system. The Ellen MacArthur Foundation similarly warns that lifecycle analyses can incentivize short-term fixes (e.g., marginally more efficient but still disposable products) rather than systemic change. Motivated by this, our perspective includes upstream effects (such as mining and manufacturing emissions) and downstream realities (such as informal sector practices), rather than focusing solely on the legislative endpoint of scrapping. In line with previous studies on automotive battery systems, circular economy solutions should be understood across multiple lifecycle phases, encompassing reuse, repurposing, and recycling rather than as discrete end-of-life measures (R\u0026ouml;nkk\u0026ouml; et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe explicitly critique narrow metrics, e.g., \u0026ldquo;percent recycled\u0026rdquo; or annual emissions improvements, and instead ask whether \u003cem\u003ethe scrappage rules actually lower total resource throughput and lifecycle emissions\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 Analytical Framework\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo systematically interrogate the policy, we apply a five-dimensional framework. See Figure. 1 below. Each dimension represents a key facet of vehicle circularity:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eDurability (Product Lifespan)\u003c/b\u003e. Does policy design encourage vehicles to live longer or shorter lives? This dimension examines incentives or disincentives for extended use. CE theory stresses longevity: products should be \u0026ldquo;designed from the start to last longer. (Nakamoto and Kagawa \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). We assess whether scrappage rules undermine durability (e.g., via age-based retirements).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eMaterial Flow Dynamics\u003c/b\u003e. How does recycling interact with raw material demand? We analyze whether increased scrap recovery actually displaces virgin inputs or instead stimulates overall demand. The literature on the waste-resource paradox is relevant: turning waste into a commodity can create new demand and even perpetuate production. (Greer et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). This dimension examines supply chain feedback, market responses, and the potential for rebound effects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eEmbedded Carbon (Upstream Emissions)\u003c/b\u003e. We track the carbon footprint of new-vehicle production (including batteries, components, and steel). Policy evaluations often ignore these upstream emissions, but they can be large. For example, manufacturing an 80 kWh EV battery can emit 2.4\u0026ndash;16 metric tons of CO₂. (MIT Climate Portal \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). We ask whether replacing old vehicles is truly carbon-saving when their embedded emissions are factored in.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eTraceability (Chain-of-Custody)\u003c/b\u003e. We consider the transparency and coverage of material flows in practice. Formal RVSFs may account for a fraction of scrapped vehicles, while informal breakers process the rest. Weak tracing results in incomplete circular loops and uncontrolled waste leaks. We examine policy provisions for tracking (e.g., CoD accounting, IT portals) and known gaps, e.g., the large informal sector. (Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003ea).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eIncentive Structures\u003c/b\u003e. This captures how financial and regulatory incentives shape stakeholder behavior. It includes subsidies for new vehicle sales, fees for continued vehicle use, and rewards for recycling output. We analyze whether these incentives align with resource conservation (e.g., rewarding long use and high recycled content) or instead favor higher throughput (e.g., subsidizing replacements).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo improve analytical transparency and replicability, each part of the framework is implemented using clear evaluative criteria. The durability dimension examines whether the rules in a policy encourage products to last longer or to retire sooner. Material flow dynamics examine whether recycling systems actually minimize the need for new materials and reduce overall material flows. Embedded carbon is evaluated by determining if upstream production emissions and global supply chain effects are incorporated into policy formulation. Traceability assesses whether systems are in place to track the flow of materials between formal and informal sectors, and how well they work. Lastly, incentive structures are examined by considering how financial and regulatory tools affect stakeholders' behavior regarding consumption, replacement cycles, and resource use.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results section rigorously applies each dimension, comparing individual policy measures to these criteria to find systemic consequences and conflicts. This systematic approach allows the framework to be adapted and applied to other policy areas that require significant resources.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results section rigorously applies each dimension, mapping policy mechanisms against these criteria to uncover related systemic consequences and conflicts. This systematic methodology enables the framework to be applied to alternative policy scenarios in resource-intensive sectors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy: Architecture and Objectives","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1 Regulatory Framework\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia\u0026rsquo;s vehicle scrappage framework consists of layered regulations across ministries. The cornerstone is the \u003cb\u003eVehicle Scrappage Policy (VSP)\u003c/b\u003e, announced in 2021 and officially titled the Voluntary Vehicle Modernization Program. Its legal components include:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRVSF Rules (2021) (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024b) \u0026ndash; The Motor Vehicles (Registration and Functions of Vehicle Scrapping Facility) Rules, 2021 (G.S.R. 653[E], 23 Sep 2021) set up the system of licensed scrapping centers. RVSFs must register with state transport authorities and comply with technical standards (e.g., AIS-129) for depollution. These rules specify that scrapping centers issue \u0026ldquo;certificate of deposit\u0026rdquo; documents when they shred a vehicle. They also require environmentally sound handling of hazardous materials (fluids, batteries) in accordance with CPCB guidelines (The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFitness and ATS Rules (2022\u0026ndash;2024) \u0026ndash; The Central Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Rules, 2022 introduced Automated Testing Stations (ATS) for vehicle fitness, phasing them in by category: from April 2023 for Heavy Goods and Passenger Vehicles, and from June 2024 for other classes. (TERI 2026). These rules also created a digital portal for ATS operations, fixed RC renewals to 10-year cycles, and mandated periodic calibration of testing equipment. ((TERI) \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2026\u003c/span\u003e). Under these rules, an old vehicle failing its ATS tests is effectively declared an End-of-Life Vehicle (ELV) and must be scrapped. The Motor Vehicles (First Amendment) Rules, 2023 further capped the lifetimes of government vehicles, no RC renewal beyond 15 years (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTax and Registration Incentives (2021\u0026ndash;2025) \u0026ndash; In October 2021, two key notifications offered financial incentives for turnover: G.S.R. 720(E) allowed a Motor Vehicle tax rebate of up to 25% (personal vehicles) or 15% (commercial) if registered against a CoD. (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). G.S.R. 714(E) waived all registration fees for such vehicles (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2021). In 2025, further amendments (e.g., G.S.R. 200[E], Mar 2025) extended concessions to vehicles of older emissions norms (TERI 2026). In practice, these incentives package scrap value with tax/fee savings and even small OEM discounts (e.g., MoRTH recommended a 5% automaker rebate for new purchases under VSP) (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eELV Rules and EPR (2024\u0026ndash;2025) \u0026ndash; The Ministry of Environment notified the \u003cem\u003eEnd-of-Life Vehicles (Management) Rules, 2024\u003c/em\u003e in Jan 2024 (gazetted 6 Jan 2025) (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003eb). These rules extend EPR to the vehicle sector. Under Rule 2, vehicle manufacturers (and importers) must register as EPR-obligated producers and can discharge their obligation by purchasing \u003cem\u003eEPR certificates\u003c/em\u003e from RVSFs. Crucially, an EPR certificate is generated only when a registered facility processes scrap steel from a demolished vehicle. (PSR Compliance \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2026\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, the law ties producer compliance to the actual recovery of vehicle materials (steel) by formal centers. Producers must meet annual scrapping targets (100% of liability initially, rising to 130% by 2030) based on kilograms of steel in sold vehicles. (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2025). This framework effectively outsources material recycling to the network of RVSFs \u0026ndash; formalizing the \u0026ldquo;recycle\u0026rdquo; leg of CE into law.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTogether, these regulations constitute a structured program: an age-based retirement regime enforced via fitness tests, coupled with formal scrapping centers and incentives for renewal. For example, under the 2021 policy, personal vehicles over 15 years old (and commercial vehicles over 10 years old) must pass ATS fitness testing or be scrapped. (Kumari \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Owners are nudged to surrender end-of-life vehicles in exchange for CoDs redeemable against new purchases with tax breaks and fee waivers. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e). Officials expect this will generate a steady stream of scrap into certified facilities, where hazardous materials are pre-removed, and bulk metals are shredded or reused in accordance with standards.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Circular Economy Promise\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe policy narrative underscores circular-economy benefits of these measures. Government statements and expert commentary highlight several formal objectives. First, \u003cem\u003eenvironmental protection\u003c/em\u003e \u0026ndash; scrapping unfit vehicles is promised to improve air quality and road safety. An S\u0026amp;P analysis notes that one old truck can emit as much as 14 new ones, so turning over fleets could substantially cut pollution. (Ghosh et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Second, \u003cem\u003erecycling and resource recovery\u003c/em\u003e \u0026ndash; RVSFs are intended to channel secondary raw materials back into industry. The rules explicitly require hazardous parts to be removed in accordance with CPCB guidelines. (Nama et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), implying that the remaining steel, aluminum, and other metals will be recycled to support the circular economy. In practice, the government envisions RVSFs as hubs that collect and sort ELVs, then compress scrap metal for sale; plastics and glass can also be recovered where economically viable. Official documents tout this as a way to reduce reliance on imported raw materials and conserve finite resources \u0026ndash; for example, one policy brief notes that 40\u0026thinsp;+\u0026thinsp;million vehicles globally reach the end of their life each year, representing a significant potential source of recyclable metals. (Aggrawal et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003eb).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA third promise is the \u003cem\u003eformalization of the sector\u003c/em\u003e. The policy explicitly invites informal dismantlers to join the formal chain; 22 of the first 62 RVSFs were former scrap dealers. (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024a). By bringing untaxed scrap operations under regulatory oversight, authorities aim to improve worker safety and environmental compliance. To this end, CPCB issued guidelines (Mar 2023) for eco-friendly depollution at RVSFs, including guidelines on oil storage and the use of wet/shear processes to minimize emissions. Fourth, \u003cem\u003eeconomic and social benefits\u003c/em\u003e are cited: proponents argue that formal scrapping will create skilled jobs and new businesses (in testing, recycling technology, and remanufacturing), while giving owners an incentive to value their scrap. For instance, one study projects the creation of \u0026ldquo;allied services\u0026rdquo; in vehicle health monitoring and maintenance as a result of the policy. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe policy narrative characterizes VSP as \"scientific scrapping\" that completes cycles. This is proposed as a cohesive strategy: eliminate the obsolete for ecological benefit, reclaim its materials for repurposing, and invigorate a domestic recycling sector. Certification and Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) are designed to ensure the monitoring of material flows. The policy is framed not merely as environmental legislation, but as a fundamental element of India\u0026rsquo;s developing circular economy for autos. It is essential to recognize that these commitments primarily emphasize outputs (e.g., formalization, recycled tonnage, number of scrapped vehicles) rather than comprehensive, system-wide goals. The policy design presupposes that enhanced recycling and fleet renewal inherently result in sustainability - a presumption we will examine further later.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3 Policy Design Logic\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe logic underlying India\u0026rsquo;s scrappage policy can be unpacked in three parts: age-based retirement, incentive alignment, and a recycling-centric approach. First, the age-based rul\u003cb\u003ee\u003c/b\u003e requires older vehicles to go. In essence, the policy equates vehicle age with environmental obsolescence. As noted, private cars beyond 15 years (and most trucks beyond 10) are flagged as candidates for scrapping. (Kumari \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Increasing maintenance costs and poorer emission performance of aging vehicles technically justify this rule. However, it is a blunt instrument: it ignores actual condition, usage, or technology. By mandating retirement at a fixed horizon, the policy \u003cem\u003eensures\u003c/em\u003e a large retirement wave, regardless of whether those vehicles still have functional life or could be upgraded. In practice, this pushes owners to scrap even marginally serviceable vehicles, accelerating turnover. (Singh et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003eb).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, the incentive structure is specifically designed to boost fleet renewal. Owners of old vehicles are enticed not only by the disposal of scrap but by material rewards to buy new ones. The CoD system effectively gives cash value for the old vehicle, which can cover 4\u0026ndash;6% of a new car\u0026rsquo;s ex-showroom price on average. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e). On top of that, new vehicles earned under CoD enjoy waived registration fees and large tax concessions (15\u0026ndash;25% of the price) (Press Information Bureau, Government of India 2024b). State governments were also urged to extend road-tax rebates. Together, these fiscal incentives resemble a subsidy for new vehicle sales. Indeed, experience from other scrappage programs (e.g., the US \u0026ldquo;Cash for Clunkers\u0026rdquo; or Germany\u0026rsquo;s 2009 scheme) shows that such incentives primarily boost sales volumes. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e). Implicitly, the policy treats vehicle manufacturing and sale as \u003cem\u003edesirable outcomes\u003c/em\u003e \u0026ndash; industrial growth and GDP gains \u0026ndash; so much so that it redirects scrap proceeds into new purchases.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, the policy\u0026rsquo;s framing is recycling-centric. Establishing RVSFs, issuing CoDs, and specifying steel recovery targets assume that circularity equates to the recovery of physical materials. Implicitly, the designers assume that processing every old car at a formal center will maximize scrap recovery, thereby reducing the need for virgin material. Thus, the policy invests heavily in the downstream \u0026ldquo;end-of-life\u0026rdquo; segment (certified shredding, steel accounting) and less in upstream demand management. The policy narrative makes no mention of measures to reduce vehicle sales or to encourage vehicle retention \u0026ndash; the core of CE's \u0026ldquo;reduce\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;reuse\u0026rdquo; principles. (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025). Instead, scrapping and recycling are treated as self-evident goods. This can be seen in statements like the claim that shifting an aging fleet to formal recycling will \u0026ldquo;complement [India\u0026rsquo;s] circular economy by recycling materials.\u0026rdquo; (Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e)\u0026ndash; The only implied material saving is from recycling, not from consuming less.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn summary, India\u0026rsquo;s scrappage architecture rests on an implicit assumption: that more recycling and more frequent fleet renewal automatically equals sustainability. In practice, this means constructing a system that channels as many old vehicles as possible through RVSFs, while simultaneously stimulating as many new sales as possible. As we will show, this logic creates tensions. For example, by incentivizing scrapping after 15 years, the policy \u003cem\u003edevalues\u003c/em\u003e durability and planned longevity. Subsidizing new vehicle purchases risks inflating total consumption. By focusing on material recovery, it overlooks embedded emissions and potential market rebound. In the next section, we apply our five-dimensional framework to examine these contradictions in detail.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Results: Systemic Contradictions in Circular Economy Design","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe analysis applies the five elements of the analytical framework\u0026mdash;durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon, traceability, and incentive structures\u0026mdash;to assess the internal coherence of India's automobile scrappage policy. Each subsection corresponds to a framework dimension and outlines the policy's structural ramifications within that domain.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1 Durability Deficit\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom the durability dimension of the analytical framework, the policy reveals a structural tendency towards shorter product lifespans, as it offers \u003cem\u003eno incentives to extend vehicle lifetimes\u003c/em\u003e. Because age thresholds trigger scrapping, vehicle longevity is actively discouraged. In fact, by making it rewarding to replace a still-functional 15-year-old vehicle, the policy effectively mandates shorter useful lives. As WRI notes, CE ideally requires designing products \u0026ldquo;to last longer.\u0026rdquo; (Tasaki and Jaeger 2025), but here the opposite is true. Owners know that at year 15 (car) or 10 (truck), their vehicle will face stringent tests or inspections; at that point, even a well-maintained vehicle is economically better to scrap (due to incentives) than to keep running. There is literally \u003cem\u003eno program component\u003c/em\u003e that encourages the maintenance or repair of older vehicles. To the contrary, the higher post-15-year renewal fees and the upfront benefit of a CoD make it financially appealing to trade in a functioning vehicle.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvidence from electric car battery systems corroborates this assertion, since batteries that attain their nominal end-of-life in vehicles typically retain 60\u0026ndash;80% of their original capacity and remain viable for secondary applications. This underscores that \"end-of-life\" is often a functionally and policy-defined criterion rather than a genuine depletion of material or product value. (R\u0026ouml;nkk\u0026ouml; et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis creates a \u0026ldquo;durability deficit\u0026rdquo;: any implicit value in a long-lived vehicle is undermined. Instead of innovation in repairability or modular upgrades, manufacturers may lean into producing vehicles that last exactly until the scrappage threshold. Consumers may habitually treat age 15 as the vessel\u0026rsquo;s endpoint. In short, the scrappage policy turns durability into a liability rather than an asset.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a durability perspective, the policy accelerates planned obsolescence. Vehicle longevity is effectively penalized, making \u0026ldquo;built to last\u0026rdquo; designs economically irrational under the program.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2 Virgin Material Paradox\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a material flow perspective within the analytical framework, the policy demonstrates a mismatch between recycling mechanisms and virgin material demand. One might assume that more recycling means less virgin mining. However, paradoxically, recycling can create demand for more material. Greer et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) describe a \u0026ldquo;waste-resource paradox\u0026rdquo;: converting waste streams into commodities can \u003cem\u003eencourage\u003c/em\u003e their continued production. (Greer et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Applied here, clearing old vehicles to supply scrap could sustain or even grow steel demand. In India\u0026rsquo;s case, recycled auto scrap will become widely available and relatively cheap if the scrappage policy succeeds. But unless new vehicles are made with very high recycled content, automakers may increase production, consuming additional virgin steel and other inputs to meet overall demand growth. Indeed, early studies of global scrappage programs find that industrial output (e.g., for steel and auto parts) often rises alongside vehicle turnover.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePut differently, recycling does not guarantee substitution: any scrap recovered only slightly offsets the immense upstream demand. India\u0026rsquo;s auto industry is expanding rapidly; new vehicle sales were projected to double in the 2020s. Even if thousands of tons of scrap flow back, the incremental demand from millions of new vehicles may swamp those savings (Sharma and Pandey \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003eb). Worse, because scrap supply is more assured, mills may decouple from scrap availability and continue mining. The policy offers no mechanism to throttle raw material use, so the net effect could be neutral or even increase virgin consumption. As Greer \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e caution, a naive circular strategy can \u0026ldquo;sustain waste (over)production\u0026rdquo; by locking in linear growth patterns. (Greer et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, research on electric vehicle battery systems indicates that recycling procedures are often technically complex, resource-intensive, and constrained by product design, especially when batteries are not engineered for disassembly or material reclamation.(R\u0026ouml;nkk\u0026ouml; et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a material flow perspective, the policy risks the waste-resource paradox: increasing scrap availability could paradoxically maintain or grow virgin material demand. Recycling alone, without demand reduction, may reinforce the linear production cycle.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3 Embedded Carbon Displacement\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom the embedded carbon perspective, the policy fails to adequately account for upstream emissions associated with production and the global supply chain, focusing on tailpipe pollutants while ignoring the carbon and energy used to manufacture new vehicles. Yet vehicle production \u0026ndash; especially of large cars and EVs \u0026ndash; can be extremely emissions-intensive. For instance, producing an 80 kWh EV battery emits on the order of 2.4\u0026ndash;16 tonnes of CO₂. (MIT Climate Portal \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Conventional vehicles also require steel (for which recycling saves\u0026thinsp;~\u0026thinsp;75% of the energy required for virgin production), and aluminum recycling saves\u0026thinsp;~\u0026thinsp;95% (Aggrawal et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003eb). Rapid turnover means many batteries and new steel billets are used, often powered by coal-fired plants and iron mines abroad. Thus, each new car carries a large \u0026ldquo;embedded carbon\u0026rdquo; debt.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor example, one Tesla Model 3\u0026rsquo;s battery (80 kWh) may embody\u0026thinsp;~\u0026thinsp;3\u0026ndash;16 tCO₂ (MIT Climate Portal \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). In comparison, the typical gasoline car emits roughly 1 tCO₂ per 4,000\u0026ndash;5,000 km of driving. Thus, an EV can \u0026ldquo;spend\u0026rdquo; several years of tailpipe emissions before breaking even on its battery. If India\u0026rsquo;s grid remains coal-heavy in the near term, these manufacturing emissions are non-trivial. (MIT Climate Portal \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The scrappage policy offers no accounting of this upstream burden. Indeed, one Indian study notes that past scrappage schemes often achieved only modest net carbon reductions because the emissions from producing new vehicles and their increased use offset much of the tailpipe gains. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023a\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, many vehicles and parts are imported, displacing domestic emissions onto exporting countries. If an old car is scrapped and its replacement uses components from high-carbon supply chains (e.g., steel from coal-intensive mills, EVs from factories powered by brown power), India\u0026rsquo;s overall carbon footprint may hardly budge. In other words, the policy displaces emissions into the supply chain without mandating cleaner production. From a CE standpoint, reducing lifecycle carbon is as important as closing material loops, and here the design assumes that replacing old vehicles with nominally cleaner ones (even if new) is an unqualified win. In reality, unless new vehicles are produced in a decarbonized manner, the \u0026ldquo;hidden\u0026rdquo; carbon may erode or even negate claimed benefits. (Poschmann et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eFrom an embedded-carbon perspective, turning over the fleet can dramatically raise lifecycle emissions. Without measures to green manufacturing and imports, the upstream carbon footprint of new vehicles is likely to offset much of any tailpipe improvement.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.4 Traceability Gap\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a traceability perspective, the policy exhibits limitations in tracking material flows across formal and informal sectors. Additionally, the policy presumes that scrapped vehicles flow through certified channels, but in practice, many ELVs bypass the system. In India, a large informal network of dismantlers still dominates ELV recycling. (Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003ea). Despite RVSF registration, we lack a mechanism to ensure that every scrapped vehicle is taken to a licensed facility. Owners of older cars may sell them to local junkyards rather than pursue the bureaucratic CoD route. Even RVSFs might covertly buy scrap without issuing proper certificates. In short, material flows are largely untraceable under current governance. (James et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023b\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis opacity carries two consequences. First, the actual recovery rates of scrap materials are unknown. Official tallies (e.g., CoDs issued) could dramatically undercount or overcount real flows. Second, environmental standards are compromised: informal breakers often use rudimentary methods (acid baths, open burning) to remove parts, releasing toxins in the process. The formal CPCB guidelines and RVSF standards won\u0026rsquo;t apply to these flows. (Zhou et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, a significant fraction of end-of-life material likely enters uncontrolled cycles, robbing the policy of its intended circular loop. Formal tracking (VIN monitoring, digital CoD registry) is still rudimentary, and no policy mandates linking each vehicle\u0026rsquo;s end-of-life to an RVSF record.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eFrom a traceability standpoint, the policy leaves a large gap. Many end-of-life vehicles may never enter the formal circular chain, undermining any claimed tracking of recycled content or pollution controls.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.5 Incentive Misalignment\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom the perspective of the incentive structure dimension, the policy reflects a misalignment between economic incentives and resource-conservation objectives. The current incentive design aligns economic actors toward churn, not conservation. For owners, the financial inducements (cash-for-clunkers, tax breaks) are often insufficient to offset the sunk cost of a working vehicle. In practice, adoption has been slow: by mid-2025, only\u0026thinsp;~\u0026thinsp;180,000 vehicles had been scrapped against a 500,000-annual target. S\u0026amp;P Global notes that \u0026ldquo;limited incentive, and the financial burden on owners,\u0026rdquo; continue to slow the program (Kumari \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Many owners postpone scrapping, waiting for better deals. This suggests that incentives may be too weak to spur owners or may be unevenly communicated.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOn the producer side, incentives are misdirected. Automakers (and dealers) benefit enormously from higher replacement sales, yet have little motivation to prioritize durability. Indeed, MoRTH\u0026rsquo;s inclusion of a recommended 5% discount on new cars undercuts the value of the CoD scrap payment, steering incentives toward consumption. (Kumari \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Meanwhile, the scrapping fees themselves are not penalized \u0026ndash; owners pay nothing beyond normal taxes until heavy fines apply after years of delay \u0026ndash; so there\u0026rsquo;s little push for owners to hold onto cars for maintenance or upgrade. In effect, the policy subsidizes new-car acquisition rather than rewarding lower throughput. This misalignment is further seen in how EPR works: producers can buy EPR certificates (based on recycled steel weight) to meet obligations, which caps their responsibility at a fixed percentage. In other words, once they pay for recycling a fraction of steel, they have little to lose by selling more cars. (Drishti IAS \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003eb).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eIncentives are skewed toward driving turnover rather than conserving stock. Consumers and firms are rewarded for scrapping and buying, not for reducing consumption or extending use.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e summarizes the correlation among the analytical aspects, policy processes, and the systemic inconsistencies uncovered in the investigation. It emphasizes how each dimension reveals a distinct disintegration in the policy's circular-economy rationale.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary of Lifecycle Dimensions and Resulting Policy Contradictions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalytical Dimension\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicy Mechanism\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eObserved System Effect\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eResulting Contradiction\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDurability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAge-based scrappage rules\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eReduced vehicle lifespan\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDurability deficit\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaterial Flow Dynamics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecycling incentives\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSustained/increased material demand\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVirgin material paradox\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmbedded Carbon\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLack of upstream accounting\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncreased production emissions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCarbon displacement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTraceability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWeak monitoring systems\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformal sector leakage\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTraceability gap\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncentive Structures\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePurchase subsidies \u0026amp; CoD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccelerated turnover\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncentive misalignment\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Discussion: Rethinking Circular Economy in Vehicle Policy","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe above results highlight a fundamental mismatch between the scrappage policy\u0026rsquo;s rhetoric and systemic impact. In effect, India\u0026rsquo;s vehicle policy exemplifies a \u0026ldquo;recycling-first\u0026rdquo; paradigm that must give way to a true circular economy approach emphasizing reduction. In this discussion, we draw out broader lessons for policy. The findings indicate a significant discrepancy between the policy's planned circular-economy principles and its actual systemic lifecycle outcomes. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e illustrates this gap, conceptualizing the disparity between recycling-based assumptions and the real dynamics of materials and emissions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.1 From Recycling to Resource Reduction\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA fundamental tenet of circular economy philosophy is the emphasis on resource reduction rather than recycling, as indicated by the reduce\u0026ndash;reuse\u0026ndash;recycle hierarchy. Recent literature underscores the need to reduce total material throughput to achieve sustainability objectives, especially amid the rapidly increasing global demand for resources (Islam et al. 2024). In this context, recycling is deemed essential yet inadequate unless supplemented by initiatives that curtail output and consumption.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results of this analysis demonstrate that India's car scrappage policy effectively reverses this hierarchy by prioritizing end-of-life processing over reducing vehicle manufacturing or extending product lifespans. The policy, centered on the methodical retirement and recycling of automobiles, tacitly posits that material recovery can offset the effects of heightened manufacturing cycles. This assumption neglects the comprehensive lifespan dynamics of resource utilization, especially the ongoing dependence on virgin materials and energy-intensive production methods.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis attitude reveals a fundamental structural paradox in circular economy policy design: recycling is regarded as the principal avenue to sustainability, despite its limited potential to reduce overall resource throughput. Guo et al. (2019) emphasize that, under specific circumstances, the valorization of waste streams may perpetuate their production rather than reduce it. In this environment, the scrappage policy may foster a self-perpetuating cycle of production and disposal, resulting in what this study terms a \u0026ldquo;circular economy mirage.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a lifecycle standpoint, substantial circularity necessitates a transition towards reduced vehicle demand, longer product lifespans, and enhanced resource utilization across the entire system. (Chapman et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) The lack of such measures in the existing policy framework suggests that recycling-focused strategies, although ostensibly consistent with circular-economy principles, may not deliver significant environmental benefits.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.2 Structural Limits of Recycling-Centric Models\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results of this study indicate a more extensive structural constraint within recycling-focused circular economy models. As illustrated in Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec10\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, enhancements to end-of-life processing do not inherently reduce total material throughput, especially as production volumes continue to increase. This illustrates a basic paradox in circular economy policy design: recycling is often regarded as a principal sustainability measure, despite its limited ability to mitigate upstream resource exploitation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe current literature emphasizes that recycling operates within systemic constraints, such as material losses, quality deterioration, and rising demand for virgin inputs in expanding economies. The \"waste\u0026ndash;resource paradox\" indicates that the economic valorization of waste streams may unintentionally perpetuate, rather than diminish, output. (Greer et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). The findings of this analysis suggest that India's scrappage policy could perpetuate this dynamic by formalizing an ongoing cycle of vehicle replacement and material recovery, while failing to tackle the fundamental demand drivers. (Singh et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003eb).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, the international structure of automotive supply chains hinders the efficacy of recycling-oriented methods. Although materials can be sourced domestically, the manufacturing of new automobiles continues to rely on energy-intensive methods and imported parts; therefore, it transfers rather than alleviates environmental impacts. (Baars et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Llamas-Orozco et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). This underscores the constraint of policy frameworks that focus solely on end-of-life management, neglecting lifecycle issues.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCollectively, these conclusions indicate that recycling, while essential, is inadequate as the primary foundation of circular economy strategy. In the absence of supplementary initiatives that reduce production intensity, extend product lifespans, and reconfigure material use, recycling-focused methods may inadvertently sustain linear resource consumption patterns while masquerading as circularity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.3 Lifecycle vs. Tailpipe Governance\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results of this study underscore a fundamental limitation of tailpipe-centered regulatory approaches in evaluating environmental performance. The scrappage policy, as illustrated in Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec10\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, assesses vehicle sustainability primarily through operational emissions while largely disregarding the environmental impacts of production processes and global supply chains. This results in a governance blind spot, in which policy interventions may appear environmentally advantageous at the point of use, while significant environmental burdens are shifted upstream.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese methods are inherently inadequate from a lifecycle perspective, as they do not account for the full range of emissions and resource consumption associated with product systems. The circular economy and sustainability literature increasingly emphasizes that the use of easily quantifiable indicators, such as emissions per kilometer, can obscure broader environmental effects, including those associated with material extraction, manufacturing, and supply chain dynamics (Ellen MacArthur Foundation \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, policies based solely on tailpipe metrics may exaggerate environmental benefits and underestimate systemic trade-offs.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analysis indicates that a transition from tailpipe-based regulation to lifecycle-oriented frameworks that incorporate both operational and embedded environmental impacts is necessary for effective circular economy governance. (Das and Bhat \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003ea). This change would necessitate redefining policy metrics to account for total lifecycle emissions and resource consumption, rather than focusing solely on the use-phase performance. In practice, this approach would ensure that regulatory incentives align with the broader system-level sustainability objectives, including enhanced supply chain accountability, reduced material intensity, and cleaner production processes. This limitation illustrates a broader issue in sustainable decision-making: reliance on single indicators does not adequately capture the intricacies of environmental systems. Current research underscores the need for effective material and policy decisions that concurrently incorporate multiple variables, thereby reflecting trade-offs among environmental, economic, and social dimensions (Bajwa et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.4 Broader Policy Implications\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results of this study transcend the Indian context and underscore wider issues in the execution of circular economy strategies in emerging economies. As seen in Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec10\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, policies focused on end-of-life processing, while neglecting production intensity and consumption growth, may struggle to achieve significant reductions in resource use. This is especially pertinent in the Global South, where rapid economic growth and rising mobility demands may outweigh the environmental benefits of recycling-focused initiatives. (Ahuja and N Khanna \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003eb).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia's example demonstrates that using circular-economy language without corresponding structural changes to production and consumption systems may yield limited or adverse effects. (Molla et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Policies formulated in high-income environments with steady or declining consumption trends may not be applicable in contexts marked by rising material demand and changing industrial frameworks. This highlights the necessity for context-specific policy formulation that incorporates lifetime issues and acknowledges developmental trajectories.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, it underscores significant equity consequences. Scrappage incentives predominantly benefit higher-income individuals who can afford new automobiles, potentially reallocating resources away from other sustainable options such as public transit or shared mobility networks. (Dwivedi et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The existence of informal recycling sectors in numerous emerging nations hinders the establishment of established circular economy models, prompting concerns regarding inclusiveness, labor conditions, and governance ability. (Kala et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe transnational character of material supply chains underscores the need for harmonized international circular-economy initiatives. When production processes and resource flows cross national borders, strategies that focus exclusively on domestic recycling may externalize environmental impacts rather than mitigate them (Gregson and Crang \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Liu et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). This study's conclusion advocates a transition to lifecycle-oriented, system-wide strategies in circular economy governance, especially in rapidly growing economies. These findings align with extensive studies showing that effective transitions to a circular economy rely on the cultivation of resilience capacities, enabling systems to foresee, adapt to, and recover from shocks. Such capabilities require systemic policy support and cannot arise solely from end-of-life interventions (Dos Santos and Gohr \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2026\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Policy Pathways for Genuine Circularity","content":"\u003cp\u003eBuilding on the identified contradictions, we outline policy pathways that reorient India\u0026rsquo;s vehicle policy toward true circularity. The key is to shift incentives from renewal to resource conservation, and to embed life-cycle criteria into regulatory design.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.1 Design-for-Durability\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicymakers could mandate durability standards (e.g., requiring corrosion protection, rebuildable key components, or minimum warranty periods of more than 15 years). For example, tax incentives could be offered for vehicles that pass stricter age-based inspections, rewarding those that remain safe and efficient well beyond 15 years. Encouraging modular design and the \u0026ldquo;right to repair\u0026rdquo; (e.g., by making spare parts readily available) would ensure that vehicles can be maintained rather than scrapped. Aggrawal et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) highlight \u0026ldquo;modular vehicle design\u0026rdquo; as a circular solution for the automotive sector (Aggrawal et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003eb). Under such an approach, OEMs would compete to build longer-lived, serviceable cars, aligning engineering incentives with CE principles. In short, promoting durability counteracts the durability deficit: it would make a 20-year-old car valuable rather than obsolete, thereby directly reducing material throughput.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.2 Condition-Based Retirement\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe National Green Tribunal\u0026rsquo;s Delhi order (diesels \u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;10y, petrol \u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;15y banned) was already a step toward this logic by effectively setting a lower lifetime for most cars. Going further, scrappage should trigger only when a vehicle is demonstrably polluting or unsafe, not automatically at a fixed age. For instance, the policy could scrap vehicles \u003cem\u003eonly after\u003c/em\u003e they fail pollutant emission thresholds or structural safety tests, regardless of age. As S\u0026amp;P Global reported, the government is already considering such a shift for certain urban fleets. (Kumari \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In practice, this means strengthening and expanding ATS checks: vehicles that meet emission norms continue on the road, while gross polluters (old or new) are retired. This would directly address premature obsolescence: a well-maintained 16-year-old vehicle could stay in use if it meets standards. It also incentivizes owners to keep vehicles clean and well-serviced. By tying retirement to \u003cem\u003econdition rather than calendar\u003c/em\u003e, the policy would conserve durable assets and ensure that scrapping actually removes the worst emitters, improving the policy\u0026rsquo;s target alignment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.3 Lifecycle-Based Incentives\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eCurrently, incentives are blunt (e.g., a flat CoD) and favor replacement. Instead, the government could introduce lifecycle assessment (LCA)-based incentives. For example, vehicles could be rated by their cradle-to-grave carbon footprint or material usage, and subsidies/penalties applied accordingly. (Trovato et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Buyers of low-lifecycle-impact vehicles (for instance, high-recycled-content EVs made with green energy) could receive larger rebates, while those of high-impact vehicles would receive smaller rebates. Similarly, scrap values could vary with a vehicle\u0026rsquo;s material intensity: scrapping a heavy steel SUV yields less credit than scrapping a lightweight or partially recycled car, to discourage unnecessarily bulky designs. The ELV rules\u0026rsquo; EPR certificate scheme is a start (linking obligations to steel recovered), but could be broadened. For instance, extending EPR to include batteries and electronics (currently governed by separate rules) would internalize the fate of non-metal components. More innovatively, the government could allow EPR certificates to be traded with a premium for higher-grade recycling (e.g., certificates for properly recycled battery metals). All such measures would shift the economic calculus: manufacturers and consumers would pay more attention to embedded impacts. Ultimately, this links the incentives directly to the policy problems identified (carbon and material use) rather than to intermediate outputs (new car sales).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.4 Domestic Supply Chain Reform\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA circular vehicle economy is not just about end-of-life \u0026ndash; it requires resource-efficient manufacturing. India should promote \u003cem\u003elocal production of recycled materials\u003c/em\u003e and green steel/aluminum. For example, encouraging steel mills to use high-percentage scrap and renewable energy would reduce the carbon intensity of new vehicles. Similarly, building domestic battery recycling and cell production facilities (powered by solar or hydropower) can lower lifecycle emissions. Policy tools could include preferential-purchase regulations (e.g., requiring government vehicle fleets to use only auto parts with a certain level of recycled content) or carbon tariffs on imported auto parts. Domestic R\u0026amp;D should be funded to develop lightweight materials (e.g., biocomposites) to reduce overall material throughput. Finally, integrating RVSFs into industrial clusters with access to remanufacturing facilities (such as engines or transmissions) would capture more value.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese supply-chain reforms complement demand-side measures: by reducing the footprint of each new vehicle, they mitigate the paradox that replacement vehicles generate large emissions. In effect, they address the \u0026ldquo;embedded carbon displacement\u0026rdquo; by making each turn of the fleet as clean as possible. When tied to EPR targets (for instance, mandating a percentage of an OEM\u0026rsquo;s output to contain recycled steel from RVSFs), such reforms can create a virtuous loop: scrap becomes feedstock for local industry, further displacing virgin materials. In sum, greening the supply chain ensures that renewals are greener, making the circular economy claim more credible.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEach of the above pathways directly tackles a dimension of the problem: durability measures reverse the \u003cem\u003edurability deficit\u003c/em\u003e; condition-based rules counter \u003cem\u003epremature obsolescence\u003c/em\u003e; LCA-based incentives address both \u003cem\u003ematerial flow\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eembedded carbon\u003c/em\u003e paradoxes; and supply-chain reforms reduce the \u003cem\u003eembedded carbon\u003c/em\u003e in new vehicles. By aligning policy tools with the identified contradictions, India can transform its scrappage policy into a genuine circular-economy instrument rather than a linear stimulus.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e6.5 Limitations of the Study\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study has significant limitations. Initially, as a conceptual and qualitative analysis, it excludes quantitative assessments of material flows or lifecycle emissions related to the scrappage program. Secondly, the analysis relies on secondary data and policy papers, which may not accurately reflect the dynamics of implementation in the informal sector. Third, although the analytical framework is intended to be generalizable, its implementation in this study is confined to the Indian automobile sector and may necessitate modification for other sectors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study does not empirically investigate the behavioral responses of essential stakeholders, such as consumers, manufacturers, and recyclers, which could affect the practical efficacy of policy interventions. Notwithstanding these constraints, the study offers a solid conceptual framework for assessing circular economy initiatives through a lifecycle systems lens.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"7. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eIndia\u0026rsquo;s Vehicle Scrappage Policy is undeniably a landmark in environmental policy. It mobilizes regulatory energy, finance, and technology toward building a formal recycling regime. However, our lifecycle analysis uncovers a circular-economy mirage: beneath the surface, gains in formal scrap processing mask fundamental inconsistencies. The policy\u0026rsquo;s age-based retirements, generous purchase incentives, and narrow recycling focus implicitly promote greater material throughput, not less. In effect, vehicles are slated to retire before the end of life, and the fleet is turned over at an accelerated rate. While this may lower tailpipe emissions per vehicle, the absolute resource demand \u0026ndash; for steel, plastics, minerals, and carbon \u0026ndash; may actually rise or stagnate. (Gao et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis finding holds considerable importance. It serves as a reminder to policymakers that recycling rates by themselves do not ensure sustainability. A circular economy should emphasize minimizing overall consumption and prolonging product lifespan, rather than merely completing a loop within the supply chain. In the automotive sector, this entails formulating policies that emphasize reducing the number of vehicles or improving their efficient use, with recycling as a supplementary measure. For India, this may entail reevaluating scrappage policies in favor of condition-based retirement, enhancing repair markets, and promoting sustainability throughout the automotive supply chain. The nation can only escape the illusion and attain the genuine circularity its policies seek by doing so.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, in the absence of lifecycle-based governance, recycling-focused policies may inadvertently perpetuate, rather than mitigate, resource-intensive development patterns. Furthermore, we emphasize that circular economy policy should be assessed not by the efficacy of recycling systems, but by its ability to diminish overall material throughput and environmental impact. India's automotive industry needs to augment the current scrappage program with structural reforms that promote longevity and deter excessive turnover. Global policymakers must recognize that a lifelong perspective is crucial for ensuring that circular economy objectives transcend mere rhetoric inside an expanding consumer economy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFuture research should address this study's limitations and findings by empirically evaluating the lifetime consequences of vehicle scrappage rules using integrated lifecycle assessment and system dynamics methodologies. Specifically, quantitative examination of material throughput, embedded carbon, and rebound effects would facilitate the validation and expansion of the conceptual framework established in this paper. Additional study is required to analyze stakeholder behavior, encompassing consumer decision-making, manufacturer strategies, and recycling sector dynamics, to enhance comprehension of how policy incentives manifest in practical consequences.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, subsequent research might investigate integrating informal recycling systems into formal circular value chains and establish monitoring methods to track material flows within intricate supply networks. (Harun et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Comparative evaluations across countries and regions would yield insights into the impact of varying policy designs on resource efficiency, lifetime emissions, and circular-economy performance under different economic circumstances.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003e \u003cb\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/b\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFunding:\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAuthor Contributions: Aladdin H.M. Shaker conceptualized the study, established the analytical framework, conducted the analysis, and drafted the initial manuscript. Puneet Pathak assisted in supervision, critical evaluation, and manuscript editing. Both writers reviewed and endorsed the final article.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability:\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo datasets were generated or analyzed during the study. The research is based on publicly available policy documents, legal texts, and secondary literature.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIndia as a model for circular economy in automotive sector. J Environ Manage 394:127386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2025.127386\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAhuja V, N Khanna S (2019) End-of-Life Vehicles in India-Regulatory Perspectives. Manesar, India, pp 2019-28\u0026ndash;2580\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBaars J, Domenech T, Bleischwitz R, et al (2020) Circular economy strategies for electric vehicle batteries reduce reliance on raw materials. Nat Sustain 4:71\u0026ndash;79. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-020-00607-0\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBajwa AUR, Siriwardana C, Shahzad W, Naeem MA (2025) Material selection in the construction industry: a systematic literature review on multi-criteria decision making. Environ Syst Decis 45:8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-025-10001-w\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eChapman DA, Eyckmans J, Van Acker K (2024) The impact of demand-side strategies to enable a more circular economy in private car mobility. Sustain Prod Consum 49:263\u0026ndash;275. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2024.06.029\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDas PK, Bhat MY (2022) Global electric vehicle adoption: implementation and policy implications for India. Environ Sci Pollut Res 29:40612\u0026ndash;40622. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-18211-w\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDe Pascale A, Arbolino R, Szopik-Depczyńska K, et al (2021) A systematic review for measuring circular economy: The 61 indicators. J Clean Prod 281:124942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.124942\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDos Santos JEA, Gohr CF (2026) Resilience capability for the circular economy: a conceptual framework. Environ Syst Decis 46:16. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-026-10079-w\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDrishti IAS (2024) Discount on New Vehicles Against Scrapping Certificates. In: Dly. Updat. - Drishti IAS. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/discount-on-new-vehicles-against-scrapping-certificates\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDwivedi A, Kumar R, Goel V, et al (2024) A move toward environmental sustainability: an analysis of the impact of state-level incentive policy improving the adoption of electric vehicles in India. J Therm Anal Calorim 149:12489\u0026ndash;12502. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10973-024-13683-7\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eEllen MacArthur Foundation (2022) Life Cycle Assessment for the Circular Economy. In: Ellen MacArthur Found. https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/life-cycle-assessment-for-the-circular-economy\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGao H, Liu J, Daigo I (2025) Methodology development for estimating the impact of restriction factors to promote national steel recycling. Resour Conserv Recycl 215:108052. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2024.108052\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGhosh SK, Ghosh SK, Baidya R (2021) Circular Economy in India: Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle Through Policy Framework. In: Ghosh SK, Ghosh SK (eds) Circular Economy: Recent Trends in Global Perspective. Springer Nature Singapore, Singapore, pp 183\u0026ndash;217\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGreer R, Von Wirth T, Loorbach D (2021) The Waste-Resource Paradox: Practical dilemmas and societal implications in the transition to a circular economy. J Clean Prod 303:126831. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126831\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGregson N, Crang M (2015) From Waste to Resource: The Trade in Wastes and Global Recycling Economies. Annu Rev Environ Resour 40:151\u0026ndash;176. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-102014-021105\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHarun Z, Molla AH, Mansor MRA, Ismail R (2022) Development, Critical Evaluation, and Proposed Framework: End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling in India. Sustainability 14:15441. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215441\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eHu S (2022) Multicriteria analysis on environmental impacts of accelerated vehicle retirement program from a life-cycle perspective: A case study of Beijing. J Environ Manage 314:115041. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.115041\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eJames AT, Asjad M, Kumar G, et al (2023a) Analyzing barriers for implementing new vehicle scrap policy in India. Transp Res Part Transp Environ 114:103568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103568\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eJames AT, Asjad M, Kumar G, et al (2023b) Analyzing barriers for implementing new vehicle scrap policy in India. Transp Res Part Transp Environ 114:103568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2022.103568\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eJerome A, Helander H, Ljunggren M, Janssen M (2022) Mapping and testing circular economy product-level indicators: A critical review. Resour Conserv Recycl 178:106080. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.106080\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eKala K, Bolia NB, Sushil (2022) Analysis of informal waste management using system dynamic modelling. Heliyon 8:e09993. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e09993\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eKumari V (2025) India\u0026rsquo;s vehicle scrappage policy: Key insights for 2025. In: SP Glob. Mobil. Automot. Insights. https://www.spglobal.com/automotive-insights/en/blogs/2025/09/india-vehicle-scrappage-policy-insights\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLiu Z, Adams M, Walker TR (2018) Are exports of recyclables from developed to developing countries waste pollution transfer or part of the global circular economy? Resour Conserv Recycl 136:22\u0026ndash;23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2018.04.005\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLlamas-Orozco JA, Meng F, Walker GS, et al (2023) Estimating the environmental impacts of global lithium-ion battery supply chain: A temporal, geographical, and technological perspective. PNAS Nexus 2:pgad361. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad361\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLowe BH, Genovese A, Vivanco DF, Zink T (2025) Revisiting circular economy rebound: Market dynamics, policy implications, and future research directions. J Ind Ecol 29:1936\u0026ndash;1945. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.70121\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMalhotra V (2023) Impact of Voluntary Vehicle Scrappage Policy 2021 on the Household Spending and Demand for New Vehicles. SSRN Electron J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4335143\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMcAvoy S, Grant T, Smith C, Bontinck P (2021) Combining Life Cycle Assessment and System Dynamics to improve impact assessment: A systematic review. J Clean Prod 315:128060. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128060\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMilios L (2018) Advancing to a Circular Economy: three essential ingredients for a comprehensive policy mix. Sustain Sci 13:861\u0026ndash;878. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0502-9\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMinistry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (2025) Environment Protection (End-of-Life Vehicles) Rules, 2025\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMishra NB, Pani A, Bansal P, et al (2024) Towards sustainable logistics in India: Forecasting freight transport emissions and policy evaluations. Transp Res Part Transp Environ 133:104267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2024.104267\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMIT Climate Portal (2022) How much CO2 is emitted by manufacturing batteries? In: MIT Clim. Portal. https://climate.mit.edu/ask-mit/how-much-co2-emitted-manufacturing-batteries\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMolla AH, Shams H, Harun Z, et al (2023) Evaluation of end-of-life vehicle recycling system in India in responding to the sustainability paradigm: an explorative study. Sci Rep 13:4169. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-30964-7\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eMolla AH, Shams H, Harun Z, et al (2022) An Assessment of Drivers and Barriers to Implementation of Circular Economy in the End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Sector in India. Sustainability 14:13084. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142013084\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eNakamoto Y, Kagawa S (2022) A generalized framework for analyzing car lifetime effects on stock, flow, and carbon footprint. J Ind Ecol 26:433\u0026ndash;447. https://doi.org/10.1111/jiec.13190\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eNama DDK, Sharma DS, Sharma DM, Sharma DD (2025) The Regulatory Tapestry of India\u0026rsquo;s Circular Economy. Int J Environ Sci 667\u0026ndash;676. https://doi.org/10.64252/j1826884\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eNguyen T, Van Nguyen T, Zhou L, et al (2025) Assessing the impact of EU policies on recycling supply chain: a system dynamics perspective on advancing packaging recycling capacity. Ann Oper Res 355:2017\u0026ndash;2069. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-024-06438-y\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePoschmann J, Bach V, Finkbeiner M (2023) Decarbonization Potentials for Automotive Supply Chains: Emission-Intensity Pathways of Carbon-Intensive Hotspots of Battery Electric Vehicles. Sustainability 15:11795. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151511795\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePress Information Bureau, Government of India (2024) Vehicle Scrappage Policy, 2021. In: Press Inf. Bur. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2042966\u0026amp;reg=3\u0026amp;lang=2\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePress Information Bureau, Government of India (2025) Compliance of End-of-Life Vehicles Rules, 2025. In: Press Inf. Bur. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2099130\u0026amp;reg=3\u0026amp;lang=2\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePress Information Bureau, Government of India (2021) Year End Review 2021: Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. In: Press Inf. Bur. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=1786527\u0026amp;reg=3\u0026amp;lang=2\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePSR Compliance (2026) EPR Registration under Vehicle Scrappage Policy India. In: PSR Compliance Blog. https://www.psrcompliance.com/blog/epr-registration-vehicle-scrappage-policy-india\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eR\u0026ouml;nkk\u0026ouml; P, Majava J, Hyv\u0026auml;rinen T, et al (2024) The circular economy of electric vehicle batteries: a Finnish case study. Environ Syst Decis 44:100\u0026ndash;113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-023-09916-z\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSahajwalla V, Hossain R (2023) Rethinking circular economy for electronics, energy storage, and solar photovoltaics with long product life cycles. MRS Bull 48:375\u0026ndash;385. https://doi.org/10.1557/s43577-023-00519-2\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSardianou E, Nikou V, Evangelinos K, Nikolaou I (2024) What are the key dimensions that CE emphasizes on? A systematic analysis of circular economy definitions. Environ Syst Decis 44:547\u0026ndash;562. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-023-09956-5\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSasmoko S, Akhtar MZ, Khan HUR, et al (2022) How Do Industrial Ecology, Energy Efficiency, and Waste Recycling Technology (Circular Economy) Fit into China\u0026rsquo;s Plan to Protect the Environment? Up to Speed. Recycling 7:83. https://doi.org/10.3390/recycling7060083\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSharma L, Pandey S (2020) Recovery of resources from end-of-life passenger cars in the informal sector in India. Sustain Prod Consum 24:1\u0026ndash;11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2020.06.005\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eShui B, Xu M, Luo X (2024) Wheels of Change: The Environmental Paradox of Accelerating Vehicle Retirement Program. Environ Sci Technol 58:20412\u0026ndash;20423. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.4c05009\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSingh N, Mishra T, Banerjee R (2021) Analysis of Retrofit and Scrappage Policies for the Indian Road Transport Sector in 2030. Transp Res Rec J Transp Res Board 2675:233\u0026ndash;246. https://doi.org/10.1177/03611981211028867\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTasaki T, Jaeger J (2025) 9 Key Findings on Global Progress Toward a Circular Economy. In: World Resour. Inst. https://www.wri.org/insights/circular-economy-global-progress\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e(TERI) (2026) Enhancing Circular Economy of End-of-Life Vehicles (ELVs) in India. NITI Aayog, Government of India, New Delhi\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) (2022) Vehicle Scrappage Policy. The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eTrovato MR, Nocera F, Giuffrida S (2020) Life-Cycle Assessment and Monetary Measurements for the Carbon Footprint Reduction of Public Buildings. Sustainability 12:3460. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083460\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eZhou W, Feng R, Han M, Chen M (2022) Evolution characters and regulation impacts within the global scrap rubber trade network. Resour Conserv Recycl 181:106201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2022.106201\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"environment-systems-and-decisions","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"envr","sideBox":"Learn more about [Environment Systems and Decisions](http://link.springer.com/journal/10669)","snPcode":"10669","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/10669/3","title":"Environment Systems and Decisions","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"em","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Circular economy, vehicle scrappage policy, lifecycle assessment, resource efficiency, embedded carbon, extended producer responsibility","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9361254/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9361254/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eIndia's Vehicle Scrappage Policy (Voluntary Vehicle Fleet Modernization Program) is a fundamental element of the circular economy transition in the transportation sector, emphasizing recycling, formalization, and emission reduction. Nonetheless, its systemic ramifications for resource efficiency are still little examined. This study rigorously assesses the strategy from a lifecycle systems viewpoint, transcending traditional measures of recycling efficiency and tailpipe emissions. The article employs a qualitative, doctrinal, and conceptual methodology to establish a five-dimensional analytical framework encompassing durability, material flow dynamics, embedded carbon, traceability, and incentive structures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study uncovers a series of structural conflicts inherent in the policy design. Initially, age-dependent scrappage regulations and financial incentives compromise product durability, resulting in a durability shortfall. Secondly, enhanced recycling may paradoxically increase the need for raw materials, illustrating a waste-resource contradiction. The policy overlooks upstream emissions, leading to the displacement of embedded carbon from increased vehicle production. Fourth, inadequate traceability and the prevalence of informal dismantling sectors undermine assertions of circularity. Ultimately, incentive frameworks are oriented towards market expansion rather than resource protection.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study characterizes these dynamics as a \"circular economy mirage,\" wherein formal recycling benefits conceal increasing material throughput and lifecycle emissions. It argues that recycling-focused policy frameworks are inadequate without concurrent efforts to reduce demand and manage lifecycles. The paper closes by recommending policy approaches focused on durability criteria, condition-based retirement, lifecycle-based incentives, and supply chain decarbonization. These findings enhance the broader discussion on circular economy policy in emerging economies by emphasizing the necessity for systematic, lifecycle-focused regulatory frameworks.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The Circular Economy Mirage: A Lifecycle Systems Analysis of India’s Vehicle Scrappage Policy ","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-05-15 06:03:41","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9361254/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"16330689737204254034344644554246168798","date":"2026-05-09T20:32:49+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-05-04T19:35:43+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-04-27T02:10:43+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2026-04-27T01:50:26+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Environment Systems and Decisions","date":"2026-04-23T23:52:56+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"environment-systems-and-decisions","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"envr","sideBox":"Learn more about [Environment Systems and Decisions](http://link.springer.com/journal/10669)","snPcode":"10669","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/10669/3","title":"Environment Systems and Decisions","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"em","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"f21c5f78-3926-48a4-b221-45cb2d887879","owner":[],"postedDate":"May 15th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"16330689737204254034344644554246168798","date":"2026-05-09T20:32:49+00:00","index":17,"fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"5","date":"2026-05-04T19:35:43+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-15T06:03:41+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-05-15 06:03:41","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-9361254","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-9361254","identity":"rs-9361254","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}