Bangladesh’s Electoral System: Constitutional Structure, Legal Framework and the Impact of the July Charter

Bangladesh’s Electoral System: Constitutional Structure, Legal Framework and the Impact of the July Charter | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Bangladesh’s Electoral System: Constitutional Structure, Legal Framework and the Impact of the July Charter Syed Nazrul Islam This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8817381/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This study examined Bangladesh’s electoral system by analyzing its constitutional structure, legal framework and recent reform initiatives by paying special attention to the Election Commission, the Representation of the People Order 1972 and the July Charter 2025. The aim of the study is to assess how legal design and institutional practice affect electoral integrity and public trust. However, a qualitative doctrinal research method has been applied in the study. It analyzed constitutional provisions, statutes and Supreme Court judgments as primary sources. It also reviewed peer-reviewed literature, policy reports and comparative studies as secondary sources. Drawing examples from India, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom, a comparative constitutional approach was used. The analysis was guided by a three-pillar framework focusing on institutional independence, legal enforceability and electoral legitimacy. The findings of the study highlighted that constitutional guarantees of electoral independence are very weak in practical points of view. Legal loopholes and selective enforcement undermine the authority of the Election Commission. Moreover, the abolition of the caretaker government created institutional uncertainty rather than stability. However, the July Charter 2025 has identified some key reform areas, but it has few lacking in binding legal force. As a result, electoral legitimacy and public confidence may continue to decline. The study recommends strengthening the Election Commission through secure tenure and insulated appointments. It calls for comprehensive campaign finance legislation with strong enforcement mechanisms and also emphasizes timely judicial oversight during elections and constitutionally grounded reform implementation. Apart from some findings and recommendations, the study has some limitations like it relied on doctrinal analysis and secondary data and didn’t not include any empirical fieldwork or survey evidence. Constitutional Law Electoral governance Constitution of Bangladesh Election Commission Caretaker government July Charter 2025 Electoral reform Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Introduction Elections are the central mechanism through which democratic legitimacy is established. In Bangladesh, however, the electoral process has faced persistent legal and institutional challenges (Baized et al., 2025). Repeated allegations of irregularities, opposition boycotts and declining voter confidence have raised serious concerns about electoral credibility of Bangladesh. These concerns are not only political but are deeply rooted in constitutional design, legal enforcement and institutional practice (Rashiduzzaman, 1997). The Constitution of Bangladesh establishes a parliamentary democracy, provides for an independent Election Commission and prescribes regular elections and outlines the basic qualifications and procedures for political representation (“Constitution of Bangladesh,” 2026). Despite these formal safeguards, elections since 2011 have remained highly contested. The abolition of the caretaker government system through the Fifteenth Amendment removed a key transitional mechanism (Sarkar & Rahman, 2024). These changes intensified disputes over neutrality during election periods and subsequent elections were marked by low participation, contested outcomes and weakened public trust. The legal framework of governing elections further complicates the problem. The Representation of the People Order 1972 remains the principal electoral statute (The Daily Star, 2025). Although it has been amended over time, major gaps are persisted in campaign finance regulation, enforcement powers and accountability mechanisms. Here, weak implementation has allowed misuse of state resources, vote manipulation and selective application of rules. As a result, legal provisions often remain declaratory rather than effective. In response to these challenges, the interim government introduced the July Charter 2025. The Charter is proposing a wide-ranging reforms, including restoring a caretaker-style framework, strengthening the Election Commission and improving campaign finance transparency (M. Ahmed, 2025). However, the Charter is a political declaration, not binding law so its legal status and implementation pathway is still very much uncertain. Objectives of the Study To examine the constitutional structure of Bangladesh’s electoral system To analyze gaps in electoral laws and their enforcement To assess the independence and role of the Election Commission To evaluate the legal and political significance of the July Charter 2025 To compare Bangladesh’s electoral framework with selected democracies Problem Statement Bangladesh’s electoral system has been facing deep legal, administrative and constitutional challenges that are undermining electoral integrity and public trust. Opposition boycotts, one-sided outcomes and widespread irregularities have plagued recent elections. For example, in 2014 half of parliament’s 300 seats were uncontested due to the main opposition boycott (Islam, 2026), contributing to a historic low turnout (≈40%) (Reuters, 2024). Similarly, official investigations of the 2018 election found that ballots were manipulated in nearly 80% of polling centres and reported turnouts exceeding 100% in some constituencies (Islam, 2026) such as voter intimidation, ballot stuffing and misuse of state power. These actions have reduced voter participation, as shown by fluctuating turnout over time in Table 1 and they have raised serious concerns about the fairness of the electoral process. Table 1: Voter turnout in recent national elections. Sources: Bangladesh EC/IPU data and media reports . Election Year Registered Voters Turnout (%) Notes 2001 74,946,364 74.97 (IFES, 2024) Third election after caretaker system introduced 2008 81,083,933 87.13 (IFES, 2024) Highest turnout under caretaker government 2014 43,943,184 39.58 (“Elections in Bangladesh,” 2026) Opposition boycott; 153 seats uncontested (Islam, 2026) 2018 104,142,381 ~82 (reported) (Reuters, 2024) Contested elections with reported rigging 2024 119,691,633 ≈40 (Reuters, 2024) Boycott by major party; polls “sham” Legally, the framework exhibits significant gaps. The Representation of the People Order (RPO) 1972 , Bangladesh’s chief election law, contains loopholes in candidate qualification, campaign finance and vote-counting procedures that are often exploited (Election Commission, 1972). For years, no effective mechanism existed for robust campaign finance disclosure. However, strict affidavit rules and public asset declarations have been introduced only recently (The Daily Star, 2025). Similarly, the RPO’s enforcement of voting rules was weak: until late 2025 the Election Commission could annul only individual polling centres, not whole-constituency results, even when massive fraud was evident (The Daily Star, 2025). Many scholars and observers note that such gaps (e.g. in arresting vote-buying or misuse of government resources) allow elections to be “orchestrated contests” rather than free contests (Islam, 2026). Constitutionally, tensions over electoral administration have intensified. The Constitution calls for an independent Election Commission (Article 118) assisted by the executive, but political parties and analysts frequently question its autonomy (Akter, 2023). As one study notes, despite constitutional guarantees, the EC’s impartiality in practice is “questionable” and it faced “many obstacles” in overseeing recent elections (Akter, 2023). At the same time, the abolition of the non-partisan caretaker government system (introduced in 1996 and later struck down) has left a legal void during electoral transitions. Since the 15th Amendment (2011) removed the caretaker provision, Bangladesh’s constitution contains no explicit path for a neutral interim government (Star Digital Report, 2024). This was tragically highlighted after the August 2024 uprising: the interim Yunus administration was formed under an ad hoc “doctrine of necessity” (Hossain, 2025; Levush, 2024), a move later described by jurists as an “extraordinary” arrangement outside normal constitutional procedure (Levush, 2024). These ambiguities fuel political conflict: the leading opposition (BNP) continues to demand restoration of a caretaker mechanism, while the government insists fresh elections can proceed under the EC without resignations (Alam, 2025; Levush, 2024). The July Charter 2025 is a tentative reform agreement by the interim government. It promises new solutions; however, its legal status remains unclear. The Charter proposes sweeping reforms, including restoring a caretaker-style framework, enforcing strict campaign finance rules and strengthening the Election Commission (Haque & Bisarya, 2025). However, it is a non-binding political declaration and it depends on a future referendum and legislation. The Charter’s potential impact remains debated. Supporters argue that it can overhaul the flawed electoral system. In contrast, critics warn that it may concentrate power or bypass democratic debate. In sum, Bangladesh’s electoral system suffers from weakened institutions, contested rules and long-standing practices of abuse. These challenges undermine fairness and voter confidence; therefore, serious legal and constitutional reforms are essential before credible elections can take place (Alam, 2025; Islam, 2026). Rationale of the study The rationale of this study is to provide an integrated legal and constitutional analysis of Bangladesh’s electoral system. Existing studies examined institutions, laws, or political behavior in isolation but, this research’s aim is to make the connections by linking constitutional norms, statutory enforcement and electoral legitimacy. So, such an analysis is necessary to understand why electoral reforms have repeatedly failed and what conditions are required for credible elections in the future. Literature Review Constitutional Foundations and Electoral System The Constitution of Bangladesh (1972) establishes a parliamentary democracy and sets the basic rules for elections. Under Part VII, Articles 65–72 govern the Jatiya Sangsad (unicameral parliament), including the composition (300 members in single-member constituencies, plus reserved women’s seats), terms, dissolution and procedures (Bangladesh Government, 1972 ). Articles 66–67 detail qualifications and disqualifications for Members of Parliament; Article 70 bars floor-crossing, penalizing MPs who defect. Article 123 requires general elections within 90 days of Parliament’s dissolution. Crucially, Article 118 creates an Election Commission of Bangladesh (ECB) with a Chief and up to four Commissioners. The Constitution guarantees that the EC will be independent and that the President (i.e. the executive) will cooperate in conducting elections (Akter, 2023 ). In theory this mirrors established democracies like India, whose Article 324 similarly entrenches a permanent Election Commission. In practice, however, scholars note a “gap between political parties and the electoral government” in Bangladesh. One study of the 2018 polls concluded that although the EC is “constitutionally recognized as an independent institution,” its impartiality has been widely challenged (Akter, 2023 ). Political scientists cite frequent instances where the ECB’s credibility was questioned, leading critics to view it as subordinate to partisan interests despite the formal constitutional promise (Akter, 2023 ; Levush, 2024 ). In addition to the constitution, electoral law has been shaped by numerous amendments. Bangladesh has amended its constitution 18 times by 2025, often in ways that directly affected the electoral cycle and institutions. The most consequential was the 13th Amendment (1996) , which introduced a unique non-party “caretaker government” system under Chapter IIA of the Constitution. Under this system, a neutral interim administration led by a former Chief Justice would oversee elections to guarantee fairness. This system was used in 1996, 2001 and 2008 and widely regarded as a key “guarantor institution” for elections (Khan, 2025 ; Levush, 2024 ). However, rising political tensions led the Supreme Court in 2011 (Abdul Mannan Khan case) to declare the caretaker provision unconstitutional and soon thereafter the 15th Amendment (2011) formally abolished it (Alam, 2025 ; Levush, 2024 ). International observers and analysts (including ConstitutionNet) noted that this removal created a “vacuum” in Bangladesh’s democratic framework (Khan, 2025 ). Unlike India and many parliamentary democracies, Bangladesh had no constitutional path for a neutral interim authority. The result has been acute contention over elections: the 2014 and 2024 polls saw major opposition boycotts, each time demanding return of the caretaker model (Alam, 2025 ; The Daily Star, 2025 ). The Representation of the People Order, 1972 (RPO) The RPO 1972 is the foundational electoral statute in Bangladesh, enacted as a Presidential Order shortly after independence. It regulates all key aspects of elections: constituency delimitation, candidate nomination and scrutiny, voting (secret ballot), vote counting and the definition of electoral offences and corrupt practices (Election Commission, 1972 ). In effect, it is the Bangladesh analogue of India’s Representation of the People Acts. Historically, the RPO has been amended many times to address emerging issues. For example, a 2013 amendment mandated that women hold at least 33% of standing committees in Parliament and other amendments have introduced new candidacy rules (Alamgir, 2021 ). Despite these updates, scholars identify significant loopholes and weaknesses in the RPO. Campaign finance regulations within RPO are especially weak. Although Section 99 of the RPO (as amended) sets spending limits for candidates, enforcement has been almost non-existent. Only in late 2025 did the interim government institute mandatory affidavits: candidates now must publicly disclose their assets and income to the EC and false statements are criminalized (The Daily Star, 2025 ). Before this reform, the lack of transparency allowed industrial-scale vote-buying and illicit funding to thrive unseen. Other procedural gaps have been exploited. For years, the EC could cancel results only at single polling centers, so district-wide rigging could not be nullified. In October 2025, the RPO was amended so the EC may now annul an entire constituency’s vote if “significant irregularities” are found (The Daily Star, 2025 ). The “no-vote” option - already introduced in 2008 for single-candidate races - was reintroduced: if a sole candidate fails to secure more votes than the ‘no vote’ box, a new election must be held (The Daily Star, 2025 ). These changes reflect past abuses: in 2014, 153 seats were uncontested due to a boycott and the “no vote” measure was meant to give dissenters an exit (though it has never overturned a result) (The Daily Star, 2025 ). Critical legal scholarship, however, points out that many RPO provisions are out of date or ambiguously worded . For instance, Sections on corrupt practices (bribery, treating, undue influence) are broad but rarely enforced, while modern tactics (e.g. digital misinformation, corporate campaign finance) are largely unaddressed (Haque & Bisarya, 2025). Observers argue the RPO treats elections as a purely mechanical process, underestimating political context. The forthcoming July Charter proposals emphasize that the RPO “requires fundamental reform” to handle campaign finance transparency and media regulation, echoing long-standing academic calls for tougher legislation (R. Ahmed, 2025 ). Delimitation of Constituencies Constituency boundaries in Bangladesh were initially determined by the 1976 Delimitation Ordinance; from 1979 to 2022 they remained mostly static despite huge demographic shifts. The Delimitation of Constituencies Act, 2021 finally replaced the old order. It empowers the Election Commission to redraw boundaries in line with three key criteria: population/voter data, geographic contiguity and administrative integrity (TBS Report, 2025 ). Section 6 of the 2021 Act explicitly requires consideration of census population, registered voters and ease of administration, while avoiding the splitting of smallest admin units. Practical implementation of the Act has begun for the 2026 elections. In mid-2025 the EC’s technical committee proposed shifting one seat from under-populated Bagerhat district to fast-growing Gazipur (TBS Report, 2025 ). The EC cited updated voter rolls and census adjustments in line with the Act’s Section 6 guidelines (TBS Report, 2025 ). Observers generally welcome the Act’s rational criteria, but some legal experts caution about potential gerrymandering. Unlike India, which has a quasi-judicial Delimitation Commission, Bangladesh’s EC has broad discretion (albeit subject to public objections) (TBS Report, 2025 ). The 2021 Act thus marks a significant modernization of electoral law, but its long-term impact will depend on transparent implementation and independent oversight. Election Commission and Related Statutes Beyond the Constitution and RPO, a web of statutes and rules govern the EC and election management. Notably, the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners Appointment Act 2022 was enacted to formalize how the EC leadership is chosen. The law creates a search committee (including a Supreme Court judge and senior legislators) to recommend commissioners, aiming at merit-based, non-partisan appointments. The interim government and ruling party have touted this as a pioneering measure (even calling it “first of its kind in the subcontinent” (UNB, 2023)), though critics note it could still be subject to political influence. The EC has also issued Conduct of Election Rules (2008) and a Code of Conduct for Parties and Candidates (2008) under the RPO’s authority. These rules specify finer details: campaign timings, use of government resources, media coverage limits and nominee paperwork. In response to past crises, the EC’s Election Observation Policy (2017) was introduced to encourage domestic and international monitoring of polls. Additionally, Election Officials (Special Provisions) Act 1991 protects presiding officers’ neutrality. Despite these frameworks, enforcement remains spotty. Election observers (domestic and international) repeatedly report biased administration (e.g. police intimidation of opposition agents) and accuse the EC of not acting decisively on violations. Campaign finance regulations have drawn growing scrutiny. Under the old regime, there were almost no effective limits on party donations or spending, leading to entrenched cronyism. Recent RPO amendments (2025) requiring asset disclosure (The Daily Star, 2025 ) and auditing of party accounts begin to address this. Still, unlike India (which has evolving caps and public reporting) or the UK (which prohibits corporate donations over a threshold), Bangladesh lacks a comprehensive finance law. Experts note the absence of clear penalties for exceeded spending or illicit funds in party coffers. Critics argue that without strong campaign finance oversight, elections will continue to favor moneyed incumbents. Caretaker vs Interim Governments A major debate in Bangladesh’s electoral law is the caretaker system . As noted, Bangladesh uniquely constitutionalized caretaker governments in 1996. Proponents (from both major parties at the time) saw this as vital to “neutralize executive interference” (Khan, 2025 ). In practice, it delivered broadly free contests in 1996, 2001 and 2008, acting as a temporary “fourth branch” of government dedicated to elections(Khan, 2025 ). Scholars observe it was “modeled loosely after India’s Election Commission,” aiming to ensure an unbiased poll environment (Khan, 2025 ). However, the abrogation of caretakers has remained highly contentious. The Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling (Abdul Mannan Khan) struck the system on grounds of “parliamentary sovereignty,” likening caretaker regimes to unconstitutional distortions (Khan, 2025 ). This echoed India’s basic-structure doctrine case (Kesavananda Bharati) insofar as the Court protected what it saw as fundamental democratic principles. The subsequent 15th Amendment removed Chapter IIA, ending any constitutional caretaker mechanism (Alam, 2025 ; Levush, 2024 ). As a result, since 2011 there is no clear legal model for election-time transition. When the August 2024 revolution occurred, this void became acute. Law scholars and international observers have discussed whether the interim Yunus government could be seen as a “de facto” caretaker or was merely an emergency government. The Law Library of Congress notes that Bangladesh has no constitutional provision for interim governments , so the August 2024 arrangement was essentially extra-constitutional, justified by Article 106 and court advice (Levush, 2024 ). The Supreme Court even ruled that an interim government could be formed under these extraordinary conditions (Levush, 2024 ). The November 2025 Supreme Court judgment went further: it restored the caretaker mechanism for future elections only , stating the 13th Amendment system must be reinstated for the “14th” post-Independence parliament (i.e. elections after 2026), but explicitly exempted the imminent 2026 polls (Alam, 2025 ). By contrast, in India elections are managed without any formal caretaker government. When Parliament dissolves, the incumbent Prime Minister and ministers continue in a caretaker capacity by convention ; there is no intervening non-partisan cabinet (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2006). The powerful Election Commission of India (Article 324) oversees conduct and India’s consistent application of this model (along with robust judicial review) has generally produced accepted results (Bhat, 2021 ). Sri Lanka similarly has no special caretaker executive: elections follow fixed terms unless Parliament is dissolved and the President or PM simply remains in office until a new government is formed (Welikala, 2019 ). However, Sri Lanka has professionalized its constitutional council and courts to maintain checks on power. For example, during Sri Lanka’s 2018 crisis the unified judiciary (Supreme Court and Court of Appeal) curtailed a controversial dissolution bid (Khan, 2025 ). In that context, expert Arafat Khan notes Sri Lanka’s “stealth constitutionalism” – courts and commissions adapting norms to uphold democracy – as a contrast to Bangladesh’s current weak judicial intervention (Khan, 2025 ). Campaign Finance and Election Conduct A recurring theme in the literature is the need for stronger campaign finance regulation . Studies of Bangladeshi elections have found nearly unfettered spending by ruling parties and cutouts. Until 2025, the RPO’s vague spending limits were unenforceable and parties often relied on anonymous taukidars (patrons) for funding. In response, the interim government’s proposed reforms (via the July Charter and RPO amendments) include much tighter controls: mandatory reporting of all donors, state funding options for campaigns and stricter penalties for violations (The Daily Star, 2025 ). These measures reflect international best practices and lessons from Bangladesh’s experience: domestic experts have long argued that financial opacity allows the ruling party to abuse incumbency (using state resources in campaigns) while the opposition is starved of funds. Election conduct (beyond money) has also been the focus of reform. Beyond the RPO’s outlawing of bribery and violence, the EC has issued detailed Observation and Security Codes . In practice, though, enforcement is uneven: security forces have been accused of acting as party militias rather than neutral guards. International observer missions (e.g. by The Carter Center or IRI) have repeatedly flagged police bias, harassment of candidates and internet blackouts around polling days as violations of fair-play (Khan, 2025 ; Levush, 2024 ). The July Charter and reform commissions have proposed measures like independent polling staff (possibly observers appointed by multiple parties) and prosecution of state agents who violate the rules. How these ideas are translated into law (perhaps via new ordinances or EC regulations) will be a key test of Bangladesh’s commitment to credible elections. July 2025 National Charter Reforms The July National Charter 2025 is a broad reform proposal negotiated by the interim government and 25 political parties (R. Ahmed, 2025 ). Although not yet law, its recommendations encompass most areas of concern. Key proposals include: Restoring a caretaker-style framework : The Charter calls for a neutral interim administration (often referred to as an “election-time government”) to oversee the 2026 polls, filling the gap left by the 15th Amendment. (This aligns with the recent Supreme Court directive to reintroduce a caretaker government for the next election (Alam, 2025 ). Election Commission independence : It recommends a more representative EC appointment process (beyond the existing search committee) and longer, staggered tenures to insulate Commissioners from government pressure. Democratization of party politics : The Charter suggests reforms to internal party democracy, including transparent candidate nomination and finance, to reduce the “winner-takes-all” tendencies. Campaign finance transparency : It endorses public funding for elections, strict private contribution limits and real-time disclosure of spending (going beyond the 2025 affidavit requirement). Voting system changes : Measures such as lowering the voting age to 18 (if not already) and potentially introducing proportional representation seats are discussed to broaden participation. Referendum and constitutional safeguards : Crucially, because these proposals would alter the Constitution and electoral laws, the Charter envisions a referendum to approve changes (as required by Article 142 for fundamental law amendments). Divergent Scholarly Views on the July Charter 2025 Scholarly commentary on the Charter is mixed. Some argue it represents a once-in-a-generation chance to correct flaws (“extraordinary circumstances call for urgent reforms”) (Hossain, 2025 ; Khan, 2025 ). Others warn that without careful procedural checks; such comprehensive change could be hijacked by the current coalition or backfire if rushed. For example, constitutionalist Arafat Khan noted the risk of bypassing legal safeguards: drawing lessons from other “Global South” transitions, he urges that any new rules must preserve core democratic principles (Khan, 2025 ). However, the interim EC has already begun translating parts of the Charter into draft legislation (e.g. RPO amendments, election-administration laws). Research Gaps Limited legal analysis of post-caretaker electoral governance Lack of doctrinal evaluation of the July Charter’s legal status Insufficient focus on enforcement weaknesses of the RPO Few comparative studies linking institutions and electoral legitimacy Absence of integrated constitutional and electoral law analysis Methodology Study Design This study employed a qualitative doctrinal research design to examine constitutional provisions, statutory frameworks, and judicial interpretations relevant to the research objectives. Data Collection Primary data were drawn from authoritative legal sources, including the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Representation of the People Order (RPO) 1972, and selected judgments of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Secondary data comprised peer-reviewed journal articles, policy reports, and scholarly comparative studies, selected based on relevance and academic credibility. Data Analysis Doctrinal and interpretative analysis was applied to identify key legal principles and judicial reasoning. In addition, a comparative constitutional approach was used, with India, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom serving as reference jurisdictions. This comparative analysis facilitated a contextual evaluation of Bangladesh’s constitutional and electoral framework and strengthened the analytical rigor of the study. Method of Scoring and Index Construction To translate comparative qualitative findings into reproducible results, a comparative institutional index was constructed. Each indicator was scored on a five-point ordinal scale (1 = very weak, 5 = very strong). Scores were assigned based on constitutional design, statutory authority, enforcement practice, judicial behavior during electoral disputes, and documented outcomes in the literature. Analytical Framework This research used a three-pillar analytical framework to assess electoral reform in Bangladesh. The framework has been grounded in institutional and constitutional scholarship, which has emphasized that electoral integrity depends on independent institutions, enforceable legal rules and public confidence in outcomes (Birch & Van Ham, 2017 ). The first pillar is institutional independence which examines whether electoral bodies, particularly the Election Commission, operate free from executive and partisan influence, as required by constitutional norms (Ham & Garnett, 2019 ). The second pillar is legal enforceability which evaluates whether electoral laws, including the Representation of the People Order 1972 and related rules, provides clear sanctions and effective mechanisms for compliance, rather than remaining merely declaratory (Murombo, 2011 ). The third pillar is electoral legitimacy and public trust which assesses how far electoral processes are accepted by political actors and voters, drawing on turnout data, opposition participation and public confidence indicators (Beetham et al., 2008 ). Result Composite Electoral Governance Performance This study assessed electoral governance using a Composite Electoral Governance Score (EGS), constructed from three analytical pillars: institutional independence , legal enforceability , and electoral legitimacy . The composite score provides an integrated and comparative evaluation of electoral governance quality across selected jurisdictions. Table 2 Composite Electoral Governance Score (EGS) Country Institutional Independence Legal Enforceability Electoral Legitimacy EGS (Mean Score) Bangladesh 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.33 India 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.90 United Kingdom 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.80 Sri Lanka 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.43 Table 3 Pillar-Level Results Summary Country Institutional Independence Legal Enforceability Electoral Legitimacy Bangladesh Low Low Low India Very High Very High Very High United Kingdom High High High Sri Lanka Moderate Moderate High The Composite Electoral Governance Score reveals substantial cross-national variation. Bangladesh records the lowest EGS (2.33) , indicating systemic weaknesses across all three pillars. Although constitutional provisions formally guarantee electoral independence, weak enforcement practices, limited judicial intervention, and reliance on non-binding or transitional mechanisms significantly undermine electoral legitimacy. India achieves the highest EGS (4.90) , reflecting a robust institutional model in which a constitutionally independent Election Commission exercises strong enforcement authority. This finding demonstrates that durable electoral credibility can be achieved without caretaker arrangements when institutional independence and legal enforceability function effectively. The United Kingdom (3.80) and Sri Lanka (3.43) occupy intermediate positions. The UK’s score reflects strong rule-based conventions and regulatory enforcement despite limited judicial intervention. Sri Lanka’s relatively higher legitimacy score is driven primarily by assertive judicial oversight during constitutional crises, compensating for moderate administrative enforcement capacity. Key Result The results confirm that electoral legitimacy is maximized where institutional independence and legal enforceability operate simultaneously . Substitute mechanisms, such as caretaker governments, may address short-term credibility deficits but do not generate sustainable electoral governance in the absence of strong institutions. Discussion Comparative Perspectives India offers a useful contrast as its long-established Election Commission is a constitutionally independent body that conducts elections for both Parliament and state legislatures. India’s EC has successfully held over a dozen general elections (and countless state polls) with minimal controversy. While India’s caretaker norms are informal (the outgoing government simply refrains from major policy shifts), the institutional strength of its EC often precludes any need for a separate caretaker regime (Khan, 2025 ). In Bangladesh, by contrast, the lack of such an entrenched system made the caretaker solution politically attractive, but now its removal highlights the need for equally strong institutions. The United Kingdom shows another model such as their elections occur every fixed term (recently five years) unless early polls are called. During the campaign period, the incumbent government operates in a “caretaker mode” guided by convention - for example, it does not announce major contracts or make high-level appointments until after voting (The House of Commons, 2010 ). Though the UK has a statutory Electoral Commission (independent, with limited powers mainly over boundaries and finance), the government itself remains intact (The Electoral Commission, 2025 ). The Bangladeshi public debate suggests interest in adopting some UK-style conventions (e.g. requiring the PM to dissolve Parliament on a fixed date, stronger campaign silence periods), but legally these are currently non-binding norms. Sri Lanka is particularly instructive in showing alternative mechanisms. Sri Lanka’s Constitution includes a Parliamentary Council and Constitutional Council which nominate judges and officials; after 2015 reforms these bodies were restructured to ensure bipartisan oversight (Welikala, 2019 ). During crises, Sri Lanka’s judiciary and independent commissions have asserted themselves - for example, when President Sirisena attempted an unconstitutional dissolution in 2018, the courts quickly overturned it (Attanayake & Kapur, 2018 ). Recent literature on Bangladesh notes that Sri Lanka’s experience (“judiciary stepping in during crises” (Khan, 2025 ) offers a model that Bangladesh has lacking: an empowered judiciary willing and able to check the executive. By comparison, Bangladesh’s Supreme Court has so far been hesitant, though its November 2025 caretaker ruling shows a readiness to reassert constitutional guardrails (Alam, 2025 ). 1. Structural Weakness of Electoral Institutions Bangladesh’s electoral crisis is institutional in nature. The Constitution has granted the Election Commission formal independence under Article 118 (“Constitution of Bangladesh,” 2026). However, this constitutional status has not ensured effective autonomy in practice. Legal guarantees have remained largely symbolic, because operational control and enforcement capacity are weak. Appointment procedures for Election Commissioners continue to be politically influenced, despite the introduction of a search committee under the 2022 Appointment Act and raised persistent concerns about impartiality and credibility (Akter, 2023 ; Levush, 2024 ). Enforcement powers are existed, but they are rarely exercised against ruling party candidates or incumbents. The Election Commission has shown reluctance to cancel results, disqualify candidates, or sanction state officials for electoral misconduct. This pattern undermines the second analytical pillar of legal enforceability. Laws without credible sanctions fail to constrain political actors and selective enforcement further erodes institutional authority (Alam, 2025 ). Different institutional logic like India relies on a strong and assertive Election Commission rather than caretaker governments. Its constitutional commission exercises broad supervisory powers and enforces compliance through binding directions (Khan, 2025 ). Sri Lanka, by contrast, relies more heavily on courts and constitutional councils to restrain executive excess during elections. Bangladesh lacks both strong administrative enforcement and consistent judicial assertiveness. As a result, institutional independence remains weak and electoral legitimacy suffers. 2. Caretaker Government Debate Revisited The caretaker government system has long been debated as a legal necessity in Bangladesh. Supporters have argued that it ensured credible elections in 1996, 2001 and 2008 by neutralizing executive interference (Liton, 2024 ). From an institutional perspective, the caretaker model functioned as a substitute for weak electoral institutions (Khan, 2025 ). Critics, however, have argued that it distorted parliamentary sovereignty and disrupted the normal constitutional order, a view later endorsed by the Supreme Court in its 2011 judgment (Levush, 2024 ). The Supreme Court has now adopted a middle position. It has restored the caretaker system for future elections only, while excluding the 2026 election (Alamgir, 2025 ). This decision has created a temporary dual framework. The immediate electoral process will proceed without a caretaker, while future elections will include one. This compromise has reduced short-term political instability and avoided disruption of the electoral calendar (Alam, 2025 ). However, this arrangement has generated long-term uncertainty. Two parallel electoral logics now coexist within the same constitutional system. From the perspective of legal enforceability and institutional independence, this ambiguity weakens predictability and undermines trust. Electoral legitimacy may suffer if actors perceive the rules as transitional or politically contingent rather than stable and rule-based. 3. Legal Status and Limits of the July Charter The July Charter represents broad political consensus, but it does not constitute binding law. Its proposals remain aspirational because they lack constitutional or statutory force. Without amendment under Article 142, the Charter cannot create enforceable obligations for state institutions or political parties (Hossain, 2025 ; Haque & Bisarya, 2025). The Charter’s principal strength lies in agenda setting. It identifies core institutional failures and proposes comprehensive reforms aligned with the three-pillar analytical framework. It addresses institutional independence, legal enforceability and electoral legitimacy in a coherent manner. However, its weakness lies in legal uncertainty. Without clear implementation pathways, reforms risk remaining declaratory (Al Jazeera English, 2025 ). A rushed implementation may bypass democratic scrutiny and judicial review. This could undermine legitimacy and violate constitutional procedures. A delayed implementation, on the other hand, may dilute reform momentum and entrench existing practices. This tension between urgency and legality defines the Charter’s future impact on Bangladesh’s electoral system. 4. Campaign Finance and Electoral Integrity Campaign finance has emerged as a central concern in Bangladesh’s electoral governance. Recent affidavit and disclosure requirements represent a positive step toward transparency. These reforms align with the analytical pillar of legal enforceability by formally expanding regulatory oversight (The Daily Star, 2025 ). However, enforcement mechanisms remain weak. Party-level finance continues to be opaque and there is no independent authority to audit or verify submitted disclosures. The system still relies heavily on self-reporting, which limits its effectiveness. Without credible penalties, disclosure alone cannot deter illicit financing (Alam, 2025 ). Comparative systems rely on strict audits, independent oversight bodies and meaningful sanctions. India and the UK both impose reporting requirements backed by investigation and prosecution powers (Global Legal Group, n.d.). Bangladesh has lack of such institutional capacity so without independent audits and enforcement, financial reform will remain largely symbolic and keep weaken the electoral legitimacy and reinforces public distrust in electoral outcomes. Policy Implications Several important policy lessons emerge from this analysis. Institutional reform must precede electoral scheduling. Elections conducted under weak or contested institutions are unlikely to restore public confidence, regardless of timing. Strengthening institutional capacity before announcing election dates is therefore essential to protect electoral legitimacy and reduce political conflict. The Election Commission must be insulated from political influence through staggered appointments and secure tenure. Such a structure would prevent wholesale replacement of commissioners by any single government and would reinforce institutional independence. Without insulation at the appointment stage, constitutional guarantees of autonomy will remain ineffective in practice. Campaign finance law must be consolidated into a single and comprehensive statute. Fragmented rules under the RPO and subsidiary regulations have weakened enforcement and accountability. A unified legal framework should establish clear spending limits, mandatory audits and meaningful sanctions for violations. Without consolidation, financial regulation will continue to favor incumbents and undermine electoral fairness. Judicial review must also be strengthened during election periods. Courts should be empowered to provide expedited remedies for electoral disputes and constitutional violations. Delayed or hesitant judicial intervention weakens legal enforceability and allows irregularities to persist. Reforms without credible enforcement mechanisms will not restore public trust or electoral legitimacy. Limitations of the Study The study is based on doctrinal and documentary analysis only and didn’t any include interviews, surveys, or field-level electoral data. Findings are dependent on publicly available legal and secondary sources. The comparative analysis is limited to selected countries. Rapid political developments may affect the relevance of some conclusions. Conclusion Bangladesh’s electoral crisis is legal, institutional and political in nature. The Constitution provides formal safeguards, including an independent Election Commission and rule-based elections, but these safeguards have remained weak in practice. The removal of the caretaker system exposed deep institutional fragility rather than resolving it. The July Charter offers a reform roadmap and reflects broad political consensus, but it does not provide a legal solution. Without constitutional amendment and statutory backing, its proposals remain aspirational. Sustainable electoral integrity requires binding reforms that are enforceable and transparent. These reforms must strengthen institutions rather than rely on personalities or temporary political arrangements. Without credible enforcement and independent oversight, elections will continue to lack legitimacy and public acceptance. The future of Bangladesh’s democracy depends on closing the persistent gap between law and practice. References Ahmed, M. (2025). The July 2025 Interim Ruler’s Charter under the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh: A Legal Analysis of Treason and Constitutional Violation (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 5640410). Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5640410 Ahmed, R. (2025, November 14). July Charter implementation order: How much of each party’s demands accommodated . Prothomalo. https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/x0zhk30jow Akter, N. (2023). 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Asian Journal of Comparative Law , 16 (S1), S85–S104. https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2021.30 Birch, S., & Van Ham, C. (2017). Getting away with foul play? The importance of formal and informal oversight institutions for electoral integrity. European Journal of Political Research , 56 (3), 487–511. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12189 Constitution of Bangladesh. (2026). In Wikipedia . https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Constitution_of_Bangladesh&oldid=1332628808 Election Commission. (1972). The Representation of the People Order, 1972 (President’s Order)( PRESIDENT’S ORDER NO. 155 OF 1972 ) . https://www.ecs.gov.bd/bec/public/files/1/Law/RPO%20%E0%A6%8F%E0%A6%B0%20%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%B0%E0 %A7%8D%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%B6%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B7%20%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%B6%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%A7%E0%A 6%BF%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%B9%20%5B%E0%A7%A7%E0%A7%A9-%E0%A7%A7%E0%A7%A8-%E0%A7%A 8%E0%A7%AB%20).pdf Elections in Bangladesh. (2026). In Wikipedia . https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Elections_in_Bangladesh&oldid=1332234495 Global Legal Group. (n.d.). International Comparative Legal Guides [Text]. (United Kingdom). International Comparative Legal Guides International Business Reports. Retrieved January 28, 2026, from https://iclg.com Ham, C. van, & Garnett, H. A. (2019). Building impartial electoral management? Institutional design, independence and electoral integrity. International Political Science Review , 40 (3), 313–334. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1177/0192512119834573 Haque, M. E., & Bisarya, S. (2025, December 1). July Charter and Constitutional Reforms in Bangladesh . ConstitutionNet. http://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/july-charter-and-constitutional-reforms-bangladesh Hossain, I. (2025). Bangladesh’s Democratic Transition: Revolution and Its Discontents. GIGA Focus Asien , 4 . https://doi.org/10.57671/GFAS-25042 IFES. (2024). IFES Election Guide | Country Profile: Bangladesh . https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/19/ Islam, S. M. (2026, January 15). How the Hasina administration engineered the 2018 ‘midnight election.’ The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/how-hasina-administration-engineered-2018-midnight-election-1335491 Khan, A. H. (2025, May 16). Bangladesh’s Constitutional Reforms: Caught Between Democratic Hopes and Authoritarian Resilience . ConstitutionNet. http://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/bangladeshs-constitutional-reforms-caught-between-democratic-hopes-and-authoritarian Levush, R. (2024, August 29). Interim Government and the Constitution of Bangladesh | In Custodia Legis [Webpage]. The Library of Congress. https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2024/08/interim-government-and-the-constitution-of-bangladesh Liton, S. (2024, August 14). Caretaker govt: How Hasina killed a system that ensured free and fair elections [Newspaper]. The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/caretaker-govt-how-hasina-killed-system-ensured-free-and-fair-elections-916636 Murombo, T. (2011). The utility of environmental rights to sustainable development in Zimbabwe: A contribution to the constitutional reform debate. African Human Rights Law Journal (AHRLJ) , 11 (1), 120–146. https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/murombo-t Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (Ed.). (2006). Caretaker government during election: A comparative study of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India . Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. Rashiduzzaman, M. (1997). Political Unrest and Democracy in Bangladesh. Asian Survey , 37 (3), 254-268. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645662 Reuters. (2024, January 7). Bangladesh turnout low in election set to keep PM Hasina in power [Newspaper]. Arab News. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2437466/amp Sarkar, A., & Rahman, A. (2024, December 17). 15Th amendment to constitution: HC scraps part that abolished caretaker system [Newspaper]. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/15th-amendment-constitution-hc-scraps-part-abolished-caretaker-system-3778971 Star Digital Report. (2024, December 17). Scrapping caretaker government system unconstitutional: HC [Newspaper]. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/scrapping-caretaker-government-system-unconstitutional-hc-3778326 TBS Report. (2025, July 30). Gazipur to have one more parliamentary seat, Bagerhat to lose one: EC [Newspaper]. The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/gazipur-have-one-more-parliamentary-seat-bagerhat-lose-one-ec-1200626 The Daily Star. (2025, October 24). RPO amendment: Alliance candidates must use their own party symbols [Newspaper]. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/rpo-amendment-alliance-candidates-must-use-their-own-party-symbols-4017446 The Electoral Commission. (2025). Our role and responsibilities | Electoral Commission . The Electoral Commission. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/about-us/our-role-and-responsibilities The House of Commons. (2010). Constitutional processes following a general election (Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral and Written Evidence Fifth Report of Session 2009–10; pp. 1–64). The House of Commons. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmjust/396/396.pdf UNB. (2023, November 13). BNP’s demand for caretaker government unconstitutional, illegal: Law minister tells UN . The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bnps-demand-caretaker-government-unconstitutional-illegal-law-minister-tells-un-738838 Welikala, A. (Ed.). (2019). Constitutional reform and crisis in Sri Lanka . Centre for Policy Additional Declarations The authors declare potential competing interests as follows: I declare that authors have no interests, affiliations, or associations that might be perceived to influence the results and/or discussion reported in this preprint submission. Supplementary Files Appendix.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8817381","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":587524434,"identity":"9a08b4b5-7b77-46d1-a327-132abd8409f2","order_by":0,"name":"Syed Nazrul Islam","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Southwest University of Political Science and Law, China; and Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption Commission Bangladesh","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Syed","middleName":"Nazrul","lastName":"Islam","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-02-07 18:14:44","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":{"humanSubjects":false,"vertebrateSubjects":true,"conflictsOfInterestStatement":true,"humanSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false,"humanSubjectConsent":false,"humanSubjectClinicalTrial":false,"humanSubjectCaseReport":false,"vertebrateSubjectEthicalGuidelines":true},"doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8817381/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8817381/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":102304175,"identity":"df54398b-ff18-4baf-8dc9-0de50dcd57ec","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-10 11:33:30","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":38684,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThree-Pillar Analytical Framework\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8817381/v1/22347a54cf3d3d9912004a3f.png"},{"id":102302318,"identity":"a9605c14-282f-4b85-8173-bc75caf9fa90","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-10 11:25:08","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":53403,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePolicy Implication\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8817381/v1/392e5744a4992304df87074b.png"},{"id":104834884,"identity":"1b314218-5306-4610-9add-5182da19d2f8","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-17 17:34:44","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1539138,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8817381/v1/3c764d1b-7db7-49b4-8760-228ba2f85d39.pdf"},{"id":102303857,"identity":"7573f80b-fe5c-4ad9-b415-b7cd74d14b3b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-10 11:32:16","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":16887,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Appendix.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8817381/v1/187fa4a85e30926fb75dae6d.docx"}],"financialInterests":"The authors declare potential competing interests as follows: I declare that authors have no interests, affiliations, or associations that might be perceived to influence the results and/or discussion reported in this preprint submission.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003eBangladesh’s Electoral System: Constitutional Structure, Legal Framework and the Impact of the July Charter\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eElections are the central mechanism through which democratic legitimacy is established. In Bangladesh, however, the electoral process has faced persistent legal and institutional challenges\u0026nbsp;(Baized et al., 2025). Repeated allegations of irregularities, opposition boycotts and declining voter confidence have raised serious concerns about electoral credibility of Bangladesh. These concerns are not only political but are deeply rooted in constitutional design, legal enforcement and institutional practice\u0026nbsp;(Rashiduzzaman, 1997).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Constitution of Bangladesh establishes a parliamentary democracy, provides for an independent Election Commission and prescribes regular elections and outlines the basic qualifications and procedures for political representation\u0026nbsp;(\u0026ldquo;Constitution of Bangladesh,\u0026rdquo; 2026). Despite these formal safeguards, elections since 2011 have remained highly contested. The abolition of the caretaker government system through the Fifteenth Amendment removed a key transitional mechanism\u0026nbsp;(Sarkar \u0026amp; Rahman, 2024). These changes intensified disputes over neutrality during election periods and subsequent elections were marked by low participation, contested outcomes and weakened public trust.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe legal framework of governing elections further complicates the problem. The Representation of the People Order 1972 remains the principal electoral statute\u0026nbsp;(The Daily Star, 2025). Although it has been amended over time, major gaps are persisted in campaign finance regulation, enforcement powers and accountability mechanisms. Here, weak implementation has allowed misuse of state resources, vote manipulation and selective application of rules. As a result, legal provisions often remain declaratory rather than effective.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn response to these challenges, the interim government introduced the July Charter 2025. The Charter is proposing a wide-ranging reforms, including restoring a caretaker-style framework, strengthening the Election Commission and improving campaign finance transparency\u0026nbsp;(M. Ahmed, 2025). However, the Charter is a political declaration, not binding law so its legal status and implementation pathway is still very much uncertain.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eObjectives of the Study\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTo examine the constitutional structure of Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral system\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTo analyze gaps in electoral laws and their enforcement\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTo assess the independence and role of the Election Commission\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTo evaluate the legal and political significance of the July Charter 2025\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTo compare Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral framework with selected democracies\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eProblem Statement\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral system has been facing deep legal, administrative and constitutional challenges that are undermining electoral integrity and public trust. Opposition boycotts, one-sided outcomes and widespread irregularities have plagued recent elections. For example, in 2014 half of parliament\u0026rsquo;s 300 seats were uncontested due to the main opposition boycott (Islam, 2026), contributing to a historic low turnout (\u0026asymp;40%) (Reuters, 2024). Similarly, official investigations of the 2018 election found that ballots were manipulated in nearly 80% of polling centres and reported turnouts exceeding 100% in some constituencies (Islam, 2026) such as voter intimidation, ballot stuffing and misuse of state power. These actions have reduced voter participation, as shown by fluctuating turnout over time in Table 1 and they have raised serious concerns about the fairness of the electoral process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eTable 1: Voter turnout in recent national elections. Sources: Bangladesh EC/IPU data and media reports\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e.\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eElection Year\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRegistered Voters\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTurnout (%)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNotes\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e74,946,364\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e74.97 (IFES, 2024)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThird election after caretaker system introduced\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2008\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e81,083,933\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e87.13 (IFES, 2024)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHighest turnout under caretaker government\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2014\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e43,943,184\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e39.58 (\u0026ldquo;Elections in Bangladesh,\u0026rdquo; 2026)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOpposition boycott; 153 seats uncontested (Islam, 2026)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2018\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e104,142,381\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e~82 (reported) (Reuters, 2024)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eContested elections with reported rigging\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2024\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e119,691,633\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026asymp;40 (Reuters, 2024)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBoycott by major party; polls \u0026ldquo;sham\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLegally, the framework exhibits significant gaps. The \u003cstrong\u003eRepresentation of the People Order (RPO) 1972\u003c/strong\u003e, Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s chief election law, contains loopholes in candidate qualification, campaign finance and vote-counting procedures that are often exploited (Election Commission, 1972). For years, no effective mechanism existed for robust campaign finance disclosure. However, strict affidavit rules and public asset declarations have been introduced only recently (The Daily Star, 2025). Similarly, the RPO\u0026rsquo;s enforcement of voting rules was weak: until late 2025 the Election Commission could annul only individual polling centres, not whole-constituency results, even when massive fraud was evident (The Daily Star, 2025). Many scholars and observers note that such gaps (e.g. in arresting vote-buying or misuse of government resources) allow elections to be \u0026ldquo;orchestrated contests\u0026rdquo; rather than free contests (Islam, 2026).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConstitutionally, tensions over \u003cstrong\u003eelectoral administration\u003c/strong\u003e have intensified. The Constitution calls for an independent Election Commission (Article 118) assisted by the executive, but political parties and analysts frequently question its autonomy (Akter, 2023). As one study notes, despite constitutional guarantees, the EC\u0026rsquo;s impartiality in practice is \u0026ldquo;questionable\u0026rdquo; and it faced \u0026ldquo;many obstacles\u0026rdquo; in overseeing recent elections (Akter, 2023). At the same time, the abolition of the non-partisan \u003cem\u003ecaretaker government\u003c/em\u003e system (introduced in 1996 and later struck down) has left a legal void during electoral transitions. Since the \u003cstrong\u003e15th Amendment (2011)\u003c/strong\u003e removed the caretaker provision, Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s constitution contains no explicit path for a neutral interim government (Star Digital Report, 2024). This was tragically highlighted after the August 2024 uprising: the interim Yunus administration was formed under an ad hoc \u0026ldquo;doctrine of necessity\u0026rdquo; (Hossain, 2025; Levush, 2024), a move later described by jurists as an \u0026ldquo;extraordinary\u0026rdquo; arrangement outside normal constitutional procedure (Levush, 2024). These ambiguities fuel political conflict: the leading opposition (BNP) continues to demand restoration of a caretaker mechanism, while the government insists fresh elections can proceed under the EC without resignations \u0026nbsp;(Alam, 2025; Levush, 2024).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe July Charter 2025 is a tentative reform agreement by the interim government. It promises new solutions; however, its legal status remains unclear. The Charter proposes sweeping reforms, including restoring a caretaker-style framework, enforcing strict campaign finance rules and strengthening the Election Commission (Haque \u0026amp; Bisarya, 2025). However, it is a non-binding political declaration and it depends on a future referendum and legislation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Charter\u0026rsquo;s potential impact remains debated. Supporters argue that it can overhaul the flawed electoral system. In contrast, critics warn that it may concentrate power or bypass democratic debate. In sum, Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral system suffers from weakened institutions, contested rules and long-standing practices of abuse. These challenges undermine fairness and voter confidence; therefore, serious legal and constitutional reforms are essential before credible elections can take place (Alam, 2025; Islam, 2026).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRationale of the study\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe rationale of this study is to provide an integrated legal and constitutional analysis of Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral system. Existing studies examined institutions, laws, or political behavior in isolation but, this research\u0026rsquo;s aim is to make the connections by linking constitutional norms, statutory enforcement and electoral legitimacy. So, such an analysis is necessary to understand why electoral reforms have repeatedly failed and what conditions are required for credible elections in the future.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Literature Review","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eConstitutional Foundations and Electoral System\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe \u003cb\u003eConstitution of Bangladesh (1972)\u003c/b\u003e establishes a parliamentary democracy and sets the basic rules for elections. Under Part VII, Articles 65–72 govern the Jatiya Sangsad (unicameral parliament), including the composition (300 members in single-member constituencies, plus reserved women’s seats), terms, dissolution and procedures (Bangladesh Government, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1972\u003c/span\u003e). Articles 66–67 detail qualifications and disqualifications for Members of Parliament; Article 70 bars floor-crossing, penalizing MPs who defect. Article 123 requires general elections within 90 days of Parliament’s dissolution. Crucially, Article 118 creates an \u003cem\u003eElection Commission of Bangladesh (ECB)\u003c/em\u003e with a Chief and up to four Commissioners. The Constitution guarantees that the EC will be independent and that the President (i.e. the executive) will cooperate in conducting elections (Akter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). In theory this mirrors established democracies like India, whose Article 324 similarly entrenches a permanent Election Commission. In practice, however, scholars note a “gap between political parties and the electoral government” in Bangladesh. One study of the 2018 polls concluded that although the EC is “constitutionally recognized as an independent institution,” its impartiality has been widely challenged (Akter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Political scientists cite frequent instances where the ECB’s credibility was questioned, leading critics to view it as subordinate to partisan interests despite the formal constitutional promise (Akter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn addition to the constitution, electoral law has been shaped by numerous amendments. Bangladesh has amended its constitution \u003cb\u003e18 times\u003c/b\u003e by 2025, often in ways that directly affected the electoral cycle and institutions. The most consequential was the \u003cem\u003e13th Amendment (1996)\u003c/em\u003e, which introduced a unique non-party “caretaker government” system under Chapter IIA of the Constitution. Under this system, a neutral interim administration led by a former Chief Justice would oversee elections to guarantee fairness. This system was used in 1996, 2001 and 2008 and widely regarded as a key “guarantor institution” for elections (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). However, rising political tensions led the Supreme Court in 2011 (Abdul Mannan Khan case) to declare the caretaker provision unconstitutional and soon thereafter the \u003cem\u003e15th Amendment (2011)\u003c/em\u003e formally abolished it (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). International observers and analysts (including ConstitutionNet) noted that this removal created a “vacuum” in Bangladesh’s democratic framework (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Unlike India and many parliamentary democracies, Bangladesh had no constitutional path for a neutral interim authority. The result has been acute contention over elections: the 2014 and 2024 polls saw major opposition boycotts, each time demanding return of the caretaker model (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eThe Representation of the People Order, 1972 (RPO)\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cb\u003eRPO 1972\u003c/b\u003e is the foundational electoral statute in Bangladesh, enacted as a Presidential Order shortly after independence. It regulates all key aspects of elections: constituency delimitation, candidate nomination and scrutiny, voting (secret ballot), vote counting and the definition of electoral offences and corrupt practices (Election Commission, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1972\u003c/span\u003e). In effect, it is the Bangladesh analogue of India’s Representation of the People Acts. Historically, the RPO has been amended many times to address emerging issues. For example, a 2013 amendment mandated that women hold at least 33% of standing committees in Parliament and other amendments have introduced new candidacy rules (Alamgir, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite these updates, scholars identify significant \u003cb\u003eloopholes and weaknesses\u003c/b\u003e in the RPO. Campaign finance regulations within RPO are especially weak. Although Section 99 of the RPO (as amended) sets spending limits for candidates, enforcement has been almost non-existent. Only in late 2025 did the interim government institute mandatory affidavits: candidates now must publicly disclose their assets and income to the EC and false statements are criminalized (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Before this reform, the lack of transparency allowed industrial-scale vote-buying and illicit funding to thrive unseen.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther procedural gaps have been exploited. For years, the EC could cancel results only at single polling centers, so district-wide rigging could not be nullified. In October 2025, the RPO was amended so the EC may now annul an entire constituency’s vote if “significant irregularities” are found (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). The “no-vote” option - already introduced in 2008 for single-candidate races - was reintroduced: if a sole candidate fails to secure more votes than the ‘no vote’ box, a new election must be held (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). These changes reflect past abuses: in 2014, 153 seats were uncontested due to a boycott and the “no vote” measure was meant to give dissenters an exit (though it has never overturned a result) (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCritical legal scholarship, however, points out that many \u003cb\u003eRPO provisions are out of date or ambiguously worded\u003c/b\u003e. For instance, Sections on corrupt practices (bribery, treating, undue influence) are broad but rarely enforced, while modern tactics (e.g. digital misinformation, corporate campaign finance) are largely unaddressed (Haque \u0026amp; Bisarya, 2025). Observers argue the RPO treats elections as a purely mechanical process, underestimating political context. The forthcoming July Charter proposals emphasize that the RPO “requires fundamental reform” to handle campaign finance transparency and media regulation, echoing long-standing academic calls for tougher legislation (R. Ahmed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eDelimitation of Constituencies\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConstituency boundaries in Bangladesh were initially determined by the 1976 Delimitation Ordinance; from 1979 to 2022 they remained mostly static despite huge demographic shifts. The \u003cb\u003eDelimitation of Constituencies Act, 2021\u003c/b\u003e finally replaced the old order. It empowers the Election Commission to redraw boundaries in line with three key criteria: population/voter data, geographic contiguity and administrative integrity (TBS Report, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Section 6 of the 2021 Act explicitly requires consideration of census population, registered voters and ease of administration, while avoiding the splitting of smallest admin units.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePractical implementation of the Act has begun for the 2026 elections. In mid-2025 the EC’s technical committee proposed shifting one seat from under-populated Bagerhat district to fast-growing Gazipur (TBS Report, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). The EC cited updated voter rolls and census adjustments in line with the Act’s Section 6 guidelines (TBS Report, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Observers generally welcome the Act’s rational criteria, but some legal experts caution about potential gerrymandering. Unlike India, which has a quasi-judicial Delimitation Commission, Bangladesh’s EC has broad discretion (albeit subject to public objections) (TBS Report, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). The 2021 Act thus marks a significant modernization of electoral law, but its long-term impact will depend on transparent implementation and independent oversight.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eElection Commission and Related Statutes\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond the Constitution and RPO, a web of statutes and rules govern the EC and election management. Notably, the \u003cb\u003eChief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners Appointment Act 2022\u003c/b\u003e was enacted to formalize how the EC leadership is chosen. The law creates a search committee (including a Supreme Court judge and senior legislators) to recommend commissioners, aiming at merit-based, non-partisan appointments. The interim government and ruling party have touted this as a pioneering measure (even calling it “first of its kind in the subcontinent” (UNB, 2023)), though critics note it could still be subject to political influence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe EC has also issued \u003cb\u003eConduct of Election Rules (2008)\u003c/b\u003e and a \u003cb\u003eCode of Conduct for Parties and Candidates (2008)\u003c/b\u003e under the RPO’s authority. These rules specify finer details: campaign timings, use of government resources, media coverage limits and nominee paperwork. In response to past crises, the EC’s \u003cb\u003eElection Observation Policy (2017)\u003c/b\u003e was introduced to encourage domestic and international monitoring of polls. Additionally, \u003cem\u003eElection Officials (Special Provisions) Act 1991\u003c/em\u003e protects presiding officers’ neutrality. Despite these frameworks, enforcement remains spotty. Election observers (domestic and international) repeatedly report biased administration (e.g. police intimidation of opposition agents) and accuse the EC of not acting decisively on violations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCampaign finance regulations have drawn growing scrutiny. Under the old regime, there were almost no effective limits on party donations or spending, leading to entrenched cronyism. Recent RPO amendments (2025) requiring asset disclosure (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) and auditing of party accounts begin to address this. Still, unlike India (which has evolving caps and public reporting) or the UK (which prohibits corporate donations over a threshold), Bangladesh lacks a comprehensive finance law. Experts note the absence of clear penalties for exceeded spending or illicit funds in party coffers. Critics argue that without strong campaign finance oversight, elections will continue to favor moneyed incumbents.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCaretaker vs Interim Governments\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA major debate in Bangladesh’s electoral law is the \u003cb\u003ecaretaker system\u003c/b\u003e. As noted, Bangladesh uniquely constitutionalized caretaker governments in 1996. Proponents (from both major parties at the time) saw this as vital to “neutralize executive interference” (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In practice, it delivered broadly free contests in 1996, 2001 and 2008, acting as a temporary “fourth branch” of government dedicated to elections(Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Scholars observe it was “modeled loosely after India’s Election Commission,” aiming to ensure an unbiased poll environment (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, the \u003cb\u003eabrogation of caretakers\u003c/b\u003e has remained highly contentious. The Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling (Abdul Mannan Khan) struck the system on grounds of “parliamentary sovereignty,” likening caretaker regimes to unconstitutional distortions (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This echoed India’s basic-structure doctrine case (Kesavananda Bharati) insofar as the Court protected what it saw as fundamental democratic principles. The subsequent 15th Amendment removed Chapter IIA, ending any constitutional caretaker mechanism (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). As a result, since 2011 there is no clear legal model for election-time transition.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhen the August 2024 revolution occurred, this void became acute. Law scholars and international observers have discussed whether the interim Yunus government could be seen as a “de facto” caretaker or was merely an emergency government. The Law Library of Congress notes that Bangladesh has \u003cb\u003eno constitutional provision for interim governments\u003c/b\u003e, so the August 2024 arrangement was essentially extra-constitutional, justified by Article 106 and court advice (Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The Supreme Court even ruled that an interim government \u003cem\u003ecould\u003c/em\u003e be formed under these extraordinary conditions (Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The November 2025 Supreme Court judgment went further: it restored the caretaker mechanism for \u003cb\u003efuture elections only\u003c/b\u003e, stating the 13th Amendment system must be reinstated for the “14th” post-Independence parliament (i.e. elections after 2026), but explicitly exempted the imminent 2026 polls (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBy contrast, in \u003cb\u003eIndia\u003c/b\u003e elections are managed without any formal caretaker government. When Parliament dissolves, the incumbent Prime Minister and ministers continue in a \u003cb\u003ecaretaker capacity by convention\u003c/b\u003e; there is no intervening non-partisan cabinet (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2006). The powerful Election Commission of India (Article 324) oversees conduct and India’s consistent application of this model (along with robust judicial review) has generally produced accepted results (Bhat, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eSri Lanka\u003c/b\u003e similarly has no special caretaker executive: elections follow fixed terms unless Parliament is dissolved and the President or PM simply remains in office until a new government is formed (Welikala, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). However, Sri Lanka has professionalized its \u003cb\u003econstitutional council\u003c/b\u003e and courts to maintain checks on power. For example, during Sri Lanka’s 2018 crisis the unified judiciary (Supreme Court and Court of Appeal) curtailed a controversial dissolution bid (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In that context, expert Arafat Khan notes Sri Lanka’s “stealth constitutionalism” – courts and commissions adapting norms to uphold democracy – as a contrast to Bangladesh’s current weak judicial intervention (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCampaign Finance and Election Conduct\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA recurring theme in the literature is the need for stronger \u003cb\u003ecampaign finance regulation\u003c/b\u003e. Studies of Bangladeshi elections have found nearly unfettered spending by ruling parties and cutouts. Until 2025, the RPO’s vague spending limits were unenforceable and parties often relied on anonymous \u003cem\u003etaukidars\u003c/em\u003e (patrons) for funding. In response, the interim government’s proposed reforms (via the July Charter and RPO amendments) include much tighter controls: mandatory reporting of all donors, state funding options for campaigns and stricter penalties for violations (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). These measures reflect international best practices and lessons from Bangladesh’s experience: domestic experts have long argued that financial opacity allows the ruling party to abuse incumbency (using state resources in campaigns) while the opposition is starved of funds.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eElection conduct (beyond money) has also been the focus of reform. Beyond the RPO’s outlawing of bribery and violence, the EC has issued detailed \u003cb\u003eObservation and Security Codes\u003c/b\u003e. In practice, though, enforcement is uneven: security forces have been accused of acting as party militias rather than neutral guards. International observer missions (e.g. by The Carter Center or IRI) have repeatedly flagged police bias, harassment of candidates and internet blackouts around polling days as violations of fair-play (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The July Charter and reform commissions have proposed measures like independent polling staff (possibly observers appointed by multiple parties) and prosecution of state agents who violate the rules. How these ideas are translated into law (perhaps via new ordinances or EC regulations) will be a key test of Bangladesh’s commitment to credible elections.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eJuly 2025 National Charter Reforms\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe \u003cb\u003eJuly National Charter 2025\u003c/b\u003e is a broad reform proposal negotiated by the interim government and 25 political parties (R. Ahmed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Although not yet law, its recommendations encompass most areas of concern. Key proposals include:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eRestoring a caretaker-style framework\u003c/b\u003e: The Charter calls for a neutral interim administration (often referred to as an “election-time government”) to oversee the 2026 polls, filling the gap left by the 15th Amendment. (This aligns with the recent Supreme Court directive to reintroduce a caretaker government for the next election (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eElection Commission independence\u003c/b\u003e: It recommends a more representative EC appointment process (beyond the existing search committee) and longer, staggered tenures to insulate Commissioners from government pressure.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eDemocratization of party politics\u003c/b\u003e: The Charter suggests reforms to internal party democracy, including transparent candidate nomination and finance, to reduce the “winner-takes-all” tendencies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eCampaign finance transparency\u003c/b\u003e: It endorses public funding for elections, strict private contribution limits and real-time disclosure of spending (going beyond the 2025 affidavit requirement).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eVoting system changes\u003c/b\u003e: Measures such as lowering the voting age to 18 (if not already) and potentially introducing proportional representation seats are discussed to broaden participation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eReferendum and constitutional safeguards\u003c/b\u003e: Crucially, because these proposals would alter the Constitution and electoral laws, the Charter envisions a referendum to approve changes (as required by Article 142 for fundamental law amendments).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eDivergent Scholarly Views on the July Charter 2025\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eScholarly commentary on the Charter is mixed. Some argue it represents a once-in-a-generation chance to correct flaws (“extraordinary circumstances call for urgent reforms”) (Hossain, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Others warn that without careful procedural checks; such comprehensive change could be hijacked by the current coalition or backfire if rushed. For example, constitutionalist Arafat Khan noted the risk of bypassing legal safeguards: drawing lessons from other “Global South” transitions, he urges that any new rules must preserve core democratic principles (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). However, the interim EC has already begun translating parts of the Charter into draft legislation (e.g. RPO amendments, election-administration laws).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eResearch Gaps\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimited legal analysis of post-caretaker electoral governance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eLack of doctrinal evaluation of the July Charter’s legal status\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eInsufficient focus on enforcement weaknesses of the RPO\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eFew comparative studies linking institutions and electoral legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbsence of integrated constitutional and electoral law analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e "},{"header":"Methodology","content":"\u003ch2\u003eStudy Design\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study employed a qualitative doctrinal research design to examine constitutional provisions, statutory frameworks, and judicial interpretations relevant to the research objectives.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Collection\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrimary data were drawn from authoritative legal sources, including the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Representation of the People Order (RPO) 1972, and selected judgments of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Secondary data comprised peer-reviewed journal articles, policy reports, and scholarly comparative studies, selected based on relevance and academic credibility.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoctrinal and interpretative analysis was applied to identify key legal principles and judicial reasoning. In addition, a comparative constitutional approach was used, with India, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom serving as reference jurisdictions. This comparative analysis facilitated a contextual evaluation of Bangladesh’s constitutional and electoral framework and strengthened the analytical rigor of the study.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eMethod of Scoring and Index Construction\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo translate comparative qualitative findings into reproducible results, a \u003cb\u003ecomparative institutional index\u003c/b\u003e was constructed. Each indicator was scored on a \u003cb\u003efive-point ordinal scale\u003c/b\u003e (1 = very weak, 5 = very strong). Scores were assigned based on constitutional design, statutory authority, enforcement practice, judicial behavior during electoral disputes, and documented outcomes in the literature.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAnalytical Framework\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis research used a three-pillar analytical framework to assess electoral reform in Bangladesh. The framework has been grounded in institutional and constitutional scholarship, which has emphasized that electoral integrity depends on independent institutions, enforceable legal rules and public confidence in outcomes (Birch \u0026amp; Van Ham, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe first pillar is institutional independence which examines whether electoral bodies, particularly the Election Commission, operate free from executive and partisan influence, as required by constitutional norms (Ham \u0026amp; Garnett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe second pillar is legal enforceability which evaluates whether electoral laws, including the Representation of the People Order 1972 and related rules, provides clear sanctions and effective mechanisms for compliance, rather than remaining merely declaratory (Murombo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe third pillar is electoral legitimacy and public trust which assesses how far electoral processes are accepted by political actors and voters, drawing on turnout data, opposition participation and public confidence indicators (Beetham et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Result","content":"\u003ch2\u003eComposite Electoral Governance Performance\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study assessed electoral governance using a Composite Electoral Governance Score (EGS), constructed from three analytical pillars: \u003cb\u003einstitutional independence\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cb\u003elegal enforceability\u003c/b\u003e, and \u003cb\u003eelectoral legitimacy\u003c/b\u003e. The composite score provides an integrated and comparative evaluation of electoral governance quality across selected jurisdictions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eComposite Electoral Governance Score (EGS)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional Independence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal Enforceability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eElectoral Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEGS (Mean Score)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBangladesh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2.33\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4.90\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited Kingdom\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3.80\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSri Lanka\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3.43\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePillar-Level Results Summary\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional Independence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal Enforceability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eElectoral Legitimacy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBangladesh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLow\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVery High\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVery High\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVery High\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnited Kingdom\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSri Lanka\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModerate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModerate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigh\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Composite Electoral Governance Score reveals substantial cross-national variation. \u003cb\u003eBangladesh records the lowest EGS (2.33)\u003c/b\u003e, indicating systemic weaknesses across all three pillars. Although constitutional provisions formally guarantee electoral independence, weak enforcement practices, limited judicial intervention, and reliance on non-binding or transitional mechanisms significantly undermine electoral legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eIndia achieves the highest EGS (4.90)\u003c/b\u003e, reflecting a robust institutional model in which a constitutionally independent Election Commission exercises strong enforcement authority. This finding demonstrates that durable electoral credibility can be achieved without caretaker arrangements when institutional independence and legal enforceability function effectively.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cb\u003eUnited Kingdom (3.80)\u003c/b\u003e and \u003cb\u003eSri Lanka (3.43)\u003c/b\u003e occupy intermediate positions. The UK’s score reflects strong rule-based conventions and regulatory enforcement despite limited judicial intervention. Sri Lanka’s relatively higher legitimacy score is driven primarily by assertive judicial oversight during constitutional crises, compensating for moderate administrative enforcement capacity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eKey Result\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe results confirm that \u003cb\u003eelectoral legitimacy is maximized where institutional independence and legal enforceability operate simultaneously\u003c/b\u003e. Substitute mechanisms, such as caretaker governments, may address short-term credibility deficits but do not generate sustainable electoral governance in the absence of strong institutions.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eComparative Perspectives\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia offers a useful contrast as its long-established Election Commission is a constitutionally independent body that conducts elections for both Parliament and state legislatures. India\u0026rsquo;s EC has successfully held over a dozen general elections (and countless state polls) with minimal controversy. While India\u0026rsquo;s caretaker norms are informal (the outgoing government simply refrains from major policy shifts), the institutional strength of its EC often precludes any need for a separate caretaker regime (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In Bangladesh, by contrast, the lack of such an entrenched system made the caretaker solution politically attractive, but now its removal highlights the need for equally strong institutions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe United Kingdom shows another model such as their elections occur every fixed term (recently five years) unless early polls are called. During the campaign period, the incumbent government operates in a \u0026ldquo;caretaker mode\u0026rdquo; guided by convention - for example, it does not announce major contracts or make high-level appointments until after voting (The House of Commons, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Though the UK has a statutory Electoral Commission (independent, with limited powers mainly over boundaries and finance), the government itself remains intact (The Electoral Commission, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). The Bangladeshi public debate suggests interest in adopting some UK-style conventions (e.g. requiring the PM to dissolve Parliament on a fixed date, stronger campaign silence periods), but legally these are currently non-binding norms.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSri Lanka is particularly instructive in showing alternative mechanisms. Sri Lanka\u0026rsquo;s Constitution includes a Parliamentary Council and Constitutional Council which nominate judges and officials; after 2015 reforms these bodies were restructured to ensure bipartisan oversight (Welikala, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). During crises, Sri Lanka\u0026rsquo;s judiciary and independent commissions have asserted themselves - for example, when President Sirisena attempted an unconstitutional dissolution in 2018, the courts quickly overturned it (Attanayake \u0026amp; Kapur, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Recent literature on Bangladesh notes that Sri Lanka\u0026rsquo;s experience (\u0026ldquo;judiciary stepping in during crises\u0026rdquo; (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) offers a model that Bangladesh has lacking: an empowered judiciary willing and able to check the executive. By comparison, Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s Supreme Court has so far been hesitant, though its November 2025 caretaker ruling shows a readiness to reassert constitutional guardrails (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e1. Structural Weakness of Electoral Institutions\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral crisis is institutional in nature. The Constitution has granted the Election Commission formal independence under Article 118 (\u0026ldquo;Constitution of Bangladesh,\u0026rdquo; 2026). However, this constitutional status has not ensured effective autonomy in practice. Legal guarantees have remained largely symbolic, because operational control and enforcement capacity are weak. Appointment procedures for Election Commissioners continue to be politically influenced, despite the introduction of a search committee under the 2022 Appointment Act and raised persistent concerns about impartiality and credibility (Akter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnforcement powers are existed, but they are rarely exercised against ruling party candidates or incumbents. The Election Commission has shown reluctance to cancel results, disqualify candidates, or sanction state officials for electoral misconduct. This pattern undermines the second analytical pillar of legal enforceability. Laws without credible sanctions fail to constrain political actors and selective enforcement further erodes institutional authority (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferent institutional logic like India relies on a strong and assertive Election Commission rather than caretaker governments. Its constitutional commission exercises broad supervisory powers and enforces compliance through binding directions (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Sri Lanka, by contrast, relies more heavily on courts and constitutional councils to restrain executive excess during elections. Bangladesh lacks both strong administrative enforcement and consistent judicial assertiveness. As a result, institutional independence remains weak and electoral legitimacy suffers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e2. Caretaker Government Debate Revisited\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe caretaker government system has long been debated as a legal necessity in Bangladesh. Supporters have argued that it ensured credible elections in 1996, 2001 and 2008 by neutralizing executive interference (Liton, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). From an institutional perspective, the caretaker model functioned as a substitute for weak electoral institutions (Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Critics, however, have argued that it distorted parliamentary sovereignty and disrupted the normal constitutional order, a view later endorsed by the Supreme Court in its 2011 judgment (Levush, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Supreme Court has now adopted a middle position. It has restored the caretaker system for future elections only, while excluding the 2026 election (Alamgir, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This decision has created a temporary dual framework. The immediate electoral process will proceed without a caretaker, while future elections will include one. This compromise has reduced short-term political instability and avoided disruption of the electoral calendar (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, this arrangement has generated long-term uncertainty. Two parallel electoral logics now coexist within the same constitutional system. From the perspective of legal enforceability and institutional independence, this ambiguity weakens predictability and undermines trust. Electoral legitimacy may suffer if actors perceive the rules as transitional or politically contingent rather than stable and rule-based.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e3. Legal Status and Limits of the July Charter\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe July Charter represents broad political consensus, but it does not constitute binding law. Its proposals remain aspirational because they lack constitutional or statutory force. Without amendment under Article 142, the Charter cannot create enforceable obligations for state institutions or political parties (Hossain, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Haque \u0026amp; Bisarya, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Charter\u0026rsquo;s principal strength lies in agenda setting. It identifies core institutional failures and proposes comprehensive reforms aligned with the three-pillar analytical framework. It addresses institutional independence, legal enforceability and electoral legitimacy in a coherent manner. However, its weakness lies in legal uncertainty. Without clear implementation pathways, reforms risk remaining declaratory (Al Jazeera English, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA rushed implementation may bypass democratic scrutiny and judicial review. This could undermine legitimacy and violate constitutional procedures. A delayed implementation, on the other hand, may dilute reform momentum and entrench existing practices. This tension between urgency and legality defines the Charter\u0026rsquo;s future impact on Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral system.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e4. Campaign Finance and Electoral Integrity\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCampaign finance has emerged as a central concern in Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral governance. Recent affidavit and disclosure requirements represent a positive step toward transparency. These reforms align with the analytical pillar of legal enforceability by formally expanding regulatory oversight (The Daily Star, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, enforcement mechanisms remain weak. Party-level finance continues to be opaque and there is no independent authority to audit or verify submitted disclosures. The system still relies heavily on self-reporting, which limits its effectiveness. Without credible penalties, disclosure alone cannot deter illicit financing (Alam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative systems rely on strict audits, independent oversight bodies and meaningful sanctions. India and the UK both impose reporting requirements backed by investigation and prosecution powers (Global Legal Group, n.d.). Bangladesh has lack of such institutional capacity so without independent audits and enforcement, financial reform will remain largely symbolic and keep weaken the electoral legitimacy and reinforces public distrust in electoral outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003ePolicy Implications\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeveral important policy lessons emerge from this analysis. Institutional reform must precede electoral scheduling. Elections conducted under weak or contested institutions are unlikely to restore public confidence, regardless of timing. Strengthening institutional capacity before announcing election dates is therefore essential to protect electoral legitimacy and reduce political conflict.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Election Commission must be insulated from political influence through staggered appointments and secure tenure. Such a structure would prevent wholesale replacement of commissioners by any single government and would reinforce institutional independence. Without insulation at the appointment stage, constitutional guarantees of autonomy will remain ineffective in practice.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCampaign finance law must be consolidated into a single and comprehensive statute. Fragmented rules under the RPO and subsidiary regulations have weakened enforcement and accountability. A unified legal framework should establish clear spending limits, mandatory audits and meaningful sanctions for violations. Without consolidation, financial regulation will continue to favor incumbents and undermine electoral fairness.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJudicial review must also be strengthened during election periods. Courts should be empowered to provide expedited remedies for electoral disputes and constitutional violations. Delayed or hesitant judicial intervention weakens legal enforceability and allows irregularities to persist. Reforms without credible enforcement mechanisms will not restore public trust or electoral legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eLimitations of the Study\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study is based on doctrinal and documentary analysis only and didn\u0026rsquo;t any include interviews, surveys, or field-level electoral data.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eFindings are dependent on publicly available legal and secondary sources.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe comparative analysis is limited to selected countries.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRapid political developments may affect the relevance of some conclusions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eBangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral crisis is legal, institutional and political in nature. The Constitution provides formal safeguards, including an independent Election Commission and rule-based elections, but these safeguards have remained weak in practice. The removal of the caretaker system exposed deep institutional fragility rather than resolving it.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe July Charter offers a reform roadmap and reflects broad political consensus, but it does not provide a legal solution. Without constitutional amendment and statutory backing, its proposals remain aspirational. Sustainable electoral integrity requires binding reforms that are enforceable and transparent.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese reforms must strengthen institutions rather than rely on personalities or temporary political arrangements. Without credible enforcement and independent oversight, elections will continue to lack legitimacy and public acceptance. The future of Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s democracy depends on closing the persistent gap between law and practice.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAhmed, M. (2025). \u003cem\u003eThe July 2025 Interim Ruler\u0026rsquo;s Charter under the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh: A Legal Analysis of Treason and Constitutional Violation\u003c/em\u003e (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 5640410). Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5640410\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAhmed, R. (2025, November 14). \u003cem\u003eJuly Charter implementation order: How much of each party\u0026rsquo;s demands accommodated\u003c/em\u003e. Prothomalo. https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/x0zhk30jow\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAkter, N. (2023). 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The Library of Congress. https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2024/08/interim-government-and-the-constitution-of-bangladesh\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLiton, S. (2024, August 14). \u003cem\u003eCaretaker govt: How Hasina killed a system that ensured free and fair elections\u003c/em\u003e [Newspaper]. The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/caretaker-govt-how-hasina-killed-system-ensured-free-and-fair-elections-916636\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMurombo, T. (2011). The utility of environmental rights to sustainable development in Zimbabwe: A contribution to the constitutional reform debate. \u003cem\u003eAfrican Human Rights Law Journal (AHRLJ)\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e11\u003c/em\u003e(1), 120\u0026ndash;146. https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/murombo-t\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (Ed.). (2006). \u003cem\u003eCaretaker government during election: A comparative study of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India\u003c/em\u003e. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRashiduzzaman, M. (1997). Political Unrest and Democracy in Bangladesh. \u003cem\u003eAsian Survey\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e37\u003c/em\u003e(3), 254-268. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645662\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eReuters. (2024, January 7). \u003cem\u003eBangladesh turnout low in election set to keep PM Hasina in power\u003c/em\u003e [Newspaper]. Arab News. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2437466/amp\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSarkar, A., \u0026amp; Rahman, A. (2024, December 17). \u003cem\u003e15Th amendment to constitution: HC scraps part that abolished caretaker system\u003c/em\u003e [Newspaper]. 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The Business Standard. https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/bnps-demand-caretaker-government-unconstitutional-illegal-law-minister-tells-un-738838\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWelikala, A. (Ed.). (2019). \u003cem\u003eConstitutional reform and crisis in Sri Lanka\u003c/em\u003e. Centre for Policy\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"Southwest University of Political Science and Law, China","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Electoral governance, Constitution of Bangladesh, Election Commission, Caretaker government, July Charter 2025, Electoral reform","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8817381/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8817381/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis study examined Bangladesh\u0026rsquo;s electoral system by analyzing its constitutional structure, legal framework and recent reform initiatives by paying special attention to the Election Commission, the Representation of the People Order 1972 and the July Charter 2025. The aim of the study is to assess how legal design and institutional practice affect electoral integrity and public trust. However, a qualitative doctrinal research method has been applied in the study. It analyzed constitutional provisions, statutes and Supreme Court judgments as primary sources. It also reviewed peer-reviewed literature, policy reports and comparative studies as secondary sources. Drawing examples from India, Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom, a comparative constitutional approach was used. The analysis was guided by a three-pillar framework focusing on institutional independence, legal enforceability and electoral legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings of the study highlighted that constitutional guarantees of electoral independence are very weak in practical points of view. Legal loopholes and selective enforcement undermine the authority of the Election Commission. Moreover, the abolition of the caretaker government created institutional uncertainty rather than stability. However, the July Charter 2025 has identified some key reform areas, but it has few lacking in binding legal force. As a result, electoral legitimacy and public confidence may continue to decline.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study recommends strengthening the Election Commission through secure tenure and insulated appointments. It calls for comprehensive campaign finance legislation with strong enforcement mechanisms and also emphasizes timely judicial oversight during elections and constitutionally grounded reform implementation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApart from some findings and recommendations, the study has some limitations like it relied on doctrinal analysis and secondary data and didn\u0026rsquo;t not include any empirical fieldwork or survey evidence.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Bangladesh’s Electoral System: Constitutional Structure, Legal Framework and the Impact of the July Charter","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-02-10 10:32:28","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8817381/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"a9445141-b9ed-41ea-8439-adc07d391186","owner":[],"postedDate":"February 10th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":62514079,"name":"Constitutional Law"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-02-10T10:32:28+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-02-10 10:32:28","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8817381","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8817381","identity":"rs-8817381","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}