Judging, Fast and Slow. Constitutional Adjudication in Times of COVID-19

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Abstract

During an emergency, time is of the essence. While the executive branch may make quick decisions, courts in general, and supreme and constitutional courts in particular, seem to act relatively slowly. Nevertheless, the function of constitutional review becomes even more important when emergency measures introduced by the executive infringe fundamental rights, violate the rule of law or undermine democracy. The following paper analyses the potential, possibilities and perspectives of fast-track constitutional adjudication and contrasts it with slower forms of judicial review. Recent developments during the COVID-19 crisis serve as an example.

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last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00