Filling the Gap: Duality, Ambivalence and Samaj in Rural Darjeeling Hills

Filling the Gap: Duality, Ambivalence and Samaj in Rural Darjeeling Hills | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Filling the Gap: Duality, Ambivalence and Samaj in Rural Darjeeling Hills Biswanath Saha, Gorky Chakraborty This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-5009197/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The literature on the fuzziness of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in rural areas of the Darjeeling hills has been elusive. The recent PRI election was conducted in 2023 after a gap of almost two decades. Between 2005 and 2023, the system of governance prevailing in the rural Darjeeling hills also failed to attract academic scrutiny. Is the system, which fills the gap, primordial or just temporary to augment the governance vacuum created from 2005–2023? Surprisingly, during the same period, urban areas functioned well under the regular elected municipalities. Moreover, a contrasting picture also emerges when we juxtapose rural governance in the plains vis-à-vis the hills within the same district. Therefore, why does this duality of governance exist in the Darjeeling hills? Furthermore, despite being the epicenter of self-rule mobilisation (Gorkhaland Movement) for a long period of time, why has it fallen short in accommodating the demand for a functional PRI structure for hills? On the basis of fieldwork, it analyses the irregular skeletal system that has been perpetuating in hills in the name of local governance in rural areas. In addition, how do the rural hill dwellers in Darjeeling negotiate everyday grievances in such a state of exception? Sociology rural governance PRIs Darjeeling hills Samaj traditional institution land rights 1. Introduction The idea of local governance, self-rule, in other words, received considerable momentum in India through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1992. While the 73rd Amendment addresses rural local bodies (Panchayati Raj Institutions – PRIs), the 74th Amendment relates to urban local bodies (Municipalities). It was only in 2023 that elections to the two-tier PRI were held after a gap of almost two decades (Goswami 2023 ). Notably, the Darjeeling hills had been struggling for self-rule since 1907, when, for the first time, a separate ‘administrative set-up’ was demanded (Samanta 2000 ; S. Sarkar 2013 ; Subba 1992 ; Sinha 2019 ). After that, this struggle, in various forms, continued until contemporary times. In its 117-year history of struggle, it has witnessed the establishment of decentralised bodies such as the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) in 1988, the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in 2012, and finally, the formation of development boards in 2013. However, it was only on 9th July 2023 that the Darjeeling hills witnessed the conduct of elections (Giri, 2023 ; Goswami, 2023 ) in its local governing structures—the erstwhile two-tier PRIs. Surprisingly, it was in 2001 when the last PRI election was organised in the Darjeeling hills. How the rural governance structure has functioned has eluded scholarly scrutiny. This article therefore analyses the intricacies related to the prolonged nonexistence of constitutionally empowered elected PRIs in the Darjeeling hills and the institutions, if any, fulfilling such a vacuum. The arguments in this article revolve around two interrelated themes: First, what arrangement of PRIs has been constitutionally prescribed for the Darjeeling hills? Second, how did the rural Darjeeling hills negotiate basic amenities and necessities in the absence of elected PRIs? Is there any other institution that filled the governance gap from 2005–2023? Probing such apprehensions leads us to the finding that there is a constitutional caveat that allows the existence of a duality of governance in the rural Darjeeling hills. Likewise, the apathy of hill leadership towards decentralisation is another important depressor , apart from the clash of power between the existing PRI, erstwhile the DGHC, and the GTA, along with the high handedness of the state, as the factors leading to such an absence of elected representatives. Surprisingly, fieldwork suggests that the rural Darjeeling hills had been practicing a traditional local governance structure as an age-old practice that eventually filled the governance vacuum created between 2005 and 2023. 2. Review of Literature and Methodology The available literature (Hutt 1997 ; Chettri 2017 ; N. Chhetri 2023 ; Middleton 2016 ; Subba 1992 ; Samanta 2000 ; Dasgupta 1988 ) concerning ethnopolitics in the Darjeeling hills has analysed the self-rule struggle, mainly through the lenses of identity and development. Furthermore, it appears that academia has dealt with the identity issue largely through the national and national questions, whereas development or its shortfall has been elaborated through economic attributes. Although the literature is premised on the idea that identity preservation and socioeconomic development are intricately juxtaposed with the governmentality of the state (Middleton 2016 ), it falls short in synthesising the identity and development issue with decentralised governance. Hence, there appears to be a gap in terms of academically engaging with the issue of governance through the staggered local governing structures in the Darjeeling hills. In light of such a fillip in terms of decentralised governance, this study seeks to critically engage with Darjeeling hill politics, which has been in vogue for over a century and has stumbled to maintain the constitutionally guaranteed regular elected body of representatives in the PRIs. This study collected data through primary fieldwork by applying the methods of focused group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews, and institutional ethnography through semistructured and nonstructured questionnaires. Field work was carried out in select villages of the Darjeeling hills from 2022–2023. Jorebunglow-Sukhiapokhri, Kurseong and Mirik are the three blocks in the hills of Darjeeling district, whereas Kalimpong I, Kalimpong II and Gorubathan and Pedong blocks from the Kalimpong district were selected. For data collection, two remote Gram Panchayats (GPs) vis-à-vis the administrative headquarters and a nearby GP were chosen. Similarly, three (03) villages each from three (03) GPs, depending upon their respective distance from the administrative (Block) headquarters, were selected for data collection. In total, twenty-four (24) Gram Panchayats (GPs) and seventy-four (74) villages were selected for data collection. Nepalis, Bhutias, and Lepchas are the major ethnic communities in the Darjeeling hills. However, within the Nepali ethnic constellation, there are several other communities, such as Tamang, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sunwar, and Yolmo. Respondents were chosen mainly through quota sampling appended by snowballing techniques in such a way that it could represent all the major ethnic and religious communities in the hills. The next section provides a glimpse of the complexities related to the structure of existing rural governance. 3. Duality of Local Governance and the Political Terrain of Darjeeling A major contention in the politics associated with the Darjeeling district is a marked two-pronged dichotomy in the rural governance system, i.e., between the plains and hills and between the rural and urban areas within the hills. This section therefore analyses the rationale for such duality of governance and the prolonged absence of elected PRIs in the Darjeeling hills. a. Constitutional Ambivalence: The existence of a two-tier PRI in the hills and the provision for a fully operational three-tier PRI set up in the plains of the district creates administrative confusion. Moreover, whatever skeletal governance exists in the rural Darjeeling hills has also been stumbled due to a lack of regular elections. Specifically, while rural areas have been struggling with the regular conduct of elections to two-tier PRIs, urban Darjeeling has functioned well in municipalities with regular mandates. Such administrative arrangements only serve to exacerbate the existing fault lines between the hills and plains of West Bengal. In contrast to the plains, which include only the Siliguri subdivision, the hills under the control of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) include the subdivisions of Kurseong, Darjeeling, and Kalimpong. The Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad (read Zilla Parishad) served as the highest tier of rural government in the Darjeeling plains, with Panchayat Samitis at the intermediary level and Gram Panchayats at the grassroots level. On the other hand, the hills were only left with panchayat bodies at two levels—the intermediary and grassroots—with the DGHC acting as the Zilla Parishad, as specified in the DGHC Act[1], 1988. In the DGHC Act, section 31(2) was included, which bestowed the DGHC with the functions of a Zilla Parishad under sections 153--162 of the West Bengal Panchayat Act (WBPA), 1973 . Despite having provisions for two-tier panchayats, the election at Panchayat Samitis never occurred since the formation of the DGHC in 1988. Only the Gram Panchayat election occurred during its reign (V. Chhetri 2023). A respondent from Kurseong, during the fieldwork, highlighted, “while the constitutional amendment in 1992 mandated a two-tier panchayat structure in the hills, election in 2001 held only for one tier .” It is said that Ghising apprehended that “the Panchayat Samiti would overlap the powers and functions of the DGHC” (Banerjee 2023). Ghising argued in 2005 that “the panchayat was diluting the powers of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC)” (PTI 2023). On the other hand, the 73 rd amendment to the Constitution of India in 1992 further legitimised the institutionalisation of a two-tier panchayat in the rural Darjeeling hills, comprising the Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Samitis, where the DGHC would act as the third-tier body, instead of a Zilla Parishad. Article 243 M [3(a)][2] of the Indian Constitution states that “panchayats at the district level shall not apply to the hill areas of the district of Darjeeling in the state of West Bengal for which the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council exists…”. The same arrangement continued with the establishment of the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in 2012, without any ‘amendment to the constitution’ (V. Chhetri 2023). This body was prescribed to be the third tier by replacing the DGHC. Since there is no DGHC and no WBPA, 1973, in operation, a question may arise: how can a constitutional arrangement be replaced without any amendments to the constitution? This suggests that the constitutional arrangement of the DGHC as the third tier of the PRIs can be replaced only with an amendment to the constitution if the GTA has to replace the DGHC as the third tier. As quoted in The Economic Times , The official end of the DGHC brought Darjeeling back to the earlier and standard system of the three-tier Panchayat system. GTA cannot work as a third tier such as a DGHC with continuation of a two-tier panchayat unless the Constitution is further amended to give the GTA the same status (D. Sarkar 2015). b. State and the Hill-Leadership: After the 2001 two-tier election, subsequent rounds of panchayat elections were never organised until 2023. This was mainly, as our fieldwork suggests, due to the sudden shift in the political discourse during the early 2000s, in the hills, towards the 6 th schedule. The subhash Ghising-led DGHC wanted to bring the Darjeeling hills under the ambit of the 6 th schedule (Saha and Chakraborty 2019), whereas he had previously rejected such a proposal for areas under the DGHC in the late 1980s by rhetorically putting the Darjeeling dwellers as ‘nontribal’ (Middleton 2016). Sensing an opportunity, Bimal Gurung emerged as the new leader with the formation of Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) in 2006 with his ‘anti-sixth schedule’ mobilisation. This change in political momentum in the 2000s, fieldwork suggests, can also be attributed to the discontinuation of panchayat elections in the hills after the 2001--2005 term. With the emergence of a new leader in the 2000s and the formation of the GTA in 2012, the Darjeeling hills missed another opportunity to mobilise the absence of an elected two-tier PRI as an important issue to consolidate the grassroots, apart from garnering support for Gorkhaland. Our fieldwork indicated[3] that during that time, the hill dwellers were spellbound with only one demand—a change in the leadership, who can lead the hills to realise the mass aspiration of a separate Gorkhaland state. As Ghising formally dropped the demand for Gorkhaland, he became obsolete in the hills and eventually made a way for Gurung to emerge. Even after the formation of the GTA, the elected councillors, led by Bimal Gurung, did not show any interest in holding panchayat elections. The perception that there would be a spillover of power of the elected officials in the panchayat with the GTA councillors, as was the case with the DGHC, etched in the minds of the hillspearheads. As a result, panchayat elections did not take place in the hills between 2005 and 2023. A female tea garden worker, Mirik, mentioned that the GTA is solely responsible for not allowing elections to occur in rural areas. She said, “If election happens in the villages regularly and should we have elected Pradhans, I do not think we will require the GTA.” Hence, “they did not let the panchayat elections to be conducted.” If a two-tier PRI sees the light of day, a scholar of Nepali literature and an ex-contestant for the state legislative assembly polls, as an independent, noted, The number of agitations that we see happening from time to time won’t be happening anymore. If there is proper development and infrastructural amenities and enough opportunities for people, then the extent of agitation dissipates to a large extent. Additionally, one of the panchayat officials[4] from the Kurseong block noted that although the GTA Act of 2012 prescribes regular panchayat elections in hills, neither the state of West Bengal nor local leaders wish to take it seriously. In the absence of elected representatives in the PRIs, various beneficiary schemes (old-age pension, disability pension, widow pension, etc.) have become a pariah for hill dwellers. Since a new GTA body was constituted in 2022 after a staggering lag of five years since the expiration of GTA’s term in 2017, there was this unanimous decision among the masses that the newly formed body in joint consultation with the state government should look for an option of running two simultaneous bodies (Financial Express, 26.06.2022). On the one hand, the GTA and two-tier panchayats are on the other hand. However, the constitutional caveat, legitimising the duality of rural governance between the hills and plains of the Darjeeling district, has also overflowed the gradually increasing disjuncture in terms of the development of amenities and infrastructures in the hills. Currently, historically, the Darjeeling hills have always been spaces where the rule of exception prevails. As a social anthropologist working in the Darjeeling hills noted, If we return to history, since British times, this place has been ruled by exception. In the sense that what laws were applicable elsewhere was not the same here. Therefore, I think, the question of why there is a two-tier system in the hills boils down to the question of political will from both sides, the hill leadership and the state of West Bengal. For a large part of the time, all the stakeholders involved have dealt with the following question: how do you actualise/bargain the statehood demand? As a result, various issues such as rural governance and urban development have been pushed aside. Therefore, I think, it is a result of a combination of these two factors; one, the history of the rule of exception and the other, a lack of concern about the issues, have ultimately led to the institutionalisation of the bleak two-tier PRI system not being challenged accordingly. However, I think, if you look at the recent past, over the last year or so, there have been various people who have been talking about bringing in the three-tier system. Last, in 2021, when the chief minister visited Kurseong, she had a meeting in the town hall, where people raised the question of bringing back the three-tier Panchayati Raj system. One is thereby apprehended by an important question: in the absence of a well-institutionalised PRI infrastructure in the rural Darjeeling hills, how had governance been actualised thus far until the recent election? Is there any other body that at least symbolically fits into the gap? The following section addresses such a scenario. [1] DGHC Act, 1988. Available at https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/14230/1/1988-13.pdf, accessed on 10/08/2024 [2] Article 243 M in Constitution of India, Indian Kanoon . Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/72125/, accessed on 10/08/2024 [3] Field-work carried out during May-August 2022. [4] Personal interview in July, 2022. 4. Role of Samaj in Rural Governance in the Absence of Elected PRIs If we closely look at the scenarios in Northeast India, one can observe that various communities/societies had been functioning rooted in their traditional governance mechanisms and structures. A few prominent traditional governance structures in northeast India include Dzumsa in the Mangan district of Sikkim and Samaj in the Darjeeling hills. The mention of Dzumsa becomes important here, as Sikkim happens to be the parent state of the Darjeeling hills. Despite being part of the same geography, there are marked similarities in the governance structures, whether traditional or legal, of both regions. Lachen and Lachung villages in Mangan inherited the legally empowered Dzumsa system (Thapa and Sachdeva 2017) to maintain its sanctity even in its postmerger status in India, whereas the rest of Sikkim follows the two-tier PRI. Surprisingly, the Darjeeling hills, in the absence of elected PRIs, have been sustaining with the existence of Samaj—a body that does not even have any legal functions or functionaries. 4.1. Structure and Functions of Samaj: If we look into the structure and functioning of the Samaj , we understand that it does not follow the legal-jurisprudential structure in the crude sense. Samaj is a collection of people in the community or village that come together to govern themselves and is commonly found in the Darjeeling–Sikkim Himalayas. However, it has been academically defined as an ‘inclusive social institution that organises support for social events’ (Wenner 2015) with conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level (Shah and Badiger 2020). It can be village specific, community specific, or religion-specific and varies across villages. In some villages, there is only one overarching village, Samaj, and in a few others, there are multiple Samajs, which are based on multiple ethnicities and religions. The following quote also gives us a complete picture: Once upon time, associations (samaj) held an important place in the lives of the people of Darjeeling. It had members from various ethnic communities. Now that new associations or samaj-s have been formed on the basis of ethnic, political and religious identities, the earlier samaj-s are falling into oblivion. Let us consider Rai Samaj, Tamang Samaj, Sunuwar Samaj, etc., for example. Here, membership is open to their respective ethnic and cultural communities only. Similarly, in a religious samaj such as Catholic Samaj or Hindu Samaj or Buddhist Samaj, only the members of the respective religions have a place. One way to fight the overexaggeration of ethnicity is to strengthen our local sample where people from various ethnic communities fit in and live together. This is why many people object to the name Gorkhaland if not to the movement (Mukhia 2018: 67). The earliest known Samaj was founded in 1932 in the name of Gorkha Dukha Niwarak Sammelan , which happens to be a Gauley Samaj (Shah and Badiger 2020). The extent and location of Samaj ’s role in the hills may vary. One of the respondents from the Jorebunglow-Sukhiapokhri block noted that if there is some kind of urgency in the village, Samaj takes care of it. When asked how Samaj operates, another interviewee from the same block noted that one member from each Samaj is duty bound to offer help to those members who are in need. Events such as funerals and weddings are typical examples that were foregrounded, with each Samaj having its limited resources that can be utilised by all members. A Samaj provides relief to the needy from the contingency fund collected through monthly meetings, where the members donate on the basis of their capacities (Rs. 50/- to 100 or more). In noting the characteristics of what makes a Samaj , it was highlighted that Samajs were formed basically to help each other during times of need. Each Samaj has its own utilities that can be used by all the members of the Samaj, and each member is expected to help others in need. There is no relief from the government, as Samaj is a voluntary group that can be found in every village. According to most Samaj members, who were interviewed, Samaj ’s role in their respective villages was limited to addressing minor issues. However, there were cases where Samaj was involved in areas of governance that required proper supervision. One respondent in the Kurseong block clarified: Samaj is not involved in any other developmental work. Yes, sometimes we all gather and work for the benefit of the village, but that is not developmental work; it is community help among the villagers. Currently, whether Samaj takes part in any form of development-related activity is a pressing concern. If so, what is the role of Samaj in such activities? They range from providing financial aid to members in a specific village to recognising and approving local land transactions[5]. Other activities include assisting the residents of a particular village in accessing certain benefits, such as old age and widow pensions, as well as collecting funds from individual villagers for repairing infrastructure, such as minor roads. Although a few interviewees mentioned that Samaj does not work for the development of rural areas, some respondents elaborated on the role that Samaj played in terms of development at the village level. With respect to curiosity, whether the gauley Samaj (village Samaj ) takes care of the grievances of a person from a specific ethnic background was investigated. The answer to this curiosity is given in the form of a conversation with a descendent of an erstwhile Mandal family—a traditional landed-gentry in Darjeeling-Sikkim Himalaya. Interviewer: Let us think that someone from a Tamang family dies in the village. Then, who will contribute in this case? Will it be the Tamang community only or the whole village? Rai Mandal: The Samaj to which the deceased person belongs generally has Tamang, Chettri, Manger, SC, ST, etc. In such cases, all will have to contribute. However, if a Tamang city dies, then most of the Tamang population contributes 4.2. Samaj in everyday governance: It becomes a concern whether Samaj participates in any development-related activities and, if so, in what roles! While some interviewees stated that Samaj does not work towards rural development, others elaborated on the role of Samaj in village-level development. Fieldwork reveals that the gap in governance, created by the absence of elected representatives in the PRIs before 2023, was negotiated by Samaj on many issues related to everyday governance. Starting from job cards, rationing, sanitary and water connections to land transactions, Samaj helped all. In the event of an unfortunate incident occurring in the village, the Samaj takes responsibility for providing relief and consolation. When asked about the work of Samaj , an interviewee from Gorubathan Block explained that one member from each Samaj is obligated to assist those in need, with events such as weddings and funerals being typical examples. There is an expectation that each member will help one another and be helped in return, with no government involvement, as Samaj is a voluntary group found in almost every village. The following narration from the field explains this further: During any event in the village, Samaj comes forward for help. If someone’s house is damaged, we gather and help them. Even during funerals and to build small footpaths in the village, in such events, we gather and help each other. On the other hand, to achieve water connections, a pressing issue in the Darjeeling hills, Samaj plays a leadership role by approaching district authorities ‘to provide a public standpipe in their locality if it does not exist’. If the district administration fails to bear the installation cost, Samaj bears it, depending on its political bargaining and liaising (Shah and Badiger 2020: 152). However, the role of Samaj in development-related activities is not very large. Nevertheless, owing to the absence of a properly functioning panchayat office and as a mediator, it intervenes in some development activities. One of the respondents from Kalimpong Block II, which has been bifurcated into the Lava and Pedong Blocks, mentioned, …we don’t even feel like casting our votes anymore. Roads in our villages are so bad, and the members of the village contributed money to repair it. However, when we were doing this, representatives of political parties were saying that the funds for this road had been sanctioned and that construction would commence soon. It has been more than two years and no sign of construction; not even a drain has been built. As the president of a village, Samaj , described: In municipalities, people receive benefits, but in Panchayat areas, people are bereft of any benefit. For example, there is the problem of drinking water supply in our area (both municipal and panchayat). However, in the municipality area, these days, people are receiving drinking water under Amrit Jal Yojna, while we do not have any such facilities. The facilities in municipalities and GPs should be equal because, given an option, we elect our leaders, and similarly, there should not be unequal treatment in terms of facilities. Apart from the building of roads, Samaj takes part in the building of walls in the case of landslides. The interventions of Samaj are not limited to physical infrastructures; they also play a very important role in helping rural residents with the availability of beneficiary schemes. As a beneficiary from Kalimpong I Block noted, Samaj has played a very important role in helping people receive their old-age pensions. In the absence of Sansad members, it becomes difficult for individuals to know which new beneficiary scheme has turned up and the criteria for availing them of the same. To address such problems, the panchayat office has also collaborated with Samaj to use it as a means of communication. The panchayat officials, in such cases, put up a notice about the Sansad meeting in areas where everyone can see, and simultaneously, they approach the Samaj Presidents too. In that way, it becomes much easier to let people know about any upcoming beneficiary scheme or program from the side of the government. While there is a unanimous response across different blocks of the study area regarding Samaj being disempowered to deliver developmental respite, there are incidences such as redressal of disputes related to marriage, elopement, etc., where Samaj plays a significant role. One such narrative from Kothidara village of Ghayabari I GP, under the Kurseong block, “Right now, if some disputes arise in the village, we directly go to the police because a President or Secretary of the Samaj does not have such powers that they can solve such disputes.” Another respondent agreed, “We try to solve it through Samaj first, but if the case is a major one and cannot be resolved through Samaj, then we hand it over to the police only”. One such response came from a descendant of an erstwhile Mandal, in Kalimpong. In any grievance-related case, he opined, “it will first go to the village Samaj, and suppose if the concerned Samaj could not resolve it by themselves then it will go to court. However, until now, things have been resolved at the Samaj level only. 4.3. Samaj in Land Transaction: The issue of parja-patta started becoming a rallying point in the Darjeeling hills in the recent past when the Chief Minister of West Bengal in Mirik in 2017 announced the provision of land rights to the landless labourers of Darjeeling. People in hills have been struggling for a long period of time to secure their land rights (S. Sarkar 2010; Tamang and Kipgen 2023; Saha 2023). ‘ Legally’ speaking, when a land transaction happens, two parties (buyer and seller) first meet each other, and then a deed is written, mentioning the Khatiyan number and size of the land under consideration to be sold. Finally, the registration is performed through the block land revenue officer . The legal procedure of land transactions as set forth by an official of the Land Reforms Department, Pedong block: The khatiyan number, a specific number of plots of government-owned land, is always 1. Let us take an example of the Pedong block. This entire block is technically divided into different plots against their owners, and they are numbered in a zig-zag fashion. Khatiyan 1 is already given to government-owned lands, so the khatiyan number for publicly owned lands under Raiyat starts with 2. As far as I know, there have been three surveys thus far; earlier, we used to have cadastral surveys; now, they have evolved from the Revisional Settlement record (RS) to the Land Reforms record (LR). The LR record is the most modern record that we have. It is a set of maps containing information about the plot with the khatiyan number and its owners. This is the fundamental land revenue system in the Land Revenue Department of West Bengal State. Therefore, we keep the records of all these areas, and beyond the outer margins, we just know that they fall under either forest or plantation areas. Our work is to maintain these records, for example, if an owner of a plot dies, leaving two--three offspring, then how to divide the plot! We do not divide it manually on the map; we update only the records. Suppose that the khatiyan number of a deceased person is 7. While updating the records, we strike out only the number 7 to divide it among the spouse and offspring of the deceased. This is called mutation, which means updating records while changing the entries. Without any land-related documents, fieldwork reveals that the Darjeeling hill dwellers cannot secure themselves from potential threats of eviction, especially in the aftermath of the NRC in Assam. It occurred with the Nepalis of northeast India in the late 1980s (Subba and Sinha 2016) and in Bhutan in the early 1990s (Hutt 2003). Moreover, in the absence of parja patta , they cannot even obtain loans from banks for their daily survival. To minimise such insecurities, the state of West Bengal started distributing parja patta to the landless people in Darjeeling, including tea gardens. Under the Nijo Griha Nijo Bhumi (Own Land, Own House) and Cha-Sundari (for tea-gardens) schemes, landless people are being provided land patta . In contrast, it can be built only if an NOC can be obtained by the beneficiary. This means that any development-related initiatives in tea garden areas are subject to no-object certificates (NOCs) from management. FGD with tea garden workers at Darjeeling, The tea garden does not give us home, not even a toilet. Therefore, we have to build it by ourselves, and that also with tin roof, let alone the concrete roof. If I do not have a home and I got it through some beneficiary schemes, I have to take the NOC first. Even to put one electricity meter, the NOC is required from the manager. Moreover, to obtain some work done through MGNREGS, one must also take NOC. Generally, such NOCs are not provided. It can only be done in villages other than tea gardens. Therefore, parja patta is very important for tea garden villagers so that we can have the security that we are dwellers in this place. In the absence of it, hill dwellers cannot involve themselves in any form of ‘legal’ land transactions. However, the communities residing in such perdition have also found a remedy for such transactions through Samaj , eluding the panoptical gaze of the state. In this context, a respondent from Mirik noted that, owing to the absence of land rights and a strict prohibition on the transaction of land, whatever land transaction happens, it all happens unofficially under the aegis of Samaj . Such transactions take place in a very local manner, sitting with some local people through plain pieces of paper. Samaj provides documentation, which is accepted by people in the locality, to prove that the land has been transferred from one person to another. Another respondent in Kurseong noted, “In my village, there are numerous Jati and Gauley Samaj that assist with land transfers. The Samaj provides a bikri patra kagaz (land transaction deed), after a land transaction is over.” Such enunciations usually do not involve any land survey by an amin . Another narration that can help peek into the process: Nonregistered lands cannot be transferred officially. However, the inhabitants of these communities have also discovered a remedy for this. It is only natural for locals to wish to transfer their possessed (occupied) properties if they have been staying in one place for a long time. We have organisations such as Samaj in villages that help in such matters. In Chenga Panighatta GP, to which I belong, it operates at the village level. A Samaj is made up of 20–30 houses, each with a president and secretary. If land in Rai village is to be purchased, Rai Samaj investigates the issue of transaction. Samaj completes the necessary paperwork for land transfers and gives documentation stating that the land was transferred to X in Y date at Z cost. Thus, Samaj is also responsible for ensuring that the transfer of land is seamless, simple, and possible. The transaction of land, in the absence of land patta, is the same for the wider community or within the family. Elaborating on the role of a Samaj in land transactions, a respondent from Kurseong shared a similar experience in his own village. In my village, land transfers take place relatively infrequently. We do not have parja patta to sell or buy land. Samaj provides documentation to prove that the land has been transferred from one person to another whenever the transfer occurs, which is typically within family members. In my village, there are numerous Jati [community] and Gaule [village] Samaj that assist with land transfers. Each Samaj offers a Bikri Patta Kagaz [land selling deed] of the territory under their jurisdiction. [5] This is detailed in the next subsection. 5. Conclusions It is apparent from our analysis that the constitutionally empowered (73rd Amendment) PRI structure eluded the rural Darjeeling hills for so long from 2001 until the 2023 election. However, there is hardly any academic work that points toward this gap and its consequences. Our fieldwork suggests that for a long time, after the elapsing of the tenure of panchayat bodies in 2005, the grassroots local bodies had been solely run sparingly by government officials. In a way, one can say that the state of West Bengal had been handling rural Darjeeling affairs without the mandate of hill dwellers. In such exuberances surrounding identity and self-rule, neither the erstwhile DGHC nor the GTA ever questioned such highhandedness of the state. Surprisingly, the Darjeeling district also practices a dual structure of local governance. On the one hand, while the rural areas had been struggling to obtain the elected local body for so long, the urban areas had been enjoying the fruits of elected municipalities. Furthermore, there is a dichotomy in the practice of a decentralised system between the plain and hill areas of the Darjeeling district. While the plains of the Darjeeling district are bestowed with a three-tier PRI system and municipal bodies, the rural areas of the Darjeeling hills had to stumble repeatedly to come under the elected PRI until 2023. To add to this surprise, the erstwhile West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973 , legally made the DGHC the third tier. Moreover, the constitutional caveat provides dual and confusing rural governance at Darjeeling. The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992, constitutionally legitimised the DGHC to be the third-tier body instead of Zilla Parishad. Therefore, when the DGHC was dissolved to allow the GTA to be formed and function as the third-tier structure of the PRI, no constitutional amendment was initiated. This simply means that with the dissolution of the DGHC, the rural Darjeeling hills automatically moved back to the erstwhile three-tier structure, unless specifically guaranteed through constitutional amendment. However, hills have a two-tier structure. Since there is no DGHC and no WBPA, 1973 , the legal confusion of having either a two-tier or there-tier governing structure for the Darjeeling hills still persists. Our fieldwork reveals that, in such an absence, there exists a traditional form of governance structure—the Samaj. It is a collection of people from the concerned village or a jati coming together to govern themselves through their means. It can be a village Samaj , community Samaj and even a religion-specific Samaj . This body had been in existence for a long period of time, and its emergence cannot be relegated by saying that it had emerged only to fill the vacuum created by the unelected PRIs between 2005 and 2023. It had its existence even before India became a modern nation-state. From dealing with everyday grievances and providing basic amenities such as rationing and sanitary and water connections to provide security through local land transactions, Samaj helped in all. While the elected PRIs are now in place, it will be interesting to witness how these two bodies – an elected PRI and Samaj – negotiate in everyday governance! Declarations Acknowledgement This paper is part of a sponsored project supported by the Azim Premji University (APU) as part of its Research Funding Programme 2021. We would also like to thank the field investigators associated with this project, Ms. Bishnu Gurung, Ms. Bhumika Rai, Mr. Raktim Majumdar, Ms. Diksha Tamang, Mr. Sachin Limbu, and Mr. Yojak Tamang for their efforts in the field. Statement on participant consent: The necessary consent from the participants was taken beforehand, although it was not necessarily in written form. The fieldwork for this research was done following the standard ethical procedures. References Banerjee, Amitava. 2023. ‘Darjeeling & Kalimpong to See Panchayat Polls after 2 Decades’. Millennium Post , 2023. https://www.millenniumpost.in/bengal/darjeeling-kalimpong-to-see-panchayat-polls-after-2-decades-521580?infinitescroll=1. Chettri, Mona. 2017. Ethnicity and Democracy in the Eastern Himalayan Borderland: Constructing Democracy . Amsterdam University Press. Chhetri, Nilamber. 2023. The Politics of Ethnic Renewal in Darjeeling: Gorkhas and the Struggle for Tribal Recognition . First. Routledge. Chhetri, Vivek. 2023. ‘Rural Polls: Darjeeling Hills Clueless about Panchayat Samiti Functions’. The Telegraph , 2023. https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/rural-polls-darjeeling-hills-cluless-about-panchayat-samiti-functions/cid/1950599. Dasgupta, Manas. 1988. ‘The Gorkhaland Agitation in Darjeeling: Some Political and Economic Dimensions’. Special Lecture XI, Centre for Himalayan Studies, University of North Bengal. FT. 2022. ‘Gorkhaland Territorial Administration, GTA Elections 2022: Voting Today, for Polls Being Held after a Decade’. The Financial Express , 26 June 2022. https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/gorkhaland-territorial-administration-gta-elections-2022-voting-today-for-polls-being-held-after-a-decade-all-you-need-to-know/2572850/. Giri, Pramod. 2023. ‘TMC Ally BGPM Sweeps Gram Panchayats in Darjeeling, Kalimpong’. The Hindustan Times , 13 July 2023. https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/kolkata-news/bgpm-dominates-panchayat-polls-in-darjeeling-and-kalimpong-independent-candidates-surprisingly-successful-101689262023206.html. Goswami, Madhusree. 2023. ‘Panchayat Polls in Darjeeling, Kalimpong After 23 Years: Where Does TMC Stand?’ The Quint. 2023. https://www.thequint.com/explainers/bengal-panchayat-polls-where-does-tmc-stand-darjeeling-kalimpong. Hutt, Michael. 1997. ‘Being Nepali Without Nepal: Reflections on a South Asian Diaspora’. In Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom. The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal , edited by David N Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John Whelpton, 101–44. Harwood Academic Publishers. ———. 2003. Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of Refugees from Bhutan . Oxford University Press. Middleton, Townsend. 2016. The Demands of Recognition: State Anthropology and Ethnopolitics in Darjeeling . Stanford University Press. Mukhia, Terence. 2018. ‘Ethnic Identities and Development in the Darjeeling Hills: A Critical Reasoning’. SALESIAN JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (2): 61–68. https://doi.org/10.51818/SJHSS.09.2018.61-68. PTI. 2023. ‘Bengal Rural Polls: BGPM Becomes Dominant Political Force in Darjeeling Hills’. Deccan Herald , 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/bengal-rural-polls-bgpm-becomes-dominant-political-force-in-darjeeling-hills-1236288.html. Saha, Biswanath. 2023. ‘Spatiality and Identity in a Borderland: Understanding the Gorkhaland Movement’. PhD Thesis, Calcutta: Institute of Development Studies Kolkata (IDSK), University of Calcutta. http://hdl.handle.net/10603/506910. Saha, Biswanath, and G. Chakraborty. 2019. ‘Reimagining the Geographies of the Gorkhaland Movement’. Economic and Political Weekly 54 (23): 27-31. https://www.epw.in/journal/2019/23/perspectives/reimagining-geographies-gorkhaland-movement.html Samanta, Amiya Kumar. 2000. Gorkhaland Movement: A Study in Ethnic Separatism . APH Publishing Corporation. Sarkar, Debasis. 2015. ‘Rural Governance Structure of Darjeeling yet to Become Clear’. The Economic Times , 2 January 2015. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/rural-governance-structure-of-darjeeling-yet-to-become-clear/articleshow/45730712.cms?from=mdr. Sarkar, Swatahsiddha. 2010. ‘The Land Question and Ethnicity in the Darjeeling Hills’. Journal of Rural Social Sciences 25 (2): 81–121. ———. 2013. ‘Gorkhaland Movement: Ethnic Conflict and State Response’. Concept Publishing Company. Shah, Rinan, and Shrinivas Badiger. 2020. ‘Conundrum or Paradox: Deconstructing the Spurious Case of Water Scarcity in the Himalayan Region through an Institutional Economics Narrative’. Water Policy 22 (S1): 146–61. https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2018.115. Sinha, A C. 2019. Dawn of Democracy in the Eastern Himalayan Kingdoms: The 20th Century . First. Routledge. Subba, Tanka Bahadur. 1992. Ethnicity, State and Development: A Case Study of the Gorkhaland Movement in Darjeeling . New Delhi: Vikas Publishing. Subba, Tanka Bahadur, and A C Sinha. 2016. Nepali Diaspora in a Globalised Era . Tamang, Sangay, and Ngamjahao Kipgen. 2023. ‘“Land” as a Site of Contestation: Empire, Identity, and Belonging in the Darjeeling Himalayas’. Ethnicities 23 (2). https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968221101400. Thapa, Sandhya, and Swati A Sachdeva. 2017. ‘Institution of Dzumsa in North Sikkim: A Sociological Understanding’. Sociological Bulletin 66 (2): 212–22. Wenner, Miriam. 2015. ‘Legitimisation through Patronage? Strategies for Political Control beyond Ethno-Regional Claims in Darjeeling, India’. Geoforum 66 (November):234–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.11.002. Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. 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Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe idea of local governance, self-rule, in other words, received considerable momentum in India through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1992. While the 73rd Amendment addresses rural local bodies (Panchayati Raj Institutions \u0026ndash; PRIs), the 74th Amendment relates to urban local bodies (Municipalities). It was only in 2023 that elections to the two-tier PRI were held after a gap of almost two decades (Goswami \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotably, the Darjeeling hills had been struggling for self-rule since 1907, when, for the first time, a separate \u0026lsquo;administrative set-up\u0026rsquo; was demanded (Samanta \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; S. Sarkar \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Subba \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1992\u003c/span\u003e; Sinha \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). After that, this struggle, in various forms, continued until contemporary times. In its 117-year history of struggle, it has witnessed the establishment of decentralised bodies such as the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) in 1988, the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in 2012, and finally, the formation of development boards in 2013. However, it was only on 9th July 2023 that the Darjeeling hills witnessed the conduct of elections (Giri, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Goswami, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) in its local governing structures\u0026mdash;the erstwhile two-tier PRIs. Surprisingly, it was in 2001 when the last PRI election was organised in the Darjeeling hills. How the rural governance structure has functioned has eluded scholarly scrutiny. This article therefore analyses the intricacies related to the prolonged nonexistence of constitutionally empowered elected PRIs in the Darjeeling hills and the institutions, if any, fulfilling such a vacuum.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe arguments in this article revolve around two interrelated themes: First, what arrangement of PRIs has been constitutionally prescribed for the Darjeeling hills? Second, how did the rural Darjeeling hills negotiate basic amenities and necessities in the absence of elected PRIs? Is there any other institution that filled the governance gap from 2005\u0026ndash;2023? Probing such apprehensions leads us to the finding that there is a constitutional caveat that allows the existence of a duality of governance in the rural Darjeeling hills. Likewise, the apathy of hill leadership towards decentralisation is another important \u003cem\u003edepressor\u003c/em\u003e, apart from the \u003cem\u003eclash of power\u003c/em\u003e between the existing PRI, erstwhile the DGHC, and the GTA, along with the high handedness of the state, as the factors leading to such an absence of elected representatives. Surprisingly, fieldwork suggests that the rural Darjeeling hills had been practicing a traditional local governance structure as an age-old practice that eventually filled the governance vacuum created between 2005 and 2023.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Review of Literature and Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe available literature (Hutt \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e; Chettri \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; N. Chhetri \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Middleton \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Subba \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1992\u003c/span\u003e; Samanta \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; Dasgupta \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1988\u003c/span\u003e) concerning ethnopolitics in the Darjeeling hills has analysed the self-rule struggle, mainly through the lenses of \u003cem\u003eidentity\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003edevelopment.\u003c/em\u003e Furthermore, it appears that academia has dealt with the identity issue largely through the national and national questions, whereas development or its shortfall has been elaborated through economic attributes. Although the literature is premised on the idea that identity preservation and socioeconomic development are intricately juxtaposed with the governmentality of the state (Middleton \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e), it falls short in synthesising the identity and development issue with decentralised governance. Hence, there appears to be a gap in terms of academically engaging with the issue of governance through the staggered local governing structures in the Darjeeling hills. In light of such a fillip in terms of decentralised governance, this study seeks to critically engage with Darjeeling hill politics, which has been in vogue for over a century and has stumbled to maintain the constitutionally guaranteed regular elected body of representatives in the PRIs.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study collected data through primary fieldwork by applying the methods of focused group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews, and institutional ethnography through semistructured and nonstructured questionnaires. Field work was carried out in select villages of the Darjeeling hills from 2022\u0026ndash;2023. Jorebunglow-Sukhiapokhri, Kurseong and Mirik are the three blocks in the hills of Darjeeling district, whereas Kalimpong I, Kalimpong II and Gorubathan and Pedong blocks from the Kalimpong district were selected. For data collection, two remote Gram Panchayats (GPs) vis-\u0026agrave;-vis the administrative headquarters and a nearby GP were chosen. Similarly, three (03) villages each from three (03) GPs, depending upon their respective distance from the administrative (Block) headquarters, were selected for data collection. In total, twenty-four (24) Gram Panchayats (GPs) and seventy-four (74) villages were selected for data collection. Nepalis, Bhutias, and Lepchas are the major ethnic communities in the Darjeeling hills. However, within the Nepali ethnic constellation, there are several other communities, such as Tamang, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sunwar, and Yolmo. Respondents were chosen mainly through quota sampling appended by snowballing techniques in such a way that it could represent all the major ethnic and religious communities in the hills.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe next section provides a glimpse of the complexities related to the structure of existing rural governance.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3. Duality of Local Governance and the Political Terrain of Darjeeling","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;A major contention in the politics associated with the Darjeeling district is a marked two-pronged dichotomy in the rural governance system, i.e., between the plains and hills and between the rural and urban areas within the hills. This section therefore analyses the rationale for such duality of governance and the prolonged absence of elected PRIs in the Darjeeling hills.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ea.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003eConstitutional Ambivalence:\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe existence of a two-tier PRI in the hills and the provision for a fully operational three-tier PRI set up in the plains of the district creates administrative confusion. Moreover, whatever skeletal governance exists in the rural Darjeeling hills has also been stumbled due to a lack of regular elections. Specifically, while rural areas have been struggling with the regular conduct of elections to two-tier PRIs, urban Darjeeling has functioned well in municipalities with regular mandates. Such administrative arrangements only serve to exacerbate the existing fault lines between the hills and plains of West Bengal.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn contrast to the plains, which include only the Siliguri subdivision, the hills under the control of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC) include the subdivisions of Kurseong, Darjeeling, and Kalimpong. The Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad (read \u003cem\u003eZilla Parishad)\u003c/em\u003e served as the highest tier of rural government in the Darjeeling plains, with Panchayat Samitis at the intermediary level and Gram Panchayats at the grassroots level. On the other hand, the hills were only left with panchayat bodies at two levels\u0026mdash;the intermediary and grassroots\u0026mdash;with the DGHC acting as the Zilla Parishad, as specified in the DGHC Act[1], 1988. In the DGHC Act, section 31(2) was included, which bestowed the DGHC with the functions of a Zilla Parishad under sections 153--162 of the \u003cem\u003eWest Bengal Panchayat Act (WBPA), 1973\u003c/em\u003e. Despite having provisions for two-tier panchayats, the election at Panchayat Samitis never occurred since the formation of the DGHC in 1988. Only the Gram Panchayat election occurred during its reign (V. Chhetri 2023). A respondent from Kurseong, during the fieldwork, highlighted,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u0026ldquo;while the constitutional amendment in 1992 mandated a two-tier panchayat structure in the hills, election in 2001 held only for one tier\u003c/em\u003e.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt is said that Ghising apprehended that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;the Panchayat Samiti would overlap the powers and functions of the DGHC\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Banerjee 2023). Ghising argued in 2005 that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;the panchayat was diluting the powers of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC)\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (PTI 2023). On the other hand, the 73\u003csup\u003erd\u003c/sup\u003e amendment to the Constitution of India in 1992 further legitimised the institutionalisation of a two-tier panchayat in the rural Darjeeling hills, comprising the Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Samitis, where the DGHC would act as the third-tier body, instead of a Zilla Parishad. Article 243 M [3(a)][2] of the Indian Constitution states that \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;panchayats at the district level shall not apply to the hill areas of the district of Darjeeling in the state of West Bengal for which the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council exists\u0026hellip;\u0026rdquo;.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eThe same arrangement continued with the establishment of the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in 2012, without any \u0026lsquo;amendment to the constitution\u0026rsquo; (V. Chhetri 2023). This body was prescribed to be the third tier by replacing the DGHC. Since there is no DGHC and no \u003cem\u003eWBPA, 1973,\u003c/em\u003e in operation, a question may arise: how can a constitutional arrangement be replaced without any amendments to the constitution? This suggests that the constitutional arrangement of the DGHC as the third tier of the PRIs can be replaced only with an amendment to the constitution if the GTA has to replace the DGHC as the third tier. As quoted in \u003cem\u003eThe Economic Times\u003c/em\u003e,\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe official end of the DGHC brought Darjeeling back to the earlier and standard system of the three-tier Panchayat system. GTA cannot work as a third tier such as a DGHC with continuation of a two-tier panchayat unless the Constitution is further amended to give the GTA the same status (D. Sarkar 2015).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eb.\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003eState and the Hill-Leadership:\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAfter the 2001 two-tier election, subsequent rounds of\u0026nbsp;panchayat\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eelections were never organised until 2023. This was mainly, as our fieldwork suggests, due to the sudden shift in the political discourse during the early 2000s, in the hills, towards the 6\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e schedule. The subhash Ghising-led DGHC wanted to bring the Darjeeling hills under the ambit of the 6\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e schedule (Saha and Chakraborty 2019), whereas he had previously rejected such a proposal for areas under the DGHC in the late 1980s by rhetorically putting the Darjeeling dwellers as \u0026lsquo;nontribal\u0026rsquo; (Middleton 2016). Sensing an opportunity, Bimal Gurung emerged as the new leader with the formation of Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) in 2006 with his \u0026lsquo;anti-sixth schedule\u0026rsquo; mobilisation. This change in political momentum in the 2000s, fieldwork suggests, can also be attributed to the discontinuation of panchayat elections in the hills after the 2001--2005 term.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWith the emergence of a new leader in the 2000s and the formation of the GTA in 2012, the Darjeeling hills missed another opportunity to mobilise the \u003cem\u003eabsence of an elected two-tier PRI\u003c/em\u003e as an important issue to consolidate the grassroots, apart from garnering support for Gorkhaland. Our fieldwork indicated[3] that during that time, the hill dwellers were spellbound with only one demand\u0026mdash;a change in the leadership, who can lead the hills to realise the mass aspiration of a separate Gorkhaland state. As Ghising formally dropped the demand for Gorkhaland, he became obsolete in the hills and eventually made a way for Gurung to emerge. Even after the formation of the GTA, the elected councillors, led by Bimal Gurung, did not show any interest in holding panchayat elections. The perception that there would be a spillover of power of the elected officials in the panchayat with the GTA councillors, as was the case with the DGHC, etched in the minds of the hillspearheads. As a result, panchayat elections did not take place in the hills between 2005 and 2023. A female tea garden worker, Mirik, mentioned that the GTA is solely responsible for not allowing elections to occur in rural areas. She said, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;If election happens in the villages regularly and should we have elected Pradhans, I do not think we will require the GTA.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e Hence,\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;they did not let the panchayat elections to be conducted.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e If a two-tier PRI sees the light of day, a scholar of Nepali literature and an ex-contestant for the state legislative assembly polls, as an independent, noted,\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe number of agitations that we see happening from time to time won\u0026rsquo;t be happening anymore. If there is proper development and infrastructural amenities and enough opportunities for people, then the extent of agitation dissipates to a large extent.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdditionally, one of the panchayat officials[4] from the Kurseong block noted that although the GTA Act of 2012 prescribes regular panchayat elections in hills, neither the state of West Bengal nor local leaders wish to take it seriously. In the absence of elected representatives in the PRIs, various beneficiary schemes (old-age pension, disability pension, widow pension, etc.) have become a pariah for hill dwellers. Since a new GTA body was constituted in 2022 after a staggering lag of five years since the expiration of GTA\u0026rsquo;s term in 2017, there was this unanimous decision among the masses that the newly formed body in joint consultation with the state government should look for an option of running two simultaneous bodies (Financial Express, 26.06.2022). On the one hand, the GTA and two-tier panchayats are on the other hand. However, the constitutional caveat, legitimising the duality of rural governance between the hills and plains of the Darjeeling district, has also overflowed the gradually increasing disjuncture in terms of the development of amenities and infrastructures in the hills. Currently, historically, the Darjeeling hills have always been spaces where the rule of exception prevails. As a social anthropologist working in the Darjeeling hills noted,\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIf we return to history, since British times, this place has been ruled by exception. In the sense that what laws were applicable elsewhere was not the same here. Therefore, I think, the question of why there is a two-tier system in the hills boils down to the question of political will from both sides, the hill leadership and the state of West Bengal. For a large part of the time, all the stakeholders involved have dealt with the following question: how do you actualise/bargain the statehood demand? As a result, various issues such as rural governance and urban development have been pushed aside. Therefore, I think, it is a result of a combination of these two factors; one, the history of the rule of exception and the other, a lack of concern about the issues, have ultimately led to the institutionalisation of the bleak two-tier PRI system not being challenged accordingly. However, I think, if you look at the recent past, over the last year or so, there have been various people who have been talking about bringing in the three-tier system. Last, in 2021, when the chief minister visited Kurseong, she had a meeting in the town hall, where people raised the question of bringing back the three-tier Panchayati Raj system.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOne is thereby apprehended by an important question: in the absence of a well-institutionalised PRI infrastructure in the rural Darjeeling hills, how had governance been actualised thus far until the recent election? Is there any other body that at least symbolically fits into the gap? The following section addresses such a scenario.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"ftn1\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e[1] DGHC Act, 1988. Available at https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/14230/1/1988-13.pdf, accessed on 10/08/2024\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"ftn2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e[2] Article 243 M in Constitution of India, \u003cem\u003eIndian Kanoon\u003c/em\u003e. Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/72125/, accessed on 10/08/2024\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"ftn3\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e[3] Field-work carried out during May-August 2022.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"ftn4\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e[4] Personal interview in July, 2022.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Role of Samaj in Rural Governance in the Absence of Elected PRIs","content":"\u003cp\u003eIf we closely look at the scenarios in Northeast India, one can observe that various communities/societies had been functioning rooted in their traditional governance mechanisms and structures. A few prominent traditional governance structures in northeast India include \u003cem\u003eDzumsa\u003c/em\u003e in the Mangan district of Sikkim and \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e in the Darjeeling hills. The mention of \u003cem\u003eDzumsa\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003ebecomes important here, as Sikkim happens to be the parent state of the Darjeeling hills. Despite being part of the same geography, there are marked similarities in the governance structures, whether traditional or legal, of both regions. Lachen and Lachung villages in Mangan inherited the legally empowered \u003cem\u003eDzumsa\u003c/em\u003e system (Thapa and Sachdeva 2017) to maintain its sanctity even in its postmerger status in India, whereas the rest of Sikkim follows the two-tier PRI. Surprisingly, the Darjeeling hills, in the absence of elected PRIs, have been sustaining with the existence of Samaj\u0026mdash;a body that does not even have any legal functions or functionaries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e4.1.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003eStructure and Functions of Samaj:\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf we look into the structure and functioning of the \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e, we understand that it does not follow the legal-jurisprudential structure in the crude sense. \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e is a collection of people in the community or village that come together to govern themselves and is commonly found in the Darjeeling\u0026ndash;Sikkim Himalayas. However, it has been academically defined as an \u0026lsquo;inclusive social institution that organises support for social events\u0026rsquo; (Wenner 2015) with conflict resolution mechanisms at the local level (Shah and Badiger 2020). It can be village specific, community specific, or religion-specific and varies across villages. In some villages, there is only one overarching village, \u003cem\u003eSamaj,\u003c/em\u003e and in a few others, there are multiple \u003cem\u003eSamajs, which are\u003c/em\u003e based on multiple ethnicities and religions. The following quote also gives us a complete picture:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOnce upon time, associations (samaj) held an important place in the lives of the people of Darjeeling. It had members from various ethnic communities. Now that new associations or samaj-s have been formed on the basis of ethnic, political and religious identities, the earlier samaj-s are falling into oblivion. Let us consider Rai Samaj, Tamang Samaj, Sunuwar Samaj, etc., for example. Here, membership is open to their respective ethnic and cultural communities only. Similarly, in a religious samaj such as Catholic Samaj or Hindu Samaj or Buddhist Samaj, only the members of the respective religions have a place. One way to fight the overexaggeration of ethnicity is to strengthen our local sample where people from various ethnic communities fit in and live together. This is why many people object to the name Gorkhaland if not to the movement (Mukhia 2018: 67).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe earliest known \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e was founded in 1932 in the name of \u003cem\u003eGorkha Dukha Niwarak Sammelan\u003c/em\u003e, which happens to be a \u003cem\u003eGauley Samaj\u003c/em\u003e (Shah and Badiger 2020). The extent and location of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rsquo;s role in the hills may vary. One of the respondents from the Jorebunglow-Sukhiapokhri block noted that if there is some kind of urgency in the village, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e takes care of it. When asked how \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e operates, another interviewee from the same block noted that one member from each \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e is duty bound to offer help to those members who are in need. Events such as funerals and weddings are typical examples that were foregrounded, with each \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e having its limited resources that can be utilised by all members. A \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e provides relief to the needy from the contingency fund collected through monthly meetings, where the members donate on the basis of their capacities (Rs. 50/- to 100 or more). In noting the characteristics of what makes a \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e, it was highlighted that\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSamajs were formed basically to help each other during times of need. Each Samaj has its own utilities that can be used by all the members of the Samaj, and each member is expected to help others in need. There is no relief from the government, as Samaj is a voluntary group that can be found in every village.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to most \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e members, who were interviewed, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rsquo;s role in their respective villages was limited to addressing minor issues. However, there were cases where \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e was involved in areas of governance that required proper supervision. One respondent in the Kurseong block clarified:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSamaj is not involved in any other developmental work. Yes, sometimes we all gather and work for the benefit of the village, but that is not developmental work; it is community help among the villagers.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCurrently, whether \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e takes part in any form of development-related activity is a pressing concern. If so, what is the role of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e in such activities? They range from providing financial aid to members in a specific village to recognising and approving local land transactions[5]. Other activities include assisting the residents of a particular village in accessing certain benefits, such as old age and widow pensions, as well as collecting funds from individual villagers for repairing infrastructure, such as minor roads. Although a few interviewees mentioned that \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e does not work for the development of rural areas, some respondents elaborated on the role that \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e played in terms of development at the village level. With respect to curiosity, whether the \u003cem\u003egauley Samaj\u003c/em\u003e (village \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e) takes care of the grievances of a person from a specific ethnic background was investigated. The answer to this curiosity is given in the form of a conversation with a descendent of an erstwhile \u003cem\u003eMandal\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003efamily\u0026mdash;a traditional landed-gentry in Darjeeling-Sikkim Himalaya.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eInterviewer: \u0026nbsp;Let us think that someone from a Tamang family dies in the village. Then, who will contribute in this case? Will it be the Tamang community only or the whole village?\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eRai Mandal: \u0026nbsp;The Samaj to which the deceased person belongs generally has Tamang, Chettri, Manger, SC, ST, etc. In such cases, all will have to contribute. However, if a Tamang city dies, then most of the Tamang population contributes\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e4.2. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;Samaj in everyday governance:\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt becomes a concern whether \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e participates in any development-related activities and, if so, in what roles! While some interviewees stated that \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e does not work towards rural development, others elaborated on the role of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e in village-level development. Fieldwork reveals that the gap in governance, created by the absence of elected representatives in the PRIs before 2023, was negotiated by \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eon many issues related to everyday governance. Starting from job cards, rationing, sanitary and water connections to land transactions, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003ehelped all.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the event of an unfortunate incident occurring in the village, the \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e takes responsibility for providing relief and consolation. When asked about the work of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e, an interviewee from Gorubathan Block explained that one member from each \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e is obligated to assist those in need, with events such as weddings and funerals being typical examples. There is an expectation that each member will help one another and be helped in return, with no government involvement, as \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e is a voluntary group found in almost every village. The following narration from the field explains this further:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDuring any event in the village, Samaj comes forward for help. If someone\u0026rsquo;s house is damaged, we gather and help them. Even during funerals and to build small footpaths in the village, in such events, we gather and help each other.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, to achieve water connections, a pressing issue in the Darjeeling hills, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e plays a leadership role by approaching district authorities \u0026lsquo;to provide a public standpipe in their locality if it does not exist\u0026rsquo;. If the district administration fails to bear the installation cost, Samaj bears it, depending on its political bargaining and liaising (Shah and Badiger 2020: 152). However, the role of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e in development-related activities is not very large. Nevertheless, owing to the absence of a properly functioning panchayat office and as a mediator, it intervenes in some development activities. One of the respondents from Kalimpong Block II, which has been bifurcated into the Lava and Pedong Blocks, mentioned,\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026hellip;we don\u0026rsquo;t even feel like casting our votes anymore. Roads in our villages are so bad, and the members of the village contributed money to repair it. However, when we were doing this, representatives of political parties were saying that the funds for this road had been sanctioned and that construction would commence soon. It has been more than two years and no sign of construction; not even a drain has been built.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs the president of a village, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e, described:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIn municipalities, people receive benefits, but in Panchayat areas, people are bereft of any benefit. For example, there is the problem of drinking water supply in our area (both municipal and panchayat). However, in the municipality area, these days, people are receiving drinking water under Amrit Jal Yojna, while we do not have any such facilities. The facilities in municipalities and GPs should be equal because, given an option, we elect our leaders, and similarly, there should not be unequal treatment in terms of facilities.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eApart from the building of roads, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e takes part in the building of walls in the case of landslides. The interventions of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e are not limited to physical infrastructures; they also play a very important role in helping rural residents with the availability of beneficiary schemes. As a beneficiary from Kalimpong I Block noted,\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSamaj has played a very important role in helping people receive their old-age pensions. In the absence of Sansad members, it becomes difficult for individuals to know which new beneficiary scheme has turned up and the criteria for availing them of the same. To address such problems, the panchayat office has also collaborated with Samaj to use it as a means of communication. The panchayat officials, in such cases, put up a notice about the Sansad meeting in areas where everyone can see, and simultaneously, they approach the Samaj Presidents too. In that way, it becomes much easier to let people know about any upcoming beneficiary scheme or program from the side of the government.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile there is a unanimous response across different blocks of the study area regarding \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e being disempowered to deliver developmental respite, there are incidences such as redressal of disputes related to marriage, elopement, etc., where \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e plays a significant role. One such narrative from Kothidara village of Ghayabari I GP, under the Kurseong block, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Right now, if some disputes arise in the village, we directly go to the police because a President or Secretary of the Samaj does not have such powers that they can solve such disputes.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eAnother respondent agreed, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;We try to solve it through Samaj first, but if the case is a major one and cannot be resolved through Samaj, then we hand it over to the police only\u0026rdquo;.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eOne such response came from a descendant of an erstwhile \u003cem\u003eMandal,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003ein Kalimpong. In any grievance-related case, he opined, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;it will first go to the village Samaj, and suppose if the concerned Samaj could not resolve it by themselves then it will go to court. However, until now, things have been resolved at the Samaj level only.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e4.3. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;Samaj in Land Transaction:\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe issue of \u003cem\u003eparja-patta\u003c/em\u003e started becoming a rallying point in the Darjeeling hills in the recent past when the Chief Minister of West Bengal in Mirik in 2017 announced the provision of land rights to the landless labourers of Darjeeling. People in hills have been struggling for a long period of time to secure their land rights (S. Sarkar 2010; Tamang and Kipgen 2023; Saha 2023). \u0026lsquo;\u003cem\u003eLegally\u0026rsquo;\u003c/em\u003e speaking, when a land transaction happens, two parties (buyer and seller) first meet each other, and then a deed is written, mentioning the \u003cem\u003eKhatiyan\u003c/em\u003e number and size of the land under consideration to be sold. Finally, the registration is performed through the \u003cem\u003eblock land revenue officer\u003c/em\u003e. The legal procedure of land transactions as set forth by an official of the Land Reforms Department, Pedong block:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe khatiyan number, a specific number of plots of government-owned land, is always 1. Let us take an example of the Pedong block. This entire block is technically divided into different plots against their owners, and they are numbered in a zig-zag fashion. Khatiyan 1 is already given to government-owned lands, so the khatiyan number for publicly owned lands under Raiyat starts with 2. As far as I know, there have been three surveys thus far; earlier, we used to have cadastral surveys; now, they have evolved from the Revisional Settlement record (RS) to the Land Reforms record (LR). The LR record is the most modern record that we have. It is a set of maps containing information about the plot with the khatiyan number and its owners. This is the fundamental land revenue system in the Land Revenue Department of West Bengal State. Therefore, we keep the records of all these areas, and beyond the outer margins, we just know that they fall under either forest or plantation areas. Our work is to maintain these records, for example, if an owner of a plot dies, leaving two--three offspring, then how to divide the plot! We do not divide it manually on the map; we update only the records. Suppose that the khatiyan number of a deceased person is 7. While updating the records, we strike out only the number 7 to divide it among the spouse and offspring of the deceased. This is called mutation, which means updating records while changing the entries.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWithout any land-related documents, fieldwork reveals that the Darjeeling hill dwellers cannot secure themselves from potential threats of eviction, especially in the aftermath of the NRC in Assam. It occurred with the Nepalis of northeast India in the late 1980s (Subba and Sinha 2016) and in Bhutan in the early 1990s (Hutt 2003). Moreover, in the absence of \u003cem\u003eparja patta\u003c/em\u003e, they cannot even obtain loans from banks for their daily survival. To minimise such insecurities, the state of West Bengal started distributing \u003cem\u003eparja patta\u003c/em\u003e to the landless people in Darjeeling, including tea gardens. Under the \u003cem\u003eNijo Griha Nijo Bhumi (Own Land, Own House)\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eand\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;Cha-Sundari\u003c/em\u003e (for tea-gardens) schemes, landless people are being provided \u003cem\u003eland patta\u003c/em\u003e. In contrast, it can be built only if an NOC can be obtained by the beneficiary. This means that any development-related initiatives in tea garden areas are subject to no-object certificates (NOCs) from management. FGD with tea garden workers at Darjeeling,\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThe tea garden does not give us home, not even a toilet. Therefore, we have to build it by ourselves, and that also with tin roof, let alone the concrete roof. If I do not have a home and I got it through some beneficiary schemes, I have to take the NOC first. Even to put one electricity meter, the NOC is required from the manager. Moreover, to obtain some work done through MGNREGS, one must also take NOC. Generally, such NOCs are not provided. It can only be done in villages other than tea gardens. Therefore, parja patta is very important for tea garden villagers so that we can have the security that we are dwellers in this place.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the absence of it, hill dwellers cannot involve themselves in any form of \u0026lsquo;legal\u0026rsquo; land transactions. However, the communities residing in such perdition have also found a remedy for such transactions through \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e, eluding the panoptical gaze of the state. In this context, a respondent from Mirik noted that, owing to the absence of land rights and a strict prohibition on the transaction of land, whatever land transaction happens, it all happens unofficially under the aegis of \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e. Such transactions take place in a very local manner, sitting with some local people through plain pieces of paper. \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e provides documentation, which is accepted by people in the locality, to prove that the land has been transferred from one person to another. Another respondent in Kurseong noted, \u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;In my village, there are numerous Jati and Gauley Samaj that assist with land transfers. The Samaj provides a bikri patra kagaz (land transaction deed), after a land transaction is over.\u0026rdquo;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eSuch enunciations usually do not involve any land survey by an \u003cem\u003eamin\u003c/em\u003e. Another narration that can help peek into the process:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eNonregistered lands cannot be transferred officially. However, the inhabitants of these communities have also discovered a remedy for this. It is only natural for locals to wish to transfer their possessed (occupied) properties if they have been staying in one place for a long time. We have organisations such as Samaj in villages that help in such matters. In Chenga Panighatta GP, to which I belong, it operates at the village level. A Samaj is made up of 20\u0026ndash;30 houses, each with a president and secretary. If land in Rai village is to be purchased, Rai Samaj investigates the issue of transaction. Samaj completes the necessary paperwork for land transfers and gives documentation stating that the land was transferred to X in Y date at Z cost. Thus, Samaj is also responsible for ensuring that the transfer of land is seamless, simple, and possible.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe transaction of land, in the absence of \u003cem\u003eland patta,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eis the same for the wider community or within the family. Elaborating on the role of a \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e in land transactions, a respondent from Kurseong shared a similar experience in his own village.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIn my village, land transfers take place relatively infrequently. We do not have parja patta to sell or buy land. Samaj provides documentation to prove that the land has been transferred from one person to another whenever the transfer occurs, which is typically within family members. In my village, there are numerous Jati [community] and Gaule [village] Samaj that assist with land transfers. Each Samaj offers a Bikri Patta Kagaz [land selling deed] of the territory under their jurisdiction.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"ftn1\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e[5] This is detailed in the next subsection.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Conclusions","content":"\u003cp\u003eIt is apparent from our analysis that the constitutionally empowered (73rd Amendment) PRI structure eluded the rural Darjeeling hills for so long from 2001 until the 2023 election. However, there is hardly any academic work that points toward this gap and its consequences. Our fieldwork suggests that for a long time, after the elapsing of the tenure of panchayat bodies in 2005, the grassroots local bodies had been solely run sparingly by government officials. In a way, one can say that the state of West Bengal had been handling rural Darjeeling affairs without the mandate of hill dwellers. In such exuberances surrounding identity and self-rule, neither the erstwhile DGHC nor the GTA ever questioned such highhandedness of the state.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurprisingly, the Darjeeling district also practices a dual structure of local governance. On the one hand, while the rural areas had been struggling to obtain the elected local body for so long, the urban areas had been enjoying the fruits of elected municipalities. Furthermore, there is a dichotomy in the practice of a decentralised system between the plain and hill areas of the Darjeeling district. While the plains of the Darjeeling district are bestowed with a three-tier PRI system and municipal bodies, the rural areas of the Darjeeling hills had to stumble repeatedly to come under the elected PRI until 2023.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo add to this surprise, the erstwhile \u003cem\u003eWest Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973\u003c/em\u003e, legally made the DGHC the third tier. Moreover, the constitutional caveat provides dual and confusing rural governance at Darjeeling. The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992, constitutionally legitimised the DGHC to be the third-tier body instead of \u003cem\u003eZilla Parishad.\u003c/em\u003e Therefore, when the DGHC was dissolved to allow the GTA to be formed and function as the third-tier structure of the PRI, no constitutional amendment was initiated. This simply means that with the dissolution of the DGHC, the rural Darjeeling hills automatically moved back to the erstwhile three-tier structure, unless specifically guaranteed through constitutional amendment. However, hills have a two-tier structure. Since there is no DGHC and no \u003cem\u003eWBPA, 1973\u003c/em\u003e, the legal confusion of having either a two-tier or there-tier governing structure for the Darjeeling hills still persists.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur fieldwork reveals that, in such an absence, there exists a traditional form of governance structure\u0026mdash;the \u003cem\u003eSamaj.\u003c/em\u003e It is a collection of people from the concerned \u003cem\u003evillage\u003c/em\u003e or a \u003cem\u003ejati\u003c/em\u003e coming together to govern themselves through their means. It can be a village \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e, community \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e and even a religion-specific \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e. This body had been in existence for a long period of time, and its emergence cannot be relegated by saying that it had emerged only to fill the vacuum created by the unelected PRIs between 2005 and 2023. It had its existence even before India became a modern nation-state. From dealing with everyday grievances and providing basic amenities such as rationing and sanitary and water connections to provide security through local land transactions, \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e helped in all. While the elected PRIs are now in place, it will be interesting to witness how these two bodies \u0026ndash; an elected PRI and \u003cem\u003eSamaj\u003c/em\u003e \u0026ndash; negotiate in everyday governance!\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eThis paper is part of a sponsored project supported by the\u003c/em\u003e \u003cb\u003eAzim Premji University (APU)\u003c/b\u003e \u003cem\u003eas part of its\u003c/em\u003e \u003cb\u003eResearch Funding Programme 2021.\u003c/b\u003e \u003cem\u003eWe would also like to thank the field investigators associated with this project, Ms. Bishnu Gurung, Ms. Bhumika Rai, Mr. Raktim Majumdar, Ms. Diksha Tamang, Mr. Sachin Limbu, and Mr. Yojak Tamang for their efforts in the field.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStatement on participant consent: The necessary consent from the participants was taken beforehand, although it was not necessarily in written form. The fieldwork for this research was done following the standard ethical procedures.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBanerjee, Amitava. 2023. \u0026lsquo;Darjeeling \u0026amp; Kalimpong to See Panchayat Polls after 2 Decades\u0026rsquo;. \u003cem\u003eMillennium Post\u003c/em\u003e, 2023. https://www.millenniumpost.in/bengal/darjeeling-kalimpong-to-see-panchayat-polls-after-2-decades-521580?infinitescroll=1.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eChettri, Mona. 2017. \u003cem\u003eEthnicity and Democracy in the Eastern Himalayan Borderland: Constructing Democracy\u003c/em\u003e. Amsterdam University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eChhetri, Nilamber. 2023. \u003cem\u003eThe Politics of Ethnic Renewal in Darjeeling: Gorkhas and the Struggle for Tribal Recognition\u003c/em\u003e. First. 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Strategies for Political Control beyond Ethno-Regional Claims in Darjeeling, India\u0026rsquo;. \u003cem\u003eGeoforum\u003c/em\u003e 66 (November):234\u0026ndash;43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.11.002.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"Institute of Development Studies Kolkata (IDSK)","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"rural governance, PRIs, Darjeeling hills, Samaj, traditional institution, land rights","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5009197/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5009197/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe literature on the fuzziness of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in rural areas of the Darjeeling hills has been elusive. The recent PRI election was conducted in 2023 after a gap of almost two decades. Between 2005 and 2023, the system of governance prevailing in the rural Darjeeling hills also failed to attract academic scrutiny. Is the system, which fills the gap, primordial or just temporary to augment the governance vacuum created from 2005\u0026ndash;2023? Surprisingly, during the same period, urban areas functioned well under the regular elected municipalities. Moreover, a contrasting picture also emerges when we juxtapose rural governance in the plains vis-\u0026agrave;-vis the hills within the same district. Therefore, why does this duality of governance exist in the Darjeeling hills? Furthermore, despite being the epicenter of self-rule mobilisation (Gorkhaland Movement) for a long period of time, why has it fallen short in accommodating the demand for a functional PRI structure for hills? On the basis of fieldwork, it analyses the irregular skeletal system that has been perpetuating in hills in the name of local governance in rural areas. In addition, how do the rural hill dwellers in Darjeeling negotiate everyday grievances in such a state of exception?\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Filling the Gap: Duality, Ambivalence and Samaj in Rural Darjeeling Hills","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2024-09-13 05:06:57","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5009197/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"9208b1ab-2fb7-4754-88ae-460ca2680883","owner":[],"postedDate":"September 13th, 2024","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":36890610,"name":"Sociology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2024-09-13T05:06:57+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2024-09-13 05:06:57","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-5009197","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-5009197","identity":"rs-5009197","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"qtupq5eGEP_6zYnWcrvyt","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}