To Vaccinate or not to Vaccinate? This Is the Question! Delay the Booster, Maybe You Get a Bratwurscht!
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OA: closed
Abstract
A game-theoretic setting is used to illuminate the conflict between vaccination proponents and vaccination opponents. A central result is that vaccination proponents could in principle persuade vaccination opponents to vaccinate by means of subsidization. Such a subsidy could increase benefits for both groups. Deeper analysis provides numerous further insights regarding the stability of these results.
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- last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00