The Damaging Effect of Leaks: How the Mode of Information Disclosure Shapes Citizens’ Trust

The Damaging Effect of Leaks: How the Mode of Information Disclosure Shapes Citizens’ Trust | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The Damaging Effect of Leaks: How the Mode of Information Disclosure Shapes Citizens’ Trust Oliver Huwyler This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8703978/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Political information does not always reach the public on politicians’ terms. This study explores how different modes of information disclosure – politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks – affect trust in politicians and political processes. Using data from a survey experiment in Switzerland (N = 2,208) on government communication about different non-state actors (scientists, environmental associations, industrial associations) co-drafting a bill, the study finds that leaks to the press significantly reduce citizens' trust compared to legal disclosure modes (ministerial press conferences and freedom of information requests). The negative effect of leaks persists regardless of the information disclosed, and is exacerbated for controversial information. Notably, trust declines among both in-party supporters and out-partisans, with in-party supporters responding even more critically to freedom of information disclosures. Overall, the findings underscore the central role that the mode of disclosure, particularly leaks, plays in shaping public trust in both politicians and the political process. Freedom of information regimes Interest groups Leaks Political communication Transparency Trust Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Introduction Politicians routinely seek to time their public communication strategically to amplify the benefits of favourable information and dampen the costs of unfavourable revelations (Gibson 1999 ; Ketelaars and Sevenans 2021). Such strategies presuppose that politicians possess the ability to control the flow of information until a politically advantageous moment arises. Yet such control is sometimes elusive, because other political actors may cause information to be disclosed at an inopportune time. A fitting example is provided by the events unfolding toward the end of the tenure of Switzerland’s first female Federal Councillor (government minister) heading the defence portfolio. In late February 2025, Viola Amherd came under intense public scrutiny following media reports on the resignations of two senior officials under her authority: the Chief of the Armed Forces and the Director of the Intelligence Service. Although both had tendered their resignations several weeks earlier, the information reached the press through leaks within the bureaucracy before any official disclosure. At the time, Amherd had deliberately refrained from informing either her cabinet colleagues or the public, presumably to manage the political fallout of developments widely perceived as weakening key security institutions. The premature disclosure thus appears to have served the purpose of undermining the minister’s standing. Cases such as this, in which politicians lose control over information disclosure, raise the question about the consequences for citizens’ trust in political actors and political processes. So far, prior research on the relationship between politicians’ communication and citizens’ trust has, barring the scholarship on scandals (Close et al. 2023 ; Schwarz and Bles 1992; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2018 ), largely operated under the assumption that politicians retain control over their disclosure strategies. Existing literature demonstrates how citizens’ trust in politicians can be shaped by their choice of communication mode (Weinberg 2024 ), medium (Boukes and Boomgaarden 2016; Enli and Rosenberg 2018), and content (Combs and Keller 2010; Goovaerts and Marien 2020). Yet politicians’ control over information disclosure can be undermined through both lawful and unlawful means. On the one hand, freedom of information regimes have become increasingly widespread and comprehensive worldwide (Coliver 2021 ). They enable journalists and civil society to exercise oversight by granting formal rights to request documents and information from public authorities (Žuffová 2023 ). On the other hand, journalistic practice also relies on leaks, whereby political insiders provide confidential information to the press outside formal procedures and under conditions of expected anonymity (Pozen 2013 , 521). Against this backdrop, this study examines how different modes of information disclosure – politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks – shape citizens’ trust in politicians and political processes. It draws on a citizen survey experiment that presented respondents with a policy formulation scenario in which different types of non-state actors (scientists, environmental associations, and industrial associations) were involved in co-drafting a bill. Their involvement was disclosed either by a minister at a press conference, by the press following a freedom of information request, or by the press after a leak from the bureaucracy. To pre-empt the main findings, the study shows that leaks from the bureaucracy to the press generate a substantial decline in citizens’ trust compared to legal disclosure modes, namely ministerial press conferences and freedom of information requests. This trust-eroding effect of leaks persists across different types of disclosed information and is most pronounced when the information revealed is more contentious, i.e. a regulatory capture scenario where industrial associations co-draft the bill. Moreover, both in-party supporters and out-partisans express significantly lower trust in the minister and the policy formulation process when information is disclosed through a leak rather than a press conference. In-party supporters, in particular, lose even more trust than out-party citizens when a politician from their own party, who could have disclosed information on their own, is instead compelled to do so through a freedom of information request. Overall, the findings emphasise that the mode of information disclosure, and particularly leaks, impact citizens' trust in both politicians and the political process. Modes of information disclosure and trust Politicians typically determine the terms under which their communication reaches the public. Within a given context, institutional arrangements and the political culture set external constraints on their communication strategies (Ward 2008 ), all the while their personal backgrounds, including party affiliation, career trajectories, and individual characteristics, shape how they communicate within these constraints (Auel and Umit 2018 ; Sampugnaro and Montemagno 2025). Politicians decide which content to emphasise, such as policy positions or private lives (Giger et al. 2021 ), the overall tonal sentiment they adopt, whether positive, negative, mixed, or neutral (Fountaine, Ross, and Comrie 2019 ), and the stylistic elements they employ, such as references to public opinion (Strikovic et al. 2020 ). They further shape their communication through vocal, visual, and verbal cues (Koppensteiner, Stephan, and Jäschke 2015 ), by selecting between traditional and new media channels (Fowler et al. 2021 ; Lilleker, Tenscher, and Štětka 2015), by timing their messages (Gibson 1999 ; Ketelaars and Sevenans 2021), and by targeting specific audiences (Holman, Schneider, and Pondel 2015). These choices have important consequences for citizens’ trust. Existing research shows that certain modes of communication, such as personal contact (Weinberg 2024 ), social media engagement, and opinion pieces, are more trust-inducing than appearances on talk shows or news interviews (Enli and Rosenberg 2018). It also demonstrates that communicative content matters: trust increases when politicians downplay self-interest, for example by praising political opponents (Combs and Keller 2010), and when they refrain from uncivil rhetoric (Goovaerts and Marien 2020). Notwithstanding this, trust is also affected when politicians do not control the flow of communication. Research on political scandals has analysed events in which politicians typically lose control over public narratives surrounding real or alleged norm violations, as they are repeatedly reported and framed as scandalous by the news media (Allern and Von Sikorski 2018, 3015). This literature shows broad consensus that public trust in politicians declines following scandal exposure (Close et al. 2023 ; Schwarz and Bles 1992; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2018 ), irrespective of whether the scandal concerns private misconduct, such as marital infidelity, or legal infractions, including tax evasion (Funk 1996 ) and corruption (Ares and Hernández 2017; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2018 ). The negative effect of scandals is even further amplified by spillovers that erode trust in other political actors and institutions as well (F.L.F. Lee 2018 ; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020). Despite extensive literatures on political communication and political scandals, it remains unclear to what extent politicians’ loss of control over information disclosure, in and of itself, affects citizens’ trust. Research on communication strategies has largely focused on forms of communication that politicians can actively manage, whereas scholarship on political scandals examines a narrow class of events in which norm violations and inherently damaging information typically coincide with disclosures not initiated by politicians. Neither strand of research therefore permits a clear separation of the effects of the information disclosed from those of the disclosure mode itself. As a result, existing work provides limited insight into whether, and through which mechanisms, different modes of information disclosure shape citizens’ trust in politicians and political processes. Two prominent modes of information disclosure deprive politicians of control: (1) freedom of information requests and (2) leaks. Freedom of information regimes have strongly surged in number since the 1980s. By 2020, 128 countries worldwide had respective laws or regulations (Coliver 2021 ). These legal frameworks provide citizens and other interested actors with a legal right to access government documents without having to justify their requests. They operate on a “right to know” principle, under which information is presumed public unless explicitly exempted by law (Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros 2006, 93). Accordingly, freedom of information requests entail a loss of control for politicians over disclosure by legally established procedures for public access to government information. Leaks, in contrast, do not follow an established formal disclosure process. Pozen ( 2013 , 521) defines a leak as “(i) a targeted disclosure (ii) by a government insider (employee, former employee, contractor) (iii) to a member of the media (iv) of confidential information the divulgence of which is generally proscribed by law, policy, or convention (v) outside of any formal process (vi) with an expectation of anonymity.” Hence, while both freedom of information requests and leaks rely on the press to bring information into the public sphere, they convey fundamentally different signals: rule-based oversight in the case of freedom of information requests, and misconduct or procedural breakdown in the case of leaks. Importantly, neither freedom of information requests nor leaks are inherently linked to the substance of the information disclosed. Leaks, for example, may at times be strategically planted, with information secretly authorised for release but presented as an unauthorised disclosure in order to advance government interests (Kwoka 2014 ). Nonetheless, leaks frequently constitute the disclosure mode through which political scandals emerge (Allern and Pollack 2012, 9). This raises the question of whether disclosure modes beyond politicians’ control carry an implicit signal of scandalisation, which prompts citizens to evaluate the act of disclosure itself more negatively. On this account, both freedom of information requests and leaks can be expected to depress trust in politicians and political processes. However, because leaks not only escape politicians’ control but also circumvent established formal procedures, they should produce the strongest negative effects on citizens’ trust. H 1 Citizens’ trust in politicians and political processes is highest when politicians control disclosure, followed by legally compelled disclosure (freedom of information requests), and are lowest when disclosure results from leaks. Although the mode of information disclosure is hypothesised to affect citizens’ trust in its own right (H 1 ), it may also shape how citizens evaluate the information that is revealed. In this sense, disclosure modes function as interpretive cues that condition how information is perceived. This is particularly relevant in cases of non-politician-controlled disclosure involving the press. When politicians appear unwilling to disclose information voluntarily and disclosure occurs only through third parties, citizens may infer problematic intent and evaluate the information more negatively. Such interpretations align with the frequent association between leaks and political scandals (Allern and Pollack 2012, 9). At the same time, the mode of disclosure does not, in itself, determine the substantive quality or normative valence of the information revealed. Non-politician-controlled disclosure therefore does not necessarily imply the scandalisation of information, as such disclosure modes are not inherently tied to the revelation of norm-violating or otherwise damaging content. Political scandals presuppose a real or alleged violation of norms (Allern and Von Sikorski 2018, 3015), and the mere fact that information was previously concealed (Thompson 2000 ) and not disclosed voluntarily does not, on its own, render its revelation scandalous. In some instances, politicians may deliberately disclose controversial information to retain control over the narrative and pre-empt framing by journalists or political opponents (Huwyler, Bailer, and Giger 2025). Conversely, favourable information may also emerge through leaks, for example when it is strategically planted in the press to shape public opinion or to test receptiveness to policy ideas (Bovens, Geveke, and de Vries 1995). Accordingly, while it may seem plausible that politician-controlled transparency of benign information is most trust-enhancing, and that leaked disclosure of controversial information is most damaging to trust, these effects may not be uniform. Previous research shows that media-driven scandalisation, in which journalists seek to persuade the public that a scandal has occurred, can backfire, when the alleged transgression is perceived as less severe than if it had not been framed as a scandal (Graβl et al. 2021). This suggests that although the mode of disclosure is likely to interact with the nature of the information revealed, the direction and magnitude of its effect may vary based on the disclosed information. On this basis, the following cautious hypothesis is formulated: H 2 : The mode of information disclosure (politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks) moderates the effect of the disclosed information on citizens’ trust in politicians and political processes. Beyond the interaction between disclosure mode and informational content, citizens’ partisan attachments warrant closer consideration. In-group loyalty, and party identification in particular, strongly shape how citizens perceive and respond to political information (Solaz, De Vries, and de Geus 2019; Bartels 2002 ). This suggests that the effect of the information disclosure mode may vary depending on whether it is associated with an in-party or an out-party politician. Research on partisan motivated reasoning has shown that citizens tend to discount the seriousness of transgressions committed by politicians from their own party, while judging comparable violations by out-party politicians more harshly (A.H.-Y. Lee et al. 2023 ). In such cases, the relevance and credibility of alleged misconduct are downplayed and assigned less weight in political evaluations (Fischle 2000 ). A large body of research supports this view, demonstrating that a shared partisan identity mitigates the negative effects of transgressions on citizens’ attitudes. For example, in-party supporters perceive corruption involving politicians from their own party as less serious (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013) and withdraw their support to a lesser extent than supporters of other parties (Anderson and Tverdova 2003 ). As a result, partisan loyalty dampens electoral punishment among co-partisans, while out-party supporters respond more strongly (Ecker, Glinitzer, and Meyer 2016 ; Solaz, De Vries, and de Geus 2019). In contrast, a smaller literature challenges the notion that partisan affiliation shields politicians from sanctioning. This research finds that both in-party and out-party politicians are punished for transgressions (Funck and McCabe 2022), and that scandals can be particularly trust-eroding among politicians’ own supporters (von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020). While information about out-party misconduct may simply reinforce existing partisan preferences, revelations involving in-party politicians can undermine prior support because supporters’ expectations are violated (Funck and McCabe 2022). Taken together, these competing perspectives imply two plausible dynamics regarding the mode of information disclosure. From a partisan motivated reasoning perspective, involuntary disclosures via freedom of information requests or leaks should reduce trust more strongly among out-party supporters than among in-party supporters, who may downplay their politicians’ loss of communication control. Alternatively, involuntary disclosures may erode trust more among in-party supporters, for whom forced transparency or leaks signal a failure to meet heightened standards they set for their representatives. Whether positive or negative in-party bias dominates is therefore an empirical question, leading to the following hypothesis: H 3 : Citizens’ partisanship moderates the effect of the mode of information disclosure (politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks) on their trust in politicians and political processes. Research design The study draws on experimental evidence from a citizen survey conducted in Switzerland (N = 2,208). Data were collected between 10 and 25 March 2025 using a paid panel administered by the survey firm Bilendi. Fieldwork thus took place shortly after the Amherd leak of 26 February referenced in the introduction. This temporal proximity is likely to attenuate the estimated effects of leaks, as exposure to recent scandals has been shown to desensitise citizens to subsequent norm violations (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012 ). The observed effects of leaks should therefore be considered conservative, while no comparable contextual attenuation is expected for the other disclosure modes employed in the experiment. The survey applied quota sampling on gender, age, educational attainment, and NUTS-2 region to ensure sample representativeness. The main instrument of data collection was a pre-registered single-vignette experiment 1 with a 3 × 3 full factorial design, in which each respondent was presented with a single hypothetical scenario in the form of an excerpt from an online newspaper article. In each scenario, a government minister (federal councillor) announced draft legislation to change the limit and target values for air pollutants. The draft law had always been developed in close collaboration between the federal bureaucracy – i.e. the Federal Office for the Environment – and specific type of non-state actors. The experiment manipulated two key attributes. The first one captured how information about the involvement of non-state actors became public. This manipulation distinguished whether the information was disclosed by the politician or by the press, and whether disclosure occurred legally or illegally. Accordingly, information was either (1) publicly announced by the government minister at a press conference, (2) released by the bureaucracy only following a freedom of information request by the press, or (3) leaked from the bureaucracy to the press. The second attribute varied the information, i.e. the type of non-state actors described as being heavily involved in formulating the bill: (1) scientists from different universities, (2) representatives of environmental associations, and (3) representatives of industrial associations. Since the draft legislation was portrayed as bearing the imprint of the respective type of actors, this manipulation was intended to cue different normative interpretations of influence. Heavy involvement of scientists aimed at signalling legitimacy-enhancing input, consistent with their commonly perceived role in policymaking as neutral experts (Ingold and Gschwend 2014). Strong involvement of environmental associations was construed to signal contested yet normatively defensible influence, as it reflects the participation of actors with clear ideological commitments oriented toward the provision of a public good, namely clean air. By contrast, heavy involvement of industrial associations was used to suggest a legitimacy-threatening case of regulatory capture, in which actors with strong sectoral self-interests write policy to advance their industry’s goals at the expense of the broader public interest (Carpenter and Moss 2013 , 13). The levels of the two attributes were fully crossed, which produced nine different vignettes (Table 1 ). A balance test reported in Online Appendix A2 indicates that respondent characteristics are fully independent of the assigned treatment. Although not central to the analysis, the gender of the government minister (male / female) and their language region (German-speaking Switzerland / French-speaking Switzerland) were also varied. In all vignettes, the minister belonged to the Centre Party. This choice ensured that close collaboration with both environmental and industrial associations appeared plausible but also limited the analysis of in-party and out-party dynamics to a single party. After reading the online newspaper article, respondents were asked to rate the trustworthiness of both the government minister and the policy formulation process on a 0–10 scale. This distinction makes it possible to assess to what extent the loss of control over information disclosure primarily undermines personalised trust in the politician and to what extent procedural trust in the decision-making process more broadly is affected. From a democratic theory perspective, a decline in procedural trust suggests systemic legitimacy risks, whereas a decline in trust in an individual politician is a more contained concern. Both measures are used as dependent variables. To explain respondents’ trust assessments of (1) the minister and (2) the policy formulation process, H 1 examines the effect of the mode of information disclosure, using the three experimental conditions (politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks) as the primary predictors. H 2 focuses on heterogeneity in these effects by assessing how the impact of disclosure modes depends on the content of the disclosure. To capture distinct mechanisms through which such heterogeneity may arise, this is addressed in three complementary ways. First, the disclosure mode is interacted with the type of non-state actor involved in co-drafting the legislation (scientists, environmental associations, and industrial associations). This captures variation in the substantive information revealed. Second, the disclosure mode is interacted with respondents’ pre-treatment trust in the respective non-state actors, measured on a 0–10 scale prior to experimental exposure. This operationalisation directly tests the information effect by accounting for citizens’ baseline evaluations of the actors involved. Third, the disclosure mode is interacted jointly with the type of non-state actor and respondents’ policy priorities relevant to the vignette. Policy priority is measured on an eleven-point scale ranging from “ Protecting the environment should be the priority, even if this leads to slower economic growth and some job losses ” (0) to “ Economic growth and job creation should be a priority, even if this causes some damage to the environment ” (10). This specification is intended to capture how political trust varies when the positional implications of actor involvement align or conflict with respondents’ underlying policy preferences in the context of a specific information disclosure mode. Finally, H 3 assesses whether the effects of disclosure mode depend on in-partisan versus out-partisan alignment. This is operationalised through respondents’ stated intention to vote for the Centre Party – the minister’s party in all vignettes – in the next election. All variables used in the analyses, including controls, are presented in Table 2 . After the experiment, there was a manipulation check to gauge whether respondents had correctly processed the experimental conditions. Respondents were asked to recall which non-state actors were involved in policy formulation and how their involvement became known to the public. As reported in Online Appendix A3, 66.0% of respondents correctly identified the mode of information disclosure, and 55.8% correctly recalled the non-state actors involved. Table 2 Variable overview Variable N Mean SD Min Max Dependent variables Vignette: trust in the minister 2208 5.2 2.3 0 10 Vignette: trust in policy formulation process 2208 5.3 2.3 0 10 Independent variables Vignette: Mode of information disclosure 2208 ... press conference 733 33% ... freedom of information request 718 33% ... government leak 757 34% Vignette: the bill was drafted in collaboration with ... scientists from different universities 787 36% ... representatives of different environmental associations 692 31% ... representatives of different industrial associations 729 33% Respondent’s trust in the depicted non-state actors (scientists, environmental associations, industrial associations) prior to the experiment 2208 5.3 2.4 0 10 Respondent’s political priority (0 = environmental protection, 10 = economic growth) 2208 4.6 2.5 0 10 Respondent’s vote intention: Centre Party 2208 ... no 1970 89% ... yes 238 11% Control variables Gender homophily between minister and respondent 2208 ... no 1124 51% ... yes 1084 49% Language homophily between minister and respondent 2208 ... no 1102 50% ... yes 1106 50% Respondent’s trust in the federal government 2208 5.4 2.5 0 10 Respondent’s trust in the federal administration 2208 5.3 2.4 0 10 Respondent’s trust in the media 2208 4.5 2.3 0 10 Respondent’s income situation 2208 ... get along very well 291 13% ... get along well 1268 57% ... only manage with difficulty 539 24% ... only manage with great difficulty 110 5% Respondent’s educational level (ISCED-11) 2208 4.4 1.7 0 8 Respondent’s gender 2201 ... male 1076 49% ... female 1125 51% Respondent’s age 2208 47 16 18 76 Results To test the three hypotheses, the analyses rely on average marginal effects plots that reveal how disclosure modes affect citizens’ trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process. The linear regression models from which these estimates are derived are reported in Online Appendix A4. Figure 1 presents the central findings of the study on the effect of the disclosure mode (H 1 ). All else equal, information leaked from the bureaucracy to the press results in a substantial and statistically significant decline in citizens’ trust, compared to the baseline condition in which the minister themself discloses information at a press conference. Trust decreases by 0.69 scale points for the minister, and by 0.75 scale points for the policy formulation process, respectively. In contrast, no meaningful difference emerges between politician-controlled transparency at a press conference and legally compelled disclosure following a freedom of information request. At the same time, there is also no evidence that the information disclosure mode affects personalised trust in the minister and procedural trust in the policy formulation process differently, as both types of trust decline by a similar magnitude. The findings suggest that the erosion of trust associated with leaks cannot be attributed to either the involuntary nature of disclosure or the involvement of the press in prompting information release, as these characteristics are shared by both freedom of information disclosures and leaks but absent from politician-led press conferences. Rather, the fact that only leaks, and not freedom of information requests, lead to a decline in trust relative to politician-controlled transparency indicates that their negative impact stems from their violation of established procedural norms of information disclosure. In line with this interpretation, the findings also offer no support for the view that press involvement per se undermines trust by signalling the newsworthiness: the effects of voluntary disclosure at a press conference and legally compelled disclosure through a freedom of information request are statistically indistinguishable. Supplementary analyses reported in Online Appendix A5 further demonstrate that citizens’ trust in the media does not moderate the effect of disclosure mode on trust in either the minister or the policy formulation process. Importantly, the identified patterns prove robust across a wide range of subgroup analyses, including respondents’ gender, age, educational attainment, income situation, and ideological orientation (see Online Appendix A6). Across the different subgroups, leaks consistently produce the strongest erosion of trust. At the same time, women, more highly educated respondents, and individuals with more left-leaning ideological orientations exhibit more pronounced trust differentials between scenarios involving formal disclosure mode (press conferences and freedom of information requests) and leaks. These patterns align with prior research showing that women (Torgler and Valev 2010 ; Swamy et al. 2001 ), politically more sophisticated individuals (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017), and more left-leaning voters (Huwyler, Bailer, and Giger 2025) evaluate norm-violating forms of information disclosure or the lack of transparency more negatively than other demographics. An important complication concerns whether the mode of disclosure conditions the trust effects of what information is revealed (H 2 ). In the experiment, disclosures varied by the type of non-state actor – scientists, environmental associations, or industrial associations – closely involved in drafting legislation on air pollutants. Prior research indicates that this distinction is consequential for citizens’ evaluations: policies with only input from business interests are perceived as less legitimate than those developed only with cause groups (Rasmussen and Reher 2023 ). To establish respondents’ baseline perceptions, the survey included a pre-treatment item battery measuring trust in different non-state actors and institutions. The trust ranking measured before the experiment reflects similar patterns documented in earlier research. Respondents’ pre-experimental trust in the different non-state actors varies significantly, with scientists rated as the most trustworthy (M = 6.34, 95% CI [6.25, 6.44]) on a 0–10 scale, followed at some distance by environmental associations (M = 4.89, 95% CI [4.79, 4.99]) and industrial associations (M = 4.55, 95% CI [4.46, 4.64]). Therefore, the question is how the mode of disclosure moderates the effect of information – specifically, the revelation of which actor is a co-drafter – on citizens' trust in the responsible minister and the policy formulation process. Figure 2 shows that the trust effects of revealing heavy non-state actor involvement in policy formulation are moderated by the mode of disclosure. The top row indicates that leaks from the bureaucracy to the press consistently reduce citizens’ trust compared to disclosure through a ministerial press conference, irrespective of which actor type is revealed to be co-drafting the bill. Even comparatively benign information such as close collaboration with scientists results in significantly less trust when disclosed through a leak. In contrast, the effect of freedom of information requests is indistinguishable from that of press conferences regardless of the non-state actor type revealed. This highlights that only disclosure modes outside of formal procedures have a scandalising impact on the revealed information, and this effect persists regardless of whether the information is more benign (co-drafting with scientists) or more contentious (co-drafting with industrial associations). The bottom row of Fig. 2 reinforces this interpretation. Higher baseline trust in the involved type of non-state actors (as measured prior to the experiment) generally translates to higher trust in both the minister and the policy process, but this positive association is systematically weakened when the information is revealed through a leak. The patterns in Fig. 2 furthermore suggest that leaks disproportionately amplify the impact of more controversial information. Whereas leaked information about the involvement of scientists or environmental associations reduces trust by values between 0.51 and 0.66 scale points relative to disclosure at a press conference, leaks revealing co-drafting activity of industrial associations lead to larger declines of 0.88 to 1.00 scale points on the trust scale. This implies that leaks tend to exacerbate particularly the negative effects of disclosures that are already normatively more contentious. In Fig. 3, additional light is shed on how respondents’ evaluations of the disclosed information shape their reactions to different disclosure modes. To this end, it examines how disclosure mode interacts with the revealed information while accounting for respondents’ policy priority, which ranges from environmental protection as the primary concern (0) to economic growth as the primary concern (10). Respondents’ policy priorities are expected to shape how they evaluate the co-drafting non-state actors, insofar as the involvement of these actors provides cues about policy positions that may align with or diverge from respondents’ own priorities. Figure 3 Marginal effects of disclosure mode × non-state actor type involvement during policy formulation × respondents’ political priority on trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process. Note : The underlying models are reported in Online Appendix A4. The results in Fig. 3 indicate that in scenarios involving scientists and environmental associations as co-drafters, the trust-eroding effect of leaks on both the minister and the policy formulation process remains relatively stable across the full range of respondents’ policy priorities. Hence, in the case of relatively less contentious information, the penalty associated with leaks operates largely independently of respondents’ substantive policy priorities. In the scientist scenario in particular, observed trust differentials between legal disclosure modes and leaks arise not from changes in the effect of leaks, but from a declining trust-enhancing effect of legal disclosures as respondents place greater emphasis on economic growth. This likely reflects the respondents’ expectation that scientists prioritise environmental protection over economic growth. By contrast, the trust-eroding impact of leaks is most pronounced in the regulatory capture scenario involving industrial associations, as already suggested by Fig. 2. Importantly, in this scenario, the effect of leaks is not independent of respondents’ policy priorities. As their preference for environmental protection strengthens, their reactions to leaks in this scenario become increasingly negative relative to those of respondents who prioritise economic growth. The bottom right panel of Fig. 3 shows that leaks have the strongest adverse effect when industrial associations co-draft the bill and respondents attach the highest priority to environmental protection. Taken together, these findings therefore indicate that respondents’ policy priorities condition their responses to disclosure modes in distinct ways. The effects of legal disclosure modes (press conferences and freedom of information requests) vary most strongly across policy priorities when the disclosed information is comparatively benign, as in the scientist scenarios. In contrast, the impact of leaks varies most strongly when the disclosed information is most controversial, as in the industrial association scenarios. Lastly, the study examines whether party identification moderates the effect of disclosure modes (H 3 ). Figure 4 contrasts reactions to different modes of information disclosure (1) among respondents intending to vote for the Centre Party in the next election, i.e. the party of the minister in the vignette, and (2) those planning to vote for another party or abstain. The results show that both Centre Party supporters and out-party respondents place significantly less trust in the responsible minister and the policy formulation process when information is revealed due to a leak in the bureaucracy rather than via a press conference. Contrary to expectations derived from motivated partisan reasoning, in-party respondents hence do not discount leaks simply because they occur under the authority of a co-partisan minister. Overall, reactions to disclosure modes differ only modestly between in-party and out-party respondents. If anything, the results suggest that Centre Party voters hold their minister, and the policy formulation process under his or her authority, to more exacting standards. This pattern is only evident in responses to information disclosure obtained through freedom of information requests. When disclosure occurs via this mode, Centre Party voters place significantly less trust in the policy formulation process than non-Centre Party respondents, with a level of trust 0.84 points lower on the scale. A similar, though weaker, pattern is observed for trust in the minister: Centre Party voters express approximately 0.5 points less trust, although this difference does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This indicates that in-party supporters are particularly sensitive to situations in which their politician could have been forthcoming with the information, but instead only revealed it under legal compulsion. Under such circumstances, partisan affinity does not only not shield the politician and the political process from declining trust, but rather introduces heightened expectations of transparency. No comparable partisan asymmetry emerges when information is disclosed through leaks. In-party and out-party supporters do not react differently to leaks. A possible interpretation of this finding is that leaks diffuse responsibility away from the minister and toward other actors such as the bureaucracy and the press, thereby weakening the link between disclosure and partisan evaluation. As a result, leaks may be interpreted less through a partisan lens and more as a general procedural failure, which leads to similar trust responses among in-party and out-party respondents. Discussion and conclusion Politicians are sometimes involuntarily deprived of their ability to steer their public communication. Using experimental evidence, this study demonstrates that how such a loss of control occurs has important consequences for citizens’ trust in politicians and political processes. Among the information disclosure modes examined – politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure and leaks, the latter stands out as having a distinct and particularly consequential impact on political trust. First, leaks erode trust because they circumvent established formal disclosure procedures. Both freedom of information requests and leaks remove politicians’ control over the timing and framing of information, and assign a central role to the media in information disclosure. Yet only leaks consistently undermine trust. This pattern indicates that trust erosion is driven less by the loss of information disclosure control than by the illicit and norm-violating character of leaks. Second, leaks exert a scandalising effect on the information that is disclosed. Whereas freedom of information requests do not reduce trust regardless of the information revealed, leaks consistently do so. This effect is amplified when the disclosed information is contentious, which suggests that leaks intensify the trust costs of already controversial revelations. Third, leaks affect trust largely indiscriminately across partisan lines. Contrary to expectations derived from motivated partisan reasoning, in-party supporters do not discount leaks simply because they occur under the authority of a co-partisan politician. If anything, in-party supporters exhibit heightened sensitivity, as reflected in lower trust in the policy formulation process when their own politician is forced to disclose information through a freedom of information request. The pronounced trust-eroding effect of leaks raises broader questions about their relationship to political scandals. On the one hand, it calls for greater clarity on the extent to which the trust-eroding impact of scandals hinges on norm violations (real or alleged) as opposed to being driven by leaks as the mechanism through which such information often becomes public. On the other, it remains to be investigated whether leaks can generate broader consequences akin to those observed in scandal dynamics. Research on political scandals shows that misconduct attributed to individual politicians can also erode trust in other political actors (Ulbig and Miller 2012), political institutions more generally (Bowler and Karp 2004 ), and even satisfaction with democracy as a whole (Kumlin and Esaiasson 2012 ). It would therefore be fruitful to examine whether leaks, even in the absence of any information on transgressions, are similarly capable of hampering trust beyond the specific politician or policy process to which they are linked. While the study provides clear evidence that the mode of information disclosure shapes citizens’ political trust, several limitations also warrant discussion. First, future research should assess the external validity of the experimental findings beyond the Swiss context. Responses to modes of information disclosure, and particularly leaks, are likely conditioned by features of the political environment. Research on political scandals, for instance, indicates that their consequences for political survival are less severe in highly polarised settings (Rottinghaus 2023 ). Given that Switzerland is comparatively weakly polarised by international comparison (Coppedge et al. 2025 ), it can be speculated that the trust effects of leaks would be less pronounced, or possibly more strongly differentiated along partisan lines, in more polarised polities. Second, the experiment was limited to a single issue on limit and target values for air pollutants. While the sociodemographic subgroup analyses reported in Online Appendix A6 reveal no sharply divergent patterns across respondent groups, future research would, for two reasons, benefit from a broader examination of how the issue context interacts with modes of disclosure. On the one hand, disclosed information varies in its complexity. The objective of a bill regulating air pollutants is relatively easy to understand, whereas more complex issues may be harder for citizens to interpret. In such cases, citizens struggle to assess the implications of the information provided and therefore assign it less weight (Taylor 2015 ) – and possibly also evaluate the information disclosure mode differently. On the other hand, baseline variation in issue salience may also further condition citizens’ reactions. When looking at different policy areas, recent research shows that voters with tertiary education accord higher priority to environmental protection compared to other issues, whereas individuals with higher living standards tend to assign it lower priority (Off and Trastulli 2026). It therefore remains an open question whether the priority citizens attach to an issue interacts with how they respond to different modes of disclosure. Third, further research is needed to clarify the role of accountability in shaping perceptions of different modes of information disclosure. In the experiment, both freedom of information requests and leaks follow a minister’s presumed failure to disclose information originating from a bureaucracy under their authority. As a result, non-politician-controlled disclosure is always linked to shortcomings attributable to the minister: freedom of information requests signal a failure of voluntary transparency, whereas leaks point to a failure of administrative control. Yet, disclosure may also originate outside a politician’s sphere of control, for example when information is leaked by actors or institutions beyond the politician’s authority. In such cases, disclosure constitutes an exogenous breach of confidentiality, and the politician may not be held accountable for the mode of disclosure itself. Citizens’ trust evaluations of different disclosure modes may therefore arguably vary depending on how they perceive politicians’ agency and responsibility in the disclosure process. In sum, though, the findings of this study convey a clear message: the mode of information disclosure emerges as a distinct and consequential mechanism shaping political trust, with effects that also operate independently of the substantive information content disclosed. This underscores that greater analytical attention should be devoted to information disclosure modes themselves as an important, and yet still underexplored, dimension in political communication research. Declarations Author Contribution O.H. is solely responsible for all aspects of the research, including conception, design, data acquisition, analysis, and manuscript writing. Acknowledgement The author is grateful to Sophia Schlosser for her insightful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. Data Availability The replication data and materials for this article are available at the Political Behavior Dataverse at [DOI TO BE ADDED]. Ethics approval: All procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. The study passed research ethics screening (confirmation no. 1331) by the Institutional Review Board of [REDACTED]. Consent: Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. References Ackerman, J. M., Irma, E., & Sandoval-Ballesteros (2006). The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws. Administrative Law Review : 85–130. Allern, S., and Ester Pollack (2012). Scandalous! The Mediated Construction of Political Scandals in Four Nordic Countries . Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. Allern, S., & Christian Von, S. (2018). Political Scandals as a Democratic Challenge: From Important Revelations to Provocations, Trivialities, and Neglect: Introduction. 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Italian MPs and Political Communication. Parliaments Estates and Representation , 45 (1), 129–151. https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.2024.2387956 Schwarz, N., and Herbert Bles (1992). Scandals and the Public's Trust in Politicians: Assimilation and Contrast Effects. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 18 (5), 574–579. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167292185007 Solaz, H., De Vries, C. E., Roosmarijn, A., & de Geus (2019). In-Group Loyalty and the Punishment of Corruption. Comparative Political Studies , 52 (6), 896–926. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018797951 Solé-Ollé, A., & Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2018). Trust No More? On the Lasting Effects of Corruption Scandals. European Journal of Political Economy , 55 , 185–203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.12.003 Strikovic, E., van der Meer, T. G. L. A., Emma, van der Goot, L., & Bos (2020). and Rens Vliegenthart. On Behalf of the People: The Use of Public Opinion and the Perception of the People in Political Communication Strategies of Dutch MPs. The International Journal of Press/Politics 25 (1): 135–157. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161219864297 Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y., & Azfar, O. (2001). Gender and Corruption. Journal of Development Economics , 64 (1), 25–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00123-1 Taylor, T. W. (2015). The Electoral Salience of Trade Policy: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Welfare and Complexity. International Interactions , 41 (1), 84–109. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.945582 Thompson, J. B. (2000). Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age . Polity. Torgler, B., & Valev, N. T. (2010). Gender and Public Attitudes Toward Corruption and Tax Evasion. Contemporary Economic Policy , 28 (4), 554–568. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2009.00188.x Ulbig, S. G., & Nancy Martorano Miller (2012). The Coingate Effect: The Impact of Scandal on Attitudes Toward, State and Federal Political Actors. The Social Science Journal , 49 (1), 61–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2011.07.006 von Sikorski, C., Heiss, R., Jörg, & Matthes (2020). How Political Scandals Affect the Electorate. Tracing the Eroding and Spillover Effects of Scandals with a Panel Study. Political Psychology , 41 (3), 549–568. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12638 Ward, S. (2008). Making a Difference: A Comparative View of the Role of the Internet in Election Politics . Lexington Books. Weinberg, J. (2024). Building Trust in Political Office: Testing the Efficacy of Political Contact and Authentic Communication. Political Studies , 72 (4), 1288–1312. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217231185706 Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca, & Winters, M. S. (2017). Can Citizens Discern? Information Credibility, Political Sophistication, and the Punishment of Corruption in Brazil. The Journal of Politics , 79 (1), 60–74. https://doi.org/10.1086/687287 Žuffová, M. (2023). Fit for Purpose? Exploring the Role of Freedom of Information Laws and Their Application for Watchdog Journalism. The International Journal of Press/Politics , 28 (1), 300–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211006702 Footnotes The experiment passed research ethics screening (confirmation no. 1331) by the Institutional Review Board of [REDACTED]. It was pre-registered with OSF ([URL REDCATED]). Please note that H 2 on the information effect as specified in the pre-registration is examined as part of H 2 on the interaction between information and the disclosure mode in the present paper. Table 1 Table 1 is available in the Supplementary Files section. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files InformationDisclosureModesAppendix.docx Table1Vignettecomposition.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8703978","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":590785322,"identity":"89586ebb-7892-49e8-a422-fa449b0f52ac","order_by":0,"name":"Oliver 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1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":135894,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMarginal effect of the mode of disclosure on trust in the minister and the policy formulation process\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNote:\u003c/strong\u003e The underlying models \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;are reported in Online Appendix A4.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/a9d6546b0c335897c833ac42.png"},{"id":102753980,"identity":"68362d63-200c-46cd-bff8-d4c2b29525a9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 09:36:45","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":438800,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMarginal effects of disclosure mode × non-state actor type involvement during policy formulation on trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNote:\u003c/strong\u003e The underlying models \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;are reported in Online Appendix A4.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/d4254d79f4bddc6ee0898510.png"},{"id":102754081,"identity":"a0d374dc-cbcf-4426-ad7d-f94c362bad92","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 09:37:01","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":556161,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMarginal effects of disclosure mode × non-state actor type involvement during policy formulation × respondents’ political priority on trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNote:\u003c/strong\u003e The underlying models \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;are reported in Online Appendix A4.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/b08e5c48e7e217f69db1be8c.png"},{"id":102753954,"identity":"09c634db-5d7d-4ab5-a39f-28e9a6261798","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 09:36:41","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":200888,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMarginal effects of disclosure mode × party vote intention on trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNote:\u003c/strong\u003e The underlying models \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;are reported in Online Appendix A4.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage5.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/3714cbe54723c2e60d665531.png"},{"id":102754955,"identity":"edf464db-735e-491b-a3bb-9eb56ad861a2","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 09:40:34","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":3049920,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/6ffa1e48-eec7-46e1-bc38-566045ed60cf.pdf"},{"id":102753872,"identity":"2924477a-1fd8-4635-876a-cf1b804b925f","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 09:36:34","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":1276257,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"InformationDisclosureModesAppendix.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/fe6d853dbd88787c6b5f6c70.docx"},{"id":102753985,"identity":"3ae77626-cfa6-454d-bee2-cff3018bbb55","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 09:36:49","extension":"docx","order_by":2,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":910122,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Table1Vignettecomposition.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8703978/v1/416825c6bad29c5bcbfb51c2.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The Damaging Effect of Leaks: How the Mode of Information Disclosure Shapes Citizens’ Trust","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003ePoliticians routinely seek to time their public communication strategically to amplify the benefits of favourable information and dampen the costs of unfavourable revelations (Gibson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Ketelaars and Sevenans 2021). Such strategies presuppose that politicians possess the ability to control the flow of information until a politically advantageous moment arises. Yet such control is sometimes elusive, because other political actors may cause information to be disclosed at an inopportune time.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA fitting example is provided by the events unfolding toward the end of the tenure of Switzerland\u0026rsquo;s first female Federal Councillor (government minister) heading the defence portfolio. In late February 2025, Viola Amherd came under intense public scrutiny following media reports on the resignations of two senior officials under her authority: the Chief of the Armed Forces and the Director of the Intelligence Service. Although both had tendered their resignations several weeks earlier, the information reached the press through leaks within the bureaucracy before any official disclosure. At the time, Amherd had deliberately refrained from informing either her cabinet colleagues or the public, presumably to manage the political fallout of developments widely perceived as weakening key security institutions. The premature disclosure thus appears to have served the purpose of undermining the minister\u0026rsquo;s standing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCases such as this, in which politicians lose control over information disclosure, raise the question about the consequences for citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in political actors and political processes. So far, prior research on the relationship between politicians\u0026rsquo; communication and citizens\u0026rsquo; trust has, barring the scholarship on scandals (Close et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Schwarz and Bles 1992; Sol\u0026eacute;-Oll\u0026eacute; and Sorribas-Navarro \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), largely operated under the assumption that politicians retain control over their disclosure strategies. Existing literature demonstrates how citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in politicians can be shaped by their choice of communication mode (Weinberg \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), medium (Boukes and Boomgaarden 2016; Enli and Rosenberg 2018), and content (Combs and Keller 2010; Goovaerts and Marien 2020).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eYet politicians\u0026rsquo; control over information disclosure can be undermined through both lawful and unlawful means. On the one hand, freedom of information regimes have become increasingly widespread and comprehensive worldwide (Coliver \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). They enable journalists and civil society to exercise oversight by granting formal rights to request documents and information from public authorities (Žuffov\u0026aacute; \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). On the other hand, journalistic practice also relies on leaks, whereby political insiders provide confidential information to the press outside formal procedures and under conditions of expected anonymity (Pozen \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e, 521).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgainst this backdrop, this study examines how different modes of information disclosure \u0026ndash; politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks \u0026ndash; shape citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in politicians and political processes. It draws on a citizen survey experiment that presented respondents with a policy formulation scenario in which different types of non-state actors (scientists, environmental associations, and industrial associations) were involved in co-drafting a bill. Their involvement was disclosed either by a minister at a press conference, by the press following a freedom of information request, or by the press after a leak from the bureaucracy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo pre-empt the main findings, the study shows that leaks from the bureaucracy to the press generate a substantial decline in citizens\u0026rsquo; trust compared to legal disclosure modes, namely ministerial press conferences and freedom of information requests. This trust-eroding effect of leaks persists across different types of disclosed information and is most pronounced when the information revealed is more contentious, i.e. a regulatory capture scenario where industrial associations co-draft the bill. Moreover, both in-party supporters and out-partisans express significantly lower trust in the minister and the policy formulation process when information is disclosed through a leak rather than a press conference. In-party supporters, in particular, lose even more trust than out-party citizens when a politician from their own party, who could have disclosed information on their own, is instead compelled to do so through a freedom of information request. Overall, the findings emphasise that the mode of information disclosure, and particularly leaks, impact citizens' trust in both politicians and the political process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eModes of information disclosure and trust\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePoliticians typically determine the terms under which their communication reaches the public. Within a given context, institutional arrangements and the political culture set external constraints on their communication strategies (Ward \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e), all the while their personal backgrounds, including party affiliation, career trajectories, and individual characteristics, shape how they communicate within these constraints (Auel and Umit \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Sampugnaro and Montemagno 2025). Politicians decide which content to emphasise, such as policy positions or private lives (Giger et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e), the overall tonal sentiment they adopt, whether positive, negative, mixed, or neutral (Fountaine, Ross, and Comrie \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), and the stylistic elements they employ, such as references to public opinion (Strikovic et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). They further shape their communication through vocal, visual, and verbal cues (Koppensteiner, Stephan, and J\u0026auml;schke \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e), by selecting between traditional and new media channels (Fowler et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Lilleker, Tenscher, and Štětka 2015), by timing their messages (Gibson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Ketelaars and Sevenans 2021), and by targeting specific audiences (Holman, Schneider, and Pondel 2015).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese choices have important consequences for citizens\u0026rsquo; trust. Existing research shows that certain modes of communication, such as personal contact (Weinberg \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), social media engagement, and opinion pieces, are more trust-inducing than appearances on talk shows or news interviews (Enli and Rosenberg 2018). It also demonstrates that communicative content matters: trust increases when politicians downplay self-interest, for example by praising political opponents (Combs and Keller 2010), and when they refrain from uncivil rhetoric (Goovaerts and Marien 2020).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotwithstanding this, trust is also affected when politicians do \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e control the flow of communication. Research on political scandals has analysed events in which politicians typically lose control over public narratives surrounding real or alleged norm violations, as they are repeatedly reported and framed as scandalous by the news media (Allern and Von Sikorski 2018, 3015). This literature shows broad consensus that public trust in politicians declines following scandal exposure (Close et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Schwarz and Bles 1992; Sol\u0026eacute;-Oll\u0026eacute; and Sorribas-Navarro \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), irrespective of whether the scandal concerns private misconduct, such as marital infidelity, or legal infractions, including tax evasion (Funk \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e) and corruption (Ares and Hern\u0026aacute;ndez 2017; Sol\u0026eacute;-Oll\u0026eacute; and Sorribas-Navarro \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). The negative effect of scandals is even further amplified by spillovers that erode trust in other political actors and institutions as well (F.L.F. Lee \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite extensive literatures on political communication and political scandals, it remains unclear to what extent politicians\u0026rsquo; loss of control over information disclosure, in and of itself, affects citizens\u0026rsquo; trust. Research on communication strategies has largely focused on forms of communication that politicians can actively manage, whereas scholarship on political scandals examines a narrow class of events in which norm violations and inherently damaging information typically coincide with disclosures not initiated by politicians. Neither strand of research therefore permits a clear separation of the effects of the information disclosed from those of the disclosure mode itself. As a result, existing work provides limited insight into whether, and through which mechanisms, different modes of information disclosure shape citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in politicians and political processes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo prominent modes of information disclosure deprive politicians of control: (1) freedom of information requests and (2) leaks. Freedom of information regimes have strongly surged in number since the 1980s. By 2020, 128 countries worldwide had respective laws or regulations (Coliver \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). These legal frameworks provide citizens and other interested actors with a legal right to access government documents without having to justify their requests. They operate on a \u0026ldquo;right to know\u0026rdquo; principle, under which information is presumed public unless explicitly exempted by law (Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros 2006, 93). Accordingly, freedom of information requests entail a loss of control for politicians over disclosure by legally established procedures for public access to government information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeaks, in contrast, do not follow an established formal disclosure process. Pozen (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e, 521) defines a leak as \u0026ldquo;(i) a targeted disclosure (ii) by a government insider (employee, former employee, contractor) (iii) to a member of the media (iv) of confidential information the divulgence of which is generally proscribed by law, policy, or convention (v) outside of any formal process (vi) with an expectation of anonymity.\u0026rdquo; Hence, while both freedom of information requests and leaks rely on the press to bring information into the public sphere, they convey fundamentally different signals: rule-based oversight in the case of freedom of information requests, and misconduct or procedural breakdown in the case of leaks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImportantly, neither freedom of information requests nor leaks are inherently linked to the substance of the information disclosed. Leaks, for example, may at times be strategically planted, with information secretly authorised for release but presented as an unauthorised disclosure in order to advance government interests (Kwoka \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Nonetheless, leaks frequently constitute the disclosure mode through which political scandals emerge (Allern and Pollack 2012, 9). This raises the question of whether disclosure modes beyond politicians\u0026rsquo; control carry an implicit signal of scandalisation, which prompts citizens to evaluate the act of disclosure itself more negatively. On this account, both freedom of information requests and leaks can be expected to depress trust in politicians and political processes. However, because leaks not only escape politicians\u0026rsquo; control but also circumvent established formal procedures, they should produce the strongest negative effects on citizens\u0026rsquo; trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eCitizens\u0026rsquo; trust in politicians and political processes is highest when politicians control disclosure, followed by legally compelled disclosure (freedom of information requests), and are lowest when disclosure results from leaks.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlthough the mode of information disclosure is hypothesised to affect citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in its own right (H\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e), it may also shape how citizens evaluate the information that is revealed. In this sense, disclosure modes function as interpretive cues that condition how information is perceived. This is particularly relevant in cases of non-politician-controlled disclosure involving the press. When politicians appear unwilling to disclose information voluntarily and disclosure occurs only through third parties, citizens may infer problematic intent and evaluate the information more negatively. Such interpretations align with the frequent association between leaks and political scandals (Allern and Pollack 2012, 9).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAt the same time, the mode of disclosure does not, in itself, determine the substantive quality or normative valence of the information revealed. Non-politician-controlled disclosure therefore does not necessarily imply the scandalisation of information, as such disclosure modes are not inherently tied to the revelation of norm-violating or otherwise damaging content. Political scandals presuppose a real or alleged violation of norms (Allern and Von Sikorski 2018, 3015), and the mere fact that information was previously concealed (Thompson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e) and not disclosed voluntarily does not, on its own, render its revelation scandalous. In some instances, politicians may deliberately disclose controversial information to retain control over the narrative and pre-empt framing by journalists or political opponents (Huwyler, Bailer, and Giger 2025). Conversely, favourable information may also emerge through leaks, for example when it is strategically planted in the press to shape public opinion or to test receptiveness to policy ideas (Bovens, Geveke, and de Vries 1995).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccordingly, while it may seem plausible that politician-controlled transparency of benign information is most trust-enhancing, and that leaked disclosure of controversial information is most damaging to trust, these effects may not be uniform. Previous research shows that media-driven scandalisation, in which journalists seek to persuade the public that a scandal has occurred, can backfire, when the alleged transgression is perceived as less severe than if it had not been framed as a scandal (Graβl et al. 2021). This suggests that although the mode of disclosure is likely to interact with the nature of the information revealed, the direction and magnitude of its effect may vary based on the disclosed information. On this basis, the following cautious hypothesis is formulated:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e \u003csub\u003e \u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/sub\u003e: \u003cem\u003eThe mode of information disclosure (politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks) moderates the effect of the disclosed information on citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in politicians and political processes.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond the interaction between disclosure mode and informational content, citizens\u0026rsquo; partisan attachments warrant closer consideration. In-group loyalty, and party identification in particular, strongly shape how citizens perceive and respond to political information (Solaz, De Vries, and de Geus 2019; Bartels \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). This suggests that the effect of the information disclosure mode may vary depending on whether it is associated with an in-party or an out-party politician.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResearch on partisan motivated reasoning has shown that citizens tend to discount the seriousness of transgressions committed by politicians from their own party, while judging comparable violations by out-party politicians more harshly (A.H.-Y. Lee et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). In such cases, the relevance and credibility of alleged misconduct are downplayed and assigned less weight in political evaluations (Fischle \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). A large body of research supports this view, demonstrating that a shared partisan identity mitigates the negative effects of transgressions on citizens\u0026rsquo; attitudes. For example, in-party supporters perceive corruption involving politicians from their own party as less serious (Anduiza, Gallego, and Mu\u0026ntilde;oz 2013) and withdraw their support to a lesser extent than supporters of other parties (Anderson and Tverdova \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). As a result, partisan loyalty dampens electoral punishment among co-partisans, while out-party supporters respond more strongly (Ecker, Glinitzer, and Meyer \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Solaz, De Vries, and de Geus 2019).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn contrast, a smaller literature challenges the notion that partisan affiliation shields politicians from sanctioning. This research finds that both in-party and out-party politicians are punished for transgressions (Funck and McCabe 2022), and that scandals can be particularly trust-eroding among politicians\u0026rsquo; own supporters (von Sikorski, Heiss, and Matthes 2020). While information about out-party misconduct may simply reinforce existing partisan preferences, revelations involving in-party politicians can undermine prior support because supporters\u0026rsquo; expectations are violated (Funck and McCabe 2022).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, these competing perspectives imply two plausible dynamics regarding the mode of information disclosure. From a partisan motivated reasoning perspective, involuntary disclosures via freedom of information requests or leaks should reduce trust more strongly among out-party supporters than among in-party supporters, who may downplay their politicians\u0026rsquo; loss of communication control. Alternatively, involuntary disclosures may erode trust more among in-party supporters, for whom forced transparency or leaks signal a failure to meet heightened standards they set for their representatives. Whether positive or negative in-party bias dominates is therefore an empirical question, leading to the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e \u003csub\u003e \u003cem\u003e3\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/sub\u003e: \u003cem\u003eCitizens\u0026rsquo; partisanship moderates the effect of the mode of information disclosure (politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks) on their trust in politicians and political processes.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eResearch design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study draws on experimental evidence from a citizen survey conducted in Switzerland (N\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2,208). Data were collected between 10 and 25 March 2025 using a paid panel administered by the survey firm Bilendi. Fieldwork thus took place shortly after the Amherd leak of 26 February referenced in the introduction. This temporal proximity is likely to attenuate the estimated effects of leaks, as exposure to recent scandals has been shown to desensitise citizens to subsequent norm violations (Kumlin and Esaiasson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). The observed effects of leaks should therefore be considered conservative, while no comparable contextual attenuation is expected for the other disclosure modes employed in the experiment. The survey applied quota sampling on gender, age, educational attainment, and NUTS-2 region to ensure sample representativeness.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe main instrument of data collection was a pre-registered single-vignette experiment\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e with a 3 \u0026times; 3 full factorial design, in which each respondent was presented with a single hypothetical scenario in the form of an excerpt from an online newspaper article. In each scenario, a government minister (federal councillor) announced draft legislation to change the limit and target values for air pollutants. The draft law had always been developed in close collaboration between the federal bureaucracy \u0026ndash; i.e. the Federal Office for the Environment \u0026ndash; and specific type of non-state actors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe experiment manipulated two key attributes. The first one captured how information about the involvement of non-state actors became public. This manipulation distinguished whether the information was disclosed by the politician or by the press, and whether disclosure occurred legally or illegally. Accordingly, information was either (1) publicly announced by the government minister at a press conference, (2) released by the bureaucracy only following a freedom of information request by the press, or (3) leaked from the bureaucracy to the press.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe second attribute varied the information, i.e. the type of non-state actors described as being heavily involved in formulating the bill: (1) scientists from different universities, (2) representatives of environmental associations, and (3) representatives of industrial associations. Since the draft legislation was portrayed as bearing the imprint of the respective type of actors, this manipulation was intended to cue different normative interpretations of influence. Heavy involvement of scientists aimed at signalling legitimacy-enhancing input, consistent with their commonly perceived role in policymaking as neutral experts (Ingold and Gschwend 2014). Strong involvement of environmental associations was construed to signal contested yet normatively defensible influence, as it reflects the participation of actors with clear ideological commitments oriented toward the provision of a public good, namely clean air. By contrast, heavy involvement of industrial associations was used to suggest a legitimacy-threatening case of regulatory capture, in which actors with strong sectoral self-interests write policy to advance their industry\u0026rsquo;s goals at the expense of the broader public interest (Carpenter and Moss \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e, 13).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe levels of the two attributes were fully crossed, which produced nine different vignettes (Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). A balance test reported in Online Appendix A2 indicates that respondent characteristics are fully independent of the assigned treatment. Although not central to the analysis, the gender of the government minister (male / female) and their language region (German-speaking Switzerland / French-speaking Switzerland) were also varied. In all vignettes, the minister belonged to the Centre Party. This choice ensured that close collaboration with both environmental and industrial associations appeared plausible but also limited the analysis of in-party and out-party dynamics to a single party.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAfter reading the online newspaper article, respondents were asked to rate the trustworthiness of both the government minister and the policy formulation process on a 0\u0026ndash;10 scale. This distinction makes it possible to assess to what extent the loss of control over information disclosure primarily undermines \u003cem\u003epersonalised\u003c/em\u003e trust in the politician and to what extent \u003cem\u003eprocedural\u003c/em\u003e trust in the decision-making process more broadly is affected. From a democratic theory perspective, a decline in procedural trust suggests systemic legitimacy risks, whereas a decline in trust in an individual politician is a more contained concern. Both measures are used as dependent variables.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo explain respondents\u0026rsquo; trust assessments of (1) the minister and (2) the policy formulation process, H\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e examines the effect of the mode of information disclosure, using the three experimental conditions (politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks) as the primary predictors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eH\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e focuses on heterogeneity in these effects by assessing how the impact of disclosure modes depends on the content of the disclosure. To capture distinct mechanisms through which such heterogeneity may arise, this is addressed in three complementary ways. First, the disclosure mode is interacted with the type of non-state actor involved in co-drafting the legislation (scientists, environmental associations, and industrial associations). This captures variation in the substantive information revealed. Second, the disclosure mode is interacted with respondents\u0026rsquo; pre-treatment trust in the respective non-state actors, measured on a 0\u0026ndash;10 scale prior to experimental exposure. This operationalisation directly tests the information effect by accounting for citizens\u0026rsquo; baseline evaluations of the actors involved. Third, the disclosure mode is interacted jointly with the type of non-state actor and respondents\u0026rsquo; policy priorities relevant to the vignette. Policy priority is measured on an eleven-point scale ranging from \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eProtecting the environment should be the priority, even if this leads to slower economic growth and some job losses\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (0) to \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eEconomic growth and job creation should be a priority, even if this causes some damage to the environment\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (10). This specification is intended to capture how political trust varies when the positional implications of actor involvement align or conflict with respondents\u0026rsquo; underlying policy preferences in the context of a specific information disclosure mode.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, H\u003csub\u003e3\u003c/sub\u003e assesses whether the effects of disclosure mode depend on in-partisan versus out-partisan alignment. This is operationalised through respondents\u0026rsquo; stated intention to vote for the Centre Party \u0026ndash; the minister\u0026rsquo;s party in all vignettes \u0026ndash; in the next election. All variables used in the analyses, including controls, are presented in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAfter the experiment, there was a manipulation check to gauge whether respondents had correctly processed the experimental conditions. Respondents were asked to recall which non-state actors were involved in policy formulation and how their involvement became known to the public. As reported in Online Appendix A3, 66.0% of respondents correctly identified the mode of information disclosure, and 55.8% correctly recalled the non-state actors involved.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable overview\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMin\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMax\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDependent variables\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVignette: trust in the minister\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVignette: trust in policy formulation process\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eIndependent variables\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVignette: Mode of information disclosure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003epress conference\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e733\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e33%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003efreedom of information request\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e718\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e33%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003egovernment leak\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e757\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e34%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVignette: the bill was drafted in collaboration with\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003escientists from different universities\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e787\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e36%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003erepresentatives of different environmental associations\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e692\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e31%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003erepresentatives of different industrial associations\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e729\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e33%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s trust in the depicted non-state actors \u003cem\u003e(scientists, environmental associations, industrial associations)\u003c/em\u003e prior to the experiment\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s political priority \u003cem\u003e(0\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;environmental protection, 10\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;economic growth)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s vote intention: Centre Party\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eno\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1970\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e89%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eyes\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e238\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eControl variables\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGender homophily between minister and respondent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eno\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1124\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e51%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eyes\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1084\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e49%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLanguage homophily between minister and respondent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eno\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1102\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e50%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eyes\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1106\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e50%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s trust in the federal government\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s trust in the federal administration\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s trust in the media\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s income situation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eget along very well\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e291\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e13%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eget along well\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1268\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e57%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eonly manage with difficulty\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e539\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e24%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003eonly manage with great difficulty\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e110\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s educational level (ISCED-11)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s gender\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2201\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003emale\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1076\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e49%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e... \u003cem\u003efemale\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1125\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e51%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRespondent\u0026rsquo;s age\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e47\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e76\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eTo test the three hypotheses, the analyses rely on average marginal effects plots that reveal how disclosure modes affect citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process. The linear regression models from which these estimates are derived are reported in Online Appendix A4.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFigure 1 presents the central findings of the study on the effect of the disclosure mode (H\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e). All else equal, information leaked from the bureaucracy to the press results in a substantial and statistically significant decline in citizens\u0026rsquo; trust, compared to the baseline condition in which the minister themself discloses information at a press conference. Trust decreases by 0.69 scale points for the minister, and by 0.75 scale points for the policy formulation process, respectively. In contrast, no meaningful difference emerges between politician-controlled transparency at a press conference and legally compelled disclosure following a freedom of information request. At the same time, there is also no evidence that the information disclosure mode affects \u003cem\u003epersonalised\u003c/em\u003e trust in the minister and \u003cem\u003eprocedural\u003c/em\u003e trust in the policy formulation process differently, as both types of trust decline by a similar magnitude.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings suggest that the erosion of trust associated with leaks cannot be attributed to either the involuntary nature of disclosure or the involvement of the press in prompting information release, as these characteristics are shared by both freedom of information disclosures and leaks but absent from politician-led press conferences. Rather, the fact that only leaks, and not freedom of information requests, lead to a decline in trust relative to politician-controlled transparency indicates that their negative impact stems from their violation of established procedural norms of information disclosure. In line with this interpretation, the findings also offer no support for the view that press involvement per se undermines trust by signalling the newsworthiness: the effects of voluntary disclosure at a press conference and legally compelled disclosure through a freedom of information request are statistically indistinguishable. Supplementary analyses reported in Online Appendix A5 further demonstrate that citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in the media does not moderate the effect of disclosure mode on trust in either the minister or the policy formulation process.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImportantly, the identified patterns prove robust across a wide range of subgroup analyses, including respondents\u0026rsquo; gender, age, educational attainment, income situation, and ideological orientation (see Online Appendix A6). Across the different subgroups, leaks consistently produce the strongest erosion of trust. At the same time, women, more highly educated respondents, and individuals with more left-leaning ideological orientations exhibit more pronounced trust differentials between scenarios involving formal disclosure mode (press conferences and freedom of information requests) and leaks. These patterns align with prior research showing that women (Torgler and Valev \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Swamy et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e), politically more sophisticated individuals (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017), and more left-leaning voters (Huwyler, Bailer, and Giger 2025) evaluate norm-violating forms of information disclosure or the lack of transparency more negatively than other demographics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn important complication concerns whether the mode of disclosure conditions the trust effects of what information is revealed (H\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e). In the experiment, disclosures varied by the type of non-state actor \u0026ndash; scientists, environmental associations, or industrial associations \u0026ndash; closely involved in drafting legislation on air pollutants. Prior research indicates that this distinction is consequential for citizens\u0026rsquo; evaluations: policies with only input from business interests are perceived as less legitimate than those developed only with cause groups (Rasmussen and Reher \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). To establish respondents\u0026rsquo; baseline perceptions, the survey included a pre-treatment item battery measuring trust in different non-state actors and institutions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe trust ranking measured before the experiment reflects similar patterns documented in earlier research. Respondents\u0026rsquo; pre-experimental trust in the different non-state actors varies significantly, with scientists rated as the most trustworthy (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;6.34, 95% CI [6.25, 6.44]) on a 0\u0026ndash;10 scale, followed at some distance by environmental associations (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.89, 95% CI [4.79, 4.99]) and industrial associations (M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.55, 95% CI [4.46, 4.64]). Therefore, the question is how the mode of disclosure moderates the effect of information \u0026ndash; specifically, the revelation of which actor is a co-drafter \u0026ndash; on citizens' trust in the responsible minister and the policy formulation process.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFigure 2 shows that the trust effects of revealing heavy non-state actor involvement in policy formulation are moderated by the mode of disclosure. The top row indicates that leaks from the bureaucracy to the press consistently reduce citizens\u0026rsquo; trust compared to disclosure through a ministerial press conference, irrespective of which actor type is revealed to be co-drafting the bill. Even comparatively benign information such as close collaboration with scientists results in significantly less trust when disclosed through a leak. In contrast, the effect of freedom of information requests is indistinguishable from that of press conferences regardless of the non-state actor type revealed. This highlights that only disclosure modes outside of formal procedures have a scandalising impact on the revealed information, and this effect persists regardless of whether the information is more benign (co-drafting with scientists) or more contentious (co-drafting with industrial associations). The bottom row of Fig.\u0026nbsp;2 reinforces this interpretation. Higher baseline trust in the involved type of non-state actors (as measured prior to the experiment) generally translates to higher trust in both the minister and the policy process, but this positive association is systematically weakened when the information is revealed through a leak.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe patterns in Fig.\u0026nbsp;2 furthermore suggest that leaks disproportionately amplify the impact of more controversial information. Whereas leaked information about the involvement of scientists or environmental associations reduces trust by values between 0.51 and 0.66 scale points relative to disclosure at a press conference, leaks revealing co-drafting activity of industrial associations lead to larger declines of 0.88 to 1.00 scale points on the trust scale. This implies that leaks tend to exacerbate particularly the negative effects of disclosures that are already normatively more contentious.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn Fig.\u0026nbsp;3, additional light is shed on how respondents\u0026rsquo; evaluations of the disclosed information shape their reactions to different disclosure modes. To this end, it examines how disclosure mode interacts with the revealed information while accounting for respondents\u0026rsquo; policy priority, which ranges from \u003cem\u003eenvironmental protection as the primary concern\u003c/em\u003e (0) to \u003cem\u003eeconomic growth as the primary concern\u003c/em\u003e (10). Respondents\u0026rsquo; policy priorities are expected to shape how they evaluate the co-drafting non-state actors, insofar as the involvement of these actors provides cues about policy positions that may align with or diverge from respondents\u0026rsquo; own priorities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Tabc\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"1\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFigure 3 Marginal effects of disclosure mode \u0026times; non-state actor type involvement during policy formulation \u0026times; respondents\u0026rsquo; political priority on trust in the minister and in the policy formulation process.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNote\u003c/b\u003e: The underlying models are reported in Online Appendix A4.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results in Fig.\u0026nbsp;3 indicate that in scenarios involving scientists and environmental associations as co-drafters, the trust-eroding effect of leaks on both the minister and the policy formulation process remains relatively stable across the full range of respondents\u0026rsquo; policy priorities. Hence, in the case of relatively less contentious information, the penalty associated with leaks operates largely independently of respondents\u0026rsquo; substantive policy priorities. In the scientist scenario in particular, observed trust differentials between legal disclosure modes and leaks arise not from changes in the effect of leaks, but from a declining trust-enhancing effect of legal disclosures as respondents place greater emphasis on economic growth. This likely reflects the respondents\u0026rsquo; expectation that scientists prioritise environmental protection over economic growth.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBy contrast, the trust-eroding impact of leaks is most pronounced in the regulatory capture scenario involving industrial associations, as already suggested by Fig.\u0026nbsp;2. Importantly, in this scenario, the effect of leaks is not independent of respondents\u0026rsquo; policy priorities. As their preference for environmental protection strengthens, their reactions to leaks in this scenario become increasingly negative relative to those of respondents who prioritise economic growth. The bottom right panel of Fig.\u0026nbsp;3 shows that leaks have the strongest adverse effect when industrial associations co-draft the bill and respondents attach the highest priority to environmental protection.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, these findings therefore indicate that respondents\u0026rsquo; policy priorities condition their responses to disclosure modes in distinct ways. The effects of legal disclosure modes (press conferences and freedom of information requests) vary most strongly across policy priorities when the disclosed information is comparatively benign, as in the scientist scenarios. In contrast, the impact of leaks varies most strongly when the disclosed information is most controversial, as in the industrial association scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLastly, the study examines whether party identification moderates the effect of disclosure modes (H\u003csub\u003e3\u003c/sub\u003e). Figure\u0026nbsp;4 contrasts reactions to different modes of information disclosure (1) among respondents intending to vote for the Centre Party in the next election, i.e. the party of the minister in the vignette, and (2) those planning to vote for another party or abstain.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results show that both Centre Party supporters and out-party respondents place significantly less trust in the responsible minister and the policy formulation process when information is revealed due to a leak in the bureaucracy rather than via a press conference. Contrary to expectations derived from motivated partisan reasoning, in-party respondents hence do not discount leaks simply because they occur under the authority of a co-partisan minister. Overall, reactions to disclosure modes differ only modestly between in-party and out-party respondents.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIf anything, the results suggest that Centre Party voters hold their minister, and the policy formulation process under his or her authority, to more exacting standards. This pattern is only evident in responses to information disclosure obtained through freedom of information requests. When disclosure occurs via this mode, Centre Party voters place significantly less trust in the policy formulation process than non-Centre Party respondents, with a level of trust 0.84 points lower on the scale. A similar, though weaker, pattern is observed for trust in the minister: Centre Party voters express approximately 0.5 points less trust, although this difference does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This indicates that in-party supporters are particularly sensitive to situations in which \u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e politician could have been forthcoming with the information, but instead only revealed it under legal compulsion. Under such circumstances, partisan affinity does not only not shield the politician and the political process from declining trust, but rather introduces heightened expectations of transparency.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo comparable partisan asymmetry emerges when information is disclosed through leaks. In-party and out-party supporters do not react differently to leaks. A possible interpretation of this finding is that leaks diffuse responsibility away from the minister and toward other actors such as the bureaucracy and the press, thereby weakening the link between disclosure and partisan evaluation. As a result, leaks may be interpreted less through a partisan lens and more as a general procedural failure, which leads to similar trust responses among in-party and out-party respondents.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion and conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003ePoliticians are sometimes involuntarily deprived of their ability to steer their public communication. Using experimental evidence, this study demonstrates that \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e such a loss of control occurs has important consequences for citizens\u0026rsquo; trust in politicians and political processes. Among the information disclosure modes examined \u0026ndash; politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure and leaks, the latter stands out as having a distinct and particularly consequential impact on political trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst, leaks erode trust because they circumvent established formal disclosure procedures. Both freedom of information requests and leaks remove politicians\u0026rsquo; control over the timing and framing of information, and assign a central role to the media in information disclosure. Yet only leaks consistently undermine trust. This pattern indicates that trust erosion is driven less by the loss of information disclosure control than by the illicit and norm-violating character of leaks. Second, leaks exert a scandalising effect on the information that is disclosed. Whereas freedom of information requests do not reduce trust regardless of the information revealed, leaks consistently do so. This effect is amplified when the disclosed information is contentious, which suggests that leaks intensify the trust costs of already controversial revelations. Third, leaks affect trust largely indiscriminately across partisan lines. Contrary to expectations derived from motivated partisan reasoning, in-party supporters do not discount leaks simply because they occur under the authority of a co-partisan politician. If anything, in-party supporters exhibit heightened sensitivity, as reflected in lower trust in the policy formulation process when their own politician is forced to disclose information through a freedom of information request.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe pronounced trust-eroding effect of leaks raises broader questions about their relationship to political scandals. On the one hand, it calls for greater clarity on the extent to which the trust-eroding impact of scandals hinges on norm violations (real or alleged) as opposed to being driven by leaks as the mechanism through which such information often becomes public. On the other, it remains to be investigated whether leaks can generate broader consequences akin to those observed in scandal dynamics. Research on political scandals shows that misconduct attributed to individual politicians can also erode trust in other political actors (Ulbig and Miller 2012), political institutions more generally (Bowler and Karp \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e), and even satisfaction with democracy as a whole (Kumlin and Esaiasson \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). It would therefore be fruitful to examine whether leaks, even in the absence of any information on transgressions, are similarly capable of hampering trust beyond the specific politician or policy process to which they are linked.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile the study provides clear evidence that the mode of information disclosure shapes citizens\u0026rsquo; political trust, several limitations also warrant discussion. First, future research should assess the external validity of the experimental findings beyond the Swiss context. Responses to modes of information disclosure, and particularly leaks, are likely conditioned by features of the political environment. Research on political scandals, for instance, indicates that their consequences for political survival are less severe in highly polarised settings (Rottinghaus \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Given that Switzerland is comparatively weakly polarised by international comparison (Coppedge et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), it can be speculated that the trust effects of leaks would be less pronounced, or possibly more strongly differentiated along partisan lines, in more polarised polities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, the experiment was limited to a single issue on limit and target values for air pollutants. While the sociodemographic subgroup analyses reported in Online Appendix A6 reveal no sharply divergent patterns across respondent groups, future research would, for two reasons, benefit from a broader examination of how the issue context interacts with modes of disclosure. On the one hand, disclosed information varies in its complexity. The objective of a bill regulating air pollutants is relatively easy to understand, whereas more complex issues may be harder for citizens to interpret. In such cases, citizens struggle to assess the implications of the information provided and therefore assign it less weight (Taylor \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) \u0026ndash; and possibly also evaluate the information disclosure mode differently. On the other hand, baseline variation in issue salience may also further condition citizens\u0026rsquo; reactions. When looking at different policy areas, recent research shows that voters with tertiary education accord higher priority to environmental protection compared to other issues, whereas individuals with higher living standards tend to assign it lower priority (Off and Trastulli 2026). It therefore remains an open question whether the priority citizens attach to an issue interacts with how they respond to different modes of disclosure.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, further research is needed to clarify the role of accountability in shaping perceptions of different modes of information disclosure. In the experiment, both freedom of information requests and leaks follow a minister\u0026rsquo;s presumed failure to disclose information originating from a bureaucracy under their authority. As a result, non-politician-controlled disclosure is always linked to shortcomings attributable to the minister: freedom of information requests signal a failure of voluntary transparency, whereas leaks point to a failure of administrative control. Yet, disclosure may also originate outside a politician\u0026rsquo;s sphere of control, for example when information is leaked by actors or institutions beyond the politician\u0026rsquo;s authority. In such cases, disclosure constitutes an exogenous breach of confidentiality, and the politician may not be held accountable for the mode of disclosure itself. Citizens\u0026rsquo; trust evaluations of different disclosure modes may therefore arguably vary depending on how they perceive politicians\u0026rsquo; agency and responsibility in the disclosure process.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, though, the findings of this study convey a clear message: the mode of information disclosure emerges as a distinct and consequential mechanism shaping political trust, with effects that also operate independently of the substantive information content disclosed. This underscores that greater analytical attention should be devoted to information disclosure modes themselves as an important, and yet still underexplored, dimension in political communication research.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eO.H. is solely responsible for all aspects of the research, including conception, design, data acquisition, analysis, and manuscript writing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe author is grateful to Sophia Schlosser for her insightful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe replication data and materials for this article are available at the Political Behavior Dataverse at [DOI TO BE ADDED].\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics approval:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eAll procedures performed in this study involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. 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Exploring the Role of Freedom of Information Laws and Their Application for Watchdog Journalism. \u003cem\u003eThe International Journal of Press/Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e28\u003c/em\u003e(1), 300\u0026ndash;322. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1177/19401612211006702\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1177/19401612211006702\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Footnotes","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eThe experiment passed research ethics screening (confirmation no. 1331) by the Institutional Review Board of [REDACTED]. It was pre-registered with OSF ([URL REDCATED]). Please note that H\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e on the information effect as specified in the pre-registration is examined as part of H\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e on the interaction between information and the disclosure mode in the present paper.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Table 1","content":"\u003cp\u003eTable 1 is available in the Supplementary Files section.\u003c/p\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Freedom of information regimes, Interest groups, Leaks, Political communication, Transparency, Trust","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8703978/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8703978/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"Political information does not always reach the public on politicians’ terms. This study explores how different modes of information disclosure – politician-controlled transparency, legally compelled disclosure, and leaks – affect trust in politicians and political processes. Using data from a survey experiment in Switzerland (N = 2,208) on government communication about different non-state actors (scientists, environmental associations, industrial associations) co-drafting a bill, the study finds that leaks to the press significantly reduce citizens' trust compared to legal disclosure modes (ministerial press conferences and freedom of information requests). The negative effect of leaks persists regardless of the information disclosed, and is exacerbated for controversial information. Notably, trust declines among both in-party supporters and out-partisans, with in-party supporters responding even more critically to freedom of information disclosures. Overall, the findings underscore the central role that the mode of disclosure, particularly leaks, plays in shaping public trust in both politicians and the political process.","manuscriptTitle":"The Damaging Effect of Leaks: How the Mode of Information Disclosure Shapes Citizens’ Trust","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-02-16 09:19:28","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8703978/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"8ac15239-cf86-4817-bc78-64c39db149b5","owner":[],"postedDate":"February 16th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-02-16T09:19:29+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-02-16 09:19:28","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8703978","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8703978","identity":"rs-8703978","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}