From Local to Global? Assessing European Solidarity through the Lens of Ukraine Aid

From Local to Global? Assessing European Solidarity through the Lens of Ukraine Aid | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article From Local to Global? Assessing European Solidarity through the Lens of Ukraine Aid Dietlind Stolle, Thomas Gareau-Paquette, Allison Harell This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8571891/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 4 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Solidarity implies mutual acceptance and a willingness to cooperate and support others. This raises a central question: solidarity with whom? We examine how the boundaries of solidarity and expectations of reciprocity in Europe help explain reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We develop four solidarity profiles capturing the level and radius of solidarity and compare them using survey data from 16 EU countries. ‘General Humanitarians,’ who draw few distinctions, show the strongest support for aid to Ukraine. ‘National Europeanists’ and ‘EU Aid Givers,’ who treat the EU as a primary community of solidarity, also express high support for aid to Ukraine, whereas ‘Nationalist Aid Givers’ are markedly less supportive. Crucially, support is strongly related to expectations of help from other EU countries, shaped by perceived benefits and knowledge about the EU. Finally, we show that humanitarian values can increase support independently of reciprocity expectations. solidarity reciprocity European identity public opinion Ukraine European Union Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 INTRODUCTION Times of crises often mobilize help, cooperation and solidarity. However, how do crises abroad channel public support to extend solidarity beyond national boundaries? While our understanding of how the public perceives its obligations to countries beyond national boundaries remains limited, there has been extensive interest in how the European Union (EU) might create alternate or complementary boundaries of identity and solidarity (for a recent review, see König, 2023). In this article, we use the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an avenue to explore the nature of Europeans’ sense of obligation and solidarity towards other Europeans currently outside of the boundaries of the EU. European governments reacted swiftly and with a high level of unity and commitment to Ukraine. They displayed solidarity by calling for Ukraine’s admission to the EU, by the EU imposing sanctions on members of Putin’s regime, Russian state enterprises, banks and other Russian organizations, and through a partial ban on Russian energy purchases. European states also contributed significant military resources to Ukraine, for example, by training the Ukrainian military and by drawing on their own national reserves to provide additional military supplies. The EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history to welcome Ukrainian refugees and facilitate their relocation across states. Some of these measures, especially the energy embargo and economic sanctions, were seen as costly by European governments due to potential negative short-term economic impacts, such as price pressures on consumers and fueling inflation (Anghel and Jones, 2023; Chen et al. , 2023; Liadze et al. , 2023). While support by governments within the EU is well documented, we know less about how European publics understood the crisis in Ukraine. Was it a foreign war in which they had little stake, or were they motivated to help based on a larger sense of European or even global solidarity? In this article, we examine how support for Ukraine aid is embedded in the overall solidarity patterns of the European public. More specifically, we develop a novel understanding of how national identities may be entrenched within larger political communities, such as a sense of Europeanness or a more humanitarian, borderless sense of obligation. In particular, our focus is on better understanding two mechanisms that shape solidarity: the level and radius of solidarity. Using these mechanisms, we develop both innovative ‘solidarity profiles’ and measures of perceptions of reciprocity, a key yet understudied component of solidarity. Our analysis relies on the EUI-YouGov Solidarity in Europe (SiE) Survey conducted in April 2023, which includes responses from 22,000 people across 16 EU countries (Genschel et al. , 2023). This survey features both standard measures, such as levels of European identity and ideology, and novel questions designed to "benchmark" solidarity toward one’s own country, other EU countries, and non-EU countries. Using these solidarity benchmarks, we develop five unique solidarity profiles that capture the scope and degree of solidarity European citizens feel toward others more generally. We also examine differences in expectations of reciprocity within a country, within the EU, and from non-EU countries when one’s own region requires help. We then use these profiles to explore how feelings of solidarity translate to support for Ukraine aid. The results provide insight into the nature of political support for Ukraine in Europe, but also a broader contrast between competing forms of national and supranational identifications. On the one hand, we explore who sees national communities as bounded, restricting obligations to help those within the country. National communities can also be understood as embedded in broader European or even global perceptions of community, where feelings of solidarity and reciprocity extend beyond state boundaries. In this paper, we first elucidate the theory of solidarity with a particular emphasis on the boundaries of both giving and receiving help from others, with the national community as the benchmark. Our argument is that two aspects of solidarity research have been undervalued: the extent to which citizens distinguish between their national obligations compared to obligations beyond the nation-state, and expectations of reciprocity. We focus on the level and radius of solidarity felt by citizens. We suggest that understanding citizens’ feelings of obligation toward their national political community is not enough to comprehend how they react to crises beyond their borders. Rather, we need to distinguish how citizens benchmark extra-national obligations against national ones (see Alvarez et al. , 2017). We then apply these theoretical considerations on solidarity and reciprocity to the case of Ukraine aid and develop the hypotheses to be tested. We do so by creating distinct solidarity profiles that help to predict solidaristic behavior in different kinds of crises. To test these solidarity profiles, we apply them to a specific form of solidarity which is located outside of both the nation-state and the political community of the EU: support for Ukraine aid. Our results show that support for aid to Ukraine varies among European citizens based on the radius of their obligations, as well as whether they believe other EU states are reciprocating. In doing so, this article provides a much-needed correction to the literature on solidarity, centring the importance – and fluidity – of boundaries that structure people’s beliefs about their own obligations and the extent to which others in a larger pan-European society are meeting them. SOLIDARITY BENCHMARKING AND SOLIDARITY PROFILESS Solidarity represents a set of ‘attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need’ (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017, p. 3). Theorizing about solidarity has been central to understanding modern societies. For Durkheim, for example, the increasing social division of labour created a new form of solidarity where, despite differences across groups, the individual was functionally interdependent on others, and this leads to a collective sense of responsibility, or cohesion between individuals that relies in part on a collective consciousness that rests on shared institutions (Durkheim, 2019). Such institutions, over time, developed a new form of social citizenship according to T.H. Marshall (1950), where membership within a political community is directly related to access to the welfare state. Solidarity, in this sense, emerges as an obligation to others to whom we feel some commonality, and can be institutionalized and put into practice through institutions. With the development of the modern nation-state and regimes of national citizenship, solidarity has been expressed in terms of the nation-state. For Anderson (1991, p. 6), these nations are conceived as ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship.’ The expression of this comradeship is through our willingness to bear costs for other members of this community, which has often been institutionalized through the state and its institutions. The resulting ‘sense of national we-ness is the source of a commitment to protection and redistribution amongst co-nationals’ (Author, 2022, p. 102). Solidarity then implies mutual aid to a larger collectivity. It is often taken for granted that solidarity extends to the national boundary, yet a sense of interconnectedness and shared identity can emerge above as well as below the nation-state. This raises the question of to whom we extend solidarity. Might we expect citizens of European nations to expand their obligations beyond the confines of their nation-states or even their wider political community, the European Union? Under what circumstances might they feel compelled to assist others? Within nation-states, political communities are defined by territorial boundaries and formal rules of citizenship that determine access to state benefits and to civil, political, and social rights (Marshall, 1963). Citizenship creates what Tamir (1995) calls an ‘ethical community,’ generating mutual obligations among members and a greater willingness to bear the costs of solidarity within national borders. At the same time, national communities not only define insiders but also demarcate those outside the circle of solidarity. A large literature shows that national identities are often constructed in exclusionary ways, making the nation the primary object of solidarity. Consistent with this, citizens tend to support domestic over international policies: for instance, in the 2008 American National Election Survey, 44% of Americans favored cutting foreign aid while 79% supported increased education spending (Milner and Tingley, 2013), and weaker national identity correlates with greater humanitarian aid support (Alvarez et al. , 2017). Public support for foreign aid is generally low—partly because citizens overestimate how much their country spends (Scotto et al. , 2017). Overall, we call this solidarity profile nationalist; expecting that those who prioritize the nation relative to other political communities will be least likely to support aid to Ukraine. This raises the question: why might some individuals extend solidarity beyond national boundaries? In other words, how can national or ingroup solidarity be broadened to include outsiders? One important factor is the presence of collective identities that transcend the nation-state. A sense of belonging to larger political communities—such as the European Union—can reduce the tension between national and wider forms of solidarity. Research consistently shows that identities beyond the nation-state foster obligations toward others: Nicoli et al. (2020), for example, find that European identity is associated with support for cross-national redistribution, while Rathbun et al. (2018) showed that stronger European identity predicts support for bailing out another EU member state. Although Bauböck (2017) is cautious about the EU as a fully consolidated political community, he argues that Europeans can nonetheless share a collective identity rooted in narratives of common membership. In sum, when European identity supersedes national identity, individuals are more willing to express solidarity across borders. We therefore distinguish a solidarity profile characterized by those who privilege a European identity over a national one, and label this group the EU aid givers . For this group, Europe, and not the member state, is the primary reference community, making support for assisting another European country a natural expression of solidarity. We expect them to strongly support aid to Ukraine. A third solidarity profile reflects individuals who prioritize national solidarity but are willing to extend support beyond national borders under certain conditions. Rather than rooting solidarity exclusively in national or transnational communities, these ‘ National Europeanist aid givers ’ operate with a hierarchy of identities: national identity comes first, but broader European solidarity can be activated when the situation or recipient is seen as worthy or when self-interest is served (Alvarez et al. , 2017; Burelli, 2018). Such solidarity is often conditional and sometimes tinged with paternalism (Baker, 2015). Like domestic solidaristic behavior, it is shaped by the perceived costs of aid, the identity of the beneficiaries, and the expectation that others will also contribute (Miller, 2002). For instance, Rathbun et al. (2019) show that compassionate individuals support foreign assistance during the Greek bailout, but this is moderated by the strength of national attachment; similarly, beliefs about fairness increase support, again conditional on national identity (see also Powers et al. , 2021). In short, this solidarity extends beyond national boundaries when reciprocity, fairness, or self-interest are at stake. From this profile, we expect cautious, conditional, and reflective support for aid to Ukraine. Finally, one type of solidarity profile is grounded in humanitarianism. Citizens in stable democracies, who typically have greater resources, are often expected to feel an obligation to assist those who are worse off globally (Alvarez et al. , 2018; Young, 2006). Global or generalized solidarity transcends political and social boundaries and aligns closely with altruism—that is, helping others without an expectation of reciprocity. Individuals with this orientation, whom we label General humanitarians, should be the most supportive of providing aid to countries outside their own political community, basing their solidarity on humanitarian values rather than identity boundaries or strategic considerations. At the opposite end of this spectrum are individuals who reject extending solidarity to anyone beyond themselves. Regardless of the radius of obligation—national, European, or global—these individuals show little inclination to support others. We refer to this group as Self-focused . Of course, other factors are also likely to influence people’s general willingness to support foreign aid. For example, ideology should influence support, with people on the left being more willing to support foreign aid (Bodenstein and Faust 2017). In short, the ‘left’ is traditionally though not exclusively associated with a strong state domestically, while also supporting the state’s role in assisting those in need beyond national borders. In this sense, solidarity in the national realm should be exported to other countries beyond national boundaries based on ideology. In sum, solidarity refers to whom individuals feel obliged to offer help in times of need or crisis. What is often missing from existing scholarship, however, is a clear delineation of the boundaries within which solidarity is expected to operate. In the European context, we argue that citizens hold distinct solidarity profiles that reflect how they perceive their relevant political communities. These profiles capture the different boundaries and benchmarks individuals apply when deciding to whom obligations extend. Although prior work has discussed nationalist and generalized/global identities in the context of humanitarian aid (Alvarez et al. , 2017), our typology provides a more comprehensive framework that incorporates multiple possible radii of solidarity. Importantly, these profiles are designed to operate beyond purely humanitarian settings and capture broader patterns of how citizens define, limit, and extend solidarity in international crises. Identifying the boundaries of solidarity tells us to whom people feel obligations, but it does not fully elucidate the motivations behind helping behavior. Solidarity is not only about who counts as ‘one of us,’ but also about whether assistance is expected to be mutual. Thus, in addition to solidarity profiles, we must consider the logic of reciprocity—how expectations about others’ contributions influence one’s own support for aid. The next section develops this second pillar of our framework. RECIPROCITY AND THE EXPECTATION OF HELP If solidarity involves obligations to help, it also inherently raises questions about reciprocity. As Oorschot (1998) notes, one of the most common reactions the Dutch public expressed when faced with someone in need was, ‘What have you, or can you, do for us?’ This highlights a central insight: expectations of reciprocity shape solidaristic behavior. Research distinguishes between different forms of reciprocity. Molm et al. (2007) argue that indirect reciprocity—generalized exchanges within a chain of actors, can generate stronger solidarity than direct, one-to-one exchanges. Empirically, Grasso and Lahusen (2020) show that reciprocity is a major determinant of support for fiscal solidarity within the EU, while Eschweiler et al. (2019) find that reciprocity thrives where political institutions are trusted and seen as fair arbiters. Similarly, in the context of economic crises, Lengfeld et al. (2015) demonstrate that solidarity depends on a general principle of reciprocity rather than the recipient country’s immediate ability to return the favor. During the COVID-19 pandemic, shared norms and expectations of reciprocity strongly shaped public support for EU financial assistance, with respondents more willing to help countries perceived as respecting fundamental EU values (Heermann et al. , 2023). How can reciprocity matter for Ukraine, where direct reciprocity is unlikely in the short term? The key lies in generalized reciprocity at the national, EU, and global levels. Citizens may support aiding Ukraine because they believe their own country is part of a broader system in which others are also contributing. In this view, individuals’ preferences are shaped by their perceptions of whether other countries —especially fellow EU members—are doing their share. However, the survey does not include a direct item measuring whether respondents think other countries are ‘doing their share’ specifically in relation to Ukraine aid. We therefore operationalize reciprocity beliefs using respondents’ expectations of receiving help in a major crisis, which captures whether individuals view the national community and, crucially, the EU as a system of mutual assistance in which help is expected to flow both ways when needed. This logic differs from humanitarian altruism, which is rooted in moral obligation regardless of others’ behavior. If Europeans see the EU, or Europe more broadly, as a political community bound by mutual obligations, then expectations of reciprocity should become even more salient. Under such conditions, support for aid is influenced by beliefs about whether other members of this supra-national community are also upholding the norms of mutual assistance. Having outlined the boundaries of solidarity and the role of reciprocity, we now turn to how these dynamics operate in the concrete context that motivates our analysis: public support for aiding Ukraine. While there is a growing literature on European solidarity during crises, the war against Ukraine introduces conditions that differ from those of economic, financial, or health emergencies. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY IN TIMES OF CRISES AND THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE European solidarity has been examined in various domains—European integration, welfare politics, and international trade—but its study in times of crisis has expanded only recently (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018; Bobzien and Kalleitner, 2021; Oana and Truchlewski, 2023), with particular attention to the financial debt crisis (Lengfeld et al. , 2021; Lengfeld and Kroh, 2016; Clasen, 2024). Much less work considers solidarity in the face of military aggression. Research suggests that public support for European solidarity is higher during exogenous, one-time crises (e.g., natural disasters or military attacks) than during long-lasting, endogenous crises such as unemployment or sovereign debt (Genschel and Hemerijck, 2018). This highlights the importance of crisis type (Wallaschek et al. , 2020) and context (Unger et al. , 2023), raising the question of how insights from economic, financial, and health crises translate to the war in Ukraine. Overall, two broad sets of determinants of help during crises are examined. First, support for EU-level solidarity is shaped less by the crisis itself than by pre-existing attitudes toward the European Union (Ganderson et al. , 2023; Unger et al. , 2023; Vrânceanu et al. , 2023). Views on within-EU redistribution are particularly influential (Bauhr and Charron, 2023) Second, national context matters significantly (Mariotto and Pellegata, 2023), especially the messages welfare-state institutions send about inclusion, exclusion, and care (Noël and Thérien, 1995). We draw on this work indirectly for the creation of solidarity profiles which are clearly shaped by national and European boundaries. The war in Ukraine is thus both a test of international solidarity and a challenge for the EU as a political community. Although the EU and its member states have taken substantial measures to support Ukraine (Trebesch et al. , 2023), public opinion varies. Many Europeans see the conflict as an attack on the whole of Europe and express strong opposition to the aggressor (Hoffmann, 2023). Studies identify several key drivers of public support (Genschel, 2022; Moise et al. , 2024; Author, 2023): Proximity and perceptions of the aggressor shape willingness to help (Hoffmann, 2023). Self-interest matters: support depends on the type of aid and its perceived costs (Kim, 2013; Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999), particularly regarding economic sanctions, energy embargoes (Bøggild et al. , 2023; Hoffmann, 2023), and heavy military equipment. Historical and contemporary relationships with Russia shape sympathies and threat perceptions (Pupcenoks et al. , 2022; Fernàndez et al. , 2023). Rally effects boost support among incumbent party supporters, who typically endorse Ukraine aid more strongly than opposition supporters (Author, 2023). While our study acknowledges this rich work on the invasion in Ukraine, it is also clear that existing studies have focused primarily on country-level patterns or specific determinants of Ukraine aid. Much less attention has been paid to how individual-level support for Ukraine fits into broader understandings of European solidarity. In particular, we lack systematic evidence on how public support for aiding Ukraine relates to (1) the boundaries of solidarity (national, European, global), and (2) expectations of reciprocity among EU member states. Our analysis contributes to filling this gap. HYPOTHESES Despite not being an EU member, Ukraine shares values and institutional aspirations that align with the broader European community (Petrov, 2023; Akaliyski and Reeskens, 2023). Since 2022 it has also held formal EU candidate status, making these aspirations highly salient for both political elites and the general public. It may therefore benefit from forms of solidarity and reciprocity that have developed within the EU. At the individual level, citizens who strongly identify as Europeans or who extend solidarity to other EU member states may be particularly inclined to support aid to Ukraine—especially given the EU’s adversarial relationship with Russia, which is widely perceived as violating European norms and principles. In this sense, supporting Ukraine reflects both solidarity toward a value-aligned country and opposition to a common aggressor. However, because Ukraine lies outside the EU, this political boundary may limit support among citizens whose solidarity is tightly bound—either to the nation or strictly to EU member states. Thus, solidarity expressed toward fellow EU countries will not necessarily spill over to Ukraine. Whether European solidarity extends beyond the EU’s borders remains an open question. Alternatively, solidarity may be extended not because Ukraine is European, but because some individuals hold global or generalized humanitarian commitments. Such individuals support helping others irrespective of political boundaries or expected reciprocity. Prior research shows that global identification increases support for foreign aid, while national pride does not (Paxton and Knack, 2012). These unbounded forms of solidarity reflect moral obligation (or lack thereof) rather than mutual expectations. This reasoning suggests three sets of hypotheses: H1. National solidarity When national solidarity is exclusive (i.e., limited to the national in-group), it should be associated with lower support for aid to Ukraine. H2. European solidarity Higher European solidarity—alone or combined with high national solidarity—should spill over into stronger support for Ukraine aid. H3. Generalized/global solidarity High levels of generalized, unbounded solidarity (solidarity that extends beyond EU and national boundaries) should be associated with stronger support for Ukraine aid. H4: Expectations of European reciprocity Expectations of reciprocity (i.e., the belief that other EU countries would help one’s own region in a major crisis) should lead to greater support for Ukraine. Given the literature, we also expect two variables to be important for any prediction of aid to another country: political ideology and European identity. People on the left and those that score high on European identity are believed to be more supportive of any aid than people who identify as right and low on European identity. Thus, European identity captures territorial self-identification (e.g., ‘country only’ versus more European identifications) and is included because prior research shows it is an important predictor of EU-related solidarity and cross-border redistribution (e.g., Verhaegen 2018). Political ideology is also a likely ingredient here. People on the left are found to be not only more supportive of the national welfare state and redistribution (Noël and Thérien, 1995) but also on foreign aid (Paxton and Knack 2012). In sum, we theorize that solidarity profiles and norms of reciprocity contribute beyond the ideology and European identity. DATA AND METHODS Our study relies on the April 2023 wave of the EUI-YouGov Solidarity in Europe (SiE) survey (Genschel et al. , 2024). This data encompasses 16 European Union countries with a cumulative sample size of approximately 22,000 respondents.[i] Dependent Variable: Support for Ukraine Our dependent variable quantifies support for Ukraine aid and is constructed from four items in the ‘Ukraine Support’ battery that capture humanitarian, military, economic, and integration-related assistance. Specifically, we use four survey items that ask respondents about their level of support for sending humanitarian aid, providing weapons and military equipment, accepting higher energy costs due to sanctions on Russia, and fast‑tracking Ukraine’s EU membership. Each measurement is rescaled to fit within a range of 0 to 1, ranging from strongly oppose (0) to strongly support (1). Responses of ‘don’t know’ are assigned a midpoint value of 0.5, and results are unchanged when these responses are excluded (see Appendix Table A7).[ii] We average the four rescaled items to create a composite index, ‘Mean Support for Ukraine,’ summarizing support for solidarity towards Ukraine across the humanitarian, military, and financial dimensions outlined above (Cronbach’s alpha = .75). This construction yields a continuous 0-1 index of support (bounded between 0 and 1), which we model using linear regression; coefficients can be interpreted directly as percentage‑point changes in mean support on the 0-1 scale. General Solidarity Profiles and Reciprocity Our core hypotheses require not only measuring identification with different political communities but also capturing how solidarity is bounded within distinct geographic spheres. To do this, we construct a set of ‘solidarity profiles’ that reflect the ways in which respondents bound their solidaristic obligations. Solidarity Profiles These profiles are derived from three survey items that measure the level of aid respondents believe should be provided in major crises at three levels: (1) within their own country, (2) to other EU countries, and (3) to countries outside the EU. Respondents rate each item on a scale from 0 (‘Should not provide any help’) to 10 (‘Should provide significant help’). We rescale these values to range from 0 to 1 for ease of comparison across items; respondents choosing ‘Don’t know’ are assigned a value of 0.5. As shown in Table A1 and A2 of the Appendix, whether or not these midpoint responses are included has no meaningful effect on the distribution of profiles. Using these standardized scores, we develop an original five‑category typology of solidarity profiles that categorizes respondents according to the level and radius of solidarity they express. The operationalization of these profiles is detailed in Table A1 of the Appendix. These five categories (plus a residual ‘Other’ group) are essential for testing H1, H2, and H3, and they capture meaningful cross-national variation in patterns of solidarity across Europe: 1. Self-Focused (reference category) These individuals have solidarity scores that fall within a narrow range around their personal mean across all three items, but that personal mean lies below the country-specific median. They represent respondents who are broadly unwilling to help others—nationally, within the EU, or globally. This group comprises approximately 19% of the sample. 2. Nationalist Aid Givers These ‘classic’ nationalists show their highest solidarity score toward their own country, with substantially lower support for helping EU or non-EU countries. This category is used to test H1. It is the largest group, accounting for around 32% of respondents. 3. EU Aid Givers These respondents display higher solidarity toward the EU than toward their own country and non-EU countries. They extend solidarity beyond the nation-state but primarily within the EU,, making them similar to—but distinct from—National Europeanists. They constitute just under 7% of the sample. 4. National Europeanists These individuals have similar solidarity scores for the EU and their own country (within 0.1 on the 0–1 scale), both of which exceed their solidarity toward non-EU countries. Their solidaristic obligations thus extend to the EU but do not reach beyond it. These two groups (EU aid givers and National Europeanists) are critical for testing spillover expectations in H2 and comprise an additional 12% of the sample. 5. General Humanitarians The opposite of Self-focused, these individuals express consistently high solidarity across all three levels. Their scores fall within a 0.1 range of their personal mean and meet or exceed the country-specific median at every geographic scale. For them, national solidarity is not exclusive and should extend to support for Ukraine (H3). They represent approximately 18% of respondents. 6. Other A residual category capturing respondents whose solidaristic attitudes do not fit into any of the five structured profiles. This group is heterogeneous and comprises the remaining share of the sample.[iii] Overall statistical descriptions of the solidarity profiles within our sample are depicted in Table A1 of the Appendix, while the country-specific proportions are illustrated in Figure A1. Both the table and figure lend support to our theoretical expectations regarding these solidarity types.[iv] To provide additional clarity, Figure A2 illustrates the average solidarity levels, aggregated across all countries. Expectations of help (H4) To operationalise reciprocity beliefs, we use a second set of variables capturing respondents’ expectations about how much help their own region would receive in a major crisis from different territorial levels. These measures are based on three survey items asking how much financial, humanitarian, and military support respondents believe they would receive from: a well-off region within their own country, another EU member state, and a country outside the EU during a major crisis. As with the solidarity measures, these ‘expectations of help’ variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (with ‘Don’t know’ coded to 0.5; see Figure A5 for weighted country means across the three levels). We incorporate these rescaled indicators directly into our analysis. We interpret these items as our operationalization of reciprocity beliefs because they capture generalized reciprocity at different territorial levels, meaning whether respondents view solidarity as embedded in a system of mutual assistance in which help would be returned when one’s own region is in need. Importantly, these expectations are not Ukraine-specific and should not be read as perceptions of other countries’ burden-sharing for Ukraine aid. In a second step, we examine the foundations of reciprocity attitudes by assessing respondents’ perceptions of the European Union, including their awareness of and beliefs about EU programs designed to provide mutual assistance to member states. Reciprocity Expectations from the EU and EU Policy Knowledge To further explore the expectations Europeans have about the EU, we also seek to understand whether such reciprocity expectations are grounded in people's knowledge about the benefits of the European Union. Those who know more about the EU, and especially those aware of the types of programs the EU has in place for mutual aid, should be most likely to perceive the EU as a community grounded in norms of reciprocity. We use this analysis as a validity check to understand whether the idea of reciprocity is reflected in the reality of mutual aid awareness. To test this, the survey asked about the Cohesion Fund, with half of the sample being questioned on SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) and the remaining half about the Recovery Plan. To evaluate ‘EU awareness,’ we construct a dichotomous variable identifying ‘Some or strong knowledge’. Respondents coded as having some or strong knowledge are those who, for at least one of these initiatives (i.e., the SURE/Recovery Plan dyad, or the Cohesion Fund), reported either some awareness (‘I have heard of it, but do not know much about it’) or strong knowledge (‘I have heard of it, and know what it is’). In the second model, we restrict the sample to respondents who reported strong knowledge of the Cohesion Fund (‘I have heard of it, and know what it is’). We measure their evaluations of the program's impact on quality of life on a scale from 0 (perceived decrease) to 10 (perceived improvement). We rescale these scores from 0 to 1, with ‘Don't Know’ responses set to the midpoint of this adjusted scale. Respondents were also asked their general view about whether their country is mainly an EU beneficiary or net contributor with the following question: ‘Overall, do you think that, on balance, [Country] receives much more than it contributes or contributes much more than it receives from the EU?’ Scores range from 0 (suggesting the country contributes more than it receives) to 10 (suggesting the country receives more than it contributes). These scores are then rescaled between 0 and 1, with ‘Don't Know’ responses treated as a midpoint value of 0.5. These measures help us highlight the idea that perceived EU reciprocity is grounded in actual policy knowledge of and experience with the EU. For our understanding of support or rejection of Ukraine aid, we also utilize variables to gauge European identity, ideology and various potential confounders described in the section below. Additional Predictors of support for Ukraine Aid European identity is quantified through a question asking respondents how they see themselves. Responses include ‘Country only,’ ‘Country then European,’ ‘European and Country,’ and ‘European only’. Responses indicating non-alignment with the provided identity categories (i.e., ‘None of these’) and those expressing uncertainty (i.e., ‘Don't know’) are combined into a single category. This variable is treated as categorical, with respondents who identify as ‘Country only’ serving as the reference category. We include it for two reasons. First, European identity is a widely used predictor in the EU solidarity literature, and prior research shows that stronger European identification is associated with greater support for EU‑level financial solidarity and cross‑border redistribution (e.g., Verhaegen, 2018). Second, including European identity allows us to assess whether our reciprocity measure, which is operationalized through expectations of help, explains support for Ukraine over and above identity-based attachments to Europe. In other words, it helps ensure that the estimated associations for expectations of help are not simply capturing hidden differences in European identification. Figure A4 presents the distribution of all European identity categories by country, showing that Europeans predominantly identify as nationals of their country only or as nationals of their country first. We also include controls for three key dichotomous variables related to attitudes toward Russia, supranational organizations and institutional trust. Although each item is measured on an ordered response scale, we dichotomize them to capture substantively meaningful thresholds and to avoid assuming equal distances between adjacent response categories; this makes the coefficients interpretable as the difference between respondents who do versus do not cross each threshold. The first variable assesses whether the respondent perceives Russia as a threat. Respondents who agree with the statement ‘European countries should invest more in defense and security to defend against Russian aggression’ are coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. The second variable measures the perceived importance of NATO, coding respondents as 1 if they consider NATO to be "very important" or "fairly important" for their country’s defense, and 0 otherwise. We also assess the level of trust in the European Union by coding respondents as 1 if they indicate they "trust a lot" or "trust a fair amount," and 0 if they do not. Lastly, we control for a range of potential confounding factors. First, we construct a categorical variable capturing the respondent’s self-declared ideological leaning, operationalized as a five-category variable ranging from extreme left to extreme right.[v] Respondents who selected "Don't know" or "Prefer not to say" are classified under a separate category labelled "No Ideology." We model ideology as a set of categories (rather than as a single ordinal scale) to avoid imposing a linear or monotonic left-right effect, and to allow for theoretically plausible non‑linearities. We also include gender (recoded into a binary variable where ‘female’ = 1), education level (coded as ‘1’ for those with a tertiary education), and self-perceived income status (with those considering themselves economically worse-off than the median person in their country coded as ‘1’, and ‘0’ otherwise). [vi] Model Estimation In addition to mapping the relationships between Ukraine support and the solidarity variables, we employ a series of linear regression models with country fixed effects. Because the dependent variable is a continuous 0-1 index, we estimate OLS models and interpret coefficients as percentage‑point shifts in mean support. Our modelling strategy involves progressively introducing different main predictors into the models to assess their singular and combined effects on support for Ukraine aid. Additionally, we employ robust standard errors clustered by country in all regression models to account for potential heteroscedasticity. Finally, to ensure that our results are nationally representative, the survey weights, calibrated to country-specific proportions of key demographics are applied in all stages of the analysis. Details on the inclusion of each variable are provided in Table A4 of the Appendix. RESULTS To test the hypotheses outlined above, Table 1 presents our full model (Model 4 in Appendix Table A4), which accounts for all relevant sociodemographic variables (age, gender, income, education), left-ideology, European identity, and most of all, solidarity profiles. Furthermore, this model incorporates reciprocity expectations of help at three geographical levels while also accounting for additional controls related to Russia, NATO and trust in the EU. The corresponding reduced specifications (Models 1-3) are summarised in Table A4 and reported in Table A6. Our results are consistent across these various specifications and when ‘Don’t know’ answers are excluded rather than recoded as midpoints (Table A7 in the Appendix).[vii] Table 1 reports coefficient estimates from our full OLS specification, including country fixed effects and the full set of covariates. Figure 1 visualizes the estimated coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) for the main predictors from this specification, holding the other covariates constant. Because the dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 1, coefficients can be interpreted as percentage‑point differences in mean support for Ukraine. First, we examine the Nationalist Aid Giver solidarity profile, which captures respondents who think of solidarity as nationally bounded. Although this group is numerous across EU countries, it does not differ significantly from the Self-focused , who are less concerned with solidarity at regional or other levels. However, the coefficient plots (i.e., Figure 1) indicate that Nationalist Aid Givers , while similar to he Self-focused , are significantly less supportive of aid to Ukraine compared to other solidarity profiles, supporting H1. [Insert Table 1 here] [Insert Figure 1 here] Second, profiles that locate solidaristic obligation beyond the nation-state are, on average, more supportive of aiding Ukraine. In the full specification, this pattern is clearest for National Europeanists , who treat their own country and the EU as jointly salient communities of solidarity: relative to the Self‑focused , they score 2.7 percentage points higher on the 0–1 Ukraine support index. This is consistent with H2, suggesting that solidaristic commitments oriented toward the EU can spill over to a European country that is formally outside the Union. By contrast, EU Aid Givers , for whom the EU is the primary locus of solidarity, are estimated to be slightly more supportive than the Self‑focused , but this difference is not statistically distinguishable from zero once controls are included. These associations persist after controlling for ideology, European identity, and our full set of sociodemographic controls. Compared to respondents identifying as “country only,” those who identify as European (only or equally European and national) and those who identify as national and European show 4.8 and 5.2 percentage‑point higher support, respectively. Third, the strongest support for Ukraine, compared to the reference category, comes from General Humanitarians, confirming Hypothesis 3. These individuals exhibit high levels of solidarity and do not adhere to strict "imaginary" boundaries, extending their circle of solidarity inclusively. This broad and inclusive sense of solidarity is evidenced by their substantial support for Ukraine during the crisis. Specifically, with a significant coefficient of 0.081 at the p < 0.001 level, transitioning from the Self-focused category (our reference category) to the General Humanitarians profile results in an 8.1-point increase in support for Ukraine on the aid scale, even when controlling for various other factors related to solidarity, including the expectation of help. While general attitudes on solidarity at various levels shape specific support for a country in need, our study also examines how the expectation of help from different sources (respondent’s own country, another EU country or a non-EU country) shapes and affects support for Ukraine aid. As a reminder, the assumption is that the expectation of help is a key factor in offering solidarity at the analogous geographical level. For Ukraine, as a non-EU country, the question is whether this reciprocity extends beyond the EU boundary. Specifically, will support for Ukraine be linked to the reciprocity felt at the EU or non-EU level? Interestingly, we find that the expectation of EU reciprocity is among the strongest predictors associated with support for Ukraine aid. When respondents believe that other EU countries would help their own region, support for aid to Ukraine is particularly high. This belief in EU reciprocity is associated with a 9.4-point increase in support for Ukraine aid. Substantively, this places EU reciprocity among the strongest predictors in the model, with an association comparable in magnitude to perceiving Russia as a threat, viewing NATO as important, and trusting the EU. In other words, respondents who feel that EU countries would reciprocate and assist in times of emergency are also the ones to extend help to Ukraine. This is a powerful confirmation of the importance of EU-level reciprocity. Expectations of help from within one’s own country also show a positive association with support for Ukraine, though to a lesser extent, with a statistically significant result at the p < 0.01 level and 1.8-points increase in support for Ukraine. This indicates that those who expect regional support within their own country are slightly more likely to support aid for Ukraine. Conversely, the expectation of help from non-EU countries does not show a significant association with support for Ukraine. This suggests that the sense of reciprocal support and solidarity is much stronger within the EU framework, highlighting once again the EU’s role in shaping attitudes towards extra-national aid. Overall, the full model presented in Table 1 explains more than a third of the variance in support for Ukraine (adjusted R² = 0.41; within-country adjusted R² = 0.34). These fit statistics summarize the model’s overall explanatory power, while the coefficient estimates and their confidence intervals indicate the magnitude and precision of the conditional associations for individual predictors. In general, our other controls behave as expected. We find that people who identify with the mainstream left are generally more supportive of aid to Ukraine at least in comparison to the centre and the extreme right. The coefficient sizes from Table 1 and the models presented in Table A6 in the Appendix demonstrate that the inclusion of European identity and solidarity profiles together reduces the impact of the ideology coefficient by about a third. Additionally, there is evidence that individuals identifying with the mainstream right also tend to support aid to Ukraine more than those identifying with the center.[viii]` Furthermore, the variables capturing attitudes pertaining to Russia, supranational organizations and institutional trust—namely, perceiving Russia as a threat, the importance of NATO, and trust in the European Union—are all significant predictors of support for Ukraine. The strongest of these is perceiving Russia as a threat, with a coefficient of 0.115 (p < 0.001), indicating that respondents who view Russia as a significant threat are 11.5 points more likely to support aid to Ukraine. Perceiving NATO as important, with a coefficient of 0.091 (p < 0.001), also appears to play a crucial role, meaning that those who see NATO as vital for their country's defense are more inclined to support Ukraine. Finally, trust in the European Union, with a coefficient of 0.080 (p < 0.001), shows that greater trust in EU institutions is associated with an 8-point increase in support for Ukraine. We also find that richer, more educated, older and male respondents are more supportive of Ukraine aid than poorer, less educated, younger and female respondents. All these relationships are depicted in Figure 1, where we show coefficient plots for all solidarity variables, alongside ideology and identity. Figure 1 highlights the importance of the ‘ general humanist ’ profile and the expectation of help at the EU country level vis-a-vis other solidarity profiles and forms of reciprocity. Table A7 in the Appendix offers insights to all the other variables we discuss above beyond solidarity profiles and norms of reciprocity. The association between belief in EU-level reciprocity and support for Ukraine suggests that Ukraine is viewed by many as an integral part of the European community rather than as an outsider. Additionally, there is a smaller (yet notable) association with expectations of assistance at the national level, indicating that expectations of mutual aid within the national community can coexist with, and even reinforce, support for extra-national assistance. This implies that a strong commitment to mutual aid and reciprocity within one's own community can also foster a broader sense of solidarity and willingness to assist others in need. It also underscores the importance of mutual aid perceptions in shaping solidarity beyond national borders. Assessing the Roots of Reciprocity at the EU Level Understanding how these perceptions of reciprocity form is crucial for comprehending the dynamics of European solidarity. While it is plausible that the expectation of help from EU countries is based on having previously received assistance from the EU, we test this proposition with three additional regression models. First, we gauge the impact of different levels of awareness of three EU initiatives—the Cohesion Fund , which targets economically lagging regions, and the SURE and Recovery Plan , which address COVID-19 economic repercussions—on the expectation of the respondent’s region receiving help in times of crisis from the EU.[ix] Second, we evaluate the impact of a positive assessment of the Cohesion Fund among those with ‘strong’ knowledge of the program. Third, we measure the extent to which respondents feel that their country is mostly a beneficiary of or contributor to the EU. These regression results are presented in Table 2 and 3. For all models presented in Tables 2 and 3, the dependent variable is the estimated likelihood of reciprocal help from another EU country, measured on a scale from 0 to 1. All models include the same set of controls as our main analysis, including sociodemographic variables (age, gender, income, education) and ideological position (with ‘Center’ as the reference category) as well as country fixed effects. [Insert Table 2 here] [Insert Figure 2 here] [Insert Table 3 here] Finally, the model presented in Table 3 examines whether respondents view their country as a beneficiary or contributor to the EU. This third model indicates that respondents who perceive their country as a beneficiary are significantly more likely to expect help from the EU, with a 26.3 point increase (p < 0.001), see also Figure 3. Once again, this finding highlights the role of perceived benefits from the EU in shaping expectations of reciprocal support. [Insert Figure 3 here] Overall, these three models demonstrate that knowledge (i.e., awareness), and positive evaluations of EU financial programs (and the EU as a whole) are positively associated with the belief that EU countries would assist in a hypothetical crisis. This association is particularly pronounced for positive evaluations of the EU Cohesion fund. This sense of reciprocity, in other words, is built on the experience and perception of EU help in action. Furthermore, the perception of one’s country as more of a beneficiary than a contributor to EU funds is also strongly related to the expectation of help from the EU. As we have shown in Table 1, this expectation of help is a strong predictor of support for Ukraine, reinforcing the importance of expectations of help in shaping solidarity beyond national borders. This connection suggests that fostering positive perceptions of the EU and its financial programs can significantly enhance public support for general solidarity and international aid initiatives, such as those directed towards Ukraine. CONCLUSION In this article, we sought to understand how general attitudes of solidarity map onto support for a concrete case: aid to Ukraine. We identified and developed two crucial, previously understudied dimensions of general solidarity. First, we created solidarity profiles that recover how individuals bound solidarity across three arenas (national, EU, non‑EU). Our analysis reveals that general humanitarians are the most consistently supportive of Ukraine, while other profiles that extend that solidarity beyond the nation and the EU also show significant support for Ukraine aid. Conversely, Nationalist Aid Givers exhibit low support for Ukraine, similar to the Self-focused. These profiles offer a parsimonious classification that helps explain patterns of reactions to different crises, both within and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state or the EU. They also help account for within‑ and between‑country variation in support for cross‑border assistance. Second, in theorizing solidarity, we introduced a new perspective that more explicitly considers its bounded nature and the centrality of reciprocity. Solidarity is embedded in communities that create obligations to help but also lead to expectations of reciprocal support. This perspective has often been missing in existing accounts of solidarity. Solidarity in this sense is bounded , yet those boundaries differ across individuals. Our findings show that reciprocity at the EU level is strongly associated with support for Ukraine aid. We also show that this sense of EU-level reciprocity is closely linked to awareness and positive evaluations of EU programs and transfers. To put it differently, this experienced solidarity and perceived reciprocity appears to underpin higher support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Similarly, a strong EU identity is independently associated with increased support for Ukraine. These findings indicate that EU benefits and identity can spill over to a proximate non-EU country in Europe. Future research on solidarity should leverage these ideas and measures of reciprocity and boundedness to explain at least some part of the variation in crisis-time solidarity. In sum, our work points to the importance of understanding how solidarity is structured within states, as well as within and across Europe. By exploring the specific case of support for Ukraine, we identify the types of solidarity profiles that are associated with the most aid, demonstrating that solidarity confined to one’s own country alone is insufficient. High obligations toward one's own country can result in inward-looking nationalism that doesn't extend to other nations. However, this national solidarity can also be embedded within broader solidarities that even cross boundaries—both within supranational communities like the EU and in more humanitarian, boundary-less profiles. As we note, our findings indicate that humanitarian profiles are likely to provide unwavering support, whereas support from other profiles appears contingent on the EU’s performance and its ability to maintain visible and credible mutual-assistance programs. These appear to foster a sense of common identity and are perceived as beneficial to its member states. Future research should further explore when and how institutions activate reciprocity expectations and shift the boundaries of solidarity in times of crisis. Declarations Author Contribution DS developed the survey measures and developed the basic frame of the project. She also wrote the first draft of the frontend and literature review, and she also revised and worked with TGP on the analysis itself as well as the analysis section of the paper. TGP conducted the entire statistical analyses and conributed to the ideas of the article. He also wrote the first draft of the analysis section and he also revised and contributed to the front end. AH contributed with her expertise on the study of soldarity, participated in the direction of the piece, and in the writing and revision process of the entir article. Acknowledgement The authors thank the participants of the European Solidarity EUI-YouGov workshop at the European University Intitute in May 2024 for the excellent comments. Furthermore, an earlier version of the paper was presented at the European Soldarity Conference in Lisbon in July 2024. Data Availability The SiE surveys that support the findings of this study are available from EUI-YouGov project website as well as from data suppositories Cadmus. https://europeangovernanceandpolitics.eui.eu/project/eui-yougov-solidarity-in-europe-project/ References Akaliyski, P., and Reeskens, T. (2023). Ukrainian values: between the Slavic-Orthodox legacy and Europe’s allure. European Societies , 1-30. Alvarez, L., Boussalis, C., Merolla, J., and Peiffer, C. (2017) Love thy neighbor: Social identity and public support for humanitarian aid. Development Policy Review. 36(S2), O935-O953. Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (2nd ed.). Verso. Anghel, V., and Jones, E. (2023). Is Europe really forged through crisis? Pandemic EU and the Russia–Ukraine war. Journal of European Public Policy, 30(4), 766-786. Baker, A. (2015). Race, Paternalism, and Foreign Aid: Evidence from US Public Opinion. American Political Science Review, 109 (1), 93-109. doi:10.1017/S0003055414000549. Banting, K., and Kymlicka, W. (2017). Introduction: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies. In K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (Eds.), The strains of commitment: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies (pp. 1-58). Oxford University Press. Bauböck, R. (2017). Citizenship and collective identities as political sources of solidarity in the European Union. In K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (Eds.), The strains of commitment: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies (pp. 80-106). Oxford University Press. Bauhr, M., and Charron, N. (2023). ‘All hands on deck’ or separate lifeboats? Public support for European economic solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic. Journal of European Public Policy , 30 (6), 1092-1118. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2077809 Bobzien, L., and Kalleitner, F. (2021). Attitudes towards European financial solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic : Evidence from a net-contributor country. European Societies , 23 (sup1), S791-S804. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2020.1836669 Bodenstein, T., and Faust, J. (2017). Who cares? European public opinion on foreign aid and political conditionality. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies , 55 (5), 955-973. Bøggild, T., Göbel, S., Lutscher, P., and Nyrup, J. (2024). Standing with Ukraine? How citizens trade off self-interest and principles in supporting war-torn international partners. Research and Politics , 11(2). Burelli, C. (2018). Solidarity, stability and enlightened self-interest in the EU. Politiche Sociali, Social Policies , 3, 449-464. Chen, Y., Jiang, J., Wang, L., and Wang, R. (2023). Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian-Ukrainian war. Energy Reports, 9 , 3082–3095. Clasen, P. (2024). Treating nations like people: How responsibility attributions shape citizens’ fiscal solidarity with other EU countries. Journal of European Social Policy , 09589287241229669. Durkheim, E. (2019). The division of labor in society. In Social Stratification, Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, Second Edition (pp. 178-183). Routledge. Eschweiler, J., Svensson, S., Mocca, E., Cartwright, A., and Villadsen Nielsen, L. (2019). The reciprocity dimension of solidarity: Insights from three European countries. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations , 30(3), 549-561. Fernández, Ó. (2023). The impact of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine on public opinion on the EU and European security. Journal of European Integration , 45(3), 463-485. Ganderson, J., Schelkle, W., and Truchlewski, Z. (2023). Who is afraid of emergency politics? Public opinion on European crisis management during Covid-19. Comparative European Politics , 21 (4), 470-490. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00329-5. Genschel, P., Hemerijck, A., Stolle, D., Cicchi, L., Russo, L., Shakespeare, S., and van Parys, J. (2023). EUI-YouGov Solidarity in Europe (SiE) survey . European University Institute. Available from EUI Research Data Repository, Cadmus. Genschel, P. (2022). Bellicist integration? The war in Ukraine, the European Union and core state powers. Journal of European Public Policy, 29 (12), 1885–1900. Genschel, P., and Hemerijck, A. (2018). Solidarity in Europe . https://doi.org/10.2870/106143. Grasso, M. T., and Lahusen, C. (2020). Solidarity in Europe: A comparative account of citizens’ attitudes and practices. In C. Lahusen (Ed.), Citizens’ solidarity in Europe: Civic engagement and public discourse in times of crises (pp. 29–54). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Heermann, M., Koos, S., and Leuffen, D. (2023). Who Deserves European Solidarity? How Recipient Characteristics Shaped Public Support for International Medical and Financial Aid during COVID-19. British Journal of Political Science , 53 (2), 629-651. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000357 Herrmann, R. K., Tetlock, P. E., and Visser, P. S. (1999). Mass public decisions to go to war: A cognitive-interactionist framework. American Political Science Review, 93 (3), 553–573. Hoffmann, I. (2023) Anxious we stand: Despite worries, Europeans Remain steadfast in support for Ukraine, available at https://globaleurope.eu/europes-future/anxious-we-stand-despite-worries-europeans-remain-steadfast-in-support-for-ukraine/. Kim, D. (2013). Beliefs in foreign policy goals and American citizens support for foreign aid. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 6 (1), 41–70. König, P. (2023). Forms of national and European identity: A research note reviewing literature of cross-national studies. Nationalities Papers , 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2023.66 Lahusen, C., and Grasso, M. (2018). Solidarity in Europe–European solidarity : An introduction. Solidarity in Europe: Citizens’ Responses in Times of Crisis , 1-18. Lengfeld, H., and Kley, F. K. (2021). Conditioned solidarity : EU citizens’ attitudes towards economic and social austerities for crisis countries receiving financial aid. Acta Politica , 56 (2), 330-350. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-020-00179-z Lengfeld, H., and Kroh, M. (2016). Solidarity with EU countries in crisis : Results of a 2015 Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey. DIW Economic Bulletin , 6 (39), 473-479. Liadze, I., C. Macchiarelli, P. Mortimer-Lee, and P.S. Juanino. 2023. Economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war. The World Economy 46 (4): 874–886. Mariotto, C., and Pellegata, A. (2023). Should EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity. Comparative European Politics , 21 (1), 42-63. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00301-9 Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays . Cambridge University Press. Marshall, T. H. (1963). Sociology at the crossroads . London, UK: Heinemann. Milner, H. V., and Tingley, D. (2013). The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy. The Review of International Organizations, 8 (3), 313–341. Miller, D. (2002). Are they my poor? The problem of altruism in the world of strangers. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 5 (4), 106-127. Moise, A. D., Dennison, J., and Kriesi, H. (2024). European attitudes to refugees after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. West European Politics , 47 (2), 356-381. Molm, L. D., Collett, J. L., and Schaefer, D. R. (2007). Building solidarity through generalized exchange: A theory of reciprocity. American journal of sociology , 113 (1), 205-242. Nicoli, F., Kuhn, T., and Burgoon, B. (2020) Collective Identities, European Solidarity: Identification Patterns and Preferences for European Social Insurance. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies , 58: 76–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12977. Noël, A., and Thérien, J.-P. (1995). From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign aid. International Organization , 49(3), 523–553. Oana, I. E., and Truchlewski, Z. (2023). Bounded solidarity? Experimental evidence on cross‐national bonding in the EU during the COVID crisis. European Journal of Political Research. Paxton, P., and Knack, S. (2012). Individual and country-level factors affecting support for foreign aid. International Political Science Review , 33 (2), 171-192. Petrov, Roman. 2023. "Bumpy Road of Ukraine Towards the EU Membership in Time of War: ‘Accession Through War’ v ‘Gradual Integration’." European Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration 2023.3 (2023): 1057-1065. Powers, K. E., Kertzer, J. D., Brooks, D. J., and Brooks, S. G. (2021). What’s fair in international politics? Equity, equality, and foreign policy attitudes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66 (2), 217-245. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211041393. Pupcenoks, J., and Klein, G. R. (2022). First Georgia, then Ukraine: How Russian propaganda justifies invasions. Ethics and International Affairs . Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy . Princeton University Press. Rathbun, B. C., Powers, K. E., and Anders, T. (2019). Moral hazard: German public opinion on the Greek debt crisis. Political Psychology, 40 (3), 523-541. Scotto, T., Reifler, J., Hudson, D., and VanHeerde-Hudson, J. (2017). We Spend How Much? Misperceptions, Innumeracy, and Support for the Foreign Aid in the United States and Great Britain. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 4 (2), 119-128. Doi:10.1017/XPS.2017.6 Silva, B. C., Wäckerle, J. and Christopher W. (2022) Determinants of public opinion support for a full embargo on Russian energy in Germany. ECONtribute Discussion Paper Series. Tamir, Y. (1995). Liberal nationalism . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., and Schramm, S. (2023). The Ukraine support tracker: which countries help Ukraine and how? (No. 2218). KIEL Working Paper. Unger, D., Sirsch, J., Stockemer, D., and Niemann, A. (2023). What guides citizen support for redistributive EU measures as a response to COVID-19: Justice attitudes, self-interest or support for European integration? European Union Politics , 24 (3), 578-600. https://doi-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1177/14651165231166284 van Oorschot, W. (1998). Shared identity and shared utility: On solidarity and its motives. Tilburg: Tilburg Institute for Social Sciences. Verhaegen, S. (2018). What to expect from European identity? Explaining support for solidarity in times of crisis. Comparative European Politics , 16 (5), 871-904. Vrânceanu, A., Dinas, E., Heidland, T., and Ruhs, M. (2023). The European refugee crisis and public support for the externalisation of migration management. European Journal of Political Research , 62 (4), 1146-1167. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12565 Wallaschek, S., Starke, C., and Brüning, C. (2020). Solidarity in the Public Sphere : A Discourse Network Analysis of German Newspapers (2008–2017). Politics and Governance , 8 (2), 257-271. Young, I. M. (2006). Responsibility and global justice: A social connection model. Social Philosophy and Policy, 23 (1), 102-130. Footnotes The EU countries included in the sample are Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia. The UK was excluded due to modifications in the wording of key questions related to the EU. We conducted tests on the inclusion of ‘Don’t know’ answers into the midpoint of the dependent variable scale. Our findings remain stable and consistent across various tests, and the inclusion of these responses expands the sample size (N) by over 4,000 observations. This considerable increase in sample size, coupled with the consistency observed in our results, confirms that integrating the ‘Don't know’ responses as midpoint do not affect the reliability of our results. The ‘Other’ profiles exhibit diverse patterns of solidarity not captured by the five predefined solidarity profiles. At the aggregate level, this group shows moderate average solidarity toward regions within their own country (mean = 0.59) and other EU countries (mean = 0.58), but higher average solidarity toward non-EU countries (mean = 0.74). At the same time, the confidence intervals point to considerable within-group dispersion on all three items, underlining the heterogeneous and residual nature of this category. Figure A3 further illustrates this heterogeneity by plotting the distribution of solidarity scores at each level for respondents in the ‘Other’ profile. We further explore the validity and distinctions across the solidarity profiles through additional bivariate statistical tests, specifically an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), as well as a post-hoc Tukey multiple comparison of means test. Refer to Appendix II for details. The exact question wording asks respondents: ‘Some people talk about ‘left,’ ‘right’ and ‘centre’ to describe parties and politicians. With this in mind, where would you place yourself on this scale?’ The original variable had 7 categories, we collapse ‘fairly’ and ‘very’ at each extreme as there were fewer cases in the highest and lowest categories. Bars indicate support for Ukraine on four items (military aid, humanitarian aid, acceptance of higher energy costs as well as EU membership of Ukraine, rescaled to be between 0–1, alpha = 0.75). Furthermore, Table A5 of the Appendix provide the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for all the independent variables for Models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Overall, the VIF values provided in these tables help confirm that multicollinearity is not a severe issue in any of our models, ensuring that the model parameters can be accurately estimated. For reference, Models 1, 2, 3, and 4—which respectively include SES, ideology, and European identity (Model 1); SES, ideology, and solidarity profiles (Model 2); SES, ideology, and expectations of help (Model 3); and SES, ideology, European identity, solidarity profiles, and expectations of help (Model 4)—are summarised in Table A4 in the Appendix . Additionally, results for Models 1, 2, and 3 are detailed in Table A6 , and Table A7 reproduces Models 1–4 with ‘Don’t know’ answers excluded from the analyses instead of being recoded as midpoints. In general, all of our results show that the respondents who are unsure about ideological placement, and national/European identity (the ‘don’t know’ category) are less likely to support Ukraine. The ‘don’t know’ categories for the solidarity items are coded at the middle of the scale. The latter two programs were addressed using a split sample approach. Therefore, we combined these two questions into one variable before incorporating the Recovery Plan. The questions inquired whether respondents had heard of the program, knew more about it, and, for those who did, evaluated its effect on their own country. Tables Table 1. Multiple Regression: Determinants of Support for Ukraine in the EU DV: Support for Ukraine Territorial Identity: European Only/European and Country (Ref: Country Only) 0.048** (0.013) Territorial Identity: Country and European (Ref: Country Only) 0.052*** (0.005) Profile: Nationalist Aid Giver (Ref: Self-focused) -0.024*** (0.005) Profile: EU Aid giver (Ref: Self-focused) 0.006 (0.010) Profile: National Europeanist (Ref: Self-focused) 0.027** (0.007) Profile: General Humanitarian (Ref: Self-focused) 0.081*** (0.007) Profile: Other (Ref: Self-focused) 0.015*** (0.003) Russia Presents a Threat (0-1) 0.115*** (0.008) Importance of NATO (0-1) 0.091*** (0.008) Trust in the European Union (0-1) 0.080*** (0.007) Expectation of Help: Region Within Own Country 0.018+ (0.009) Expectation of Help: EU Country 0.094*** (0.009) Expectation of Help: Non-EU Country 0.011 (0.007) Ideology: Extreme Left (Ref: Center) 0.024** (0.008) Ideology: Left (Ref: Center) 0.016* (0.006) Ideology: Right (Ref: Center) 0.015* (0.007) Ideology: Extreme Right (Ref: Center) -0.009 (0.013) Num.Obs. 22199 R2 Adj. 0.412 R2 Within Adj. 0.335 RMSE 0.19 FE: Country X Notes. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. None of these/Don't know" for territorial identity and "No ideology" for ideology have been omitted from the table. Dependent variable is Mean Support for Ukraine (0-1). OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country; survey weights are applied. Because the outcome is scaled from 0 to 1, coefficients can be interpreted as percentage‑point differences in mean support for Ukraine. None of these/Don't know" for territorial identity and "No ideology" for ideology have been omitted from the table. The full output is available in Table A6 of the Appendix and another version of the regression without the cases that indicated Don't know can be found below in Table A7. Table 2. Correlates of Expectation of Help from the EU Some and Strong Knowledge of EU initiatives Model Cohesion Fund Assessment (‘Strong Knowledge’ Respondents only) Model Age 0.029* 0.050+ (0.013) (0.027) Female 0.002 -0.003 (0.005) (0.012) Low Income -0.032*** -0.008 (0.005) (0.016) College Educated 0.022*** 0.023* (0.004) (0.009) Some and Strong Knowledge 0.032*** (0.005) Ideology: Extreme Left 0.001 -0.001 (0.010) (0.015) Ideology: Left 0.024** 0.028 (0.008) (0.019) Ideology: Right -0.003 0.029 (0.013) (0.018) Ideology: Extreme Right -0.026+ -0.021 (0.015) (0.026) Ideology: No Ideology -0.036*** -0.007 (0.007) (0.014) Cohesion Fund Assessment 0.380*** (0.024) Num.Obs. 22199 3066 R2 Adj. 0.034 0.136 R2 Within Adj. 0.038 0.138 RMSE 0.28 0.28 FE: Country X X + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Table 3. Correlates of Considering Country as Beneficiary or Contributor to the EU Beneficiary or Contributor to the EU Model Age 0.042** (0.011) Female 0.002 (0.005) Low Income -0.029*** (0.004) College Educated 0.017** (0.004) EU Contributor (0) or Beneficiary (1) 0.263*** (0.013) Ideology: Extreme Left -0.003 (0.008) Ideology: Left 0.019* (0.007) Ideology: Right 0.003 (0.009) Ideology: Extreme Right -0.007 (0.011) Ideology: No Ideology -0.034*** (0.007) Num.Obs. 22199 R2 Adj. 0.091 R2 Within 0.072 R2 Within Adj. 0.071 RMSE 0.27 FE: Country X + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files APPENDIX.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Reviewers invited by journal 26 Jan, 2026 Editor assigned by journal 11 Jan, 2026 Submission checks completed at journal 11 Jan, 2026 First submitted to journal 11 Jan, 2026 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8571891","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":581383926,"identity":"c5e30484-26d3-4f5b-988e-0af7ccaa92b0","order_by":0,"name":"Dietlind Stolle","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"McGill University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Dietlind","middleName":"","lastName":"Stolle","suffix":""},{"id":581383927,"identity":"33d21345-ea66-4182-b262-77c6abaed758","order_by":1,"name":"Thomas Gareau-Paquette","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Cornell University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Thomas","middleName":"","lastName":"Gareau-Paquette","suffix":""},{"id":581383928,"identity":"b21db046-b2f4-471b-8042-8fef26bc30c4","order_by":2,"name":"Allison Harell","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Quebec in Montreal","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Allison","middleName":"","lastName":"Harell","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-01-11 06:53:10","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8571891/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8571891/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":101414167,"identity":"70806660-5753-4ca0-8017-868c4d492657","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-29 12:22:30","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":179106,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eModel with Solidarity Profiles and Expectations of Help\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\n \u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eNotes. Coefficients are from the OLS model reported in Table 1 with country fixed effects; robust standard errors are clustered by country and survey weights are applied. Points indicate coefficient estimates and bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1. Coefficients represent percentage‑point differences in mean support for Ukraine.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8571891/v1/55c9b325e8c5732b6dd560aa.png"},{"id":101414168,"identity":"a626cf89-18c1-4802-aeda-4f70248e4039","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-29 12:22:30","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":134596,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eCorrelates of Expectation of Help from the EU\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first model, which includes respondents with both some and strong knowledge, our results indicate a clear positive relationship, with a statistically significant increase of 3.2 points in the expectation of EU help. This finding underscores that a higher level of awareness, whether basic or comprehensive, enhances the expectation of reciprocity from the EU. The second model focuses on respondents with a strong understanding of the Cohesion Fund (N = 3,066). The results show a robust association between positive assessments of the Cohesion Fund and expectations of EU help. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the positive evaluation of the Cohesion Fund translates to a statistically significant 38-point increase in the expectation of help from the EU. This substantial increase underscores the importance of positive experiences and perceptions of EU initiatives in fostering a sense of reciprocity.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8571891/v1/d242d085953045766adc0601.png"},{"id":101751392,"identity":"90c211f2-405a-42c5-bb04-cc562a450765","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-03 10:19:57","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":80401,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eCorrelates of Considering Country as Beneficiary or Contributor to the EU\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8571891/v1/7e4ae8b9489873f94c913f7c.png"},{"id":101880423,"identity":"13926d11-0fbc-4f88-a39b-6a73dd47bc56","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-04 15:00:52","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1230157,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8571891/v1/2a51146b-541c-4a26-8754-5e01ecfe0ac0.pdf"},{"id":101414171,"identity":"e2ea4c56-7180-4d2f-ae66-0129e955c419","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-29 12:22:30","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":728806,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"APPENDIX.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8571891/v1/36012c54c3aebe26c3b1b770.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"From Local to Global? Assessing European Solidarity through the Lens of Ukraine Aid","fulltext":[{"header":"INTRODUCTION","content":"\u003cp\u003eTimes of crises often mobilize help, cooperation and solidarity. However, how do crises abroad channel public support to extend solidarity beyond national boundaries? \u0026nbsp;While our understanding of how the public perceives its obligations to countries beyond national boundaries remains limited, there has been extensive interest in how the European Union (EU) might create alternate or complementary boundaries of identity and solidarity (for a recent review, see K\u0026ouml;nig, 2023). In this article, we use the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an avenue to explore the nature of Europeans\u0026rsquo; sense of obligation and solidarity towards other Europeans currently outside of the boundaries of the EU.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEuropean governments reacted swiftly and with a high level of unity and commitment to Ukraine. They displayed solidarity by calling for Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s admission to the EU, by the EU imposing sanctions on members of Putin\u0026rsquo;s regime, Russian state enterprises, banks and other Russian organizations, and through a partial ban on Russian energy purchases. European states also contributed significant military resources to Ukraine, for example, by training the Ukrainian military and by drawing on their own national reserves to provide additional military supplies. The EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time in its history to welcome Ukrainian refugees and facilitate their relocation across states. Some of these measures, especially the energy embargo and economic sanctions, were seen as costly by European governments due to potential negative short-term economic impacts, such as price pressures on consumers and fueling inflation (Anghel and Jones, 2023; Chen \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023; Liadze \u003cem\u003eet al.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e, 2023). While support by governments within the EU is well documented, we know less about how European publics understood the crisis in Ukraine. Was it a foreign war in which they had little stake, or were they motivated to help based on a larger sense of European or even global solidarity?\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn this article, we examine how support for Ukraine aid is embedded in the overall solidarity patterns of the European public. More specifically, we develop a novel understanding of how national identities may be entrenched within larger political communities, such as a sense of Europeanness or a more humanitarian, borderless sense of obligation. In particular, our focus is on better understanding two mechanisms that shape solidarity: the level and radius of solidarity. Using these mechanisms, we develop both innovative \u0026lsquo;solidarity profiles\u0026rsquo; and measures of perceptions of reciprocity, a key yet understudied component of solidarity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur analysis relies on the EUI-YouGov Solidarity in Europe (SiE) Survey conducted in April 2023, which includes responses from 22,000 people across 16 EU countries (Genschel \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023). This survey features both standard measures, such as levels of European identity and ideology, and novel questions designed to \u0026quot;benchmark\u0026quot; solidarity toward one\u0026rsquo;s own country, other EU countries, and non-EU countries. Using these solidarity benchmarks, we develop five unique solidarity profiles that capture the scope and degree of solidarity European citizens feel toward others more generally. We also examine differences in expectations of reciprocity within a country, within the EU, and from non-EU countries when one\u0026rsquo;s own region requires help. We then use these profiles to explore how feelings of solidarity translate to support for Ukraine aid. The results provide insight into the nature of political support for Ukraine in Europe, but also a broader contrast between competing forms of national and supranational identifications. On the one hand, we explore who sees national communities as bounded, restricting obligations to help those within the country. National communities can also be understood as embedded in broader European or even global perceptions of community, where feelings of solidarity and reciprocity extend beyond state boundaries. \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn this paper, we first elucidate the theory of solidarity with a particular emphasis on the boundaries of both giving and receiving help from others, with the national community as the benchmark. Our argument is that two aspects of solidarity research have been undervalued: the extent to which citizens distinguish between their national obligations compared to obligations beyond the nation-state, and expectations of reciprocity. We focus on the level and radius of solidarity felt by citizens. We suggest that understanding citizens\u0026rsquo; feelings of obligation toward their national political community is not enough to comprehend how they react to crises beyond their borders. Rather, we need to distinguish how citizens benchmark extra-national obligations against national ones (see Alvarez \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2017). We then apply these theoretical considerations on solidarity and reciprocity to the case of Ukraine aid and develop the hypotheses to be tested. We do so by creating distinct solidarity profiles that help to predict solidaristic behavior in different kinds of crises. To test these solidarity profiles, we apply them to a specific form of solidarity which is located outside of both the nation-state and the political community of the EU: support for Ukraine aid. \u0026nbsp;Our results show that support for aid to Ukraine varies among European citizens based on the radius of their obligations, as well as whether they believe other EU states are reciprocating. In doing so, this article provides a much-needed correction to the literature on solidarity, centring the importance \u0026ndash; and fluidity \u0026ndash; of boundaries that structure people\u0026rsquo;s beliefs about their own obligations and the extent to which others in a larger pan-European society are meeting them. \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSOLIDARITY BENCHMARKING AND SOLIDARITY PROFILESS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSolidarity represents a set of \u0026lsquo;attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need\u0026rsquo; (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017, p. 3). Theorizing about solidarity has been central to understanding modern societies. For Durkheim, for example, the increasing social division of labour created a new form of solidarity where, despite differences across groups, the individual was functionally interdependent on others, and this leads to a collective sense of responsibility, or cohesion between individuals that relies in part on a collective consciousness that rests on shared institutions (Durkheim, 2019). Such institutions, over time, developed a new form of social citizenship according to T.H. Marshall (1950), where membership within a political community is directly related to access to the welfare state. Solidarity, in this sense, emerges as an obligation to others to whom we feel some commonality, and can be institutionalized and put into practice through institutions.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWith the development of the modern nation-state and regimes of national citizenship, solidarity has been expressed in terms of the nation-state. For Anderson (1991, p. 6), these nations are conceived as \u0026lsquo;a deep, horizontal comradeship.\u0026rsquo; The expression of this comradeship is through our willingness to bear costs for other members of this community, which has often been institutionalized through the state and its institutions. The resulting \u0026lsquo;sense of national we-ness is the source of a commitment to protection and redistribution amongst co-nationals\u0026rsquo; (Author, 2022, p. 102). \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSolidarity then implies mutual aid to a larger collectivity. It is often taken for granted that solidarity extends to the national boundary, yet a sense of interconnectedness and shared identity can emerge above as well as below the nation-state. This raises the question of to whom we extend solidarity. Might we expect citizens of European nations to expand their obligations beyond the confines of their nation-states or even their wider political community, the European Union? Under what circumstances might they feel compelled to assist others? \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWithin nation-states, political communities are defined by territorial boundaries and formal rules of citizenship that determine access to state benefits and to civil, political, and social rights (Marshall, 1963). Citizenship creates what Tamir (1995) calls an \u0026lsquo;ethical community,\u0026rsquo; generating mutual obligations among members and a greater willingness to bear the costs of solidarity within national borders. At the same time, national communities not only define insiders but also demarcate those outside the circle of solidarity. A large literature shows that national identities are often constructed in exclusionary ways, making the nation the primary object of solidarity. Consistent with this, citizens tend to support domestic over international policies: for instance, in the 2008 American National Election Survey, 44% of Americans favored cutting foreign aid while 79% supported increased education spending (Milner and Tingley, 2013), and weaker national identity correlates with greater humanitarian aid support (Alvarez \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2017). Public support for foreign aid is generally low\u0026mdash;partly because citizens overestimate how much their country spends (Scotto \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2017). Overall, we call this solidarity profile \u003cstrong\u003enationalist;\u003c/strong\u003e expecting that those who prioritize the nation relative to other political communities will be least likely to support aid to Ukraine.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis raises the question: why might some individuals extend solidarity beyond national boundaries? In other words, how can national or ingroup solidarity be broadened to include outsiders? One important factor is the presence of collective identities that transcend the nation-state. A sense of belonging to larger political communities\u0026mdash;such as the European Union\u0026mdash;can reduce the tension between national and wider forms of solidarity. Research consistently shows that identities beyond the nation-state foster obligations toward others: Nicoli \u003cem\u003eet al.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e (2020), for example, find that European identity is associated with support for cross-national redistribution, while Rathbun \u003cem\u003eet al.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e (2018) showed that stronger European identity predicts support for bailing out another EU member state. Although Baub\u0026ouml;ck (2017) is cautious about the EU as a fully consolidated political community, he argues that Europeans can nonetheless share a collective identity rooted in narratives of common membership.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn sum, when European identity supersedes national identity, individuals are more willing to express solidarity across borders. We therefore distinguish a solidarity profile characterized by those who privilege a European identity over a national one, and label this group the \u003cstrong\u003eEU aid givers\u003c/strong\u003e. For this group, Europe, and not the member state, is the primary reference community, making support for assisting another European country a natural expression of solidarity. We expect them to strongly support aid to Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA third solidarity profile reflects individuals who prioritize national solidarity but are willing to extend support beyond national borders under certain conditions. Rather than rooting solidarity exclusively in national or transnational communities, these \u0026lsquo;\u003cstrong\u003eNational Europeanist aid givers\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026rsquo; operate with a hierarchy of identities: national identity comes first, but broader European solidarity can be activated when the situation or recipient is seen as worthy or when self-interest is served (Alvarez \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2017; Burelli, 2018). Such solidarity is often conditional and sometimes tinged with paternalism (Baker, 2015). Like domestic solidaristic behavior, it is shaped by the perceived costs of aid, the identity of the beneficiaries, and the expectation that others will also contribute (Miller, 2002). For instance, Rathbun \u003cem\u003eet al.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e (2019) show that compassionate individuals support foreign assistance during the Greek bailout, but this is moderated by the strength of national attachment; similarly, beliefs about fairness increase support, again conditional on national identity (see also Powers \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2021). In short, this solidarity extends beyond national boundaries when reciprocity, fairness, or self-interest are at stake. From this profile, we expect cautious, conditional, and reflective support for aid to Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, one type of solidarity profile is grounded in humanitarianism. Citizens in stable democracies, who typically have greater resources, are often expected to feel an obligation to assist those who are worse off globally (Alvarez \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e2018; Young, 2006). Global or generalized solidarity transcends political and social boundaries and aligns closely with altruism\u0026mdash;that is, helping others without an expectation of reciprocity. Individuals with this orientation, whom we label \u003cstrong\u003eGeneral humanitarians,\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eshould be the most supportive of providing aid to countries outside their own political community, basing their solidarity on humanitarian values rather than identity boundaries or strategic considerations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAt the opposite end of this spectrum are individuals who reject extending solidarity to anyone beyond themselves. Regardless of the radius of obligation\u0026mdash;national, European, or global\u0026mdash;these individuals show little inclination to support others. We refer to this group as \u003cstrong\u003eSelf-focused\u003c/strong\u003e.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, other factors are also likely to influence people\u0026rsquo;s general willingness to support foreign aid. For example, ideology should influence support, with people on the left being more willing to support foreign aid (Bodenstein and Faust 2017). In short, the \u0026lsquo;left\u0026rsquo; is traditionally though not exclusively associated with a strong state domestically, while also supporting the state\u0026rsquo;s role in assisting those in need beyond national borders. In this sense, solidarity in the national realm should be exported to other countries beyond national boundaries based on ideology.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn sum, solidarity refers to whom individuals feel obliged to offer help in times of need or crisis. What is often missing from existing scholarship, however, is a clear delineation of the boundaries within which solidarity is expected to operate. In the European context, we argue that citizens hold distinct solidarity profiles that reflect how they perceive their relevant political communities. These profiles capture the different boundaries and benchmarks individuals apply when deciding to whom obligations extend. Although prior work has discussed nationalist and generalized/global identities in the context of humanitarian aid (Alvarez \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2017), our typology provides a more comprehensive framework that incorporates multiple possible radii of solidarity. Importantly, these profiles are designed to operate beyond purely humanitarian settings and capture broader patterns of how citizens define, limit, and extend solidarity in international crises.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIdentifying the boundaries of solidarity tells us to whom people feel obligations, but it does not fully elucidate the motivations behind helping behavior. Solidarity is not only about who counts as \u0026lsquo;one of us,\u0026rsquo; but also about whether assistance is expected to be mutual. Thus, in addition to solidarity profiles, we must consider the logic of reciprocity\u0026mdash;how expectations about others\u0026rsquo; contributions influence one\u0026rsquo;s own support for aid. The next section develops this second pillar of our framework.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRECIPROCITY AND THE EXPECTATION OF HELP\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIf solidarity involves obligations to help, it also inherently raises questions about reciprocity. As Oorschot (1998) notes, one of the most common reactions the Dutch public expressed when faced with someone in need was, \u0026lsquo;What have you, or can you, do for us?\u0026rsquo; This highlights a central insight: expectations of reciprocity shape solidaristic behavior. Research distinguishes between different forms of reciprocity. Molm \u003cem\u003eet al. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e(2007) argue that \u003cem\u003eindirect\u003c/em\u003e reciprocity\u0026mdash;generalized exchanges within a chain of actors, can generate stronger solidarity than direct, one-to-one exchanges. Empirically, Grasso and Lahusen (2020) show that reciprocity is a major determinant of support for fiscal solidarity within the EU, while Eschweiler \u003cem\u003eet al.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e (2019) find that reciprocity thrives where political institutions are trusted and seen as fair arbiters. Similarly, in the context of economic crises, Lengfeld \u003cem\u003eet al.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e (2015) demonstrate that solidarity depends on a general principle of reciprocity rather than the recipient country\u0026rsquo;s immediate ability to return the favor. During the COVID-19 pandemic, shared norms and expectations of reciprocity strongly shaped public support for EU financial assistance, with respondents more willing to help countries perceived as respecting fundamental EU values (Heermann \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHow can reciprocity matter for Ukraine, where \u003cem\u003edirect\u003c/em\u003e reciprocity is unlikely in the short term? The key lies in \u003cem\u003egeneralized\u003c/em\u003e reciprocity at the national, EU, and global levels. Citizens may support aiding Ukraine because they believe their own country is part of a broader system in which others are also contributing. In this view, individuals\u0026rsquo; preferences are shaped by their perceptions of whether \u003cem\u003eother countries\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;especially fellow EU members\u0026mdash;are doing their share. However, the survey does not include a direct item measuring whether respondents think other countries are \u0026lsquo;doing their share\u0026rsquo; specifically in relation to Ukraine aid. We therefore operationalize reciprocity beliefs using respondents\u0026rsquo; expectations of receiving help in a major crisis, which captures whether individuals view the national community and, crucially, the EU as a system of mutual assistance in which help is expected to flow both ways when needed. This logic differs from humanitarian altruism, which is rooted in moral obligation regardless of others\u0026rsquo; behavior. If Europeans see the EU, or Europe more broadly, as a political community bound by mutual obligations, then expectations of reciprocity should become even more salient. Under such conditions, support for aid is influenced by beliefs about whether other members of this supra-national community are also upholding the norms of mutual assistance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHaving outlined the boundaries of solidarity and the role of reciprocity, we now turn to how these dynamics operate in the concrete context that motivates our analysis: public support for aiding Ukraine. While there is a growing literature on European solidarity during crises, the war against Ukraine introduces conditions that differ from those of economic, financial, or health emergencies.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePUBLIC SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY IN TIMES OF CRISES AND THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEuropean solidarity has been examined in various domains\u0026mdash;European integration, welfare politics, and international trade\u0026mdash;but its study in times of crisis has expanded only recently (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018; Bobzien and Kalleitner, 2021; Oana and Truchlewski, 2023), with particular attention to the financial debt crisis (Lengfeld\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;et al.\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e2021; Lengfeld and Kroh, 2016; Clasen, 2024). Much less work considers solidarity in the face of \u003cem\u003emilitary\u003c/em\u003e aggression. Research suggests that public support for European solidarity is higher during exogenous, one-time crises (e.g., natural disasters or military attacks) than during long-lasting, endogenous crises such as unemployment or sovereign debt (Genschel and Hemerijck, 2018). This highlights the importance of crisis type (Wallaschek \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2020) and context (Unger \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023), raising the question of how insights from economic, financial, and health crises translate to the war in Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOverall, two broad sets of determinants of help during crises are examined. First, support for EU-level solidarity is shaped less by the crisis itself than by pre-existing attitudes toward the European Union (Ganderson \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023; Unger \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e2023; Vr\u0026acirc;nceanu\u0026nbsp;\u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023). Views on within-EU redistribution are particularly influential (Bauhr and Charron, 2023)\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;Second, national context matters significantly (Mariotto and Pellegata, 2023), especially the messages welfare-state institutions send about inclusion, exclusion, and care (No\u0026euml;l and Th\u0026eacute;rien, 1995). We draw on this work indirectly for the creation of solidarity profiles which are clearly shaped by national and European boundaries.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe war in Ukraine is thus both a test of international solidarity and a challenge for the EU as a political community. Although the EU and its member states have taken substantial measures to support Ukraine (Trebesch \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e2023), public opinion varies. Many Europeans see the conflict as an attack on the whole of Europe and express strong opposition to the aggressor (Hoffmann, 2023). Studies identify several key drivers of public support (Genschel, 2022; Moise \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e2024; Author, 2023):\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col start=\"1\" type=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eProximity and perceptions of the aggressor shape willingness to help (Hoffmann, 2023).\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSelf-interest matters: support depends on the type of aid and its perceived costs (Kim, 2013; Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999), particularly regarding economic sanctions, energy embargoes (B\u0026oslash;ggild \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2023; Hoffmann, 2023), and heavy military equipment.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHistorical and contemporary relationships with Russia shape sympathies and threat perceptions (Pupcenoks \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2022; Fern\u0026agrave;ndez\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;et al.\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e2023).\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRally effects boost support among incumbent party supporters, who typically endorse Ukraine aid more strongly than opposition supporters (Author, 2023).\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile our study acknowledges this rich work on the invasion in Ukraine, it is also clear that existing studies have focused primarily on country-level patterns or specific determinants of Ukraine aid. Much less attention has been paid to how individual-level support for Ukraine fits into broader understandings of European solidarity. In particular, we lack systematic evidence on how public support for aiding Ukraine relates to (1) the boundaries of solidarity (national, European, global), and (2) expectations of reciprocity among EU member states. Our analysis contributes to filling this gap.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHYPOTHESES\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/strong\u003eDespite not being an EU member, Ukraine shares values and institutional aspirations that align with the broader European community (Petrov, 2023; Akaliyski and Reeskens, 2023). \u0026nbsp;Since 2022 it has also held formal EU candidate status, making these aspirations highly salient for both political elites and the general public. It may therefore benefit from forms of solidarity and reciprocity that have developed within the EU. At the individual level, citizens who strongly identify as Europeans or who extend solidarity to other EU member states may be particularly inclined to support aid to Ukraine\u0026mdash;especially given the EU\u0026rsquo;s adversarial relationship with Russia, which is widely perceived as violating European norms and principles. In this sense, supporting Ukraine reflects both solidarity toward a value-aligned country and opposition to a common aggressor.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, because Ukraine lies outside the EU, this political boundary may limit support among citizens whose solidarity is tightly bound\u0026mdash;either to the nation or strictly to EU member states. Thus, solidarity expressed toward fellow EU countries will not necessarily spill over to Ukraine. Whether European solidarity extends beyond the EU\u0026rsquo;s borders remains an open question.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAlternatively, solidarity may be extended not because Ukraine is European, but because some individuals hold global or generalized humanitarian commitments. Such individuals support helping others irrespective of political boundaries or expected reciprocity. Prior research shows that global identification increases support for foreign aid, while national pride does not (Paxton and Knack, 2012). These unbounded forms of solidarity reflect moral obligation (or lack thereof) rather than mutual expectations. This reasoning suggests three sets of hypotheses:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eH1. National solidarity\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen national solidarity is \u003cem\u003eexclusive\u003c/em\u003e (i.e., limited to the national in-group), it should be associated with lower support for aid to Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eH2. European solidarity\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHigher European solidarity\u0026mdash;alone or combined with high national solidarity\u0026mdash;should spill over into stronger support for Ukraine aid.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eH3. Generalized/global solidarity\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHigh levels of generalized, unbounded solidarity (solidarity that extends beyond EU and national boundaries) should be associated with stronger support for Ukraine aid.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eH4: Expectations of European reciprocity\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExpectations of reciprocity (i.e., the belief that other EU countries would help one\u0026rsquo;s own region in a major crisis) should lead to greater support for Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eGiven the literature, we also expect two variables to be important for any prediction of aid to another country: political ideology and European identity. People on the left and those that score high on European identity are believed to be more supportive of any aid than people who identify as right and low on European identity. Thus, European identity captures territorial self-identification (e.g., \u0026lsquo;country only\u0026rsquo; versus more European identifications) and is included because prior research shows it is an important predictor of EU-related solidarity and cross-border redistribution (e.g., Verhaegen 2018). Political ideology is also a likely ingredient here. People on the left are found to be not only more supportive of the national welfare state and redistribution (No\u0026euml;l and Th\u0026eacute;rien, 1995) but also on foreign aid (Paxton and Knack 2012). In sum, we theorize that solidarity profiles and norms of reciprocity contribute beyond the ideology and European identity.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"DATA AND METHODS","content":"\u003cp\u003eOur study relies on the April 2023 wave of the EUI-YouGov Solidarity in Europe (SiE) survey (Genschel \u003cem\u003eet al.\u003c/em\u003e, 2024). This data encompasses 16 European Union countries with a cumulative sample size of approximately 22,000 respondents.[i]\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDependent Variable: Support for Ukraine\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur dependent variable quantifies support for Ukraine aid and is constructed from four items in the \u0026lsquo;Ukraine Support\u0026rsquo; battery that capture humanitarian, military, economic, and integration-related assistance. Specifically, we use four survey items that ask respondents about their level of support for sending humanitarian aid, providing weapons and military equipment, accepting higher energy costs due to sanctions on Russia, and fast‑tracking Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s EU membership. Each measurement is rescaled to fit within a range of 0 to 1, ranging from strongly oppose (0) to strongly support (1). Responses of \u0026lsquo;don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; are assigned a midpoint value of 0.5, and results are unchanged when these responses are excluded (see Appendix Table A7).[ii] We average the four rescaled items to create a composite index, \u0026lsquo;Mean Support for Ukraine,\u0026rsquo; summarizing support for solidarity towards Ukraine across the humanitarian, military, and financial dimensions outlined above (Cronbach\u0026rsquo;s alpha = .75). This construction yields a continuous 0-1 index of support (bounded between 0 and 1), which we model using linear regression; coefficients can be interpreted directly as percentage‑point changes in mean support on the 0-1 scale.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGeneral Solidarity Profiles and Reciprocity\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur core hypotheses require not only measuring identification with different political communities but also capturing how solidarity is bounded within distinct geographic spheres. To do this, we construct a set of \u0026lsquo;solidarity profiles\u0026rsquo; that reflect the ways in which respondents bound their solidaristic obligations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cu\u003eSolidarity Profiles\u003c/u\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/strong\u003eThese profiles are derived from three survey items that measure the level of aid respondents believe should be provided in major crises at three levels: (1) within their own country, (2) to other EU countries, and (3) to countries outside the EU. Respondents rate each item on a scale from 0 (\u0026lsquo;Should not provide any help\u0026rsquo;) to 10 (\u0026lsquo;Should provide significant help\u0026rsquo;). We rescale these values to range from 0 to 1 for ease of comparison across items; respondents choosing \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; are assigned a value of 0.5. As shown in Table A1 and A2 of the Appendix, whether or not these midpoint responses are included has no meaningful effect on the distribution of profiles.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUsing these standardized scores, we develop an original five‑category typology of solidarity profiles that categorizes respondents according to the level and radius of solidarity they express. The operationalization of these profiles is detailed in Table A1 of the Appendix. These five categories (plus a residual \u0026lsquo;Other\u0026rsquo; group) are essential for testing H1, H2, and H3, and they capture meaningful cross-national variation in patterns of solidarity across Europe:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e1. Self-Focused (reference category)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese individuals have solidarity scores that fall within a narrow range around their personal mean across all three items, but that personal mean lies below the country-specific median. They represent respondents who are broadly unwilling to help others\u0026mdash;nationally, within the EU, or globally. This group comprises approximately 19% of the sample.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e2. Nationalist Aid Givers\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese \u0026lsquo;classic\u0026rsquo; nationalists show their highest solidarity score toward their own country, with substantially lower support for helping EU or non-EU countries. This category is used to test H1. It is the largest group, accounting for around 32% of respondents.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e3. EU Aid Givers\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese respondents display higher solidarity toward the EU than toward their own country and non-EU countries. They extend solidarity beyond the nation-state but primarily within the EU,, making them similar to\u0026mdash;but distinct from\u0026mdash;National Europeanists. They constitute just under 7% of the sample.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e4. National Europeanists\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese individuals have similar solidarity scores for the EU and their own country (within 0.1 on the 0\u0026ndash;1 scale), both of which exceed their solidarity toward non-EU countries. Their solidaristic obligations thus extend to the EU but do not reach beyond it. These two groups (EU aid givers and National Europeanists) are critical for testing spillover expectations in H2 and comprise an additional 12% of the sample.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e5. General Humanitarians\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe opposite of Self-focused, these individuals express consistently high solidarity across all three levels. Their scores fall within a 0.1 range of their personal mean and meet or exceed the country-specific median at every geographic scale. For them, national solidarity is not exclusive and should extend to support for Ukraine (H3). They represent approximately 18% of respondents.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e6. Other\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA residual category capturing respondents whose solidaristic attitudes do not fit into any of the five structured profiles. This group is heterogeneous and comprises the remaining share of the sample.[iii]\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOverall statistical descriptions of the solidarity profiles within our sample are depicted in Table A1 of the Appendix, while the country-specific proportions are illustrated in Figure A1. Both the table and figure lend support to our theoretical expectations regarding these solidarity types.[iv] To provide additional clarity, Figure A2 illustrates the average solidarity levels, aggregated across all countries.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cu\u003eExpectations of help (H4)\u003c/u\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo operationalise reciprocity beliefs, we use a second set of variables capturing respondents\u0026rsquo; expectations about how much help their own region would receive in a major crisis from different territorial levels. These measures are based on three survey items asking how much financial, humanitarian, and military support respondents believe they would receive from:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003col start=\"1\" type=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ea well-off region within their own country,\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eanother EU member state, and\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ea country outside the EU during a major crisis.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs with the solidarity measures, these \u0026lsquo;expectations of help\u0026rsquo; variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (with \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; coded to 0.5; see Figure A5 for weighted country means across the three levels). We incorporate these rescaled indicators directly into our analysis. We interpret these items as our operationalization of reciprocity beliefs because they capture generalized reciprocity at different territorial levels, meaning whether respondents view solidarity as embedded in a system of mutual assistance in which help would be returned when one\u0026rsquo;s own region is in need. Importantly, these expectations are not Ukraine-specific and should not be read as perceptions of other countries\u0026rsquo; burden-sharing for Ukraine aid. In a second step, we examine the foundations of reciprocity attitudes by assessing respondents\u0026rsquo; perceptions of the European Union, including their awareness of and beliefs about EU programs designed to provide mutual assistance to member states.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eReciprocity Expectations from the EU and EU Policy Knowledge\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo further explore the expectations Europeans have about the EU, we also seek to understand whether such reciprocity expectations are grounded in people\u0026apos;s knowledge about the benefits of the European Union. Those who know more about the EU, and especially those aware of the types of programs the EU has in place for mutual aid, should be most likely to perceive the EU as a community grounded in norms of reciprocity. We use this analysis as a validity check to understand whether the idea of reciprocity is reflected in the reality of mutual aid awareness. To test this, the survey asked about the Cohesion Fund, with half of the sample being questioned on SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) and the remaining half about the Recovery Plan. To evaluate \u0026lsquo;EU awareness,\u0026rsquo; we construct a dichotomous variable identifying \u0026lsquo;Some or strong knowledge\u0026rsquo;. Respondents coded as having some or strong knowledge are those who, for at least one of these initiatives (i.e., the SURE/Recovery Plan dyad, or the Cohesion Fund), reported either some awareness (\u0026lsquo;I have heard of it, but do not know much about it\u0026rsquo;) or strong knowledge (\u0026lsquo;I have heard of it, and know what it is\u0026rsquo;). In the second model, we restrict the sample to respondents who reported strong knowledge of the Cohesion Fund (\u0026lsquo;I have heard of it, and know what it is\u0026rsquo;). We measure their evaluations of the program\u0026apos;s impact on quality of life on a scale from 0 (perceived decrease) to 10 (perceived improvement). We rescale these scores from 0 to 1, with \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026apos;t Know\u0026rsquo; responses set to the midpoint of this adjusted scale.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRespondents were also asked their general view about whether their country is mainly an EU beneficiary or net contributor with the following question: \u0026lsquo;Overall, do you think that, on balance, [Country] receives much more than it contributes or contributes much more than it receives from the EU?\u0026rsquo; Scores range from 0 (suggesting the country contributes more than it receives) to 10 (suggesting the country receives more than it contributes). These scores are then rescaled between 0 and 1, with \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026apos;t Know\u0026rsquo; responses treated as a midpoint value of 0.5. These measures help us highlight the idea that perceived EU reciprocity is grounded in actual policy knowledge of and experience with the EU.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor our understanding of support or rejection of Ukraine aid, we also utilize variables to gauge European identity, ideology and various potential confounders described in the section below.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eAdditional Predictors of support for Ukraine Aid\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEuropean identity is quantified through a question asking respondents how they see themselves. Responses include \u0026lsquo;Country only,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;Country then European,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;European and Country,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;European only\u0026rsquo;. Responses indicating non-alignment with the provided identity categories (i.e., \u0026lsquo;None of these\u0026rsquo;) and those expressing uncertainty (i.e., \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026apos;t know\u0026rsquo;) are combined into a single category. This variable is treated as categorical, with respondents who identify as \u0026lsquo;Country only\u0026rsquo; serving as the reference category. We include it for two reasons. First, European identity is a widely used predictor in the EU solidarity literature, and prior research shows that stronger European identification is associated with greater support for EU‑level financial solidarity and cross‑border redistribution (e.g., Verhaegen, 2018). Second, including European identity allows us to assess whether our reciprocity measure, which is operationalized through expectations of help, explains support for Ukraine over and above identity-based attachments to Europe. In other words, it helps ensure that the estimated associations for expectations of help are not simply capturing hidden differences in European identification. Figure A4 presents the distribution of all European identity categories by country, showing that Europeans predominantly identify as nationals of their country only or as nationals of their country first.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe also include controls for three key dichotomous variables related to attitudes toward Russia, supranational organizations and institutional trust. Although each item is measured on an ordered response scale, we dichotomize them to capture substantively meaningful thresholds and to avoid assuming equal distances between adjacent response categories; this makes the coefficients interpretable as the difference between respondents who do versus do not cross each threshold. The first variable assesses whether the respondent perceives Russia as a threat. Respondents who agree with the statement \u0026lsquo;European countries should invest more in defense and security to defend against Russian aggression\u0026rsquo; are coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. The second variable measures the perceived importance of NATO, coding respondents as 1 if they consider NATO to be \u0026quot;very important\u0026quot; or \u0026quot;fairly important\u0026quot; for their country\u0026rsquo;s defense, and 0 otherwise. We also assess the level of trust in the European Union by coding respondents as 1 if they indicate they \u0026quot;trust a lot\u0026quot; or \u0026quot;trust a fair amount,\u0026quot; and 0 if they do not.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLastly, we control for a range of potential confounding factors. First, we construct a categorical variable capturing the respondent\u0026rsquo;s self-declared ideological leaning, operationalized as a five-category variable ranging from extreme left to extreme right.[v] Respondents who selected \u0026quot;Don\u0026apos;t know\u0026quot; or \u0026quot;Prefer not to say\u0026quot; are classified under a separate category labelled \u0026quot;No Ideology.\u0026quot; We model ideology as a set of categories (rather than as a single ordinal scale) to avoid imposing a linear or monotonic left-right effect, and to allow for theoretically plausible non‑linearities. We also include gender (recoded into a binary variable where \u0026lsquo;female\u0026rsquo; = 1), education level (coded as \u0026lsquo;1\u0026rsquo; for those with a tertiary education), and self-perceived income status (with those considering themselves economically worse-off than the median person in their country coded as \u0026lsquo;1\u0026rsquo;, and \u0026lsquo;0\u0026rsquo; otherwise). [vi]\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eModel Estimation\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition to mapping the relationships between Ukraine support and the solidarity variables, we employ a series of linear regression models with country fixed effects. Because the dependent variable is a continuous 0-1 index, we estimate OLS models and interpret coefficients as percentage‑point shifts in mean support. Our modelling strategy involves progressively introducing different main predictors into the models to assess their singular and combined effects on support for Ukraine aid. Additionally, we employ robust standard errors clustered by country in all regression models to account for potential heteroscedasticity. Finally, to ensure that our results are nationally representative, the survey weights, calibrated to country-specific proportions of key demographics are applied in all stages of the analysis. Details on the inclusion of each variable are provided in Table A4 of the Appendix.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"RESULTS","content":"\u003cp\u003eTo test the hypotheses outlined above, Table 1 presents our full model (Model 4 in Appendix Table A4), which accounts for all relevant sociodemographic variables (age, gender, income, education), left-ideology, European identity, and most of all, solidarity profiles. Furthermore, this model incorporates reciprocity expectations of help at three geographical levels while also accounting for additional controls related to Russia, NATO and trust in the EU. The corresponding reduced specifications (Models 1-3) are summarised in Table A4 and reported in Table A6.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur results are consistent across these various specifications and when \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; answers are excluded rather than recoded as midpoints (Table A7 in the Appendix).[vii] Table 1 reports coefficient estimates from our full OLS specification, including country fixed effects and the full set of covariates. Figure 1 visualizes the estimated coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) for the main predictors from this specification, holding the other covariates constant. Because the dependent variable is scaled from 0 to 1, coefficients can be interpreted as percentage‑point differences in mean support for Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, we examine the \u003cstrong\u003eNationalist Aid Giver\u003c/strong\u003e solidarity profile, which captures respondents who think of solidarity as nationally bounded. Although this group is numerous across EU countries, it does not differ significantly from the \u003cstrong\u003eSelf-focused\u003c/strong\u003e, who are less concerned with solidarity at regional or other levels. However, the coefficient plots (i.e., Figure 1) indicate that \u003cstrong\u003eNationalist Aid Givers\u003c/strong\u003e, while similar to he \u003cstrong\u003eSelf-focused\u003c/strong\u003e, are significantly less supportive of aid to Ukraine compared to other solidarity profiles, supporting H1.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e[Insert Table 1 here]\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;[Insert Figure 1 here]\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, profiles that locate solidaristic obligation beyond the nation-state are, on average, more supportive of aiding Ukraine. In the full specification, this pattern is clearest for \u003cstrong\u003eNational Europeanists\u003c/strong\u003e, who treat their own country and the EU as jointly salient communities of solidarity: relative to the \u003cstrong\u003eSelf‑focused\u003c/strong\u003e, they score 2.7 percentage points higher on the 0\u0026ndash;1 Ukraine support index. This is consistent with H2, suggesting that solidaristic commitments oriented toward the EU can spill over to a European country that is formally outside the Union. By contrast, \u003cstrong\u003eEU Aid Givers\u003c/strong\u003e, for whom the EU is the primary locus of solidarity, are estimated to be slightly more supportive than the \u003cstrong\u003eSelf‑focused\u003c/strong\u003e, but this difference is not statistically distinguishable from zero once controls are included. These associations persist after controlling for ideology, European identity, and our full set of sociodemographic controls. Compared to respondents identifying as \u0026ldquo;country only,\u0026rdquo; those who identify as European (only or equally European and national) and those who identify as national and European show 4.8 and 5.2 percentage‑point higher support, respectively.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThird, the strongest support for Ukraine, compared to the reference category, comes from \u003cstrong\u003eGeneral Humanitarians,\u003c/strong\u003e confirming Hypothesis 3. These individuals exhibit high levels of solidarity and do not adhere to strict \u0026quot;imaginary\u0026quot; boundaries, extending their circle of solidarity inclusively. This broad and inclusive sense of solidarity is evidenced by their substantial support for Ukraine during the crisis. Specifically, with a significant coefficient of 0.081 at the p \u0026lt; 0.001 level, transitioning from the \u003cstrong\u003eSelf-focused\u003c/strong\u003e category (our reference category) to the \u003cstrong\u003eGeneral Humanitarians\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eprofile results in an 8.1-point increase in support for Ukraine on the aid scale, even when controlling for various other factors related to solidarity, including the expectation of help.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile general attitudes on solidarity at various levels shape specific support for a country in need, our study also examines how the \u003cem\u003eexpectation of help\u003c/em\u003e from different sources (respondent\u0026rsquo;s own country, another EU country or a non-EU country) shapes and affects support for Ukraine aid. As a reminder, the assumption is that the expectation of help is a key factor in offering solidarity at the analogous geographical level. For Ukraine, as a non-EU country, the question is whether this reciprocity extends beyond the EU boundary. Specifically, will support for Ukraine be linked to the reciprocity felt at the EU or non-EU level? Interestingly, we find that the expectation of EU reciprocity is among the strongest predictors associated with support for Ukraine aid. When respondents believe that other EU countries would help their own region, support for aid to Ukraine is particularly high. This belief in EU reciprocity is associated with a 9.4-point increase in support for Ukraine aid. Substantively, this places EU reciprocity among the strongest predictors in the model, with an association comparable in magnitude to perceiving Russia as a threat, viewing NATO as important, and trusting the EU. In other words, respondents who feel that EU countries would reciprocate and assist in times of emergency are also the ones to extend help to Ukraine. This is a powerful confirmation of the importance of EU-level reciprocity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eExpectations of help from within one\u0026rsquo;s own country also show a positive association with support for Ukraine, though to a lesser extent, with a statistically significant result at the p \u0026lt; 0.01 level and 1.8-points increase in support for Ukraine. This indicates that those who expect regional support within their own country are slightly more likely to support aid for Ukraine. Conversely, the expectation of help from non-EU countries does not show a significant association with support for Ukraine. This suggests that the sense of reciprocal support and solidarity is much stronger within the EU framework, highlighting once again the EU\u0026rsquo;s role in shaping attitudes towards extra-national aid. Overall, the full model presented in Table 1 explains more than a third of the variance in support for Ukraine (adjusted R\u0026sup2; = 0.41; within-country adjusted R\u0026sup2; = 0.34). These fit statistics summarize the model\u0026rsquo;s overall explanatory power, while the coefficient estimates and their confidence intervals indicate the magnitude and precision of the conditional associations for individual predictors.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn general, our other controls behave as expected. We find that people who identify with the mainstream left are generally more supportive of aid to Ukraine at least in comparison to the centre and the extreme right. The coefficient sizes from Table 1 and the models presented in Table A6 in the Appendix demonstrate that the inclusion of European identity and solidarity profiles together reduces the impact of the ideology coefficient by about a third. Additionally, there is evidence that individuals identifying with the mainstream right also tend to support aid to Ukraine more than those identifying with the center.[viii]`\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, the variables capturing attitudes pertaining to Russia, supranational organizations and institutional trust\u0026mdash;namely, perceiving Russia as a threat, the importance of NATO, and trust in the European Union\u0026mdash;are all significant predictors of support for Ukraine. The strongest of these is perceiving Russia as a threat, with a coefficient of 0.115 (p \u0026lt; 0.001), indicating that respondents who view Russia as a significant threat are 11.5 points more likely to support aid to Ukraine. Perceiving NATO as important, with a coefficient of 0.091 (p \u0026lt; 0.001), also appears to play a crucial role, meaning that those who see NATO as vital for their country\u0026apos;s defense are more inclined to support Ukraine. Finally, trust in the European Union, with a coefficient of 0.080 (p \u0026lt; 0.001), shows that greater trust in EU institutions is associated with an 8-point increase in support for Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe also find that richer, more educated, older and male respondents are more supportive of Ukraine aid than poorer, less educated, younger and female respondents. All these relationships are depicted in Figure 1, where we show coefficient plots for all solidarity variables, alongside ideology and identity. Figure 1 highlights the importance of the \u0026lsquo;\u003cstrong\u003egeneral humanist\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026rsquo; profile and the expectation of help at the EU country level vis-a-vis other solidarity profiles and forms of reciprocity. Table A7 in the Appendix offers insights to all the other variables we discuss above beyond solidarity profiles and norms of reciprocity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe association between belief in EU-level reciprocity and support for Ukraine suggests that Ukraine is viewed by many as an integral part of the European community rather than as an outsider. Additionally, there is a smaller (yet notable) association with expectations of assistance at the national level, indicating that expectations of mutual aid within the national community can coexist with, and even reinforce, support for extra-national assistance. This implies that a strong commitment to mutual aid and reciprocity within one\u0026apos;s own community can also foster a broader sense of solidarity and willingness to assist others in need. It also underscores the importance of mutual aid perceptions in shaping solidarity beyond national borders.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eAssessing the Roots of Reciprocity at the EU Level\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnderstanding how these perceptions of reciprocity form is crucial for comprehending the dynamics of European solidarity. While it is plausible that the expectation of help from EU countries is based on having previously received assistance from the EU, we test this proposition with three additional regression models. First, we gauge the impact of different levels of awareness of three EU initiatives\u0026mdash;the \u003cem\u003eCohesion Fund\u003c/em\u003e, which targets economically lagging regions, and the \u003cem\u003eSURE\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eRecovery Plan\u003c/em\u003e, which address COVID-19 economic repercussions\u0026mdash;on the expectation of the respondent\u0026rsquo;s region receiving help in times of crisis from the EU.[ix] Second, we evaluate the impact of a positive assessment of the \u003cem\u003eCohesion Fund\u003c/em\u003e among those with \u0026lsquo;strong\u0026rsquo; knowledge of the program. Third, we measure the extent to which respondents feel that their country is mostly a beneficiary of or contributor to the EU. These regression results are presented in Table 2 and 3. For all models presented in Tables 2 and 3, the dependent variable is the estimated likelihood of reciprocal help from another EU country, measured on a scale from 0 to 1. All models include the same set of controls as our main analysis, including sociodemographic variables (age, gender, income, education) and ideological position (with \u0026lsquo;Center\u0026rsquo; as the reference category) as well as country fixed effects.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e[Insert Table 2 here]\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e[Insert Figure 2 here]\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e[Insert Table 3 here]\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, the model presented in Table 3 examines whether respondents view their country as a beneficiary or contributor to the EU. This third model indicates that respondents who perceive their country as a beneficiary are significantly more likely to expect help from the EU, with a 26.3 point increase (p \u0026lt; 0.001), see also Figure 3. Once again, this finding highlights the role of perceived benefits from the EU in shaping expectations of reciprocal support.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e[Insert Figure 3 here]\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOverall, these three models demonstrate that knowledge (i.e., awareness), and positive evaluations of EU financial programs (and the EU as a whole) are positively associated with the belief that EU countries would assist in a hypothetical crisis. This association is particularly pronounced for positive evaluations of the EU Cohesion fund. This sense of reciprocity, in other words, is built on the \u003cem\u003eexperience and perception\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eof EU help in action. Furthermore, the perception of one\u0026rsquo;s country as more of a beneficiary than a contributor to EU funds is also strongly related to the expectation of help from the EU. As we have shown in Table 1, this expectation of help is a strong predictor of support for Ukraine, reinforcing the importance of expectations of help in shaping solidarity beyond national borders. This connection suggests that fostering positive perceptions of the EU and its financial programs can significantly enhance public support for general solidarity and international aid initiatives, such as those directed towards Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"CONCLUSION","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn this article, we sought to understand how general attitudes of solidarity map onto support for a concrete case: aid to Ukraine. We identified and developed two crucial, previously understudied dimensions of general solidarity. First, we created solidarity profiles that recover how individuals bound solidarity across three arenas (national, EU, non‑EU). Our analysis reveals that general humanitarians are the most consistently supportive of Ukraine, while other profiles that extend that solidarity beyond the nation and the EU also show significant support for Ukraine aid. Conversely, Nationalist Aid Givers exhibit low support for Ukraine, similar to the Self-focused. These profiles offer a parsimonious classification that helps explain patterns of reactions to different crises, both within and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state or the EU. They also help account for within‑ and between‑country variation in support for cross‑border assistance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, in theorizing solidarity, we introduced a new perspective that more explicitly considers its bounded nature and the centrality of reciprocity. Solidarity is embedded in communities that create obligations to help but also lead to expectations of reciprocal support. This perspective has often been missing in existing accounts of solidarity. Solidarity in this sense is \u003cem\u003ebounded\u003c/em\u003e, yet those boundaries differ across individuals. Our findings show that reciprocity at the EU level is strongly associated with support for Ukraine aid. We also show that this sense of EU-level reciprocity is closely linked to \u003cem\u003eawareness\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003epositive evaluations\u003c/em\u003e of EU programs and transfers. To put it differently, this experienced solidarity and perceived reciprocity appears to underpin higher support for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Similarly, a strong EU identity is independently associated with increased support for Ukraine. These findings indicate that EU benefits and identity can spill over to a proximate non-EU country in Europe. Future research on solidarity should leverage these ideas and measures of reciprocity and boundedness to explain at least some part of the variation in crisis-time solidarity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, our work points to the importance of understanding how solidarity is structured within states, as well as within and across Europe. By exploring the specific case of support for Ukraine, we identify the types of solidarity profiles that are associated with the most aid, demonstrating that solidarity confined to one\u0026rsquo;s own country alone is insufficient. High obligations toward one's own country can result in inward-looking nationalism that doesn't extend to other nations. However, this national solidarity can also be embedded within broader solidarities that even cross boundaries\u0026mdash;both within supranational communities like the EU and in more humanitarian, boundary-less profiles. As we note, our findings indicate that humanitarian profiles are likely to provide unwavering support, whereas support from other profiles appears contingent on the EU\u0026rsquo;s performance and its ability to maintain visible and credible mutual-assistance programs. These appear to foster a sense of common identity and are perceived as beneficial to its member states. Future research should further explore when and how institutions activate reciprocity expectations and shift the boundaries of solidarity in times of crisis.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDS developed the survey measures and developed the basic frame of the project. She also wrote the first draft of the frontend and literature review, and she also revised and worked with TGP on the analysis itself as well as the analysis section of the paper. TGP conducted the entire statistical analyses and conributed to the ideas of the article. He also wrote the first draft of the analysis section and he also revised and contributed to the front end. AH contributed with her expertise on the study of soldarity, participated in the direction of the piece, and in the writing and revision process of the entir article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors thank the participants of the European Solidarity EUI-YouGov workshop at the European University Intitute in May 2024 for the excellent comments. Furthermore, an earlier version of the paper was presented at the European Soldarity Conference in Lisbon in July 2024.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe SiE surveys that support the findings of this study are available from EUI-YouGov project website as well as from data suppositories Cadmus. https://europeangovernanceandpolitics.eui.eu/project/eui-yougov-solidarity-in-europe-project/\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAkaliyski, P., and Reeskens, T. (2023). Ukrainian values: between the Slavic-Orthodox legacy and Europe\u0026rsquo;s allure. \u003cem\u003eEuropean Societies\u003c/em\u003e, 1-30.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAlvarez, L., Boussalis, C., Merolla, J., and Peiffer, C. (2017) Love thy neighbor: Social identity and public support for humanitarian aid. \u003cem\u003eDevelopment Policy Review.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e36(S2), O935-O953.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAnderson, B. (1991). \u003cem\u003eImagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism\u003c/em\u003e (2nd ed.). Verso.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAnghel, V., and Jones, E. (2023). Is Europe really forged through crisis? Pandemic EU and the Russia\u0026ndash;Ukraine war. Journal of European Public Policy, 30(4), 766-786.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBaker, A. (2015). Race, Paternalism, and Foreign Aid: Evidence from US Public Opinion. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Political Science Review,\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003e109\u003c/em\u003e(1), 93-109. doi:10.1017/S0003055414000549.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBanting, K., and Kymlicka, W. (2017). Introduction: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies. In K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (Eds.), The strains of commitment: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies (pp. 1-58). Oxford University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBaub\u0026ouml;ck, R. (2017). Citizenship and collective identities as political sources of solidarity in the European Union. In K. Banting and W. Kymlicka (Eds.), The strains of commitment: The political sources of solidarity in diverse societies (pp. 80-106). Oxford University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBauhr, M., and Charron, N. (2023). \u0026lsquo;All hands on deck\u0026rsquo; or separate lifeboats? Public support for European economic solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic. \u003cem\u003eJournal of European Public Policy\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e30\u003c/em\u003e(6), 1092-1118. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2077809\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBobzien, L., and Kalleitner, F. (2021). Attitudes towards European financial solidarity during the Covid-19 pandemic : Evidence from a net-contributor country. \u003cem\u003eEuropean Societies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e23\u003c/em\u003e(sup1), S791-S804. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2020.1836669\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBodenstein, T., and Faust, J. (2017). Who cares? European public opinion on foreign aid and political conditionality. \u003cem\u003eJCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e55\u003c/em\u003e(5), 955-973.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eB\u0026oslash;ggild, T., G\u0026ouml;bel, S., Lutscher, P., and Nyrup, J. (2024). Standing with Ukraine? How citizens trade off self-interest and principles in supporting war-torn international partners. \u003cem\u003eResearch and Politics\u003c/em\u003e, 11(2).\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eBurelli, C. (2018). Solidarity, stability and enlightened self-interest in the EU. \u003cem\u003ePolitiche Sociali, Social Policies\u003c/em\u003e, 3, 449-464.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eChen, Y., Jiang, J., Wang, L., and Wang, R. (2023). Impact assessment of energy sanctions in geo-conflict: Russian-Ukrainian war. \u003cem\u003eEnergy Reports, 9\u003c/em\u003e, 3082\u0026ndash;3095.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eClasen, P. (2024). Treating nations like people: How responsibility attributions shape citizens\u0026rsquo; fiscal solidarity with other EU countries. \u003cem\u003eJournal of European Social Policy\u003c/em\u003e, 09589287241229669.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eDurkheim, E. (2019). The division of labor in society. In \u003cem\u003eSocial Stratification, Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, Second Edition\u003c/em\u003e (pp. 178-183). Routledge.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eEschweiler, J., Svensson, S., Mocca, E., Cartwright, A., and Villadsen Nielsen, L. (2019). The reciprocity dimension of solidarity: Insights from three European countries. \u003cem\u003eVOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations\u003c/em\u003e, 30(3), 549-561.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eFern\u0026aacute;ndez, \u0026Oacute;. (2023). The impact of Russia\u0026rsquo;s 2022 invasion of Ukraine on public opinion on the EU and European security. \u003cem\u003eJournal of European Integration\u003c/em\u003e, 45(3), 463-485.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGanderson, J., Schelkle, W., and Truchlewski, Z. (2023). Who is afraid of emergency politics? Public opinion on European crisis management during Covid-19. \u003cem\u003eComparative European Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e21\u003c/em\u003e(4), 470-490. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-023-00329-5.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGenschel, P., Hemerijck, A., Stolle, D., Cicchi, L., Russo, L., Shakespeare, S., and van Parys, J. (2023). \u003cem\u003eEUI-YouGov Solidarity in Europe (SiE) survey\u003c/em\u003e. European University Institute. Available from EUI Research Data Repository, Cadmus.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGenschel, P. (2022). Bellicist integration? The war in Ukraine, the European Union and core state powers. \u003cem\u003eJournal of European Public Policy, 29\u003c/em\u003e(12), 1885\u0026ndash;1900.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGenschel, P., and Hemerijck, A. (2018). \u003cem\u003eSolidarity in Europe\u003c/em\u003e. https://doi.org/10.2870/106143.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGrasso, M. T., and Lahusen, C. (2020). Solidarity in Europe: A comparative account of citizens\u0026rsquo; attitudes and practices. In C. Lahusen (Ed.), \u003cem\u003eCitizens\u0026rsquo; solidarity in Europe: Civic engagement and public discourse in times of crises\u003c/em\u003e (pp. 29\u0026ndash;54). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHeermann, M., Koos, S., and Leuffen, D. (2023). Who Deserves European Solidarity? How Recipient Characteristics Shaped Public Support for International Medical and Financial Aid during COVID-19. \u003cem\u003eBritish Journal of Political Science\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e53\u003c/em\u003e(2), 629-651. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000357\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHerrmann, R. K., Tetlock, P. E., and Visser, P. S. (1999). Mass public decisions to go to war: A cognitive-interactionist framework. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Political Science Review, 93\u003c/em\u003e(3), 553\u0026ndash;573.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eHoffmann, I. (2023) Anxious we stand: Despite worries, Europeans Remain steadfast in support for Ukraine, available at https://globaleurope.eu/europes-future/anxious-we-stand-despite-worries-europeans-remain-steadfast-in-support-for-ukraine/.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eKim, D. (2013). Beliefs in foreign policy goals and American citizens support for foreign aid. \u003cem\u003eEuropean Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 6\u003c/em\u003e(1), 41\u0026ndash;70.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eK\u0026ouml;nig, P. (2023). Forms of national and European identity: A research note reviewing literature of cross-national studies. \u003cem\u003eNationalities Papers\u003c/em\u003e, 1\u0026ndash;28. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2023.66\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLahusen, C., and Grasso, M. (2018). Solidarity in Europe\u0026ndash;European solidarity : An introduction. \u003cem\u003eSolidarity in Europe: Citizens\u0026rsquo; Responses in Times of Crisis\u003c/em\u003e, 1-18.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLengfeld, H., and Kley, F. K. (2021). Conditioned solidarity : EU citizens\u0026rsquo; attitudes towards economic and social austerities for crisis countries receiving financial aid. \u003cem\u003eActa Politica\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e56\u003c/em\u003e(2), 330-350. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-020-00179-z\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLengfeld, H., and Kroh, M. (2016). Solidarity with EU countries in crisis : Results of a 2015 Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey. \u003cem\u003eDIW Economic Bulletin\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e6\u003c/em\u003e(39), 473-479.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eLiadze, I., C. Macchiarelli, P. Mortimer-Lee, and P.S. Juanino. 2023. Economic costs of the Russia-Ukraine war. The World Economy 46 (4): 874\u0026ndash;886.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMariotto, C., and Pellegata, A. (2023). Should EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity. \u003cem\u003eComparative European Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e21\u003c/em\u003e(1), 42-63. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-022-00301-9\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMarshall, T. H. (1950). \u003cem\u003eCitizenship and social class and other essays\u003c/em\u003e. Cambridge University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMarshall, T. H. (1963). \u003cem\u003eSociology at the crossroads\u003c/em\u003e. London, UK: Heinemann.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMilner, H. V., and Tingley, D. (2013). The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy. \u003cem\u003eThe Review of International Organizations, 8\u003c/em\u003e(3), 313\u0026ndash;341.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMiller, D. (2002). Are they my poor? The problem of altruism in the world of strangers. \u003cem\u003eCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 5\u003c/em\u003e(4), 106-127.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMoise, A. D., Dennison, J., and Kriesi, H. (2024). European attitudes to refugees after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. \u003cem\u003eWest European Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e47\u003c/em\u003e(2), 356-381.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eMolm, L. D., Collett, J. L., and Schaefer, D. R. (2007). Building solidarity through generalized exchange: A theory of reciprocity. \u003cem\u003eAmerican journal of sociology\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e113\u003c/em\u003e(1), 205-242.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eNicoli, F., Kuhn, T., and Burgoon, B. (2020) Collective Identities, European Solidarity: Identification Patterns and Preferences for European Social Insurance. \u003cem\u003eJCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies\u003c/em\u003e, 58: 76\u0026ndash;95. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12977.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eNo\u0026euml;l, A., and Th\u0026eacute;rien, J.-P. (1995). From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign aid. \u003cem\u003eInternational Organization\u003c/em\u003e, 49(3), 523\u0026ndash;553.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eOana, I. E., and Truchlewski, Z. (2023). Bounded solidarity? Experimental evidence on cross‐national bonding in the EU during the COVID crisis. European Journal of Political Research.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePaxton, P., and Knack, S. (2012). Individual and country-level factors affecting support for foreign aid. \u003cem\u003eInternational Political Science Review\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e33\u003c/em\u003e(2), 171-192.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePetrov, Roman. 2023. \u0026quot;Bumpy Road of Ukraine Towards the EU Membership in Time of War: \u0026lsquo;Accession Through War\u0026rsquo; v \u0026lsquo;Gradual Integration\u0026rsquo;.\u0026quot; \u003cem\u003eEuropean Papers-A Journal on Law and Integration\u003c/em\u003e 2023.3 (2023): 1057-1065.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePowers, K. E., Kertzer, J. D., Brooks, D. J., and Brooks, S. G. (2021). What\u0026rsquo;s fair in international politics? Equity, equality, and foreign policy attitudes. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Conflict Resolution, 66\u003c/em\u003e(2), 217-245. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027211041393.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePupcenoks, J., and Klein, G. R. (2022). First Georgia, then Ukraine: How Russian propaganda justifies invasions. \u003cem\u003eEthics and International Affairs\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003ePutnam, R. D. (1993). \u003cem\u003eMaking democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy\u003c/em\u003e. Princeton University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eRathbun, B. C., Powers, K. E., and Anders, T. (2019). Moral hazard: German public opinion on the Greek debt crisis. \u003cem\u003ePolitical Psychology, 40\u003c/em\u003e(3), 523-541.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eScotto, T., Reifler, J., Hudson, D., and VanHeerde-Hudson, J. (2017). We Spend How Much? Misperceptions, Innumeracy, and Support for the Foreign Aid in the United States and Great Britain. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Experimental Political Science,\u003c/em\u003e\u003cem\u003e4\u003c/em\u003e(2), 119-128. Doi:10.1017/XPS.2017.6\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eSilva, B. C., W\u0026auml;ckerle, J. and Christopher W. (2022) Determinants of public opinion support for a full embargo on Russian energy in Germany. ECONtribute Discussion Paper Series.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTamir, Y. (1995). \u003cem\u003eLiberal nationalism\u003c/em\u003e. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eTrebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., and Schramm, S. (2023). The Ukraine support tracker: which countries help Ukraine and how? (No. 2218). KIEL Working Paper.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eUnger, D., Sirsch, J., Stockemer, D., and Niemann, A. (2023). What guides citizen support for redistributive EU measures as a response to COVID-19: Justice attitudes, self-interest or support for European integration? \u003cem\u003eEuropean Union Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e24\u003c/em\u003e(3), 578-600. https://doi-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1177/14651165231166284\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003evan Oorschot, W. (1998). Shared identity and shared utility: On solidarity and its motives. Tilburg: Tilburg Institute for Social Sciences.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVerhaegen, S. (2018). What to expect from European identity? Explaining support for solidarity in times of crisis. \u003cem\u003eComparative European Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e16\u003c/em\u003e(5), 871-904.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eVr\u0026acirc;nceanu, A., Dinas, E., Heidland, T., and Ruhs, M. (2023). The European refugee crisis and public support for the externalisation of migration management. \u003cem\u003eEuropean Journal of Political Research\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e62\u003c/em\u003e(4), 1146-1167. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12565\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eWallaschek, S., Starke, C., and Br\u0026uuml;ning, C. (2020). Solidarity in the Public Sphere : A Discourse Network Analysis of German Newspapers (2008\u0026ndash;2017). \u003cem\u003ePolitics and Governance\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e8\u003c/em\u003e(2), 257-271.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eYoung, I. M. (2006). Responsibility and global justice: A social connection model. \u003cem\u003eSocial Philosophy and Policy, 23\u003c/em\u003e(1), 102-130.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Footnotes","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e The EU countries included in the sample are Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia. The UK was excluded due to modifications in the wording of key questions related to the EU.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e We conducted tests on the inclusion of \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; answers into the midpoint of the dependent variable scale. Our findings remain stable and consistent across various tests, and the inclusion of these responses expands the sample size (N) by over 4,000 observations. This considerable increase in sample size, coupled with the consistency observed in our results, confirms that integrating the \u0026lsquo;Don't know\u0026rsquo; responses as midpoint do not affect the reliability of our results.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e The \u0026lsquo;Other\u0026rsquo; profiles exhibit diverse patterns of solidarity not captured by the five predefined solidarity profiles. At the aggregate level, this group shows moderate average solidarity toward regions within their own country (mean\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.59) and other EU countries (mean\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.58), but higher average solidarity toward non-EU countries (mean\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.74). At the same time, the confidence intervals point to considerable within-group dispersion on all three items, underlining the heterogeneous and residual nature of this category. Figure \u003cspan refid=\"Fig6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eA3\u003c/span\u003e further illustrates this heterogeneity by plotting the distribution of solidarity scores at each level for respondents in the \u0026lsquo;Other\u0026rsquo; profile.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e We further explore the validity and distinctions across the solidarity profiles through additional bivariate statistical tests, specifically an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), as well as a post-hoc Tukey multiple comparison of means test. Refer to \u003cspan refid=\"Sec21\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eAppendix\u003c/span\u003e II for details.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e The exact question wording asks respondents: \u0026lsquo;Some people talk about \u0026lsquo;left,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;right\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;centre\u0026rsquo; to describe parties and politicians. With this in mind, where would you place yourself on this scale?\u0026rsquo; The original variable had 7 categories, we collapse \u0026lsquo;fairly\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;very\u0026rsquo; at each extreme as there were fewer cases in the highest and lowest categories.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Bars indicate support for Ukraine on four items (military aid, humanitarian aid, acceptance of higher energy costs as well as EU membership of Ukraine, rescaled to be between 0\u0026ndash;1, alpha\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.75). Furthermore, Table \u003cspan refid=\"Tab9\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eA5\u003c/span\u003e of the \u003cspan refid=\"Sec21\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eAppendix\u003c/span\u003e provide the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for all the independent variables for Models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Overall, the VIF values provided in these tables help confirm that multicollinearity is not a severe issue in any of our models, ensuring that the model parameters can be accurately estimated.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;For reference, Models 1, 2, 3, and 4\u0026mdash;which respectively include SES, ideology, and European identity (Model 1); SES, ideology, and solidarity profiles (Model 2); SES, ideology, and expectations of help (Model 3); and SES, ideology, European identity, solidarity profiles, and expectations of help (Model 4)\u0026mdash;are summarised in Table \u003cspan refid=\"Tab7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eA4\u003c/span\u003e in the \u003cspan refid=\"Sec21\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eAppendix\u003c/span\u003e. Additionally, results for Models 1, 2, and 3 are detailed in Table \u003cspan refid=\"Tab10\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eA6\u003c/span\u003e, and Table \u003cspan refid=\"Tab11\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003eA7\u003c/span\u003e reproduces Models 1\u0026ndash;4 with \u0026lsquo;Don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; answers excluded from the analyses instead of being recoded as midpoints.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e In general, all of our results show that the respondents who are unsure about ideological placement, and national/European identity (the \u0026lsquo;don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; category) are less likely to support Ukraine. The \u0026lsquo;don\u0026rsquo;t know\u0026rsquo; categories for the solidarity items are coded at the middle of the scale.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e\u0026nbsp;The latter two programs were addressed using a split sample approach. Therefore, we combined these two questions into one variable before incorporating the Recovery Plan. The questions inquired whether respondents had heard of the program, knew more about it, and, for those who did, evaluated its effect on their own country.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Tables","content":"\u003cp\u003eTable 1. Multiple Regression: Determinants of Support for Ukraine in the EU\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"602\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;DV: Support for Ukraine\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTerritorial Identity: European Only/European and Country\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; (Ref: Country Only)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.048**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.013)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTerritorial Identity: Country and European\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp; (Ref: Country Only)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.052***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.005)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProfile: Nationalist Aid Giver (Ref: Self-focused)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.024***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.005)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProfile: EU Aid giver (Ref: Self-focused)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.006\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.010)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProfile: National Europeanist (Ref: Self-focused)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.027**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProfile: General Humanitarian (Ref: Self-focused)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.081***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eProfile: Other (Ref: Self-focused)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.015***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.003)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRussia Presents a Threat (0-1)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.115***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.008)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eImportance of NATO (0-1)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.091***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.008)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTrust in the European Union (0-1)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.080***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExpectation of Help: Region Within Own Country\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.018+\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.009)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExpectation of Help: EU Country\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.094***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.009)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eExpectation of Help: Non-EU Country\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.011\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Extreme Left (Ref: Center)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.024**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.008)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Left (Ref: Center)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.016*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.006)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Right (Ref: Center)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.015*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Extreme Right (Ref: Center)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.009\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.013)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNum.Obs.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22199\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Adj.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.412\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Within Adj.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.335\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRMSE\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 398px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFE: Country\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 203px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eX\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 602px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eNotes. p \u0026lt; 0.1, * p \u0026lt; 0.05, ** p \u0026lt; 0.01, *** p \u0026lt; 0.001. None of these/Don\u0026apos;t know\u0026quot; for territorial identity and \u0026quot;No ideology\u0026quot; for ideology have been omitted from the table. Dependent variable is Mean Support for Ukraine (0-1). OLS coefficients with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country; survey weights are applied. Because the outcome is scaled from 0 to 1, coefficients can be interpreted as percentage‑point differences in mean support for Ukraine. None of these/Don\u0026apos;t know\u0026quot; for territorial identity and \u0026quot;No ideology\u0026quot; for ideology have been omitted from the table. The full output is available in Table A6 of the Appendix and another version of the regression without the cases that indicated Don\u0026apos;t know can be found below in Table A7.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTable 2. Correlates of Expectation of Help from the EU\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"602\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSome and Strong Knowledge of EU initiatives Model\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCohesion Fund Assessment (\u0026lsquo;Strong Knowledge\u0026rsquo; Respondents only) Model\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.029*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.050+\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.013)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.027)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.002\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.003\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.005)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.012)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLow Income\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.032***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.008\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.005)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.016)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCollege Educated\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.022***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.023*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.004)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.009)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSome and Strong Knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.032***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.005)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Extreme Left\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.010)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.015)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Left\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.024**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.028\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.008)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.019)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Right\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.003\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.029\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.013)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.018)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Extreme Right\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.026+\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.021\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.015)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.026)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: No Ideology\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.036***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.007\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.014)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCohesion Fund Assessment\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.380***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.024)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNum.Obs.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22199\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3066\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Adj.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.034\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.136\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Within Adj.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.038\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.138\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRMSE\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.28\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 202px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFE: Country\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 183px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eX\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 216px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eX\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 602px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+ p \u0026lt; 0.1, * p \u0026lt; 0.05, ** p \u0026lt; 0.01, *** p \u0026lt; 0.001\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTable 3. Correlates of Considering Country as Beneficiary or Contributor to the EU\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"532\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"bottom\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBeneficiary or Contributor to the EU Model\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.042**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.011)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.002\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.005)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLow Income\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.029***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.004)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCollege Educated\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.017**\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.004)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eEU Contributor (0) or Beneficiary (1)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.263***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.013)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Extreme Left\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.003\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.008)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Left\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.019*\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Right\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.003\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.009)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: Extreme Right\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.007\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.011)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIdeology: No Ideology\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e-0.034***\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(0.007)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNum.Obs.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22199\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Adj.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.091\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Within\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.072\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eR2 Within Adj.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.071\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eRMSE\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 327px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFE: Country\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 205px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eX\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 532px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+ p \u0026lt; 0.1, * p \u0026lt; 0.05, ** p \u0026lt; 0.01, *** p \u0026lt; 0.001\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"international-politics","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [International Politics](https://link.springer.com/journal/41311)","snPcode":"41311","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41311/3","title":"International Politics","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"solidarity, reciprocity, European identity, public opinion, Ukraine, European Union","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8571891/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8571891/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eSolidarity implies mutual acceptance and a willingness to cooperate and support others. This raises a central question: solidarity with whom? We examine how the boundaries of solidarity and expectations of reciprocity in Europe help explain reactions to Russia\u0026rsquo;s invasion of Ukraine. We develop four solidarity profiles capturing the level and radius of solidarity and compare them using survey data from 16 EU countries. \u0026lsquo;General Humanitarians,\u0026rsquo; who draw few distinctions, show the strongest support for aid to Ukraine. \u0026lsquo;National Europeanists\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;EU Aid Givers,\u0026rsquo; who treat the EU as a primary community of solidarity, also express high support for aid to Ukraine, whereas \u0026lsquo;Nationalist Aid Givers\u0026rsquo; are markedly less supportive. Crucially, support is strongly related to expectations of help from other EU countries, shaped by perceived benefits and knowledge about the EU. Finally, we show that humanitarian values can increase support independently of reciprocity expectations.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"From Local to Global? Assessing European Solidarity through the Lens of Ukraine Aid","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-01-29 12:22:16","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8571891/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-01-26T15:31:44+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-01-12T01:59:01+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2026-01-12T01:57:52+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"International Politics","date":"2026-01-11T06:38:46+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"international-politics","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [International Politics](https://link.springer.com/journal/41311)","snPcode":"41311","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41311/3","title":"International Politics","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"dba4d84c-fa4f-4ae8-b61b-55ed4341c71e","owner":[],"postedDate":"January 29th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-01-29T12:22:17+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-01-29 12:22:16","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8571891","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8571891","identity":"rs-8571891","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}