Computation and Analysis of Price of Anarchy for Selfish Node Detection and efficient Resource Allocation for Dynamic Communication Network using Game theory

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Abstract

With the advent of novel technologies, the coverage of communication networks and the number of participating nodes have increased drastically. Due to the dynamic and decentralized nature of the system, some nodes tend to be uncooperative with other nodes within the network. The uncooperative nodes (selfish nodes) use the facilities of the cooperative nodes to raise their interest, which leads to security threats, path delay, congestion and a suboptimal use of resources. To curtail this issue and enhance the performance of the system, there is need to identify potentially selfish nodes. This paper proposes a combination of Nash equilibrium based game theory with Price of Anarchy (PoA) for detection of selfish nodes in a network. Also, a least response dynamic based Capacitated Selfish Resource Allocation (CSRA) game is proposed to enhance resource usage among participating nodes. The simulation was carried out using the SolarWinds simulator and an evaluation of the results demonstrates that the proposed approach promises outputs in terms of throughput, delay and delivery ratio in comparison to the state-of-the-art detection and allocation techniques.

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europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00
unpaywall
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License: CC-BY-4.0