The moral blueprint is not necessary for STEM wisdom

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Abstract

How can one bring wisdom into STEM education? One popular position holds that wise judgment follows from teaching morals and ethics in STEM. However, wisdom scholars debate the causal role of morality and whether presence of apriori moral dispositions is a necessary condition for cultivating and expressing wisdom. Some philosophers, education practitioners and behavioral scientists champion this view, whereas social psychologists and cognitive scientists argue that moral features like prosocial behavior are reinforcing factors or outcomes of wise judgment rather than pre-requisites. This debate matters particularly for science and technology, where wisdom-demanding decisions typically involve incommensurable values and radical uncertainty. Here, we evaluate these competing positions through four lines of evidence. First, empirical research shows that heightened moralization aligns with foolish rejection of scientific claims, political polarization, and value extremism. Second, scholarship on repeated economic games (Folk Theorem) suggests that wisdom-related metacognition—perspective-integration, context-sensitivity, and balancing long- and short-term goals—can give rise to prosocial behavior without an apriori moral blueprint. Third, in real life, moral values often compete, making metacognition indispensable to balance competing interests for the common good. Fourth, numerous scientific tasks require wise handling of ill-defined challenges, without a clear role of morals for such tasks. We address potential objections about immoral and Machiavellian applications of blueprint-free wisdom accounts. Finally, we explore implications for giftedness: what exceptional wisdom looks like in STEM context, and how to train it in the classroom via self-reflection exercises and exercises that highlight one’s knowledge gaps.

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last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00