Ownership Structure and Sustainability: Insights into SDG Disclosures in European Firms

Ownership Structure and Sustainability: Insights into SDG Disclosures in European Firms | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Ownership Structure and Sustainability: Insights into SDG Disclosures in European Firms Rasmi Meqbel, Aladdin Dwekat, Zeena Mardawi This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-5907095/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 7 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Corporate ownership structures significantly influence sustainable development transparency, yet how different ownership types impact SDG disclosures remains underexplored in sustainability research. This study investigates the impact of ownership structure on sustainable development goal (SDG) disclosures in publicly traded European firms from 2019 to 2023. Grounded in stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories, the research employs fixed-effects regression models and the two-step system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to address endogeneity concerns. The findings reveal a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and SDG disclosures, highlighting the conflict between short-term financial pressures and long-term sustainability goals. Foreign ownership positively influences SDG disclosures, underlining its role in driving transparency and aligning firms with global sustainability standards. Conversely, government ownership exhibits no significant effect, reflecting governance inefficiencies and conflicting priorities within state-owned enterprises. By presenting comprehensive empirical evidence, this study advances the literature on ownership structure and sustainability practices, offering actionable insights for policymakers, investors, and governance professionals striving to enhance corporate transparency and alignment with the SDGs. Ownership Structure SDG Disclosures Institutional Investors Corporate Governance Sustainability Reporting 1 Introduction Corporate reporting on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has emerged as a critical mechanism for firms to demonstrate their commitment to global sustainability challenges [ 1 ]. Despite escalating regulatory pressures and stakeholder demands for greater transparency, there remains considerable variation in both the extent of corporate SDG disclosures [ 2 – 4 ]. This heterogeneity prompts fundamental questions about the determinants of corporate SDG reporting, specifically, how internal governance mechanisms shape firms' transparency regarding their contributions to sustainable development objectives. The phenomenon is particularly evident in Europe, where advanced regulatory frameworks coexist with markedly different approaches to SDG disclosure [ 5 ] Among these governance factors, ownership structure stands out as a key determinant of corporate transparency and sustainability initiatives. Institutional investors, guided by long-term objectives and risk mitigation, often champion rigorous disclosure aligned with global sustainability standards [ 6 – 8 ]. In parallel, government ownership leverages state influence to align corporate behavior with national and international sustainability goals, emphasising regulatory compliance and public policy objectives [ 9 , 10 ]. However, foreign ownership introduces a global perspective that can drive higher transparency to meet international expectations and address agency conflicts between managers and foreign shareholders [ 11 , 12 ]. Collectively, these dynamics highlight the multifaceted influence of ownership structures on corporate accountability and highlight their role in advancing SDG disclosures across diverse institutional and regulatory environments [ 9 ]. The European context provides an ideal setting for investigating these issues, given its mature regulatory ecosystem for sustainability reporting. The EU's Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) has significantly bolstered both the accountability and comparability of non-financial information [ 13 , 14 ], leading to high compliance levels among European companies in environmental and social matters [ 15 ]. In addition, the European Green Deal has further reinforced sustainability imperatives, creating incentives for corporate transparency that extend beyond mere regulatory compliance [ 16 , 17 ]. While this leadership in sustainability offers opportunities for comprehensive SDG engagement, it also poses challenges in standardising disclosure across varying organisational contexts and national boundaries. Existing research on SDG disclosure determinants, however, reveals notable limitations. First, many studies treat institutional ownership as a homogeneous category, overlooking the substantial heterogeneity within this investor class and its diverse implications for sustainability practices [ 18 , 19 ]. For example, although García-Sánchez, Rodríguez‐Ariza [ 7 ] identified a positive relationship between institutional investors and SDG disclosure, they did not differentiate among various institutional investor types. Second, while certain studies have explored the effects of ownership structure on aggregate SDG disclosure [ 8 , 9 ]. One important source of inconsistency in the current literature lies in the diverse methodologies, datasets, and regional settings adopted by different scholars [ 2 ]. For instance, some studies treat various forms of institutional ownership as a single, uniform category, ignoring the substantial differences between short-term and long-term investors [ 8 , 19 , 20 ]. This methodological choice can contribute to contradictory findings, especially when distinct SDG reporting indices are used [ 9 , 10 ]. Moreover, country-level factors such as legal frameworks, cultural norms, and the role of government agencies all create unique pressures on firms to report [ 9 ], sometimes yielding contradictory conclusions. By acknowledging these methodological and contextual differences, our study helps clarify why prior work has produced divergent findings and situates our results within a broader comparative framework [ 21 ]. Yet, most have not examined how different ownership types might distinctly affect reporting on specific SDG categories. This gap is critical, as evidence suggests that companies engage with different SDGs to varying degrees based on operational relevance and stakeholder expectations [ 3 , 22 , 23 ]. To address these gaps, this study investigates how diverse ownership structures influence SDG disclosure patterns among European firms, with particular emphasis on their differential effects across thematically grouped SDGs. Drawing on a panel of publicly traded European companies from 2019 to 2023, we classify the 17 SDGs into environmental, social, economic, and governance-focused categories. We also employ robust econometric techniques—including GMM estimation—to manage endogeneity concerns [ 24 ]. This study makes three key contributions to the literature. First, it enhances theoretical understanding by illustrating how different ownership structures generate distinct incentives for SDG disclosure, extending agency, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories in sustainability reporting. This contribution is especially relevant given the heightened emphasis on sustainability in corporate strategy and stakeholder relations [ 25 ]. Second, it offers methodological innovation through a more granular analysis of SDG groupings, revealing patterns that aggregate measures can obscure. This approach provides a nuanced view of how ownership structures influence specific sustainability priorities, addressing a critical gap identified in recent research [ 23 , 26 ]. Third, it delivers practical insights for policymakers, investors, and corporate governance professionals seeking to elevate transparency and advance sustainable practices in the European context. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses, grounded in relevant theoretical frameworks and prior studies. Section 3 explains the methodology, including data collection, sample selection, variable definitions, and regression models. Section 4 reports the empirical results, covering descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression findings. Finally, Section 5 discusses the study's implications and proposes avenues for future research. 2 Literature review and development of hypotheses The relationship between ownership structure and SDG disclosure is deeply rooted in the theoretical foundations of stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories. Together, these theories provide a comprehensive lens for understanding the motivations, mechanisms, and dynamics driving corporate behaviour toward SDG reporting. Stakeholder theory highlights the obligation of companies to address the diverse interests of their stakeholders, who encompass not only shareholders but also employees, customers, communities, and environmental groups [ 27 , 28 ]. These stakeholders demand transparency regarding corporate contributions to social and environmental well-being, especially concerning the SDGs. The multidimensional nature of the SDGs allows firms to address these diverse interests effectively, integrating societal expectations into their strategies. For example, institutional investors, as key stakeholders, increasingly demand SDG disclosures to align corporate practices with broader societal goals and ethical standards [ 29 – 31 ]. Companies adopting this approach benefit from improved stakeholder relationships, enhanced trust, and a stronger reputation. The theory posits that by proactively managing these relationships, firms can mitigate risks associated with stakeholder dissatisfaction and secure long-term support, particularly in regions with strong cultural and regulatory expectations for sustainability. Agency theory, on the other hand, centres on the challenges posed by information asymmetry and conflicting objectives between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). The ownership dispersion impairs these agency problems, as managers may prioritise personal interests over shareholder wealth maximisation [ 32 ]. Ownership structures play a pivotal role in mitigating these conflicts. Concentrated ownership by institutional investors and foreign shareholders enhances monitoring mechanisms, incentivising managers to disclose SDG-related information and align corporate strategies with long-term objectives [ 32 , 33 ]. Institutional investors often view SDG disclosures as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry and ensure managerial accountability, particularly in firms with complex operational structures or international exposure. With its emphasis on global standards and transparency, foreign ownership further intensifies the demand for SDG disclosures, reflecting a broader perspective on governance and sustainability [ 34 , 35 ]. Voluntary SDG reporting thus becomes a tool for mitigating agency conflicts while simultaneously enhancing the firm's appeal to professional and international investors. Legitimacy theory highlights the societal dimension of SDG reporting, emphasising the importance of aligning corporate actions and disclosures with societal norms and values to gain legitimacy and acceptance [ 36 ]. This theory is particularly relevant for government-owned firms, which are under heightened scrutiny to demonstrate their alignment with public welfare objectives and sustainability commitments. SDG reporting serves as a mechanism to enhance legitimacy by communicating the firm's efforts to address societal and environmental concerns. For example, government ownership often creates incentives to prioritise non-financial objectives, such as environmental protection and social equity, to maintain alignment with public policy goals [see, 21]. Furthermore, legitimacy theory suggests that firms may engage in either symbolic or substantive SDG disclosures. While symbolic disclosures aim to enhance reputation through strategic presentation, substantive disclosures reflect legitimate operational and strategic alignment with sustainability goals [ 37 , 38 ]. This duality underscores the strategic importance of SDG reporting in managing stakeholder perceptions, reducing potential legitimacy gaps, and ensuring long-term organisational survival. The integration of these three theoretical perspectives—stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy—provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding how different ownership structures influence SDG disclosures. While each theory offers valuable insights individually, their combined application helps explain the complex and sometimes contradictory relationships observed in empirical research. Stakeholder theory illuminates how different owner types prioritise various stakeholder groups; agency theory clarifies how ownership concentration affects monitoring and information asymmetry; and legitimacy theory explains how visibility and external pressures shape disclosure behaviours. Together, they reveal how shareholders' decision-making regarding SDG disclosures is influenced by their distinct risk perceptions, time horizons, and legitimacy concerns [ 39 , 40 ]. 2.1 Institutional Ownership and SDGs Institutional ownership refers to the significant proportion of a company's equity held by large financial entities, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and investment banks. These entities substantially influence corporate decision-making and governance due to their significant voting power and monitoring capabilities [ 32 , 41 ]. Institutional investors' active involvement often encourages improved disclosure practices, particularly in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) areas, aligning corporate strategies with sustainable development goals (SDGs) [ 42 , 43 ]. Institutional investors' characteristics and investment horizons are diverse, influencing their impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability practices. Long-term institutional investors, such as pension funds, prioritise sustainable growth and tend to support enhanced CSR activities and SDG disclosures [ 44 ]. They view CSR as a mechanism to mitigate risks and align with societal and environmental values, thereby ensuring stable and long-term returns [ 45 , 46 ]. Conversely, short-term-focused investors, such as mutual and hedge funds, may prioritise immediate financial returns over sustainable practices, often limiting their influence on CSR and SDG initiatives [ 19 , 47 ]. This heterogeneity within institutional investors is particularly significant for understanding their relationship with SDG disclosures. Long-term institutional investors typically hold large percentages of shares in portfolio companies [ 48 , 49 ] and cannot rapidly trade their investments due to their size [ 50 ]. As "universal owners" with diversified portfolios across numerous firms, their performance corresponds to broader economic developments rather than individual company performance [ 51 , 52 ]. Consequently, these investors internalise externalities that single companies might otherwise ignore, leading them to value comprehensive SDG disclosures that address systemic risks [ 53 ]. In contrast, short-term institutional investors face different pressures. Fund managers are evaluated quarterly [ 49 , 54 ] and must compete for limited market accounts [ 55 ]. They require liquidity to respond to money flows in and out of their portfolios [ 56 ], prioritising immediate financial results over long-term sustainability considerations. While they may avoid investments with obvious sustainability risks that could damage share prices in the near term, they typically show less interest in comprehensive SDG reporting focusing on long-term value creation [ 57 ]. The relationship between institutional ownership and SDG disclosure is underpinned by stakeholder and agency theories. Stakeholder theory posits that corporations must address the interests of various stakeholders, including institutional investors, by disclosing relevant non-financial information to maintain legitimacy and trust [ 58 , 59 ]. From an agency perspective, institutional investors act as sophisticated monitors, reducing information asymmetry between management and shareholders by demanding transparent disclosure policies [ 32 , 60 ]. Empirical studies consistently highlight a positive association between institutional ownership and corporate sustainability performance. Institutional investors often pressure management to disclose CSR and SDG-related information to demonstrate accountability and strategic alignment with sustainability goals [ 10 ]. This trend is particularly evident in countries with strong norms supporting social and environmental responsibility, where institutional investors prioritise sustainability as part of their fiduciary duty [ 44 , 61 ]. However, the extent of influence varies across different categories of institutional investors. For instance, foreign ownership have been shown to enhance SDG-related disclosures, while government ownership or cross-holdings often exhibit weaker impacts due to potential conflicts of interest or passive governance styles [ 47 , 62 ]. Given these dynamics, the following hypothesis is proposed: H1 Institutional ownership is positively associated with sustainable development goal (SDG) disclosure. 2.2 Government Ownership and SDGs The impact of government ownership on SDGs remains a topic of ongoing debate, with studies presenting mixed findings. Government ownership often brings stability and long-term orientation to companies, advancing stakeholder trust, particularly during market uncertainty. This is reflected in government-owned companies' broader social and political responsibilities, which frequently prioritise public welfare, social stability, and environmental sustainability over short-term profits [ 63 , 64 ]. These attributes generally support increased CSR engagement and sustainability disclosures. Empirical findings provide contrasting perspectives on the relationship between government ownership and SDG disclosures. Zaid, Abuhijleh [ 10 ] suggest that higher levels of government ownership lead to increased sustainability disclosures, as governments emphasise transparency, accountability, and alignment with public welfare objectives. Similarly, Muttakin and Subramaniam [ 65 ] argue that government-owned companies, under significant public scrutiny, are motivated to disclose additional non-financial information to maintain their legitimacy and meet stakeholder expectations. However, other studies challenge this view. García-Sánchez, Rodríguez‐Ariza [ 7 ] and Jiang, García-Meca [ 8 ] report that government ownership has an insignificant association with SDG disclosures, indicating that government shareholders do not necessarily enhance sustainability-related reporting. These findings suggest that the impact of government ownership may depend on contextual factors, such as the governance framework, regulatory environment, and political priorities. Adding further complexity, Giordino, Jabeen [ 9 ] identify a negative association between government ownership and SDG disclosures. This finding may reflect inefficiencies in governance within state-owned enterprises, where overlapping roles between government bodies and company executives can hinder effective decision-making and transparency. In such cases, the competing objectives of government ownership may limit a company's ability to prioritise and effectively communicate its contributions to sustainability. Despite these contradictory findings, the literature generally highlights the role of governments as institutional investors with the potential to influence corporate strategies. Government ownership often aligns with long-term investment goals that integrate ethical, social, and environmental considerations [ 66 ]. This perspective is supported by stakeholder and legitimacy theories, which posit that government-owned companies are driven to meet broader societal expectations by engaging in responsible and transparent practices [ 7 , 67 ]. Briefly, while government ownership has the potential to influence sustainability practices and disclosures positively, the evidence remains inconclusive and context-dependent. The apparent inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes regarding government ownership can be elucidated through a more sophisticated application of legitimacy theory. Despite theoretical pressures on state-owned enterprises to demonstrate alignment with public policy objectives, countervailing mechanisms frequently impede effective sustainability reporting. Governance inefficiencies manifest as structural impediments, with ambiguous accountability frameworks and politically-appointed executives often lacking requisite sustainability expertise [ 68 , 69 ]. Furthermore, the governmental dual role as shareholder and regulator engenders institutional tensions wherein political imperatives—prioritising social stability or economic development—frequently supersede transparent sustainability reporting [ 9 ]. Operating within protected markets with diminished competitive pressures, state-owned enterprises experience reduced incentives to employ SDG disclosures as differentiation mechanisms [ 70 ]. Given the mixed empirical findings, this study posits the following hypothesis: H2 Government ownership is positively associated with sustainable development goals. 2.3 Foreign Ownership and SDGs Foreign ownership, characterised by the ownership of a company's shares by entities outside the company's home country, has been increasingly studied for its role in corporate governance and sustainability practices. Foreign investors bring diverse expertise, global perspectives, and high expectations for transparency, often resulting in enhanced corporate governance and disclosure practices [ 19 , 71 ]. These investors are known to prioritise long-term performance and compliance with social and environmental norms, potentially increasing firms' alignment with sustainable development goals (SDGs) [ 65 , 72 ]. Empirical findings, however, present mixed evidence regarding the influence of foreign ownership on SDG-related disclosures. On the one hand, García-Sánchez, Rodríguez‐Ariza [ 7 ] highlight a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the relevance of SDG disclosures. This positive impact is attributed to foreign investors' tendency to promote transparency, reduce information asymmetries, and encourage firms to adopt internationally recognised sustainability practices, such as the SDG Compass. Similarly, Al-Gamrh, Al-Dhamari [ 73 ] and Gerged and Almontaser [ 74 ] suggest that foreign investors, with their global business perspective, drive companies toward enhanced CSR and SDG disclosures to improve reputational standing and minimise risks. Conversely, some studies indicate a neutral or even negative association between foreign ownership and SDG disclosures. Zaid, Abuhijleh [ 10 ] found no significant effect of foreign ownership on sustainability disclosures, suggesting that the influence of foreign investors may depend on the size of their holdings or their level of engagement with the firm. Jiang, García-Meca [ 8 ] report a negative association, particularly in the context of Chinese firms, where foreign investors prioritise short-term returns and lack sufficient voting power to enforce sustainability-related practices. Similarly, Giordino, Jabeen [ 9 ] found an insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and SDG disclosures, further emphasising the contextual variability in the impact of foreign ownership. A possible explanation for these mixed results lies in foreign investors' diversity and investment strategies. Large foreign institutional investors, such as pension funds, often focus on long-term investments and encourage sustainability practices to safeguard their reputations and ensure stable returns [ 75 ]. In contrast, smaller or dispersed foreign investors may prioritise short-term profits, limiting their involvement in CSR or SDG-related activities [ 76 ]. Furthermore, geographical distance and cultural differences between foreign investors and local firms may contribute to variations in their influence on corporate disclosures [ 46 ]. The theoretical framework supports these findings through the lens of agency and stakeholder theories. Agency theory posits that foreign investors, as external stakeholders, act as corporate governance monitors by enforcing stricter disclosure standards and reducing agency costs [ 12 ]. Stakeholder theory suggests that foreign investors' emphasis on transparency and social responsibility aligns with the broader interests of global stakeholders, motivating firms to disclose more non-financial information [ 7 , 19 ]. Based on the aforementioned, while the impact of foreign ownership on SDG disclosures remains context-dependent, the literature suggests that foreign investors can play a significant role in promoting corporate sustainability practices. Nevertheless, this influence varies depending on factors such as the level of foreign ownership, investment strategy, and the specific governance environment. Based on these insights, the following hypothesis is proposed: H3 Foreign ownership is positively associated with sustainable development goals 3 Methodology 3.1 Sample and data This study analyses a sample of publicly traded companies in Europe over the period 2019–2023. Europe was selected as the focus of this research due to its globally recognised leadership in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability practices. European firms are at the forefront of sustainable development initiatives, with many publicly committing to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and integrating these goals into their corporate strategies [ 7 , 77 ]. The region's advanced sustainability frameworks and regulatory mechanisms, such as the European Union's Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), ensure robust and comprehensive sustainability disclosures, making Europe an ideal setting for studying the determinants and impacts of SDG reporting [ 78 ]. Europe's mature sustainability reporting landscape further justifies its selection as the study sample. European companies frequently disclose detailed non-financial information through annual reports, dedicated sustainability reports, or ESG disclosures. This widespread commitment to transparency provides a wealth of accessible, high-quality data for analysis, enhancing the reliability and depth of the study [ 79 ]. Additionally, Europe's regulatory frameworks prioritise standardised disclosure practices, reducing variability in reporting and allowing for consistent cross-country comparisons. The diversity of the European corporate landscape is another key consideration. Our sample includes firms from various industries and sectors, reflecting a broad range of operational and regulatory environments. This diverse sample contributes to the robustness and generalizability of our analysis of the relationship between ownership structures and SDG disclosures. However, we do not perform a sector-specific analysis in this study, as our primary focus is on the overall impact of ownership structures on sustainability reporting practices [ 31 ]. Furthermore, the inclusion of companies from European countries allows for examining differences in regulatory environments, cultural norms, and market dynamics, which are critical factors influencing sustainability reporting [ 78 ]. Data for this study were primarily obtained from the Refinitiv Eikon database, recognised for its comprehensive coverage of financial, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information. The initial dataset included approximately 7,521 firm-year observations (1,505 firms), encompassing a broad range of European companies. To refine the sample, firms incorporated outside Europe were excluded to ensure alignment with the study's regional focus and to avoid regulatory discrepancies. Accordingly, the sample's countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The highest representation in the sample goes for France (15.92%), the United Kingdom (15.90%), Germany (11.20%), and Switzerland (8.79%), collectively forming a significant share of the dataset. Observations with missing data for key variables or fewer than three consecutive years of available data were also excluded (1,918 firm-year observations). Following these adjustments, the final dataset comprised 5,603 firm-year observations, providing a robust and reliable basis for empirical analysis. Sustainability-related variables, including SDG disclosures and ESG performance scores, were sourced from Refinitiv's Asset4 ESG database, which is widely recognised for its high-quality data on corporate sustainability practices [ 34 ]. Ownership and board characteristics, such as institutional, government, and foreign ownership, were extracted from the same source. Financial variables, including firm size, leverage, profitability, and market-to-book ratio, were obtained from the Worldscope database. Winsorisation at the 1st and 99th percentiles was applied to continuous variables, such as firm size and leverage, to mitigate the influence of extreme values and improve the robustness of the analysis. 3.2 Variables measurement 3.2.1 Dependent Variable The dependent variable, SDG disclosure (SDG_Percent), is measured as a compliance ratio based on the 17 SDGs, following the measurement approach used in recent literature [ 23 , 80 ]. Each goal is assigned a value of 1 if a company discloses relevant initiatives or contributions toward that specific SDG in a reporting year and 0 otherwise. The sum of these values is divided by 17 to calculate the degree of compliance, providing a standardised measure that reflects the extent to which firms incorporate the SDGs into their reporting practices. This measurement approach captures the breadth of a company's engagement with the SDG framework while allowing for comparative analysis across firms and over time. To mitigate potential "SDG-washing" concerns (where companies symbolically reference SDGs without substantive action), we only considered disclosures with concrete evidence of activities or initiatives aligned with specific SDG targets. This approach ensures consistency and comparability across firms and years, enabling a comprehensive assessment of corporate commitment to sustainable development objectives [ 9 ]. 3.2.2 Independent variables The primary independent variables capture the ownership structure, including institutional ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership. Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of shares held by institutional investors relative to the total shares outstanding. This metric highlights the influence of these investors, who often advocate for transparency and sustainability practices within the firms they invest in [ 46 , 81 ]. Government ownership is quantified as the proportion of shares owned by government entities. Firms with significant government ownership often emphasise long-term objectives aligned with public policy, including enhanced sustainability and social responsibility [ 82 , 83 ]. Foreign ownership, representing the percentage of shares held by foreign investors, reflects the influence of global stakeholders who demand adherence to international standards and sustainability frameworks, driving transparency and SDG disclosures [ 19 , 72 ]. 3.2.3 Control Variables Control variables capture additional influences on SDG disclosure, guided by established theories and empirical work. Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets, reflects a firm's risk profile; agency theory posits that higher leverage prompts more extensive disclosure to address information asymmetries [ 32 , 84 ]. Empirical research highlights leverage's importance in sustainability reporting [ 85 , 86 ], with Zaid, Abuhijleh [ 10 ] confirming its relevance for SDG-specific contexts. Firm size, computed as the natural logarithm of total assets, is included because larger firms face greater scrutiny, driving more comprehensive disclosure [ 87 , 88 ]. Resource-based theory suggests they also have a greater capacity for sophisticated reporting [ 89 ]. Giordino, Jabeen [ 9 ] affirm size's impact on SDG disclosures, particularly in European settings. Financial performance, represented by return on equity (ROE), is considered because profitable firms can invest more in sustainability [ 90 – 92 ]. Legitimacy theory holds that profitable entities may disclose more to demonstrate responsible citizenship [ 3 , 65 ]. Rosati and Faria [ 93 ] link stronger financial performance with higher SDG disclosure. The ESG score from Refinitiv Eikon is incorporated, given evidence that established sustainability practices promote deeper SDG engagement [ 94 – 97 ]. Khaled, Ali [ 3 ] show that strong ESG performance supports robust SDG reporting through refined internal processes. Governance factors provide further insights. A CSR committee (binary) signifies organised sustainability governance, often tied to improved disclosure [ 1 , 78 , 98 ]. Jiang, García-Meca [ 8 ] highlight its influence on SDG reporting. The market-to-book ratio, reflecting market value of equity versus the book value of assets, captures investor perceptions of growth and sustainability [ 77 , 99 – 101 ]. Consolandi, Phadke [ 102 ] argue that it represents intangible assets aligned with SDG strategies. CEO-chairman duality (binary) gauges leadership structure linked to disclosure decisions [ 77 , 95 , 103 ]. Martínez-Ferrero and García‐Meca [ 104 ] note that centralised leadership can shape sustainability reporting. Lastly, board size is included because larger boards may offer broader oversight and expertise [ 7 , 105 ], thus influencing SDG disclosure. Insert Table 1 Here Table 1 Measurements of the Variables Variable Name Label Operational Definition SDGs_Disclosure SDGs_percent The percentage of the 17 SDG goals disclosed by the firm is calculated as the sum of disclosed goals divided by 17 (Hamad et al., 2023). Each goal disclosure is assigned a value of 1 if the company demonstrates substantive engagement with that SDG through specific initiatives, targets, or performance indicators and 0 otherwise. This measurement approach evaluates the breadth of SDG engagement while allowing for comparability across firms. The resulting score represents the proportion of the SDGs incorporated into a firm's sustainability strategy and disclosure practices. (Refinitiv Eikon) Institutional Ownership Institutional_Own The proportion of a firm's shares owned by institutional investors, expressed as a percentage. Governmental Ownership Government_Own The proportion of a firm's shares owned by government entities, expressed as a percentage. Foreign Ownership Foreign_Own The proportion of a firm's shares owned by foreign investors, expressed as a percentage. Financial Leverage LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total assets, indicating the firm's financial structure and reliance on debt financing. Firm Size SIZE The natural logarithm of a firm's annual sales revenue, used as a proxy for firm size. Return on Equity ROE The ratio of net income to shareholders' equity, reflecting the firm's profitability relative to equity investments. Loss LOSS A binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a net loss during the year, and 0 otherwise. ESG Score ESG_SCORE A composite score obtained from the Refinitiv Eikon database represents the firm's environmental, social, and governance performance. Through a comprehensive assessment methodology, this measure evaluates a company's resource use, emissions, innovation, workforce practices, human rights, community engagement, product responsibility, management structure, shareholders' policies, and CSR strategy. Higher scores indicate stronger ESG performance and more transparent disclosure practices. CSR Committee CSR_COMMITTEE A binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dedicated corporate social responsibility committee, and 0 otherwise. Market-to-Book Ratio MTB The ratio of the book value of total assets to the market value of total assets, reflecting market expectations of firm value. Duality DUALITY A binary variable is equal to 1 if the firm's CEO and chairperson of the board are the same person and 0 otherwise. Board Size BOARD_SIZE The total number of board members serving at the end of the fiscal year. 3.3 Regression model Based on Zaid, Abuhijleh [ 10 ], the study uses the following regression model: Where the dependent and independent variables are defined in Table (1), ε is the error term, and βk is the regression coefficients. The study employs a fixed-effects panel regression to control for firm-level heterogeneity and better isolate the impact of ownership structures on SDG disclosure, while accounting for industry and country effects [ 106 – 108 ]. A Hausman test (p < 0.05) confirms that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than the random-effects alternative [ 109 ]. 4 Results 4.1 Descriptive and correlation Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. On average, companies report 5.44 out of 17 SDGs, reflecting about 32% compliance, though some firms report none while others cover all goals. Institutional ownership averages 4.58% (ranging from 0 to 68%), government ownership averages 2.54% (ranging from 0 to 99%), and foreign ownership averages 9.49%, all with notable variation. These differences suggest that while some firms are highly transparent and committed to sustainability, others lag. Additional metrics, such as varied ESG scores, ROE, and differing governance structures like CSR committees and board sizes, further highlight these companies' diverse profiles and the need to explore how ownership types shape SDG disclosures. Table 2 Descriptive statistics Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max SDG Percent .32 .312 0 1 SDG Score 5.44 5.29 0 17 Institutional_Own 4.583 7.723 0 68 Government_Own 2.537 9.957 0 99 Foreign_Own 9.491 16.738 0 94 ESG Score 57.798 18.823 .63 95.38 LEVERAGE .208 .163 0 .689 SIZE 14.41 2.035 .693 20.19 ROE 12.007 23.883 -6.94 44.90 LOSS .143 .35 0 1 CSR_COMMITTEE .736 .441 0 1 MTB 3.205 3.598 − .58 22.91 DUALITY .236 .425 0 1 BOARD_SIZE 10.179 3.703 6 15 Insert Table 2 Here Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients, providing insights into the relationships between the study variables and potential multicollinearity concerns. The results reveal the highest correlation between firm size (SIZE) and ESG_SCORE, with a coefficient of 0.596. This value is below the widely accepted threshold of 0.80 for multicollinearity concerns [ 110 ], suggesting that including these variables in the analysis does not compromise the robustness of the results. Table 3 Correlation matrix Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (1) SDGs_Percent 1.000 (2) Institutional_Own -0.062 1.000 (3) Government_Own 0.040 -0.117 1.000 (4) Foreign_Own 0.030 0.140 -0.052 1.000 (5) ESG Score 0.292 -0.104 0.082 0.005 1.000 (6) LEVERAGE 0.096 -0.005 0.033 0.084 0.072 1.000 (7) SIZE 0.185 -0.205 0.173 0.043 0.596 0.199 1.000 (8) ROE 0.018 -0.047 -0.041 -0.053 0.070 -0.120 0.007 1.000 (9) LOSS -0.019 0.082 0.013 0.078 -0.096 0.129 -0.064 -0.614 1.000 (10) CSR_COMMITTEE 0.243 -0.081 0.057 0.014 0.513 0.098 0.374 0.043 -0.050 1.000 (11) MTB -0.049 0.064 -0.108 -0.008 -0.117 -0.046 -0.309 0.291 -0.060 -0.121 1.000 (12) DUALITY 0.044 -0.064 -0.054 -0.008 0.008 -0.033 0.033 0.014 -0.030 0.034 0.036 1.000 (13) BOARD_SIZE 0.151 -0.148 0.129 0.060 0.411 0.060 0.568 -0.019 -0.033 0.273 -0.177 0.110 1.000 The remaining correlations between independent and control variables are generally low, indicating limited overlap in their explanatory power. This supports the validity of the dataset for hypothesis testing and ensures that the estimated relationships among variables are not adversely influenced by multicollinearity. Insert Table 3 Here 4.2 Regression analysis The regression results in Table 4 offer a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and SDG disclosures, drawing on stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories. The analysis incorporates four models: Models 1 to 3 assess the individual effects of institutional, government, and foreign ownership, while Model 4 integrates all three ownership variables. A Hausman test confirmed the appropriateness of the fixed-effects model (p < 0.05), and robust standard errors were employed to address heteroscedasticity. Year, country, and industry fixed effects were included to control for unobserved heterogeneity, ensuring robust and reliable estimates. Table 4 Regression analysis (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES SDGs_Percent SDGs_Percent SDGs_Percent SDGs_Percent Institutional_Own -0.00123*** -0.00124*** (0.000416) (0.000419) Government_Own 0.00102 0.000987 (0.000290) (0.000294) Foreign_Own 0.000277** 0.000400** (0.000179) (0.000182) LEVERAGE 0.0843*** 0.0830*** 0.0805*** 0.0816*** (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0207) (0.0207) SIZE 0.0208*** 0.0209*** 0.0218*** 0.0198*** (0.00272) (0.00269) (0.00269) (0.00271) ROE 0.000287 0.000303* 0.000294* 0.000300* (0.000178) (0.000179) (0.000178) (0.000178) LOSS -0.0240** -0.0258** -0.0264** -0.0254** (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) ESG_SCORE 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00238*** 0.00242*** (0.000219) (0.000217) (0.000218) (0.000218) CSR_COMMITTEE 0.0414*** 0.0416*** 0.0417*** 0.0411*** (0.00789) (0.00786) (0.00789) (0.00787) MTB -0.00242 -0.00232 -0.00247 -0.00232 (0.000826) (0.000829) (0.000829) (0.000825) DUALITY 0.0301*** 0.0328*** 0.0313*** 0.0318*** (0.00712) (0.00711) (0.00710) (0.00711) BOARD_SIZE 0.00755*** 0.00750*** 0.00758*** 0.00729*** (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00108) Constant -0.583*** -0.592*** -0.605*** -0.570*** (0.0366) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0366) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 5,603 5,603 5,603 5,603 R-squared 0.431 0.432 0.431 0.433 Note: This Table presents the results of the regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019–2023. Models 1, 2 and 3 individually examine the effect of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on the adoption of sustainable development goals, respectively. Whereas, In Model 4, we include these three variables in one regression. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Institutional ownership exhibits a negative and statistically significant effect on SDG disclosures (β = -0.00124; p < 0.01), challenging Hypothesis 1 (H1). While stakeholder theory posits that institutional investors should champion greater transparency to align corporate strategies with societal goals [ 29 ], our findings emphasise the heterogeneity among institutional investors. Consistent with Bushee [ 111 ] and Jiang, García-Meca [ 8 ], we suggest that a subset of institutional investors with short-term investment horizons may prioritise immediate financial returns over long-term sustainability initiatives, thereby pressuring management to focus on quarterly performance rather than resource-intensive SDG reporting. This dynamic is further contextualised by agency theory Meckling and Jensen [ 32 ], which highlights the conflicts between investors and managers over the allocation of resources for non-financial objectives. Additionally, legitimacy theory indicates that while some firms may adopt SDG reporting to gain legitimacy, short-term-oriented investors can limit the depth or scope of such disclosures if they perceive little immediate financial benefit. Following Giordino, Jabeen [ 9 ], our result aligns with evidence suggesting that institutional ownership's contribution to SDG reporting may be muted in firms lacking committed, long-term investment. In line with Oh, Chang [ 20 ] and Pucheta-Martínez and Chiva‐Ortells [ 47 ], this outcome reinforces the importance of distinguishing among different types of institutional investors, as their investment horizons and strategic priorities can yield diverse impacts on SDG disclosure practices. Foreign ownership, in contrast, demonstrates a positive and statistically significant relationship with SDG disclosures (β = 0.0004; p < 0.05), supporting Hypothesis 3 (H3). This finding reinforces the role of foreign investors in promoting corporate transparency and aligning practices with global sustainability standards, as emphasised by García-Sánchez, Rodríguez‐Ariza [ 7 ] and Zaid, Abuhijleh [ 10 ]. Stakeholder theory positions foreign investors as external stakeholders who demand higher levels of accountability and alignment with international norms [ 72 ]. Legitimacy theory further supports this finding, with Deegan [ 21 ] highlighting that firms with substantial foreign ownership often engage in substantive SDG disclosures to enhance their legitimacy in global markets. Foreign investors bring expertise and diverse perspectives to governance, often advocating for adopting internationally recognised frameworks such as the GRI or SDG Compass [ 31 , 46 ]. This proactive influence aligns corporate strategies with global sustainability expectations, reinforcing the pivotal role of foreign ownership in advancing SDG reporting. Government ownership does not statistically affect SDG disclosures in Model 4, challenging Hypothesis 2 (H2). This finding is consistent with García-Sánchez, Rodríguez‐Ariza [ 7 ] and Jiang, García-Meca [ 8 ], who also report no significant link between government ownership and SDG reporting. While legitimacy theory would suggest that government-owned companies should meet societal expectations through transparent reporting, practical challenges, such as governance inefficiencies and conflicting political priorities, often stand in the way [ 66 ]. Furthermore, the overlapping roles of the government as both owner and regulator can lead to weak oversight and ambiguous accountability, with political interference further diverting focus from rigorous disclosure practices [ 9 , 10 ]. These issues seem to dilute the positive impact that might be expected from government ownership on SDG disclosures. Future research could benefit from a deeper qualitative exploration of these internal dynamics to better understand how political influences and governance structures interact to shape sustainability reporting. The control variables further illuminate the dynamics of SDG disclosures. Our analysis shows that firm size (SIZE) is positively and significantly associated with SDG disclosures (β = 0.0198; p < 0.01), consistent with Giordino, Jabeen [ 9 ] and Zaid, Abuhijleh [ 10 ]. This relationship can be understood from several theoretical perspectives. The resource-based view posits that larger firms have more financial and human resources to invest in sustainability initiatives and comprehensive reporting systems [ 87 , 112 ]. In addition, stakeholder theory argues that larger firms' heightened public visibility and scrutiny compel them to offer detailed sustainability disclosures to maintain legitimacy and satisfy diverse stakeholder expectations [ 88 , 89 ]. Deegan [ 21 ] further suggests that extensive SDG reporting serves as a broader reputation management strategy, enabling these firms to absorb the costs of thorough sustainability reporting. Additionally, leverage (LEVERAGE) is positively and significantly related to SDG disclosures (β = 0.0816; p < 0.01). Agency theory [ 32 , 84 ] explains that highly leveraged firms tend to disclose more sustainability information to reduce information asymmetry with creditors and potentially lower capital costs. In contrast, stakeholder theory indicates that firms with higher debt might prioritise debtholder concerns over sustainability initiatives [ 85 , 86 ]. Bose and Khan [ 112 ] also observed that "firms with higher leverage... have lower firm value," suggesting that the leverage–SDG disclosure relationship is context-dependent and shaped by industry norms, regional regulations, and market expectations. Other control variables provide additional insights into the nuanced dynamics shaping SDG disclosure practices. Financial performance (ROE) exhibits a modest yet statistically significant positive effect (β = 0.0003; p < 0.1), as evidenced by Reverte [ 113 ] and García-Sánchez, Rodríguez‐Ariza [ 7 ]. This suggests that firms with stronger financial performance are better able, albeit marginally, to allocate resources toward comprehensive sustainability reporting. Bose and Khan [ 112 ] also observed that "firms with greater profitability... have a higher level of SDG disclosure," reinforcing the view that financial robustness facilitates investments in environmental and social initiatives—a concept supported by legitimacy theory [ 3 , 65 ]. Conversely, financial losses (LOSS) exert a significant negative influence on SDG disclosures (β = -0.0254; p < 0.05), highlighting the constraints faced by financially distressed firms [ 8 ]. This outcome aligns with resource dependency theory, which posits that firms experiencing losses tend to prioritise core operations and financial recovery over sustainability initiatives, thereby reducing their engagement in SDG reporting. Moreover, ESG performance (ESG_SCORE) is strongly and positively associated with SDG disclosures (β = 0.00242; p < 0.01), reinforcing findings by Rosati and Faria [ 93 ] that robust ESG practices enhance transparency and facilitate the integration of SDG considerations into reporting frameworks [ 3 ]. Governance factors also play a critical role. The existence of a CSR committee is linked to increased SDG disclosures (β = 0.0411; p < 0.01), as demonstrated by Albitar, Elmarzouky [ 78 ] and Jiang, García-Meca [ 8 ]. Additionally, CEO duality (β = 0.0318; p < 0.01) and board size (β = 0.00729; p < 0.01) are positively associated with SDG reporting, suggesting that diverse and empowered boards foster more effective sustainability oversight [ 7 , 72 , 104 ]. Insert Table 4 here 4.3 Robustness test - control for endogeneity To address endogeneity in examining the link between ownership structure and SDG disclosures, this study employs the two-step system GMM estimator, as outlined by Arellano and Bond [ 114 ] and refined by Blundell and Bond [ 115 ]. Endogeneity arises here from several sources: unobserved heterogeneity (firm-specific traits that affect both ownership and disclosure practices), simultaneity (reverse causality between ownership structure and SDG disclosures), and dynamic endogeneity (past SDG disclosures influencing current ownership decisions) [ 24 , 116 ]. This concern is particularly relevant given potential reverse causality issues, where shifts in ownership might simultaneously reflect and influence SDG reporting practices. A key advantage of the system GMM estimator is its use of lagged dependent and endogenous variables as internal instruments. Unlike conventional instrumental variable approaches, which require external instruments that are often difficult to justify or locate, this method leverages past values to mitigate endogeneity [ 24 , 117 , 118 ]. Moreover, system GMM improves on difference GMM by addressing the weak instruments problem—common when dependent variables are highly persistent—by incorporating lagged differences as instruments for level equations [ 115 , 119 ]. This methodological choice not only counters simultaneity issues but also enhances estimator efficiency and reduces finite sample bias. To ensure the validity of our instruments and the overall model specification, we conduct diagnostic tests. The Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals yields p-values of 0.289, 0.309, and 0.211 across our models, surpassing the 0.05 threshold and thus supporting the absence of second-order serial correlation [ 24 ]. Additionally, the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions provides p-values of 0.506, 0.375, and 0.423, which fail to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity [ 114 ]. Given the dataset's structure—comprising multiple firms over several years—the system GMM estimator is particularly appropriate, as it robustly controls for unobserved heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity [ 119 ]. Our sample size also surpasses the threshold at which GMM might encounter limitations, as noted by Khatib [ 24 ]. Table 5 presents the GMM results across three institutional, government, and foreign ownership models. The results reaffirm our baseline findings (Table 4 ): institutional ownership is negatively associated with SDG disclosures, likely due to short-term financial priorities [ 8 , 111 ]; foreign ownership exhibits a positive and significant relationship, enhancing transparency and adherence to global sustainability standards [ 7 , 10 ]; while government ownership remains statistically insignificant, reflecting governance inefficiencies and conflicting political priorities [ 9 , 66 ]. Table 5 Robustness test - Two-Step System GMM (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES SDGs_Percent SDGs_Percent SDGs_Percent L.SDG_Percent 0.721*** 0.781*** 0.882*** (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) Institutional_Own -0.000801** (0.000429) Government_Own 0.000402 (0.000356) Foreign_Own 0.000128** (0.000182) LEVERAGE 0.00153*** 0.00153*** 0.00153*** (0.000248) (0.000247) (0.000248) SIZE 0.0696*** 0.0682*** 0.0673*** (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0213) ROE 0.00201 0.00167 0.00131 (0.00266) (0.00263) (0.00263) LOSS -0.000227* -0.000218* -0.000224 (0.000172) (0.000174) (0.000174) ESG_SCORE 0.00150 0.00230 0.00263 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) CSR_COMMITTEE 0.0214** 0.0217** 0.0215** (0.00874) (0.00874) (0.00875) MTB -0.00114 -0.00118 -0.00112 (0.000712) (0.000720) (0.000721) DUALITY 0.0210*** 0.0224*** 0.0217*** (0.00751) (0.00755) (0.00753) BOARD_SIZE 0.00321*** 0.00322*** 0.00324*** (0.00110) (0.00111) (0.00112) Constant 0.0283 0.0186 0.0136 (0.0325) (0.0318) (0.0317) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Country FE Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Observations 4,482 4,482 4,482 AR (2) p-value 0.289 0.309 0.211 Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.506 0.375 0.423 Note: This Table presents the results of the regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019–2023. Models 1, 2, and 3 individually examine the effect of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on the adoption of sustainable development goals, respectively. The Two-Step System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) has been applied to address potential endogeneity issues. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Insert Table 5 here 4.4 Robustness test - Generalised estimating equations (GEE) In a robustness check, we employed Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) to our panel data analysis. GEE is ideal for managing correlated observations from repeated measurements within firms and provides robust standard errors even when the within-firm correlation structure is not perfectly specified [ 120 ]. The GEE results, detailed in Table 6 , are consistent with our main findings in Table 4 , reaffirming that institutional ownership is negatively associated with SDG disclosures while foreign ownership shows a positive effect. This consistency across estimation techniques reinforces the reliability of our conclusions regarding the influence of ownership structure on corporate sustainability reporting. Table 6 Robustness test - Generalised estimating equations (GEE) (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Institutional_Own -0.0246*** (0.00733) Government_Own 0.00390 (0.00713) Foreign_Own 0.00602** (0.00347) LEVERAGE 1.639*** 1.670*** 1.648*** (0.417) (0.417) (0.417) SIZE 0.109** 0.125*** 0.126*** (0.0465) (0.0464) (0.0463) ROE 0.00213 0.00193 0.00195 (0.00268) (0.00269) (0.00268) LOSS -0.468** -0.489** -0.498*** (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) ESG_SCORE 0.0833*** 0.0827*** 0.0831*** (0.00449) (0.00449) (0.00449) CSR_COMMITTEE 0.772*** 0.766*** 0.758*** (0.160) (0.161) (0.161) MTB -0.00485 -0.00488 -0.00485 (0.00384) (0.00384) (0.00384) DUALITY 0.592*** 0.645*** 0.653*** (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) BOARD_SIZE 1.519*** 1.543*** 1.532*** (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) Constant -6.897*** -7.296*** -7.337*** (0.568) (0.558) (0.553) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Country FE Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Observations 4,982 4,982 4,982 Number of id 2,000 2,000 2,000 Note: This Table presents the results of the regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019–2023. Models 1, 2, and 3 individually examine the effect of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on the adoption of sustainable development goals, respectively. The Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) have been applied to address issues related to correlated data and to provide robust standard errors. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Insert Table 6 here 4.5 Additional test - SDGs grouping To further validate our main findings, we conducted an additional test by disaggregating SDG disclosures into four thematic groups (i.e., Environmental, Social, Economic, and Institutional) to uncover whether specific dimensions of sustainability reporting are differentially influenced by ownership structures [ 121 , 122 ]. In Table 7 , the analysis reveals that institutional ownership consistently exhibits a robust, negative association across all thematic groups, supporting the notion that the short-term performance focus of institutional investors may discourage firms from engaging in the long-term initiatives required for comprehensive SDG reporting. In contrast, government ownership shows no statistically significant effect, suggesting that the mixed mandates and potential bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in state-owned enterprises may neutralise any positive impact on sustainability disclosure practices. Notably, foreign ownership exerts a positive effect, particularly pronounced in the Environmental, Social, and Institutional domains. This finding indicates that foreign investors, who often advocate for higher transparency and alignment with global sustainability standards, can act as catalysts for enhanced SDG reporting. Table 7 Additional test - SDGs grouping (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Environmental _SDGs Social _SDGs Economic _SDGs Institutional _SDGs Institutional_Own -0.00906*** -0.00552** -0.00443** -0.00607*** (0.00209) (0.00260) (0.00189) (0.00137) Government_Own 0.000761 -0.00234 0.00251 0.00234 (0.00250) (0.00301) (0.00196) (0.00173) Foreign_Own 0.00195* 0.00282** 0.000249 0.00169** (0.00113) (0.00131) (0.000900) (0.000738) LEVERAGE 0.400*** 0.496*** 0.406*** 0.317*** (0.128) (0.151) (0.106) (0.0828) SIZE 0.0376*** 0.0393** 0.00668 0.0218** (0.0144) (0.0176) (0.0113) (0.00911) ROE 0.000370 0.000510 0.000970 0.000421 (0.000777) (0.000911) (0.000648) (0.000523) LOSS -0.136** -0.140** -0.145*** -0.0597 (0.0587) (0.0678) (0.0488) (0.0373) ESG_SCORE 0.0241*** 0.0252*** 0.0209*** 0.0135*** (0.00137) (0.00166) (0.00112) (0.000877) CSR_COMMITTEE 0.195*** 0.293*** 0.201*** 0.0783** (0.0496) (0.0595) (0.0440) (0.0314) MTB -0.00146* -0.00106 -0.00162** -0.000671 (0.000762) (0.00100) (0.000698) (0.000506) DUALITY 0.187*** 0.240*** 0.0751* 0.107*** (0.0495) (0.0582) (0.0385) (0.0321) BOARD_SIZE 0.327*** 0.559*** 0.296*** 0.309*** (0.0631) (0.0766) (0.0514) (0.0410) Constant -2.110*** -2.315*** -1.166*** -1.269*** (0.172) (0.208) (0.142) (0.113) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 4,982 4,982 4,982 4,982 R-squared 0.338 0.275 0.312 0.266 Note: This table presents the results of regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019–2023. Model 1 examines the impact of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on environmental SDGs. Model 2 examines the impact of these ownership structures on social SDGs. Model 3 examines the impact on economic SDGs, while Model 4 focuses on institutional SDGs. Refer to Table 1 for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Insert Table 7 here 5 Conclusion This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and SDG disclosures in publicly traded European firms from 2019 to 2023, focusing on institutional, government, and foreign ownership as the primary variables. Using fixed-effects regression models and addressing endogeneity through the two-step system GMM estimator, the analysis provides robust evidence of the nuanced roles of ownership types in shaping sustainability reporting. The study also incorporates key control variables, including firm size, leverage, ESG performance, financial performance, financial losses, and governance attributes such as CSR committees, CEO duality, and board size. The findings reveal that institutional ownership negatively influences SDG disclosures, reflecting the conflicting priorities of short-term financial objectives versus long-term sustainability goals. In contrast, foreign ownership positively impacts SDG disclosures, emphasising the role of global investors in fostering transparency and aligning corporate practices with international sustainability standards. Government ownership, however, does not show a significant effect, underscoring the governance inefficiencies and competing priorities often associated with state-owned enterprises. The findings of this study have critical implications for investors, firms, policymakers, and government-owned companies, offering practical strategies to enhance SDG disclosures and promote sustainable business practices. Institutional investors are encouraged to adopt long-term investment strategies that integrate sustainability into corporate decision-making. Short-term financial objectives often conflict with the goals of SDG reporting, limiting its effectiveness. Institutional investors, particularly pension funds and insurance companies, can play a pivotal role by engaging actively with portfolio firms through voting rights and strategic dialogues to ensure that sustainability becomes a core part of corporate practices. Firms, in turn, should focus on attracting foreign investors who have consistently driven higher levels of transparency and alignment with global sustainability standards. The presence of foreign investors not only signals credibility but also enhances a firm's reputation among stakeholders. Investing in robust governance structures, such as CSR committees, can help firms strategically and effectively communicate their sustainability goals, particularly in industries with high environmental and social impacts. Policymakers play a crucial role in enabling SDG disclosures by strengthening regulatory frameworks to mandate comprehensive and standardised reporting. In regions with weaker governance mechanisms, incentives such as tax benefits or access to funding for firms demonstrating strong sustainability practices can bridge the gap. Additionally, encouraging transparency through public-private partnerships can foster knowledge sharing and capacity building in sustainability reporting. Governance inefficiencies and political interference must be addressed for government-owned companies to enhance SDG disclosures. Independent oversight mechanisms and international benchmarks can help these enterprises align with both local and global sustainability expectations, improving public trust and organisational legitimacy. The findings also contribute to the theoretical understanding of SDG disclosures by enriching stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories. Stakeholder theory is supported by the positive influence of foreign ownership, which aligns corporate practices with global sustainability norms and promotes transparency. Agency theory highlights the conflicts inherent in institutional ownership, where short-term financial pressures often undermine the long-term nature of sustainability initiatives. Conversely, long-term institutional investors can positively influence sustainability efforts, reflecting the nuanced dynamics of ownership structures. Legitimacy theory underscores the role of SDG disclosures in aligning corporate behavior with societal expectations, particularly for firms with substantial foreign ownership. While this study makes significant contributions, it has limitations that offer avenues for future research. The sample is limited to European firms, and future studies should explore the relationship between ownership structures and SDG disclosures in other regions, particularly emerging economies where governance and regulatory environments may differ. Expanding the sample to include diverse geographic and cultural contexts could enhance the generalizability of findings. Moreover, although our results indicate that foreign ownership is positively associated with SDG disclosures, we do not account for potential variations in this relationship across different European countries. Future research could incorporate interaction terms with country-level institutional factors (such as ESG regulation strength) to better understand how national contexts influence sustainability reporting. Future research would also consider dividing SDG disclosures into specific categories, such as environmental-related goals, to capture more nuanced dynamics between ownership structures and targeted sustainability practices. Additionally, our study relies on the Refinitiv Eikon database, which provides SDG data in the form of dummy variables indicating whether firms disclose information on each of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. While this approach captures the extent of SDG adoption, it does not assess the quality or depth of these disclosures. A more detailed evaluation would require comprehensive content analysis, which is beyond the scope of this study due to time constraints. Future research could explore alternative datasets or qualitative assessments to provide deeper insights into the quality of SDG reporting. Finally, while our regression results indicate statistically significant relationships between ownership variables and SDG disclosures, the magnitudes of these effects are modest. One potential reason for the low practical significance is the presence of unobserved firm-level factors (e.g., managerial practices, corporate culture, and unique stakeholder pressures) that our model may not fully capture, even after including fixed effects for year, country, and industry. Additionally, the measurement of SDG disclosures as a percentage may yield inherently smaller coefficients. Given the complex and multifaceted nature of sustainability reporting, it is likely that a range of other determinants also influences these outcomes. Future research could benefit from incorporating additional firm-level controls. Declarations Funding No funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript. Competing Interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests. Data Availability The datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. Clinical Trial Registration Not applicable. Ethics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish Declarations Not applicable. Ethics Declaration Not applicable. Authors' Contributions Rasmi Meqbel contributed to the study by developing the methodology, collecting the data, and performing the analysis. Aladdin Dwekat conducted the literature review and proofreading of the manuscript. Zeena Mardawi contributed to writing the introduction and conclusion sections. All authors reviewed and approved the final manuscript. Acknowledgments None. Declaration of Generative AI and AI-Assisted Technologies in the Writing Process During the preparation of this work, the author(s) used Grammarly for assistance in proofreading and enhancing the manuscript's readability. Following its use, the author(s) thoroughly reviewed and revised the content as necessary and assume full responsibility for the published content. Authorship Statement The corresponding author confirms that all authors have read and agreed to the journal's policies on author responsibilities and that this manuscript is submitted in accordance with those policies. Third-Party Material No third-party material was used in this manuscript; all material is original work by the authors. References Hassanein A, Elmaghrabi M. How does market competition affect the reporting of sustainability practices? Insights from the UK and Germany. International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management; 2024. Van der Waal JW, Thijssens T. 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Multinational enterprises and the Sustainable Development Goals: An institutional approach to corporate engagement. J Int Bus Policy. 2018;1(3):208–33. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 04 Apr, 2025 Reviews received at journal 02 Apr, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 02 Apr, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 01 Apr, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 01 Apr, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 01 Apr, 2025 First submitted to journal 22 Mar, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-5907095","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":437346043,"identity":"2aab3281-d044-4bbc-849b-caa8ae342386","order_by":0,"name":"Rasmi Meqbel","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"The Hashemite University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Rasmi","middleName":"","lastName":"Meqbel","suffix":""},{"id":437346044,"identity":"6208f723-c320-4a16-a15c-077a87327deb","order_by":1,"name":"Aladdin Dwekat","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"An-Najah National University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Aladdin","middleName":"","lastName":"Dwekat","suffix":""},{"id":437346045,"identity":"7712a854-6893-438d-9b57-ae5431c379ea","order_by":2,"name":"Zeena Mardawi","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"An-Najah National University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Zeena","middleName":"","lastName":"Mardawi","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-01-26 15:08:14","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5907095/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5907095/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":79847369,"identity":"cb01156d-a4b6-47c3-a478-55fc79bfc592","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-04-03 14:00:50","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1487519,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-5907095/v1/303e52b1-7263-48b3-aa72-2ae54e24a970.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Ownership Structure and Sustainability: Insights into SDG Disclosures in European Firms","fulltext":[{"header":"1 Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eCorporate reporting on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has emerged as a critical mechanism for firms to demonstrate their commitment to global sustainability challenges [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e]. Despite escalating regulatory pressures and stakeholder demands for greater transparency, there remains considerable variation in both the extent of corporate SDG disclosures [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR3\" citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e]. This heterogeneity prompts fundamental questions about the determinants of corporate SDG reporting, specifically, how internal governance mechanisms shape firms' transparency regarding their contributions to sustainable development objectives. The phenomenon is particularly evident in Europe, where advanced regulatory frameworks coexist with markedly different approaches to SDG disclosure [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAmong these governance factors, ownership structure stands out as a key determinant of corporate transparency and sustainability initiatives. Institutional investors, guided by long-term objectives and risk mitigation, often champion rigorous disclosure aligned with global sustainability standards [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR7\" citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e]. In parallel, government ownership leverages state influence to align corporate behavior with national and international sustainability goals, emphasising regulatory compliance and public policy objectives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. However, foreign ownership introduces a global perspective that can drive higher transparency to meet international expectations and address agency conflicts between managers and foreign shareholders [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. Collectively, these dynamics highlight the multifaceted influence of ownership structures on corporate accountability and highlight their role in advancing SDG disclosures across diverse institutional and regulatory environments [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe European context provides an ideal setting for investigating these issues, given its mature regulatory ecosystem for sustainability reporting. The EU's Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) has significantly bolstered both the accountability and comparability of non-financial information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e], leading to high compliance levels among European companies in environmental and social matters [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e]. In addition, the European Green Deal has further reinforced sustainability imperatives, creating incentives for corporate transparency that extend beyond mere regulatory compliance [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e]. While this leadership in sustainability offers opportunities for comprehensive SDG engagement, it also poses challenges in standardising disclosure across varying organisational contexts and national boundaries.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExisting research on SDG disclosure determinants, however, reveals notable limitations. First, many studies treat institutional ownership as a homogeneous category, overlooking the substantial heterogeneity within this investor class and its diverse implications for sustainability practices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e]. For example, although Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez, Rodr\u0026iacute;guez‐Ariza [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e] identified a positive relationship between institutional investors and SDG disclosure, they did not differentiate among various institutional investor types. Second, while certain studies have explored the effects of ownership structure on aggregate SDG disclosure [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne important source of inconsistency in the current literature lies in the diverse methodologies, datasets, and regional settings adopted by different scholars [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e]. For instance, some studies treat various forms of institutional ownership as a single, uniform category, ignoring the substantial differences between short-term and long-term investors [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e]. This methodological choice can contribute to contradictory findings, especially when distinct SDG reporting indices are used [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. Moreover, country-level factors such as legal frameworks, cultural norms, and the role of government agencies all create unique pressures on firms to report [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e], sometimes yielding contradictory conclusions. By acknowledging these methodological and contextual differences, our study helps clarify why prior work has produced divergent findings and situates our results within a broader comparative framework [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e]. Yet, most have not examined how different ownership types might distinctly affect reporting on specific SDG categories. This gap is critical, as evidence suggests that companies engage with different SDGs to varying degrees based on operational relevance and stakeholder expectations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo address these gaps, this study investigates how diverse ownership structures influence SDG disclosure patterns among European firms, with particular emphasis on their differential effects across thematically grouped SDGs. Drawing on a panel of publicly traded European companies from 2019 to 2023, we classify the 17 SDGs into environmental, social, economic, and governance-focused categories. We also employ robust econometric techniques\u0026mdash;including GMM estimation\u0026mdash;to manage endogeneity concerns [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study makes three key contributions to the literature. First, it enhances theoretical understanding by illustrating how different ownership structures generate distinct incentives for SDG disclosure, extending agency, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories in sustainability reporting. This contribution is especially relevant given the heightened emphasis on sustainability in corporate strategy and stakeholder relations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e]. Second, it offers methodological innovation through a more granular analysis of SDG groupings, revealing patterns that aggregate measures can obscure. This approach provides a nuanced view of how ownership structures influence specific sustainability priorities, addressing a critical gap identified in recent research [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e]. Third, it delivers practical insights for policymakers, investors, and corporate governance professionals seeking to elevate transparency and advance sustainable practices in the European context.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses, grounded in relevant theoretical frameworks and prior studies. Section 3 explains the methodology, including data collection, sample selection, variable definitions, and regression models. Section 4 reports the empirical results, covering descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression findings. Finally, Section 5 discusses the study's implications and proposes avenues for future research.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2 Literature review and development of hypotheses","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe relationship between ownership structure and SDG disclosure is deeply rooted in the theoretical foundations of stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories. Together, these theories provide a comprehensive lens for understanding the motivations, mechanisms, and dynamics driving corporate behaviour toward SDG reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStakeholder theory highlights the obligation of companies to address the diverse interests of their stakeholders, who encompass not only shareholders but also employees, customers, communities, and environmental groups [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e]. These stakeholders demand transparency regarding corporate contributions to social and environmental well-being, especially concerning the SDGs. The multidimensional nature of the SDGs allows firms to address these diverse interests effectively, integrating societal expectations into their strategies. For example, institutional investors, as key stakeholders, increasingly demand SDG disclosures to align corporate practices with broader societal goals and ethical standards [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR30\" citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e]. Companies adopting this approach benefit from improved stakeholder relationships, enhanced trust, and a stronger reputation. The theory posits that by proactively managing these relationships, firms can mitigate risks associated with stakeholder dissatisfaction and secure long-term support, particularly in regions with strong cultural and regulatory expectations for sustainability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgency theory, on the other hand, centres on the challenges posed by information asymmetry and conflicting objectives between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). The ownership dispersion impairs these agency problems, as managers may prioritise personal interests over shareholder wealth maximisation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e]. Ownership structures play a pivotal role in mitigating these conflicts. Concentrated ownership by institutional investors and foreign shareholders enhances monitoring mechanisms, incentivising managers to disclose SDG-related information and align corporate strategies with long-term objectives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e]. Institutional investors often view SDG disclosures as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry and ensure managerial accountability, particularly in firms with complex operational structures or international exposure. With its emphasis on global standards and transparency, foreign ownership further intensifies the demand for SDG disclosures, reflecting a broader perspective on governance and sustainability [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e]. Voluntary SDG reporting thus becomes a tool for mitigating agency conflicts while simultaneously enhancing the firm's appeal to professional and international investors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegitimacy theory highlights the societal dimension of SDG reporting, emphasising the importance of aligning corporate actions and disclosures with societal norms and values to gain legitimacy and acceptance [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e]. This theory is particularly relevant for government-owned firms, which are under heightened scrutiny to demonstrate their alignment with public welfare objectives and sustainability commitments. SDG reporting serves as a mechanism to enhance legitimacy by communicating the firm's efforts to address societal and environmental concerns. For example, government ownership often creates incentives to prioritise non-financial objectives, such as environmental protection and social equity, to maintain alignment with public policy goals [see, 21]. Furthermore, legitimacy theory suggests that firms may engage in either symbolic or substantive SDG disclosures. While symbolic disclosures aim to enhance reputation through strategic presentation, substantive disclosures reflect legitimate operational and strategic alignment with sustainability goals [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e]. This duality underscores the strategic importance of SDG reporting in managing stakeholder perceptions, reducing potential legitimacy gaps, and ensuring long-term organisational survival.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe integration of these three theoretical perspectives\u0026mdash;stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy\u0026mdash;provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding how different ownership structures influence SDG disclosures. While each theory offers valuable insights individually, their combined application helps explain the complex and sometimes contradictory relationships observed in empirical research. Stakeholder theory illuminates how different owner types prioritise various stakeholder groups; agency theory clarifies how ownership concentration affects monitoring and information asymmetry; and legitimacy theory explains how visibility and external pressures shape disclosure behaviours. Together, they reveal how shareholders' decision-making regarding SDG disclosures is influenced by their distinct risk perceptions, time horizons, and legitimacy concerns [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Institutional Ownership and SDGs\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional ownership refers to the significant proportion of a company's equity held by large financial entities, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and investment banks. These entities substantially influence corporate decision-making and governance due to their significant voting power and monitoring capabilities [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e]. Institutional investors' active involvement often encourages improved disclosure practices, particularly in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) areas, aligning corporate strategies with sustainable development goals (SDGs) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional investors' characteristics and investment horizons are diverse, influencing their impact on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability practices. Long-term institutional investors, such as pension funds, prioritise sustainable growth and tend to support enhanced CSR activities and SDG disclosures [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e]. They view CSR as a mechanism to mitigate risks and align with societal and environmental values, thereby ensuring stable and long-term returns [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e]. Conversely, short-term-focused investors, such as mutual and hedge funds, may prioritise immediate financial returns over sustainable practices, often limiting their influence on CSR and SDG initiatives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis heterogeneity within institutional investors is particularly significant for understanding their relationship with SDG disclosures. Long-term institutional investors typically hold large percentages of shares in portfolio companies [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e] and cannot rapidly trade their investments due to their size [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e]. As \"universal owners\" with diversified portfolios across numerous firms, their performance corresponds to broader economic developments rather than individual company performance [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e]. Consequently, these investors internalise externalities that single companies might otherwise ignore, leading them to value comprehensive SDG disclosures that address systemic risks [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn contrast, short-term institutional investors face different pressures. Fund managers are evaluated quarterly [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e] and must compete for limited market accounts [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e]. They require liquidity to respond to money flows in and out of their portfolios [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e], prioritising immediate financial results over long-term sustainability considerations. While they may avoid investments with obvious sustainability risks that could damage share prices in the near term, they typically show less interest in comprehensive SDG reporting focusing on long-term value creation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e57\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe relationship between institutional ownership and SDG disclosure is underpinned by stakeholder and agency theories. Stakeholder theory posits that corporations must address the interests of various stakeholders, including institutional investors, by disclosing relevant non-financial information to maintain legitimacy and trust [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e58\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e59\u003c/span\u003e]. From an agency perspective, institutional investors act as sophisticated monitors, reducing information asymmetry between management and shareholders by demanding transparent disclosure policies [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e60\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical studies consistently highlight a positive association between institutional ownership and corporate sustainability performance. Institutional investors often pressure management to disclose CSR and SDG-related information to demonstrate accountability and strategic alignment with sustainability goals [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. This trend is particularly evident in countries with strong norms supporting social and environmental responsibility, where institutional investors prioritise sustainability as part of their fiduciary duty [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e61\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, the extent of influence varies across different categories of institutional investors. For instance, foreign ownership have been shown to enhance SDG-related disclosures, while government ownership or cross-holdings often exhibit weaker impacts due to potential conflicts of interest or passive governance styles [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e62\u003c/span\u003e]. Given these dynamics, the following hypothesis is proposed:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH1\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eInstitutional ownership is positively associated with sustainable development goal (SDG) disclosure.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Government Ownership and SDGs\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe impact of government ownership on SDGs remains a topic of ongoing debate, with studies presenting mixed findings. Government ownership often brings stability and long-term orientation to companies, advancing stakeholder trust, particularly during market uncertainty. This is reflected in government-owned companies' broader social and political responsibilities, which frequently prioritise public welfare, social stability, and environmental sustainability over short-term profits [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e63\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e64\u003c/span\u003e]. These attributes generally support increased CSR engagement and sustainability disclosures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical findings provide contrasting perspectives on the relationship between government ownership and SDG disclosures. Zaid, Abuhijleh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e] suggest that higher levels of government ownership lead to increased sustainability disclosures, as governments emphasise transparency, accountability, and alignment with public welfare objectives. Similarly, Muttakin and Subramaniam [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e] argue that government-owned companies, under significant public scrutiny, are motivated to disclose additional non-financial information to maintain their legitimacy and meet stakeholder expectations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, other studies challenge this view. Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez, Rodr\u0026iacute;guez‐Ariza [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e] and Jiang, Garc\u0026iacute;a-Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e] report that government ownership has an insignificant association with SDG disclosures, indicating that government shareholders do not necessarily enhance sustainability-related reporting. These findings suggest that the impact of government ownership may depend on contextual factors, such as the governance framework, regulatory environment, and political priorities. Adding further complexity, Giordino, Jabeen [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] identify a negative association between government ownership and SDG disclosures. This finding may reflect inefficiencies in governance within state-owned enterprises, where overlapping roles between government bodies and company executives can hinder effective decision-making and transparency. In such cases, the competing objectives of government ownership may limit a company's ability to prioritise and effectively communicate its contributions to sustainability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite these contradictory findings, the literature generally highlights the role of governments as institutional investors with the potential to influence corporate strategies. Government ownership often aligns with long-term investment goals that integrate ethical, social, and environmental considerations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e66\u003c/span\u003e]. This perspective is supported by stakeholder and legitimacy theories, which posit that government-owned companies are driven to meet broader societal expectations by engaging in responsible and transparent practices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e67\u003c/span\u003e]. Briefly, while government ownership has the potential to influence sustainability practices and disclosures positively, the evidence remains inconclusive and context-dependent.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe apparent inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes regarding government ownership can be elucidated through a more sophisticated application of legitimacy theory. Despite theoretical pressures on state-owned enterprises to demonstrate alignment with public policy objectives, countervailing mechanisms frequently impede effective sustainability reporting. Governance inefficiencies manifest as structural impediments, with ambiguous accountability frameworks and politically-appointed executives often lacking requisite sustainability expertise [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e68\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e69\u003c/span\u003e]. Furthermore, the governmental dual role as shareholder and regulator engenders institutional tensions wherein political imperatives\u0026mdash;prioritising social stability or economic development\u0026mdash;frequently supersede transparent sustainability reporting [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e]. Operating within protected markets with diminished competitive pressures, state-owned enterprises experience reduced incentives to employ SDG disclosures as differentiation mechanisms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e70\u003c/span\u003e]. Given the mixed empirical findings, this study posits the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH2\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eGovernment ownership is positively associated with sustainable development goals.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 Foreign Ownership and SDGs\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign ownership, characterised by the ownership of a company's shares by entities outside the company's home country, has been increasingly studied for its role in corporate governance and sustainability practices. Foreign investors bring diverse expertise, global perspectives, and high expectations for transparency, often resulting in enhanced corporate governance and disclosure practices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e71\u003c/span\u003e]. These investors are known to prioritise long-term performance and compliance with social and environmental norms, potentially increasing firms' alignment with sustainable development goals (SDGs) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e72\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical findings, however, present mixed evidence regarding the influence of foreign ownership on SDG-related disclosures. On the one hand, Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez, Rodr\u0026iacute;guez‐Ariza [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e] highlight a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the relevance of SDG disclosures. This positive impact is attributed to foreign investors' tendency to promote transparency, reduce information asymmetries, and encourage firms to adopt internationally recognised sustainability practices, such as the SDG Compass. Similarly, Al-Gamrh, Al-Dhamari [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e73\u003c/span\u003e] and Gerged and Almontaser [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e74\u003c/span\u003e] suggest that foreign investors, with their global business perspective, drive companies toward enhanced CSR and SDG disclosures to improve reputational standing and minimise risks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConversely, some studies indicate a neutral or even negative association between foreign ownership and SDG disclosures. Zaid, Abuhijleh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e] found no significant effect of foreign ownership on sustainability disclosures, suggesting that the influence of foreign investors may depend on the size of their holdings or their level of engagement with the firm. Jiang, Garc\u0026iacute;a-Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e] report a negative association, particularly in the context of Chinese firms, where foreign investors prioritise short-term returns and lack sufficient voting power to enforce sustainability-related practices. Similarly, Giordino, Jabeen [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] found an insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and SDG disclosures, further emphasising the contextual variability in the impact of foreign ownership.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA possible explanation for these mixed results lies in foreign investors' diversity and investment strategies. Large foreign institutional investors, such as pension funds, often focus on long-term investments and encourage sustainability practices to safeguard their reputations and ensure stable returns [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e75\u003c/span\u003e]. In contrast, smaller or dispersed foreign investors may prioritise short-term profits, limiting their involvement in CSR or SDG-related activities [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e76\u003c/span\u003e]. Furthermore, geographical distance and cultural differences between foreign investors and local firms may contribute to variations in their influence on corporate disclosures [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e]. The theoretical framework supports these findings through the lens of agency and stakeholder theories. Agency theory posits that foreign investors, as external stakeholders, act as corporate governance monitors by enforcing stricter disclosure standards and reducing agency costs [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. Stakeholder theory suggests that foreign investors' emphasis on transparency and social responsibility aligns with the broader interests of global stakeholders, motivating firms to disclose more non-financial information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBased on the aforementioned, while the impact of foreign ownership on SDG disclosures remains context-dependent, the literature suggests that foreign investors can play a significant role in promoting corporate sustainability practices. Nevertheless, this influence varies depending on factors such as the level of foreign ownership, investment strategy, and the specific governance environment. Based on these insights, the following hypothesis is proposed:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH3\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eForeign ownership is positively associated with sustainable development goals\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3 Methodology","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1 Sample and data\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study analyses a sample of publicly traded companies in Europe over the period 2019\u0026ndash;2023.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEurope was selected as the focus of this research due to its globally recognised leadership in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability practices. European firms are at the forefront of sustainable development initiatives, with many publicly committing to the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and integrating these goals into their corporate strategies [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e77\u003c/span\u003e]. The region's advanced sustainability frameworks and regulatory mechanisms, such as the European Union's Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), ensure robust and comprehensive sustainability disclosures, making Europe an ideal setting for studying the determinants and impacts of SDG reporting [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e78\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEurope's mature sustainability reporting landscape further justifies its selection as the study sample. European companies frequently disclose detailed non-financial information through annual reports, dedicated sustainability reports, or ESG disclosures. This widespread commitment to transparency provides a wealth of accessible, high-quality data for analysis, enhancing the reliability and depth of the study [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e79\u003c/span\u003e]. Additionally, Europe's regulatory frameworks prioritise standardised disclosure practices, reducing variability in reporting and allowing for consistent cross-country comparisons.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe diversity of the European corporate landscape is another key consideration. Our sample includes firms from various industries and sectors, reflecting a broad range of operational and regulatory environments. This diverse sample contributes to the robustness and generalizability of our analysis of the relationship between ownership structures and SDG disclosures. However, we do not perform a sector-specific analysis in this study, as our primary focus is on the overall impact of ownership structures on sustainability reporting practices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e]. Furthermore, the inclusion of companies from European countries allows for examining differences in regulatory environments, cultural norms, and market dynamics, which are critical factors influencing sustainability reporting [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e78\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eData for this study were primarily obtained from the Refinitiv Eikon database, recognised for its comprehensive coverage of financial, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) information. The initial dataset included approximately 7,521 firm-year observations (1,505 firms), encompassing a broad range of European companies. To refine the sample, firms incorporated outside Europe were excluded to ensure alignment with the study's regional focus and to avoid regulatory discrepancies. Accordingly, the sample's countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The highest representation in the sample goes for France (15.92%), the United Kingdom (15.90%), Germany (11.20%), and Switzerland (8.79%), collectively forming a significant share of the dataset.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObservations with missing data for key variables or fewer than three consecutive years of available data were also excluded (1,918 firm-year observations). Following these adjustments, the final dataset comprised 5,603 firm-year observations, providing a robust and reliable basis for empirical analysis.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSustainability-related variables, including SDG disclosures and ESG performance scores, were sourced from Refinitiv's Asset4 ESG database, which is widely recognised for its high-quality data on corporate sustainability practices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e]. Ownership and board characteristics, such as institutional, government, and foreign ownership, were extracted from the same source. Financial variables, including firm size, leverage, profitability, and market-to-book ratio, were obtained from the Worldscope database. Winsorisation at the 1st and 99th percentiles was applied to continuous variables, such as firm size and leverage, to mitigate the influence of extreme values and improve the robustness of the analysis.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Variables measurement\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.1 Dependent Variable\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe dependent variable, SDG disclosure (SDG_Percent), is measured as a compliance ratio based on the 17 SDGs, following the measurement approach used in recent literature [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e80\u003c/span\u003e]. Each goal is assigned a value of 1 if a company discloses relevant initiatives or contributions toward that specific SDG in a reporting year and 0 otherwise. The sum of these values is divided by 17 to calculate the degree of compliance, providing a standardised measure that reflects the extent to which firms incorporate the SDGs into their reporting practices. This measurement approach captures the breadth of a company's engagement with the SDG framework while allowing for comparative analysis across firms and over time. To mitigate potential \"SDG-washing\" concerns (where companies symbolically reference SDGs without substantive action), we only considered disclosures with concrete evidence of activities or initiatives aligned with specific SDG targets. This approach ensures consistency and comparability across firms and years, enabling a comprehensive assessment of corporate commitment to sustainable development objectives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.2 Independent variables\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe primary independent variables capture the ownership structure, including institutional ownership, government ownership, and foreign ownership. Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of shares held by institutional investors relative to the total shares outstanding. This metric highlights the influence of these investors, who often advocate for transparency and sustainability practices within the firms they invest in [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e81\u003c/span\u003e]. Government ownership is quantified as the proportion of shares owned by government entities. Firms with significant government ownership often emphasise long-term objectives aligned with public policy, including enhanced sustainability and social responsibility [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR82\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e82\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR83\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e83\u003c/span\u003e]. Foreign ownership, representing the percentage of shares held by foreign investors, reflects the influence of global stakeholders who demand adherence to international standards and sustainability frameworks, driving transparency and SDG disclosures [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e72\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.3 Control Variables\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eControl variables capture additional influences on SDG disclosure, guided by established theories and empirical work. Leverage, measured by total debt to total assets, reflects a firm's risk profile; agency theory posits that higher leverage prompts more extensive disclosure to address information asymmetries [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e84\u003c/span\u003e]. Empirical research highlights leverage's importance in sustainability reporting [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR85\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e85\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR86\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e86\u003c/span\u003e], with Zaid, Abuhijleh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e] confirming its relevance for SDG-specific contexts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirm size, computed as the natural logarithm of total assets, is included because larger firms face greater scrutiny, driving more comprehensive disclosure [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR87\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e87\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e88\u003c/span\u003e]. Resource-based theory suggests they also have a greater capacity for sophisticated reporting [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR89\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e89\u003c/span\u003e]. Giordino, Jabeen [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] affirm size's impact on SDG disclosures, particularly in European settings.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial performance, represented by return on equity (ROE), is considered because profitable firms can invest more in sustainability [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR91\" citationid=\"CR90\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e90\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR92\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e92\u003c/span\u003e]. Legitimacy theory holds that profitable entities may disclose more to demonstrate responsible citizenship [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e]. Rosati and Faria [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e93\u003c/span\u003e] link stronger financial performance with higher SDG disclosure.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe ESG score from Refinitiv Eikon is incorporated, given evidence that established sustainability practices promote deeper SDG engagement [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR95 CR96\" citationid=\"CR94\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e94\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e97\u003c/span\u003e]. Khaled, Ali [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e] show that strong ESG performance supports robust SDG reporting through refined internal processes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance factors provide further insights. A CSR committee (binary) signifies organised sustainability governance, often tied to improved disclosure [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e78\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR98\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e98\u003c/span\u003e]. Jiang, Garc\u0026iacute;a-Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e] highlight its influence on SDG reporting. The market-to-book ratio, reflecting market value of equity versus the book value of assets, captures investor perceptions of growth and sustainability [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e77\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR100\" citationid=\"CR99\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e99\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR101\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e101\u003c/span\u003e]. Consolandi, Phadke [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR102\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e102\u003c/span\u003e] argue that it represents intangible assets aligned with SDG strategies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCEO-chairman duality (binary) gauges leadership structure linked to disclosure decisions [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e77\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR95\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e95\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR103\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e103\u003c/span\u003e]. Mart\u0026iacute;nez-Ferrero and Garc\u0026iacute;a‐Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e104\u003c/span\u003e] note that centralised leadership can shape sustainability reporting. Lastly, board size is included because larger boards may offer broader oversight and expertise [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR105\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e105\u003c/span\u003e], thus influencing SDG disclosure.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003eHere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeasurements of the Variables\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable Name\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLabel\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOperational Definition\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Disclosure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe percentage of the 17 SDG goals disclosed by the firm is calculated as the sum of disclosed goals divided by 17 (Hamad et al., 2023). Each goal disclosure is assigned a value of 1 if the company demonstrates substantive engagement with that SDG through specific initiatives, targets, or performance indicators and 0 otherwise. This measurement approach evaluates the breadth of SDG engagement while allowing for comparability across firms. The resulting score represents the proportion of the SDGs incorporated into a firm's sustainability strategy and disclosure practices. (Refinitiv Eikon)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional Ownership\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe proportion of a firm's shares owned by institutional investors, expressed as a percentage.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernmental Ownership\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe proportion of a firm's shares owned by government entities, expressed as a percentage.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign Ownership\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe proportion of a firm's shares owned by foreign investors, expressed as a percentage.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Leverage\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe ratio of total debt to total assets, indicating the firm's financial structure and reliance on debt financing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirm Size\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe natural logarithm of a firm's annual sales revenue, used as a proxy for firm size.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eReturn on Equity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe ratio of net income to shareholders' equity, reflecting the firm's profitability relative to equity investments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLoss\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eA binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a net loss during the year, and 0 otherwise.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG Score\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG_SCORE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eA composite score obtained from the Refinitiv Eikon database represents the firm's environmental, social, and governance performance. Through a comprehensive assessment methodology, this measure evaluates a company's resource use, emissions, innovation, workforce practices, human rights, community engagement, product responsibility, management structure, shareholders' policies, and CSR strategy. Higher scores indicate stronger ESG performance and more transparent disclosure practices.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR Committee\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eA binary variable equal to 1 if the firm has a dedicated corporate social responsibility committee, and 0 otherwise.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket-to-Book Ratio\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe ratio of the book value of total assets to the market value of total assets, reflecting market expectations of firm value.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDuality\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eA binary variable is equal to 1 if the firm's CEO and chairperson of the board are the same person and 0 otherwise.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoard Size\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe total number of board members serving at the end of the fiscal year.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3 Regression model\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBased on Zaid, Abuhijleh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e], the study uses the following regression model:\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cimg 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\"\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhere the dependent and independent variables are defined in Table\u0026nbsp;(1), ε is the error term, and βk is the regression coefficients.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study employs a fixed-effects panel regression to control for firm-level heterogeneity and better isolate the impact of ownership structures on SDG disclosure, while accounting for industry and country effects [\u003cspan additionalcitationids=\"CR107\" citationid=\"CR106\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e106\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan citationid=\"CR108\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e108\u003c/span\u003e]. A Hausman test (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05) confirms that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than the random-effects alternative [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR109\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e109\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4 Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1 Descriptive and correlation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. On average, companies report 5.44 out of 17 SDGs, reflecting about 32% compliance, though some firms report none while others cover all goals. Institutional ownership averages 4.58% (ranging from 0 to 68%), government ownership averages 2.54% (ranging from 0 to 99%), and foreign ownership averages 9.49%, all with notable variation. These differences suggest that while some firms are highly transparent and committed to sustainability, others lag. Additional metrics, such as varied ESG scores, ROE, and differing governance structures like CSR committees and board sizes, further highlight these companies' diverse profiles and the need to explore how ownership types shape SDG disclosures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDescriptive statistics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStd. Dev.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMin\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMax\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDG Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.32\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.312\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDG Score\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.44\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.29\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.583\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.723\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e68\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.537\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.957\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e99\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.491\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.738\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e94\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG Score\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e57.798\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.823\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.63\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e95.38\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.208\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.163\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.689\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.41\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.035\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.693\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.19\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.007\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e23.883\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-6.94\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e44.90\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.143\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.35\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.736\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.441\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.205\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.598\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;.58\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e22.91\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.236\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e.425\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.179\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.703\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003eHere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e presents the Pearson correlation coefficients, providing insights into the relationships between the study variables and potential multicollinearity concerns. The results reveal the highest correlation between firm size (SIZE) and ESG_SCORE, with a coefficient of 0.596. This value is below the widely accepted threshold of 0.80 for multicollinearity concerns [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR110\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e110\u003c/span\u003e], suggesting that including these variables in the analysis does not compromise the robustness of the results.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorrelation matrix\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"14\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c9\" colnum=\"9\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c10\" colnum=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c11\" colnum=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c12\" colnum=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c13\" colnum=\"13\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c14\" colnum=\"14\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(5)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(6)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(7)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(8)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(9)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(10)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(11)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(12)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c14\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(13)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(1) SDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"12\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(2) Institutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.062\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"11\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(3) Government_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.040\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.117\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"10\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(4) Foreign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.030\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.140\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.052\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"9\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(5) ESG Score\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.292\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.104\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.082\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.005\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"8\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(6) LEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.096\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.005\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.033\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.084\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.072\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"7\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(7) SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.185\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.205\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.173\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.043\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.596\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.199\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"6\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(8) ROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.018\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.047\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.041\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.053\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.070\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.120\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.007\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"5\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(9) LOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.019\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.082\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.013\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.078\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.096\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.129\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.064\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.614\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(10) CSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.243\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.081\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.057\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.014\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.513\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.098\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.374\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.043\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.050\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(11) MTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.049\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.064\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.108\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.008\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.117\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.046\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.309\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.291\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.060\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.121\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c13\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(12) DUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.044\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.064\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.054\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.008\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.008\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.033\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.033\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.014\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.030\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.034\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.036\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c14\" namest=\"c14\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(13) BOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.151\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.148\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.129\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.060\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.411\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.060\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.568\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.019\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.033\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.273\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.177\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.110\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c14\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe remaining correlations between independent and control variables are generally low, indicating limited overlap in their explanatory power. This supports the validity of the dataset for hypothesis testing and ensures that the estimated relationships among variables are not adversely influenced by multicollinearity.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003eHere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2 Regression analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe regression results in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e offer a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between ownership structure and SDG disclosures, drawing on stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories. The analysis incorporates four models: Models 1 to 3 assess the individual effects of institutional, government, and foreign ownership, while Model 4 integrates all three ownership variables. A Hausman test confirmed the appropriateness of the fixed-effects model (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05), and robust standard errors were employed to address heteroscedasticity. Year, country, and industry fixed effects were included to control for unobserved heterogeneity, ensuring robust and reliable estimates.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegression analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVARIABLES\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00123***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00124***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000416)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000419)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00102\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000987\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000290)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000294)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000277**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000400**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000179)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000182)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0843***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0830***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0805***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0816***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0206)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0206)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0207)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0207)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0208***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0209***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0218***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0198***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00272)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00269)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00269)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00271)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000287\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000303*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000294*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000300*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000178)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000179)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000178)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000178)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.0240**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.0258**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.0264**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.0254**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG_SCORE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00239***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00239***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00238***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00242***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000219)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000217)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000218)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000218)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0414***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0416***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0417***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0411***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00789)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00786)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00789)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00787)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00242\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00232\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00247\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00232\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000826)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000829)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000829)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000825)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0301***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0328***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0313***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0318***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00712)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00711)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00710)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00711)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00755***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00750***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00758***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00729***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00108)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.583***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.592***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.605***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.570***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0366)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0359)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0358)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0366)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndustry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5,603\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5,603\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5,603\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5,603\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eR-squared\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.431\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.432\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.431\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.433\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"5\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNote: This Table presents the results of the regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019\u0026ndash;2023. Models 1, 2 and 3 individually examine the effect of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on the adoption of sustainable development goals, respectively. Whereas, In Model 4, we include these three variables in one regression. Refer to Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional ownership exhibits a negative and statistically significant effect on SDG disclosures (β = -0.00124; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01), challenging Hypothesis 1 (H1). While stakeholder theory posits that institutional investors should champion greater transparency to align corporate strategies with societal goals [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e], our findings emphasise the heterogeneity among institutional investors. Consistent with Bushee [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR111\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e111\u003c/span\u003e] and Jiang, Garc\u0026iacute;a-Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e], we suggest that a subset of institutional investors with short-term investment horizons may prioritise immediate financial returns over long-term sustainability initiatives, thereby pressuring management to focus on quarterly performance rather than resource-intensive SDG reporting. This dynamic is further contextualised by agency theory Meckling and Jensen [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e], which highlights the conflicts between investors and managers over the allocation of resources for non-financial objectives. Additionally, legitimacy theory indicates that while some firms may adopt SDG reporting to gain legitimacy, short-term-oriented investors can limit the depth or scope of such disclosures if they perceive little immediate financial benefit. Following Giordino, Jabeen [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e], our result aligns with evidence suggesting that institutional ownership's contribution to SDG reporting may be muted in firms lacking committed, long-term investment. In line with Oh, Chang [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e] and Pucheta-Mart\u0026iacute;nez and Chiva‐Ortells [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e], this outcome reinforces the importance of distinguishing among different types of institutional investors, as their investment horizons and strategic priorities can yield diverse impacts on SDG disclosure practices.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign ownership, in contrast, demonstrates a positive and statistically significant relationship with SDG disclosures (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0004; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05), supporting Hypothesis 3 (H3). This finding reinforces the role of foreign investors in promoting corporate transparency and aligning practices with global sustainability standards, as emphasised by Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez, Rodr\u0026iacute;guez‐Ariza [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e] and Zaid, Abuhijleh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. Stakeholder theory positions foreign investors as external stakeholders who demand higher levels of accountability and alignment with international norms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e72\u003c/span\u003e]. Legitimacy theory further supports this finding, with Deegan [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e] highlighting that firms with substantial foreign ownership often engage in substantive SDG disclosures to enhance their legitimacy in global markets. Foreign investors bring expertise and diverse perspectives to governance, often advocating for adopting internationally recognised frameworks such as the GRI or SDG Compass [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e]. This proactive influence aligns corporate strategies with global sustainability expectations, reinforcing the pivotal role of foreign ownership in advancing SDG reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment ownership does not statistically affect SDG disclosures in Model 4, challenging Hypothesis 2 (H2). This finding is consistent with Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez, Rodr\u0026iacute;guez‐Ariza [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e] and Jiang, Garc\u0026iacute;a-Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e], who also report no significant link between government ownership and SDG reporting. While legitimacy theory would suggest that government-owned companies should meet societal expectations through transparent reporting, practical challenges, such as governance inefficiencies and conflicting political priorities, often stand in the way [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e66\u003c/span\u003e]. Furthermore, the overlapping roles of the government as both owner and regulator can lead to weak oversight and ambiguous accountability, with political interference further diverting focus from rigorous disclosure practices [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. These issues seem to dilute the positive impact that might be expected from government ownership on SDG disclosures. Future research could benefit from a deeper qualitative exploration of these internal dynamics to better understand how political influences and governance structures interact to shape sustainability reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe control variables further illuminate the dynamics of SDG disclosures. Our analysis shows that firm size (SIZE) is positively and significantly associated with SDG disclosures (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0198; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01), consistent with Giordino, Jabeen [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] and Zaid, Abuhijleh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. This relationship can be understood from several theoretical perspectives. The resource-based view posits that larger firms have more financial and human resources to invest in sustainability initiatives and comprehensive reporting systems [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR87\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e87\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR112\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e112\u003c/span\u003e]. In addition, stakeholder theory argues that larger firms' heightened public visibility and scrutiny compel them to offer detailed sustainability disclosures to maintain legitimacy and satisfy diverse stakeholder expectations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e88\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR89\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e89\u003c/span\u003e]. Deegan [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e] further suggests that extensive SDG reporting serves as a broader reputation management strategy, enabling these firms to absorb the costs of thorough sustainability reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdditionally, leverage (LEVERAGE) is positively and significantly related to SDG disclosures (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0816; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01). Agency theory [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e84\u003c/span\u003e] explains that highly leveraged firms tend to disclose more sustainability information to reduce information asymmetry with creditors and potentially lower capital costs. In contrast, stakeholder theory indicates that firms with higher debt might prioritise debtholder concerns over sustainability initiatives [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR85\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e85\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR86\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e86\u003c/span\u003e]. Bose and Khan [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR112\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e112\u003c/span\u003e] also observed that \"firms with higher leverage... have lower firm value,\" suggesting that the leverage\u0026ndash;SDG disclosure relationship is context-dependent and shaped by industry norms, regional regulations, and market expectations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther control variables provide additional insights into the nuanced dynamics shaping SDG disclosure practices. Financial performance (ROE) exhibits a modest yet statistically significant positive effect (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0003; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1), as evidenced by Reverte [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR113\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e113\u003c/span\u003e] and Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez, Rodr\u0026iacute;guez‐Ariza [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e]. This suggests that firms with stronger financial performance are better able, albeit marginally, to allocate resources toward comprehensive sustainability reporting. Bose and Khan [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR112\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e112\u003c/span\u003e] also observed that \"firms with greater profitability... have a higher level of SDG disclosure,\" reinforcing the view that financial robustness facilitates investments in environmental and social initiatives\u0026mdash;a concept supported by legitimacy theory [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConversely, financial losses (LOSS) exert a significant negative influence on SDG disclosures (β = -0.0254; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05), highlighting the constraints faced by financially distressed firms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e]. This outcome aligns with resource dependency theory, which posits that firms experiencing losses tend to prioritise core operations and financial recovery over sustainability initiatives, thereby reducing their engagement in SDG reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, ESG performance (ESG_SCORE) is strongly and positively associated with SDG disclosures (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.00242; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01), reinforcing findings by Rosati and Faria [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e93\u003c/span\u003e] that robust ESG practices enhance transparency and facilitate the integration of SDG considerations into reporting frameworks [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernance factors also play a critical role. The existence of a CSR committee is linked to increased SDG disclosures (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0411; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01), as demonstrated by Albitar, Elmarzouky [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e78\u003c/span\u003e] and Jiang, Garc\u0026iacute;a-Meca [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e]. Additionally, CEO duality (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0318; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01) and board size (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.00729; p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01) are positively associated with SDG reporting, suggesting that diverse and empowered boards foster more effective sustainability oversight [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e72\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e104\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003ehere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3 Robustness test - control for endogeneity\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo address endogeneity in examining the link between ownership structure and SDG disclosures, this study employs the two-step system GMM estimator, as outlined by Arellano and Bond [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR114\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e114\u003c/span\u003e] and refined by Blundell and Bond [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR115\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e115\u003c/span\u003e]. Endogeneity arises here from several sources: unobserved heterogeneity (firm-specific traits that affect both ownership and disclosure practices), simultaneity (reverse causality between ownership structure and SDG disclosures), and dynamic endogeneity (past SDG disclosures influencing current ownership decisions) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR116\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e116\u003c/span\u003e]. This concern is particularly relevant given potential reverse causality issues, where shifts in ownership might simultaneously reflect and influence SDG reporting practices.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA key advantage of the system GMM estimator is its use of lagged dependent and endogenous variables as internal instruments. Unlike conventional instrumental variable approaches, which require external instruments that are often difficult to justify or locate, this method leverages past values to mitigate endogeneity [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR117\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e117\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR118\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e118\u003c/span\u003e]. Moreover, system GMM improves on difference GMM by addressing the weak instruments problem\u0026mdash;common when dependent variables are highly persistent\u0026mdash;by incorporating lagged differences as instruments for level equations [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR115\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e115\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR119\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e119\u003c/span\u003e]. This methodological choice not only counters simultaneity issues but also enhances estimator efficiency and reduces finite sample bias.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo ensure the validity of our instruments and the overall model specification, we conduct diagnostic tests. The Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation in the differenced residuals yields p-values of 0.289, 0.309, and 0.211 across our models, surpassing the 0.05 threshold and thus supporting the absence of second-order serial correlation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e]. Additionally, the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions provides p-values of 0.506, 0.375, and 0.423, which fail to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR114\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e114\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGiven the dataset's structure\u0026mdash;comprising multiple firms over several years\u0026mdash;the system GMM estimator is particularly appropriate, as it robustly controls for unobserved heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR119\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e119\u003c/span\u003e]. Our sample size also surpasses the threshold at which GMM might encounter limitations, as noted by Khatib [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e presents the GMM results across three institutional, government, and foreign ownership models. The results reaffirm our baseline findings (Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e): institutional ownership is negatively associated with SDG disclosures, likely due to short-term financial priorities [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR111\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e111\u003c/span\u003e]; foreign ownership exhibits a positive and significant relationship, enhancing transparency and adherence to global sustainability standards [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]; while government ownership remains statistically insignificant, reflecting governance inefficiencies and conflicting political priorities [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e66\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRobustness test - Two-Step System GMM\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVARIABLES\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSDGs_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eL.SDG_Percent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.721***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.781***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.882***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0147)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0147)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0147)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.000801**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000429)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000402\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000356)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000128**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000182)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00153***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00153***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00153***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000248)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000247)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000248)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0696***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0682***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0673***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0212)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0212)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0213)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00201\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00167\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00131\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00266)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00263)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00263)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.000227*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.000218*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.000224\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000172)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000174)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000174)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG_SCORE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00150\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00230\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00263\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0103)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0104)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0104)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0214**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0217**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0215**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00874)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00874)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00875)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00114\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00118\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00112\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000712)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000720)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000721)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0210***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0224***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0217***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00751)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00755)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00753)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00321***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00322***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00324***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00110)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00111)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00112)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0283\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0186\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0136\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0325)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0318)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0317)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndustry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,482\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,482\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,482\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAR (2) p-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.289\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.309\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.211\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSargan-Hansen (p-value)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.506\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.375\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.423\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNote: This Table presents the results of the regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019\u0026ndash;2023. Models 1, 2, and 3 individually examine the effect of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on the adoption of sustainable development goals, respectively. The Two-Step System Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) has been applied to address potential endogeneity issues. Refer to Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003ehere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.4 Robustness test - Generalised estimating equations (GEE)\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn a robustness check, we employed Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) to our panel data analysis. GEE is ideal for managing correlated observations from repeated measurements within firms and provides robust standard errors even when the within-firm correlation structure is not perfectly specified [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR120\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e120\u003c/span\u003e]. The GEE results, detailed in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, are consistent with our main findings in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, reaffirming that institutional ownership is negatively associated with SDG disclosures while foreign ownership shows a positive effect. This consistency across estimation techniques reinforces the reliability of our conclusions regarding the influence of ownership structure on corporate sustainability reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab6\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 6\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e Robustness test - Generalised estimating equations (GEE)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVARIABLES\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModel 1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModel 1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModel 1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.0246***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00733)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00390\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00713)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00602**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00347)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.639***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.670***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.648***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.417)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.417)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.417)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.109**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.125***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.126***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0465)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0464)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0463)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00213\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00193\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00195\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00268)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00269)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00268)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.468**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.489**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.498***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.192)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.192)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.192)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG_SCORE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0833***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0827***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0831***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00449)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00449)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00449)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.772***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.766***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.758***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.160)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.161)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.161)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00485\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00488\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00485\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00384)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00384)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00384)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.592***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.645***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.653***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.150)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.150)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.150)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.519***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.543***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.532***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.198)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.198)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.198)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-6.897***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-7.296***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-7.337***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.568)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.558)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.553)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndustry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNumber of id\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2,000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2,000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2,000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNote: This Table presents the results of the regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019\u0026ndash;2023. Models 1, 2, and 3 individually examine the effect of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on the adoption of sustainable development goals, respectively. The Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) have been applied to address issues related to correlated data and to provide robust standard errors. Refer to Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003ehere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.5 Additional test - SDGs grouping\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo further validate our main findings, we conducted an additional test by disaggregating SDG disclosures into four thematic groups (i.e., Environmental, Social, Economic, and Institutional) to uncover whether specific dimensions of sustainability reporting are differentially influenced by ownership structures [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR121\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e121\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR122\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e122\u003c/span\u003e]. In Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, the analysis reveals that institutional ownership consistently exhibits a robust, negative association across all thematic groups, supporting the notion that the short-term performance focus of institutional investors may discourage firms from engaging in the long-term initiatives required for comprehensive SDG reporting. In contrast, government ownership shows no statistically significant effect, suggesting that the mixed mandates and potential bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in state-owned enterprises may neutralise any positive impact on sustainability disclosure practices. Notably, foreign ownership exerts a positive effect, particularly pronounced in the Environmental, Social, and Institutional domains. This finding indicates that foreign investors, who often advocate for higher transparency and alignment with global sustainability standards, can act as catalysts for enhanced SDG reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab7\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 7\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdditional test - SDGs grouping\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVARIABLES\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnvironmental _SDGs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSocial _SDGs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomic _SDGs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional _SDGs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutional_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00906***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00552**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00443**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00607***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00209)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00260)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00189)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00137)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000761\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00234\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00251\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00234\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00250)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00301)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00196)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00173)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeign_Own\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00195*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00282**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000249\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00169**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00113)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00131)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000900)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000738)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLEVERAGE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.400***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.496***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.406***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.317***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.128)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.151)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.106)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0828)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0376***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0393**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.00668\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0218**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0144)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0176)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0113)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00911)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000370\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000510\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000970\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000421\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000777)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000911)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000648)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000523)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLOSS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.136**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.140**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.145***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.0597\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0587)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0678)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0488)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0373)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eESG_SCORE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0241***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0252***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0209***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0135***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00137)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00166)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00112)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000877)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCSR_COMMITTEE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.195***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.293***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.201***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0783**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0496)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0595)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0440)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0314)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMTB\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00146*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00106\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.00162**\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.000671\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000762)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.00100)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000698)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.000506)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDUALITY\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.187***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.240***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0751*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.107***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0495)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0582)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0385)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0321)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBOARD_SIZE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.327***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.559***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.296***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.309***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0631)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0766)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0514)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.0410)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-2.110***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-2.315***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-1.166***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-1.269***\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.172)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.208)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.142)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(0.113)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndustry \u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4,982\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eR-squared\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.338\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.275\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.312\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.266\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"5\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNote: This table presents the results of regression models applied to a sample of European companies during the period 2019\u0026ndash;2023. Model 1 examines the impact of institutional, governmental, and foreign ownership on environmental SDGs. Model 2 examines the impact of these ownership structures on social SDGs. Model 3 examines the impact on economic SDGs, while Model 4 focuses on institutional SDGs. Refer to Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e for definitions of the variables used in the models. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInsert\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e \u003cb\u003ehere\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5 Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study examines the relationship between ownership structure and SDG disclosures in publicly traded European firms from 2019 to 2023, focusing on institutional, government, and foreign ownership as the primary variables. Using fixed-effects regression models and addressing endogeneity through the two-step system GMM estimator, the analysis provides robust evidence of the nuanced roles of ownership types in shaping sustainability reporting. The study also incorporates key control variables, including firm size, leverage, ESG performance, financial performance, financial losses, and governance attributes such as CSR committees, CEO duality, and board size.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings reveal that institutional ownership negatively influences SDG disclosures, reflecting the conflicting priorities of short-term financial objectives versus long-term sustainability goals. In contrast, foreign ownership positively impacts SDG disclosures, emphasising the role of global investors in fostering transparency and aligning corporate practices with international sustainability standards. Government ownership, however, does not show a significant effect, underscoring the governance inefficiencies and competing priorities often associated with state-owned enterprises.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings of this study have critical implications for investors, firms, policymakers, and government-owned companies, offering practical strategies to enhance SDG disclosures and promote sustainable business practices. Institutional investors are encouraged to adopt long-term investment strategies that integrate sustainability into corporate decision-making. Short-term financial objectives often conflict with the goals of SDG reporting, limiting its effectiveness. Institutional investors, particularly pension funds and insurance companies, can play a pivotal role by engaging actively with portfolio firms through voting rights and strategic dialogues to ensure that sustainability becomes a core part of corporate practices. Firms, in turn, should focus on attracting foreign investors who have consistently driven higher levels of transparency and alignment with global sustainability standards. The presence of foreign investors not only signals credibility but also enhances a firm's reputation among stakeholders. Investing in robust governance structures, such as CSR committees, can help firms strategically and effectively communicate their sustainability goals, particularly in industries with high environmental and social impacts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicymakers play a crucial role in enabling SDG disclosures by strengthening regulatory frameworks to mandate comprehensive and standardised reporting. In regions with weaker governance mechanisms, incentives such as tax benefits or access to funding for firms demonstrating strong sustainability practices can bridge the gap. Additionally, encouraging transparency through public-private partnerships can foster knowledge sharing and capacity building in sustainability reporting. Governance inefficiencies and political interference must be addressed for government-owned companies to enhance SDG disclosures. Independent oversight mechanisms and international benchmarks can help these enterprises align with both local and global sustainability expectations, improving public trust and organisational legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings also contribute to the theoretical understanding of SDG disclosures by enriching stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories. Stakeholder theory is supported by the positive influence of foreign ownership, which aligns corporate practices with global sustainability norms and promotes transparency. Agency theory highlights the conflicts inherent in institutional ownership, where short-term financial pressures often undermine the long-term nature of sustainability initiatives. Conversely, long-term institutional investors can positively influence sustainability efforts, reflecting the nuanced dynamics of ownership structures. Legitimacy theory underscores the role of SDG disclosures in aligning corporate behavior with societal expectations, particularly for firms with substantial foreign ownership.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile this study makes significant contributions, it has limitations that offer avenues for future research. The sample is limited to European firms, and future studies should explore the relationship between ownership structures and SDG disclosures in other regions, particularly emerging economies where governance and regulatory environments may differ. Expanding the sample to include diverse geographic and cultural contexts could enhance the generalizability of findings. Moreover, although our results indicate that foreign ownership is positively associated with SDG disclosures, we do not account for potential variations in this relationship across different European countries. Future research could incorporate interaction terms with country-level institutional factors (such as ESG regulation strength) to better understand how national contexts influence sustainability reporting. Future research would also consider dividing SDG disclosures into specific categories, such as environmental-related goals, to capture more nuanced dynamics between ownership structures and targeted sustainability practices. Additionally, our study relies on the Refinitiv Eikon database, which provides SDG data in the form of dummy variables indicating whether firms disclose information on each of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. While this approach captures the extent of SDG adoption, it does not assess the quality or depth of these disclosures. A more detailed evaluation would require comprehensive content analysis, which is beyond the scope of this study due to time constraints. Future research could explore alternative datasets or qualitative assessments to provide deeper insights into the quality of SDG reporting.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, while our regression results indicate statistically significant relationships between ownership variables and SDG disclosures, the magnitudes of these effects are modest. One potential reason for the low practical significance is the presence of unobserved firm-level factors (e.g., managerial practices, corporate culture, and unique stakeholder pressures) that our model may not fully capture, even after including fixed effects for year, country, and industry. Additionally, the measurement of SDG disclosures as a percentage may yield inherently smaller coefficients. Given the complex and multifaceted nature of sustainability reporting, it is likely that a range of other determinants also influences these outcomes. Future research could benefit from incorporating additional firm-level controls.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNo funding was received to assist with the preparation of this manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting Interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that they have no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe datasets generated and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eClinical Trial Registration\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish Declarations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics Declaration\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthors\u0026apos; Contributions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRasmi Meqbel contributed to the study by developing the methodology, collecting the data, and performing the analysis. Aladdin Dwekat conducted the literature review and proofreading of the manuscript. Zeena Mardawi contributed to writing the introduction and conclusion sections. All authors reviewed and approved the final manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAcknowledgments\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNone.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDeclaration of Generative AI and AI-Assisted Technologies in the Writing Process\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cbr\u003eDuring the preparation of this work, the author(s) used Grammarly for assistance in proofreading and enhancing the manuscript\u0026apos;s readability. Following its use, the author(s) thoroughly reviewed and revised the content as necessary and assume full responsibility for the published content.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthorship Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe corresponding author confirms that all authors have read and agreed to the journal\u0026apos;s policies on author responsibilities and that this manuscript is submitted in accordance with those policies.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThird-Party Material\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNo third-party material was used in this manuscript; all material is original work by the authors.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eHassanein A, Elmaghrabi M. How does market competition affect the reporting of sustainability practices? Insights from the UK and Germany. 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J Int Bus Policy. 2018;1(3):208\u0026ndash;33.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-sustainability","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"disu","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Sustainability](https://www.springer.com/43621)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Discover Sustainability","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Ownership Structure, SDG Disclosures, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, Sustainability Reporting","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5907095/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5907095/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eCorporate ownership structures significantly influence sustainable development transparency, yet how different ownership types impact SDG disclosures remains underexplored in sustainability research. This study investigates the impact of ownership structure on sustainable development goal (SDG) disclosures in publicly traded European firms from 2019 to 2023. Grounded in stakeholder, agency, and legitimacy theories, the research employs fixed-effects regression models and the two-step system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to address endogeneity concerns. The findings reveal a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and SDG disclosures, highlighting the conflict between short-term financial pressures and long-term sustainability goals. Foreign ownership positively influences SDG disclosures, underlining its role in driving transparency and aligning firms with global sustainability standards. Conversely, government ownership exhibits no significant effect, reflecting governance inefficiencies and conflicting priorities within state-owned enterprises. By presenting comprehensive empirical evidence, this study advances the literature on ownership structure and sustainability practices, offering actionable insights for policymakers, investors, and governance professionals striving to enhance corporate transparency and alignment with the SDGs.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Ownership Structure and Sustainability: Insights into SDG Disclosures in European Firms","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-04-03 13:52:39","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-5907095/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-04-04T06:45:48+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-04-02T09:48:20+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"145286898591689625220528556838883707176","date":"2025-04-02T09:19:44+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-04-02T02:34:22+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-04-02T02:33:15+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-04-01T04:29:58+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Discover Sustainability","date":"2025-03-22T21:33:52+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-sustainability","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"disu","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Sustainability](https://www.springer.com/43621)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Discover Sustainability","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"91130f02-15aa-4bce-b912-79a642e719e3","owner":[],"postedDate":"April 3rd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-08-07T06:23:10+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-04-03 13:52:39","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-5907095","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-5907095","identity":"rs-5907095","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}