Who are Effective and Trustworthy Messengers for Election-Related Communications? How Local Messengers Impact Effectiveness of Psychological Inoculation

Who are Effective and Trustworthy Messengers for Election-Related Communications? How Local Messengers Impact Effectiveness of Psychological Inoculation | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Who are Effective and Trustworthy Messengers for Election-Related Communications? How Local Messengers Impact Effectiveness of Psychological Inoculation Joseph Sherlock, Shaye-Ann Hopkins, Dylan Benjamin Moore This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8663461/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Trust serves as a critical heuristic that facilitates basic democratic functioning. The rise of election-related misinformation has been linked to a decline in democratic trust. Recent research suggests that psychological inoculation, or pre-exposure to how misinformation works, may be an effective method to address misinformation beliefs. We extend this line of inquiry to examine the effectiveness of inoculation messages in countering election-related misinformation and to explore whether inoculation interventions are subject to messenger effects, a phenomenon in which information is evaluated by the identity of the person delivering it, rather than its objective content. Using three online experiments (n = 2317), we test how different messengers (e.g., election organizations, election officials, and non-election-related individuals and entities) impact participants’ discernment, trust, and engagement with actual true and false headlines. We find that messenger identity affects the effectiveness of inoculation messages. Specifically, local, male messengers—such as pastors and election officials—were more effective than a typical voter and other institution-based messengers at improving discernment between true and false information by up to 12 percentage points. These messenger effects were strongest in the period leading up to the 2022 US midterm elections and for individuals more susceptible to believing misinformation. Biological sciences/Psychology Social science/Psychology Social science/Science technology and society misinformation psychological inoculation messenger effects elections trust social media Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Introduction The Misinformation Problem Modern democracies are characterized by high social complexity, as citizens engage in varied social interactions while processing vast quantities of information [ 1 ]. In this context, various forms of trust—including interpersonal trust and trust in institutions, procedures, elites, experts, or fellow citizens—act as critical psychological heuristics to simplify complexity and facilitate decision-making [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ]. Trust in the fairness of election administration and election results is a particularly crucial heuristic that underlies the basic and normal functioning of democracies. Alarmingly, several forms of trust are eroding in the United States: interpersonal trust and trust in government, media, and many institutions are at historic lows, and Americans are becoming more distrustful of elections [ 5 , 6 ]. Declining trust is symptomatic of broader informational challenges exacerbated by widespread social media adoption and the proliferation of information technologies (OECD 2020). Citizens are now processing information at increased speeds and volumes, despite relying on cognitive abilities evolved in pre-modern environments [ 7 , 8 ]. False information—both misinformation, false or misleading content that is spread without the specific intent to cause harm, and disinformation, false content that is knowingly spread to cause a harmful outcome—has become prevalent as digital technology now facilitates the voluminous generation of misleading or contradictory information that further complicates democratic decision-making [ 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ]. Widespread false political information can reinforce polarized views, alter voting decisions, decrease trust in public institutions, and decrease trust in elections in a manner resistant to subsequent correction [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 ]. Furthermore, false information is easy to produce, amplifies quickly within social networks, and activates heuristics that reinforce its spread and stickiness [ 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 ]. Together, these features create a vicious cycle that undermines trust, with experimental work suggesting that exposure to misinformation increases generalized skepticism and decreases true information belief, while also increasing individuals’ overconfidence in their ability to discern true from false information [ 22 ]. Given the potential of false information to influence multiple forms of trust and confidence in elections and to sway real-world political behavior, developing new strategies informed by the behavioral and psychological literature to counter the proliferation of dis- and misinformation represents an urgent task for election officials and policymakers. In this paper, we narrow our focus to explore how messenger effects might modify the influence of social media interventions on voters’ ability to discern true from false information and their likelihood of sharing election-related information. Inoculation Theory Misinformation has been shown to be resistant to factual correction once introduced, including in the context of elections [ 23 , 24 , 25 ]. However, newer research shows a range of approaches to address misinformation, including inoculation. Inoculation theory suggests that psychological resistance to persuasion can be conferred prior to exposure to false information, analogous to the physical protection vaccines create against biological threats [ 26 , 27 ]. Inoculation messages show considerable promise, with a meta-analysis of 54 studies finding that inoculation messages were more effective than both alternative interventions and control messages at conferring resistance to subsequent attempts at persuasion [ 28 , 29 ]. We therefore first sought to test whether social media messages informed by inoculation theory could serve as effective interventions against election-related misinformation. Messenger Effects While a robust and growing literature has explored psychological inoculation in the context of misinformation, much less is known about how the identity of the person delivering a psychological inoculation message might modify its efficacy. Like other cognitive heuristics, the messenger effect—in which information is evaluated based on who delivers it rather than its objective content is behaviorally important and may be the result of cultural evolutionary adaptations, such as mimicry and status, in which humans emulate the behavior of successful or socially desirable others [ 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 ]. Messenger effects have been noted across several domains. For example, the notion of “trusted messengers” emerged in the environmental literature over two decades ago, with several findings that who communicated information often had important implications for whether individuals would trust and subsequently act on new information [ 34 , 35 ]. More recently, economists have found that corporate messengers, in particular contexts, were more effective messengers than government regulators or physicians in changing smoking behavior [ 36 ]. The rise in misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 US Presidential election highlighted the need to explore how messenger effects might influence political beliefs and shape behavior [ 37 , 38 ]. The perceived trustworthiness of COVID-19 vaccine messengers and their ability to encourage vaccination behavior has been shown to be influenced by key aspects of the messenger’s identity, with in-group bias, racial concordance, and religious similarity each being associated with messenger effectiveness [ 39 , 40 , 41 ]. The perceived reliability of a source of information has also been shown to reduce the extent to which individuals update their beliefs using misinformation [ 42 ]. Messengers influence the formation of political and policy beliefs, as both out-group and in-group signaling can increase skepticism among opposing or co-partisans [ 43 , 44 ]. The partisan valence of a messenger (or lack thereof) may be especially critical in polarized debates such as those over election integrity. Experimental work has found that messengers from one’s own party were more effective at delivering information to promote vaccination among Republican voters and that messaging from counter-partisan elites induced a backfire effect that reduced the likelihood of vaccination [ 45 ]. U.S. voters may also be predisposed to seeking election-related information from certain sources, including local and state election offices, and learn about elections passively, through incidental contact with information on social media feeds or television channels [ 46 ]. While significant public effort has been expended to craft effective communications to correct misinformation, much less has been dedicated to understanding "who" should be communicating this information. Although online information is increasingly polluted by false and partisan content and lacks many traditional cues that help us discern, a majority of Americans overestimate their ability to distinguish between true and false information [ 25 , 47 , 48 ]. False messages from political elites can erode confidence in elections among their supporters [ 49 , 50 ]. This context suggests that, in an increasingly complex democratic landscape, voters may be increasingly relying on heuristics, such as looking to certain trusted messengers, for information about elections, which suggests a possible corollary: trust in certain messengers—political elites, local leaders, or celebrities—may be able to help counter false election-related information. Drawing upon prior research on psychological inoculation theory and messenger effects, we conducted three consecutive online studies. In the first pilot study (Inoculation Pilot Study), we sought to identify which message frames work best to improve truth and sharing discernment between true and false election-related information. Our second study (Messengers Study), conducted just prior to the 2022 US midterm elections, explored our primary research question: how does the messenger shape the impact of election-related inoculation messages on voters’ truth and sharing discernment ? In our final exploratory study (Exploratory Timing Study), we replicated Study 2's design during a non-election period to examine whether the timing of inoculation messages might modify the messenger effects identified in our Messengers Study for participants who believed misinformation in the baseline period. Methods Experimental Design Following scholarship suggesting that inoculation-based interventions may be effective at countering misinformation online, we operationalized inoculation theory in our experimental context using a randomized pre-test-post-test design in Qualtrics to test how different social media posts impacted participants’ truth discernment and sharing behavior [ 26 , 29 ]. For all three studies, participants completed pre-intervention headline rating tasks in a simulated Twitter/X environment. Both the baseline and post-intervention headlines, sourced from fact-checking sites, consisted of 4 sets: 2 pro-Democrat, 2 pro-Republican, and either accurate or inaccurate. Headlines were selected based on an initial pre-test to balance across partisanship and accuracy ratings to minimize the impact of partisan-motivated reasoning [ 51 ]. Participants were then randomly assigned to view one of our inoculation interventions, which varied either the message (Study 1) or messenger (Studies 2 and 3), or the control message or messenger. Interventions are described in detail under each study’s methods subsection. Following this intervention, participants again rated headlines, allowing us to measure changes in misinformation receptivity from pre- to post-intervention headline ratings [ 52 ]. We also measured changes in sharing, liking, truth, and trust discernment, as summarized in Table 1 . All rating measures were rescaled from − 3 to 3, to 0 to 1. Table 1 Outcomes Measured Measure Survey Question Description Sharing discernment: Would share this post: 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree) Differences in engagement metrics for true vs. false content Liking discernment: Would like this post: 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree) Differences in engagement metrics for true vs. false content Truth discernment: Confident about the accuracy of the post: 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree) Differences in accuracy ratings for true vs. false information Trust discernment: Trusted the content of this post: 1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree) Differences in trust for true vs. false content Methods were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations for research involving human subjects. The methods for all studies were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Duke University [Study 1: 2022 − 0435, Studies 2 & 3: 2022 − 0451]. The pre-registration for the Pilot Study can be found at https://osf.io/6heau , and for the Messengers Study at https://osf.io/3ycs8 . Informed consent was obtained from all participants across the three studies. Data Analysis We initially used pre-registered ANOVAs and ANCOVAs to determine pre- and post-headline rating differences in discernment. However, following the submission of our pre-registration plans and completion of data collection for all three studies, the recommended position on measuring discernment in the misinformation literature evolved [ 52 , 53 ]. In line with this new literature, we modeled non-pre-registered linear mixed-effects with random effects for participant and headline type at the individual rating level to assess intervention effects on the outcomes and exploratory variables (e.g., demographics and political views). This approach allowed us to account for individual and headline variability, providing advantages over traditional ANOVA methods for handling nested data. Based on these updates, we also operationalized discernment as the difference between average ratings of true versus false content by modeling ratings of individual headlines with an interaction between a dummy variable for headline veracity (true versus false) and experimental conditions. The interaction coefficient within these models represented discernment, or the difference-in-differences between ratings of true and false content across experimental conditions. We controlled for headline order variation in all models. For all models developed across all three studies, Benjamini and Hochberg adjustments were used to address the issue of false discovery arising from multiple comparisons [ 54 ]. All p-values reported throughout this paper are the values that result after applying the correction. Inoculation Pilot Study: Design, Hypotheses, and Results We first designed a pilot study to apply inoculation theory to the context of elections in the United States and assess how inoculation-based messages might influence truth and sharing discernment. This study addressed our first research question: What message frames work best to improve truth and sharing discernment between true and false election-related information? Study 1 was conducted in June 2022 with a sample of 1,252 participants, with 1,228 participants assigned to an experimental condition. Participants were recruited from 14 electorally competitive U.S. states (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin) using CloudResearch. We excluded participants who responded that they randomly selected answers or who failed a post-test attention check that asked, “Have you ever had a fatal heart attack?” Attrition rates ranged from 1.23% in the control to 3.38% in the Prebunking condition, although attrition rates did not significantly differ by condition (𝜒2 (4) = 3.69, p = 0.45). The full demographic characteristics of the Inoculation Pilot Study can be found in Supplementary Table 1 . We developed and tested four different message frames, each based on a mechanism explored in earlier literature, in addition to a control frame: An Accuracy Nudge urging social media users to consider the accuracy of the information they encounter online, which may help to reduce the likelihood of sharing misinformation and improve discernment, although this latter result has not always reliably replicated [ 55 ], [ 56 , 57 , 58 ]. A Prebunking Message aiming to inform participants about the techniques used to spread misinformation prior to their exposure, which has shown evidence of making individuals less susceptible to misinformation [ 59 , 60 ]. A Digital Literacy prompt urging users to engage in more thoughtful information-gathering processes. A large survey experiment found that those scoring higher on a measure of digital literacy were more accurate at discerning between true and false information, although they did not find that higher literacy significantly reduced sharing intentions [ 61 ]. An “ Armies ” message, which relied on the observation that group social dynamics (groupthink, mob mentality, etc.) often influence misinformation-related behavior [ 62 ]. This message informed participants that a small minority of online users create and drive the dissemination of most online misinformation, and that the ‘silent majority’ might counter misinformation by sharing reliable information [ 63 , 64 ]. A Control message consisting of non-election, nonpartisan trending content on Twitter (now X, i.e., pulled from the hashtag #ThePerfectCombination). Detailed descriptions and images of the intervention materials used in Study 1 are found in Supplementary Table 2. For this pilot study, participants completed the pre-intervention headline rating task, then were randomized to 1 of 5 conditions (4 inoculating frames and 1 control). Subjects were presented with 3 social media posts of their assigned condition, with the order of these messages randomized, and then completed the post-intervention headline rating task. While we expected that different message frames could be effective inoculants, we were cognizant that interventions to correct misinformation can result in the entrenchment of misperceptions and false beliefs through a phenomenon known as the ‘backfire effect’ (Swire-Thompson et al., 2020; Swire-Thompson et al., 2022). After adjusting p-values for multiple comparisons, we found that none of the conditions had a significant impact on false headline ratings, and none significantly improved truth discernment. These results are consistent with previous research showing that inoculation may be an effective intervention against misinformation, albeit less robust after multiple comparison testing [ 26 ]. Nevertheless, this study enabled us to identify our best-performing inoculation messages to carry forward into the subsequent studies. The pilot study’s full results are shown in Supplemental Figs. 1 and 2 , and Supplemental Tables 6, 7, and 8 . Messengers Study Design and Hypotheses Our Messengers Study was designed as a follow-up to the Inoculation Pilot Study to assess if messenger effects might operate in the context of election-related communications and influence the effects identified in Study 1. This experiment focused on our primary research question: How is the impact of social media inoculation interventions on truth and sharing discernment modified by the identity of the person delivering that message? We used a between-subjects design that paired the Digital Literacy message frame (one of the better-performing message frames) from the Pilot Study with 12 different messengers (e.g., local elected officials, faith leaders, celebrities, etc.) to test how the messenger influenced discernment. The messengers we tested were: Election organizations, including a 1) State page with a state flag, 2) State page with an election official (EO) image, 3) Local page with a state image, or 4) Local page with an EO image, Individual election officials, including a 5) Verified male election official (through a blue [ 1 ]tick), 6) Male election official, 7) Female election official, and Non-elections-related individuals and entities, including 8) Celebrity, 9) Community Organization, 10) Faith Group Leader, 11) Fact-Checking Organization, and 12) Generic Messenger - a ‘typical’ male voter (the control). Examples of the messengers and intervention posts are shown in Fig. 1 . Demographics of the Messengers Study sample are shown in Supplementary Table 3. Detailed descriptions and images of all messengers used in Studies 2 and 3 are shown in Supplementary Table 4 . Study 2 was conducted in October 2022, immediately prior to the 2022 midterm elections. After attrition and exclusions, our final sample for Study 2 was 618 participants. We found no significant differences in attrition by condition assignment (𝜒2(11) = 16.52, p = .123). Participants were shown 3 ads from 1 of 12 messengers based on the condition to which they were randomly assigned. The outcomes for this Messengers Study were measured using the same baseline and post-intervention headline rating task as the prior study to determine how participant behavior was impacted by these interventions. As in Study 1, the order of headlines shown during the baseline and post-intervention rating tasks was also randomized, so that participants saw varying sets of false and true content before and after the intervention. Study 2 utilized the exclusion criteria as described in Study 1. Given the limited research in this area, we did not hypothesize which messengers would be most effective. Because we did not specify a directional hypothesis, we reported only adjusted p-values to account for the possibility of false discoveries arising from multiple comparisons. Results Messenger Study Results – Does the Messenger Matter? In Study 2, we found that all messengers improved truth discernment, with effects ranging from .02 to .12, relative to the control (Fig. 2 ). The messengers with the largest impact were the Local Page with an EO image (𝛽 = 0.090, p = 0.021), Male EO (𝛽 = 0.112, p = 0.006), Verified Male EO (𝛽 = 0.114, p = 0.006), Local Male Pastor (𝛽 = 0.124, p = 0.004), and Community Organization (𝛽 =0.090, p = 0.021). Reported p-values are adjusted for multiple comparisons. The Male EO, Verified Male EO, Male Pastor, Local Page with EO Image, and Community Organization conditions all had significant effects on truth discernment after adjustment for multiple comparisons. These findings suggest that these messengers were robustly effective at improving participants' ability to discern between true and false information. We similarly saw that most messengers significantly decreased trust in inaccurate content compared to the ‘typical voter’ messenger (Fig. 3 ). However, only the local male pastor (𝛽 = 0.105, p = 0.033) had a significant effect on trust discernment that remained significant at the 5% level after adjustment for multiple comparisons. The Verified Male EO (𝛽 = 0.074, p = 0.093) and Male EO (𝛽 = 0.069, p = 0.110) again showed relatively large, though nonsignificant, increases in trust discernment. After receiving the intervention during the Messengers Study, participants were asked “to what extent do you trust information provided by the following institutions/individuals?” for each of the messengers. Although participants reported the greatest trust in fact-checkers, female EOs, and state government, experimental measurement of trust discernment showed that participants trusted local, male, and religious messengers more than those they self-reported as more trustworthy (Fig. 4 ). Further results for Study 2 are found in Supplementary Figs. 3, 4, and 5 and Supplementary Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12. Exploratory Follow-up Study on Timing: Design Study 3, which was not pre-registered, replicated the design of our Messengers Study in March 2023 to explore whether there were temporal components to our messenger effects and to examine effects specifically among misinformation believers. As shown in Supplementary Table 5, 46 .60% (n = 288) of our sample for the Messengers Study believed at least one of the misinformation headlines in the pre-test. We therefore wanted to determine the impact that these messenger-based interventions had on those who initially believed any of the inaccurate pre-test headlines (whom we refer to as misinformation believers), as we observed that effects in the pilot study and messengers were lower and mostly negative for those not already susceptible to misinformation, indicating value in primarily targeting misinformation believers. The final sample comprised of 447 participants for our Exploratory Timing Study (288 participants from the messengers study and in the election period, and 159 participants from the non-election period). Exploratory Follow-up Study on Timing: Results When messenger groups are aggregated in exploratory analysis that pooled participants across studies 2 and 3 we observe that inoculation messages were more effective at improving truth discernment when delivered by a local male authority (𝛽 = 0.329, p = 0.015), such as male election officials, pastors, or celebrities ( Supplementary Table 13) . In our exploratory analysis of the Timing Study results, we observed a similar positive impact of local messengers on truth discernment ( Supplementary Fig. 6) . We find no significant changes in true and false headline ratings between the two periods for most messengers, indicating that the impact of these messengers remains generally consistent across the two periods (Fig. 5 ). Using aggregated messenger groupings, we find that local male authority figures had the largest impact on truth discernment for misinformation believers and trust discernment in the post-election period. Only local male authorities' effects on truth discernment remained significant at the 5% level in the non-election period ( Supplementary Table 14 , 𝛽 =0.415, p = 0.018). Otherwise, non-person-based and other messengers (institution-based election pages with logos, non-elections organizations, female election officials) had a weaker, non-significant impact on truth discernment in the non-election period. Full results and statistics for the Timing Study are available in Supplementary Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16. Notably, when examining the three-way interaction between messenger, headline veracity, and election versus non-election period, we observe that effect of local male authorities on truth discernment drops from a significant effect in Period 1 (𝛽 =0.415, p = 0.018) to a non-significant effect in the non-election Period 2 (Fig. 6, Supplementary Table 14 , 𝛽 = -0.199, p = 0.195). The three-way interaction within these exploratory results indicates that certain messengers may be marginally less effective in the non-election period when compared to the election period. This could indicate that inoculation through such strategies, especially for the most effective messengers (local male authorities), is most effective around election periods and when inoculation-based content is most needed. The generally non-significant impact on trust for this population ( Supplementary Figs. 6, 7, and 8 ) could potentially indicate that trust is difficult to influence for individuals that believe misinformation. Discussion Our results reinforce the potential of inoculation strategies to reduce misinformation susceptibility, while underscoring the critical role of the messenger in shaping intervention effectiveness. In Study 1, inoculation posts helped participants spot misinformation, but only some had small, non-significant effects. Accuracy nudges and pre-bunking messages slightly improved perceptions of fake news accuracy, though no message clearly improved participants’ overall ability to distinguish true from false content. Studies 2 and 3 highlight that messages were notably more effective when delivered by trusted messengers. Local, male figures—such as pastors and election officials—were the most persuasive, especially when the message included a personal touch like a face image. These effects were strongest during the election period and among participants who had previously believed misinformation, suggesting these interventions may be most impactful when timed well and targeted toward vulnerable audiences. Interestingly, participants reported the highest trust in fact-checkers and government sources, but responded more strongly to familiar, local messengers—indicating that trust perceptions do not always align with behavioral impact (Fig. 4 ) . Social desirability, trust, and other heuristics may help to explain some of the divergence between the self-reported and experimentally revealed measures of trust. Taken together, our findings suggest that who delivers a message matters and can have an important mediating effect on its behavioral impact. Further attention is needed to understand these effects beyond a message's objective informational content. Our results align with findings in other domains: messengers perceived as having relevant expertise—such as local election officials—are more effective at driving desired attitudinal or behavioral shifts. We also find that local pastors were effective messengers of election-related messages, consistent with results showing that religious leaders are effective messengers for addressing vaccine hesitancy across partisan groups [ 41 ]. Greater coordination around election-related messaging between public officials and religious leaders may therefore be one way to counter false election information. Notably, we found that most male messengers were more effective at increasing truth discernment than a female election official, and that lack of efficacy was not based on the gender of participants. Implicit biases for men and against women have been demonstrated to negatively impact women across a range of domains, such as science education or political leadership, and gender stereotypes about leadership remain pervasive and are often more pronounced in online spaces [ 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 ]. Further research should clarify the mechanisms driving these effects, which may involve cognitive biases such as the halo effect, implicit gender biases, or confirmation bias, and elucidate why certain messengers, even those lacking relevant experience, were nevertheless effective. Future research should also aim to explore interventions that address gender biases in the propagation of misinformation. One limitation of our study is the exclusive use of online experiments with a limited sample size. With this approach, we cannot fully capture the dynamism or complexity of real-world environments where misinformation spreads. Additionally, the messengers used in our experiments were represented by avatars rather than realistic images, which may not accurately reflect how real messengers are perceived by the public. This abstraction could limit the generalizability of our results, as the impact of interventions might differ when delivered by actual EOs, whose personality, real-world appearance, or demeanor could influence or mediate their credibility and effectiveness. Another key limitation of our design is the lack of racial and language diversity amongst our messenger/message combinations, as all messengers were white, and all message frames were in English. Although we did not find significant differences in effects between racial groups in our study, our sampling method may limit the generalizability of our findings across groups. Oversampling for underrepresented racial and ethnic groups is a particularly urgent line of inquiry, as recent polling suggests that Black Americans and Spanish-speaking Americans are disproportionately exposed to false information online [ 69 ]. Furthermore, our sample was drawn from 14 states of interest, which may impact the generalizability of our results to the entire U.S. voting population across all 50 states. Developing a more sophisticated understanding of the role of messengers in elections is an increasingly urgent line of research, given the rapid development of large-language models (LLMs), social media algorithms, and related technologies that are increasingly capable of generating personalized, persuasive information [ 11 ]. LLMs are increasingly capable of generating highly-personalized messaging to influence attitudes and behavior, especially when given access to demographic information [ 70 , 71 ]. Without appropriate safeguards, such tools could accelerate the spread of election-related misinformation. However, they could also be used by public officials to target election messaging and combat false information. Our findings of significant inoculation and messenger effects also raise important questions about how interventions that rely on these effects could backfire. If someone trusts a messenger or institution and that actor spreads false information, the resulting beliefs could be stickier [ 72 ]. Partisan-motivated reasoning often shapes election views [ 73 ], and the expression of certain “out-of-bounds” messages can degrade the credibility of messengers over time [ 74 ]. One-time inoculation could also foster overconfidence in an individual’s truth discernment, so further research could explore how sustained interventions to counter false information might be bolstered by messenger effects [ 75 ]. Conclusion Using three online experiments, we find that psychological inoculation can effectively counter election-related misinformation, but its effectiveness depends on the messenger selected. Our findings reveal that local, trusted figures—particularly male messengers like pastors and election officials—outperform other messengers and abstract institutions in improving public discernment between true and false information. These messenger effects are most pronounced during election periods and among populations vulnerable to misinformation. Future research is needed to assess if these findings translate into field-based contexts. The implications for democratic resilience are clear: combating misinformation and increasing trust in elections require more than accurate information—they also require attention to messenger selection and targeted delivery. Personalization and localization may be more important for trust than institutional branding. Election-related information should be communicated through diverse messenger networks that cut across demographic and political lines, and resources should be focused on communities with low institutional trust. The timing of interventions also matters, with election officials appearing most effective immediately before elections. As misinformation continues to threaten democratic trust, these findings advance our understanding of how psychological inoculation interventions against misinformation are mediated by timing and messenger effects. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of inoculation strategies may depend as much on who delivers the message as on the message itself, highlighting the need for further research on how messenger identity, timing, and audience characteristics shape receptivity to and resistance to false information in the context of elections and democratic trust. Declarations Additional Information The authors declare no competing interests. Funding Declaration The authors received funding from the Center for Advanced Hindsight at Duke University and from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University. Author Contribution JS and SH conceptualized and led the study. JS and SH designed the experimental methodology. SH oversaw data collection, designed and conducted initial analysis. JS and DM performed data validation. DM drafted and prepared the manuscript. DM designed Figures 1-3, SH designed Figures 4-5, and the Supplemental Figures and Tables. DM prepared Figure Legends. 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Bowles, J., Croke, K., Larreguy, H., Marshall, J. & Liu, S. Sustaining Exposure to Fact-checks: Misinformation Discernment, Media Consumption, and its Political Implications, Sept. 25, Rochester, NY : 4582703. (2023). 10.2139/ssrn.4582703 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files SupplementaryInformationmessengersjanuary2026.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8663461","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":588139848,"identity":"8c453d9e-0e42-405a-94b6-e61888059d4b","order_by":0,"name":"Joseph Sherlock","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"King's College London","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Joseph","middleName":"","lastName":"Sherlock","suffix":""},{"id":588139849,"identity":"664b8e3c-d2bb-4bc0-b6d8-dd3f317aaede","order_by":1,"name":"Shaye-Ann Hopkins","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Vienna University of Economics and Business","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Shaye-Ann","middleName":"","lastName":"Hopkins","suffix":""},{"id":588139850,"identity":"2eccc77c-69c8-4824-a7af-7ea72692ea31","order_by":2,"name":"Dylan Benjamin Moore","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Washington State University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Dylan","middleName":"Benjamin","lastName":"Moore","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-01-21 21:08:37","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8663461/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8663461/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":104397218,"identity":"be22a28c-d75a-471e-9717-c94b5730d387","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 11:44:45","extension":"jpg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":152415,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003ch5\u003eSample Inoculation Messages and Messengers used in the Messengers and Timing Studies.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAn example of an inoculation intervention message (in this case, an accuracy nudge) paired with two different messengers shown to study participants during the Messenger and Timing Studies. Panel (a) shows a post from a local election official. Panel (b) shows a post from a local community nonprofit page. Participants were randomly shown three posts from one messenger as the intervention before completing the post-intervention headlines rating task.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure1.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/7e2bfa9481a32fd7354193f3.jpg"},{"id":102427362,"identity":"497a0f88-ffea-4d3f-86c6-cd2654529662","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-11 14:52:18","extension":"jpg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":79035,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003ch5\u003eTruth Discernment Change by Messenger (Messengers Study)\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe interaction of messenger type with the true condition (in blue) compared to the baseline truth rating change (orange). The coefficients for each messenger show the difference-in-differences between ratings of true and false content across experimental conditions (representing the messenger effect on truth discernment). Full Study 2 truth discernment results are shown in Supplementary Figure 4. Reported p-values are adjusted using the Benjamin-Hochberg method for false discovery. ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure2.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/c86a990b48dd6f3922efbe75.jpg"},{"id":102427367,"identity":"ebb7b21c-8f84-404a-ba39-504bdbda0ac5","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-11 14:52:18","extension":"jpg","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":98882,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003ch5\u003eTrust Discernment by Messenger (Messengers Study)\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe interaction of messenger type with the true condition (in blue and red) compared to the baseline trust rating change (orange). The coefficients for each messenger show the difference-in-differences between ratings of true and false content across experimental conditions (representing the messenger effect on trust discernment). Full Study 2 Trust Discernment results are shown in Supplementary Figure 5. Reported p-values are adjusted using the Benjamin-Hochberg method for false discovery. ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, * at the 0.05 level.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure3.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/3b7b4f7bc8fe7636298d4723.jpg"},{"id":102745920,"identity":"ee145ffa-fa76-4ed9-81da-9053c7272cc2","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 08:54:41","extension":"jpg","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":113794,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003ch5\u003eComparison of self-reported and experimentally revealed trust (Messengers Study)\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTrust scores shown as normalized z-scores for both self-reported trust (blue) and experimentally revealed (light blue) for participants in Study 2 (Messengers Study). Participants in the Messengers Study were asked “to what extent do you trust information provided by the following institutions/individuals?” for all messengers after receiving the intervention. Participants reported having the strongest trust in fact-checkers, female EOs, and local EOs. However, experimental measurement of trust discernment showed that participants trusted local male messengers more than those messengers they self-reported as trusting more (e.g., fact checkers), indicating that trust perceptions do not always align with behavioral responses to those messengers.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure4.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/025692afe5b9952cd073126c.jpg"},{"id":102427364,"identity":"8e526ba4-0a25-4dd2-b1cc-6df3e36148e2","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-11 14:52:18","extension":"jpg","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":80927,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003ch5\u003eRelative change in truth discernment in election versus non-election periods by aggregated messenger type.\u003c/h5\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePeriod 1 shows results from October 2022, just prior to the federal midterm elections in the United States (Messengers Study), while Period 2 shows results from March 2023 (Timing Study). Exploratory analysis was performed by aggregating messengers by type.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e“Female” shows the results across the female EO condition. “Non-Elections Org” shows the average results for the Community Organization and Fact-Checking Organization messengers. “Non-Face Elections Org” shows the average results for depersonalized messenger profiles that used a state flag or logo instead of a human face (State page with EO with Flag and Local EO with Flag messengers). “Non-Local Male Face” shows average results for all non-local male messengers that used a human face (State page with EO image and Celebrity). “Local Male Authority” shows the average results for the Verified EO, Male EO, and Local page with EO image, and Local Pastor. “Typical Male Voter” is the baseline condition.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNotably, the change in truth rating from Period 1 to 2 is largely driven by the decreased effect on discernment in the non-election period for local male election officials when compared to the election period. The change in truth discernment for the aggregated Local Male Authority is largely driven by the decrease in discernment effects from local election messengers in the non-election period.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"Figure5.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/91159f701eb7d9824bfce73f.jpg"},{"id":104407202,"identity":"04e71544-3cb8-4755-b568-fa545657fe99","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:35:17","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1624052,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/df2cf3ec-95bf-4753-89e7-a7dd894e1a4b.pdf"},{"id":102427368,"identity":"2403a351-5d27-4c50-a8f4-5ab4b5ea8864","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-11 14:52:19","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":15438527,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryInformationmessengersjanuary2026.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8663461/v1/a1b24b4a8f28367dc1cc4281.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Who are Effective and Trustworthy Messengers for Election-Related Communications? How Local Messengers Impact Effectiveness of Psychological Inoculation","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec2\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eThe Misinformation Problem\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eModern democracies are characterized by high social complexity, as citizens engage in varied social interactions while processing vast quantities of information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e]. In this context, various forms of trust\u0026mdash;including interpersonal trust and trust in institutions, procedures, elites, experts, or fellow citizens\u0026mdash;act as critical psychological heuristics to simplify complexity and facilitate decision-making [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e]. Trust in the fairness of election administration and election results is a particularly crucial heuristic that underlies the basic and normal functioning of democracies. Alarmingly, several forms of trust are eroding in the United States: interpersonal trust and trust in government, media, and many institutions are at historic lows, and Americans are becoming more distrustful of elections [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e]. Declining trust is symptomatic of broader informational challenges exacerbated by widespread social media adoption and the proliferation of information technologies (OECD 2020). Citizens are now processing information at increased speeds and volumes, despite relying on cognitive abilities evolved in pre-modern environments [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFalse information\u0026mdash;both misinformation, false or misleading content that is spread without the specific intent to cause harm, and disinformation, false content that is knowingly spread to cause a harmful outcome\u0026mdash;has become prevalent as digital technology now facilitates the voluminous generation of misleading or contradictory information that further complicates democratic decision-making [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. Widespread false political information can reinforce polarized views, alter voting decisions, decrease trust in public institutions, and decrease trust in elections in a manner resistant to subsequent correction [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurthermore, false information is easy to produce, amplifies quickly within social networks, and activates heuristics that reinforce its spread and stickiness [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e]. Together, these features create a vicious cycle that undermines trust, with experimental work suggesting that exposure to misinformation increases generalized skepticism and decreases true information belief, while also increasing individuals\u0026rsquo; overconfidence in their ability to discern true from false information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGiven the potential of false information to influence multiple forms of trust and confidence in elections and to sway real-world political behavior, developing new strategies informed by the behavioral and psychological literature to counter the proliferation of dis- and misinformation represents an urgent task for election officials and policymakers. In this paper, we narrow our focus to explore how messenger effects might modify the influence of social media interventions on voters\u0026rsquo; ability to discern true from false information and their likelihood of sharing election-related information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eInoculation Theory\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eMisinformation has been shown to be resistant to factual correction once introduced, including in the context of elections [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e]. However, newer research shows a range of approaches to address misinformation, including inoculation. Inoculation theory suggests that psychological resistance to persuasion can be conferred prior to exposure to false information, analogous to the physical protection vaccines create against biological threats [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e]. Inoculation messages show considerable promise, with a meta-analysis of 54 studies finding that inoculation messages were more effective than both alternative interventions and control messages at conferring resistance to subsequent attempts at persuasion [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e]. We therefore first sought to test whether social media messages informed by inoculation theory could serve as effective interventions against election-related misinformation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eMessenger Effects\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile a robust and growing literature has explored psychological inoculation in the context of misinformation, much less is known about how the identity of the person delivering a psychological inoculation message might modify its efficacy. Like other cognitive heuristics, the messenger effect\u0026mdash;in which information is evaluated based on who delivers it rather than its objective content is behaviorally important and may be the result of cultural evolutionary adaptations, such as mimicry and status, in which humans emulate the behavior of successful or socially desirable others [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMessenger effects have been noted across several domains. For example, the notion of \u0026ldquo;trusted messengers\u0026rdquo; emerged in the environmental literature over two decades ago, with several findings that \u003cem\u003ewho\u003c/em\u003e communicated information often had important implications for whether individuals would trust and subsequently act on new information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e]. More recently, economists have found that corporate messengers, in particular contexts, were more effective messengers than government regulators or physicians in changing smoking behavior [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe rise in misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 US Presidential election highlighted the need to explore how messenger effects might influence political beliefs and shape behavior [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e]. The perceived trustworthiness of COVID-19 vaccine messengers and their ability to encourage vaccination behavior has been shown to be influenced by key aspects of the messenger\u0026rsquo;s identity, with in-group bias, racial concordance, and religious similarity each being associated with messenger effectiveness [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e]. The perceived reliability of a source of information has also been shown to reduce the extent to which individuals update their beliefs using misinformation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMessengers influence the formation of political and policy beliefs, as both out-group and in-group signaling can increase skepticism among opposing or co-partisans [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e]. The partisan valence of a messenger (or lack thereof) may be especially critical in polarized debates such as those over election integrity. Experimental work has found that messengers from one\u0026rsquo;s own party were more effective at delivering information to promote vaccination among Republican voters and that messaging from counter-partisan elites induced a backfire effect that reduced the likelihood of vaccination [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eU.S. voters may also be predisposed to seeking election-related information from certain sources, including local and state election offices, and learn about elections passively, through incidental contact with information on social media feeds or television channels [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile significant public effort has been expended to craft effective communications to correct misinformation, much less has been dedicated to understanding \"who\" should be communicating this information. Although online information is increasingly polluted by false and partisan content and lacks many traditional cues that help us discern, a majority of Americans overestimate their ability to distinguish between true and false information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e]. False messages from political elites can erode confidence in elections among their supporters [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e]. This context suggests that, in an increasingly complex democratic landscape, voters may be increasingly relying on heuristics, such as looking to certain trusted messengers, for information about elections, which suggests a possible corollary: trust in certain messengers\u0026mdash;political elites, local leaders, or celebrities\u0026mdash;may be able to help counter false election-related information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDrawing upon prior research on psychological inoculation theory and messenger effects, we conducted three consecutive online studies. In the first pilot study (Inoculation Pilot Study), we sought to identify which message frames work best to improve truth and sharing discernment between true and false election-related information. Our second study (Messengers Study), conducted just prior to the 2022 US midterm elections, explored our primary research question: \u003cem\u003ehow does the messenger shape the impact of election-related inoculation messages on voters\u0026rsquo; truth and sharing discernment\u003c/em\u003e? In our final exploratory study (Exploratory Timing Study), we replicated Study 2's design during a non-election period to examine whether the timing of inoculation messages might modify the messenger effects identified in our Messengers Study for participants who believed misinformation in the baseline period.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eExperimental Design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFollowing scholarship suggesting that inoculation-based interventions may be effective at countering misinformation online, we operationalized inoculation theory in our experimental context using a randomized pre-test-post-test design in Qualtrics to test how different social media posts impacted participants\u0026rsquo; truth discernment and sharing behavior [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor all three studies, participants completed pre-intervention headline rating tasks in a simulated Twitter/X environment. Both the baseline and post-intervention headlines, sourced from fact-checking sites, consisted of 4 sets: 2 pro-Democrat, 2 pro-Republican, and either accurate or inaccurate. Headlines were selected based on an initial pre-test to balance across partisanship and accuracy ratings to minimize the impact of partisan-motivated reasoning [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants were then randomly assigned to view one of our inoculation interventions, which varied either the message (Study 1) or messenger (Studies 2 and 3), or the control message or messenger. Interventions are described in detail under each study\u0026rsquo;s methods subsection. Following this intervention, participants again rated headlines, allowing us to measure changes in misinformation receptivity from pre- to post-intervention headline ratings [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e]. We also measured changes in sharing, liking, truth, and trust discernment, as summarized in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e. All rating measures were rescaled from \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;3 to 3, to 0 to 1.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOutcomes Measured\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeasure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey Question\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDescription\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSharing discernment:\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWould share this post:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferences in engagement metrics for true vs. false content\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLiking discernment:\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWould like this post:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferences in engagement metrics for true vs. false content\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTruth discernment:\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfident about the accuracy of the post:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferences in accuracy ratings for true vs. false information\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust discernment:\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrusted the content of this post:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1 (Strongly disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDifferences in trust for true vs. false content\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e Methods were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations for research involving human subjects. The methods for all studies were reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at Duke University [Study 1: 2022\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0435, Studies 2 \u0026amp; 3: 2022\u0026thinsp;\u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;0451]. The pre-registration for the Pilot Study can be found at \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://osf.io/6heau\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://osf.io/6heau\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and for the Messengers Study at \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://osf.io/3ycs8\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://osf.io/3ycs8\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Informed consent was obtained from all participants across the three studies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eData Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe initially used pre-registered ANOVAs and ANCOVAs to determine pre- and post-headline rating differences in discernment. However, following the submission of our pre-registration plans and completion of data collection for all three studies, the recommended position on measuring discernment in the misinformation literature evolved [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e In line with this new literature, we modeled non-pre-registered linear mixed-effects with random effects for participant and headline type at the individual rating level to assess intervention effects on the outcomes and exploratory variables (e.g., demographics and political views). This approach allowed us to account for individual and headline variability, providing advantages over traditional ANOVA methods for handling nested data. Based on these updates, we also operationalized discernment as the difference between average ratings of true versus false content by modeling ratings of individual headlines with an interaction between a dummy variable for headline veracity (true versus false) and experimental conditions. The interaction coefficient within these models represented discernment, or the difference-in-differences between ratings of true and false content across experimental conditions. We controlled for headline order variation in all models.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor all models developed across all three studies, Benjamini and Hochberg adjustments were used to address the issue of false discovery arising from multiple comparisons [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e]. All p-values reported throughout this paper are the values that result after applying the correction.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eInoculation Pilot Study: Design, Hypotheses, and Results\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe first designed a pilot study to apply inoculation theory to the context of elections in the United States and assess how inoculation-based messages might influence truth and sharing discernment. This study addressed our first research question:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eWhat message frames work best to improve truth and sharing discernment between true and false election-related information?\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStudy 1 was conducted in June 2022 with a sample of 1,252 participants, with 1,228 participants assigned to an experimental condition. Participants were recruited from 14 electorally competitive U.S. states (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin) using CloudResearch. We excluded participants who responded that they randomly selected answers or who failed a post-test attention check that asked, \u0026ldquo;Have you ever had a fatal heart attack?\u0026rdquo; Attrition rates ranged from 1.23% in the control to 3.38% in the Prebunking condition, although attrition rates did not significantly differ by condition (\u0026#120594;2 (4)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.69, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.45). The full demographic characteristics of the Inoculation Pilot Study can be found in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;1\u003c/b\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe developed and tested four different message frames, each based on a mechanism explored in earlier literature, in addition to a control frame:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn \u003cspan type=\"BoldUnderline\" class=\"BoldUnderline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003eAccuracy Nudge\u003c/span\u003e urging social media users to consider the accuracy of the information they encounter online, which may help to reduce the likelihood of sharing misinformation and improve discernment, although this latter result has not always reliably replicated [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e], [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e57\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e58\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eA \u003cspan type=\"BoldUnderline\" class=\"BoldUnderline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ePrebunking Message\u003c/span\u003e aiming to inform participants about the techniques used to spread misinformation prior to their exposure, which has shown evidence of making individuals less susceptible to misinformation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e59\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e60\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eA \u003cspan type=\"BoldUnderline\" class=\"BoldUnderline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003eDigital Literacy\u003c/span\u003e prompt urging users to engage in more thoughtful information-gathering processes. A large survey experiment found that those scoring higher on a measure of digital literacy were more accurate at discerning between true and false information, although they did not find that higher literacy significantly reduced sharing intentions [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e61\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn \u003cb\u003e\u0026ldquo;\u003c/b\u003e\u003cspan type=\"BoldUnderline\" class=\"BoldUnderline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003eArmies\u003c/span\u003e\u003cb\u003e\u0026rdquo;\u003c/b\u003e message, which relied on the observation that group social dynamics (groupthink, mob mentality, etc.) often influence misinformation-related behavior [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e62\u003c/span\u003e]. This message informed participants that a small minority of online users create and drive the dissemination of most online misinformation, and that the \u0026lsquo;silent majority\u0026rsquo; might counter misinformation by sharing reliable information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e63\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e64\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eA \u003cspan type=\"BoldUnderline\" class=\"BoldUnderline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003eControl\u003c/span\u003e message consisting of non-election, nonpartisan trending content on Twitter (now X, i.e., pulled from the hashtag #ThePerfectCombination).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDetailed descriptions and images of the intervention materials used in Study 1 are found in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;2.\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor this pilot study, participants completed the pre-intervention headline rating task, then were randomized to 1 of 5 conditions (4 inoculating frames and 1 control). Subjects were presented with 3 social media posts of their assigned condition, with the order of these messages randomized, and then completed the post-intervention headline rating task.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile we expected that different message frames could be effective inoculants, we were cognizant that interventions to correct misinformation can result in the entrenchment of misperceptions and false beliefs through a phenomenon known as the \u0026lsquo;backfire effect\u0026rsquo; (Swire-Thompson et al., 2020; Swire-Thompson et al., 2022).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAfter adjusting p-values for multiple comparisons, we found that none of the conditions had a significant impact on false headline ratings, and none significantly improved truth discernment. These results are consistent with previous research showing that inoculation may be an effective intervention against misinformation, albeit less robust after multiple comparison testing [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e]. Nevertheless, this study enabled us to identify our best-performing inoculation messages to carry forward into the subsequent studies. The pilot study\u0026rsquo;s full results are shown in \u003cb\u003eSupplemental Figs.\u0026nbsp;1 and 2\u003c/b\u003e, and \u003cb\u003eSupplemental Tables\u0026nbsp;6, 7, and 8\u003c/b\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eMessengers Study Design and Hypotheses\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur Messengers Study was designed as a follow-up to the Inoculation Pilot Study to assess if messenger effects might operate in the context of election-related communications and influence the effects identified in Study 1. This experiment focused on our primary research question:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eHow is the impact of social media inoculation interventions on truth and sharing discernment modified by the identity of the person delivering that message?\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e We used a between-subjects design that paired the Digital Literacy message frame (one of the better-performing message frames) from the Pilot Study with 12 different messengers (e.g., local elected officials, faith leaders, celebrities, etc.) to test how the messenger influenced discernment. The messengers we tested were:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eElection organizations, including a 1) State page with a state flag, 2) State page with an election official (EO) image, 3) Local page with a state image, or 4) Local page with an EO image,\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndividual election officials, including a 5) Verified male election official (through a blue [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e]tick), 6) Male election official, 7) Female election official, and\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eNon-elections-related individuals and entities, including 8) Celebrity, 9) Community Organization, 10) Faith Group Leader, 11) Fact-Checking Organization, and 12) Generic Messenger - a \u0026lsquo;typical\u0026rsquo; male voter (the control).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExamples of the messengers and intervention posts are shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e. Demographics of the Messengers Study sample are shown in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;3.\u003c/b\u003e Detailed descriptions and images of all messengers used in Studies 2 and 3 are shown in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;4\u003c/b\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStudy 2 was conducted in October 2022, immediately prior to the 2022 midterm elections. After attrition and exclusions, our final sample for Study 2 was 618 participants. We found no significant differences in attrition by condition assignment (\u0026#120594;2(11)\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;16.52, p = .123).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParticipants were shown 3 ads from 1 of 12 messengers based on the condition to which they were randomly assigned. The outcomes for this Messengers Study were measured using the same baseline and post-intervention headline rating task as the prior study to determine how participant behavior was impacted by these interventions. As in Study 1, the order of headlines shown during the baseline and post-intervention rating tasks was also randomized, so that participants saw varying sets of false and true content before and after the intervention.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStudy 2 utilized the exclusion criteria as described in Study 1. Given the limited research in this area, we did not hypothesize which messengers would be most effective. Because we did not specify a directional hypothesis, we reported only adjusted p-values to account for the possibility of false discoveries arising from multiple comparisons.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eMessenger Study Results \u0026ndash; Does the Messenger Matter?\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn Study 2, we found that all messengers improved truth discernment, with effects ranging from .02 to .12, relative to the control (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e). The messengers with the largest impact were the Local Page with an EO image (\u0026#120573; = 0.090, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.021), Male EO (\u0026#120573; = 0.112, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.006), Verified Male EO (\u0026#120573; = 0.114, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.006), Local Male Pastor (\u0026#120573; = 0.124, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.004), and Community Organization (\u0026#120573; =0.090, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.021). Reported p-values are adjusted for multiple comparisons. The Male EO, Verified Male EO, Male Pastor, Local Page with EO Image, and Community Organization conditions all had significant effects on truth discernment after adjustment for multiple comparisons. These findings suggest that these messengers were robustly effective at improving participants' ability to discern between true and false information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe similarly saw that most messengers significantly decreased trust in inaccurate content compared to the \u0026lsquo;typical voter\u0026rsquo; messenger (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e). However, only the local male pastor (\u0026#120573; = 0.105, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.033) had a significant effect on trust discernment that remained significant at the 5% level after adjustment for multiple comparisons. The Verified Male EO (\u0026#120573; = 0.074, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.093) and Male EO (\u0026#120573; = 0.069, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.110) again showed relatively large, though nonsignificant, increases in trust discernment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAfter receiving the intervention during the Messengers Study, participants were asked \u0026ldquo;to what extent do you trust information provided by the following institutions/individuals?\u0026rdquo; for each of the messengers. Although participants reported the greatest trust in fact-checkers, female EOs, and state government, experimental measurement of trust discernment showed that participants trusted local, male, and religious messengers more than those they self-reported as more trustworthy (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurther results for Study 2 are found in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Figs.\u0026nbsp;3, 4, and 5 and Supplementary Tables\u0026nbsp;9, 10, 11, and 12.\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eExploratory Follow-up Study on Timing: Design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eStudy 3, which was not pre-registered, replicated the design of our Messengers Study in March 2023 to explore whether there were temporal components to our messenger effects and to examine effects specifically among misinformation believers. As shown in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;5, 46\u003c/b\u003e.60% (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;288) of our sample for the Messengers Study believed at least one of the misinformation headlines in the pre-test.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe therefore wanted to determine the impact that these messenger-based interventions had on those who initially believed any of the inaccurate pre-test headlines (whom we refer to as misinformation believers), as we observed that effects in the pilot study and messengers were lower and mostly negative for those not already susceptible to misinformation, indicating value in primarily targeting misinformation believers. The final sample comprised of 447 participants for our Exploratory Timing Study (288 participants from the messengers study and in the election period, and 159 participants from the non-election period).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eExploratory Follow-up Study on Timing: Results\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhen messenger groups are aggregated in exploratory analysis that pooled participants across studies 2 and 3 we observe that inoculation messages were more effective at improving truth discernment when delivered by a local male authority (\u0026#120573; = 0.329, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.015), such as male election officials, pastors, or celebrities (\u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;13)\u003c/b\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn our exploratory analysis of the Timing Study results, we observed a similar positive impact of local messengers on truth discernment (\u003cb\u003eSupplementary Fig.\u0026nbsp;6)\u003c/b\u003e. We find no significant changes in true and false headline ratings between the two periods for most messengers, indicating that the impact of these messengers remains generally consistent across the two periods (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUsing aggregated messenger groupings, we find that local male authority figures had the largest impact on truth discernment for misinformation believers and trust discernment in the post-election period. Only local male authorities' effects on truth discernment remained significant at the 5% level in the non-election period (\u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;14\u003c/b\u003e, \u0026#120573; =0.415, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.018).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOtherwise, non-person-based and other messengers (institution-based election pages with logos, non-elections organizations, female election officials) had a weaker, non-significant impact on truth discernment in the non-election period. Full results and statistics for the Timing Study are available in \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Tables\u0026nbsp;13, 14, 15, and 16.\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotably, when examining the three-way interaction between messenger, headline veracity, and election versus non-election period, we observe that effect of local male authorities on truth discernment drops from a significant effect in Period 1 (\u0026#120573; =0.415, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.018) to a non-significant effect in the non-election Period 2 (Fig.\u0026nbsp;6, \u003cb\u003eSupplementary Table\u0026nbsp;14\u003c/b\u003e, \u0026#120573; = -0.199, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.195).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe three-way interaction within these exploratory results indicates that certain messengers may be marginally less effective in the non-election period when compared to the election period. This could indicate that inoculation through such strategies, especially for the most effective messengers (local male authorities), is most effective around election periods and when inoculation-based content is most needed. The generally non-significant impact on trust for this population (\u003cb\u003eSupplementary Figs.\u0026nbsp;6, 7, and 8\u003c/b\u003e) could potentially indicate that trust is difficult to influence for individuals that believe misinformation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eOur results reinforce the potential of inoculation strategies to reduce misinformation susceptibility, while underscoring the critical role of the messenger in shaping intervention effectiveness. In Study 1, inoculation posts helped participants spot misinformation, but only some had small, non-significant effects. Accuracy nudges and pre-bunking messages slightly improved perceptions of fake news accuracy, though no message clearly improved participants\u0026rsquo; overall ability to distinguish true from false content. Studies 2 and 3 highlight that messages were notably more effective when delivered by trusted messengers. Local, male figures\u0026mdash;such as pastors and election officials\u0026mdash;were the most persuasive, especially when the message included a personal touch like a face image. These effects were strongest during the election period and among participants who had previously believed misinformation, suggesting these interventions may be most impactful when timed well and targeted toward vulnerable audiences. Interestingly, participants reported the highest trust in fact-checkers and government sources, but responded more strongly to familiar, local messengers\u0026mdash;indicating that trust perceptions do not always align with behavioral impact (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e\u003cb\u003e)\u003c/b\u003e. Social desirability, trust, and other heuristics may help to explain some of the divergence between the self-reported and experimentally revealed measures of trust. Taken together, our findings suggest that who delivers a message matters and can have an important mediating effect on its behavioral impact. Further attention is needed to understand these effects beyond a message's objective informational content.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur results align with findings in other domains: messengers perceived as having relevant expertise\u0026mdash;such as local election officials\u0026mdash;are more effective at driving desired attitudinal or behavioral shifts. We also find that local pastors were effective messengers of election-related messages, consistent with results showing that religious leaders are effective messengers for addressing vaccine hesitancy across partisan groups [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e]. Greater coordination around election-related messaging between public officials and religious leaders may therefore be one way to counter false election information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotably, we found that most male messengers were more effective at increasing truth discernment than a female election official, and that lack of efficacy was not based on the gender of participants. Implicit biases for men and against women have been demonstrated to negatively impact women across a range of domains, such as science education or political leadership, and gender stereotypes about leadership remain pervasive and are often more pronounced in online spaces [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e66\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e67\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e68\u003c/span\u003e]. Further research should clarify the mechanisms driving these effects, which may involve cognitive biases such as the halo effect, implicit gender biases, or confirmation bias, and elucidate why certain messengers, even those lacking relevant experience, were nevertheless effective. Future research should also aim to explore interventions that address gender biases in the propagation of misinformation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne limitation of our study is the exclusive use of online experiments with a limited sample size. With this approach, we cannot fully capture the dynamism or complexity of real-world environments where misinformation spreads. Additionally, the messengers used in our experiments were represented by avatars rather than realistic images, which may not accurately reflect how real messengers are perceived by the public. This abstraction could limit the generalizability of our results, as the impact of interventions might differ when delivered by actual EOs, whose personality, real-world appearance, or demeanor could influence or mediate their credibility and effectiveness.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnother key limitation of our design is the lack of racial and language diversity amongst our messenger/message combinations, as all messengers were white, and all message frames were in English. Although we did not find significant differences in effects between racial groups in our study, our sampling method may limit the generalizability of our findings across groups. Oversampling for underrepresented racial and ethnic groups is a particularly urgent line of inquiry, as recent polling suggests that Black Americans and Spanish-speaking Americans are disproportionately exposed to false information online [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e69\u003c/span\u003e]. Furthermore, our sample was drawn from 14 states of interest, which may impact the generalizability of our results to the entire U.S. voting population across all 50 states.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeveloping a more sophisticated understanding of the role of messengers in elections is an increasingly urgent line of research, given the rapid development of large-language models (LLMs), social media algorithms, and related technologies that are increasingly capable of generating personalized, persuasive information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e]. LLMs are increasingly capable of generating highly-personalized messaging to influence attitudes and behavior, especially when given access to demographic information [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e70\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e71\u003c/span\u003e]. Without appropriate safeguards, such tools could accelerate the spread of election-related misinformation. However, they could also be used by public officials to target election messaging and combat false information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur findings of significant inoculation and messenger effects also raise important questions about how interventions that rely on these effects could backfire. If someone trusts a messenger or institution and that actor spreads false information, the resulting beliefs could be stickier [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e72\u003c/span\u003e]. Partisan-motivated reasoning often shapes election views [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e73\u003c/span\u003e], and the expression of certain \u0026ldquo;out-of-bounds\u0026rdquo; messages can degrade the credibility of messengers over time [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e74\u003c/span\u003e]. One-time inoculation could also foster overconfidence in an individual\u0026rsquo;s truth discernment, so further research could explore how sustained interventions to counter false information might be bolstered by messenger effects [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e75\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eUsing three online experiments, we find that psychological inoculation can effectively counter election-related misinformation, but its effectiveness depends on the messenger selected. Our findings reveal that local, trusted figures\u0026mdash;particularly male messengers like pastors and election officials\u0026mdash;outperform other messengers and abstract institutions in improving public discernment between true and false information. These messenger effects are most pronounced during election periods and among populations vulnerable to misinformation. Future research is needed to assess if these findings translate into field-based contexts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe implications for democratic resilience are clear: combating misinformation and increasing trust in elections require more than accurate information\u0026mdash;they also require attention to messenger selection and targeted delivery. Personalization and localization may be more important for trust than institutional branding. Election-related information should be communicated through diverse messenger networks that cut across demographic and political lines, and resources should be focused on communities with low institutional trust. The timing of interventions also matters, with election officials appearing most effective immediately before elections.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs misinformation continues to threaten democratic trust, these findings advance our understanding of how psychological inoculation interventions against misinformation are mediated by timing and messenger effects. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of inoculation strategies may depend as much on who delivers the message as on the message itself, highlighting the need for further research on how messenger identity, timing, and audience characteristics shape receptivity to and resistance to false information in the context of elections and democratic trust.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":" \u003ch2\u003eAdditional Information\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFunding Declaration\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe authors received funding from the Center for Advanced Hindsight at Duke University and from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eJS and SH conceptualized and led the study. JS and SH designed the experimental methodology. SH oversaw data collection, designed and conducted initial analysis. JS and DM performed data validation. DM drafted and prepared the manuscript. DM designed Figures 1-3, SH designed Figures 4-5, and the Supplemental Figures and Tables. DM prepared Figure Legends. SH and DM designed the Tables and Supplementary Information, JS edited. All authors reviewed and edited the final manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe datasets, code used for analysis and figure generation, and study materials are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLuhmann, N. \u003cem\u003eVertrauen. Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexitat [Trust. A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity]\u003c/em\u003e (Verlag F. Enke, 1968).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eFrega, R. 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(2023). \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.2139/ssrn.4582703\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.2139/ssrn.4582703\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"misinformation, psychological inoculation, messenger effects, elections, trust, social media","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8663461/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8663461/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eTrust serves as a critical heuristic that facilitates basic democratic functioning. The rise of election-related misinformation has been linked to a decline in democratic trust. Recent research suggests that psychological inoculation, or pre-exposure to how misinformation works, may be an effective method to address misinformation beliefs. We extend this line of inquiry to examine the effectiveness of inoculation messages in countering election-related misinformation and to explore whether inoculation interventions are subject to messenger effects, a phenomenon in which information is evaluated by the identity of the person delivering it, rather than its objective content. Using three online experiments (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2317), we test how different messengers (e.g., election organizations, election officials, and non-election-related individuals and entities) impact participants\u0026rsquo; discernment, trust, and engagement with actual true and false headlines. We find that messenger identity affects the effectiveness of inoculation messages. Specifically, local, male messengers\u0026mdash;such as pastors and election officials\u0026mdash;were more effective than a typical voter and other institution-based messengers at improving discernment between true and false information by up to 12 percentage points. These messenger effects were strongest in the period leading up to the 2022 US midterm elections and for individuals more susceptible to believing misinformation.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Who are Effective and Trustworthy Messengers for Election-Related Communications? How Local Messengers Impact Effectiveness of Psychological Inoculation","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-02-11 14:52:13","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8663461/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"c7ecb958-8218-4d42-b3a0-980952575b00","owner":[],"postedDate":"February 11th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":62564330,"name":"Biological sciences/Psychology"},{"id":62564331,"name":"Social science/Psychology"},{"id":62564332,"name":"Social science/Science technology and society"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-02-19T05:10:27+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-02-11 14:52:13","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8663461","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8663461","identity":"rs-8663461","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}