Science and Different Ways of Knowing

This paper examines the growing prominence of “different ways of knowing” across disciplines including psychology, global health, and environmental science, and clarifies their relationship to scientific inquiry. While recognising the legitimate motivations underlying this trend - particularly concerns about exclusion, epistemic injustice, and the need for more inclusive and context-sensitive research - the paper argues that these aims do not require the adoption of alternative epistemic systems alongside science. Drawing on philosophy of science, the authors distinguish between diverse sources of insight and the methodological standards that govern the production of empirical knowledge. They propose a set of thresholds for identifying when the boundary between science and non-science is crossed, including claims of epistemic parity, the insulation of claims from criticism, and institutional enforcement of such positions. The paper argues that maintaining shared standards of evidence - such as testability, openness to refutation, and collective error correction - is essential for science to function as a public, cross-cultural enterprise, while still allowing meaningful integration of diverse perspectives as inputs to, rather than substitutes for, scientific inquiry.