Public understanding of net zero: Conflicted perceptions of different mitigation pathways between feasibility and desirability

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This study investigates how people perceive (1) the attainability and necessity of the 2050 net-zero target and (2) the feasibility and desirability of three illustrative net-zero pathways: carbon dioxide removal (CDR), low energy demand (LED), and carbon capture utilization (CCU). Through deliberative focus groups with ordinary people in Japan, we found that people view net zero as an unrealistic yet necessary benchmark, reflecting ambivalence toward its symbolic value as a policy target. We also found conflicting views on three net-zero scenarios, swinging widely between feasibility (‘what is possible’) and desirability (‘what is good’). Cost consideration was an underlying cause of different scenario perceptions—economic cost was seen as a ‘proxy for realism’ determining ‘what is possible under real-world conditions’ but it was left out of consideration for normative evaluation on ‘what is good or bad for society and themselves’. In judgement over desirability, people are more concerned about environmental safety, policy effectiveness and impacts on their own ways of life. The study highlights tensions between feasibility and desirability in people’s minds, underscoring conflicted preferences for policy choices. Social science/Science, technology and society Scientific community and society/Social sciences/Climate change/Climate-change mitigation Scientific community and society/Social sciences/Carbon and energy Scientific community and society/Social sciences/Communication Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Energy and society/Energy and behaviour net zero scenarios decarbonization energy transition public perception carbon dioxide removal low energy demand carbon capture utilization feasibility desirability Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 INTRODUCTION Since the Paris climate summit in 2015, the target of achieving net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and in particular carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) for the second half of the century has become a cornerstone of climate policy for organising global mitigation actions [ 1 , 2 , 3 ]. The release of the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) played a significant role in giving prominence to a net-zero target with a clear statement that global CO 2 emissions must reach net zero around 2050 to meet the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement [ 4 ]. This created an international wave of net-zero target announcements by major emitting countries, which rapidly expanded to cover almost 150 countries, accounting for nearly 90 percent of the global economy [ 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ]. Net zero is now a central frame of reference for understanding the challenge of climate change and structuring the policy for low-carbon energy transition [ 3 ]. Despite this proliferation of net zero as a new policy target, there is thus far not much research on studying public perceptions and understanding of net zero. One exception is annual surveys conducted by the United Kingdom (UK) government since 2021 to track public attitudes about net zero. According to a recent poll, UK public awareness of the concept of net zero is quite high, with almost all people saying they had heard of it; people are more negative about the impacts of a net-zero transition on the UK economy in the short term but more positive in the long term; and public confidence about the UK net-zero target is rather low, with nearly 70 percent of people responding not very or not at all confident in achieving the target by 2050 [ 9 ]. This result indicates people’s mixed feelings about the challenge and the impact of net-zero energy transitions. An expert survey also shows nuanced views on the feasibility of a national net-zero target in Japan [ 10 ]. The significance of examining public perceptions of net zero is twofold. First, achieving net-zero emissions requires a deep and rapid decarbonization of global energy systems, transitioning away from fossil fuels to clean energy, which has profound social and political implications for the global economy. Since modern society as a whole is built around fossil-fuel-based energy infrastructure, the transformation of the entire energy system entails a huge impact on everyone’s life—though such effects may not be felt evenly among people and countries. Second, there are multiple pathways for achieving the same net-zero target but having widely different socioeconomic consequences. For example, net-zero energy systems that rely heavily on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to preserve fossil fuel use by compensating its associated emissions are not equal to those systems that involve radical shifts in social practices and behaviours to reduce energy consumption and facilitate rapid phaseout of fossil fuels. Net zero emerges as a unifying target for climate policy but its social implications and public perceptions are more complex, depending on the policy pathway taken towards energy decarbonization. This means that to fully grasp public perceptions of net zero, it is important to investigate not only the perception of a policy target itself but also that of different societal pathways towards it. The aim of this study is to explore public perceptions of net zero and untangle the complex web of social meanings attached to low-carbon energy transitions. Using deliberative focus groups with ordinary people in Japan, we address two specific questions. First, how do people perceive the attainability and necessity of a net-zero target? (perception of a net-zero target) Do people think it is possible to achieve net zero CO 2 emissions by mid-century? Even if not, do they still think we should aim for that? Second, how do people perceive the feasibility and desirability of different pathways toward net-zero energy systems? (perception of net-zero pathways) Regardless of their views on the attainability of a net-zero target, people could have some sense of a preferable approach towards decarbonization. Exploring which pathway people think is more feasible or desirable than others can shed light on what people care and worry about. To do so, we developed a set of three illustrative scenarios that would reach net-zero CO 2 emissions by 2050 through different mitigation strategies for energy supply and demand sectors: (1) a heavy reliance on large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR); (2) a drastic change in individual lifestyles leading to low energy demand (LED); and (3) a big bet on new-tech innovation of carbon-neutral synfuels based on carbon capture utilization (CCU). The details of the three scenarios are described below. In climate policy, integrated assessment models (IAMs) have been playing a dominant role by describing a range of possible pathways that achieve long-term policy goals such as net zero [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ]. Recently, there have been mounting calls for greater engagement and integration with perspectives from diverse societal stakeholders as well as insights from the humanities and social sciences into model-based scenario development, thereby increasing policy-relevance of IAM scenarios (e.g. [ 15 , 16 , 17 ]). But so far, little research has been done on studying how IAM scenarios are perceived by broader groups of ordinary people. Our study is an attempt to fill this knowledge gap and provide some feedback to the model-based scenario framework. It must be noted, however, that while IAM scenarios consist of both qualitative narratives (or storylines) and quantitative formulations based on formal modelling [ 18 ], our study only looked into the perceptions of qualitative narrative information of scenarios. We also use the terms ‘scenarios’ and ‘pathways’ interchangeably, as is often the case in the IAM literature [ 19 , 20 ]. Three illustrative net-zero pathways: CDR, LED and CCU The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC Working Group (WG) III presented a range of mitigation scenarios—so-called illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs)—that achieve deep and rapid emissions reductions through different mitigation strategies, each of which has distinctive social characteristics [ 19 , 20 , 21 ]. The purpose of IMPs was to show the contrasting pictures of different policy choices on decarbonization strategies. Like the IMPs of IPCC WGIII AR6, the narratives of the three net-zero energy scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) were developed to cover a range of different decarbonization strategies with contrasting characteristics in terms of economic cost, demand-side transformation and reliance on CDR methods (see Table 1 ). CDR scenario is characterized by extensive use of CDR options (similar to IMP-Neg), whereby fossil fuels continue to be used in demand sectors. This is an archetypal ‘cost-optimal’ scenario developed using IAMs to find a least-cost combination of mitigation options without imposing constraints on technology deployment as a default strategy [ 22 ]. IAM scenarios often assume carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a cost-competitive mitigation option and emphasize the role of bioenergy CCS (BECCS) in balancing out residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy industry, shipping and aviation [ 23 , 24 , 25 ]. In contrast, LED scenario is characterized by demand-side transformations (similar to IMP-LD) that involve widespread electrification in end-use sectors and lifestyle changes to reduce energy-intensive activities (e.g. driving and flying). The core idea behind the scenarios focused on demand-side solutions is to minimize the use of CCS and CDR options due to concerns about the uncertainties and negative consequences associated with large-scale BECCS deployment [ 22 , 26 , 27 ]. CCU scenario is a new alternative pathway proposed by Oshiro et al. [ 28 ], characterized by supply-side transformations to replace fossil fuels with carbon-neutral synthetic fuels (synfuels or sometimes called e-fuels) that are produced from combining renewable-based hydrogen and CO 2 removed from the atmosphere by direct air capture (DAC) technology. A key feature of this scenario is to achieve net-zero emissions without relying on large-scale CDR deployment or requiring drastic changes in energy demand structure and lifestyle choice, which could allow continued use of petrol cars or gas stoves. However, there remain deep uncertainties about rapid upscaling and economy-wide implementation of DAC technology and associated high mitigation costs [ 28 , 29 ]. Table 1 Overview of main characteristics of three net-zero scenarios CDR LED CCU Basic narrative • Continued use of fossil fuels • Heavy reliance on CDR to offset residual emissions • Demand reduction via lifestyle change • Widespread electrification in demand sectors • Mass production of synfuels by CCU to replace fossil fuels • Limited electrification in demand sectors Economic cost Low Moderate Very high Demand-side transformation Low High Low Reliance on CDR High Low Low It is worth noting that while there is a policy debate on whether a net-zero target is about CO 2 or GHG emissions [ 2 , 30 ], our study focused only on CO 2 emissions from energy systems. This is simply because we are primarily interested in looking at public perceptions of low-carbon energy transitions. Thus, although more emphasis is now placed on the role of dietary shifts to achieve the 1.5°C goal (e.g. [ 22 , 31 ]), this was not considered in the three net-zero scenarios of our study. The contrasting characteristics of the three net-zero scenarios can be described by the degree of reliance on CDR methods and system change in demand sectors (see Fig. 1 ). It shows the uniqueness of CCU scenario, located at the middle ground between CDR and LED scenarios, featured by relatively low dependence on CDR and low change in end-use systems. The point here is however to show trade-offs between different pathways for net-zero energy transitions. Like the IPCC AR6 IMPs, the three net-zero scenarios illustrate how different policy choices on decarbonization strategies have different social, political and economic implications for people’s everyday lives. The focus of our study is on understanding how people navigate trade-offs between scenarios and evaluate the pros and cons of each scenario. In doing so, we looked into people’s perceptions of the feasibility and desirability of each scenario. In IPCC WGIII AR6, the feasibility of low-carbon scenarios was a key focal point of its assessment and was evaluated from multiple dimensions [ 21 , 32 ]. But there was little attention to the desirability of scenarios and this omission of desirability led to the conflation of the two concepts within the IPCC feasibility assessment framework [ 33 ]. As analytical concepts, there is a clear distinction between feasibility and desirability—the former mostly refers to technical or practical possibility (‘what is possible’), whereas the latter is more specifically about ethical or normative judgement (‘what is good’). Due to this conceptual difference, as Tank et al. [ 33 ] argue, it is important to distinguish feasibility from desirability and treat them separately for policy assessment. This is especially true when looking at the perception of feasibility and desirability because ‘what is considered possible’ is often not equal to ‘what is considered good’ in people’s minds. In our study, we define perceived feasibility as ‘what people think is possible to happen’ while perceived desirability as ‘what people think is good to happen’ (or ‘what people want to have happen’) (cf. [ 33 , 34 ]). We paid closer attention to both the perceived feasibility and desirability of the three net-zero scenarios and analysed how the perceptions of each scenario might change in judgement over feasibility and desirability. However, when asking people about their perceptions of feasibility and desirability, we did not specify their definitions because what is considered feasible or desirable could mean different things to different people. We were rather interested in finding out each person’s own views and conceptions of feasibility (‘what is possible’) and desirability (‘what is good’). RESULTS General perceptions of climate change issues Before looking into how people perceive the challenge of net-zero energy transitions, it is worth mentioning their views and attitudes about climate change in general. In our study, many participants expressed concerns over the impacts of climate change such as extreme heat and rainfall, but at the same time, they also felt the issue remained distant from their everyday lives. Several participants vaguely raised questions about human-caused global warming; they were unsure whether the cause is human activity or a natural cycle. These attitudes correspond to those of the Concerned and the Cautious among six audience segments for climate change views identified by Leiserowitz et al. [ 35 ], which account for roughly half of Japanese respondents in recent global surveys [ 36 , 37 ]. In short, the participants of our study largely accepted the science of climate change and worried about the impacts on society, but they were less engaged with the issue and had no clear opinions about it. As pointed out by Dechezleprêtre et al. [ 38 ], the perception of climate change impacts may not be directly relevant to the perception of climate mitigation policy. But still, these views of our participants about climate change provide an important context for interpreting their perceptions about net-zero scenarios. In addition, the participants' awareness of the Paris Agreement was relatively low—most of them either did not know it or knew it only by name but didn’t know what it was about. On the other hand, most participants have heard the term ‘net zero’ or ‘carbon neutral’ and many were aware of the government’s net-zero target. However, no one could explain clearly the meaning of net zero. As such, our participants were not so much familiar with the challenge of net-zero energy transitions. Perceptions of the 2050 net-zero target: attainability and necessity When participants were first asked about their perceptions of the 2050 net-zero target, they showed conflictual —and somewhat contradictory— reactions to its attainability and necessity. Our analysis found three common framings of net zero that were broadly shared among participants across groups: (1) unreal (‘net zero is an unrealistic target’); (2) dubious (‘net zero is an empty promise’); and (3) necessary (‘net zero is a necessary benchmark’) (see Table 2 and Supplementary Table 2). It must be noted that these framings are not mutually exclusive but can sometimes be identified in the utterances of the same individual participants. Table 2 Perceptions of the 2050 net-zero target Framing Quote Unreal (‘Net zero is an unrealistic target’) “This is a bit of a stretch. Time is too short. I feel like, ‘What's the point of setting a goal like this?’” (Group A, Participant 2) “I've known the term global warming since I was a kid, and despite all the efforts, emissions are still going up. Now, you set a target, suddenly can things really change that dramatically, like a roller coaster?” (Group C, Participant 5) “It doesn’t quite hit home. No visible actions really come across in my head. It feels unfamiliar, like someone else’s problem. I just can't feel a personal connection to it.” (Group D, Participant 2) Dubious (‘Net zero is an empty promise’) “This sort of making it zero is the same as the type of thing politicians say when they put up a manifesto, promising ‘we will do this,’ but when it's all over they haven't done anything. It just seems like they're setting these goals to claim it as their own achievement.” (Group A, Participant 4) “Since it's about achieving net zero, I wondered if there was some kind of trick involved. We have a lot of emissions here, but we can cancel it out by doing something else. Perhaps there's a strategy like that. So, then they can say they've met their obligations.” (Group D, Participant 6) “If we don't say that, we get stoned these days. Apart from whether we actually mean it or not, we have to put a target out there; otherwise, we will be asked ‘Aren’t you going to do it?’” (Group E, Participant 6) Necessary (‘Net zero is a necessary benchmark’) “It's better to have it than not to have it ... If each household could see their CO 2 levels at home every day, perhaps people would be more motivated to make their efforts.” (Group C, Participant 6) “We need a target; otherwise, it might seem like anything goes. Set a target, do what we are told, and see how it goes. We don't have to abandon it.” (Group E, Participant 2) “As I work in sales, we often end up not reaching our target if the number appears to be achievable. But, if the target is set at a level where it may or may not be achievable, we can commit ourselves to trying hard to make it. So, it's essential to set some form of numerical target and work towards it.” (Group E, Participant 4) First, most participants, if not all, unambiguously thought of achieving the net-zero target by mid-century as a lost cause. Given the fact that global CO 2 emissions have been steadily increasing over a long period, it was largely considered impossible or implausible to turn things around so quickly and reduce emissions to zero in a matter of decades. The feeling of unreality also came from the difficulty of grasping the notion of net zero itself. Many participants couldn’t figure out what it means to achieve net-zero emissions in the first place. They felt the target was out of touch with the reality of their everyday lives. The net-zero target was thus perceived as unrealistic both in terms of feasibility and familiarity. Second, while governments showed their political ambition by setting the net-zero target, many participants held sceptical views on the government’s seriousness of achieving it. They regarded setting such an ambitious goal as rhetorical gesture rather than substantial action—a typical behaviour of making an empty promise or keeping up a pretence of acting in politics as usual. One participant also cast a dubious eye on the notion of net zero itself by raising a question about the way in which the target is achieved through residual emissions being offset by carbon removal methods (see Table 2 ). A sense of dubiousness about net zero was prevalent among participants, which led them to believe that the target would unlikely be met by mid-century. Third, despite all of this scepticism, many participants still supported aiming to achieve the net-zero target—irrespective of whether it is feasible or not—to keep ambition alive. Although a few participants took a dismissive attitude toward the urgency of climate change (see Supplementary Table 2), many others generally understood that net zero or some form of quantitative indicator is needed for measuring and increasing global efforts in reducing CO 2 emissions. They worried that mitigation policy might go astray without such a specific, ambitious target. In other words, it was the concreteness (and ambition) of net zero that provided people with a reason to believe the necessity of having it as a policy target. As described above, three framings ( unreal , dubious and necessary ) of the 2050 net-zero target showed conflicted views of participants about its attainability and necessity. While the target was considered an unrealistic goal or just empty posturing by governments, it was nevertheless regarded as a necessary benchmark for catalysing low-carbon energy transition. On the surface, these different perceptions seemed contradictory. However, the implausibility of achieving the net-zero target did not necessarily lead people to disprove the importance of having such an ambitious target. Instead, these apparently contradictory framings of net zero were compatible with each other in their mind. Perceptions of three net-zero scenarios: feasibility and desirability When three different scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) of net-zero energy transitions were introduced to focus groups, there were some clear tendencies of opinions among participants that emerged from their discussions about the feasibility and desirability of these scenarios. Below, we show the results of our framing analysis on how people perceived the pros and cons of each scenario and on what grounds they made their judgement on its feasibility and desirability. For the summary of each scenario’s perceptions and exemplary quotes from focus group discussions, see Tables 3 – 5 and Supplementary Tables 3–5. Perceptions of CDR scenario—feasible but undesirable In terms of feasibility, many participants perceived CDR scenario as the most feasible option among the three and this perception was rooted in the relatively low economic cost of the scenario. People argued that whether they like it or not, a cost issue inevitably comes to the forefront in judgement over feasibility. In other words, low economic cost was understood as a sort of political lever to decrease the risk of opposition against—and hence increase the likelihood of—net-zero energy transition. When it comes to the question of desirability, however, many participants widely regarded CDR scenario as an undesirable option. This negative perception of CDR scenario stemmed mostly from their scepticism toward geological CO 2 storage. People showed strong suspicions about the safety and efficacy of geological storage, for example, by analogy with nuclear waste disposal (see Supplementary Table 3). On top of their concerns over CCS safety, the very idea of storing CO 2 underground was put down as a false solution to decarbonization. It was deemed deceptive to achieve net zero by recourse to large-scale CCS deployment because this appeared to duck the responsibility of reducing emissions in the first place—one participant described it as “brushing a problem under the carpet” (see Table 3 ). Instead, they preferred to find more ‘useful’ ways to reuse CO 2 captured from the air, not storing it underground. As such, whilst being perceived as most realistic from the cost perspective, CDR scenario was considered an unfavourable approach to energy decarbonization. Table 3 Perceptions of CDR scenario Framing Quote CDR scenario is most feasible because… Low economic cost “It’s because of the cheapest cost ... If you listen to people's opinions, they'd probably think from a cost perspective.” (Group B, Participant 5) “Given the cost and other factors, [CDR scenario] looks like the most feasible option to achieve quickly … There's a sense of urgency now, with people saying we need to make it by 2050. When I think about if we can make it by then, the fastest way seems like storing as much [CO 2 ] as we can.” (Group C, Participant 3) “It would be the quickest way since it's the least expensive way to reduce emissions ... Keeping costs low is the best. In the end, if it gets expensive, taxes will go up, so I think [CDR scenario] is most suitable.” (Group D, Participant 3) CDR scenario is undesirable because… Concern over CCS safety “I'm not sure if CO 2 storage will work well. I guess the technology has not been fully developed yet, so it's uncertain whether it can be done. Even if it can be stored, what will happen then? … It would be problematic if CO 2 is dumped into the ocean.” (Group B, Participant 6) “I wonder if underground CO 2 storage might have more negative impacts. I think it's the most feasible option, but probably not a good solution.” (Group D, Participant 5) CCS is a false solution “It's really just about storing, just making invisible from sight. If it gets completely full, will you just dig new underground sites? If you keep digging underground, you dig too deep and now you have to ask yourself, ‘Is the ground safe?’ There will be such concerns coming up, so [CDR scenario] does not look very good.” (Group C, Participant 1) “What do you do after storing CO 2 ? ... It's just like brushing a problem under the carpet. If you can convert CO 2 into something else and make use of it, that would be good, but if you're just storing it, you're just avoiding the problem.” (Group F, Participant 2) Perceptions of LED scenario—feasible, infeasible and undesirable The perceived feasibility of LED scenario was contested among participants. Whereas many (but not as many as in the case of CDR scenario) participants viewed LED scenario as the most feasible option, some others considered it an infeasible approach to decarbonization. This division in their perceptions between feasible and infeasible came from the different aspects of LED scenario to which people paid attention in making their judgement. The perception of LED scenario as the most feasible option was largely based upon their understanding that the world is already moving in a direction toward electrification of transport or buildings sectors and that this shift to electrification is irreversible. The familiarity with electric vehicles also contributed to having a more convinced sense of plausibility about this scenario. On the other hand, some participants insisted on the difficulty of changing a modern, convenient lifestyle to reduce energy demand. They claimed that such an attempt would arguably cause social friction and political backlash from those who want to keep the status quo. There were a few participants who thought of changing their lifestyles as possible, at least on the individual level (see Supplementary Table 4). But, for many others, it was inconceivable that society as a whole would forcibly change everyone's behaviour. This sense of implausibility led people to believe that LED scenario is also undesirable because of too much restriction imposed on individual life. There was particularly a strong psychological resistance against the idea of less flying. The assumption behind this resistance was that any effort to reduce energy demand would inevitably result in lowered standards of living—something like “returning to an agrarian society” in one participant’s words (see Supplementary Table 4). In short, the social change demanded in LED scenario was deemed not only unrealistic but also unacceptable to many participants. Table 4 Perceptions of LED scenario Framing Quote LED scenario is most feasible because… Electrification is already underway “[LED scenario] is most straightforward no matter where, either in Japan or abroad. Electrification is now strongly promoted in Europe ... In particular, the US and Europe are moving towards electric vehicles (EVs). For getting with the current trends, stepping into electricity is a good choice.” (Group B, Participant 2) “I think [LED scenario] is the most likely option ... since we already have things like electric vehicles and induction cooktops … The economic costs are also moderate, so this feels like the most realistic option.” (Group C, Participant 4) LED scenario is infeasible because… Changing lifestyle is hard “This is about people's feelings, and you can't control people's feelings ... This is not realistic. Even if we were suddenly told not to fly, it wouldn't work without airplanes in such a globalized world. So, [LED scenario] is least feasible.” (Group E, Participant 5) “Changing lifestyle is most challenging ... Once you've experienced a convenient life, you can’t really give it up just for reducing CO 2 . I find it difficult for myself.” (Group F, Participant 4) LED scenario is undesirable because… Too much restriction on individual life “I dislike [LED scenario] ... We'd have to change our current behaviours, and that's a downside. It would mean we can’t travel abroad any longer.” (Group B, Participant 1) “We have to balance practical benefits and people's feelings; otherwise, there will be a backlash. Things like restricting everything isn’t a good idea.” (Group E, Participant 3) “It's too extreme. It seems like nothing is acceptable that will harm the environment. It’s not so kind to people ... If someone comes and tells us that, I would feel like, 'Oh, no, you don’t say that.'” (Group F, Participant 6) Perceptions of CCU scenario—infeasible but desirable In contrast to CDR scenario, most participants (except a few) unambiguously considered CCU scenario an infeasible approach to energy decarbonization. The reasons for this perceived infeasibility of CCU scenario are twofold: high economic cost and the risk of unproven technology. First, as with CDR scenario, a cost issue served as a basis for participants’ judgement about the feasibility of CCU scenario; this time, however, concern over the high economic cost of synfuel production led them to conclude that this would most likely end up as a pious wish. Second, some participants were openly sceptical about whether mass production of synfuels could really bear fruit as expected. In their eyes, pushing through decarbonization based on the innovation of novel, unproven technology looked like a risky gamble with a high chance of failure. Despite such pervasive scepticism about feasibility, a large majority of participants still considered CCU scenario the most desirable option. There was a strong, blind optimism among (especially, male) participants for new technological innovation in solving difficult social challenges—for example, by referring to the past history of social progress made by technological breakthroughs (see Supplementary Table 5). Furthermore, in comparison to CDR and LED scenarios, CCU scenario was seen as the least intrusive or disruptive approach with no involvement of geological CO 2 storage and radical lifestyle change. Put differently, CCU scenario was deemed preferable because new technologies such as synfuels allow people not to confront the potential downsides of the other two scenarios—it was seen as a kind of ‘refuge’ to escape from choosing a difficult trade-off between CDR and LED scenarios. Table 5 Perceptions of CCU scenario Framing Quote CCU scenario is infeasible because… High economic cost “No chance, it's too expensive … Whether it's hydrogen, ammonia, or even microalgae, technology innovation will cost about 30 to 40 times more than today. To bring this down to the cost of oil is practically impossible for now … The cost is just way too high.” (Group F, Participant 6) Unproven technology “It’s based on wishful thinking that there will be technology breakthrough by 2050 and synthetic fuel will be available. I can’t imagine betting my future on that kind of hope.” (Group A, Participant 6) “If you try out on a large scale and fail, it would be a waste of time ... We’d better invest in things that are already proven and then scale them up, not gambling on something that might or might not work. It’s more realistic to start small with something doable and gradually expand.” (Group C, Participant 1) CCU scenario is most desirable because… Optimism for tech-innovation “If this synthetic fuel gets developed and put into practical use … we would still be able to fly on planes as usual without restrictions, so it's an amazing dream story.” (Group A, Participant 1) “I want to go with [CCU scenario]. I think innovation is the key to addressing everything we would have to confront ... It might be overwhelmingly expensive, but I believe it would be most effective.” (Group B, Participant 1) Least intrusive solution “If we didn’t have to think about money, this would be most desirable … We wouldn’t need to find places to store CO 2 or make changes to the existing systems, so it would be beneficial for everyone.” (Group D, Participant 3) “This is the least burdensome option … It costs money, but if we create new fuels and use CO 2 , more CO 2 will be produced. It's going to be like a cycle. So, aside from the financial aspect, this option has the least burden.” (Group F, Participant 3) Different choices between the most feasible and desirable scenario In our focus groups, we asked each participant to choose the most feasible scenario first and then later the most desirable scenario among the three (see Fig. 2 and Supplementary Table 6). In terms of feasibility, although three net-zero scenarios were presented in parallel as equally plausible, people quickly came to a common understanding of CCU scenario as the least feasible option. The opinions over the most feasible option were split between CDR and LED scenarios, though people were more inclined to choose the former than the latter as most likely to succeed. With regard to desirability, however, quite a lot of people changed their minds and chose CCU scenario as the most desirable option. A large difference in perceptions of CCU scenario between least feasible and most desirable can be explained by how an issue of economic cost was considered or not in judgement over feasibility and desirability. When asked about feasibility, people took the cost issue as a key consideration in determining their views on scenarios—CDR scenario was regarded as most feasible primarily due to low economic cost, whereas CCU scenario was believed to be too expensive to be realised. However, when asked about desirability, people somewhat spontaneously took cost considerations out of the equation and chose CCU scenario as an attractive alternative to CDR and LED scenarios because it was deemed least intrusive into their everyday lives. Interestingly, some participants suggested combining CDR and CCU scenarios to reconcile a cost trade-off between them, as described below: “I hope [CCU scenario] can be done at a low cost. It probably won't be implemented because it's too expensive … Ideally, we could go with [CDR scenario] for storage, and if possible, do a little bit of [CCU scenario] to use [CO 2 ] for synthetic fuel, at the same time. That seems like a perfect approach.” (Group A, Participant 2) This suggestion of compromise, however, is an implicit acknowledgement that there is no such thing as a perfect scenario, both feasible and desirable at the same time. In fact, only a quarter of all participants chose the same scenario as most feasible and desirable; the rest of them changed their choice from one to another (see Supplementary Table 7). This indicates a clear gap in people’s minds between feasibility (‘what is possible’) and desirability (‘what is good’). DISCUSSION In this study, we explored public perceptions about net-zero energy transitions—more specifically, how ordinary people perceive (1) the attainability and necessity of the 2050 net-zero target and (2) the feasibility and desirability of three illustrative scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) toward net-zero energy systems. Overall, we found that people often have conflictual and ambivalent feelings about how to understand the social implications of net zero. Net zero is perceived as an unrealistic yet necessary benchmark With regard to the challenge of achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century, we found that ordinary people largely consider it an unrealistic but necessary goal. This means that, despite a deep sense of infeasibility over net zero, people recognise the significance of target-setting in policy guidance—that is, show the level of policy ambition to meet, indicate the policy direction to be taken and provide the common benchmark to evaluate policy outcomes [ 39 , 40 ]. In other words, a net-zero target is understood as a governing tool to keep mitigation policy on the right track toward decarbonization [ 41 ]. The symbolic value of net zero as a policy target rests not on its perceived feasibility but on its performative function to keep ambition alive and hence catalyse social change [ 42 , 43 ]. However, we also found that people have a pervasive sense of distance to a global net-zero goal, feeling it detached from the reality of their everyday lives. This feeling of unreality suggests that a net-zero target is perceived as what Morseletto et al. [ 39 ] called a ‘disembedded object’—while broadly accepted as a common goal, a target has no shared vision or agenda to translate into effective policy programmes. At the end of the day, net zero is just a number; it does not tell people how to achieve energy decarbonization and what it would mean to their lives and livelihoods. In this sense, scenarios can be a useful communication tool to help people grasp the policy implications of net-zero energy transitions by describing possible societal pictures of future energy systems [ 44 , 45 , 46 ]. Economic cost is seen as crucial for feasibility but not considered for desirability On perceptions of three net-zero scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU), our analysis found that people have conflicting views and struggle to form a clear opinion about which pathway should be taken, swinging widely between feasibility (‘what is possible’) and desirability (‘what is good’). Each scenario was rarely seen as both feasible and desirable at the same time. For example, CDR and LED scenarios were generally considered feasible, but their judgement of desirability was rather negative. It was particularly striking how the perception of CCU scenario changed entirely from least feasible to most desirable. This inconsistency in scenario perceptions implies that people have different conceptions of feasibility and desirability, but it also means that their perceptions of net-zero scenarios get swayed by the viewpoint from which questions are being asked. Notably, one key element leading to people’s different perceptions between feasibility and desirability was the consideration of economic cost . A cost issue was (unsurprisingly) a dominant concern of people in judgement over feasibility, but it was left out of consideration for judgement over desirability. Whether or not to consider the cost perspective led to starkly contrasting views over CCU scenario between least feasible and most desirable. The point is that people see economic cost as a ‘proxy for realism’ that basically determines ‘what is possible under real-world conditions’, while on the other hand, in the context of desirability, people automatically assume that their preference need not be constrained by cost concerns. In other words, economic cost is recognised as a key barrier to implementing mitigation options [ 19 , 47 ] or a crucial factor to determine what is “do-able under realistic assumptions” [ 48 ]. However, cost does not tell much about people’s normative evaluation on ‘what is good or bad for society and themselves’. In judging desirability, people are more concerned about other factors such as safety, effectiveness and impacts on their lifestyles and personal comfort. There is now significant interest in assessing the feasibility of low-carbon scenarios from different dimensions and angles [ 10 , 21 , 32 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 ]. Jewell and Cherp [ 48 ] argue that systematic analysis of historical precedents (‘what has happened in the past’) can serve as a useful “benchmark for scenario realism” and provide more realistic insights into future possibilities (‘what could realistically happen in the future’). But our study suggests that more careful attention should also be paid to the desirability of scenarios [ 16 , 33 , 54 ]. Exploring public perceptions of desirability can shed light on what kind of policy people support and from what normative standpoint. For example, Dechezleprêtre et al. [ 38 ] found that people’s beliefs about effectiveness, fairness and self-interest shape their support for climate policy. In feasibility assessment, public acceptance is often referred to as key to the social and political feasibility of scenarios [ 32 , 46 ]. If so, it is crucial to understand what people consider good (desirable) and bad (undesirable) because it is politically infeasible to implement an unpopular policy deemed socially undesirable by the public. Perceptions of individual mitigation options Our study focused on examining public perceptions about the overall narrative of net-zero scenarios that combine different mitigation options into a coherent policy strategy. But, what could our findings tell more specifically about public perceptions of individual mitigation options? Since our study is based on the qualitative public deliberation method (i.e., deliberative focus groups) with a small number of participants, we must be cautious in drawing general conclusions from our findings. Nevertheless, we could raise at least three points on ways in which people understand different mitigation options. Persistent scepticism toward geological CO 2 storage In our study, CCS was in general perceived negatively as a false solution to decarbonization or a deceptive means to circumvent making genuine efforts to reduce emissions. This indicates the gap between scientific and social views on the role of CCS. Although scientists emphasize that permanent storage of CO 2 in durable geological formations is essential for achieving net-zero [ 3 , 55 ], ordinary people may not find any social merits in geological storage, only incurring additional costs and safety concerns. From the broader societal standpoint, it’s not immediately obvious what is the point of storing CO 2 deep underground; there is also a legitimate political concern that reliance on CCS and CDR options might delay or deter the transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy [ 56 , 57 , 58 ]. Previous research on CCS perception has been done predominantly on identifying the factors that determine and increase social acceptance [ 59 , 60 , 61 ]. However, our results suggest that people might not even see CCS as an effective option for decarbonization policy, instead preferring an alternative CCU approach. Political contentions over lifestyle changes to reduce energy demand In our study, many people showed deep reluctance to change—or be directed to change—their own behaviours and ways of life. The options of changing everyone’s consumption patterns (e.g., adopting behaviours to reduce flying) were regarded not only as an infeasible plan at a societal level but also as an unwanted intrusion into individual life. This negative perception was partly due to a common belief that reducing energy consumption would necessarily lead to a decline in living standards. While people might support low-carbon lifestyles at least in principle, they are acutely aware of trade-offs with personal comfort and freedom [ 62 ]. There are now increasing efforts to integrate low-demand lifestyle options into the modelling framework [ 26 , 63 , 64 , 65 ] and the literature shows the multiple benefits of demand-side strategies for decarbonization and well-being [ 66 , 67 , 68 ]. However, our results indicate the persistence of psychological and emotional resistance against policy interventions in individual lifestyles. There is no easy way to avoid political controversy around lifestyle change options in mitigation policy. Blind optimism for new-tech innovation of carbon-neutral synfuels In our study, people were at first quite sceptical about the prospect of widespread use of synfuels across different sectors, primarily due to concern over high economic cost; nevertheless, many of them expressed high expectations for synfuels to become a new alternative to fossil fuels. For ordinary people, this option looks attractive because it promises to achieve decarbonization without major transformation of end-use sectors (e.g., transport and buildings) and hence without sacrifice of personal comfort and freedom. However, there are large uncertainties over the future availability and cost-effectiveness of synfuels at large scale [ 29 , 69 , 70 ]. Our results suggest that people are well aware of the risk that synfuels may fall short of expectations, and yet at the same time, they are still attracted by the luring promise that new-tech innovation can provide a solution to decarbonization without fundamental changes in the existing systems. This means that exaggerating the future prospect of synfuel production might carry a risk of delaying necessary changes otherwise possible and perpetuating the lock-in to fossil-fuel-dependent systems—becoming an exemplary case of the ‘attraction of delay’ that enables prevarication and justifies procrastination [ 71 ]. One way to avoid creating such inflated optimism for synfuels is to take a more cautious approach and focus on the limited use only where direct electrification is not possible. CONCLUSION Our study showed that there are multiple views and perceptions on what net zero means in broader social contexts. Net zero is a powerful unifying target that defines and guides global actions toward decarbonization. However, people often feel conflicted about the target of achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century—being sceptical about its attainability while recognising its necessity for catalysing low-carbon transitions. People also do not perceive different net-zero pathways equally. Their perceptions of net-zero scenarios widely differ from feasibility (‘what is possible’) to desirability (‘what is good’). This means that what people consider feasible is not often the same as what they consider desirable. Dissecting tensions in people’s minds between feasibility and desirability can tell us more about what people care in the challenge of net-zero energy transitions. Furthermore, these conflicting views on net zero suggest that it is important for policymakers to keep a delicate balance between political realism and social ambition in navigating the pathways towards net zero. A sole focus on feasibility might risk losing this balance and falling into disappointment and resignation. A better understanding of what people think is desirable could perhaps help sustain public support for decarbonization. Finally, we use scenarios to illustrate different mitigation strategies to achieve net-zero emissions. Our results show that scenarios serve as a powerful framing device to shape the way people understand different mitigation strategies. The political significance of IAM scenarios [72,73] suggests that more social scientific research is needed to critically examine the role of scenarios in wider social deliberations. METHODS To explore public perceptions about the 2050 net-zero target and the three net-zero scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU), we conducted focus groups with ordinary people from various socioeconomic backgrounds who have no specific expertise on the challenge of energy decarbonization. Focus groups are a well-established qualitative social research method, often used in sociology and psychology, to explore people’s experiences, opinions and concerns on a specific topic through group interaction [74,75,76,77,78]. Based on informal discussions among a small number of participants, focus groups are not suitable to gauge the ‘statistically representative’ opinions of the general population. The primary aim of focus groups is to gain more nuanced insights into people’s different—and sometimes conflictual—perspectives, which are difficult to measure in simple yes-no answers to predetermined questions in opinion surveys. The method is particularly useful for examining how people negotiate the meanings of a topic through group interaction and generate their own opinions, questions, priorities and frames in their own terms. It can also be used to examine people’s views on unfamiliar topics with which participants have no prior knowledge or experience. In comparison to other research methods, surveys are often used to elicit generalizable public attitudes and opinions, but they tend to have the problem of producing ‘pseudo opinions’ of respondents who know little or nothing about topics [79,80,81]. Focus groups, on the other hand, have a methodological limit on the generalizability of results due to a small sample size. Despite that, focus groups are useful to have more in-depth and contextual understandings about how and why people make sense of unfamiliar topics through their own experiences and perspectives. Macnaghten [82,83] highlights the use of focus groups as an ‘anticipatory methodology’ that aims at articulating a contextual understanding of how people develop views and attitudes under conditions of unfamiliarity. This is directly applicable to our study. Despite that global efforts on low-carbon energy transition are already underway, the future vision of net-zero energy systems is not yet settled. The policy trajectory of net-zero energy transitions is still emergent, susceptible to public imagination of the kinds of worlds that people think are possible and plausible. In this study, we used focus groups as an anticipatory public deliberation method to explore how people understand the pros and cons of different net-zero scenarios achieving energy decarbonization by mid-century, with a special focus on their perceptions of feasibility and desirability. Participants and recruitment We conducted six focus groups in Tokyo, Japan in November 2022, each lasting two hours with six participants living in the Greater Tokyo area. The design feature of our focus groups (e.g. sampling, moderation) broadly followed the criteria of Macnaghten [82,83]. Participants were recruited via purposeful sampling from survey panellists of a marketing research firm and were given a monetary incentive for their participation. Since the target of our study was generic groups of ordinary people, the recruitment was topic-blind (i.e. participants were recruited to take part in a discussion on ‘global issues’) to avoid those with a particular stake or interest in environmental issues. The sampling of participants was designed to cover a diverse range of social backgrounds (age, gender, occupation) but to compose homogeneous groups of people with some shared experience or demographic in order to foster a favourable setting for group discussions (see Table 6). Table 6 Characteristics of focus group participants Group Characteristics Age Gender A University students living alone 20-29 Mixed B Retired seniors with grandchildren >65 Mixed C Young mothers with children of age under 15 25-40 Female D Young & middle-aged women in service industries 30-50 Female E Young & middle-aged men in manufacturing industries 35-55 Male F Middle-aged men in construction or transport industries 40-60 Male Materials and procedures Each group discussion was moderated not by the researchers themselves but by an experienced professional facilitator with no expert knowledge of the topic. A research team hid in a separate monitoring room and observed discussions from there. This was because the mere presence of researchers might influence the framing of discussions among lay participants by inducing ‘deference to experts’ (cf. [82,83]). However, as people are not generally familiar with net-zero energy transitions, the information materials (vignettes with text and pictures) explaining the concept of net zero and the narratives of three net-zero scenarios were provided to help participants understand the topic and stimulate conversation. To ensure that participants can freely express their opinions, it was also emphasized that there are no right or wrong answers and that all opinions matter and should be respected. Following brief introductions, the overall flow of focus group discussions consists of three main steps: (1) discussion about general perceptions of climate change issues; (2) discussion about the attainability and necessity of the 2050 net-zero target; and (3) discussion about the feasibility and desirability of three net-zero scenarios. The details of the focus group interview guide are available in Supplementary Table 1. For the first step, participants were asked about their perceptions of climate change in general and more specifically about their knowledge of the Paris Agreement and the net-zero concept under conditions of providing no additional information. The aim of this step was to grasp the general views and attitudes of participants about climate change issues, which provided a contextual understanding for the following discussions about the 2050 net-zero target and the three net-zero scenarios. For the second step, participants were introduced via a vignette (see Supplementary Figure 1) to global emissions projections for 2100, which showed that global CO 2 emissions must be reduced to net zero by mid-century to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement. Here, some probing questions were asked to examine how participants perceive the attainability (‘Is it achievable?’) and the necessity (‘Should we aim to achieve it?’) of the 2050 net-zero target. For the third step, participants were introduced via a vignette (see Supplementary Figure 2) to the concept of net zero (or carbon neutrality). The vignette included four basic approaches to achieving energy decarbonization: (1) energy saving; (2) clean electricity; (3) carbon-neutral fuels; and (4) CO 2 removal. CO 2 removal was presented as a necessary means to balance out residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors (e.g. steel, cement, shipping, aviation). However, the technical detail of CO 2 removal methods was not included since this was not the main focus of our study. Participants were then introduced via vignettes (see Supplementary Figures 3-5) to three different approaches to energy decarbonization. Three net-zero scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) were presented as equally plausible, each having both pros and cons as summarized in Table 1. To explore how participants navigate trade-offs between the three scenarios in their judgement of feasibility and desirability, we first probed their choice of the most feasible scenario and then later probed their choice of the most desirable scenario. Participants were also asked to explain why their scenario choice changed from feasibility to desirability, if this was the case. Following open discussions, the focus groups ended with a short question-and-answer session with a research team to respond to questions from participants about our research project. Coding and analysis Focus groups were audio-recorded, the recordings were transcribed, and the transcripts were fully anonymized, all done by a marketing research firm. Focus groups were conducted in Japanese, but all the quotations in the article were translated into English and some have been edited for brevity and clarity. We thematically analysed the transcripts, using an inductive approach to identify key themes and frames related to participant perceptions of the 2050 net-zero target and the three net-zero scenarios. The analysis was done, through an iterative process of close reading and thematic coding, to identify broad, convergent issues and viewpoints among participants and across groups. Because of that, whilst we grouped participants by similar socioeconomic backgrounds, we didn’t look into and compare differences in framings between groups. (Homogeneous grouping was mainly for creating a favourable condition in which each participant can express their opinions freely without any discomfort or hesitation.) The analysis was rather aimed to find framings that were commonly shared more or less by participants from all the groups. Declarations Ethics statement Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee for Non-Biomedical Research at National Institute for Environmental Studies (number 2022-002). Informed consent was obtained from all research participants before their participation. COMPETING INTERESTS The authors declare no competing interests. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS S.A. conceived and designed the study with inputs from S.F., K.O., H.S. and M.S. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by S.A. The first draft of the manuscript was written by S.A. and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study was supported by the Environmental Research and Technology Development Fund of the Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan [grant number JPMEERF20211001; JPMEERF20241001] and JSPS KAKENHI [grant number JP24K15419]. 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Towards an anticipatory public engagement methodology: deliberative experiments in the assembly of possible worlds using focus groups. Qualitative Research 21 , 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794120919096. Additional Declarations There is NO Competing Interest. Supplementary Files COREQAsayamaetalPublicunderstandingofnetzero.docx COREQ nrreportingsummary.pdf Reporting Summary SupplementaryInformation.pdf SUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATION Supplementary Figures 1-5 and Tables 1–7 Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 26 Jan, 2026 Read the published version in Communications Sustainability → Version 1 posted Editorial decision: revise 26 Sep, 2025 Review # 3 received at journal 23 Sep, 2025 Review # 2 received at journal 10 Sep, 2025 Review # 1 received at journal 26 Aug, 2025 Reviewer # 3 agreed at journal 15 Aug, 2025 Reviewer # 2 agreed at journal 15 Aug, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 15 Aug, 2025 Reviewer # 1 agreed at journal 15 Aug, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 15 Aug, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 15 Aug, 2025 First submitted to journal 15 Aug, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7379576","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":501108766,"identity":"1a3c7ca1-213d-4d20-8ca8-1bc637e18ece","order_by":0,"name":"Shinichiro Asayama","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6817-3862","institution":"National Institute for Environmental Studies","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Shinichiro","middleName":"","lastName":"Asayama","suffix":""},{"id":501108767,"identity":"d143d449-a432-4674-a5b2-8eef1c728006","order_by":1,"name":"Shinichiro Fujimori","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7897-1796","institution":"Kyoto University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Shinichiro","middleName":"","lastName":"Fujimori","suffix":""},{"id":501108768,"identity":"ffcee5ee-b464-42a0-8634-854164342865","order_by":2,"name":"Ken Oshiro","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6720-409X","institution":"Hokkaido University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Ken","middleName":"","lastName":"Oshiro","suffix":""},{"id":501108769,"identity":"a3735a91-a046-4568-b7d1-6c73d19f1b1a","order_by":3,"name":"Tomoko Hasegawa","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Tomoko","middleName":"","lastName":"Hasegawa","suffix":""},{"id":501108770,"identity":"4a182cc8-7737-4752-8c7b-b37cdaf0230e","order_by":4,"name":"Hiroto Shiraki","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Hiroto","middleName":"","lastName":"Shiraki","suffix":""},{"id":501108771,"identity":"fb3c07e8-11c5-48ca-8e21-b7fec519d986","order_by":5,"name":"Masahiro Sugiyama","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2038-1045","institution":"University of Tokyo","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Masahiro","middleName":"","lastName":"Sugiyama","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-08-15 08:11:16","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7379576/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7379576/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[{"content":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s44458-025-00021-7","type":"published","date":"2026-01-26T05:00:00+00:00"}],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":89695753,"identity":"175d113d-cc15-4376-8176-dfe1d11cf409","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-22 18:04:40","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":146089,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eComparison of three illustrative net-zero scenarios.\u003c/strong\u003e Each net-zero scenario is plotted based on the degree of CDR reliance (vertical axis) and system change in end-use sectors (horizontal axis). The two axes are generally in an inverse relationship among the illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs) of the IPCC WGIII AR6, which means the less reliant on CDR methods, the higher system changes are required in demand sectors. (GS: gradual strengthening, Neg: net negative, Ren: renewables, LD: low demand, SP: shifting pathways).\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7379576/v1/41cbbf88b3f928a3866deb91.png"},{"id":89695751,"identity":"79d8f8cb-5cd0-49df-997b-7799984d6807","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-22 18:04:40","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":67872,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDifferent choices of the most feasible and desirable among three net-zero scenarios.\u003c/strong\u003e Circles indicate each participant’s choice of the most feasible or desirable scenario among the three scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU). Participants were asked to choose the most feasible scenario first and then later the most desirable scenario. Arrows indicate the move of the participant’s choice from feasible to desirable.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7379576/v1/c77b613b2d01822ec9956dd2.png"},{"id":101195912,"identity":"f332fe7e-0e9e-4cf5-9028-218b60963d73","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-27 08:11:43","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1507614,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7379576/v1/fcbee9b9-5534-43f8-aaa6-70cced86a1d3.pdf"},{"id":89695530,"identity":"e9ea07f6-5714-412d-a693-78d90627bebb","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-22 17:56:40","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":23882,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"COREQ","description":"","filename":"COREQAsayamaetalPublicunderstandingofnetzero.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7379576/v1/f887b15f29dbc393942612a0.docx"},{"id":89696846,"identity":"1e559ad6-c97b-4d82-abfc-795c029e5494","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-22 18:20:40","extension":"pdf","order_by":2,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":1665904,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"Reporting Summary","description":"","filename":"nrreportingsummary.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7379576/v1/f96f7a22591982b43a76205a.pdf"},{"id":89695543,"identity":"40193a68-fa00-4168-9329-e5075e83b5ce","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-22 17:56:40","extension":"pdf","order_by":3,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":1210318,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATION\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSupplementary Figures 1-5 and Tables 1–7\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryInformation.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7379576/v1/2c573f8f13504fe04f206a84.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"There is \u003cb\u003eNO\u003c/b\u003e Competing Interest.","formattedTitle":"Public understanding of net zero: Conflicted perceptions of different mitigation pathways between feasibility and desirability","fulltext":[{"header":"INTRODUCTION","content":"\u003cp\u003eSince the Paris climate summit in 2015, the target of achieving net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and in particular carbon dioxide (CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e) for the second half of the century has become a cornerstone of climate policy for organising global mitigation actions [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e]. The release of the \u003cem\u003eSpecial Report on Global Warming of 1.5\u0026deg;C\u003c/em\u003e of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) played a significant role in giving prominence to a net-zero target with a clear statement that global CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions must reach net zero around 2050 to meet the 1.5\u0026deg;C goal of the Paris Agreement [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e]. This created an international wave of net-zero target announcements by major emitting countries, which rapidly expanded to cover almost 150 countries, accounting for nearly 90 percent of the global economy [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e]. Net zero is now a central frame of reference for understanding the challenge of climate change and structuring the policy for low-carbon energy transition [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDespite this proliferation of net zero as a new policy target, there is thus far not much research on studying public perceptions and understanding of net zero. One exception is annual surveys conducted by the United Kingdom (UK) government since 2021 to track public attitudes about net zero. According to a recent poll, UK public awareness of the concept of net zero is quite high, with almost all people saying they had heard of it; people are more negative about the impacts of a net-zero transition on the UK economy in the short term but more positive in the long term; and public confidence about the UK net-zero target is rather low, with nearly 70 percent of people responding not very or not at all confident in achieving the target by 2050 [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e]. This result indicates people\u0026rsquo;s mixed feelings about the challenge and the impact of net-zero energy transitions. An expert survey also shows nuanced views on the feasibility of a national net-zero target in Japan [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe significance of examining public perceptions of net zero is twofold. First, achieving net-zero emissions requires a deep and rapid decarbonization of global energy systems, transitioning away from fossil fuels to clean energy, which has profound social and political implications for the global economy. Since modern society as a whole is built around fossil-fuel-based energy infrastructure, the transformation of the entire energy system entails a huge impact on everyone\u0026rsquo;s life\u0026mdash;though such effects may not be felt evenly among people and countries. Second, there are multiple pathways for achieving the same net-zero target but having widely different socioeconomic consequences. For example, net-zero energy systems that rely heavily on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to preserve fossil fuel use by compensating its associated emissions are not equal to those systems that involve radical shifts in social practices and behaviours to reduce energy consumption and facilitate rapid phaseout of fossil fuels. Net zero emerges as a unifying target for climate policy but its social implications and public perceptions are more complex, depending on the policy pathway taken towards energy decarbonization. This means that to fully grasp public perceptions of net zero, it is important to investigate not only the perception of a policy \u003cem\u003etarget\u003c/em\u003e itself but also that of different societal \u003cem\u003epathways\u003c/em\u003e towards it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe aim of this study is to explore public perceptions of net zero and untangle the complex web of social meanings attached to low-carbon energy transitions. Using deliberative focus groups with ordinary people in Japan, we address two specific questions. First, how do people perceive the attainability and necessity of a net-zero target? (perception of a net-zero target) Do people think it is possible to achieve net zero CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions by mid-century? Even if not, do they still think we should aim for that? Second, how do people perceive the feasibility and desirability of different pathways toward net-zero energy systems? (perception of net-zero pathways) Regardless of their views on the attainability of a net-zero target, people could have some sense of a preferable approach towards decarbonization. Exploring which pathway people think is more feasible or desirable than others can shed light on what people care and worry about. To do so, we developed a set of three illustrative scenarios that would reach net-zero CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions by 2050 through different mitigation strategies for energy supply and demand sectors: (1) a heavy reliance on large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR); (2) a drastic change in individual lifestyles leading to low energy demand (LED); and (3) a big bet on new-tech innovation of carbon-neutral synfuels based on carbon capture utilization (CCU). The details of the three scenarios are described below.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn climate policy, integrated assessment models (IAMs) have been playing a dominant role by describing a range of possible pathways that achieve long-term policy goals such as net zero [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e]. Recently, there have been mounting calls for greater engagement and integration with perspectives from diverse societal stakeholders as well as insights from the humanities and social sciences into model-based scenario development, thereby increasing policy-relevance of IAM scenarios (e.g. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e]). But so far, little research has been done on studying how IAM scenarios are perceived by broader groups of ordinary people. Our study is an attempt to fill this knowledge gap and provide some feedback to the model-based scenario framework. It must be noted, however, that while IAM scenarios consist of both qualitative narratives (or storylines) and quantitative formulations based on formal modelling [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e], our study only looked into the perceptions of qualitative narrative information of scenarios. We also use the terms \u0026lsquo;scenarios\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;pathways\u0026rsquo; interchangeably, as is often the case in the IAM literature [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eThree illustrative net-zero pathways: CDR, LED and CCU\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC Working Group (WG) III presented a range of mitigation scenarios\u0026mdash;so-called illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs)\u0026mdash;that achieve deep and rapid emissions reductions through different mitigation strategies, each of which has distinctive social characteristics [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e]. The purpose of IMPs was to show the contrasting pictures of different policy choices on decarbonization strategies.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLike the IMPs of IPCC WGIII AR6, the narratives of the three net-zero energy scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) were developed to cover a range of different decarbonization strategies with contrasting characteristics in terms of economic cost, demand-side transformation and reliance on CDR methods (see Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). CDR scenario is characterized by extensive use of CDR options (similar to IMP-Neg), whereby fossil fuels continue to be used in demand sectors. This is an archetypal \u0026lsquo;cost-optimal\u0026rsquo; scenario developed using IAMs to find a least-cost combination of mitigation options without imposing constraints on technology deployment as a default strategy [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e]. IAM scenarios often assume carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a cost-competitive mitigation option and emphasize the role of bioenergy CCS (BECCS) in balancing out residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy industry, shipping and aviation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e]. In contrast, LED scenario is characterized by demand-side transformations (similar to IMP-LD) that involve widespread electrification in end-use sectors and lifestyle changes to reduce energy-intensive activities (e.g. driving and flying). The core idea behind the scenarios focused on demand-side solutions is to minimize the use of CCS and CDR options due to concerns about the uncertainties and negative consequences associated with large-scale BECCS deployment [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e]. CCU scenario is a new alternative pathway proposed by Oshiro et al. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e], characterized by supply-side transformations to replace fossil fuels with carbon-neutral synthetic fuels (synfuels or sometimes called e-fuels) that are produced from combining renewable-based hydrogen and CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e removed from the atmosphere by direct air capture (DAC) technology. A key feature of this scenario is to achieve net-zero emissions without relying on large-scale CDR deployment or requiring drastic changes in energy demand structure and lifestyle choice, which could allow continued use of petrol cars or gas stoves. However, there remain deep uncertainties about rapid upscaling and economy-wide implementation of DAC technology and associated high mitigation costs [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverview of main characteristics of three net-zero scenarios\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCDR\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLED\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCCU\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBasic narrative\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026bull; \u003cem\u003eContinued use of fossil fuels\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026bull; \u003cem\u003eHeavy reliance on CDR to offset residual emissions\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026bull; \u003cem\u003eDemand reduction via lifestyle change\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026bull; \u003cem\u003eWidespread electrification in demand sectors\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026bull; \u003cem\u003eMass production of synfuels by CCU to replace fossil fuels\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u0026bull; \u003cem\u003eLimited electrification in demand sectors\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEconomic cost\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLow\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eModerate\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eVery high\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDemand-side transformation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLow\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eHigh\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLow\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eReliance on CDR\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eHigh\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLow\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLow\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIt is worth noting that while there is a policy debate on whether a net-zero target is about CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e or GHG emissions [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e], our study focused only on CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions from energy systems. This is simply because we are primarily interested in looking at public perceptions of low-carbon energy transitions. Thus, although more emphasis is now placed on the role of dietary shifts to achieve the 1.5\u0026deg;C goal (e.g. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e]), this was not considered in the three net-zero scenarios of our study.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe contrasting characteristics of the three net-zero scenarios can be described by the degree of reliance on CDR methods and system change in demand sectors (see Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). It shows the uniqueness of CCU scenario, located at the middle ground between CDR and LED scenarios, featured by relatively low dependence on CDR and low change in end-use systems. The point here is however to show trade-offs between different pathways for net-zero energy transitions. Like the IPCC AR6 IMPs, the three net-zero scenarios illustrate how different policy choices on decarbonization strategies have different social, political and economic implications for people\u0026rsquo;s everyday lives. The focus of our study is on understanding how people navigate trade-offs between scenarios and evaluate the pros and cons of each scenario. In doing so, we looked into people\u0026rsquo;s perceptions of the \u003cem\u003efeasibility\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003edesirability\u003c/em\u003e of each scenario.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn IPCC WGIII AR6, the \u003cem\u003efeasibility\u003c/em\u003e of low-carbon scenarios was a key focal point of its assessment and was evaluated from multiple dimensions [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e]. But there was little attention to the \u003cem\u003edesirability\u003c/em\u003e of scenarios and this omission of desirability led to the conflation of the two concepts within the IPCC feasibility assessment framework [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e]. As analytical concepts, there is a clear distinction between feasibility and desirability\u0026mdash;the former mostly refers to technical or \u003cem\u003epractical possibility\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;what is possible\u0026rsquo;), whereas the latter is more specifically about ethical or \u003cem\u003enormative judgement\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;what is good\u0026rsquo;). Due to this conceptual difference, as Tank et al. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e] argue, it is important to distinguish feasibility from desirability and treat them separately for policy assessment. This is especially true when looking at the perception of feasibility and desirability because \u0026lsquo;what is considered possible\u0026rsquo; is often not equal to \u0026lsquo;what is considered good\u0026rsquo; in people\u0026rsquo;s minds.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn our study, we define \u003cem\u003eperceived\u003c/em\u003e feasibility as \u0026lsquo;what people think is possible to happen\u0026rsquo; while \u003cem\u003eperceived\u003c/em\u003e desirability as \u0026lsquo;what people think is good to happen\u0026rsquo; (or \u0026lsquo;what people want to have happen\u0026rsquo;) (cf. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e]). We paid closer attention to both the \u003cem\u003eperceived\u003c/em\u003e feasibility and desirability of the three net-zero scenarios and analysed how the perceptions of each scenario might change in judgement over feasibility and desirability. However, when asking people about their perceptions of feasibility and desirability, we did not specify their definitions because what is considered feasible or desirable could mean different things to different people. We were rather interested in finding out each person\u0026rsquo;s own views and conceptions of feasibility (\u0026lsquo;what is possible\u0026rsquo;) and desirability (\u0026lsquo;what is good\u0026rsquo;).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"RESULTS","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eGeneral perceptions of climate change issues\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBefore looking into how people perceive the challenge of net-zero energy transitions, it is worth mentioning their views and attitudes about climate change in general. In our study, many participants expressed concerns over the impacts of climate change such as extreme heat and rainfall, but at the same time, they also felt the issue remained distant from their everyday lives. Several participants vaguely raised questions about human-caused global warming; they were unsure whether the cause is human activity or a natural cycle. These attitudes correspond to those of the \u003cem\u003eConcerned\u003c/em\u003e and the \u003cem\u003eCautious\u003c/em\u003e among six audience segments for climate change views identified by Leiserowitz et al. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e], which account for roughly half of Japanese respondents in recent global surveys [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e]. In short, the participants of our study largely accepted the science of climate change and worried about the impacts on society, but they were less engaged with the issue and had no clear opinions about it. As pointed out by Dechezlepr\u0026ecirc;tre et al. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e], the perception of climate change impacts may not be directly relevant to the perception of climate mitigation policy. But still, these views of our participants about climate change provide an important context for interpreting their perceptions about net-zero scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, the participants' awareness of the Paris Agreement was relatively low\u0026mdash;most of them either did not know it or knew it only by name but didn\u0026rsquo;t know what it was about. On the other hand, most participants have heard the term \u0026lsquo;net zero\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;carbon neutral\u0026rsquo; and many were aware of the government\u0026rsquo;s net-zero target. However, no one could explain clearly the meaning of net zero. As such, our participants were not so much familiar with the challenge of net-zero energy transitions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePerceptions of the 2050 net-zero target: attainability and necessity\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen participants were first asked about their perceptions of the 2050 net-zero target, they showed \u003cem\u003econflictual\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;and somewhat \u003cem\u003econtradictory\u0026mdash;\u003c/em\u003ereactions to its attainability and necessity. Our analysis found three common framings of net zero that were broadly shared among participants across groups: (1) \u003cem\u003eunreal\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;net zero is an unrealistic target\u0026rsquo;); (2) \u003cem\u003edubious\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;net zero is an empty promise\u0026rsquo;); and (3) \u003cem\u003enecessary\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;net zero is a necessary benchmark\u0026rsquo;) (see Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e and Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;2). It must be noted that these framings are not mutually exclusive but can sometimes be identified in the utterances of the same individual participants.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerceptions of the 2050 net-zero target\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFraming\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuote\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eUnreal\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e(\u0026lsquo;Net zero is an unrealistic target\u0026rsquo;)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;This is a bit of a stretch. Time is too short. I feel like, \u0026lsquo;What's the point of setting a goal like this?\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group A, Participant 2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I've known the term global warming since I was a kid, and despite all the efforts, emissions are still going up. Now, you set a target, suddenly can things really change that dramatically, like a roller coaster?\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group C, Participant 5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It doesn\u0026rsquo;t quite hit home. No visible actions really come across in my head. It feels unfamiliar, like someone else\u0026rsquo;s problem. I just can't feel a personal connection to it.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group D, Participant 2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDubious\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e(\u0026lsquo;Net zero is an empty promise\u0026rsquo;)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;This sort of making it zero is the same as the type of thing politicians say when they put up a manifesto, promising \u0026lsquo;we will do this,\u0026rsquo; but when it's all over they haven't done anything. It just seems like they're setting these goals to claim it as their own achievement.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group A, Participant 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Since it's about achieving net zero, I wondered if there was some kind of trick involved. We have a lot of emissions here, but we can cancel it out by doing something else. Perhaps there's a strategy like that. So, then they can say they've met their obligations.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group D, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;If we don't say that, we get stoned these days. Apart from whether we actually mean it or not, we have to put a target out there; otherwise, we will be asked \u0026lsquo;Aren\u0026rsquo;t you going to do it?\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group E, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eNecessary\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e(\u0026lsquo;Net zero is a necessary benchmark\u0026rsquo;)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It's better to have it than not to have it ... If each household could see their CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003elevels at home every day, perhaps people would be more motivated to make their efforts.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group C, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;We need a target; otherwise, it might seem like anything goes. Set a target, do what we are told, and see how it goes. We don't have to abandon it.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group E, Participant 2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;As I work in sales, we often end up not reaching our target if the number appears to be achievable. But, if the target is set at a level where it may or may not be achievable, we can commit ourselves to trying hard to make it. So, it's essential to set some form of numerical target and work towards it.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group E, Participant 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirst, most participants, if not all, unambiguously thought of achieving the net-zero target by mid-century as a lost cause. Given the fact that global CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions have been steadily increasing over a long period, it was largely considered impossible or implausible to turn things around so quickly and reduce emissions to zero in a matter of decades. The feeling of unreality also came from the difficulty of grasping the notion of net zero itself. Many participants couldn\u0026rsquo;t figure out what it means to achieve net-zero emissions in the first place. They felt the target was out of touch with the reality of their everyday lives. The net-zero target was thus perceived as unrealistic both in terms of feasibility and familiarity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, while governments showed their political ambition by setting the net-zero target, many participants held sceptical views on the government\u0026rsquo;s seriousness of achieving it. They regarded setting such an ambitious goal as rhetorical gesture rather than substantial action\u0026mdash;a typical behaviour of making an empty promise or keeping up a pretence of acting in politics as usual. One participant also cast a dubious eye on the notion of net zero itself by raising a question about the way in which the target is achieved through residual emissions being offset by carbon removal methods (see Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e). A sense of dubiousness about net zero was prevalent among participants, which led them to believe that the target would unlikely be met by mid-century.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThird, despite all of this scepticism, many participants still supported aiming to achieve the net-zero target\u0026mdash;irrespective of whether it is feasible or not\u0026mdash;to keep ambition alive. Although a few participants took a dismissive attitude toward the urgency of climate change (see Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;2), many others generally understood that net zero or some form of quantitative indicator is needed for measuring and increasing global efforts in reducing CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions. They worried that mitigation policy might go astray without such a specific, ambitious target. In other words, it was the \u003cem\u003econcreteness\u003c/em\u003e (and ambition) of net zero that provided people with a reason to believe the necessity of having it as a policy target.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAs described above, three framings (\u003cem\u003eunreal\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003edubious\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003enecessary\u003c/em\u003e) of the 2050 net-zero target showed conflicted views of participants about its attainability and necessity. While the target was considered an unrealistic goal or just empty posturing by governments, it was nevertheless regarded as a necessary benchmark for catalysing low-carbon energy transition. On the surface, these different perceptions seemed contradictory. However, the implausibility of achieving the net-zero target did not necessarily lead people to disprove the importance of having such an ambitious target. Instead, these apparently contradictory framings of net zero were compatible with each other in their mind.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePerceptions of three net-zero scenarios: feasibility and desirability\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen three different scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) of net-zero energy transitions were introduced to focus groups, there were some clear tendencies of opinions among participants that emerged from their discussions about the feasibility and desirability of these scenarios. Below, we show the results of our framing analysis on how people perceived the pros and cons of each scenario and on what grounds they made their judgement on its feasibility and desirability. For the summary of each scenario\u0026rsquo;s perceptions and exemplary quotes from focus group discussions, see Tables\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e and Supplementary Tables\u0026nbsp;3\u0026ndash;5.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePerceptions of CDR scenario—feasible but undesirable\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn terms of feasibility, many participants perceived CDR scenario as the most \u003cem\u003efeasible\u003c/em\u003e option among the three and this perception was rooted in the relatively low economic cost of the scenario. People argued that whether they like it or not, a cost issue inevitably comes to the forefront in judgement over feasibility. In other words, low economic cost was understood as a sort of political lever to decrease the risk of opposition against\u0026mdash;and hence increase the likelihood of\u0026mdash;net-zero energy transition. When it comes to the question of desirability, however, many participants widely regarded CDR scenario as an \u003cem\u003eundesirable\u003c/em\u003e option. This negative perception of CDR scenario stemmed mostly from their scepticism toward geological CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e storage. People showed strong suspicions about the safety and efficacy of geological storage, for example, by analogy with nuclear waste disposal (see Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;3). On top of their concerns over CCS safety, the very idea of storing CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e underground was put down as a false solution to decarbonization. It was deemed deceptive to achieve net zero by recourse to large-scale CCS deployment because this appeared to duck the responsibility of reducing emissions in the first place\u0026mdash;one participant described it as \u0026ldquo;brushing a problem under the carpet\u0026rdquo; (see Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e). Instead, they preferred to find more \u0026lsquo;useful\u0026rsquo; ways to reuse CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e captured from the air, not storing it underground. As such, whilst being perceived as most realistic from the cost perspective, CDR scenario was considered an unfavourable approach to energy decarbonization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerceptions of CDR scenario\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFraming\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuote\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCDR scenario is most feasible because\u0026hellip;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLow economic cost\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It\u0026rsquo;s because of the cheapest cost ... If you listen to people's opinions, they'd probably think from a cost perspective.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group B, Participant 5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Given the cost and other factors, [CDR scenario] looks like the most feasible option to achieve quickly \u0026hellip; There's a sense of urgency now, with people saying we need to make it by 2050. When I think about if we can make it by then, the fastest way seems like storing as much [CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003e] as we can.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group C, Participant 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It would be the quickest way since it's the least expensive way to reduce emissions ... Keeping costs low is the best. In the end, if it gets expensive, taxes will go up, so I think [CDR scenario] is most suitable.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group D, Participant 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCDR scenario is undesirable because\u0026hellip;\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConcern over CCS safety\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I'm not sure if CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003estorage will work well. I guess the technology has not been fully developed yet, so it's uncertain whether it can be done. Even if it can be stored, what will happen then? \u0026hellip; It would be problematic if CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003eis dumped into the ocean.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group B, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I wonder if underground CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003estorage might have more negative impacts. I think it's the most feasible option, but probably not a good solution.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group D, Participant 5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCCS is a false solution\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It's really just about storing, just making invisible from sight. If it gets completely full, will you just dig new underground sites? If you keep digging underground, you dig too deep and now you have to ask yourself, \u0026lsquo;Is the ground safe?\u0026rsquo; There will be such concerns coming up, so [CDR scenario] does not look very good.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group C, Participant 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;What do you do after storing CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003e? ... It's just like brushing a problem under the carpet. If you can convert CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003einto something else and make use of it, that would be good, but if you're just storing it, you're just avoiding the problem.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group F, Participant 2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePerceptions of LED scenario\u0026mdash;feasible, infeasible and undesirable\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe perceived feasibility of LED scenario was contested among participants. Whereas many (but not as many as in the case of CDR scenario) participants viewed LED scenario as the most \u003cem\u003efeasible\u003c/em\u003e option, some others considered it an \u003cem\u003einfeasible\u003c/em\u003e approach to decarbonization. This division in their perceptions between feasible and infeasible came from the different aspects of LED scenario to which people paid attention in making their judgement. The perception of LED scenario as the most feasible option was largely based upon their understanding that the world is already moving in a direction toward electrification of transport or buildings sectors and that this shift to electrification is irreversible. The familiarity with electric vehicles also contributed to having a more convinced sense of plausibility about this scenario. On the other hand, some participants insisted on the difficulty of changing a modern, convenient lifestyle to reduce energy demand. They claimed that such an attempt would arguably cause social friction and political backlash from those who want to keep the status quo. There were a few participants who thought of changing their lifestyles as possible, at least on the individual level (see Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;4). But, for many others, it was inconceivable that society as a whole would forcibly change everyone's behaviour. This sense of implausibility led people to believe that LED scenario is also \u003cem\u003eundesirable\u003c/em\u003e because of too much restriction imposed on individual life. There was particularly a strong psychological resistance against the idea of less flying. The assumption behind this resistance was that any effort to reduce energy demand would inevitably result in lowered standards of living\u0026mdash;something like \u0026ldquo;returning to an agrarian society\u0026rdquo; in one participant\u0026rsquo;s words (see Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;4). In short, the social change demanded in LED scenario was deemed not only unrealistic but also unacceptable to many participants.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerceptions of LED scenario\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFraming\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuote\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLED scenario is most feasible because\u0026hellip;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eElectrification is already underway\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;[LED scenario] is most straightforward no matter where, either in Japan or abroad. Electrification is now strongly promoted in Europe ... In particular, the US and Europe are moving towards electric vehicles (EVs). For getting with the current trends, stepping into electricity is a good choice.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group B, Participant 2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I think [LED scenario] is the most likely option ... since we already have things like electric vehicles and induction cooktops \u0026hellip; The economic costs are also moderate, so this feels like the most realistic option.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group C, Participant 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLED scenario is infeasible because\u0026hellip;\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eChanging lifestyle is hard\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;This is about people's feelings, and you can't control people's feelings ... This is not realistic. Even if we were suddenly told not to fly, it wouldn't work without airplanes in such a globalized world. So, [LED scenario] is least feasible.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group E, Participant 5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;Changing lifestyle is most challenging ... Once you've experienced a convenient life, you can\u0026rsquo;t really give it up just for reducing CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e. \u003cem\u003eI find it difficult for myself.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group F, Participant 4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLED scenario is undesirable because\u0026hellip;\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eToo much restriction on individual life\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I dislike [LED scenario] ... We'd have to change our current behaviours, and that's a downside. It would mean we can\u0026rsquo;t travel abroad any longer.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group B, Participant 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;We have to balance practical benefits and people's feelings; otherwise, there will be a backlash. Things like restricting everything isn\u0026rsquo;t a good idea.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group E, Participant 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It's too extreme. It seems like nothing is acceptable that will harm the environment. It\u0026rsquo;s not so kind to people ... If someone comes and tells us that, I would feel like, 'Oh, no, you don\u0026rsquo;t say that.'\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group F, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePerceptions of CCU scenario—infeasible but desirable\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn contrast to CDR scenario, most participants (except a few) unambiguously considered CCU scenario an \u003cem\u003einfeasible\u003c/em\u003e approach to energy decarbonization. The reasons for this perceived infeasibility of CCU scenario are twofold: high economic cost and the risk of unproven technology. First, as with CDR scenario, a cost issue served as a basis for participants\u0026rsquo; judgement about the feasibility of CCU scenario; this time, however, concern over the high economic cost of synfuel production led them to conclude that this would most likely end up as a pious wish. Second, some participants were openly sceptical about whether mass production of synfuels could really bear fruit as expected. In their eyes, pushing through decarbonization based on the innovation of novel, unproven technology looked like a risky gamble with a high chance of failure. Despite such pervasive scepticism about feasibility, a large majority of participants still considered CCU scenario the most \u003cem\u003edesirable\u003c/em\u003e option. There was a strong, blind optimism among (especially, male) participants for new technological innovation in solving difficult social challenges\u0026mdash;for example, by referring to the past history of social progress made by technological breakthroughs (see Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;5). Furthermore, in comparison to CDR and LED scenarios, CCU scenario was seen as the least intrusive or disruptive approach with no involvement of geological CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e storage and radical lifestyle change. Put differently, CCU scenario was deemed preferable because new technologies such as synfuels allow people not to confront the potential downsides of the other two scenarios\u0026mdash;it was seen as a kind of \u0026lsquo;refuge\u0026rsquo; to escape from choosing a difficult trade-off between CDR and LED scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePerceptions of CCU scenario\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFraming\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eQuote\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCCU scenario is infeasible because\u0026hellip;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHigh economic cost\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;No chance, it's too expensive \u0026hellip; Whether it's hydrogen, ammonia, or even microalgae, technology innovation will cost about 30 to 40 times more than today. To bring this down to the cost of oil is practically impossible for now \u0026hellip; The cost is just way too high.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group F, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUnproven technology\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;It\u0026rsquo;s based on wishful thinking that there will be technology breakthrough by 2050 and synthetic fuel will be available. I can\u0026rsquo;t imagine betting my future on that kind of hope.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group A, Participant 6)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;If you try out on a large scale and fail, it would be a waste of time ... We\u0026rsquo;d better invest in things that are already proven and then scale them up, not gambling on something that might or might not work. It\u0026rsquo;s more realistic to start small with something doable and gradually expand.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group C, Participant 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eCCU scenario is most desirable because\u0026hellip;\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eOptimism for tech-innovation\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;If this synthetic fuel gets developed and put into practical use \u0026hellip; we would still be able to fly on planes as usual without restrictions, so it's an amazing dream story.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group A, Participant 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I want to go with [CCU scenario]. I think innovation is the key to addressing everything we would have to confront ... It might be overwhelmingly expensive, but I believe it would be most effective.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group B, Participant 1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLeast intrusive\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003esolution\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;If we didn\u0026rsquo;t have to think about money, this would be most desirable \u0026hellip; We wouldn\u0026rsquo;t need to find places to store CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003eor make changes to the existing systems, so it would be beneficial for everyone.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group D, Participant 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;This is the least burdensome option \u0026hellip; It costs money, but if we create new fuels and use CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e, \u003cem\u003emore CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e \u003cem\u003ewill be produced. It's going to be like a cycle. So, aside from the financial aspect, this option has the least burden.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group F, Participant 3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eDifferent choices between the most feasible and desirable scenario\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn our focus groups, we asked each participant to choose the most \u003cem\u003efeasible\u003c/em\u003e scenario first and then later the most \u003cem\u003edesirable\u003c/em\u003e scenario among the three (see Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e and Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;6). In terms of feasibility, although three net-zero scenarios were presented in parallel as equally plausible, people quickly came to a common understanding of CCU scenario as the least feasible option. The opinions over the most feasible option were split between CDR and LED scenarios, though people were more inclined to choose the former than the latter as most likely to succeed. With regard to desirability, however, quite a lot of people changed their minds and chose CCU scenario as the most desirable option.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eA large difference in perceptions of CCU scenario between \u003cem\u003eleast feasible\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003emost desirable\u003c/em\u003e can be explained by how an issue of economic cost was considered or not in judgement over feasibility and desirability. When asked about feasibility, people took the cost issue as a key consideration in determining their views on scenarios\u0026mdash;CDR scenario was regarded as most feasible primarily due to low economic cost, whereas CCU scenario was believed to be too expensive to be realised. However, when asked about desirability, people somewhat spontaneously took cost considerations out of the equation and chose CCU scenario as an attractive alternative to CDR and LED scenarios because it was deemed \u003cem\u003eleast intrusive\u003c/em\u003e into their everyday lives. Interestingly, some participants suggested combining CDR and CCU scenarios to reconcile a cost trade-off between them, as described below:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026ldquo;I hope [CCU scenario] can be done at a low cost. It probably won't be implemented because it's too expensive \u0026hellip; Ideally, we could go with [CDR scenario] for storage, and if possible, do a little bit of [CCU scenario] to use [CO\u003c/em\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e\u003cem\u003e] for synthetic fuel, at the same time. That seems like a perfect approach.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/em\u003e (Group A, Participant 2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis suggestion of compromise, however, is an implicit acknowledgement that there is no such thing as a perfect scenario, both feasible and desirable at the same time. In fact, only a quarter of all participants chose the same scenario as most feasible and desirable; the rest of them changed their choice from one to another (see Supplementary Table\u0026nbsp;7). This indicates a clear gap in people\u0026rsquo;s minds between feasibility (\u0026lsquo;what is possible\u0026rsquo;) and desirability (\u0026lsquo;what is good\u0026rsquo;).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"DISCUSSION","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn this study, we explored public perceptions about net-zero energy transitions\u0026mdash;more specifically, how ordinary people perceive (1) the attainability and necessity of the 2050 net-zero target and (2) the feasibility and desirability of three illustrative scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) toward net-zero energy systems. Overall, we found that people often have conflictual and ambivalent feelings about how to understand the social implications of net zero.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eNet zero is perceived as an unrealistic yet necessary benchmark\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWith regard to the challenge of achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century, we found that ordinary people largely consider it an \u003cem\u003eunrealistic but necessary\u003c/em\u003e goal. This means that, despite a deep sense of infeasibility over net zero, people recognise the significance of target-setting in policy guidance\u0026mdash;that is, show the level of policy ambition to meet, indicate the policy direction to be taken and provide the common benchmark to evaluate policy outcomes [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e]. In other words, a net-zero target is understood as a governing tool to keep mitigation policy on the right track toward decarbonization [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e]. The symbolic value of net zero as a policy target rests not on its perceived feasibility but on its \u003cem\u003eperformative function\u003c/em\u003e to keep ambition alive and hence catalyse social change [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e]. However, we also found that people have a pervasive sense of distance to a global net-zero goal, feeling it detached from the reality of their everyday lives. This feeling of unreality suggests that a net-zero target is perceived as what Morseletto et al. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e] called a \u0026lsquo;disembedded object\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;while broadly accepted as a common goal, a target has no shared vision or agenda to translate into effective policy programmes. At the end of the day, net zero is just a number; it does not tell people how to achieve energy decarbonization and what it would mean to their lives and livelihoods. In this sense, scenarios can be a useful communication tool to help people grasp the policy implications of net-zero energy transitions by describing possible societal pictures of future energy systems [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eEconomic cost is seen as crucial for feasibility but not considered for desirability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eOn perceptions of three net-zero scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU), our analysis found that people have conflicting views and struggle to form a clear opinion about which pathway should be taken, swinging widely between feasibility (\u0026lsquo;what is possible\u0026rsquo;) and desirability (\u0026lsquo;what is good\u0026rsquo;). Each scenario was rarely seen as both feasible and desirable at the same time. For example, CDR and LED scenarios were generally considered feasible, but their judgement of desirability was rather negative. It was particularly striking how the perception of CCU scenario changed entirely from least feasible to most desirable. This inconsistency in scenario perceptions implies that people have different conceptions of feasibility and desirability, but it also means that their perceptions of net-zero scenarios get swayed by the viewpoint from which questions are being asked.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNotably, one key element leading to people\u0026rsquo;s different perceptions between feasibility and desirability was the consideration of \u003cem\u003eeconomic cost\u003c/em\u003e. A cost issue was (unsurprisingly) a dominant concern of people in judgement over feasibility, but it was left out of consideration for judgement over desirability. Whether or not to consider the cost perspective led to starkly contrasting views over CCU scenario between least feasible and most desirable. The point is that people see economic cost as a \u0026lsquo;proxy for realism\u0026rsquo; that basically determines \u0026lsquo;what is possible under real-world conditions\u0026rsquo;, while on the other hand, in the context of desirability, people \u003cem\u003eautomatically\u003c/em\u003e assume that their preference need not be constrained by cost concerns. In other words, economic cost is recognised as a key barrier to implementing mitigation options [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e] or a crucial factor to determine what is \u0026ldquo;do-able under realistic assumptions\u0026rdquo; [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e]. However, cost does not tell much about people\u0026rsquo;s normative evaluation on \u0026lsquo;what is good or bad for society and themselves\u0026rsquo;. In judging desirability, people are more concerned about other factors such as safety, effectiveness and impacts on their lifestyles and personal comfort.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere is now significant interest in assessing the feasibility of low-carbon scenarios from different dimensions and angles [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e]. Jewell and Cherp [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e] argue that systematic analysis of historical precedents (\u0026lsquo;what has happened in the past\u0026rsquo;) can serve as a useful \u0026ldquo;benchmark for scenario realism\u0026rdquo; and provide more realistic insights into future possibilities (\u0026lsquo;what could realistically happen in the future\u0026rsquo;). But our study suggests that more careful attention should also be paid to the desirability of scenarios [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e]. Exploring public perceptions of desirability can shed light on what kind of policy people support and from what normative standpoint. For example, Dechezlepr\u0026ecirc;tre et al. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e] found that people\u0026rsquo;s beliefs about effectiveness, fairness and self-interest shape their support for climate policy. In feasibility assessment, public acceptance is often referred to as key to the social and political feasibility of scenarios [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e]. If so, it is crucial to understand what people consider \u003cem\u003egood\u003c/em\u003e (desirable) and \u003cem\u003ebad\u003c/em\u003e (undesirable) because it is politically infeasible to implement an unpopular policy deemed socially undesirable by the public.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePerceptions of individual mitigation options\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eOur study focused on examining public perceptions about the overall narrative of net-zero scenarios that combine different mitigation options into a coherent policy strategy. But, what could our findings tell more specifically about public perceptions of individual mitigation options? Since our study is based on the qualitative public deliberation method (i.e., deliberative focus groups) with a small number of participants, we must be cautious in drawing general conclusions from our findings. Nevertheless, we could raise at least three points on ways in which people understand different mitigation options.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePersistent scepticism toward geological CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e storage\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn our study, CCS was in general perceived negatively as a false solution to decarbonization or a deceptive means to circumvent making genuine efforts to reduce emissions. This indicates the gap between scientific and social views on the role of CCS. Although scientists emphasize that permanent storage of CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e in durable geological formations is essential for achieving net-zero [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e], ordinary people may not find any social merits in geological storage, only incurring additional costs and safety concerns. From the broader societal standpoint, it\u0026rsquo;s not immediately obvious what is the point of storing CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e deep underground; there is also a legitimate political concern that reliance on CCS and CDR options might delay or deter the transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e57\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e58\u003c/span\u003e]. Previous research on CCS perception has been done predominantly on identifying the factors that determine and increase social acceptance [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e59\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e60\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e61\u003c/span\u003e]. However, our results suggest that people might not even see CCS as an effective option for decarbonization policy, instead preferring an alternative CCU approach.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePolitical contentions over lifestyle changes to reduce energy demand\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn our study, many people showed deep reluctance to change\u0026mdash;or be directed to change\u0026mdash;their own behaviours and ways of life. The options of changing everyone\u0026rsquo;s consumption patterns (e.g., adopting behaviours to reduce flying) were regarded not only as an infeasible plan at a societal level but also as an unwanted intrusion into individual life. This negative perception was partly due to a common belief that reducing energy consumption would \u003cem\u003enecessarily\u003c/em\u003e lead to a decline in living standards. While people might support low-carbon lifestyles at least in principle, they are acutely aware of trade-offs with personal comfort and freedom [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e62\u003c/span\u003e]. There are now increasing efforts to integrate low-demand lifestyle options into the modelling framework [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e63\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e64\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e] and the literature shows the multiple benefits of demand-side strategies for decarbonization and well-being [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e66\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e67\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e68\u003c/span\u003e]. However, our results indicate the persistence of psychological and emotional resistance against policy interventions in individual lifestyles. There is no easy way to avoid political controversy around lifestyle change options in mitigation policy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eBlind optimism for new-tech innovation of carbon-neutral synfuels\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn our study, people were at first quite sceptical about the prospect of widespread use of synfuels across different sectors, primarily due to concern over high economic cost; nevertheless, many of them expressed high expectations for synfuels to become a new alternative to fossil fuels. For ordinary people, this option looks attractive because it promises to achieve decarbonization without major transformation of end-use sectors (e.g., transport and buildings) and hence without sacrifice of personal comfort and freedom. However, there are large uncertainties over the future availability and cost-effectiveness of synfuels at large scale [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e69\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e70\u003c/span\u003e]. Our results suggest that people are well aware of the risk that synfuels may fall short of expectations, and yet at the same time, they are still attracted by the luring promise that new-tech innovation can provide a solution to decarbonization without fundamental changes in the existing systems. This means that exaggerating the future prospect of synfuel production might carry a risk of delaying necessary changes otherwise possible and perpetuating the lock-in to fossil-fuel-dependent systems\u0026mdash;becoming an exemplary case of the \u0026lsquo;attraction of delay\u0026rsquo; that enables prevarication and justifies procrastination [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e71\u003c/span\u003e]. One way to avoid creating such inflated optimism for synfuels is to take a more cautious approach and focus on the limited use only where direct electrification is not possible.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"CONCLUSION","content":"\u003cp\u003eOur study showed that there are multiple views and perceptions on what net zero means in broader social contexts. Net zero is a powerful unifying target that defines and guides global actions toward decarbonization. However, people often feel conflicted about the target of achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century—being sceptical about its attainability while recognising its necessity for catalysing low-carbon transitions. People also do not perceive different net-zero pathways equally. Their perceptions of net-zero scenarios widely differ from feasibility (‘what is possible’) to desirability (‘what is good’). This means that what people consider feasible is not often the same as what they consider desirable. Dissecting tensions in people’s minds between feasibility and desirability can tell us more about what people care in the challenge of net-zero energy transitions. Furthermore, these conflicting views on net zero suggest that it is important for policymakers to keep a delicate balance between political realism and social ambition in navigating the pathways towards net zero. A sole focus on feasibility might risk losing this balance and falling into disappointment and resignation. A better understanding of what people think is desirable could perhaps help sustain public support for decarbonization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, we use scenarios to illustrate different mitigation strategies to achieve net-zero emissions. Our results show that scenarios serve as a powerful framing device to shape the way people understand different mitigation strategies. The political significance of IAM scenarios [72,73] suggests that more social scientific research is needed to critically examine the role of scenarios in wider social deliberations.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"METHODS","content":"\u003cp\u003eTo explore public perceptions about the 2050 net-zero target and the three net-zero scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU), we conducted focus groups with ordinary people from various socioeconomic backgrounds who have no specific expertise on the challenge of energy decarbonization.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFocus groups are a well-established qualitative social research method, often used in sociology and psychology, to explore people\u0026rsquo;s experiences, opinions and concerns on a specific topic through group interaction [74,75,76,77,78]. \u0026nbsp;Based on informal discussions among a small number of participants, focus groups are not suitable to gauge the \u0026lsquo;statistically representative\u0026rsquo; opinions of the general population. \u0026nbsp;The primary aim of focus groups is to gain more nuanced insights into people\u0026rsquo;s different\u0026mdash;and sometimes conflictual\u0026mdash;perspectives, which are difficult to measure in simple yes-no answers to predetermined questions in opinion surveys. \u0026nbsp;The method is particularly useful for examining how people negotiate the meanings of a topic through group interaction and generate their own opinions, questions, priorities and frames in their own terms. \u0026nbsp;It can also be used to examine people\u0026rsquo;s views on unfamiliar topics with which participants have no prior knowledge or experience.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn comparison to other research methods, surveys are often used to elicit generalizable public attitudes and opinions, but they tend to have the problem of producing \u0026lsquo;pseudo opinions\u0026rsquo; of respondents who know little or nothing about topics [79,80,81]. Focus groups, on the other hand, have a methodological limit on the generalizability of results due to a small sample size. Despite that, focus groups are useful to have more in-depth and contextual understandings about how and why people make sense of unfamiliar topics through their own experiences and perspectives.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMacnaghten [82,83] highlights the use of focus groups as an \u0026lsquo;anticipatory methodology\u0026rsquo; that aims at articulating a contextual understanding of how people develop views and attitudes under conditions of unfamiliarity. \u0026nbsp;This is directly applicable to our study. \u0026nbsp;Despite that global efforts on low-carbon energy transition are already underway, the future vision of net-zero energy systems is not yet settled. \u0026nbsp;The policy trajectory of net-zero energy transitions is still emergent, susceptible to public imagination of the kinds of worlds that people think are possible and plausible. \u0026nbsp;In this study, we used focus groups as an anticipatory public deliberation method to explore how people understand the pros and cons of different net-zero scenarios achieving energy decarbonization by mid-century, with a special focus on their perceptions of feasibility and desirability.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eParticipants and recruitment\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWe conducted six focus groups in Tokyo, Japan in November 2022, each lasting two hours with six participants living in the Greater Tokyo area. \u0026nbsp;The design feature of our focus groups (e.g. sampling, moderation) broadly followed the criteria of Macnaghten [82,83]. \u0026nbsp;Participants were recruited via purposeful sampling from survey panellists of a marketing research firm and were given a monetary incentive for their participation. \u0026nbsp; Since the target of our study was generic groups of ordinary people, the recruitment was topic-blind (i.e. participants were recruited to take part in a discussion on \u0026lsquo;global issues\u0026rsquo;) to avoid those with a particular stake or interest in environmental issues. \u0026nbsp;The sampling of participants was designed to cover a diverse range of social backgrounds (age, gender, occupation) but to compose homogeneous groups of people with some shared experience or demographic in order to foster a favourable setting for group discussions (see Table 6).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 6 Characteristics of focus group participants\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eGroup\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCharacteristics\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAge\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eGender\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eA\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eUniversity students living alone\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e20-29\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMixed\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eB\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eRetired seniors with grandchildren\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u0026gt;65\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMixed\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eC\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eYoung mothers with children of age under 15\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e25-40\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFemale\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eD\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eYoung \u0026amp; middle-aged women in service industries\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e30-50\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFemale\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eE\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eYoung \u0026amp; middle-aged men in manufacturing industries\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e35-55\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMale\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 11.2245%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eF\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 62.2449%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMiddle-aged men in construction or transport industries\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e40-60\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 13.2653%;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMale\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMaterials and procedures\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEach group discussion was moderated not by the researchers themselves but by an experienced professional facilitator with no expert knowledge of the topic. \u0026nbsp;A research team hid in a separate monitoring room and observed discussions from there. \u0026nbsp;This was because the mere presence of researchers might influence the framing of discussions among lay participants by inducing \u0026lsquo;deference to experts\u0026rsquo; (cf. [82,83]). \u0026nbsp; However, as people are not generally familiar with net-zero energy transitions, the information materials (vignettes with text and pictures) explaining the concept of net zero and the narratives of three net-zero scenarios were provided to help participants understand the topic and stimulate conversation. \u0026nbsp;To ensure that participants can freely express their opinions, it was also emphasized that there are no right or wrong answers and that all opinions matter and should be respected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFollowing brief introductions, the overall flow of focus group discussions consists of three main steps: (1) discussion about general perceptions of climate change issues; (2) discussion about the attainability and necessity of the 2050 net-zero target; and (3) discussion about the feasibility and desirability of three net-zero scenarios. \u0026nbsp;The details of the focus group interview guide are available in Supplementary Table 1.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor the first step, participants were asked about their perceptions of climate change in general and more specifically about their knowledge of the Paris Agreement and the net-zero concept under conditions of providing no additional information. \u0026nbsp;The aim of this step was to grasp the general views and attitudes of participants about climate change issues, which provided a contextual understanding for the following discussions about the 2050 net-zero target and the three net-zero scenarios.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor the second step, participants were introduced via a vignette (see Supplementary Figure 1) to global emissions projections for 2100, which showed that global CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions must be reduced to net zero by mid-century to meet the 1.5\u0026deg;C target of the Paris Agreement. \u0026nbsp;Here, some probing questions were asked to examine how participants perceive the \u003cem\u003eattainability\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;Is it achievable?\u0026rsquo;) and the \u003cem\u003enecessity\u003c/em\u003e (\u0026lsquo;Should we aim to achieve it?\u0026rsquo;) of the 2050 net-zero target.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor the third step, participants were introduced via a vignette (see Supplementary Figure 2) to the concept of net zero (or carbon neutrality). \u0026nbsp;The vignette included four basic approaches to achieving energy decarbonization: (1) energy saving; (2) clean electricity; (3) carbon-neutral fuels; and (4) CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e removal. \u0026nbsp;CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e removal was presented as a necessary means to balance out residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors (e.g. steel, cement, shipping, aviation). \u0026nbsp;However, the technical detail of CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e removal methods was not included since this was not the main focus of our study. \u0026nbsp;Participants were then introduced via vignettes (see Supplementary Figures 3-5) to three different approaches to energy decarbonization. \u0026nbsp;Three net-zero scenarios (CDR, LED and CCU) were presented as equally plausible, each having both pros and cons as summarized in Table 1. \u0026nbsp; To explore how participants navigate trade-offs between the three scenarios in their judgement of feasibility and desirability, we first probed their choice of the most \u003cem\u003efeasible\u003c/em\u003e scenario and then later probed their choice of the most \u003cem\u003edesirable\u003c/em\u003e scenario. \u0026nbsp; Participants were also asked to explain why their scenario choice changed from feasibility to desirability, if this was the case. \u0026nbsp;Following open discussions, the focus groups ended with a short question-and-answer session with a research team to respond to questions from participants about our research project.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCoding and analysis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFocus groups were audio-recorded, the recordings were transcribed, and the transcripts were fully anonymized, all done by a marketing research firm. \u0026nbsp;Focus groups were conducted in Japanese, but all the quotations in the article were translated into English and some have been edited for brevity and clarity. \u0026nbsp;We thematically analysed the transcripts, using an inductive approach to identify key themes and frames related to participant perceptions of the 2050 net-zero target and the three net-zero scenarios. \u0026nbsp;The analysis was done, through an iterative process of close reading and thematic coding, to identify broad, convergent issues and viewpoints among participants and across groups. \u0026nbsp;Because of that, whilst we grouped participants by similar socioeconomic backgrounds, we didn\u0026rsquo;t look into and compare differences in framings between groups. \u0026nbsp; (Homogeneous grouping was mainly for creating a favourable condition in which each participant can express their opinions freely without any discomfort or hesitation.) \u0026nbsp;The analysis was rather aimed to find framings that were commonly shared more or less by participants from all the groups.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthical approval for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee for Non-Biomedical Research at National Institute for Environmental Studies (number 2022-002). \u0026nbsp; Informed consent was obtained from all research participants before their participation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eCOMPETING INTERESTS\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eAUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eS.A. conceived and designed the study with inputs from S.F., K.O., H.S. and M.S. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by S.A. The first draft of the manuscript was written by S.A. and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eACKNOWLEDGMENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study was supported by the Environmental Research and Technology Development Fund of the Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency of Japan [grant number JPMEERF20211001; JPMEERF20241001] and JSPS KAKENHI [grant number JP24K15419].\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eDATA AVAILABILITY\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIndividual participant data or complete transcripts of the focus groups are confidential following the approval of the Research Ethics Committee. Other anonymised data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eGeden, O. (2016). An actionable climate target. Nature Geoscience \u003cem\u003e9\u003c/em\u003e, 340\u0026ndash;342. https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2699.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRogelj, J., Geden, O., Cowie, A., and Reisinger, A. (2021). Three ways to improve net-zero emissions targets. Nature \u003cem\u003e591\u003c/em\u003e, 365\u0026ndash;368. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-021-00662-3.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFankhauser, S., Smith, S.M., Allen, M., Axelsson, K., Hale, T., Hepburn, C., Kendall, J.M., Khosla, R., Lezaun, J., Mitchell-Larson, E., et al. (2022). The meaning of net zero and how to get it right. Nature Climate Change \u003cem\u003e12\u003c/em\u003e, 15\u0026ndash;21. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-021-01245-w.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eIPCC, (2018). 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Qualitative Research \u003cem\u003e21\u003c/em\u003e, 3\u0026ndash;19. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794120919096.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"commssustain","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":false,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"commssustain","sideBox":"Learn more about [Communications Sustainability](https://www.nature.com/commssustain/)","snPcode":"44458","submissionUrl":"https://mts-commssustain.nature.com","title":"Communications Sustainability","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"ejp","reportingPortfolio":"Nature","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"net zero, scenarios, decarbonization, energy transition, public perception, carbon dioxide removal, low energy demand, carbon capture utilization, feasibility, desirability","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7379576/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7379576/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eAchieving net-zero CO\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e emissions by mid-century is a cornerstone of global climate policy, yet public perceptions of net zero remain underexplored. \u0026nbsp;This study investigates how people perceive (1) the attainability and necessity of the 2050 net-zero target and (2) the feasibility and desirability of three illustrative net-zero pathways: carbon dioxide removal (CDR), low energy demand (LED), and carbon capture utilization (CCU). \u0026nbsp;Through deliberative focus groups with ordinary people in Japan, we found that people view net zero as an unrealistic yet necessary benchmark, reflecting ambivalence toward its symbolic value as a policy target. \u0026nbsp;We also found conflicting views on three net-zero scenarios, swinging widely between feasibility (‘what is possible’) and desirability (‘what is good’).\u0026nbsp; Cost consideration was an underlying cause of different scenario perceptions—economic cost was seen as a ‘proxy for realism’ determining ‘what is possible under real-world conditions’ but it was left out of consideration for normative evaluation on ‘what is good or bad for society and themselves’.\u0026nbsp; In judgement over desirability, people are more concerned about environmental safety, policy effectiveness and impacts on their own ways of life. \u0026nbsp;The study highlights tensions between feasibility and desirability in people’s minds, underscoring conflicted preferences for policy choices.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Public understanding of net zero: Conflicted perceptions of different mitigation pathways between feasibility and desirability","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-08-22 17:56:35","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7379576/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"revise","date":"2025-09-26T19:45:22+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"This content is not available.","date":"2025-09-23T23:50:07+00:00","index":3,"fulltext":"This content is not available."},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"This content is not available.","date":"2025-09-10T07:19:38+00:00","index":2,"fulltext":"This content is not available."},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"This content is not available.","date":"2025-08-27T02:31:01+00:00","index":1,"fulltext":"This content is not available."},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"This content is not available.","date":"2025-08-15T19:11:05+00:00","index":3,"fulltext":"This content is not available."},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"This content is not available.","date":"2025-08-15T19:10:54+00:00","index":2,"fulltext":"This content is not available."},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-08-15T19:10:40+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"This content is not available.","date":"2025-08-15T19:10:40+00:00","index":1,"fulltext":"This content is not available."},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-08-15T18:59:40+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-08-15T08:08:15+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Communications Sustainability","date":"2025-08-15T08:08:14+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"commssustain","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":false,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"commssustain","sideBox":"Learn more about [Communications Sustainability](https://www.nature.com/commssustain/)","snPcode":"44458","submissionUrl":"https://mts-commssustain.nature.com","title":"Communications Sustainability","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"ejp","reportingPortfolio":"Nature","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"1f3f9ee2-f814-464e-a95a-0e584e588e5a","owner":[],"postedDate":"August 22nd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"published-in-journal","subjectAreas":[{"id":53233745,"name":"Social science/Science, technology and society"},{"id":53233746,"name":"Scientific community and society/Social sciences/Climate change/Climate-change mitigation"},{"id":53233747,"name":"Scientific community and society/Social sciences/Carbon and energy"},{"id":53233748,"name":"Scientific community and society/Social sciences/Communication"},{"id":53233749,"name":"Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Energy and society/Energy and behaviour"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-01-27T08:11:21+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-7379576","link":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s44458-025-00021-7","journal":{"identity":"commssustain","isVorOnly":false,"title":"Communications Sustainability"},"publishedOn":"2026-01-26 05:00:00","publishedOnDateReadable":"January 26th, 2026"},"versionCreatedAt":"2025-08-22 17:56:35","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1038/s44458-025-00021-7","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s44458-025-00021-7","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7379576","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7379576","identity":"rs-7379576","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}