Metacognitive and cultural cognition accounts jointly explain believing, and spreading of contested information

Although science-related misconceptions such as climate denial are often held with high confidence, research explaining the origin of erroneous beliefs has historically remained largely detached from research into metacognition—the insight and confidence we have in these beliefs. Instead, traditional explanations were based on political and econom5ic worldviews. Here, we provide a joint investigation into the explanatory value of ideology-driven cultural cognition, and more reflective, metacognitive accounts for belief-updating and information sharing about contested science. We presented a national sample of citizens in Germany with noisy information about climate change, most of it aligned with scientific consensus, but some contradicting consensus. Frequentist and Bayesian results demonstrate that, skeptical belief-updating was more pronounced among citizens with lower metacognitive insight; and sharing claims about the uncertainty of climate science was increased among citizens with lower metacognitive confidence in climate change knowledge--even when controlling for their worldviews. Furthermore, the predictivity of metacognitive variables was systematically reduced among climate skeptic citizens, revealing a striking interaction between worldviews and the reliance on more reflective, metacognitive cues for belief-updating. Together these findings suggest that both worldview-related, and more reflective, metacognitive accounts—and their interactions—explain beliefs about contested issues; advancing more realistic theories of the “ideology” vs. “rationality” of science beliefs.