Perceptions of injustices in the struggle for scarce critical lands: farmer-herder conflict and violence escalation in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland

Perceptions of injustices in the struggle for scarce critical lands: farmer-herder conflict and violence escalation in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Perceptions of injustices in the struggle for scarce critical lands: farmer-herder conflict and violence escalation in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland Cletus Famous Nwankwo This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6967912/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract For decades, there have been debates on whether scarcity of natural resources causes the conflict between pastoralists and crop farmers in Africa. This study examines the farmer-herder conflict in Benue-Nasarawa borderland in Nigeria from the perspective of the scarcity thesis. It shows how wetland scarcity and perceived injustices contribute to and escalate the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland. It integrates social injustice, eco-violence, and political ecology perspectives, highlighting the pivotal role of perceptions of injustice in shaping the conflict's root and intensification and violent actions. The conflict's roots lie in perceived distributive and procedural injustices related to compensation for crop damage and cattle killings in farmer-herder relations amid competition for access to wetlands. Nonetheless, state intervention and the anti-open grazing law's enactment foster procedural and restorative injustice perceptions, triggering violent responses and counter-attacks. Unlike prior studies that attribute conflicts to state policies marginalising pastoralists, this study finds that the anti-open grazing law, while marginalising the pastoralists, did not instigate the conflict. Instead, the law intensifies violence due to the perception of it as procedural and restorative injustices. The paper suggests that integrating the social justice into eco-violence perspective and emphasising social justice more in the political ecology perspective can reduce the theoretical disagreement between eco-violence and political ecology perspective on the conflict. It can provide a platform for a framework the blends the two traditions enhancing the analysis of farmer-herder conflicts. Development Economics Behavioral Geography Other Political Science farmer-herder conflict injustice political ecology eco-violence scarcity Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 1. Introduction This article is about the farmer-herder conflict in the borderland between Benue and Nasarawa States in Nigeria. The paper focuses on this conflict because it has remained topical in the last decade and continues to be considered a threat to national security, food security and poses danger to socio-economic development of the communities affected. The paper focuses on how perceptions of injustices escalate the conflict and violence within the context of how scarcity of natural resources. For decades, there have been debates on whether scarcity of natural resources causes the conflict between pastoralists and crop farmers in Africa. The eco-violence perspective highlights competition over scarce resources and environmental changes but acknowledge the significance of population growth, cultural differences, and political dysfunctionality, among others, in comprehending these conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kelley et al., 2015; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998; Adibe, 2020; Out & Impraim, 2021; Cabot, 2017; Cite and Cite, 2021; Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). On the other hand, political ecology perspective critiques the scarcity narrative, emphasising how power relations underlie access to and exclusion from resources which often results in marginalisation of pastoralists (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009, 2019, 2021; Bergius et al., 2020; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Lind, 2003; Verhoeven, 2011; Walwa, 2020). However, there is a little attention to perception of injustice in the literature. Some studies have mentioned it (e.g., Brottem, 2016; Hansen, 2023; Krätli & Toulmin, 2020; Nwozor et al., 2021; Olumba et al., 2022) but they lack explicit discussion on how perception of injustice shape the conflict in the context of natural resource scarcity. Therefore, there is a need for an explicit focus on how perception of injustice shapes the conflict in the context of struggles for scarce resources. This paper explores the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa border of Nigeria, focusing on how scarcity of natural resources drives the conflict. Within this context, it considers how perceptions of injustices fuels the conflict to become a violent armed struggle. Conflict actions could manifest itself as involving individuals or all communities and involve a combination of social tension/avoidance, political action, and violent action (Turner, 2004). Social tension/avoidance describes a situation in which conflict of interest is acknowledged, but no public action is taken (Turner, 2004). On the other hand, political action is a form of organised action within already-existing legal, administrative, or customary institutions to resolve the conflict (Turner, 2004). Various methods of political action can take place, such as verbal discussion/bargaining and mediation by a team of elders. On the other hand, violence can result in harm or death and continually diminish the bond between different groups. Violence is usually the last resort and occurs when rights or established relations systems have been grossly breached (Cite, 2023). Analyses of African pastoral conflicts often focus on “conflict,” a phenomenon slightly different from “violence” even though they are closely related. Here, I take violent FHCs to mean conflicts that are not reduced or settled through verbal discussion/bargaining, mediation, or other established means. Instead, it is the use of physical harm that causes death, injuries or displacement to seek redress for a disagreement. More recently, there is interest in understanding why FHCs escalate into violence (e.g., Detges, 2014; Cite & Cite 2, 2021; Bukari, 2023; Cite, 2023). Detges (2014: 58), for example, distinguished pastoral violence from conflict by focusing “on armed clashes between pastoralist groups in northern Kenya”, which they refer to as “pastoralist violence”. Conflict in farmer-herder relations is not a strange occurrence, as conflict is part of everyday human interactions. Indeed, there have been conflicts between farmers and herders in northern Nigeria in places like the Mambila Plateau since the 1900s (Blench, 1984). However, recurrent violence is a new feature of the farmer-herder relations in the Benue Valley since approximately 2012. This paper considers how scarcity of natural resource is implicated in the conflict and how perceptions of injustices trigger the outbreak and recurrence of violence in the farmer-herder relations focusing on the Benue-Nasarawa borderland. The study uses an ethnographic approach involving interviews and field observations. It builds on both the scarcity theory from eco-violence and access to resource framework of political ecology, emphasising the role of wetland scarcity and perceptions of injustices. The study examines how wetland scarcity and perceptions of injustices contribute to the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland. Four critical perspectives and theories are essential to elucidate FHCs namely the property rights perspective, environmental security theory, political economy theory and political ecology theory (As Kenee, 2022; Cite & Cite, 2021). The interdependence of these theories underscores their combined relevance in explaining conflicts. However, this paper prioritises eco-violence and political ecology theories to elucidate the conflict roots. It incorporates a social justice perspective to explain the escalation of violence. Therefore, theoretically, the paper combines social justice theory with environmental security and political ecology theories. It underscores the pivotal role of perceived injustices in shaping and intensifying the conflict, with wetland scarcity fuelling resource competition between pastoralists and farmers. While scarcity is critical, conflict escalation predominantly revolves around distributive, procedural and restorative injustices. The conflict's core relates more to perceptions of injustice regarding compensation for crop damage and cattle killings in farmer-herder relations in a condition of material scarcity. State intervention, especially the enactment of the anti-open grazing law by Benue State (that political ecologists emphasises), amplifies restorative injustice perceptions, sparking violent responses and counter-attacks. Contrary to previous political ecology studies attributing conflicts to state policies marginalising pastoralists, this study finds that the anti-open grazing law, while marginalising herders, did not trigger the conflict. Instead, the conflict’s root lies in perceived distributive and procedural injustices amid competition for access to scarce wetlands. However, the law exacerbates violence due to procedural and restorative injustice perceptions in farmer-herder relations. The study argues that the findings suggest that the conflict's origins and escalation can be appreciated by integrating social justice into scarcity theories from eco-violence and political ecology. This perspective can bridge gaps between the divergent environmental security and political ecology perspectives on the FHCs. Thus, it can offer a unified framework for analysing farmer-herder conflicts, improving understanding despite theoretical differences. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the empirical and theoretical literature. After that is the methods and subsequent sections present the findings before the discussion and conclusions sections. 2. Literature and theoretical review 2.1 Eco-violence and political ecology perspectives on the farmer-herder conflicts in Africa The nexus between natural resources and violent conflict is often conceptualised through scarcity and abundance pathways, popularly known as the “resource curse” and “resource scarcity” hypotheses (Koubi et al., 2013). Wealth from renewable resources like arable land and water can similarly lead to conflicts when deteriorated or scarce and when abundant, triggering disputes over resource control and allocation (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Wittenberg & Adano, 2009). The “resource curse” argument links resource-rich states to economic instability and heightened conflict due to mismanagement of profitable resources (Humphreys, 2005). Non-renewable resources can foster corruption, incentivize looting, and fuel conflict for resource seizure and rent-seeking behaviour (Kalyvas, 2006; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The abundance of renewable resources may drive conflicts, motivating individuals to fight to secure livelihoods, assets, or land (Brown, 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2010). Perception of relative wealth and status quo also influences conflict propensity, with communities more willing to engage in violence to protect valuable assets (Bell & Keys, 2016). The “resource scarcity” argument indicates that scarcity of renewable resources in vulnerable regions with demographic pressures and economic instabilities can lead to political turmoil and internal conflicts (Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kelley et al., 2015). Depletion or increased demand for resources can intensify competition among impoverished communities, sparking intra-national conflicts and uprisings (Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998). Such scarcity widens societal disparities, exacerbates economic hardships, and amplifies grievances, particularly in agriculturally reliant or ethnically divided societies (Von Uexkull et al., 2016; Von Uexkull, 2014). Scarcity-induced factors like agricultural failures, elevated food prices, and deteriorating livelihoods contribute to relative deprivation, leading to societal tensions and potentially triggering migration from vulnerable areas (Adger et al., 2015). Like those in the Sahel, water scarcity and droughts have historically driven migration flows, destabilizing host communities or accentuating societal divides (Scheffran et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2010). The farmer-herder conflicts in Africa are often framed through scarcity theory or eco-violence emphasising the interplay of socio-ecological and demographic changes and unequal resource distribution stemming from identity differences, especially ethnic and religious differences (Adibe, 2020; Ani & Uwizeyimana, 2022; Hommer-Dixon, 1994, 1999). Studies (Homer-Dixon, 2010; Markakis, 1998; Mkutu, 2001; Meier et al., 2007) have suggested a link between resource scarcity and pastoral conflicts, where drought-induced famine in impoverished areas may trigger conflicts (Sachs & Warner, 2001). Nordas and Gleditsch highlight that resource scarcity can either prompt conflicts over limited resources or force migration, potentially leading to violence in areas where resources are constrained (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2010; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2015). Out and Impraim (2021) link farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana, respectively to social identities, demographic changes, and competition for scarce resources, presenting the conflicts as struggles for environmental resources with roots in ethnicity, religion, and environmental changes. The eco-violence perspective on farmer-herder conflicts suggests that these conflicts arise from competition over diminishing resources, worsened by climate change-induced scarcity (Cabot, 2017; Cite & Cite, 2021; Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). Climate change in West Africa is foreseen to intensify, causing land degradation, droughts, and reducing food production and water availability, heightening tensions between farmers and herders who rely on common pool Resources (Cabot, 2017). The relationship between environmental factors such as climate change and farmer-herder conflicts in Africa remains complex and lacks consensus among studies. While some studies suggest a link between environmental factors like precipitation and conflict, there is considerable variability in the nature and extent of this relationship, highlighting the complexity and multifaceted nature of farmer-herder conflicts in relation to environmental stressors (Ayana et al., 2016; Meier et al., 2007; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012; Cite & Cite, 2021; O'Loughlin et al., 2012; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012). Nonetheless, studies in Ghana and Nigeria tend to link climate change and resource scarcity to the farmer-herder conflicts. Studies in Ghana, like those by Out and Impraim (2021), Otu, Impraim and Twumhene (2020), and Issifu, Darko, and Paalo (2022), illustrate the complex dynamics between climate change, increasing human and herd populations, resource scarcity, and farmer-herder conflicts. Similarly, studies in Nigeria link the conflict to climate change and associated desertification that engenders pasture and water scarcities in northern Nigeria prompting the exodus of pastoralists to the south and together with rising population and cultural differences lead to the conflict (Adibe, 2020; Ani & Uwizeyimana, 2022; Lenshie et al., 2021; Cite & Cite, 2021; Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). Studies following the eco-violence thesis to analyse the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria have also incorporated other perspectives such as the “ungoverned space” thesis (Lenshie et al., 2021), “eco-survivalism” (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018), “political opportunity structure” that emphasizes the impact of political changes favouring Fulani herders (Olumba, 2022). The social justice perspective has less been emphasised and there is little explicit focus on social justice perspective especially how perceptions of injustices shape the conflict from the eco-violence tradition. This paper thus contributes to literature by focusing explicitly on how perceptions of injustices shape the farmer-herder conflicts in the faces of struggles for scarce natural resources. The political ecology perspective, evolving from a case-based approach, focuses on power relations, critiquing the scarcity and neo-Malthusian perspectives of eco-violence for lacking ecological and political detail (Robbins, 2004; Peluso & Watts, 2001; Verhoeven, 2011). Political ecology, acknowledging politics as the practices and processes of power relations, delves deeper into the role of political and economic factors in shaping human-environment relations (Bassett, 1988; Paulson et al., 2003). The political ecology approach highlights the interplay between local resource use patterns and larger political economies, emphasising vulnerability arising from resource dependence and its link to conflict rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance (Le Billon, 2001). Moreover, political ecology asserts that socio-political constructs influence resource allocation, exacerbating abundance or scarcity through power dynamics and property rights (Peluso & Watts, 2001). This approach critiques the scarcity theory for oversimplifying complex political contexts (Barnett, 2000), for overlooking socio-economic and political factors critical in understanding resource control (Lind, 2003). Empirical studies began to apply this theory to analyse farmer-herder conflicts in the late 1980s (e.g., Bassett, 1988; Turner, 1999). Thus, political ecologists argue that eco-violence neglects the impacts of political marginalisation and exclusion resulting from patronage politics or varying territorial capacities across states. Political ecology studies, on the other hand, emphasise how politics shapes resource distribution, causing political instability and unequal governance processes (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009, 2019, 2021; Bergius et al., 2020; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Lind, 2003; Verhoeven, 2011; Walwa, 2020). They argue that unequal access to resources can generate ecological conflicts, often framed as distributional disputes rooted in governance failures and power imbalances (Agarwal, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2002). Such conflicts might discriminate against marginalized groups like women, people of colour, or indigenous communities, perpetuating selective exclusion and unequal treatment (Agarwal, 2001; Bullard, 1993; Guha & Martinez-Alier, 1997; Vesco et al., 2020). Therefore, highlights the hierarchical relationships, power dynamics, local access issues, resource use, ethnic group membership and moral transgressions (Ahmed & Kuusaana, 2021; Cite & Cite s, 2021; Cite, 2023; Turner, 2004; Turner et al., 2011). These studies reveal that conflicts, like farmer-herder conflicts in Africa, are not merely about resources scarcity but reflect broader tensions among social groups. They address the state's role, resource access, and exclusion in conflicts. Studies examining African farmer-herder conflicts through a political ecology lens underscore the state's inconsistent role in assisting or constraining pastoral livelihoods. They demonstrate how state efforts to provide secure resources sometimes initiate social conflicts rather than ensure security (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009, 2021; Bergius et al., 2020; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Walwa, 2020). Some political ecology studies on the farmer-herder conflicts also look into what Moritz (2006) called "belly politics" which refers to wealth accumulation through political power in neo-patrimonial states. From this perspective, Benjaminsen and Ba (2009, 2019) argue that corruption among government officials intensifies farmer-herder conflicts over lands. The literature reviewed demonstrates that the focus of both eco-violence and political ecology studies on the farmer-herder conflict lack of explicit discussion of perception injustice in the context of natural resource scarcity. This is not to claim that there is nowhere perception of injustice is mentioned in the farmer-herder conflict literature, but they are less emphasised and at best just a few lines if more than a line (e.g., Brottem, 2016, p. 553; Hansen, 2023, p. 2; Krätli & Toulmin, 2020, p. 51; Nwozor et al., 2021, p. 61). Therefore, there is a need for an explicit focus on how perception injustice shapes the conflict in the context of resource struggles. 2.2 Social justice perspective on the farmer-herder relations This paper focuses on how the perception of injustices fuels violent conflicts in the context of struggles between farmers and pastoralists for access to scarce wetlands. Thus, “justice” is a crucial concept to be considered. Justice, as a concept, has varied conceptions and applications in scholarly inquiries but commonly denotes the idea that people receive what they deserve (entitlement) based on who they are and their actions (Liebig & Sauer, 2016; Raphael, 2001). Thus, an injustice is perceived when these expectations are not met. However, defining entitlements precisely is challenging, leaving justice open to various interpretations. Different individuals or groups may have contrasting views on justice stemming from subjective judgments or evaluations (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and observers may diverge on what constitutes justice or injustice in a situation (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000). Conflicting opinions on justice can thus lead to social conflicts, and rigid beliefs hindering conflict resolution (Mikula & Wenzel, 2000). Therefore, it is crucial to explore the claims of injustices by farmers and herders as well as observers to appreciate how the farmer-herder conflicts develop and escalate. The question of injustice can stem from three primary sources: distributive, procedural and participatory (Upton, 2014) but restorative injustice is also crucial. Societal frameworks, shaped by political processes, continuously alter the distributions of benefits and burdens among members, leading to debates on distributive justice (Fraser, 2007). Principles of distributive justice guide these debates, offering moral guidance on the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Walker, 2012). The ideas on distributive justice emphasise evaluations of outcomes in relation to comparison standards rather than absolute terms (Figueroa, 2022). Procedural justice concerns perceptions of fairness in decision-making processes, emphasising factors like control, consistency, unbiased decision-making, appeal mechanisms, representation, and ethical compatibility (Vermunt & Steensma, 2016). The perception of procedural justice impacts various outcomes, fostering acceptance of decisions, compliance with agreements, cooperation, trust in authorities, and satisfaction—even when outcomes are unfavourable (Leventhal, 1980). Aspects such as participation, decision-maker accountability, and respectful treatment significantly influence perceptions of procedural fairness and subsequent conflict actors’ actions (Ruano-Chamorro, Gurney & Cinner, 2022). Restorative justice, rooted in indigenous peacemaking practices, redefines offences as violations against people, relationships, and the community rather than the state or law and emphasises repairing the harm caused by wrongdoing (Goldblum, 2023). Restorative justice engages offenders directly with those harmed, focusing on their responsibilities to repair harm rather than solely on punitive measures by the state (Zehr, 2002). Howard Zehr outlines restorative justice's essence as collective involvement to identify, address harms, and put things right, guided by three key questions: what harm was done, how it can be repaired, and who is responsible for the repair (Zehr, 2002). In contrast to traditional conflict resolution systems centred on punishing offenders and separating them from victims, restorative justice seeks to balance the needs of all involved, encouraging empathy and accountability from offenders while providing victims with information, a voice in the process, safety, validation, and restitution where relevant (Zehr, 2002). Additionally, restorative justice involves the community, allowing them a platform to express concerns and participate in the welfare of its members (Cameron & Thorsborne, 2001; Strickland, 2004). Perceptions of social phenomena such as farmers' and herders' actions may be argued to provide only a limited understanding of the actual factors driving their conflict. Despite this limitation, perceptions are invaluable in understanding social issues (Higginbotham et al., 2010) and should be considered, particularly in adopting the precautionary principle to prevent further conflicts. This perspective parallels Amartya Sen's (2009) approach to defining social injustice, where societal perceptions play a significant role in both reflecting and shaping the experience of injustice. The concept of social injustice lacks a singular definition. Rawls (1999) laid the groundwork for a contemporary comprehension of social justice, presenting “justice as fairness” as a basis for society to establish just principles. Sen (2009) expands Rawls's framework by asserting that social justice not only should adhere to just principles but must also be perceived as just. This perspective underscores the importance of public perception in determining social justice, providing a platform to reconcile perceived injustices with objectively identified injustices. Similarly, perceived issues in farmer-herder relations can manifest as actual problems due to the anxiety surrounding potential injustices. Although social justice garners significant attention in moral and political philosophy, the attention given to social injustice remains limited. Bufacchi (2011) argues that understanding social injustice solely as the opposite of social justice restricts the comprehension of what constitutes an injustice in society. This paper views social injustice as the unequal or unfair social distribution of rewards, burdens, and opportunities for optimising life chances and outcomes (Colagiuri & Morrice, 2015; Morrice & Colagiuri, 2013), aligning with Bufacchi's (2011) perspective. It also acknowledges the precautionary principle, indicating that social injustice may arise not only from abusive actors but also from complacent authorities failing to prevent harm (Venkatapuram, Bell & Marmot, 2010). From this perspective, environmental justice is crucial in understanding farmer-pastoralists' struggle in the context of land access in the face of scarcity (Jacobsen & Linnell, 2016). It empowers them to contest perceived injustices in land use policies, emphasising their rights and alternative resource management (Upton, 2014). Distributive injustices arise when communities lose access to resources without adequate compensation (Bétrisey et al., 2018; Gurney et al., 2021). Procedural justice concerns emerge when local participation in land use decisions, legislation or policy is overlooked (Fisher et al., 2018; He & Sikor, 2015). Displacement of traditional lifestyles also triggers environmental injustices (Blaikie & Muldavin, 2014; Lecuyer et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2015). Land use policies need diverse voices and inclusive approaches to ensure fairness and positive ecological outcomes (Gurney et al., 2021). Whilst not explicitly analysed, some studies indicate that the conflicts between farmers and herders across Africa are marked by persistent grievances rooted in a sense of injustice. For example, Brottem (2016) indicated that the conflict in Kotouba village in the Cercle of Kita in the Kayes Region of south-western Mali is marked by persistent grievances rooted in perceptions of injustice. Despite longstanding relationships, cases of crop damage by herders often lead to unaddressed compensation issues. Thus, as cattle crop damage often develops from scarcity of grazing fields and the grazing route, the eco-violence perspective can be complemented by emphasising the social justice perspective. This sense of injustice from failure to compensate for crop damage intensifies tensions between farmers and herders. The farmers' resentment towards herders is compounded by disparities in power and wealth, especially in the context of a bias in court judgements favouring affluent herders (Brottem, 2016). Thus, disparities in power and wealth between farmers and herders can be implicated in the perpetration and perception of injustice, highlighting the relevance of the political ecology perspective. Political ecology studies emphasise the complex dynamics that exacerbate these conflicts, involving poor management, corruption, and manipulation by authorities (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Krätli & Toulmin, 2020) that heightens the perception of injustices. Nwozor et al. (2021) stated that an apparent governmental bias and reluctance to address the disarmament or prosecution of Fulani herders intensifies the perception of injustice, creating an unequal power structure (Nwozor et al., 2021). The social justice perspective further complements the political ecology perspective of the farmer-herder conflict because political exclusion, marginalisation, and discrimination heighten feelings of injustice and the risk of further conflict (Ogu, 2022). Whilst not explicitly foregrounded in the political ecology perspective on the farmer-herder conflicts in Africa, the social justice concerns are central to the wider political ecology analysis of resource conflicts (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Forsyth, 2008). Political ecology's diverse focus includes resource-related conflicts, illuminating the roots of conflicts across social lines. It underscores political ecology's concern for social justice in natural resource use and its successful use of conflicts to reveal underlying power structures and interests (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Neumann, 1998; Turner, 2004). This concern for social justice in political ecology has been less emphasised in the political ecology perspective on farmer-herder conflicts in Africa and needs to be given more central focus. This paper integrates the social justice dimension into the eco-violence perspective and emphasises it in the political ecology perspective on the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland. 3. Methods The results reported in this paper is part of a lager study exploring the farmer-herder conflicts in Central Nigeria. It was conducted in villages at the Benue-Nasarawa border in local government areas where the conflict between farmers and herders have been intense. The data collection method is in-depth interviews and field observations. The study employed a multistage sampling strategy. First, states where there has been fighting(s) or substantial dispute(s) between herders and farmers were purposively selected because that is where we can have a good amount of information regarding the drivers, dynamics and contestation surrounding the conflict. Cite and Cite (2021) indicated that the conflicts are concentrated in states in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria namely Benue, Taraba, Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa and Adamawa. Also, data from the Nigeria Watch database show that the top six states in Nigeria with the highest cases of the FHCs (Fig. 1) from 2008 to end of 2020 when I commenced fieldwork are Benue (142), Plateau (86), Nasarawa (77), Kaduna (46), Taraba (45) and Adamawa (29). The Nigeria Watch database uses newspaper reports to create an inventory of the incidence, location and fatality from the conflict. Initially, the study was to be conducted in the local government areas (LGAs) with the highest conflicts in two selected states from the top six, namely Benue and Plateau States. However, at that time, there was security advice against travelling to Plateau State because of the rising crisis there. Thus, the next state on the list, Nasarawa State, was selected. Initial inquiry about the conflicts indicate they are mostly occurring in the villages at the boundary between Benue and Nasarawa States. These villages fall within Agatu, Guma, Gwer West and Logo LGAs in Benue State and Awe, Doma, Keana and Nasarawa LGAs in Nasarawa State. Thus, the study area is at the intersection of the Benue and Nasarawa (Fig. 2 ). All these LGAs fall within the precinct Benue River valley. The villages were visited to make observations and conduct interviews. The observations were overt with the permission of the village heads and the participants recorded. The physical and social characters of the places and how these shaped how the conflicts manifested were noted. Videos, photographs and audio recordings were made. Since most of the villages experiencing the conflicts are in close proximity within specific districts or council wards of each LGA, it was easy to explore as many villages as possible in a few visits and return to critical sites for further observation. In-depth unstructured interviews were conducted with participants from diverse backgrounds, including but not limited to farmers, herders, the leaders of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), academics, students, legal practitioners, politicians, community leaders, youth leaders, leaders of social and political organisations and NGOs, in the conflict area. The main criterion for selection is experience and knowledge of the FHCs and willingness to participate. I identified those who have the experience and knowledge of the conflict through initial contacts made with the village heads and chiefs and those who have fled the conflicts and are living in internally displaced persons’ camp. The study deployed both unstructured and semi-structured interviews. Unstructured interview involves interviewing participants without a pre-planned sequence of how the questions are to be asked; hence there is minimal restraint on the question to be asked (Adeoye-Olatunde & Olenik, 2021). Semi-structured interviews have pre-determined set of open questions. The interviews usually began with unstructured format and the structured questions later deployed where vital issues were not discussed in the unstructured session. This approach retained the chance to touch on critical issues that may have been missed during the conversations. For example, supposed the discussion with an interviewee did not touch on land which is a central issue in the conflict, the researcher asked questions on the land section in the interview guide. Also, if the interviewees digressed the interview guide was also used to pose relevant question(s) related to issue of discussion before the digression redirecting the discussion back to track. A total of 93 interviews with 128 participants were conducted for the larger study of which 67 are relevant to this paper. Ethical approval was sought from the relevant ethics committee at the author’s University. The study received ethical approval. Participation in the research was strictly voluntary. Explanations of the research’s aim, scope and duration were made to the participants before the interviews were conducted. Participants were informed that they could stop their involvement and decline to answer any questions. Written consent was requested from participants regarding disposition and readiness to participate and preferred recording technique (audiotape recording and/or note-taking). The personal and identifying information of the participant was not directly referred to in the research report. Data analysis involved thematic analysis. This approach identifies and evaluates themes and patterns in the interview’s transcript and field notes and relates them to the question of injustice. The analysis also involved constantly comparing the data (Memon et al., 2017) to assess the reliability of the themes and patterns identified and make essential adjustments when needed (Clark & Vealé, 2018). 4. Explaining the causes of conflict: wetland’s scarcity The farmer-herder conflict has been recorded as far back as the 1980s in this study area but the conflicts were mostly short-lived compared with those of the last decade. Both pastoralists and farmers maintained that their first violent clash was in 1980s in the Iyode village at the boundary between Guma and Awe of LGAs of Benue and Nasarawa State, respectively. At that time Nasarawa State was still part of the lager Plateau State. The conflict developed from crop damage by pastoralists’ cattle and the killing of pastoralists’ cattle by farmers. This conflict led to the death of the Tiv Chief called Yawude. The current chief of Nzorov explained the origin as follows. The conflict began in 1980s when, as I mentioned earlier, they started destroying our farms. When we called security to arrest them, they paid us. They often claimed it was their children responsible for the damage. However, things worsened when they began asserting that even if they destroyed our farms, they would not pay because they considered it their land and had the power to do as they pleased. Our former district head (Yawude) tried to mediate, urging us to find a peaceful resolution and emphasising the need for behavioural changes on both sides. He highlighted that it was not right for Tiv people to disturb Fulani cattle or for Fulani cattle to damage our farms. Unfortunately, this intervention angered the Fulani herders, leading to a planned fight that resulted in his death in 1989 (Interview A20, Tiv farmer, interpreted from Nigerian Pidgin). The secretary of the Awe Chapter of the MACBAN also corroborated this story and hinted that the conflict escalated in 2011. In his words, “Incidents of cow killings began to occur in the 1980s” …These were known as “jo” in the Tiv language, where militia groups slaughtered cows and took the meat to their homes. Subsequently, tensions between the Tiv and Fulani escalated” (Interview A26(b) Fulani pastoralists, Interpreted from Nigerian Pidgin). However, “in 1989, a crisis erupted, resulting in the killing of Yawude”. Although “this situation was eventually resolved, a major crisis arose in 2011, encompassing pastoral-farmer clashes and religious conflicts involving various ethnic groups like Hausa, Alago, and Gambari” (Interview A26(b) Fulani pastoralists, Interpreted from Nigerian Pidgin). Although violent clashes between herders and farmers (especially the Tiv) was recorded in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the conflict has escalated since 2011 as the Secretary to Awe Chapter of MACBAN indicated. Table 1 presents the cases of and fatalities from the conflict showing that there were eight cases with 104 fatalities across the study area in 2011 compared to less than 3 cases on average per year in the previous three years as reported by the Nigeria Watch database. The cases of and fatalities from the conflict have remained relatively higher since then. Table 1 Cases and death from FHCs in the studied area Year Cases % Cases Deaths % Deaths 2008 1 0.29 3 0.11 2009 3 0.86 60 2.21 2010 1 0.29 2 0.074 2011 8 2.29 109 4.015 2012 7 2 121 4.457 2013 22 6.29 219 8.066 2014 3 0.86 66 2.431 2015 5 1.43 55 2.026 2016 11 3.14 106 3.904 2017 17 4.86 100 3.683 2018 102 29.1 774 28.51 2019 17 4.86 96 3.536 2020 22 6.29 84 3.094 2021 31 8.86 310 11.42 2022 43 12.3 200 7.366 2023 57 16.3 410 15.1 Total 350 100 2715 100 Source: Nigeria Watch database https://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtList&cherche=1 Thus, the conflict’s origin lies in material interests with pastoralists’ cattle crop damage and the killing of pastoralists cattle by farmers being at the centre of the conflict at the earlier stage. However, as both pastoralists and farmers opinions suggest, underlying this material struggle is the competition for access to the fadama , the Hausa word for floodplains. Pastoralists interviewed in the study area maintained that wetlands are extremely crucial to their livelihood to the point that even if there are dangerous wild animals in a wetland, they would kill it in order for the cattle to graze there. Water if very important to us; that is why this place is very good for our cattle. No matter the number of grasses in a place and no matter how fresh they may be if there is no water we cannot stay there because if the cattle eat grass, they must drink water. Even if there is a lion this place where there is enough water, we will go there and deal with that lion (Interview B16, Fulani pastoralists, translated from Hausa). Farmers also corroborated the perspective of the pastoralists. For example, farmers interviewed in Agatu, explained that the tension has been about pastoralists seeking access to the fadama which provides better pasture: “This fadama is very fertile for them [pastoralists]. The grasses are very fertile because they[pastoralists] said when they come to Agatu here before they will go back their cow will produce more.” (Interview A50, farmer in Agatu). Thus, this corroborates Turner (2004) who indicated that the quality of land resources significantly shapes farmer-herder relations. Floodplains offer higher and more stable productivity than rain-fed land, resulting in diverse interests surrounding floodplain land (Turner, 2004). Thus, competing access to wetlands is crucial in explaining conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in many parts of Africa. Previously, subsistence farmers and herders had a mutual tenure arrangement in this Benue River floodplain, where farmers cultivated the floodplains in the rainy season and allowed herders to graze in the dry season. However, the privatisation and the encroachment on these floodplains by agro-industrial projects and commercial farmers reduced herders’ access to grazing spaces in the dry season. For example, Olam Agri in Doma LGA which was established in 2012 sits on 10,000 hectares of the fadama , representing 7.14% of the 140,000 hectares of floodplain in Nasarawa State. Also, Dangote Sugar farm and refinery sits on 78,000 hectares in Tunga area of Awe, representing 55.71% of the floodplain and Kereksuk Rice Farm sits on 45,000 hectares in Awe representing 32.14%. The projects and other smaller scale commercial farms on the floodplains have significantly added to the pressure on the fadama limiting pastoralists access to them: For more than ten years, we do not have space for grazing. Everywhere you go, there is farm and the farms are increasing everyday. Previously, we follow our cattle routes to move the cattle to take water from the streams and rivers, but now the farmers have covered the cattle route with farms. Everywhere in this Nasarawa State is farm; here there is no land to graze our cattle. (Interview B19, Fulani pastoralists, translated from Hausa). Farmers maintained that the acquisition of the floodplains by the agro-industrial projects have reduced the pastoralists’ access to the wetlands causing the pastoralists to compete with them for their space, e.g., “The places that have been left for them [pastoralists] for generations, this fadama in Nasarawa has been occupied by this Olam [Olam Agri]. They [pastoralists] have now descended on us because we are nothing” (Interview A45, Farmer). In addition, there is intense pressure on the adjoining uplands as some subsistence farmers have transformed their production into a larger scale and this make the pastoralists feel they are being displaced by the farmers: “…a significant shift has occurred, and numerous farmers have transitioned to commercial farming. This shift towards commercial agriculture has also become a contributing factor to conflicts” (Interview B28, farmer). Upon visiting a small village, it becomes evident that the number of houses is limited, indicating that the residents have a small agricultural capacity, typically ranging from ten to twenty hectares, or roughly fifty hectares. However, these villagers now seek financial assistance from local elites. Such individuals arrive now cultivate significantly larger areas exceeding 200 hectares. This situation creates a sense of limited space for herders, making them feel the farmers are displacing them. (Interview B25, farmer). Herders assert that the expansion of crop fields by farmers block grazing routes ( labi ), prompting retaliatory actions that result in crop and farm destruction: “the main reason why there is damage on crops by cattle is because there is no grass and no passage for cattle to take water; everywhere is farm” (Interview B25, pastoralists, interpreted from Hausa). They also highlight the issue of lack of access to traditional routes, particularly those leading to watering points. We know the specific paths we have traditionally used for grazing; there are designated grazing routes. Often, what happens is that farmers cultivate in these areas, obstructing the cattle passage or blocking the roads used. This obstruction angers the herders, leading them to take matters into their own hands, resulting in actions such as destroying the farms. The destruction occurs because farming activities impede the paths where the cattle typically move. Consequently, when these routes get blocked, leaving the herders unable to pass, they retaliate by destroying the farms in frustration (Interview A16, pastoralists, interpreted from Hausa). Farmers, on the other hand, emphasise the encroachment of herders onto their farms, attributing conflicts to the destruction of crops and the failure to respect farmland boundaries. Additionally, both herders and farmers’ perspectives suggest that the scarcity of land and the increasing human and cattle population contribute to the increase in demand for land resulting in competition for access and ownership of lands, especially the fadama. The debate extends to whether cattle routes were historically present and whether they should be created without due permission or negotiation: The issue with some complaints regarding the absence of cattle routes is that these routes did not exist there before. If there is a sudden demand for it now, negotiation becomes necessary. Demanding that the landowner forfeits part of their land for the convenience of others should be discussed and negotiated rather than forcefully imposed upon them. (Interview B, farmer). Thus, this farmer’s opinion in the quote above suggests that there is a feeling of procedural injustice among farmers’ if grazing routes are created without due negotiation and perhaps compensation. Overall, the farmers and pastoralists’ views underscore the multifaceted nature of the conflicts, touching on land rights, population growth, traditional routes, encroachments, and lack of proper governance or negotiation between both parties. Underlying these issues is the scarcity of floodplain, and pastoralist quest for access to the limited uncultivated wetlands. 5. Perceptions of injustice and conflict escalation 5.1 Perceived injustices from material struggles and the conflict management The farmers and herders’ perceptions of injustices relating to their conflicts in the study area demonstrate a lack of multiple dimensions of justice shaping the ongoing tensions. The interviews show that the conflict actors perceive multitude of injustices encompassing mainly a lack of distributive and procedural justices. Distributive justice refers to the equitable distribution of resources and opportunities among different groups. Procedural justice refers to the fairness and impartiality in the processes and procedures followed to resolve disputes. In the study area, there is a glaring perception of disparity in the distribution of resources, particularly land and compensation for crop damage and the perception of the absence of fair and unbiased procedures for addressing farmer-herder grievances. The herders feel unjustly treated considering what they perceive as fair in the management of crop damage by pastoralists’ cattle and cattle theft by farmers. The opinions of the pastoralists interviewed emphasised how cattle theft and killing of cattle soured the relationship between them and Tiv farmers. According to the leader of the pastoralists whose area of influence covers the Awe LGA in Nasarawa State and Guma LGA in Benue State, there has been bias in the treatment of crimes committed by Tiv farmers and Fulani pastoralists: When a Tiv person committed a crime, they were not taken before the law. However, if a Fulani person did something, they were immediately brought to justice, perpetuating this bias. As a result, the Fulani began to seek revenge. If a farmer confronted them, they would retaliate. This cycle of revenge has persisted until now. If the security agents allowed them to retaliate, they were content and acted as they pleased. (Interview B35, pastoralist). The crimes the pastoralists’ leader was talking about is the issue of crop destruction by pastoralists’ cattle and killing of cattle by farmers. For the farmers, especially the Tiv, the conflict started from the pastoralists refusal to pay compensation for crop damaged by cattle. The farmers reject the view that they are responsible for the rustling and killing of pastoralists’ cattle. Rather they argue that the refusal to pay compensation for crop damage is the bone of contention. Pastoralists’ refusal to pay comes from claims that the farmers attempt to evict them after collecting exorbitant compensation far higher than the value of damage done to crops by cattle and huge fees to grant them access to land for grazing: One major issue is when we move to certain communities for grazing. These communities demand that we purchase a portion of the grassland there, often at exorbitant prices. After paying and entering the area, our boys and cows are still subjected to beating and sometimes even killing of the cattle. We often need to seek permission by sitting down with the community leaders, negotiating, and paying money before we are allowed to graze. The amount paid ranges from 100,000 to 500,000 naira for a portion of land. Even when there are accidental instances of our cows trespassing and causing crop damage, we will be taxed heavily. We engage in discussions to settle these issues. However, the problem worsens when, after settling and paying the requested fees, the communities later refuse to allow us to stay despite having paid for the right to graze there. This rejection and expulsion after fulfilling their demands are particularly painful and distressing for us (Interview A16, Fulani pastoralists, interpreted from Hausa). However, the farmers refute that herders’ claims arguing that the pastoralists started refusing to pay compensation for crop damage because they have acquired guns: “Things escalated when they started moving around armed with AK47s. Initially, they assured us that there was no issue, but in 2013, they began killing people in our villages” (Interview A21, Tiv farmer). Therefore, the conflict is shaped by the perception of distributive and procedural injustices regarding access to land and how disagreements stemming from crop damage and the killing of cattle are addressed. This perception of injustices has deteriorated the mutual solidarity farmers and herders once shared for survival as they have become more focused on monetary profit. Herders’ refusal to pay compensation under the above alleged circumstance has swayed some farmers to alternative dispute resolution through the courts, which herders dislike due to the stress of legal procedures, legal fees, and the potential hefty fines imposed by the court, requiring compensation to both the government and the farmer: Some staffs of the court are aware, they know the herder, he is a man that doesn’t want peace to reign at all times, but during my judgement at least I think I have not had anything that has to do with that man again because he was compel to pay compensation to the state government and to the farmer at least he has learnt his lessons (Interview B29, Magistrate Court Judge, Keana). The use of courts by farmers to seek justice and especially the requirement to compensate the government in addition to the farmer is another phenomenon pastoralists consider procedural and restorative injustices. Herders strongly dislike court cases, and farmers who resort to legal action for crop destruction grievances may become targets of the herders. A distressing example involves a young Tiv farmer who obtained court judgments against herders, ordering them to compensate him over ₦1,000,000 (Interview B10, Alago farmer). The Tiv farmers received a warning that the herders would attack in three days. So, they fled their village to Doma Township. The Tiv farmer who obtained court judgments against herders had returned to his farm one evening to collect his produce before the herders would strike. Unfortunately, the herders arrived and killed him (Interview B10, Alago farmer). This grim account highlights the grave dangers faced by farmers who dare to confront herders through legal means because they perceive it as restorative injustice that negates the traditional approach to resolving the dispute. Thus, perceptions of distributive, procedural and restorative injustices can be germane to the intensification of conflicts and emergence of violent actions. 5.2 Violence escalation: perception of anti-open grazing law as procedural and restorative injustices Beyond the perception of disparities in how resources, rights, and legal treatments are allocated between farmers and herders, another procedural injustice strongly emphasised by herders as the most critical factor for violence escalation is the perceived unfairness in addressing the conflict through the enactment of the anti-open grazing law in Benue State. The herders see the law as a catalyst for further violent crisis and rightly so because as Fig. 3 shows, there is a sharp rise in the cases of and even far more deaths from the conflict in 2018 when the law enforcement began. There is a recurring notion among farmers that the Federal Government did not address the conflict between herders and farmers because it supported the atrocities of the pastoralists which created a sense of injustice about the government’s handling of the conflict. Farmers mostly blame the Federal Government as culpable in the crisis for failure to act or giving herders preferential treatment in the conflicts. Farmers think that the law is vital because security agencies controlled by the Federal Government failed to address herders’ violent activities effectively, with herders managing to evade punishment and continuing to ravage farms. This perception of procedural injustice provided the impetus for farmers support for the anti-open grazing law. Farmers in Benue State perceive the law as a corrective measure to protect their interests. They considered the former president Mahammadu Buhari treated the pastoralists preferentially by not encouraging the pastoralists to obey the anti-open grazing law in Benue State to resolve the crisis: So, now, for me, I am blaming the Federal Government because those people [pastoralists], they are terrorists. How come they are moving with AK47 and government, Buhari cannot say I decline. If he claims to decline, the decline does not make sense because they are still doing it and he has the power. If he says today, they should respect government of Benue for the law [anti-open grazing law] they have implemented, the matter [conflict] will finish. That is all I see because already government has taken its own decision. Government of Benue has taken its own decision (Interview A21, Tiv farmer). Meanwhile, herders believe that the implementation of the anti-grazing law is an unjust means of displacement, affecting their traditional way of life and disrupted traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, leading to a breakdown in dialogue and resolution methods. Herders mostly blame the government of Benue State. They particularly accuse the former Benue State governor, Mr Samuel Otorm (who is a Tiv) of marginalisation for its intervention in the conflict through the enactment of anti-open grazing law. This sense of procedural injustice according to the herders and particularly the killing of a herder by Benue State Livestock Guard (BSLG) enforcing the law motivated their retaliation through armed attacks on the Tiv farmers: Conflicts between them [pastoralists] and the Tiv people have been occurring periodically over the years, but the situation worsened in the last few years. Both groups have been living in the bush prior to escalating tensions. The conflict started from Makurdi when Governor Otorm instructed the Fulani herders to leave Makurdi [use Makurdi, the state capital to referred to Benue State]. This directive intensified the conflict. When the Fulani herders were attacked and killed there, reprisal attacks occurred, with Tiv people being targeted. This cycle of violence continues, and without this specific trigger, there would be no conflict between the two groups. (Interview B21, Fulani herder, interpreted from Hausa). Pastoralists indicate that the enforcement of the anti-grazing law has separated the pastoralist and farmers with no chance for dialogue and reconciliation highlighting perceived restorative injustice. Thus, the herders’ perception of the law stems from the perspective of restorative justice which is rooted in indigenous peace-making practices that focuses on violations against people, relationships, and the community rather than the state or law and emphasises repairing the harm caused by wrongdoing (Goldblum, 2023). Thus, the use of the law as a tool for conflict resolution by the Benue State Government is perceived an injustice hence is a point of contention and a significant factor contributing to the worsening situation. The herders reminisce about past conflict resolution methods that were effective before the anti-grazing law was enforced. Previously, when conflicts arose between herders and farmers, they would gather, sit together, and resolve issues amicably. The absence of this shared space and dialogue because of the displacement engendered by the enforcement of the law is highlighted as a significant loss contributing to the current conflict escalation. The crisis has been ongoing for a considerable period, but the situation is worse now. In the past, when we resided in Benue, any conflicts or violence that arose would be resolved through discussions and mutual agreement. However, the enforcement of the anti-grazing law compelled us to leave Benue. As a result, we find it impossible to live in Benue now. The implementation of this law is what exacerbated the conflict, making it worse than it was in previous years. Previously, when we coexisted with the Tiv community, if our cattle caused any trouble, they would approach the Mai-angwa [village head] and settle the dispute amicably. However, the introduction of the anti-grazing law has made it difficult for leaders from both sides to make efforts to resolve the issue. Previously, if someone committed an offense, the police would take action and enforce the law. But now, the Livestock Guard holds the power, creating a tensed situation without peace. This change has significantly escalated the conflict, leaving no peaceful resolution in sight (Interview B26b, pastoralist, interpreted from Hausa). The pastoralists emphasised the significant impact of the anti-grazing law in Benue. They argued that this legislation has disrupted not only their traditional way of life but also the traditional approach to managing the conflicts. Thus, there is a perception of a shift in authority from the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as that conducted by the Mai-angwa [village heads], to the Livestock Guard. This shift is viewed negatively by the herders as disrupting the established norms of managing the conflict highlighting perception restorative injustice. The herders portray the conflict as having reached an insurmountable level due to the absence of dialogue, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, and law enforcement impartiality. Overall, the escalation of violence in the farmer-herder relations in the study area can be argued to be rooted in perceived distributive and procedural injustices regarding access to scarce resources and the management of conflicts stemming from the competition for scarce resources. Farmers feel marginalised by the Federal Government, believing that it supports herders and overlooks their violent activities. Conversely, herders feel alienated by the anti-grazing law, perceiving it as discriminatory and disruptive to their way of life. Both groups feel their traditional systems of resolving conflicts and their heritage have been disregarded, leading to further misunderstandings and exacerbation of the conflict. These perceptions of bias and injustice are linked to political influences, with allegations that politicians siding with members of their own groups, affecting governance and fair judgment. This political influence exacerbates the cycle of revenge and retaliation, perpetuating the conflict and eroding trust in the justice system and governance. 6. Discussion The study has explored how wetland scarcity and perceptions of injustices contribute to the farmer-herder conflict and its escalation in Benue-Nasarawa borderland. It incorporated the social injustice perspective into the eco-violence and political ecology perspectives on the farmer-herder conflicts. It emphasises that perceptions of injustices are crucial to clarifying the escalation of the conflict rather than the cause. Some studies that have mentioned perceptions of injustices but have not deeply explore this dimension (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009, 2019; Brottem, 2016; Eke, 2018; Hagberg, 2005; Hernann, 2016; Krätli & Toulmin, 2020; Nwozor et al., 2021; Ogu, 2022; Tobie & Sangare, 2019) tend to see it as the cause. The study has demonstrated that the scarcity of wetlands, crucial to agro-pastoral production, underpins this conflict root rather than the scarcity of all lands. Wetlands’ scarcity has triggered intense resource access competition between pastoralists and farmers. Thus, this finding supports the environmental security perspective on the farmer-herder conflict that emphasis the role of resources scarcity (e.g., Homer-Dixon, 1999; Cabot, 2007; Out et al., 2020). However, the escalation of conflict is associated more with the perceptions of injustices that centred on distributive, procedural and restorative injustices. Incorporating these social justice concepts helps explain how perceptions of injustices created a circle of actions and reactions of retaliation and deterrence. The perception of distributive and procedural injustices was more related to issues of addressing grievances from crop damage by pastoralists and cattle killing by farmers and compensation for these wrongdoings. Hence, this suggest that while scarcity (as a material condition) is relevant, the conflict root lies in the perception of injustice/justice regarding how compensation for wrongdoings in farmer-herder relations are addressed. Thus, the social justice perspective can be valuable to the eco-violence theory of the conflict. While also related to distributive and procedural injustices, the management of the conflict through state intervention and the action of the Federal Government influenced perception of restorative injustices. Particularly, pastoralists’ perception of the anti-open grazing law enacted by the Benue State government as procedural and restorative injustices triggered a violent response as retaliation and deterrence, leading to violent attacks on farmers and counter-attacks from farmers. Existing political ecology studies emphasise that state policies marginalising pastoralists is often at the heart of this conflict (e.g., Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Walwa, 2020). However, in the study area, the anti-open grazing law while marginalising the pastoralists, did not cause the conflict. Instead, the conflict is rooted the scarcity of wetlands and it is escalated by perceptions of distributive and procedural injustices in compensation for crop damage and cattle killings in face of competition for scarce wetlands. However, the escalation of violence is a function of perceptions of procedural and restorative injustices pertaining to pastoralists and farmers’ senses of marginalisation by governments at the state and federal levels, respectively. Thus, the incorporation of the social justice perspective to the scarcity theory from the eco-violence perspective can explain the origin of the tensions. Emphasising the social justice perspective to the political ecology perspective on the conflict explains the escalation of violence. Hence, the incorporation of the social justice perspective can offer a bridge between political ecology and eco-violence perspectives on the farmer-herder conflicts which have had disagreements. This perspective can help improve the analysis of the FHCs using a single framework that integrates both perspectives despite their theoretical disagreements. 7. Conclusion The study delved into the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland, exploring the impact of wetland scarcity and perceived injustices on conflict escalation. It combines social injustice, eco-violence, and political ecology perspectives to highlight the critical role of perceptions of injustice in conflict origins and intensification. The study shows that the scarcity of wetlands crucial for agro-pastoral activities fuels resource competition, driving conflict between pastoralists and farmers. While resource scarcity is crucial, conflict escalation is primarily linked to distributive and procedural injustice perceptions. Grievances regarding compensation for crop damage and cattle killings drive distributive and procedural injustice perceptions, shaping the conflict's core. Additionally, state intervention, notably the anti-open grazing law, amplifies procedural and restorative injustice perceptions, prompting violent responses and counter-attacks. Contrary to existing political ecology studies, which attribute conflicts to state policies marginalising pastoralists, this study finds that the anti-open grazing law, while marginalising herders, did not initiate the conflict. Instead, the conflict stems from perceived injustices in compensation amid wetland competition. However, the law's role lies in intensifying violence due to procedural and restorative injustice perceptions in farmer-herder relations. The study's contribution to literature is that it elucidates the origins and escalation of conflict by integrating social justice perspectives into scarcity theories from eco-violence and political ecology. The findings can bridge the gap between the divergent eco-violence and political ecology perspectives. The study argues that integrating social justice perspectives with eco-violence and emphasizing social justice in political ecology perspectives on FHCs can offer a unified framework for analysing farmer-herder conflicts, enhancing a comprehensive understanding that reduces their theoretical differences. Declarations Conflict of Interest: none. Ethics: The study received appropriate ethical approval. References Adger, W.N., Arnell, N.W., Black, R., Dercon, S., Geddes, A., Thomas, D.S.G., 2015. 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The social psychology of procedural justice . Springer Science & Business Media. Lind, J. (2003). Adaptation, conflict and cooperation in pastoralist East Africa: a case study from South Turkana, Kenya. Conflict, Security & Development , 3 (3), 315-334. Martinez-Alier, J., 2002. The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and Valuation. Elgar, Cheltenham. Meier, P., Bond, D., & Bond, J. (2007). Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa. Political Geography , 26 (6), 716-735. Memon, S., Umrani, S., & Pathan, H. (2017). Application of constant comparison method in social sciences: a useful technique to analyze interviews. Grassroots (17260396) , 51 (1), 152–165. Mikula, G., & Wenzel, M. (2000). Justice and social conflict. International Journal of Psychology , 35 (2), 126-135. Morrice, E., & Colagiuri, R. (2013). Coal mining, social injustice and health: A universal conflict of power and priorities. Health & Place , 19 , 74-79. Nordås, R., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2015). Climate change and conflict (pp. 21-38). Springer International Publishing. Nwozor, A., Olanrewaju, J. S., Oshewolo, S., Oladoyin, A. M., Adedire, S., & Okidu, O. (2021). Herder-farmer conflicts: The politicization of violence and evolving security measures in Nigeria. African Security , 14 (1), 55-79. O’Loughlin, J., Witmer, F. D., Linke, A. M., Laing, A., Gettelman, A., & Dudhia, J. (2012). Climate variability and conflict risk in East Africa, 1990–2009. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 109 (45), 18344-18349. Ogu, M.I. (2022). Ethnicity, Farmer–Herder Conflicts, and Nation-Building in Nigeria. In: Oloruntoba, S.O. (eds) The Political Economy of Colonialism and Nation-Building in Nigeria. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Pp. 257-275. Okoli, A. C., & Ogayi, C. O. (2018). Herdsmen militancy and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: A theoretical briefing. African Security Review , 27 (2), 129-143. Olumba, E. E. (2022). The Politics of Eco-Violence: Why Is Conflict Escalating in Nigeria’s Middle Belt?. Terrorism and Political Violence , 1-18. Olumba, E. E., Nwosu, B. U., Okpaleke, F. N., & Okoli, R. C. (2022). Conceptualising eco-violence: moving beyond the multiple labelling of water and agricultural resource conflicts in the Sahel. Third World Quarterly , 43 (9), 2075-2090. Otu, B. O., & Impraim, K. (2021). Aberration of Farmer–Pastoralist Conflicts in Ghana. Peace Review , 33 (3), 412-419. Otu, B., Impraim, K., & Twumhene, P. (2020). New Dimensions of Farmer–Herder Conflict in the Afram Plains of Ghana: Implications for Human Security. Journal of Applied Security Research , 15 (4), 484-497. Peluso, N.L., Watts, M., 2001. Violent Environments. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Percival, V., Homer-Dixon, T., 1998. Environmental scarcity and violent conflict: the case of South Africa. J. Peace Res. 35, 279–298. Raleigh, C. (2010). Political marginalization, climate change, and conflict in African Sahel states. International Studies Review , 12 (1), 69-86. Raleigh, C., & Kniveton, D. (2012). Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and climate variability in East Africa. Journal of Peace Research , 49 (1), 51-64. Raleigh, C., Urdal, H., 2007. Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict. Polit. Geogr. 26, 674–694. Raphael, D. D. (2001). Concepts of justice . Clarendon Press. Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ruano‐Chamorro, C., Gurney, G. G., & Cinner, J. E. (2022). Advancing procedural justice in conservation. Conservation Letters , 15 (3), e12861. Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M., 2001. The curse of natural resources. Eur. Econ. Rev. 45, 827–838. Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Kominek, J., Link, P.M., Schilling, J., 2012. Climate change and violent conflict. Science 336, 869–871. Schlosberg, D., & Collins, L. B. (2014). From environmental to climate justice: climate change and the discourse of environmental justice. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change , 5 (3), 359-374. Schwartz, B.P., Randall, D., 2003. An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security. Sen. A. (2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Strickland, R. (2004). Restorative justice. New York: Peter Lang. Tolossa, D., & Baudouin, A. (2004). Access to natural resources and conflicts between farmers and agro‐pastoralists in Borkena Wetland, north‐eastern Ethiopia. Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift-Norwegian Journal of Geography , 58 (3), 97-112. Turner, M. D., Ayantunde, A. A., Patterson, K. P., & Patterson III, E. D. (2011). Livelihood transitions and the changing nature of farmer–herder conflict in Sahelian West Africa. The journal of Development Studies , 47 (2), 183-206. Upton, C. (2014). The new politics of pastoralism: identity, justice and global activism. Geoforum , 54 , 207-216. Venkatapuram, S., Bell, R., & Marmot, M. (2010). The right to sutures: social epidemiology, human rights, and social justice. Health and human rights , 12 (2), 3. Verhoeven, H. (2011). Climate change, conflict and development in Sudan: global neo‐Malthusian narratives and local power struggles. Development and Change , 42 (3), 679-707. Vermunt, R., & Steensma, H. (2016). Procedural justice. Handbook of social justice theory and research , 219-236. Vesco, P., Dasgupta, S., De Cian, E., & Carraro, C. (2020). Natural resources and conflict: A meta-analysis of the empirical literature. Ecological Economics , 172 , 106633. Von Uexkull, N., 2014. Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Polit. Geogr. 43, 16–26. Von Uexkull, N., Croicu, M., Fjelde, H., Buhaug, H., 2016. Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 113, 12391–12396. Walker, G. (2012). Environmental justice: concepts, evidence and politics . Routledge. Walwa, W. J. (2020). Growing farmer-herder conflicts in Tanzania: the licenced exclusions of pastoral communities interests over access to resources. The Journal of Peasant Studies , 47 (2), 366-382. Zehr, H. (2002). The little book of restorative justice. Intercourse, PA: Good Books. Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6967912","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":475891034,"identity":"5eb42dbb-1f1e-4bfd-b961-5357007ea75d","order_by":0,"name":"Cletus Famous Nwankwo","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0071-4903","institution":"University of Nigeria","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Cletus","middleName":"Famous","lastName":"Nwankwo","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-24 16:57:18","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":{"humanSubjects":true,"vertebrateSubjects":false,"conflictsOfInterestStatement":false,"humanSubjectEthicalGuidelines":true,"humanSubjectConsent":true,"humanSubjectClinicalTrial":false,"humanSubjectCaseReport":false,"vertebrateSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false},"doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6967912/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6967912/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":85456084,"identity":"b6090a32-a21f-4a83-8cfa-0db743907708","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-26 06:25:22","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":38047,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSee image above for figure legend.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6967912/v1/5ab36900acac05d85ea05a9a.png"},{"id":85456087,"identity":"16c81a90-dc7a-45df-9281-6b7c93066bb4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-26 06:25:22","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":375736,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ethe study area.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6967912/v1/37701e49b59de239ff05f3b4.png"},{"id":85457101,"identity":"2c436567-4e27-44fd-a133-13cf05745dfc","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-26 06:41:23","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1109683,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6967912/v1/b451106c-eb56-4c54-bf7b-50c241b7441a.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"The authors declare no competing interests.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePerceptions of injustices in the struggle for scarce critical lands: farmer-herder conflict and violence escalation in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis article is about the farmer-herder conflict in the borderland between Benue and Nasarawa States in Nigeria. The paper focuses on this conflict because it has remained topical in the last decade and continues to be considered a threat to national security, food security and poses danger to socio-economic development of the communities affected. The paper focuses on how perceptions of injustices escalate the conflict and violence within the context of how scarcity of natural resources. For decades, there have been debates on whether scarcity of natural resources causes the conflict between pastoralists and crop farmers in Africa. The eco-violence perspective highlights competition over scarce resources and environmental changes but acknowledge the significance of population growth, cultural differences, and political dysfunctionality, among others, in comprehending these conflicts (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kelley et al., 2015; Raleigh \u0026amp; Urdal, 2007; Percival \u0026amp; Homer-Dixon, 1998; Adibe, 2020; Out \u0026amp; Impraim, 2021; Cabot, 2017; Cite and Cite, 2021; Okoli \u0026amp; Ogayi, 2018). On the other hand, political ecology perspective critiques the scarcity narrative, emphasising how power relations underlie access to and exclusion from resources which often results in marginalisation of pastoralists (Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009, 2019, 2021; Bergius et al., 2020; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Lind, 2003; Verhoeven, 2011; Walwa, 2020).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, there is a little attention to perception of injustice in the literature. Some studies have mentioned it (e.g., Brottem, 2016; Hansen, 2023; Kr\u0026auml;tli \u0026amp; Toulmin, 2020; Nwozor et al., 2021; Olumba et al., 2022) but they lack explicit discussion on how perception of injustice shape the conflict in the context of natural resource scarcity. Therefore, there is a need for an explicit focus on how perception of injustice shapes the conflict in the context of struggles for scarce resources. This paper explores the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa border of Nigeria, focusing on how scarcity of natural resources drives the conflict. Within this context, it considers how perceptions of injustices fuels the conflict to become a violent armed struggle. Conflict actions could manifest itself as involving individuals or all communities and involve a combination of social tension/avoidance, political action, and violent action (Turner, 2004). Social tension/avoidance describes a situation in which conflict of interest is acknowledged, but no public action is taken (Turner, 2004). On the other hand, political action is a form of organised action within already-existing legal, administrative, or customary institutions to resolve the conflict (Turner, 2004). Various methods of political action can take place, such as verbal discussion/bargaining and mediation by a team of elders. On the other hand, violence can result in harm or death and continually diminish the bond between different groups. Violence is usually the last resort and occurs when rights or established relations systems have been grossly breached (Cite, 2023).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalyses of African pastoral conflicts often focus on \u0026ldquo;conflict,\u0026rdquo; a phenomenon slightly different from \u0026ldquo;violence\u0026rdquo; even though they are closely related. Here, I take violent FHCs to mean conflicts that are not reduced or settled through verbal discussion/bargaining, mediation, or other established means. Instead, it is the use of physical harm that causes death, injuries or displacement to seek redress for a disagreement. More recently, there is interest in understanding why FHCs escalate into violence (e.g., Detges, 2014; Cite \u0026amp; Cite 2, 2021; Bukari, 2023; Cite, 2023). Detges (2014: 58), for example, distinguished pastoral violence from conflict by focusing \u0026ldquo;on armed clashes between pastoralist groups in northern Kenya\u0026rdquo;, which they refer to as \u0026ldquo;pastoralist violence\u0026rdquo;. Conflict in farmer-herder relations is not a strange occurrence, as conflict is part of everyday human interactions. Indeed, there have been conflicts between farmers and herders in northern Nigeria in places like the Mambila Plateau since the 1900s (Blench, 1984). However, recurrent violence is a new feature of the farmer-herder relations in the Benue Valley since approximately 2012. This paper considers how scarcity of natural resource is implicated in the conflict and how perceptions of injustices trigger the outbreak and recurrence of violence in the farmer-herder relations focusing on the Benue-Nasarawa borderland.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study uses an ethnographic approach involving interviews and field observations. It builds on both the scarcity theory from eco-violence and access to resource framework of political ecology, emphasising the role of wetland scarcity and perceptions of injustices. The study examines how wetland scarcity and perceptions of injustices contribute to the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland. Four critical perspectives and theories are essential to elucidate FHCs namely the property rights perspective, environmental security theory, political economy theory and political ecology theory (As Kenee, 2022; Cite \u0026amp; Cite, 2021). The interdependence of these theories underscores their combined relevance in explaining conflicts. However, this paper prioritises eco-violence and political ecology theories to elucidate the conflict roots. It incorporates a social justice perspective to explain the escalation of violence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTherefore, theoretically, the paper combines social justice theory with environmental security and political ecology theories. It underscores the pivotal role of perceived injustices in shaping and intensifying the conflict, with wetland scarcity fuelling resource competition between pastoralists and farmers. While scarcity is critical, conflict escalation predominantly revolves around distributive, procedural and restorative injustices. The conflict's core relates more to perceptions of injustice regarding compensation for crop damage and cattle killings in farmer-herder relations in a condition of material scarcity. State intervention, especially the enactment of the anti-open grazing law by Benue State (that political ecologists emphasises), amplifies restorative injustice perceptions, sparking violent responses and counter-attacks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContrary to previous political ecology studies attributing conflicts to state policies marginalising pastoralists, this study finds that the anti-open grazing law, while marginalising herders, did not trigger the conflict. Instead, the conflict\u0026rsquo;s root lies in perceived distributive and procedural injustices amid competition for access to scarce wetlands. However, the law exacerbates violence due to procedural and restorative injustice perceptions in farmer-herder relations. The study argues that the findings suggest that the conflict's origins and escalation can be appreciated by integrating social justice into scarcity theories from eco-violence and political ecology. This perspective can bridge gaps between the divergent environmental security and political ecology perspectives on the FHCs. Thus, it can offer a unified framework for analysing farmer-herder conflicts, improving understanding despite theoretical differences. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the empirical and theoretical literature. After that is the methods and subsequent sections present the findings before the discussion and conclusions sections.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Literature and theoretical review","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Eco-violence and political ecology perspectives on the farmer-herder conflicts in Africa\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe nexus between natural resources and violent conflict is often conceptualised through scarcity and abundance pathways, popularly known as the \u0026ldquo;resource curse\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;resource scarcity\u0026rdquo; hypotheses (Koubi et al., 2013). Wealth from renewable resources like arable land and water can similarly lead to conflicts when deteriorated or scarce and when abundant, triggering disputes over resource control and allocation (Hendrix \u0026amp; Salehyan, 2012; Wittenberg \u0026amp; Adano, 2009). The \u0026ldquo;resource curse\u0026rdquo; argument links resource-rich states to economic instability and heightened conflict due to mismanagement of profitable resources (Humphreys, 2005). Non-renewable resources can foster corruption, incentivize looting, and fuel conflict for resource seizure and rent-seeking behaviour (Kalyvas, 2006; Fearon \u0026amp; Laitin, 2003). The abundance of renewable resources may drive conflicts, motivating individuals to fight to secure livelihoods, assets, or land (Brown, 2010; Hidalgo et al., 2010). Perception of relative wealth and status quo also influences conflict propensity, with communities more willing to engage in violence to protect valuable assets (Bell \u0026amp; Keys, 2016).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe \u0026ldquo;resource scarcity\u0026rdquo; argument indicates that scarcity of renewable resources in vulnerable regions with demographic pressures and economic instabilities can lead to political turmoil and internal conflicts (Raleigh \u0026amp; Urdal, 2007; Percival \u0026amp; Homer-Dixon, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kelley et al., 2015). Depletion or increased demand for resources can intensify competition among impoverished communities, sparking intra-national conflicts and uprisings (Hauge \u0026amp; Ellingsen, 1998). Such scarcity widens societal disparities, exacerbates economic hardships, and amplifies grievances, particularly in agriculturally reliant or ethnically divided societies (Von Uexkull et al., 2016; Von Uexkull, 2014). Scarcity-induced factors like agricultural failures, elevated food prices, and deteriorating livelihoods contribute to relative deprivation, leading to societal tensions and potentially triggering migration from vulnerable areas (Adger et al., 2015). Like those in the Sahel, water scarcity and droughts have historically driven migration flows, destabilizing host communities or accentuating societal divides (Scheffran et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2010).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe farmer-herder conflicts in Africa are often framed through scarcity theory or eco-violence emphasising the interplay of socio-ecological and demographic changes and unequal resource distribution stemming from identity differences, especially ethnic and religious differences (Adibe, 2020; Ani \u0026amp; Uwizeyimana, 2022; Hommer-Dixon, 1994, 1999). Studies (Homer-Dixon, 2010; Markakis, 1998; Mkutu, 2001; Meier et al., 2007) have suggested a link between resource scarcity and pastoral conflicts, where drought-induced famine in impoverished areas may trigger conflicts (Sachs \u0026amp; Warner, 2001). Nordas and Gleditsch highlight that resource scarcity can either prompt conflicts over limited resources or force migration, potentially leading to violence in areas where resources are constrained (Gleditsch \u0026amp; Nord\u0026aring;s, 2010; Nord\u0026aring;s \u0026amp; Gleditsch, 2015). Out and Impraim (2021) link farmer-herder conflicts in Ghana, respectively to social identities, demographic changes, and competition for scarce resources, presenting the conflicts as struggles for environmental resources with roots in ethnicity, religion, and environmental changes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe eco-violence perspective on farmer-herder conflicts suggests that these conflicts arise from competition over diminishing resources, worsened by climate change-induced scarcity (Cabot, 2017; Cite \u0026amp; Cite, 2021; Okoli \u0026amp; Ogayi, 2018). Climate change in West Africa is foreseen to intensify, causing land degradation, droughts, and reducing food production and water availability, heightening tensions between farmers and herders who rely on common pool Resources (Cabot, 2017). The relationship between environmental factors such as climate change and farmer-herder conflicts in Africa remains complex and lacks consensus among studies. While some studies suggest a link between environmental factors like precipitation and conflict, there is considerable variability in the nature and extent of this relationship, highlighting the complexity and multifaceted nature of farmer-herder conflicts in relation to environmental stressors (Ayana et al., 2016; Meier et al., 2007; Raleigh \u0026amp; Kniveton, 2012; Cite \u0026amp; Cite, 2021; O'Loughlin et al., 2012; Raleigh \u0026amp; Kniveton, 2012). Nonetheless, studies in Ghana and Nigeria tend to link climate change and resource scarcity to the farmer-herder conflicts. Studies in Ghana, like those by Out and Impraim (2021), Otu, Impraim and Twumhene (2020), and Issifu, Darko, and Paalo (2022), illustrate the complex dynamics between climate change, increasing human and herd populations, resource scarcity, and farmer-herder conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilarly, studies in Nigeria link the conflict to climate change and associated desertification that engenders pasture and water scarcities in northern Nigeria prompting the exodus of pastoralists to the south and together with rising population and cultural differences lead to the conflict (Adibe, 2020; Ani \u0026amp; Uwizeyimana, 2022; Lenshie et al., 2021; Cite \u0026amp; Cite, 2021; Okoli \u0026amp; Ogayi, 2018). Studies following the eco-violence thesis to analyse the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria have also incorporated other perspectives such as the \u0026ldquo;ungoverned space\u0026rdquo; thesis (Lenshie et al., 2021), \u0026ldquo;eco-survivalism\u0026rdquo; (Okoli \u0026amp; Ogayi, 2018), \u0026ldquo;political opportunity structure\u0026rdquo; that emphasizes the impact of political changes favouring Fulani herders (Olumba, 2022). The social justice perspective has less been emphasised and there is little explicit focus on social justice perspective especially how perceptions of injustices shape the conflict from the eco-violence tradition. This paper thus contributes to literature by focusing explicitly on how perceptions of injustices shape the farmer-herder conflicts in the faces of struggles for scarce natural resources.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe political ecology perspective, evolving from a case-based approach, focuses on power relations, critiquing the scarcity and neo-Malthusian perspectives of eco-violence for lacking ecological and political detail (Robbins, 2004; Peluso \u0026amp; Watts, 2001; Verhoeven, 2011). Political ecology, acknowledging politics as the practices and processes of power relations, delves deeper into the role of political and economic factors in shaping human-environment relations (Bassett, 1988; Paulson et al., 2003). The political ecology approach highlights the interplay between local resource use patterns and larger political economies, emphasising vulnerability arising from resource dependence and its link to conflict rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance (Le Billon, 2001). Moreover, political ecology asserts that socio-political constructs influence resource allocation, exacerbating abundance or scarcity through power dynamics and property rights (Peluso \u0026amp; Watts, 2001). This approach critiques the scarcity theory for oversimplifying complex political contexts (Barnett, 2000), for overlooking socio-economic and political factors critical in understanding resource control (Lind, 2003). Empirical studies began to apply this theory to analyse farmer-herder conflicts in the late 1980s (e.g., Bassett, 1988; Turner, 1999).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, political ecologists argue that eco-violence neglects the impacts of political marginalisation and exclusion resulting from patronage politics or varying territorial capacities across states. Political ecology studies, on the other hand, emphasise how politics shapes resource distribution, causing political instability and unequal governance processes (Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009, 2019, 2021; Bergius et al., 2020; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Lind, 2003; Verhoeven, 2011; Walwa, 2020). They argue that unequal access to resources can generate ecological conflicts, often framed as distributional disputes rooted in governance failures and power imbalances (Agarwal, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2002). Such conflicts might discriminate against marginalized groups like women, people of colour, or indigenous communities, perpetuating selective exclusion and unequal treatment (Agarwal, 2001; Bullard, 1993; Guha \u0026amp; Martinez-Alier, 1997; Vesco et al., 2020).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTherefore, highlights the hierarchical relationships, power dynamics, local access issues, resource use, ethnic group membership and moral transgressions (Ahmed \u0026amp; Kuusaana, 2021; Cite \u0026amp; Cite s, 2021; Cite, 2023; Turner, 2004; Turner et al., 2011). These studies reveal that conflicts, like farmer-herder conflicts in Africa, are not merely about resources scarcity but reflect broader tensions among social groups. They address the state's role, resource access, and exclusion in conflicts. Studies examining African farmer-herder conflicts through a political ecology lens underscore the state's inconsistent role in assisting or constraining pastoral livelihoods. They demonstrate how state efforts to provide secure resources sometimes initiate social conflicts rather than ensure security (Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009, 2021; Bergius et al., 2020; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Walwa, 2020). Some political ecology studies on the farmer-herder conflicts also look into what Moritz (2006) called \"belly politics\" which refers to wealth accumulation through political power in neo-patrimonial states. From this perspective, Benjaminsen and Ba (2009, 2019) argue that corruption among government officials intensifies farmer-herder conflicts over lands.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe literature reviewed demonstrates that the focus of both eco-violence and political ecology studies on the farmer-herder conflict lack of explicit discussion of perception injustice in the context of natural resource scarcity. This is not to claim that there is nowhere perception of injustice is mentioned in the farmer-herder conflict literature, but they are less emphasised and at best just a few lines if more than a line (e.g., Brottem, 2016, p. 553; Hansen, 2023, p. 2; Kr\u0026auml;tli \u0026amp; Toulmin, 2020, p. 51; Nwozor et al., 2021, p. 61). Therefore, there is a need for an explicit focus on how perception injustice shapes the conflict in the context of resource struggles.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Social justice perspective on the farmer-herder relations\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis paper focuses on how the perception of injustices fuels violent conflicts in the context of struggles between farmers and pastoralists for access to scarce wetlands. Thus, \u0026ldquo;justice\u0026rdquo; is a crucial concept to be considered. Justice, as a concept, has varied conceptions and applications in scholarly inquiries but commonly denotes the idea that people receive what they deserve (entitlement) based on who they are and their actions (Liebig \u0026amp; Sauer, 2016; Raphael, 2001). Thus, an injustice is perceived when these expectations are not met. However, defining entitlements precisely is challenging, leaving justice open to various interpretations. Different individuals or groups may have contrasting views on justice stemming from subjective judgments or evaluations (Lind \u0026amp; Tyler, 1988). Perspectives of victims, perpetrators, and observers may diverge on what constitutes justice or injustice in a situation (Mikula \u0026amp; Wenzel, 2000). Conflicting opinions on justice can thus lead to social conflicts, and rigid beliefs hindering conflict resolution (Mikula \u0026amp; Wenzel, 2000).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTherefore, it is crucial to explore the claims of injustices by farmers and herders as well as observers to appreciate how the farmer-herder conflicts develop and escalate. The question of injustice can stem from three primary sources: distributive, procedural and participatory (Upton, 2014) but restorative injustice is also crucial. Societal frameworks, shaped by political processes, continuously alter the distributions of benefits and burdens among members, leading to debates on distributive justice (Fraser, 2007). Principles of distributive justice guide these debates, offering moral guidance on the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies (Schlosberg \u0026amp; Collins, 2014; Walker, 2012). The ideas on distributive justice emphasise evaluations of outcomes in relation to comparison standards rather than absolute terms (Figueroa, 2022). Procedural justice concerns perceptions of fairness in decision-making processes, emphasising factors like control, consistency, unbiased decision-making, appeal mechanisms, representation, and ethical compatibility (Vermunt \u0026amp; Steensma, 2016).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe perception of procedural justice impacts various outcomes, fostering acceptance of decisions, compliance with agreements, cooperation, trust in authorities, and satisfaction\u0026mdash;even when outcomes are unfavourable (Leventhal, 1980). Aspects such as participation, decision-maker accountability, and respectful treatment significantly influence perceptions of procedural fairness and subsequent conflict actors\u0026rsquo; actions (Ruano-Chamorro, Gurney \u0026amp; Cinner, 2022). Restorative justice, rooted in indigenous peacemaking practices, redefines offences as violations against people, relationships, and the community rather than the state or law and emphasises repairing the harm caused by wrongdoing (Goldblum, 2023). Restorative justice engages offenders directly with those harmed, focusing on their responsibilities to repair harm rather than solely on punitive measures by the state (Zehr, 2002). Howard Zehr outlines restorative justice's essence as collective involvement to identify, address harms, and put things right, guided by three key questions: what harm was done, how it can be repaired, and who is responsible for the repair (Zehr, 2002). In contrast to traditional conflict resolution systems centred on punishing offenders and separating them from victims, restorative justice seeks to balance the needs of all involved, encouraging empathy and accountability from offenders while providing victims with information, a voice in the process, safety, validation, and restitution where relevant (Zehr, 2002). Additionally, restorative justice involves the community, allowing them a platform to express concerns and participate in the welfare of its members (Cameron \u0026amp; Thorsborne, 2001; Strickland, 2004).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerceptions of social phenomena such as farmers' and herders' actions may be argued to provide only a limited understanding of the actual factors driving their conflict. Despite this limitation, perceptions are invaluable in understanding social issues (Higginbotham et al., 2010) and should be considered, particularly in adopting the precautionary principle to prevent further conflicts. This perspective parallels Amartya Sen's (2009) approach to defining social injustice, where societal perceptions play a significant role in both reflecting and shaping the experience of injustice. The concept of social injustice lacks a singular definition. Rawls (1999) laid the groundwork for a contemporary comprehension of social justice, presenting \u0026ldquo;justice as fairness\u0026rdquo; as a basis for society to establish just principles. Sen (2009) expands Rawls's framework by asserting that social justice not only should adhere to just principles but must also be perceived as just. This perspective underscores the importance of public perception in determining social justice, providing a platform to reconcile perceived injustices with objectively identified injustices. Similarly, perceived issues in farmer-herder relations can manifest as actual problems due to the anxiety surrounding potential injustices.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlthough social justice garners significant attention in moral and political philosophy, the attention given to social injustice remains limited. Bufacchi (2011) argues that understanding social injustice solely as the opposite of social justice restricts the comprehension of what constitutes an injustice in society. This paper views social injustice as \u003cem\u003ethe unequal or unfair social distribution of rewards, burdens, and opportunities for optimising life chances and outcomes\u003c/em\u003e (Colagiuri \u0026amp; Morrice, 2015; Morrice \u0026amp; Colagiuri, 2013), aligning with Bufacchi's (2011) perspective. It also acknowledges the precautionary principle, indicating that social injustice may arise not only from abusive actors but also from complacent authorities failing to prevent harm (Venkatapuram, Bell \u0026amp; Marmot, 2010).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom this perspective, environmental justice is crucial in understanding farmer-pastoralists' struggle in the context of land access in the face of scarcity (Jacobsen \u0026amp; Linnell, 2016). It empowers them to contest perceived injustices in land use policies, emphasising their rights and alternative resource management (Upton, 2014). Distributive injustices arise when communities lose access to resources without adequate compensation (B\u0026eacute;trisey et al., 2018; Gurney et al., 2021). Procedural justice concerns emerge when local participation in land use decisions, legislation or policy is overlooked (Fisher et al., 2018; He \u0026amp; Sikor, 2015). Displacement of traditional lifestyles also triggers environmental injustices (Blaikie \u0026amp; Muldavin, 2014; Lecuyer et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2015). Land use policies need diverse voices and inclusive approaches to ensure fairness and positive ecological outcomes (Gurney et al., 2021).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhilst not explicitly analysed, some studies indicate that the conflicts between farmers and herders across Africa are marked by persistent grievances rooted in a sense of injustice. For example, Brottem (2016) indicated that the conflict in Kotouba village in the Cercle of Kita in the Kayes Region of south-western Mali is marked by persistent grievances rooted in perceptions of injustice. Despite longstanding relationships, cases of crop damage by herders often lead to unaddressed compensation issues. Thus, as cattle crop damage often develops from scarcity of grazing fields and the grazing route, the eco-violence perspective can be complemented by emphasising the social justice perspective. This sense of injustice from failure to compensate for crop damage intensifies tensions between farmers and herders. The farmers' resentment towards herders is compounded by disparities in power and wealth, especially in the context of a bias in court judgements favouring affluent herders (Brottem, 2016).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, disparities in power and wealth between farmers and herders can be implicated in the perpetration and perception of injustice, highlighting the relevance of the political ecology perspective. Political ecology studies emphasise the complex dynamics that exacerbate these conflicts, involving poor management, corruption, and manipulation by authorities (Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Kr\u0026auml;tli \u0026amp; Toulmin, 2020) that heightens the perception of injustices. Nwozor et al. (2021) stated that an apparent governmental bias and reluctance to address the disarmament or prosecution of Fulani herders intensifies the perception of injustice, creating an unequal power structure (Nwozor et al., 2021). The social justice perspective further complements the political ecology perspective of the farmer-herder conflict because political exclusion, marginalisation, and discrimination heighten feelings of injustice and the risk of further conflict (Ogu, 2022).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhilst not explicitly foregrounded in the political ecology perspective on the farmer-herder conflicts in Africa, the social justice concerns are central to the wider political ecology analysis of resource conflicts (Blaikie \u0026amp; Brookfield, 1987; Forsyth, 2008). Political ecology's diverse focus includes resource-related conflicts, illuminating the roots of conflicts across social lines. It underscores political ecology's concern for social justice in natural resource use and its successful use of conflicts to reveal underlying power structures and interests (Blaikie \u0026amp; Brookfield, 1987; Neumann, 1998; Turner, 2004). This concern for social justice in political ecology has been less emphasised in the political ecology perspective on farmer-herder conflicts in Africa and needs to be given more central focus. This paper integrates the social justice dimension into the eco-violence perspective and emphasises it in the political ecology perspective on the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe results reported in this paper is part of a lager study exploring the farmer-herder conflicts in Central Nigeria. It was conducted in villages at the Benue-Nasarawa border in local government areas where the conflict between farmers and herders have been intense. The data collection method is in-depth interviews and field observations. The study employed a multistage sampling strategy. First, states where there has been fighting(s) or substantial dispute(s) between herders and farmers were purposively selected because that is where we can have a good amount of information regarding the drivers, dynamics and contestation surrounding the conflict. Cite and Cite (2021) indicated that the conflicts are concentrated in states in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria namely Benue, Taraba, Kaduna, Plateau, Nasarawa and Adamawa. Also, data from the Nigeria Watch database show that the top six states in Nigeria with the highest cases of the FHCs (Fig. 1) from 2008 to end of 2020 when I commenced fieldwork are Benue (142), Plateau (86), Nasarawa (77), Kaduna (46), Taraba (45) and Adamawa (29). The Nigeria Watch database uses newspaper reports to create an inventory of the incidence, location and fatality from the conflict.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInitially, the study was to be conducted in the local government areas (LGAs) with the highest conflicts in two selected states from the top six, namely Benue and Plateau States. However, at that time, there was security advice against travelling to Plateau State because of the rising crisis there. Thus, the next state on the list, Nasarawa State, was selected. Initial inquiry about the conflicts indicate they are mostly occurring in the villages at the boundary between Benue and Nasarawa States. These villages fall within Agatu, Guma, Gwer West and Logo LGAs in Benue State and Awe, Doma, Keana and Nasarawa LGAs in Nasarawa State. Thus, the study area is at the intersection of the Benue and Nasarawa (Fig. \u003cspan class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e). All these LGAs fall within the precinct Benue River valley.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe villages were visited to make observations and conduct interviews. The observations were overt with the permission of the village heads and the participants recorded. The physical and social characters of the places and how these shaped how the conflicts manifested were noted. Videos, photographs and audio recordings were made. Since most of the villages experiencing the conflicts are in close proximity within specific districts or council wards of each LGA, it was easy to explore as many villages as possible in a few visits and return to critical sites for further observation. In-depth unstructured interviews were conducted with participants from diverse backgrounds, including but not limited to farmers, herders, the leaders of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), academics, students, legal practitioners, politicians, community leaders, youth leaders, leaders of social and political organisations and NGOs, in the conflict area. The main criterion for selection is experience and knowledge of the FHCs and willingness to participate. I identified those who have the experience and knowledge of the conflict through initial contacts made with the village heads and chiefs and those who have fled the conflicts and are living in internally displaced persons\u0026rsquo; camp.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study deployed both unstructured and semi-structured interviews. Unstructured interview involves interviewing participants without a pre-planned sequence of how the questions are to be asked; hence there is minimal restraint on the question to be asked (Adeoye-Olatunde \u0026amp; Olenik, 2021). Semi-structured interviews have pre-determined set of open questions. The interviews usually began with unstructured format and the structured questions later deployed where vital issues were not discussed in the unstructured session. This approach retained the chance to touch on critical issues that may have been missed during the conversations. For example, supposed the discussion with an interviewee did not touch on land which is a central issue in the conflict, the researcher asked questions on the land section in the interview guide. Also, if the interviewees digressed the interview guide was also used to pose relevant question(s) related to issue of discussion before the digression redirecting the discussion back to track. A total of 93 interviews with 128 participants were conducted for the larger study of which 67 are relevant to this paper.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthical approval was sought from the relevant ethics committee at the author\u0026rsquo;s University. The study received ethical approval. Participation in the research was strictly voluntary. Explanations of the research\u0026rsquo;s aim, scope and duration were made to the participants before the interviews were conducted. Participants were informed that they could stop their involvement and decline to answer any questions. Written consent was requested from participants regarding disposition and readiness to participate and preferred recording technique (audiotape recording and/or note-taking). The personal and identifying information of the participant was not directly referred to in the research report. Data analysis involved thematic analysis. This approach identifies and evaluates themes and patterns in the interview\u0026rsquo;s transcript and field notes and relates them to the question of injustice. The analysis also involved constantly comparing the data (Memon et al., 2017) to assess the reliability of the themes and patterns identified and make essential adjustments when needed (Clark \u0026amp; Veal\u0026eacute;, 2018).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4. Explaining the causes of conflict: wetland’s scarcity","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe farmer-herder conflict has been recorded as far back as the 1980s in this study area but the conflicts were mostly short-lived compared with those of the last decade. Both pastoralists and farmers maintained that their first violent clash was in 1980s in the Iyode village at the boundary between Guma and Awe of LGAs of Benue and Nasarawa State, respectively. At that time Nasarawa State was still part of the lager Plateau State. The conflict developed from crop damage by pastoralists\u0026rsquo; cattle and the killing of pastoralists\u0026rsquo; cattle by farmers. This conflict led to the death of the Tiv Chief called Yawude. The current chief of Nzorov explained the origin as follows.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe conflict began in 1980s when, as I mentioned earlier, they started destroying our farms. When we called security to arrest them, they paid us. They often claimed it was their children responsible for the damage. However, things worsened when they began asserting that even if they destroyed our farms, they would not pay because they considered it their land and had the power to do as they pleased. Our former district head (Yawude) tried to mediate, urging us to find a peaceful resolution and emphasising the need for behavioural changes on both sides. He highlighted that it was not right for Tiv people to disturb Fulani cattle or for Fulani cattle to damage our farms. Unfortunately, this intervention angered the Fulani herders, leading to a planned fight that resulted in his death in 1989 (Interview A20, Tiv farmer, interpreted from Nigerian Pidgin).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe secretary of the Awe Chapter of the MACBAN also corroborated this story and hinted that the conflict escalated in 2011. In his words, \u0026ldquo;Incidents of cow killings began to occur in the 1980s\u0026rdquo; \u0026hellip;These were known as \u0026ldquo;jo\u0026rdquo; in the Tiv language, where militia groups slaughtered cows and took the meat to their homes. Subsequently, tensions between the Tiv and Fulani escalated\u0026rdquo; (Interview A26(b) Fulani pastoralists, Interpreted from Nigerian Pidgin). However, \u0026ldquo;in 1989, a crisis erupted, resulting in the killing of Yawude\u0026rdquo;. Although \u0026ldquo;this situation was eventually resolved, a major crisis arose in 2011, encompassing pastoral-farmer clashes and religious conflicts involving various ethnic groups like Hausa, Alago, and Gambari\u0026rdquo; (Interview A26(b) Fulani pastoralists, Interpreted from Nigerian Pidgin). Although violent clashes between herders and farmers (especially the Tiv) was recorded in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the conflict has escalated since 2011 as the Secretary to Awe Chapter of MACBAN indicated. Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e presents the cases of and fatalities from the conflict showing that there were eight cases with 104 fatalities across the study area in 2011 compared to less than 3 cases on average per year in the previous three years as reported by the Nigeria Watch database. The cases of and fatalities from the conflict have remained relatively higher since then.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCases and death from FHCs in the studied area\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e 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align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.074\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2011\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.29\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e109\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.015\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2012\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e121\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.457\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2013\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.29\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e219\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.066\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2014\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.86\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e66\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.431\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2015\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.43\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e55\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.026\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2016\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e106\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.904\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2017\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.86\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e100\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.683\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2018\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e102\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e29.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e774\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e28.51\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2019\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.86\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e96\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.536\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2020\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.29\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e84\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.094\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2021\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e31\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.86\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e310\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.42\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2022\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e43\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e200\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.366\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2023\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e57\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e410\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTotal\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e350\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e100\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2715\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e100\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Nigeria Watch database\u003c/em\u003e \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtList\u0026amp;cherche=1\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtList\u0026amp;cherche=1\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, the conflict\u0026rsquo;s origin lies in material interests with pastoralists\u0026rsquo; cattle crop damage and the killing of pastoralists cattle by farmers being at the centre of the conflict at the earlier stage. However, as both pastoralists and farmers opinions suggest, underlying this material struggle is the competition for access to the \u003cem\u003efadama\u003c/em\u003e, the Hausa word for floodplains. Pastoralists interviewed in the study area maintained that wetlands are extremely crucial to their livelihood to the point that even if there are dangerous wild animals in a wetland, they would kill it in order for the cattle to graze there.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWater if very important to us; that is why this place is very good for our cattle. No matter the number of grasses in a place and no matter how fresh they may be if there is no water we cannot stay there because if the cattle eat grass, they must drink water. Even if there is a lion this place where there is enough water, we will go there and deal with that lion (Interview B16, Fulani pastoralists, translated from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFarmers also corroborated the perspective of the pastoralists. For example, farmers interviewed in Agatu, explained that the tension has been about pastoralists seeking access to the \u003cem\u003efadama\u003c/em\u003e which provides better pasture: \u0026ldquo;This fadama is very fertile for them [pastoralists]. The grasses are very fertile because they[pastoralists] said when they come to Agatu here before they will go back their cow will produce more.\u0026rdquo; (Interview A50, farmer in Agatu). Thus, this corroborates Turner (2004) who indicated that the quality of land resources significantly shapes farmer-herder relations. Floodplains offer higher and more stable productivity than rain-fed land, resulting in diverse interests surrounding floodplain land (Turner, 2004). Thus, competing access to wetlands is crucial in explaining conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in many parts of Africa.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreviously, subsistence farmers and herders had a mutual tenure arrangement in this Benue River floodplain, where farmers cultivated the floodplains in the rainy season and allowed herders to graze in the dry season. However, the privatisation and the encroachment on these floodplains by agro-industrial projects and commercial farmers reduced herders\u0026rsquo; access to grazing spaces in the dry season. For example, Olam Agri in Doma LGA which was established in 2012 sits on 10,000 hectares of the \u003cem\u003efadama\u003c/em\u003e, representing 7.14% of the 140,000 hectares of floodplain in Nasarawa State. Also, Dangote Sugar farm and refinery sits on 78,000 hectares in Tunga area of Awe, representing 55.71% of the floodplain and Kereksuk Rice Farm sits on 45,000 hectares in Awe representing 32.14%. The projects and other smaller scale commercial farms on the floodplains have significantly added to the pressure on the \u003cem\u003efadama\u003c/em\u003e limiting pastoralists access to them:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor more than ten years, we do not have space for grazing. Everywhere you go, there is farm and the farms are increasing everyday. Previously, we follow our cattle routes to move the cattle to take water from the streams and rivers, but now the farmers have covered the cattle route with farms. Everywhere in this Nasarawa State is farm; here there is no land to graze our cattle. (Interview B19, Fulani pastoralists, translated from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFarmers maintained that the acquisition of the floodplains by the agro-industrial projects have reduced the pastoralists\u0026rsquo; access to the wetlands causing the pastoralists to compete with them for their space, e.g., \u0026ldquo;The places that have been left for them [pastoralists] for generations, this fadama in Nasarawa has been occupied by this Olam [Olam Agri]. They [pastoralists] have now descended on us because we are nothing\u0026rdquo; (Interview A45, Farmer). In addition, there is intense pressure on the adjoining uplands as some subsistence farmers have transformed their production into a larger scale and this make the pastoralists feel they are being displaced by the farmers: \u0026ldquo;\u0026hellip;a significant shift has occurred, and numerous farmers have transitioned to commercial farming. This shift towards commercial agriculture has also become a contributing factor to conflicts\u0026rdquo; (Interview B28, farmer).\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUpon visiting a small village, it becomes evident that the number of houses is limited, indicating that the residents have a small agricultural capacity, typically ranging from ten to twenty hectares, or roughly fifty hectares. However, these villagers now seek financial assistance from local elites. Such individuals arrive now cultivate significantly larger areas exceeding 200 hectares. This situation creates a sense of limited space for herders, making them feel the farmers are displacing them. (Interview B25, farmer).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHerders assert that the expansion of crop fields by farmers block grazing routes (\u003cem\u003elabi\u003c/em\u003e), prompting retaliatory actions that result in crop and farm destruction: \u0026ldquo;the main reason why there is damage on crops by cattle is because there is no grass and no passage for cattle to take water; everywhere is farm\u0026rdquo; (Interview B25, pastoralists, interpreted from Hausa). They also highlight the issue of lack of access to traditional routes, particularly those leading to watering points.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe know the specific paths we have traditionally used for grazing; there are designated grazing routes. Often, what happens is that farmers cultivate in these areas, obstructing the cattle passage or blocking the roads used. This obstruction angers the herders, leading them to take matters into their own hands, resulting in actions such as destroying the farms. The destruction occurs because farming activities impede the paths where the cattle typically move. Consequently, when these routes get blocked, leaving the herders unable to pass, they retaliate by destroying the farms in frustration (Interview A16, pastoralists, interpreted from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFarmers, on the other hand, emphasise the encroachment of herders onto their farms, attributing conflicts to the destruction of crops and the failure to respect farmland boundaries. Additionally, both herders and farmers\u0026rsquo; perspectives suggest that the scarcity of land and the increasing human and cattle population contribute to the increase in demand for land resulting in competition for access and ownership of lands, especially the fadama. The debate extends to whether cattle routes were historically present and whether they should be created without due permission or negotiation:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe issue with some complaints regarding the absence of cattle routes is that these routes did not exist there before. If there is a sudden demand for it now, negotiation becomes necessary. Demanding that the landowner forfeits part of their land for the convenience of others should be discussed and negotiated rather than forcefully imposed upon them. (Interview B, farmer).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, this farmer\u0026rsquo;s opinion in the quote above suggests that there is a feeling of procedural injustice among farmers\u0026rsquo; if grazing routes are created without due negotiation and perhaps compensation. Overall, the farmers and pastoralists\u0026rsquo; views underscore the multifaceted nature of the conflicts, touching on land rights, population growth, traditional routes, encroachments, and lack of proper governance or negotiation between both parties. Underlying these issues is the scarcity of floodplain, and pastoralist quest for access to the limited uncultivated wetlands.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"5. Perceptions of injustice and conflict escalation","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e5.1 Perceived injustices from material struggles and the conflict management\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe farmers and herders\u0026rsquo; perceptions of injustices relating to their conflicts in the study area demonstrate a lack of multiple dimensions of justice shaping the ongoing tensions. The interviews show that the conflict actors perceive multitude of injustices encompassing mainly a lack of distributive and procedural justices. Distributive justice refers to the equitable distribution of resources and opportunities among different groups. Procedural justice refers to the fairness and impartiality in the processes and procedures followed to resolve disputes. In the study area, there is a glaring perception of disparity in the distribution of resources, particularly land and compensation for crop damage and the perception of the absence of fair and unbiased procedures for addressing farmer-herder grievances.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe herders feel unjustly treated considering what they perceive as fair in the management of crop damage by pastoralists\u0026rsquo; cattle and cattle theft by farmers. The opinions of the pastoralists interviewed emphasised how cattle theft and killing of cattle soured the relationship between them and Tiv farmers. According to the leader of the pastoralists whose area of influence covers the Awe LGA in Nasarawa State and Guma LGA in Benue State, there has been bias in the treatment of crimes committed by Tiv farmers and Fulani pastoralists:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWhen a Tiv person committed a crime, they were not taken before the law. However, if a Fulani person did something, they were immediately brought to justice, perpetuating this bias. As a result, the Fulani began to seek revenge. If a farmer confronted them, they would retaliate. This cycle of revenge has persisted until now. If the security agents allowed them to retaliate, they were content and acted as they pleased. (Interview B35, pastoralist).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe crimes the pastoralists\u0026rsquo; leader was talking about is the issue of crop destruction by pastoralists\u0026rsquo; cattle and killing of cattle by farmers. For the farmers, especially the Tiv, the conflict started from the pastoralists refusal to pay compensation for crop damaged by cattle. The farmers reject the view that they are responsible for the rustling and killing of pastoralists\u0026rsquo; cattle. Rather they argue that the refusal to pay compensation for crop damage is the bone of contention. Pastoralists\u0026rsquo; refusal to pay comes from claims that the farmers attempt to evict them after collecting exorbitant compensation far higher than the value of damage done to crops by cattle and huge fees to grant them access to land for grazing:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOne major issue is when we move to certain communities for grazing. These communities demand that we purchase a portion of the grassland there, often at exorbitant prices. After paying and entering the area, our boys and cows are still subjected to beating and sometimes even killing of the cattle. We often need to seek permission by sitting down with the community leaders, negotiating, and paying money before we are allowed to graze. The amount paid ranges from 100,000 to 500,000 naira for a portion of land. Even when there are accidental instances of our cows trespassing and causing crop damage, we will be taxed heavily. We engage in discussions to settle these issues. However, the problem worsens when, after settling and paying the requested fees, the communities later refuse to allow us to stay despite having paid for the right to graze there. This rejection and expulsion after fulfilling their demands are particularly painful and distressing for us (Interview A16, Fulani pastoralists, interpreted from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHowever, the farmers refute that herders\u0026rsquo; claims arguing that the pastoralists started refusing to pay compensation for crop damage because they have acquired guns: \u0026ldquo;Things escalated when they started moving around armed with AK47s. Initially, they assured us that there was no issue, but in 2013, they began killing people in our villages\u0026rdquo; (Interview A21, Tiv farmer). Therefore, the conflict is shaped by the perception of distributive and procedural injustices regarding access to land and how disagreements stemming from crop damage and the killing of cattle are addressed. This perception of injustices has deteriorated the mutual solidarity farmers and herders once shared for survival as they have become more focused on monetary profit. Herders\u0026rsquo; refusal to pay compensation under the above alleged circumstance has swayed some farmers to alternative dispute resolution through the courts, which herders dislike due to the stress of legal procedures, legal fees, and the potential hefty fines imposed by the court, requiring compensation to both the government and the farmer:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSome staffs of the court are aware, they know the herder, he is a man that doesn\u0026rsquo;t want peace to reign at all times, but during my judgement at least I think I have not had anything that has to do with that man again because he was compel to pay compensation to the state government and to the farmer at least he has learnt his lessons (Interview B29, Magistrate Court Judge, Keana).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe use of courts by farmers to seek justice and especially the requirement to compensate the government in addition to the farmer is another phenomenon pastoralists consider procedural and restorative injustices. Herders strongly dislike court cases, and farmers who resort to legal action for \u003cem\u003ecrop destruction\u003c/em\u003e grievances may become targets of the herders. A distressing example involves a young Tiv farmer who obtained court judgments against herders, ordering them to compensate him over ₦1,000,000 (Interview B10, Alago farmer). The Tiv farmers received a warning that the herders would attack in three days. So, they fled their village to Doma Township. The Tiv farmer who obtained court judgments against herders had returned to his farm one evening to collect his produce before the herders would strike. Unfortunately, the herders arrived and killed him (Interview B10, Alago farmer). This grim account highlights the grave dangers faced by farmers who dare to confront herders through legal means because they perceive it as restorative injustice that negates the traditional approach to resolving the dispute. Thus, perceptions of distributive, procedural and restorative injustices can be germane to the intensification of conflicts and emergence of violent actions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e5.2 Violence escalation: perception of anti-open grazing law as procedural and restorative injustices\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBeyond the perception of disparities in how resources, rights, and legal treatments are allocated between farmers and herders, another procedural injustice strongly emphasised by herders as the most critical factor for violence escalation is the perceived unfairness in addressing the conflict through the enactment of the anti-open grazing law in Benue State. The herders see the law as a catalyst for further violent crisis and rightly so because as Fig. 3 shows, there is a sharp rise in the cases of and even far more deaths from the conflict in 2018 when the law enforcement began. There is a recurring notion among farmers that the Federal Government did not address the conflict between herders and farmers because it supported the atrocities of the pastoralists which created a sense of injustice about the government\u0026rsquo;s handling of the conflict. Farmers mostly blame the Federal Government as culpable in the crisis for failure to act or giving herders preferential treatment in the conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFarmers think that the law is vital because security agencies controlled by the Federal Government failed to address herders\u0026rsquo; violent activities effectively, with herders managing to evade punishment and continuing to ravage farms. This perception of procedural injustice provided the impetus for farmers support for the anti-open grazing law. Farmers in Benue State perceive the law as a corrective measure to protect their interests. They considered the former president Mahammadu Buhari treated the pastoralists preferentially by not encouraging the pastoralists to obey the anti-open grazing law in Benue State to resolve the crisis:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSo, now, for me, I am blaming the Federal Government because those people [pastoralists], they are terrorists. How come they are moving with AK47 and government, Buhari cannot say I decline. If he claims to decline, the decline does not make sense because they are still doing it and he has the power. If he says today, they should respect government of Benue for the law [anti-open grazing law] they have implemented, the matter [conflict] will finish. That is all I see because already government has taken its own decision. Government of Benue has taken its own decision (Interview A21, Tiv farmer).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMeanwhile, herders believe that the implementation of the anti-grazing law is an unjust means of displacement, affecting their traditional way of life and disrupted traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, leading to a breakdown in dialogue and resolution methods. Herders mostly blame the government of Benue State. They particularly accuse the former Benue State governor, Mr Samuel Otorm (who is a Tiv) of marginalisation for its intervention in the conflict through the enactment of anti-open grazing law. This sense of procedural injustice according to the herders and particularly the killing of a herder by Benue State Livestock Guard (BSLG) enforcing the law motivated their retaliation through armed attacks on the Tiv farmers:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eConflicts between them [pastoralists] and the Tiv people have been occurring periodically over the years, but the situation worsened in the last few years. Both groups have been living in the bush prior to escalating tensions. The conflict started from Makurdi when Governor Otorm instructed the Fulani herders to leave Makurdi [use Makurdi, the state capital to referred to Benue State]. This directive intensified the conflict. When the Fulani herders were attacked and killed there, reprisal attacks occurred, with Tiv people being targeted. This cycle of violence continues, and without this specific trigger, there would be no conflict between the two groups. (Interview B21, Fulani herder, interpreted from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePastoralists indicate that the enforcement of the anti-grazing law has separated the pastoralist and farmers with no chance for dialogue and reconciliation highlighting perceived restorative injustice. Thus, the herders\u0026rsquo; perception of the law stems from the perspective of restorative justice which is rooted in indigenous peace-making practices that focuses on violations against people, relationships, and the community rather than the state or law and emphasises repairing the harm caused by wrongdoing (Goldblum, 2023). Thus, the use of the law as a tool for conflict resolution by the Benue State Government is perceived an injustice hence is a point of contention and a significant factor contributing to the worsening situation. The herders reminisce about past conflict resolution methods that were effective before the anti-grazing law was enforced.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePreviously, when conflicts arose between herders and farmers, they would gather, sit together, and resolve issues amicably. The absence of this shared space and dialogue because of the displacement engendered by the enforcement of the law is highlighted as a significant loss contributing to the current conflict escalation.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe crisis has been ongoing for a considerable period, but the situation is worse now. In the past, when we resided in Benue, any conflicts or violence that arose would be resolved through discussions and mutual agreement. However, the enforcement of the anti-grazing law compelled us to leave Benue. As a result, we find it impossible to live in Benue now. The implementation of this law is what exacerbated the conflict, making it worse than it was in previous years. Previously, when we coexisted with the Tiv community, if our cattle caused any trouble, they would approach the Mai-angwa [village head] and settle the dispute amicably. However, the introduction of the anti-grazing law has made it difficult for leaders from both sides to make efforts to resolve the issue. Previously, if someone committed an offense, the police would take action and enforce the law. But now, the Livestock Guard holds the power, creating a tensed situation without peace. This change has significantly escalated the conflict, leaving no peaceful resolution in sight (Interview B26b, pastoralist, interpreted from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe pastoralists emphasised the significant impact of the anti-grazing law in Benue. They argued that this legislation has disrupted not only their traditional way of life but also the traditional approach to managing the conflicts. Thus, there is a perception of a shift in authority from the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as that conducted by the Mai-angwa [village heads], to the Livestock Guard. This shift is viewed negatively by the herders as disrupting the established norms of managing the conflict highlighting perception restorative injustice. The herders portray the conflict as having reached an insurmountable level due to the absence of dialogue, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, and law enforcement impartiality.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOverall, the escalation of violence in the farmer-herder relations in the study area can be argued to be rooted in perceived distributive and procedural injustices regarding access to scarce resources and the management of conflicts stemming from the competition for scarce resources. Farmers feel marginalised by the Federal Government, believing that it supports herders and overlooks their violent activities. Conversely, herders feel alienated by the anti-grazing law, perceiving it as discriminatory and disruptive to their way of life. Both groups feel their traditional systems of resolving conflicts and their heritage have been disregarded, leading to further misunderstandings and exacerbation of the conflict. These perceptions of bias and injustice are linked to political influences, with allegations that politicians siding with members of their own groups, affecting governance and fair judgment. This political influence exacerbates the cycle of revenge and retaliation, perpetuating the conflict and eroding trust in the justice system and governance.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe study has explored how wetland scarcity and perceptions of injustices contribute to the farmer-herder conflict and its escalation in Benue-Nasarawa borderland. It incorporated the social injustice perspective into the eco-violence and political ecology perspectives on the farmer-herder conflicts. It emphasises that perceptions of injustices are crucial to clarifying the escalation of the conflict rather than the cause. Some studies that have mentioned perceptions of injustices but have not deeply explore this dimension (Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009, 2019; Brottem, 2016; Eke, 2018; Hagberg, 2005; Hernann, 2016; Kr\u0026auml;tli \u0026amp; Toulmin, 2020; Nwozor et al., 2021; Ogu, 2022; Tobie \u0026amp; Sangare, 2019) tend to see it as the cause. The study has demonstrated that the scarcity of wetlands, crucial to agro-pastoral production, underpins this conflict root rather than the scarcity of all lands. Wetlands\u0026rsquo; scarcity has triggered intense resource access competition between pastoralists and farmers. Thus, this finding supports the environmental security perspective on the farmer-herder conflict that emphasis the role of resources scarcity (e.g., Homer-Dixon, 1999; Cabot, 2007; Out et al., 2020). However, the escalation of conflict is associated more with the perceptions of injustices that centred on distributive, procedural and restorative injustices. Incorporating these social justice concepts helps explain how perceptions of injustices created a circle of actions and reactions of retaliation and deterrence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe perception of distributive and procedural injustices was more related to issues of addressing grievances from crop damage by pastoralists and cattle killing by farmers and compensation for these wrongdoings. Hence, this suggest that while scarcity (as a material condition) is relevant, the conflict root lies in the perception of injustice/justice regarding how compensation for wrongdoings in farmer-herder relations are addressed. Thus, the social justice perspective can be valuable to the eco-violence theory of the conflict. While also related to distributive and procedural injustices, the management of the conflict through state intervention and the action of the Federal Government influenced perception of restorative injustices. Particularly, pastoralists\u0026rsquo; perception of the anti-open grazing law enacted by the Benue State government as procedural and restorative injustices triggered a violent response as retaliation and deterrence, leading to violent attacks on farmers and counter-attacks from farmers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExisting political ecology studies emphasise that state policies marginalising pastoralists is often at the heart of this conflict (e.g., Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Walwa, 2020). However, in the study area, the anti-open grazing law while marginalising the pastoralists, did not cause the conflict. Instead, the conflict is rooted the scarcity of wetlands and it is escalated by perceptions of distributive and procedural injustices in compensation for crop damage and cattle killings in face of competition for scarce wetlands. However, the escalation of violence is a function of perceptions of procedural and restorative injustices pertaining to pastoralists and farmers\u0026rsquo; senses of marginalisation by governments at the state and federal levels, respectively. Thus, the incorporation of the social justice perspective to the scarcity theory from the eco-violence perspective can explain the origin of the tensions. Emphasising the social justice perspective to the political ecology perspective on the conflict explains the escalation of violence. Hence, the incorporation of the social justice perspective can offer a bridge between political ecology and eco-violence perspectives on the farmer-herder conflicts which have had disagreements. This perspective can help improve the analysis of the FHCs using a single framework that integrates both perspectives despite their theoretical disagreements.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"7. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe study delved into the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland, exploring the impact of wetland scarcity and perceived injustices on conflict escalation. It combines social injustice, eco-violence, and political ecology perspectives to highlight the critical role of perceptions of injustice in conflict origins and intensification. The study shows that the scarcity of wetlands crucial for agro-pastoral activities fuels resource competition, driving conflict between pastoralists and farmers. While resource scarcity is crucial, conflict escalation is primarily linked to distributive and procedural injustice perceptions. Grievances regarding compensation for crop damage and cattle killings drive distributive and procedural injustice perceptions, shaping the conflict's core. Additionally, state intervention, notably the anti-open grazing law, amplifies procedural and restorative injustice perceptions, prompting violent responses and counter-attacks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContrary to existing political ecology studies, which attribute conflicts to state policies marginalising pastoralists, this study finds that the anti-open grazing law, while marginalising herders, did not initiate the conflict. Instead, the conflict stems from perceived injustices in compensation amid wetland competition. However, the law's role lies in intensifying violence due to procedural and restorative injustice perceptions in farmer-herder relations. The study's contribution to literature is that it elucidates the origins and escalation of conflict by integrating social justice perspectives into scarcity theories from eco-violence and political ecology. The findings can bridge the gap between the divergent eco-violence and political ecology perspectives. The study argues that integrating social justice perspectives with eco-violence and emphasizing social justice in political ecology perspectives on FHCs can offer a unified framework for analysing farmer-herder conflicts, enhancing a comprehensive understanding that reduces their theoretical differences.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003eConflict of Interest: none.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthics: The study received appropriate ethical approval.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAdger, W.N., Arnell, N.W., Black, R., Dercon, S., Geddes, A., Thomas, D.S.G., 2015. Focus on environmental risks and migration: causes and consequences. Environ. Res. Lett. 10, 060201.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAdibe, J. (2020). 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Growing farmer-herder conflicts in Tanzania: the licenced exclusions of pastoral communities interests over access to resources. \u003cem\u003eThe Journal of Peasant Studies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e47\u003c/em\u003e(2), 366-382.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eZehr, H. (2002). The little book of restorative justice. Intercourse, PA: Good Books.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[{"identity":"fefdeb95-81ee-49c6-b2ab-4ca9288b5b67","identifier":"10.13039/501100000867","name":"Commonwealth Scholarship Commission","awardNumber":"NGCA-2020-76","order_by":0}],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"University of Leicester","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"farmer-herder conflict, injustice, political ecology, eco-violence, scarcity","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6967912/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6967912/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eFor decades, there have been debates on whether scarcity of natural resources causes the conflict between pastoralists and crop farmers in Africa. This study examines the farmer-herder conflict in Benue-Nasarawa borderland in Nigeria from the perspective of the scarcity thesis. It shows how wetland scarcity and perceived injustices contribute to and escalate the farmer-herder conflict in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland. It integrates social injustice, eco-violence, and political ecology perspectives, highlighting the pivotal role of perceptions of injustice in shaping the conflict's root and intensification and violent actions. The conflict's roots lie in perceived distributive and procedural injustices related to compensation for crop damage and cattle killings in farmer-herder relations amid competition for access to wetlands. Nonetheless, state intervention and the anti-open grazing law's enactment foster procedural and restorative injustice perceptions, triggering violent responses and counter-attacks. Unlike prior studies that attribute conflicts to state policies marginalising pastoralists, this study finds that the anti-open grazing law, while marginalising the pastoralists, did not instigate the conflict. Instead, the law intensifies violence due to the perception of it as procedural and restorative injustices. The paper suggests that integrating the social justice into eco-violence perspective and emphasising social justice more in the political ecology perspective can reduce the theoretical disagreement between eco-violence and political ecology perspective on the conflict. It can provide a platform for a framework the blends the two traditions enhancing the analysis of farmer-herder conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Perceptions of injustices in the struggle for scarce critical lands: farmer-herder conflict and violence escalation in the Benue-Nasarawa borderland","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-06-26 06:25:18","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6967912/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"d4c4a936-8f98-43ef-85fd-9e5c72836b73","owner":[],"postedDate":"June 26th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":50534138,"name":"Development Economics"},{"id":50534139,"name":"Behavioral Geography"},{"id":50534140,"name":"Other Political Science"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-06-26T06:25:18+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-06-26 06:25:18","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6967912","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6967912","identity":"rs-6967912","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}