Structural Violence and Protracted Insurgency in Baluchistan: Investigating its Implications on National Security of Pakistan

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Subsequently, Baluchistan has been experiencing a protracted insurgency and counterinsurgency operations carried out by the security forces. The study examines the policies implemented by the Pakistani government as a direct cause of violence and insurgency, which has resulted in ongoing security operations in Baluchistan. I contend that discriminatory state policies and persistent neglect have resulted in a sense of hopelessness among the disenfranchised population. Additionally, there is a growing public sentiment that the state is grabbing their resources without their consent. Based on Galtung's theory of structural violence and conflict theory, I argue that discriminatory state policies, prolonged neglect, and limited public involvement in developmental enterprises have generated a sense of despair and hopelessness. Consequently, these communities have resorted to armed resistance in order to safeguard their rights, pushing the security dynamics of this region from being neglected area to the epicenter of international headlines. Social science/Criminology Humanities/Cultural and media studies Social science/Cultural and media studies Social science/Development studies Social science/Politics and international relations Social science/Social policy Social science/Sociology Violence terrorism counter terrorism geopolitics marginalized people Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Introduction Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has been confronted with serious challenges in creating a harmonious society. Groups with ethnic, linguistic, and regional affiliations, whose allegiances are primarily regional and tribal rather than national, frequently find themselves in confrontation with a broader notion of national identity (M. N. Khan, 2021 ). The tragedy of former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and the repeated insurgencies in Baluchistan are notable examples. Regardless of conflicting assertions, it is an undeniable reality that Baluchistan continues to be Pakistan's soft underbelly, even after seventy-seven years of independence(Shah & Ishaque, 2017 ). The causes of the instability are widely recognized; nonetheless, there has been inadequate efforts to address their grievances though inclusive participation of all the stake holders (Ishaque et al., 2021a ). Baluchistan has garnered significant attention in both local and international media during the past five decades. The state of Pakistan's failure to incorporate a highly destitute and neglected territory into the national mainstream, due to a lack of political determination and prioritization, has led to a violent insurrection by marginalized segments of society (Ishaque et al., 2022 ). The federal government launched security operations in Baluchistan for the first time in 1973, with the aim of addressing socio-economic needs (Wani, 2023 ). Over the past five decades, five rounds of counterinsurgency operations have been carried out. However, despite these efforts, a persistent insurgency continues to this day (Bukhari, 2025 ). Due to years of neglect, marginalization, underdevelopment, and flawed state policies, people have resorted to armed resistance against the government, causing widespread destruction through the use of suicide bombers and target killings against variety of targets, especially the security forces (Mehdi et al., 2021 ). This violence persists, amid fluctuating intensity. There is insufficiency of literature about Baluchistan, but the author has dedicated over a decade to extensively exploring various regions of Baluchistan. The data collection was conducted through field visits, and the analyses are primarily derived on first-hand knowledge gathered during personal visits to the majority of the troubled districts. The research paper posits that deprivation, economic marginalization, abhorrent human rights conditions, and a lack of individual freedom are fundamental factors contributing to the ongoing insurgency (Rehman et al., 2025 ). Conversely, from the state's standpoint, the inflexible tribal culture and sardari system hinder the developmental activities and prevent the population from reaping the economic benefits of mega development projects launched in Baluchistan. The rebels' widely accepted views revolve around the foreigners' exploitation of Baluch resources. Consequently, the locals have a moral obligation to violently resist the occupiers in order to protect their rights (Yasmin et al., 2025 ). The study comprehensively examines the prevalence of violence in Baluchistan by applying Galtung's theory of structural violence and conflict theory. Applying theoretical frameworks to the unique security environment of Baluchistan can aid in investigating the state's policies towards these peripheral regions. Such policies have resulted in attracting international attention as hotspots of terrorism and conflict. The study also provides recommendations for ensuring long-term stability as a policy input for the government, which is currently working towards launching a comprehensive reconciliation process and integrating these undeveloped regions into the mainstream. Core Argument Structural violence and years of neglect have alienated the Baluch population and generated feelings of marginalization. Instead of dialogue and development, the successive governments have resorted to use of force to suppress the population, who has now challenged the writ of state through protracted insurgency for safeguarding their fundamental rights and tribal traditions. Research Questions Q.1. What is the genesis of Baluchistan problem? Q. 2. Why successive governments failed to redress the public grievances? Q. 3. Why the state machinery always resorted to structural violence? Q. 4. How protracted insurgency is affecting Pakistan’s national security paradigm? Q. 5. What policy measures should be adopted in mainstreaming of Baluch population and enduring stability in Baluchistan? Materials and Methods Overview of Baluchistan Baluchistan, situated in the South-West of Pakistan, is the largest province in terms of land area but is the least developed (Akhtar, 2011 ). It shares borders with Iran and Afghanistan, as well as with the erstwhile FATA region, which is now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Punjab, and Sindh provinces (Ahmed et al., 2020 ). Map of Baluchistan is given in Figure.1. Baluchistan comprises around 43% of Pakistan's total land area and is a thinly inhabited region, with only 6.8% of the country's population(Zafar et al., 2024 ). The population of Baluchistan, according to the 1998 census, is 12.34 million. Baluchistan is home to various ethnic groups, including as Balochi, Pashtun, Punjabis, and Sindhi(G. Siddiqui & Siddiqui, 2009 ). The demographic survey published in 2011 in the daily newspaper. The News reveals that the population composition of Baluchistan is as follows: 35.49% Baloch, 17.12% Brahui, 35.34% Pashtun, 1.13% Punjabis, 2.65% Saraiki, 4.56% Sindhi, and 3.71% other people. Demography chart is shown in Fig. 2 . The province consists of 30 administrative districts and 7 divisions, which include both A and B Areas as given in Fig. 3 . The government's operations are divided between the Police and other law enforcement agencies, each with different levels of jurisdiction and engagement (Makki et al., 2025 ). From an ethnic standpoint, the northern region is predominantly inhabited by the Pashtun population, while the southern region is primarily home to the Baluch population. The capital city of Quetta and its surrounding areas include a diverse mix of different ethnic groups. The capital city is moderately developed, with a considerable level of infrastructure development, government buildings, military training facilities, and shopping malls (Ul-Huda et al., 2015 ). The lifestyle in areas outside of Quetta, particularly in the periphery regions, exhibits notable differences. The fundamental necessities such as power, gas, water, healthcare, and education are not being taken into account, and extreme poverty is being observed (Dikshit & Dikshit, 2025a ). The population density in Baluchistan is exceptionally low due to the difficult hilly terrain, lack of necessary infrastructure, insufficient water, and basic services. The Suleman Mountain range dominates the northern section of Baluchistan, with the Bolan Pass serving as a historical route to Kandahar in Afghanistan (Singh, 2019 ). The Makran range is located in the south, while Kalat is situated near the middle of the province. The region extending from Quetta to the coastline and Iranian border is characterized by a low population density, primarily due to its arid topography. However, there are a few isolated settlements around water reservoirs or river streams. In contrast, Baluchistan is the most economically disadvantaged province of Pakistan, despite being endowed with abundant natural resources and a coastline (Bashir et al., 2023 ). The complexity and difficulty of law enforcement and development activities are exacerbated by the intricate governance, administrative, and judicial jurisdiction conundrum. This is due to the prevailing feudal system and the significant influence wielded by sardars in their different districts and tribes (Pavla & Petr, 2012 ). The government is also subject to Sardar's preferences and approval of development projects or exploration activities. Hence, the inefficient civil administration, absence of political reform initiatives by the government, and indifferent attitude of the federal government have resulted in a sense of hopelessness among the populace, who perceive themselves as marginalized and their resources being exploited by external entities(Ullah & Akhtar, 2024 ). The widespread acceptance of the slogan among the Baluch people, which highlights their conversion into a minority and their enslavement, has generated a significant level of sympathy among the oppressed population(Bansal, 2008a ). Consequently, there is a prevailing sentiment that violent methods are necessary to secure their rights(Samad, 2015 ). From a geostrategic standpoint, Baluchistan is situated at the confluence of economic, socio-cultural, and physical crossroads of West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East as shown in Fig. 4 . The close vicinity to the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing development of Gwadar Port makes it an attractive industrial hub with significant investments expected from both local and foreign investors (Siddiqi, 2015 ). Baluchistan has a border that spans 1200 kilometres with Afghanistan, 900 kilometres with Iran, and roughly 200 kilometres of coastline (Dikshit & Dikshit, 2025b ). Due to its geostrategic advantages, Baluchistan is positioned as a crucial transit and commerce hub. It is also expected to serve as a launching point for future regional economic integration (Akbar & Shabbir, 2024 ). The Province of Baluchistan is blessed with abundant natural resources, both exploited and unexploited. The Sui gas field is the largest in the country and supplies around 60% of Pakistan's gas requirements (Tariq, 2013a ). As per the Government of Baluchistan, Board of Investment and Trade data, the province possesses a substantial quantity of mineral resources. The regions of Reko Diq, Saindak, and Duddar are rich in high-grade mineral resources. Consequently, the provincial administration of Baluchistan has built specific mineral processing zones in Saindak, Duddar, and District Lasbela, as well as a marble city in Hub. In addition, coal reserves are being exploited in the areas of Sibbi and Loralai(Aslam, 2011 ). Research methodology The mixed methods approach has been applied in completing study using both primary and secondary data sources. Semi structured interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in obtaining public’s perception of District Kohlu and Sibbi. Additionally, the content analysis was conducted by examining news conferences, speeches, and policy declarations made by political leaders, tribal leaders and government institutions. Field visits were also conducted to Tehsil Kahan of District Kohlu and interior regions of District Sibbi. Field visits to Gwadar were also conducted to examine the ongoing mega development projects associated with much trumpeted China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Poverty and under development survey were also conducted which was later analysed through quantitative method using SPSS. The last part of the study provides policy recommendations for relevant government ministries and institutions for enduring stability and poverty alleviation in the most impoverished region of Pakistan. Conceptual framework The study has been completed by using a combination of two theories to objectively assess the internal dynamics of the unrest in Baluchistan and the government's notion of rational actor to the use of force to suppress the insurgency. The conflict theory provides a comprehensive explanation for the sources of conflict in Baluchistan. It highlights the widespread belief among the public that the federal government is seizing their abundant natural resources, leading to the marginalization of local residents. As a result, armed rebellion is seen as a legitimate means to safeguard their rights. The second idea is the concept of structural violence, which focuses on the state's excessive use of force to establish peace in Baluchistan and the resulting rebellion of the people due to unintended harm. Both views are elaborated upon in the following paragraph. The primary premise of Conflict theories is the correlation between civil wars or insurgencies and the abundance of natural resources, whereby the "wealth derived from natural resources can incite, escalate, or perpetuate armed uprisings." Therefore, in the context of Pakistan, the reliance on Baluchistan's natural gas, minerals, and ongoing infrastructure development projects through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) inevitably leads to conflict. The broader public perception supports the idea that resorting to violence increases the chances of gaining valuable resources and profits, which may not be achieved through peaceful protests. This has been empirically demonstrated by the state's preferences and priorities for Baluchistan over the past 50 years. Baloch politician and former governor, Mir Ghaus Bizenjo, asserted that "Baluchistan did not need Pakistan but Pakistan needed Baluchistan."(Ishaque et al., 2021b ) There three analytical methodologies for examining conflicts related to the allocation of resources(Ertmer et al., 2003 ). The first aspect centres around environmental factors or the grievances that emerge because of the escalating shortage of renewable resources. The second perspective highlights the role of economic considerations, where conflicts are driven by the self-interested pursuit of wealth and greed by individuals. The third and ultimate state-centric approach centres on the political factors and deficiencies in institutions. The analysis at hand is especially concerned with economic considerations. The authors contend that economic factors have a significant correlation with oil, but they also highlight how rebels seeking to make references to ethnic and religious marginalization, unequal distribution of wealth, government ineptitude, and lack of political rights in their political demands (Bansal, 2008b ). Baloch rebels cite all of these grievances as reasons for engaging in insurgency against the Pakistani state. Significantly, when a specific subgroup, whether it be defined by ethnicity, politics, or religion, perceives that it is not being adequately included in the benefits derived from the exploitation of natural resources, there is an increased likelihood of political instability (M. Hussain & Kumar, 2023 ). This is exemplified by instances such as rebel assaults on oil workers in Nigeria and attacks on energy infrastructure and personnel in Baluchistan. When there is an established energy infrastructure to extract and utilize natural resources, rebels have the chance and motivation to target this infrastructure in order to create more instability, exert political influence on the government, and strengthen their nationalist cause (Bansal, 2005 ). Additionally, the residents of any given region anticipate receiving a portion of the wealth generated from the extraction of natural resources from their land. If the residents of regions abundant in resources perceive themselves to be falling behind in terms of infrastructure and living standards, while other regions or provinces benefit from their resources, they are likely to feel resentful. Many Baloch leaders have previously stated that they will not support foreign development initiatives that extract resources from Baluchistan which do not benefit the local inhabitants (A. Khan, 2009 ). Scholars have established that economic development is crucial for reducing the occurrences of intra-state conflict. In the case of Baluchistan, the initial steps towards this would involve effective management of the revenue of natural resource and implementation of mega development projects that provide social and economic advantages to the local communities (Bansal, 2006 ). Politically, it is necessary for the state to grant Baloch political leaders and the provincial government equal voice in decision-making, allowing them to actively participate and have a stake in the economic development of the province. An alternative approach, when considering policy development, is the implementation of efficient strategies for managing natural resources (A. Khan, 2003 ). The effectiveness of the governance system for resource extraction, processing, and revenue management determines whether natural resources are beneficial or detrimental. In the context of Baluchistan, this would involve guaranteeing that the revenue generated from natural resources is not only received in the form of royalties but also allocated to development funds for the underdeveloped regions of Baluchistan. Structural violence is a form of harm that is not easily seen but is deeply embedded in the social and political systems of institutions. It leads to disparities in society, whether they are related to social, political, economic, or cultural factors (Tariq, 2013b ). The population of Baluchistan have experienced increased social and economic marginalization due to constitutional and legal isolation and governmental neglect. The current administrative and bureaucratic systems are contributing to the discontent of population towards the state. Literature Review There is a scarcity of literature regarding the insurgency in Baluchistan. Possible factors contributing to this situation may include the perception that it was a localized issue specific to Pakistan, and the region's isolated and underdeveloped nature, which could have hindered accessibility. Nevertheless, diligent efforts have been made to access archives, digital libraries, and electronic resources. The history of Baluchistan is marked by a series of uprisings that began soon after the foundation of Pakistan in 1947 (Khattak et al., 2022 ). At that time, the provinces were expected to willingly join the newly established state of Pakistan. In 1948, the government of Pakistan gained attention for the annexation of the state of Kalat following the Khan of Kalat's decision to accede on August 15, 1947. Abdul Karim Khan, the younger brother of Khan, declined to acknowledge the succession and led a rebellion in May 1948 alongside his loyal supporters. This led to a conflict with the security forces, resulting in casualties and damage. In order to suppress the rebellion, Khan was apprehended in 1950 and incarcerated for a duration of seven years (Bhattacharya, 2024 ). The implementation of the "One Unit System" in 1955, which merged all four provinces of West Pakistan into a single administrative structure, resulted in feelings of marginalization and a perceived loss of autonomy and identity among the Baluch population (Lieven, 2017 ). This eventually led to a significant confrontation with the state apparatus in 1958. The security forces were motivated to impose martial law in 1958 in response to the turmoil in Baluchistan. A full-scale operation was carried out in Kalat, resulting in the re-arrest of Khan. Nevertheless, the opposition to the "one Unit System" intensified and by 1963, the Bugti, Marri, and Mengal tribes initiated a rebellion against the central authority (Rizwan & Arshad, 2014 ). The prolonged neglect, exclusion, inadequate progress, and extreme poverty resulted in feelings of detachment among the inhabitants, ultimately leading to a large-scale insurgency in the province (Weinbaum, 2019 ). In 1970, the federal government officially designated Baluchistan as a province. However, during this period, the conditions were set for a rebellion, and the following years proved this prediction to be true. The public mood in Baluchistan is strongly negative towards the federal government because of its non-inclusive stance and marginalization of the native Baluch population. This is mostly owing to the lack of development, widespread poverty, and exploitation of Baluchistan's natural resources (K. Siddiqui, 2023 ). Although Baluchistan supplies 80% of the gas to Pakistan, it receives a meagre amount of US $ 1.2 million in gas royalties. The provincial government of Baluchistan was dismissed by then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in February 1973. This action was met with strong opposition from nationalist Baloch leaders, who organized widespread protests and uprisings. These events led to the formal insurgency and provoked a fierce counterinsurgency response from the military. This conflict persisted for four years until 1977, resulting in the loss of precious lives and displacement of innocent people, particularly those belonging to the Marri Tribes residing in Kohlu and Kahan areas. Multiple insurgent organizations emerged and have since developed into full-fledged rebellious entities that regularly defy the authority of the state and pose continuous dangers to Baluchistan (Mullick, 2009 ). Following the death of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup, General Zia ul Haq shifted his approach from employing forceful tactics to appeasing Baluch Sardars in order to integrate them into the political system and gain widespread public approval. Significant emphasis was placed on the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects like dam construction, development of roads and gas field. These projects were specifically allocated to local leaders, and the tribal system sardars exerted a substantial influence on the society (Bashir Baloch, 2025 ). In 1985, the nationalist Baluch leaders took part in the elections that were termed non- political parties. Following the death of General Zia ul Haq, the political power in Pakistan shifted between the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) from 1989 to 1999. During this period, there was a significant focus on improving the conditions in Baluchistan, and the level of insurgency appeared to be at its lowest point. In October 1999, General Musharraf orchestrated a military coup that had devastating consequences for Baluchistan. He initiated a large-scale military operation in the restive areas of Baluchistan, resulting in the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the leader of the Bugti Tribe, in 2005 (Bugti, 2020 ). Simultaneously, he made promises of significant investment, particularly in the Gwadar port, with the aim of transforming the economic prospects of Baluchistan. Both of his gambles had a detrimental effect on both the province and the country (Javed, 2010 ). The federal government's mega development projects were perceived as exploitation of Baluch resources and deprivation of their ancestral lands due to a lack of public participation. Additionally, the killing of Akbar Bugti and plans to increase military garrisons in the province severely hindered any attempts to politically integrate Baluchistan (Rafique & Anwar, 2014 ). However, the population criticized the government's attempts to colonize Baluchistan and reduce the number of local inhabitants by bringing in people from other provinces and foreigners, all under the pretext of executing the development projects. Never before had there been such a significant disparity in viewpoints between the federal government and the populace in Baluchistan. An ongoing revolt, which began in 2006, continues to incur significant costs in terms of human lives and resources for both the security forces and the inhabitants of Baluchistan. The security situation in Baluchistan is significantly intricate and diverse, beyond common perceptions due to the combination of various disparate factions. These forces have resorted to violent methods in their pursuit of getting their legitimate rights (Weinbaum, 2009 ). Hence, it is inaccurate to just attribute all the violence in Baluchistan today to insurgents. The complex security landscape of Baluchistan involves various actors, including sectarian organizations, tribal groups, Baluch and non-Baluch people. These actors contribute to the security challenges in Baluchistan. The militants have consistently engaged in a low-intensity conflict aimed at energy and infrastructure projects. This conflict has now extended to encompass Chinese people, who are vulnerable due to their involvement in many projects and institutions throughout Pakistan (Akhter, 2017 ). The focus on the energy infrastructure can be attributed to the theoretical research on conflicts related to natural resources. When examining the conflict in Baluchistan from the perspective of concerns related to resources, it is important to mention one point right from the beginning. The natural resources, primarily natural gas, extracted from Baluchistan are mainly intended for domestic consumption rather than for export. The research argues that relying on primary commodity exports raises the probability of civil strife. While the discussion on exports may not directly pertain to Baluchistan, the steady movement of natural resources from Baluchistan to other provinces has been a persistent cause of disagreement (Ashraf et al., 2018 ). The analytical review of existing literature on Baluchistan does not necessarily address the origin or factors contributing to the conflict spanning nearly five decades. No single suitable theoretical framework can be applied to the intricate network of issues in Baluchistan. Moreover, gathering data in remote, inaccessible, and highly unstable regions such as Kohlu, Kahan, Dera Bugti, and Khuzdar is nearly impracticable. The author has gained valuable experience by serving in various conflict-prone areas and participating in security and post-conflict stability operations between 1998 and 2013. As a result, the research article has been developed based on the author's first-hand knowledge of the Baluchistan region. Results and Discussion Baluchistan insurgency in retrospect The ongoing insurrection in Baluchistan exemplifies the rare insurgency against the Pakistani government that has endured in Baluchistan since 1948. However, the level of resistance observed in 2004 differed significantly from the resistance witnessed during the periods of 1948-52, 1958-60, 1962-69, and 1973-77 in terms of both the severity and extent of defiance (Gattani, 2021 ). On August 15, 1947, the Khan of Kalat notified the Muslim League about the creation of Pakistan and conveyed his flexible position. Nevertheless, the Pakistani military assumed control of Kalat on April 1, 1948. Abdul Karim's family demonstrated their opposition by publicly expressing their endorsement of Kalat's self-governance and delivering a proclamation of independence, bearing the signature of the Khan, to the National Liberation Group of Baloch (Schofield, 2012 ). Karim would have been granted asylum in Afghanistan due to Afghanistan's close association with the Pashtun and Baloch regions of Pakistan, as well as its restriction of Pakistan's UN accreditation. The first Baluch rebellion Abdul Karim incited a rebellion against the security forces of Pakistani in the Jhalawan region in May 1950. However, the Khan, faced with opposition from Pakistan military, persuaded his relatives to surrender by promising them safety and protection from the state of Pakistan. However, Pakistani security forces went ahead by apprehending and capturing Prince Abdul Karim and his 102 companions as they were enroute to negotiate with Kalat in 1950 (Abbasi, 2025 ). Abdul Karim's defiance in the history of Baloch was evident for a distinct reason. It was admitted that the public were unaware of the expansion of Kalat in relation to the government of Pakistan. Baloch perceives this as a starting step towards a series of breached agreements that have resulted in a state of uncertainty between them and the Government. Prince Karim and his followers were subjected to extended periods of detention, however, their voices could not be supressed, while they continued non-violent resistance. The second insurgency In 1957, during a meeting with Pakistani leader Iskandar Mirza, the Baloch tribal leader Khan presented a unique case to Mirza. He requested forgiveness for the single component plot in Kalat and urged him to allocate more resources towards developmental activities in the region. Nevertheless, the Khan augmented the naval force to launch an assault against Pakistan's army, despite the uncertain nature of their affection. Ayub Khan's objectives involved restructuring the political landscape of Pakistan. Despite the detachment of various Baluch rulers from the Pakistani army, Ayub Khan requested military support to enter Kalat in October 1958, shortly after imposing naval control in Pakistan. The provided evidence implicated the khan and his allies, accusing them of covertly collaborating with Afghan forces to organize a large-scale Baloch rebellion (Cheema, 2013 ). The resistance that occurred in 1958 was closely monitored by the Pakistani military, which deployed security forces to the evolving threats in Baluchistan. This subsequently motivated the Balochi people to prepare for more sophisticated insurgent operations capable of defending Balochi interests. The breakthrough was propelled by Sher Mohammad Murri, who possessed the necessary insight to recognize that the current chaotic conflict needed to be transformed into a formidable guerrilla warfare. Consequently, he formed a coalition of base camps spanning from the southern Mengal Group in Jhalawan to the Murri and Bugatti districts in the north. The friaries, as the insurgents were called, captured escorts, bombarded trains, and engaged in similar activities at many places. The third nationalist insurgency The nationalist Baloch leaders confronted basic administrative issues inside the central authority of Ayyub Khan. They established a peaceful relationship with the Pashtuns in KPK and successfully ended the 'One Unit' agreement in 1970. As a result of elections, in 1970, the National Awami Party (NAP) emerged victorious in Baluchistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, while the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Bhutto gained widespread support in West Pakistan. The incidents in Quetta and the mistreatment of Punjabi workers in 1973 were linked to Ataullah Mengal's clear defiance of the Baluchistan government. As a result, Tikka Khan was sent to Baluchistan to lead the military operation against Balochi nationalists (Majeed & Hashmi, 2014 ). Bhutto's entry in February 1973 marked a significant development in the conflict, when Ghaus Bukhsh Bazenjo and Ataullah Mengal were chosen as Governor and Chief Minister of Baluchistan, respectively. The counter Bhutto suppositions of the Balochi loyalists were effectively addressed by General Zia in 1977 when he assumed control and his demonstration of forgiveness was well received by many Baloch leaders, including Ghaus Bukhsh Bazenjo, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugatti, and Ataullah Mengal. Nevertheless, a rebellious assembly of the Marris persevered in testing the Pakistani association. In addition, as a manifestation of the hostile atmosphere created by Balochi patriotism towards Pakistani national patriotism, the Baloch Students Union (BSU), known for their strong and fiercely independent nature, revived and reaffirmed their presence in the mid-1996 (Iqbal et al., 2024 ). The fourth phase-structural violence during President Musharraf era President Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif's stable national government and imposed martial law. Due to their frequent interactions with the Baloch, the people of Baluchistan had consistently harboured animosity and resentment towards the Army. As a result, the tension in Baluchistan gained momentum, particularly following the Musharraf government. The convergence of Chinese presence in Gwadar, the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugatti, and the continued abduction of Baloch people have collectively intensified the gravity of the situation in the region. Following the demise of Nawab Akbar Bugatti, the prosperity of the Baloch community experienced a significant decline, as reported by The News in 2004. The guerrilla war commenced in 2000 with the regular targeting of military forces. The extremist began to attack the government institutions and infrastructure. The conditions proved to be increasingly complicated. In 2002, President Parvez Musharraf initiated the building of Gwadar, a strategic maritime port in the region. China made significant contributions to the development of this seaport, both in terms of physical infrastructure and economic investment. In 2004, a series of car explosions in the coastal town of Gwadar resulted in injuries to three Chinese workers. This overt display of terror was intended earnestly for domestic reasons and furthermore, aimed to halt the developmental act ivies in Baluchistan and Pakistan at large. The workers were slaughtered in retaliation by the Marri rebels (Raisani & Singhaputargun, 2025 ). On March 17, 2005, a conflict broke out between the Baluch decedents and the military, resulting in the death of 10 soldiers and sixty rebels, as well as casualties among the general population. The instigators targeted rail, roads, energy infrastructure, gas pipelines, and various other locations. Simultaneously with the completion of the legislative council's approvals, a distressing incident occurred when General Parvez Musharraf, who was scheduled to address the local Jirga in Kohlu, a region in Baluchistan, was attacked by extremists. In addition, on December 15, 2005, the aircraft of the FC encountered a collision, causing injuries to prominent figures Shujaat Zamer and Brig. Salim Nawaz. The perpetrator orchestrated this ambush in an attempt to destabilize the country. As a result, Nawab Akbar Bugatti sought refuge in the Mountains after these attacks on President Musharraf and IG Frontier Force (Baloch, 2016 ). In 2006, there were several events involving attacks on Chinese nationals. The proscribed organization involved in insurgency and thereafter issuing threats to the government, the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), accepted the responsibility of carrying out an attack on Chinese engineers and demanded that China cease all activities in Baluchistan. Undoubtedly, during the Musharraf era from 1999–2008, the insurgency was being controlled. In addition to this, several other initiatives were also initiated within the region for the benefit and welfare of the entire community of Baluchistan, such as the Gwadar seaport, Sendek project, Kechi Canal, and various important highways. The establishment of Gwadar ports is considered a remarkable endeavour in the region due to its pursuit of self-sufficiency. The construction of the Gwadar seaport commenced in 2002 and successfully completed in 2007, serving as a significant milestone in facilitating the economic traffic of the region. The strategically located Gwadar seaport is situated 72 kilometres away from the Iranian border and is positioned within the Strait of Hormuz. However, the killing of Akbar Bugatti in August 2006 has led to a perpetual state of protracted insurgency which is going on even today amid varying intensity (Shams, 2016 ). The fifth phase- post Musharraf era On September 6, 2008, Zardari assumed the presidency of Pakistan. He extended his display of remorse to the entire population of Baluchistan and assured them that substantial measures would be implemented for the progress of the Baloch people. Despite the waning enthusiasm of loyalist energy in the 2008 election due to the assassination of Akbar Bugatti, the PPP government made efforts to regain the trust of the general populace. In November 2008, the Pakistani government granted increased autonomy to the region as part of the celebration of human rights. In order to address the problems of the Baloch people, the governing body implemented a significant course of action in the legislature on November 24, 2008, known as 'Aghaz-e-Huqooq Baluchistan'. The legislature officially approved it in December 2009 (Gishkori, 2011 ). Thus, the defining moment arrived as the National Finance Commission (NFC) allocated additional resources for development of Baluchistan. This era was relatively peaceful and inclusive in redressing the grievances of marginalised Balush communities. The contemporary wave – protracted insurgency and devastating consequences The frequency of terrorist incidents in Baluchistan has been notable in the past five years, exhibiting a visible surge in attacks carried out by Baloch separatist factions and Islamist extremists. During the year 2019, Baluchistan experienced around 229 acts of terrorism, leading to a death toll above 200. Significant incidents comprised of the detonation of an explosive device at a marketplace in Quetta resulting in the death of 20 individuals, as well as an assault on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar executed by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). In 2020, there was a little decrease in the number of occurrences, with approximately 165 terrorist attacks resulting in 140 deaths. Notable events included attacks on security forces, such as a surprise attack in Turbat that led to the fatalities of 14 security personnel. In 2021, the insurgency continued to be active, with approximately 175 documented events. In Quetta, there was a notable bombing incident that resulted in the death of four individuals and left more than a dozen injured. During the year 2022, Baluchistan experienced an estimated total of 194 acts of terrorism, resulting in about 186 recorded fatalities. One significant occurrence was the twin bombs in Quetta, resulting in the death of at least seven individuals, in addition to ongoing attacks on security convoys. In 2023, the insurgency continued, resulting in approximately 183 terrorist acts and almost 160 deaths. Significant assaults encompassed a blast at a mosque in Quetta, along with ongoing strikes on military sites and infrastructure. The numbers indicate the continuous danger presented by both separatist and militant organizations in Baluchistan, which contributes to the continued instability and security problems in the province. According to government and local media reports on Monday, August 26, 2024, as it coincided with the death anniversary of veteran Baluch leader nawab Akbar Bugti, coordinated attacks were launched across length and breadth of Baluchistan by terrorist groups. A total of seventy-four individuals lost their lives in a series of prolonged skirmishes and attacks in the southwest and northwest regions of Pakistan. Among the casualties were twenty-one terrorists and fourteen security personnel. The army has reported that terrorists executed synchronized assaults on the army in Musakhel, Qalat, and Lasbela areas, resulting in the deaths of twenty-one militants and ten paramilitary personnel. While the state machinery appears to have reached a level of exhaustion, but terrorist’s freedom of conducting activities is going unabated with grave consequences for civilian and security forces alike. Dr Mudassir a media expert at National University of Modern Languages Islamabad, opines that current wave of insurgency has its roots to 2006 killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, which provided fuel to fire, while Mr. Hamza Amir a national security expert at National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad argues that years of neglect, deprivation and marginalization coupled with security forces operations have alienated that Baluch population, who have now decided to raise their voice through protracted insurgency focusing on the economic targets and innocent civilians to create a wedge between the government and the population and as a result making national and international media headlines. Just to make a point, terrorism incidents of year 2022, 2023 and 2024 are depicted in Figs. 5 , 6 and 7 respectively which are taken from Police official sources and terrorism watch in Pakistan. Challenges to Pakistan’s national security landscape The heinous murder of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan in 2024 (A. Hussain, 2024 ), the self-inflicted attack on a bus transporting Chinese engineers at the Dasu Dam Project in July 2021(Ali, 2024 ), and the occurrence in which a female student suicide bomber killed Chinese teachers in Karachi University (Syed, 2022 ), subsequently claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), serve as clear indications of our vulnerability and the substantial hazards associated with protecting foreign citizens in Pakistan. In March 2022, the ISS-K orchestrated a deadly suicide attack at the Shiite Mosque in Peshawar, intensifying the already escalating terrorism issues in Pakistan. The consistent occurrence of cross-border terrorism originating from Afghanistan and infiltrating the border districts of KPK has become a recurring phenomenon. The series of attacks that occurred in 2024 in Banu, North and South Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan (DIK), and other locations in Baluchistan and Sindh have posed a significant threat to the authority of the state. This issue has been intensified by the limited political alliances and regionalism, which have come at the expense of national unity. Pakistan's national security is threatened by the shifting regional and global dynamics, as illustrated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 . To properly deal with the changing security environment, it is imperative to possess robust leadership, internal cohesion, and harmonious cohabitation and concord. Pakistani society is currently extremely concerned with the socio-political and socio-economic challenges it faces, especially those arising from undeveloped peripheral regions. The interaction between political power struggles and inefficient governance, coupled with pervasive corruption, has led to a multitude of socio-economic difficulties, especially among the educated youth. Similarly, the socioeconomically disadvantaged segments of the population have been affected by the rising inflation, taxation, and declining ability to buy goods and services. The gloomy economic projection and pervasive sense of hopelessness have caused a rift in our society and the country, resulting in significant implications for national cohesion (Husain, 2018 ). The presence of numerous unresolved issues has caused a sense of unease among the general people (Sheikh et al., 2022 ), highlighting the need for immediate attention and settlement to promote a harmonious and successful community. The internal assortment also presents a menacing portrayal of the Pakistani society, therefore, complicating national security matrix. Conclusion National integration is an intricate and developing process that necessitates substantial endeavors and should be accorded with paramount significance by every administration. Securing economic stability, prosperity, and national pride necessitates focused endeavors, which, in turn, contribute to fostering national unity and cultivating a harmonious community. It is encouraging that the current government and all state institutions in Pakistan are aware of the crucial national requirement to revitalize Pakistani society through economic recovery, which would foster optimism, affection, and a sense of unity. The implementation of power devolution to the federating units will grant them a significant role in all aspects of society, thereby initiating the process of comprehensive reconciliation and economic growth through inclusivity. The crucial factor in resolving all the issues currently faced by Pakistan is political stability. Therefore, it is imperative to make comprehensive and diverse efforts to establish a tolerant, progressive, and harmonious Pakistan. Baluchistan is in the spotlight for the last four decades due to multiple terrorism and counter terrorism operations. Despite major chunk of mega development China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the grievances of locals have further intensified. It is about time to have a reconciliation process and settle this issue on sustainable basis. Declarations Data availability The authors declare that the data and empirical analyses supporting the findings of this research article is available within this article in the form of figures and tables. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge facilitation provided NUML and NDU in terms of office space, lab facility and field visits to Baluchistan and sparing workload for completing this study. Author contributions WI, writing—original draft, conceptualization, formal analysis; ZR, writing—review and editing, supervision. All authors approved the final version of the article. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests Funding details No funding was provided for this study. Ethical approval This research received ethical approval from the ethical review committee of the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) Islamabad, Pakistan on May 12, 2025, vide letter number ML.1-5/2025/R&SI/4066. All procedures performed in this study complied with the ethical standards of the institution as well as with the Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments. Informed consent Data collection commenced on September 2023, with all participants giving implied informed consent through online survey questionnaire prior to their involvement. The research team conducted the sessions throughout September 2023-February 2024, ensuring that ethical standards were strictly followed and informed consent was obtained at the outset of each session. They were presented with detailed information about key aspects of the research, including: (1) confidentiality, which ensured that personal information would remain private and would not be disclosed or published, and (2) data usage, specifying that all collected data would solely serve academic research purposes without any commercial applications. To participate in the study, participants were required to indicate their understanding and agreement by clicking the “agree and continue” button, which granted them access to the questionnaires. Additional information Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Corresponding Author. References Abbasi A (2025) RESOURCE EXPLOITATION AND ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES: FUELING INSURGENCY IN BALOCHISTAN. 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11:37:05","extension":"html","order_by":19,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":138742,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"earlyproof.html","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/ee16d18b36ec4dd0aa6e377d.html"},{"id":97343287,"identity":"9e0595a2-c9b6-4520-bd86-afb8c4dacde3","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 11:37:04","extension":"jpeg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":224265,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePolitical map of Pakistan \u003ca href=\"https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/pakistan\"\u003ehttps://www.worldatlas.com/maps/pakistan\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/bb0c4545e8c2644619faaee4.jpeg"},{"id":97343281,"identity":"24f80ab8-2def-4b4c-a596-fd9e5134c02a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 11:37:04","extension":"jpg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":66204,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eDemography of Baluchistan\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/c5feea5f98159faf725ecbe2.jpg"},{"id":97343301,"identity":"09f9ea6f-666b-46fc-b80f-8a4e5a629d24","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 11:37:05","extension":"jpg","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":24527,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePolitical map of Baluchistan (\u003cem\u003eGeographical Map of Pakistan Balochistan\u003c/em\u003e, 2025)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/85ab66b2c85d7c4a651f4bc4.jpg"},{"id":97343292,"identity":"e438f840-3169-4878-96c2-70f16b104d82","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 11:37:04","extension":"jpg","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":27396,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eGeostrategic location map of Baluchistan (Ali Zaman Shah, 2017)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"4.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/62148817f0cc2ccfb6d1601e.jpg"},{"id":97343297,"identity":"d801e328-c5a8-4ae5-890b-ab9102c1ce76","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 11:37:05","extension":"jpg","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":205284,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eTerrorist incidents in Baluchistan in 2022, source (\u003cem\u003eTerrorism Incidents | Balochistan Police\u003c/em\u003e, n.d.)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"5.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/a8d3fa54e8e2bd599278c55c.jpg"},{"id":97369509,"identity":"821af2bd-0cf4-4ef4-9002-e2d7052bc8cd","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 16:25:02","extension":"jpg","order_by":6,"title":"Figure 6","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":280295,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eTerrorist incidents in Baluchistan in 2023, source (\u003cem\u003eTerrorism Incidents | Balochistan Police\u003c/em\u003e, n.d.)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"6.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/aea596ac6553f04077103042.jpg"},{"id":97343295,"identity":"db5c1e0a-2dad-4bf9-85c3-65fd179306e3","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 11:37:05","extension":"jpg","order_by":7,"title":"Figure 7","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":43686,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eTerrorist incidents in Baluchistan in April to June 2024, source (\u003cem\u003eTerrorism Continues to Batter Pakistan | CRSS\u003c/em\u003e, n.d.)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"7.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/f8da5ccb077b6ebe44296bd8.jpg"},{"id":97664763,"identity":"092fd2ab-db6f-459c-9e02-b810e24a597b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-08 09:14:01","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1566501,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7645553/v1/670fba88-d114-4d59-9b83-252e643e9dfc.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Structural Violence and Protracted Insurgency in Baluchistan: Investigating its Implications on National Security of Pakistan","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eSince independence in 1947, Pakistan has been confronted with serious challenges in creating a harmonious society. Groups with ethnic, linguistic, and regional affiliations, whose allegiances are primarily regional and tribal rather than national, frequently find themselves in confrontation with a broader notion of national identity (M. N. Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). The tragedy of former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and the repeated insurgencies in Baluchistan are notable examples. Regardless of conflicting assertions, it is an undeniable reality that Baluchistan continues to be Pakistan's soft underbelly, even after seventy-seven years of independence(Shah \u0026amp; Ishaque, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). The causes of the instability are widely recognized; nonetheless, there has been inadequate efforts to address their grievances though inclusive participation of all the stake holders (Ishaque et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021a\u003c/span\u003e). Baluchistan has garnered significant attention in both local and international media during the past five decades. The state of Pakistan's failure to incorporate a highly destitute and neglected territory into the national mainstream, due to a lack of political determination and prioritization, has led to a violent insurrection by marginalized segments of society (Ishaque et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The federal government launched security operations in Baluchistan for the first time in 1973, with the aim of addressing socio-economic needs (Wani, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Over the past five decades, five rounds of counterinsurgency operations have been carried out. However, despite these efforts, a persistent insurgency continues to this day (Bukhari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Due to years of neglect, marginalization, underdevelopment, and flawed state policies, people have resorted to armed resistance against the government, causing widespread destruction through the use of suicide bombers and target killings against variety of targets, especially the security forces (Mehdi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). This violence persists, amid fluctuating intensity. There is insufficiency of literature about Baluchistan, but the author has dedicated over a decade to extensively exploring various regions of Baluchistan. The data collection was conducted through field visits, and the analyses are primarily derived on first-hand knowledge gathered during personal visits to the majority of the troubled districts. The research paper posits that deprivation, economic marginalization, abhorrent human rights conditions, and a lack of individual freedom are fundamental factors contributing to the ongoing insurgency (Rehman et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Conversely, from the state's standpoint, the inflexible tribal culture and sardari system hinder the developmental activities and prevent the population from reaping the economic benefits of mega development projects launched in Baluchistan. The rebels' widely accepted views revolve around the foreigners' exploitation of Baluch resources. Consequently, the locals have a moral obligation to violently resist the occupiers in order to protect their rights (Yasmin et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study comprehensively examines the prevalence of violence in Baluchistan by applying Galtung's theory of structural violence and conflict theory. Applying theoretical frameworks to the unique security environment of Baluchistan can aid in investigating the state's policies towards these peripheral regions. Such policies have resulted in attracting international attention as hotspots of terrorism and conflict. The study also provides recommendations for ensuring long-term stability as a policy input for the government, which is currently working towards launching a comprehensive reconciliation process and integrating these undeveloped regions into the mainstream.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCore Argument\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStructural violence and years of neglect have alienated the Baluch population and generated feelings of marginalization. Instead of dialogue and development, the successive governments have resorted to use of force to suppress the population, who has now challenged the writ of state through protracted insurgency for safeguarding their fundamental rights and tribal traditions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eResearch Questions\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eQ.1.\u003c/b\u003e What is the genesis of Baluchistan problem?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eQ.\u003c/b\u003e2. Why successive governments failed to redress the public grievances?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eQ.\u003c/b\u003e3. Why the state machinery always resorted to structural violence?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eQ.\u003c/b\u003e4. How protracted insurgency is affecting Pakistan\u0026rsquo;s national security paradigm?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eQ.\u003c/b\u003e5. What policy measures should be adopted in mainstreaming of Baluch population and enduring stability in Baluchistan?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Materials and Methods","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eOverview of Baluchistan\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eBaluchistan, situated in the South-West of Pakistan, is the largest province in terms of land area but is the least developed (Akhtar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). It shares borders with Iran and Afghanistan, as well as with the erstwhile FATA region, which is now part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Punjab, and Sindh provinces (Ahmed et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Map of Baluchistan is given in Figure.1.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBaluchistan comprises around 43% of Pakistan's total land area and is a thinly inhabited region, with only 6.8% of the country's population(Zafar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The population of Baluchistan, according to the 1998 census, is 12.34\u0026nbsp;million. Baluchistan is home to various ethnic groups, including as Balochi, Pashtun, Punjabis, and Sindhi(G. Siddiqui \u0026amp; Siddiqui, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). The demographic survey published in 2011 in the daily newspaper. The News reveals that the population composition of Baluchistan is as follows: 35.49% Baloch, 17.12% Brahui, 35.34% Pashtun, 1.13% Punjabis, 2.65% Saraiki, 4.56% Sindhi, and 3.71% other people. Demography chart is shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe province consists of 30 administrative districts and 7 divisions, which include both A and B Areas as given in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e. The government's operations are divided between the Police and other law enforcement agencies, each with different levels of jurisdiction and engagement (Makki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). From an ethnic standpoint, the northern region is predominantly inhabited by the Pashtun population, while the southern region is primarily home to the Baluch population. The capital city of Quetta and its surrounding areas include a diverse mix of different ethnic groups. The capital city is moderately developed, with a considerable level of infrastructure development, government buildings, military training facilities, and shopping malls (Ul-Huda et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe lifestyle in areas outside of Quetta, particularly in the periphery regions, exhibits notable differences. The fundamental necessities such as power, gas, water, healthcare, and education are not being taken into account, and extreme poverty is being observed (Dikshit \u0026amp; Dikshit, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025a\u003c/span\u003e). The population density in Baluchistan is exceptionally low due to the difficult hilly terrain, lack of necessary infrastructure, insufficient water, and basic services. The Suleman Mountain range dominates the northern section of Baluchistan, with the Bolan Pass serving as a historical route to Kandahar in Afghanistan (Singh, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). The Makran range is located in the south, while Kalat is situated near the middle of the province. The region extending from Quetta to the coastline and Iranian border is characterized by a low population density, primarily due to its arid topography. However, there are a few isolated settlements around water reservoirs or river streams. In contrast, Baluchistan is the most economically disadvantaged province of Pakistan, despite being endowed with abundant natural resources and a coastline (Bashir et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). The complexity and difficulty of law enforcement and development activities are exacerbated by the intricate governance, administrative, and judicial jurisdiction conundrum. This is due to the prevailing feudal system and the significant influence wielded by sardars in their different districts and tribes (Pavla \u0026amp; Petr, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). The government is also subject to Sardar's preferences and approval of development projects or exploration activities. Hence, the inefficient civil administration, absence of political reform initiatives by the government, and indifferent attitude of the federal government have resulted in a sense of hopelessness among the populace, who perceive themselves as marginalized and their resources being exploited by external entities(Ullah \u0026amp; Akhtar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The widespread acceptance of the slogan among the Baluch people, which highlights their conversion into a minority and their enslavement, has generated a significant level of sympathy among the oppressed population(Bansal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008a\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, there is a prevailing sentiment that violent methods are necessary to secure their rights(Samad, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). From a geostrategic standpoint, Baluchistan is situated at the confluence of economic, socio-cultural, and physical crossroads of West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East as shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e. The close vicinity to the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing development of Gwadar Port makes it an attractive industrial hub with significant investments expected from both local and foreign investors (Siddiqi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Baluchistan has a border that spans 1200 kilometres with Afghanistan, 900 kilometres with Iran, and roughly 200 kilometres of coastline (Dikshit \u0026amp; Dikshit, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025b\u003c/span\u003e). Due to its geostrategic advantages, Baluchistan is positioned as a crucial transit and commerce hub. It is also expected to serve as a launching point for future regional economic integration (Akbar \u0026amp; Shabbir, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Province of Baluchistan is blessed with abundant natural resources, both exploited and unexploited. The Sui gas field is the largest in the country and supplies around 60% of Pakistan's gas requirements (Tariq, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013a\u003c/span\u003e). As per the Government of Baluchistan, Board of Investment and Trade data, the province possesses a substantial quantity of mineral resources. The regions of Reko Diq, Saindak, and Duddar are rich in high-grade mineral resources. Consequently, the provincial administration of Baluchistan has built specific mineral processing zones in Saindak, Duddar, and District Lasbela, as well as a marble city in Hub. In addition, coal reserves are being exploited in the areas of Sibbi and Loralai(Aslam, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eResearch methodology\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe mixed methods approach has been applied in completing study using both primary and secondary data sources. Semi structured interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in obtaining public\u0026rsquo;s perception of District Kohlu and Sibbi. Additionally, the content analysis was conducted by examining news conferences, speeches, and policy declarations made by political leaders, tribal leaders and government institutions. Field visits were also conducted to Tehsil Kahan of District Kohlu and interior regions of District Sibbi. Field visits to Gwadar were also conducted to examine the ongoing mega development projects associated with much trumpeted China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Poverty and under development survey were also conducted which was later analysed through quantitative method using SPSS. The last part of the study provides policy recommendations for relevant government ministries and institutions for enduring stability and poverty alleviation in the most impoverished region of Pakistan.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eConceptual framework\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe study has been completed by using a combination of two theories to objectively assess the internal dynamics of the unrest in Baluchistan and the government's notion of rational actor to the use of force to suppress the insurgency. The conflict theory provides a comprehensive explanation for the sources of conflict in Baluchistan. It highlights the widespread belief among the public that the federal government is seizing their abundant natural resources, leading to the marginalization of local residents. As a result, armed rebellion is seen as a legitimate means to safeguard their rights. The second idea is the concept of structural violence, which focuses on the state's excessive use of force to establish peace in Baluchistan and the resulting rebellion of the people due to unintended harm. Both views are elaborated upon in the following paragraph.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe primary premise of Conflict theories is the correlation between civil wars or insurgencies and the abundance of natural resources, whereby the \"wealth derived from natural resources can incite, escalate, or perpetuate armed uprisings.\" Therefore, in the context of Pakistan, the reliance on Baluchistan's natural gas, minerals, and ongoing infrastructure development projects through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) inevitably leads to conflict. The broader public perception supports the idea that resorting to violence increases the chances of gaining valuable resources and profits, which may not be achieved through peaceful protests. This has been empirically demonstrated by the state's preferences and priorities for Baluchistan over the past 50 years. Baloch politician and former governor, Mir Ghaus Bizenjo, asserted that \"Baluchistan did not need Pakistan but Pakistan needed Baluchistan.\"(Ishaque et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021b\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere three analytical methodologies for examining conflicts related to the allocation of resources(Ertmer et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). The first aspect centres around environmental factors or the grievances that emerge because of the escalating shortage of renewable resources. The second perspective highlights the role of economic considerations, where conflicts are driven by the self-interested pursuit of wealth and greed by individuals. The third and ultimate state-centric approach centres on the political factors and deficiencies in institutions. The analysis at hand is especially concerned with economic considerations. The authors contend that economic factors have a significant correlation with oil, but they also highlight how rebels seeking to make references to ethnic and religious marginalization, unequal distribution of wealth, government ineptitude, and lack of political rights in their political demands (Bansal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008b\u003c/span\u003e). Baloch rebels cite all of these grievances as reasons for engaging in insurgency against the Pakistani state. Significantly, when a specific subgroup, whether it be defined by ethnicity, politics, or religion, perceives that it is not being adequately included in the benefits derived from the exploitation of natural resources, there is an increased likelihood of political instability (M. Hussain \u0026amp; Kumar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). This is exemplified by instances such as rebel assaults on oil workers in Nigeria and attacks on energy infrastructure and personnel in Baluchistan. When there is an established energy infrastructure to extract and utilize natural resources, rebels have the chance and motivation to target this infrastructure in order to create more instability, exert political influence on the government, and strengthen their nationalist cause (Bansal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). Additionally, the residents of any given region anticipate receiving a portion of the wealth generated from the extraction of natural resources from their land. If the residents of regions abundant in resources perceive themselves to be falling behind in terms of infrastructure and living standards, while other regions or provinces benefit from their resources, they are likely to feel resentful. Many Baloch leaders have previously stated that they will not support foreign development initiatives that extract resources from Baluchistan which do not benefit the local inhabitants (A. Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Scholars have established that economic development is crucial for reducing the occurrences of intra-state conflict. In the case of Baluchistan, the initial steps towards this would involve effective management of the revenue of natural resource and implementation of mega development projects that provide social and economic advantages to the local communities (Bansal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Politically, it is necessary for the state to grant Baloch political leaders and the provincial government equal voice in decision-making, allowing them to actively participate and have a stake in the economic development of the province. An alternative approach, when considering policy development, is the implementation of efficient strategies for managing natural resources (A. Khan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). The effectiveness of the governance system for resource extraction, processing, and revenue management determines whether natural resources are beneficial or detrimental. In the context of Baluchistan, this would involve guaranteeing that the revenue generated from natural resources is not only received in the form of royalties but also allocated to development funds for the underdeveloped regions of Baluchistan. Structural violence is a form of harm that is not easily seen but is deeply embedded in the social and political systems of institutions. It leads to disparities in society, whether they are related to social, political, economic, or cultural factors (Tariq, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013b\u003c/span\u003e). The population of Baluchistan have experienced increased social and economic marginalization due to constitutional and legal isolation and governmental neglect. The current administrative and bureaucratic systems are contributing to the discontent of population towards the state.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eLiterature Review\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere is a scarcity of literature regarding the insurgency in Baluchistan. Possible factors contributing to this situation may include the perception that it was a localized issue specific to Pakistan, and the region's isolated and underdeveloped nature, which could have hindered accessibility. Nevertheless, diligent efforts have been made to access archives, digital libraries, and electronic resources. The history of Baluchistan is marked by a series of uprisings that began soon after the foundation of Pakistan in 1947 (Khattak et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). At that time, the provinces were expected to willingly join the newly established state of Pakistan. In 1948, the government of Pakistan gained attention for the annexation of the state of Kalat following the Khan of Kalat's decision to accede on August 15, 1947. Abdul Karim Khan, the younger brother of Khan, declined to acknowledge the succession and led a rebellion in May 1948 alongside his loyal supporters. This led to a conflict with the security forces, resulting in casualties and damage. In order to suppress the rebellion, Khan was apprehended in 1950 and incarcerated for a duration of seven years (Bhattacharya, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The implementation of the \"One Unit System\" in 1955, which merged all four provinces of West Pakistan into a single administrative structure, resulted in feelings of marginalization and a perceived loss of autonomy and identity among the Baluch population (Lieven, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). This eventually led to a significant confrontation with the state apparatus in 1958. The security forces were motivated to impose martial law in 1958 in response to the turmoil in Baluchistan. A full-scale operation was carried out in Kalat, resulting in the re-arrest of Khan. Nevertheless, the opposition to the \"one Unit System\" intensified and by 1963, the Bugti, Marri, and Mengal tribes initiated a rebellion against the central authority (Rizwan \u0026amp; Arshad, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). The prolonged neglect, exclusion, inadequate progress, and extreme poverty resulted in feelings of detachment among the inhabitants, ultimately leading to a large-scale insurgency in the province (Weinbaum, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). In 1970, the federal government officially designated Baluchistan as a province. However, during this period, the conditions were set for a rebellion, and the following years proved this prediction to be true. The public mood in Baluchistan is strongly negative towards the federal government because of its non-inclusive stance and marginalization of the native Baluch population. This is mostly owing to the lack of development, widespread poverty, and exploitation of Baluchistan's natural resources (K. Siddiqui, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Although Baluchistan supplies 80% of the gas to Pakistan, it receives a meagre amount of US\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e 1.2\u0026nbsp;million in gas royalties. The provincial government of Baluchistan was dismissed by then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in February 1973. This action was met with strong opposition from nationalist Baloch leaders, who organized widespread protests and uprisings. These events led to the formal insurgency and provoked a fierce counterinsurgency response from the military. This conflict persisted for four years until 1977, resulting in the loss of precious lives and displacement of innocent people, particularly those belonging to the Marri Tribes residing in Kohlu and Kahan areas. Multiple insurgent organizations emerged and have since developed into full-fledged rebellious entities that regularly defy the authority of the state and pose continuous dangers to Baluchistan (Mullick, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Following the death of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup, General Zia ul Haq shifted his approach from employing forceful tactics to appeasing Baluch Sardars in order to integrate them into the political system and gain widespread public approval. Significant emphasis was placed on the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects like dam construction, development of roads and gas field. These projects were specifically allocated to local leaders, and the tribal system sardars exerted a substantial influence on the society (Bashir Baloch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 1985, the nationalist Baluch leaders took part in the elections that were termed non- political parties. Following the death of General Zia ul Haq, the political power in Pakistan shifted between the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) from 1989 to 1999. During this period, there was a significant focus on improving the conditions in Baluchistan, and the level of insurgency appeared to be at its lowest point. In October 1999, General Musharraf orchestrated a military coup that had devastating consequences for Baluchistan. He initiated a large-scale military operation in the restive areas of Baluchistan, resulting in the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the leader of the Bugti Tribe, in 2005 (Bugti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Simultaneously, he made promises of significant investment, particularly in the Gwadar port, with the aim of transforming the economic prospects of Baluchistan. Both of his gambles had a detrimental effect on both the province and the country (Javed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). The federal government's mega development projects were perceived as exploitation of Baluch resources and deprivation of their ancestral lands due to a lack of public participation. Additionally, the killing of Akbar Bugti and plans to increase military garrisons in the province severely hindered any attempts to politically integrate Baluchistan (Rafique \u0026amp; Anwar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). However, the population criticized the government's attempts to colonize Baluchistan and reduce the number of local inhabitants by bringing in people from other provinces and foreigners, all under the pretext of executing the development projects. Never before had there been such a significant disparity in viewpoints between the federal government and the populace in Baluchistan. An ongoing revolt, which began in 2006, continues to incur significant costs in terms of human lives and resources for both the security forces and the inhabitants of Baluchistan. The security situation in Baluchistan is significantly intricate and diverse, beyond common perceptions due to the combination of various disparate factions. These forces have resorted to violent methods in their pursuit of getting their legitimate rights (Weinbaum, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Hence, it is inaccurate to just attribute all the violence in Baluchistan today to insurgents. The complex security landscape of Baluchistan involves various actors, including sectarian organizations, tribal groups, Baluch and non-Baluch people. These actors contribute to the security challenges in Baluchistan. The militants have consistently engaged in a low-intensity conflict aimed at energy and infrastructure projects. This conflict has now extended to encompass Chinese people, who are vulnerable due to their involvement in many projects and institutions throughout Pakistan (Akhter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). The focus on the energy infrastructure can be attributed to the theoretical research on conflicts related to natural resources. When examining the conflict in Baluchistan from the perspective of concerns related to resources, it is important to mention one point right from the beginning. The natural resources, primarily natural gas, extracted from Baluchistan are mainly intended for domestic consumption rather than for export. The research argues that relying on primary commodity exports raises the probability of civil strife. While the discussion on exports may not directly pertain to Baluchistan, the steady movement of natural resources from Baluchistan to other provinces has been a persistent cause of disagreement (Ashraf et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). The analytical review of existing literature on Baluchistan does not necessarily address the origin or factors contributing to the conflict spanning nearly five decades. No single suitable theoretical framework can be applied to the intricate network of issues in Baluchistan. Moreover, gathering data in remote, inaccessible, and highly unstable regions such as Kohlu, Kahan, Dera Bugti, and Khuzdar is nearly impracticable. The author has gained valuable experience by serving in various conflict-prone areas and participating in security and post-conflict stability operations between 1998 and 2013. As a result, the research article has been developed based on the author's first-hand knowledge of the Baluchistan region.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eBaluchistan insurgency in retrospect\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe ongoing insurrection in Baluchistan exemplifies the rare insurgency against the Pakistani government that has endured in Baluchistan since 1948. However, the level of resistance observed in 2004 differed significantly from the resistance witnessed during the periods of 1948-52, 1958-60, 1962-69, and 1973-77 in terms of both the severity and extent of defiance (Gattani, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). On August 15, 1947, the Khan of Kalat notified the Muslim League about the creation of Pakistan and conveyed his flexible position. Nevertheless, the Pakistani military assumed control of Kalat on April 1, 1948. Abdul Karim's family demonstrated their opposition by publicly expressing their endorsement of Kalat's self-governance and delivering a proclamation of independence, bearing the signature of the Khan, to the National Liberation Group of Baloch (Schofield, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Karim would have been granted asylum in Afghanistan due to Afghanistan's close association with the Pashtun and Baloch regions of Pakistan, as well as its restriction of Pakistan's UN accreditation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe first Baluch rebellion\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAbdul Karim incited a rebellion against the security forces of Pakistani in the Jhalawan region in May 1950. However, the Khan, faced with opposition from Pakistan military, persuaded his relatives to surrender by promising them safety and protection from the state of Pakistan. However, Pakistani security forces went ahead by apprehending and capturing Prince Abdul Karim and his 102 companions as they were enroute to negotiate with Kalat in 1950 (Abbasi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Abdul Karim's defiance in the history of Baloch was evident for a distinct reason. It was admitted that the public were unaware of the expansion of Kalat in relation to the government of Pakistan. Baloch perceives this as a starting step towards a series of breached agreements that have resulted in a state of uncertainty between them and the Government. Prince Karim and his followers were subjected to extended periods of detention, however, their voices could not be supressed, while they continued non-violent resistance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe second insurgency\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn 1957, during a meeting with Pakistani leader Iskandar Mirza, the Baloch tribal leader Khan presented a unique case to Mirza. He requested forgiveness for the single component plot in Kalat and urged him to allocate more resources towards developmental activities in the region. Nevertheless, the Khan augmented the naval force to launch an assault against Pakistan's army, despite the uncertain nature of their affection. Ayub Khan's objectives involved restructuring the political landscape of Pakistan. Despite the detachment of various Baluch rulers from the Pakistani army, Ayub Khan requested military support to enter Kalat in October 1958, shortly after imposing naval control in Pakistan. The provided evidence implicated the khan and his allies, accusing them of covertly collaborating with Afghan forces to organize a large-scale Baloch rebellion (Cheema, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). The resistance that occurred in 1958 was closely monitored by the Pakistani military, which deployed security forces to the evolving threats in Baluchistan. This subsequently motivated the Balochi people to prepare for more sophisticated insurgent operations capable of defending Balochi interests. The breakthrough was propelled by Sher Mohammad Murri, who possessed the necessary insight to recognize that the current chaotic conflict needed to be transformed into a formidable guerrilla warfare. Consequently, he formed a coalition of base camps spanning from the southern Mengal Group in Jhalawan to the Murri and Bugatti districts in the north. The friaries, as the insurgents were called, captured escorts, bombarded trains, and engaged in similar activities at many places.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe third nationalist insurgency\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe nationalist Baloch leaders confronted basic administrative issues inside the central authority of Ayyub Khan. They established a peaceful relationship with the Pashtuns in KPK and successfully ended the 'One Unit' agreement in 1970. As a result of elections, in 1970, the National Awami Party (NAP) emerged victorious in Baluchistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, while the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Bhutto gained widespread support in West Pakistan. The incidents in Quetta and the mistreatment of Punjabi workers in 1973 were linked to Ataullah Mengal's clear defiance of the Baluchistan government. As a result, Tikka Khan was sent to Baluchistan to lead the military operation against Balochi nationalists (Majeed \u0026amp; Hashmi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Bhutto's entry in February 1973 marked a significant development in the conflict, when Ghaus Bukhsh Bazenjo and Ataullah Mengal were chosen as Governor and Chief Minister of Baluchistan, respectively. The counter Bhutto suppositions of the Balochi loyalists were effectively addressed by General Zia in 1977 when he assumed control and his demonstration of forgiveness was well received by many Baloch leaders, including Ghaus Bukhsh Bazenjo, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugatti, and Ataullah Mengal. Nevertheless, a rebellious assembly of the Marris persevered in testing the Pakistani association. In addition, as a manifestation of the hostile atmosphere created by Balochi patriotism towards Pakistani national patriotism, the Baloch Students Union (BSU), known for their strong and fiercely independent nature, revived and reaffirmed their presence in the mid-1996 (Iqbal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe fourth phase-structural violence during President Musharraf era\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003ePresident Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif's stable national government and imposed martial law. Due to their frequent interactions with the Baloch, the people of Baluchistan had consistently harboured animosity and resentment towards the Army. As a result, the tension in Baluchistan gained momentum, particularly following the Musharraf government. The convergence of Chinese presence in Gwadar, the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugatti, and the continued abduction of Baloch people have collectively intensified the gravity of the situation in the region. Following the demise of Nawab Akbar Bugatti, the prosperity of the Baloch community experienced a significant decline, as reported by The News in 2004. The guerrilla war commenced in 2000 with the regular targeting of military forces. The extremist began to attack the government institutions and infrastructure. The conditions proved to be increasingly complicated. In 2002, President Parvez Musharraf initiated the building of Gwadar, a strategic maritime port in the region. China made significant contributions to the development of this seaport, both in terms of physical infrastructure and economic investment. In 2004, a series of car explosions in the coastal town of Gwadar resulted in injuries to three Chinese workers. This overt display of terror was intended earnestly for domestic reasons and furthermore, aimed to halt the developmental act ivies in Baluchistan and Pakistan at large. The workers were slaughtered in retaliation by the Marri rebels (Raisani \u0026amp; Singhaputargun, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). On March 17, 2005, a conflict broke out between the Baluch decedents and the military, resulting in the death of 10 soldiers and sixty rebels, as well as casualties among the general population. The instigators targeted rail, roads, energy infrastructure, gas pipelines, and various other locations. Simultaneously with the completion of the legislative council's approvals, a distressing incident occurred when General Parvez Musharraf, who was scheduled to address the local Jirga in Kohlu, a region in Baluchistan, was attacked by extremists. In addition, on December 15, 2005, the aircraft of the FC encountered a collision, causing injuries to prominent figures Shujaat Zamer and Brig. Salim Nawaz. The perpetrator orchestrated this ambush in an attempt to destabilize the country. As a result, Nawab Akbar Bugatti sought refuge in the Mountains after these attacks on President Musharraf and IG Frontier Force (Baloch, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). In 2006, there were several events involving attacks on Chinese nationals. The proscribed organization involved in insurgency and thereafter issuing threats to the government, the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), accepted the responsibility of carrying out an attack on Chinese engineers and demanded that China cease all activities in Baluchistan. Undoubtedly, during the Musharraf era from 1999\u0026ndash;2008, the insurgency was being controlled. In addition to this, several other initiatives were also initiated within the region for the benefit and welfare of the entire community of Baluchistan, such as the Gwadar seaport, Sendek project, Kechi Canal, and various important highways. The establishment of Gwadar ports is considered a remarkable endeavour in the region due to its pursuit of self-sufficiency. The construction of the Gwadar seaport commenced in 2002 and successfully completed in 2007, serving as a significant milestone in facilitating the economic traffic of the region. The strategically located Gwadar seaport is situated 72 kilometres away from the Iranian border and is positioned within the Strait of Hormuz. However, the killing of Akbar Bugatti in August 2006 has led to a perpetual state of protracted insurgency which is going on even today amid varying intensity (Shams, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe fifth phase- post Musharraf era\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eOn September 6, 2008, Zardari assumed the presidency of Pakistan. He extended his display of remorse to the entire population of Baluchistan and assured them that substantial measures would be implemented for the progress of the Baloch people. Despite the waning enthusiasm of loyalist energy in the 2008 election due to the assassination of Akbar Bugatti, the PPP government made efforts to regain the trust of the general populace. In November 2008, the Pakistani government granted increased autonomy to the region as part of the celebration of human rights. In order to address the problems of the Baloch people, the governing body implemented a significant course of action in the legislature on November 24, 2008, known as 'Aghaz-e-Huqooq Baluchistan'. The legislature officially approved it in December 2009 (Gishkori, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, the defining moment arrived as the National Finance Commission (NFC) allocated additional resources for development of Baluchistan. This era was relatively peaceful and inclusive in redressing the grievances of marginalised Balush communities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe contemporary wave \u0026ndash; protracted insurgency and devastating consequences\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe frequency of terrorist incidents in Baluchistan has been notable in the past five years, exhibiting a visible surge in attacks carried out by Baloch separatist factions and Islamist extremists. During the year 2019, Baluchistan experienced around 229 acts of terrorism, leading to a death toll above 200. Significant incidents comprised of the detonation of an explosive device at a marketplace in Quetta resulting in the death of 20 individuals, as well as an assault on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar executed by the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). In 2020, there was a little decrease in the number of occurrences, with approximately 165 terrorist attacks resulting in 140 deaths. Notable events included attacks on security forces, such as a surprise attack in Turbat that led to the fatalities of 14 security personnel. In 2021, the insurgency continued to be active, with approximately 175 documented events. In Quetta, there was a notable bombing incident that resulted in the death of four individuals and left more than a dozen injured. During the year 2022, Baluchistan experienced an estimated total of 194 acts of terrorism, resulting in about 186 recorded fatalities. One significant occurrence was the twin bombs in Quetta, resulting in the death of at least seven individuals, in addition to ongoing attacks on security convoys. In 2023, the insurgency continued, resulting in approximately 183 terrorist acts and almost 160 deaths. Significant assaults encompassed a blast at a mosque in Quetta, along with ongoing strikes on military sites and infrastructure. The numbers indicate the continuous danger presented by both separatist and militant organizations in Baluchistan, which contributes to the continued instability and security problems in the province. According to government and local media reports on Monday, August 26, 2024, as it coincided with the death anniversary of veteran Baluch leader nawab Akbar Bugti, coordinated attacks were launched across length and breadth of Baluchistan by terrorist groups. A total of seventy-four individuals lost their lives in a series of prolonged skirmishes and attacks in the southwest and northwest regions of Pakistan. Among the casualties were twenty-one terrorists and fourteen security personnel. The army has reported that terrorists executed synchronized assaults on the army in Musakhel, Qalat, and Lasbela areas, resulting in the deaths of twenty-one militants and ten paramilitary personnel. While the state machinery appears to have reached a level of exhaustion, but terrorist\u0026rsquo;s freedom of conducting activities is going unabated with grave consequences for civilian and security forces alike. Dr Mudassir a media expert at National University of Modern Languages Islamabad, opines that current wave of insurgency has its roots to 2006 killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, which provided fuel to fire, while Mr. Hamza Amir a national security expert at National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad argues that years of neglect, deprivation and marginalization coupled with security forces operations have alienated that Baluch population, who have now decided to raise their voice through protracted insurgency focusing on the economic targets and innocent civilians to create a wedge between the government and the population and as a result making national and international media headlines. Just to make a point, terrorism incidents of year 2022, 2023 and 2024 are depicted in Figs.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan refid=\"Fig6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan refid=\"Fig7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e respectively which are taken from Police official sources and terrorism watch in Pakistan.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eChallenges to Pakistan\u0026rsquo;s national security landscape\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe heinous murder of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan in 2024 (A. Hussain, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), the self-inflicted attack on a bus transporting Chinese engineers at the Dasu Dam Project in July 2021(Ali, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), and the occurrence in which a female student suicide bomber killed Chinese teachers in Karachi University (Syed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), subsequently claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), serve as clear indications of our vulnerability and the substantial hazards associated with protecting foreign citizens in Pakistan. In March 2022, the ISS-K orchestrated a deadly suicide attack at the Shiite Mosque in Peshawar, intensifying the already escalating terrorism issues in Pakistan. The consistent occurrence of cross-border terrorism originating from Afghanistan and infiltrating the border districts of KPK has become a recurring phenomenon. The series of attacks that occurred in 2024 in Banu, North and South Waziristan, Dera Ismail Khan (DIK), and other locations in Baluchistan and Sindh have posed a significant threat to the authority of the state. This issue has been intensified by the limited political alliances and regionalism, which have come at the expense of national unity. Pakistan's national security is threatened by the shifting regional and global dynamics, as illustrated in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e and Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e. To properly deal with the changing security environment, it is imperative to possess robust leadership, internal cohesion, and harmonious cohabitation and concord. Pakistani society is currently extremely concerned with the socio-political and socio-economic challenges it faces, especially those arising from undeveloped peripheral regions. The interaction between political power struggles and inefficient governance, coupled with pervasive corruption, has led to a multitude of socio-economic difficulties, especially among the educated youth. Similarly, the socioeconomically disadvantaged segments of the population have been affected by the rising inflation, taxation, and declining ability to buy goods and services. The gloomy economic projection and pervasive sense of hopelessness have caused a rift in our society and the country, resulting in significant implications for national cohesion (Husain, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). The presence of numerous unresolved issues has caused a sense of unease among the general people (Sheikh et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), highlighting the need for immediate attention and settlement to promote a harmonious and successful community. The internal assortment also presents a menacing portrayal of the Pakistani society, therefore, complicating national security matrix.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eNational integration is an intricate and developing process that necessitates substantial endeavors and should be accorded with paramount significance by every administration. Securing economic stability, prosperity, and national pride necessitates focused endeavors, which, in turn, contribute to fostering national unity and cultivating a harmonious community. It is encouraging that the current government and all state institutions in Pakistan are aware of the crucial national requirement to revitalize Pakistani society through economic recovery, which would foster optimism, affection, and a sense of unity. The implementation of power devolution to the federating units will grant them a significant role in all aspects of society, thereby initiating the process of comprehensive reconciliation and economic growth through inclusivity. The crucial factor in resolving all the issues currently faced by Pakistan is political stability. Therefore, it is imperative to make comprehensive and diverse efforts to establish a tolerant, progressive, and harmonious Pakistan. Baluchistan is in the spotlight for the last four decades due to multiple terrorism and counter terrorism operations. Despite major chunk of mega development China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the grievances of locals have further intensified. It is about time to have a reconciliation process and settle this issue on sustainable basis.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData availability\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that the data and empirical analyses supporting the findings of this research article is available within this article in the form of figures and tables.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAcknowledgements\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors acknowledge facilitation provided NUML and NDU in terms of office space, lab facility and field visits to Baluchistan and sparing workload for completing this study.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u0026nbsp;Author contributions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;WI, writing\u0026mdash;original draft, conceptualization, formal analysis; ZR, writing\u0026mdash;review\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;and editing, supervision. All authors approved the final version of the article.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e\u0026nbsp;Competing interests\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;The authors declare no competing interests\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eFunding details\u0026nbsp;\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo funding was provided for this study.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eEthical approval\u0026nbsp;\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis research received ethical approval from the ethical review committee of the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) Islamabad, Pakistan on May 12, 2025, vide letter number ML.1-5/2025/R\u0026amp;SI/4066. All procedures performed in this study complied with the ethical standards of the institution as well as with the Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eInformed consent\u0026nbsp;\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eData collection commenced on September 2023, with all participants giving implied informed consent through online survey questionnaire prior to their involvement. The research team conducted the sessions throughout September 2023-February 2024, ensuring that ethical standards were strictly followed and informed consent was obtained at the outset of each session. They were presented with detailed information about key aspects of the research, including: (1) confidentiality, which ensured that personal information would remain private and would not be disclosed or published, and (2) data usage, specifying that all collected data would solely serve academic research purposes without any commercial applications. To participate in the study, participants were required to indicate their understanding and agreement by clicking the \u0026ldquo;agree and continue\u0026rdquo; button, which granted them access to the questionnaires. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAdditional information\u0026nbsp;\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCorrespondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Corresponding Author.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAbbasi A (2025) RESOURCE EXPLOITATION AND ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES: FUELING INSURGENCY IN BALOCHISTAN. J Media Horizons 6(3):1161\u0026ndash;1171\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAhmed A, Mohammad N, Wadood A (2020) Balochistan: Overview of its Geo-economic and Socio-economic Perspectives. 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Al Khadim Res J Islamic Cult Civiliz 5(1):1\u0026ndash;42\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Violence, terrorism, counter terrorism, geopolitics, marginalized people","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7645553/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7645553/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eViolence in Baluchistan has been the subject of attention since the initial rebellion in 1948. Subsequently, Baluchistan has been experiencing a protracted insurgency and counterinsurgency operations carried out by the security forces. The study examines the policies implemented by the Pakistani government as a direct cause of violence and insurgency, which has resulted in ongoing security operations in Baluchistan. I contend that discriminatory state policies and persistent neglect have resulted in a sense of hopelessness among the disenfranchised population. Additionally, there is a growing public sentiment that the state is grabbing their resources without their consent. Based on Galtung's theory of structural violence and conflict theory, I argue that discriminatory state policies, prolonged neglect, and limited public involvement in developmental enterprises have generated a sense of despair and hopelessness. Consequently, these communities have resorted to armed resistance in order to safeguard their rights, pushing the security dynamics of this region from being neglected area to the epicenter of international headlines.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Structural Violence and Protracted Insurgency in Baluchistan: Investigating its Implications on National Security of Pakistan","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-12-03 11:36:59","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7645553/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-12-25T10:01:32+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"193058888878066255341165843088782173031","date":"2025-12-06T14:00:12+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-12-01T13:24:02+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-10-24T07:26:43+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-10-21T15:01:42+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","date":"2025-10-10T04:36:33+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"e3ff793f-b993-4f4e-8a78-3cb6386494f3","owner":[],"postedDate":"December 3rd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[{"id":58892553,"name":"Social science/Criminology"},{"id":58892554,"name":"Humanities/Cultural and media studies"},{"id":58892555,"name":"Social science/Cultural and media studies"},{"id":58892556,"name":"Social science/Development studies"},{"id":58892557,"name":"Social science/Politics and international relations"},{"id":58892558,"name":"Social science/Social policy"},{"id":58892559,"name":"Social science/Sociology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-12-03T11:36:59+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-12-03 11:36:59","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7645553","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7645553","identity":"rs-7645553","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}