Exclusionary Stakeholderism in Bus Rapid Transit Governance in Dar es Salaam

Exclusionary Stakeholderism in Bus Rapid Transit Governance in Dar es Salaam | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Exclusionary Stakeholderism in Bus Rapid Transit Governance in Dar es Salaam Colman Titus Msoka, Paul Japhet, Patrick Mlinga This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-9040607/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 7 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects are frequently promoted as modern and inclusive mobility solutions, yet their governance can reconfigure urban livelihoods and access. This study examines how stakeholder engagement influenced the implementation of Dar es Salaam’s BRT. It focuses on informal vendors and paratransit workers whose activities are closely intertwined with the world-class corridors. Using a multi-method qualitative case study comprising analysis of policy and project documents, field observations at major stations and corridors, and interviews with commuters, vendors, informal operators and officials, we trace how engagement practices were organised and how decisions were implemented on the ground. We find evidence of ‘exclusionary stakeholderism’: participation that is largely informational and selective, coupled with fragmented regulatory authority. These dynamics contributed to displacement from high-footfall spaces, uneven access to services, and inconsistent enforcement. The paper advances a governance-oriented account of inclusive transit planning in rapidly urbanising cities. The analysis clarifies the difference between public information and dialogic engagement in governance. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Stakeholder engagement Stakeholderism Transport governance street vendors inclusive urban mobility and Dar es Salaam 1. Introduction Dar es Salaam’s public transport system has long been shaped by policy shifts and rapid urbanisation that expanded (and normalised) informality as the city’s dominant mobility solution. Following economic liberalisation and transport-sector deregulation in the 1980s, privately operated daladala minibuses became the backbone of everyday urban mobility. They emerged to fill the institutional vacuum left by the decline of state-led bus services – UDA. However, they operated in a largely unregulated environment, with persistent concerns around safety, congestion and labour conditions (Rizzo, 2011 ; 2014; 2015 ). This shift coincided with demographic pressure: between 1988 and 2022 the city grew from about 1.4 million to over 5.7 million residents, far outstripping the capacity of existing infrastructure and intensifying congestion and commute-time burdens (Mkalawa & Haixiao, 2014 ; NBS, 2022). In parallel, the city’s informally developed spatial form, characterised by widespread informal settlements and organically evolving transport nodes such as bus stops, terminals and markets, deepened the coupling between mobility corridors and livelihoods, especially for informal vendors whose customer access depends on high footfall commuter spaces Dar es Salaam’s BRT, introduced in 2016 and financed through a blended model involving international financiers and state institutions (WB, 2017; 2020;2024; JICA, 2019; AfDB, 2021), was positioned as a modern, efficient and 'world-class' solution to chronic mobility dysfunction (Cervero, 2013 ). Yet the system’s spatial re-engineering (dedicated lanes, controlled stations, altered stop geographies, interchange megaprojects) has also restructured the informal economic ecology that historically co-existed with slower, stop-flexible paratransit circulation. Vendors and small traders report displacement from long-standing trading points, loss of customer access, and forced relocation into precarious or prohibited spaces, illustrating how transport modernisation can externalise socio-economic costs onto informal workers who lack formal representation in governance structures. Initial field engagement undertaken for this study suggested that the BRT’s median-lane station design and restrictions on trading may be altering how informal vendors access and interact with passenger flows. For example, one vendor remarked that “ we cannot communicate with passengers who are waiting to board or those who are off-boarding ” (Interview 5, a male street vendor, Mbagala Rangi Tatu, 2023). This insight informed our focus on exclusionary stakeholderism and guided our research questions. In the findings (Section 4.2 ), we analyse how station design and access restrictions reshape livelihood opportunities for informal vendors. 2. Methods and Materials We adopted a qualitative research design to examine stakeholder dynamics in the financing, design, governance, and inclusivity of Dar es Salaam’s BRT, and to trace how participation is structured and how inclusion and exclusion are produced at the interface between infrastructure delivery and everyday mobility–livelihood practices. Given the multi-actor nature of BRT governance and the need to connect formal project rationales to lived experience, we employed a multi-method qualitative strategy combining document analysis, semi-structured interviews, repeated field observations at BRT corridors and stations, and stakeholder mapping to visualise power relations among relevant actors. Methodologically, the approach was informed by comparable qualitative strategies used to study BRT reforms and their socio-political effects in other LMIC settings (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2013 ; Pirie, 2013 ; Schalekamp & Behrens, 2013 ). In line with prior work emphasising the importance of community engagement for understanding the social impacts of urban transport projects, the design prioritised the perspectives of informal actors and everyday users whose livelihoods and mobility are most exposed to corridor restructuring (Rizzo, 2017 ; Schalekamp & Klopp, 2018 ). Data were drawn from three main sources: policy and project documents (PMORALG, 2014; DMDP, 2014; DART, 2022a, 2022b; PORALG, 2023), semi-structured interviews, and repeated field observations. These were selected to link formal BRT rationales and governance structures with lived realities at the mobility–livelihood interface, where patterns of inclusion and exclusion emerge. Following qualitative approaches commonly used to study the socio-political dynamics of BRT reforms in LMICs (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2013 ; Pirie, 2013 ; Schalekamp & Behrens, 2013 ), we reviewed reports, policy texts, and planning and financing materials from 2017 to 2023 to examine how stakeholder roles, consultation processes and implementation responsibilities were formally defined. Interviews with stakeholders occupying diverse positions in the BRT system—including informal transport operators, vendors and commuters—were used to reflect on and challenge official narratives. Field observations, conducted between 2022 and 2024 along three Phase 2/3 corridors—Ubungo Interchange to Kibamba CCM (Morogoro Road), Mbagala Rangi 3 to Gerezani (Kilwa Road), and Tazara to Gongo la Mboto (Nyerere Road)—documented commuter flows, station-area access conditions, and everyday regulatory practices, including enforcement and informal negotiation (Rizzo, 2019 ; Venter et al., 2020 ). To empirically examine stakeholderism and power relations, we constructed a stakeholder map by triangulating data from documents (mandates and formal responsibilities), interviews (perceived influence and access to decision-making), and observations (spatial control and enforcement). This map structured our analysis of representation and decision rights, distinguishing cases where “engagement” functioned more as one-way information provision than genuine participation (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 3. Results 3.1 From Stakeholder Rhetoric to Stakeholderism: A Gap in BRT Governance Debates on BRT governance in LMIC cities often invoke “stakeholder engagement” as an automatic virtue. Still, the practical content of that engagement is frequently thin: consultation without influence, information provision without feedback, or symbolic inclusion without institutionalised voice. In Dar es Salaam’s BRT, stakeholder participation has tended to privilege formal actors, including state agencies, private operators and international financiers. In contrast, marginalised groups, such as informal transport operators, vendors and low-income commuters, remain weakly represented or excluded from decision-making arenas. This asymmetry is not unique. Research from Greater Accra characterises engagement as a one-way 'master–servant' relationship, in which officials deliver information to operators without creating meaningful feedback channels (Debrah et al., 2025 ). This dynamic contributes to apathy and service dysfunctions. These patterns motivate an analytic move from stakeholder talk (a slogan) to stakeholderism – a governance lens that asks: who counts, who decides, and through what institutional channels? (Poku-Boansi & Marsden, 2018 a, 2018 b). In this paper, we treated stakeholderism as more than a normative call for “inclusion.” It is an analytical framework for diagnosing how participation is structured (or denied), how voice is converted into authority, and how accountability travels (or stalls) across multi-actor transport regimes. A useful distinction here is between stakeholder management (containing claims) and stakeholder engagement (dialogue, mutual responsibility, shared decision processes). Dialogic approaches further clarify why “communication” alone is insufficient: stakeholder engagement should create two-way interaction and potentially surface either deliberative consensus or productive contestation, rather than functioning primarily as legitimation. Framed this way, stakeholderism helps explain why highly unequal, capacity-constrained contexts tend to generate distributional conflicts around megaprojects. When regulatory gaps persist and inequality is high, governance systems face pressure to internalise externalities rather than displace them. This intuition is echoed in broader 'heterodox stakeholderism' debates about how Global South institutional environments shape stakeholder protections (Kumar & Barrett, 2022 ; Pargendler, 2024 ). This paper asks how Dar es Salaam’s BRT reform, implemented through multi-actor financing and a complex governance network, reconfigures inclusion and exclusion in the city’s mobility-livelihood nexus. Building on qualitative field observations and interviews that foreground everyday experiences at BRT corridors and hubs, the analysis focuses specifically on bottom-level stakeholders whose economic survival and daily mobility are tightly coupled to transport space. These include informal vendors and traders operating near stations and terminals, informal transport workers and operators, and lower-income commuters. The study’s premise is that exclusion is not incidental; it is often produced through concrete design decisions, regulatory practices, and governance arrangements that concentrate decision authority while leaving affected stakeholders without representation. The analysis is guided by three questions. First, how are decision-making power and representation distributed among key BRT stakeholders, state agencies, donors, operators, informal workers and vendors, and commuters, across the stages of financing, design and implementation? Second, how does the BRT reshape access to livelihood spaces and mobility options for informal actors and low-income users, through spatial and regulatory mechanisms? Third, if stakeholderism is treated as a governance “test,” what would meaningful stakeholderism in BRT governance look like beyond consultation? And how might it reduce conflict, resistance and exclusionary outcomes—especially given evidence that transport interventions lacking stakeholder agreement often face resistance and underperformance, which can undermine sustainability (Moslem et al., 2019 )? The paper makes three contributions. Theoretically, it operationalises stakeholderism as a governance diagnostic for BRT reforms in LMIC contexts. It distinguishes stakeholder rhetoric from institutionalised voice and examines stakeholderism as a “double-edged” concept—one that can remain exclusionary despite inclusive language. Empirically, it provides grounded evidence from Dar es Salaam, including corridor-level observations and stakeholder testimonies. These show how BRT design and enforcement practices reorganise informal economic life and produce fragmented, discretionary regulation that shapes everyday survival strategies. Policy-wise, the paper advances dialogues on participatory urban transport governance. It highlights the need to recognise informal stakeholders as legitimate governance participants. It also calls for designing integration mechanisms, such as designated commercial spaces within or near hubs, structured feedback loops and co-governance arrangements, rather than relying on ad hoc enforcement and displacement. 3.2 Defining Stakeholderism in Public Transport Governance This paper treats stakeholderism as a governance lens for public transport reforms, centring on three linked questions: who is recognised as a legitimate stakeholder, what forms of participation are provided, and whether participation has decision-making consequences (Bryson, 2004 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). In practice, stakeholderism is often invoked as a norm of inclusion. Still, its operationalisation can be thin, especially where projects are delivered through multi-actor networks and affected groups sit outside formal decision arenas (Debrah et al., 2025 ). Evidence from Greater Accra, for example, describes a “master–servant relationship” in which officials provide information to transport operators without opportunities for feedback, generating apathy and service problems (Debrah et al., 2025 ). This framing is analytically useful for BRT reforms because it shifts attention from whether stakeholders were present in some forum to whether they had a structured pathway to shape choices that matter, such as corridor design, station access rules, enforcement regimes, or mitigation for affected livelihoods (Moslem et al., 2019 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). A second clarification is that stakeholderism should be distinguished from stakeholder management. Manetti et al. ( 2016 ) explicitly separate stakeholder management (managing expectations and claims, often tied to stakeholder “salience”) from stakeholder engagement (bringing primary stakeholders into decision processes, sharing information, and building mutual responsibility) (Manetti et al., 2016 ). In their review of the stakeholder literature, engagement is defined as creating “a dynamic context of interaction, mutual respect, dialogue and change,” rather than unilateral management (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., 2016 ). This distinction matters for public transport governance because a reform can be highly communicative and still exclusionary if participation remains non-consequential or confined to “managed” interactions that do not redistribute decision authority (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 3.3 Engagement Quality: Public Information vs Dialogic Engagement A key analytical distinction in this paper is between public information and dialogic engagement. Public information refers to one-way communication—updates, announcements, sensitisation campaigns—where the primary purpose is transmission. Dialogic engagement, by contrast, involves interactive processes in which stakeholders can respond, contest, and potentially influence decisions (Manetti et al., 2016 ). Manetti et al. ( 2016 ) make this distinction explicit by defining stakeholder engagement as a process that creates mutual responsibility and enables stakeholder interaction, rather than simply managing expectations (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., 2016 ). They further argue that engagement can take at least two dialogic forms: (i) a deliberative approach oriented toward consensus under conditions of fair communication, and (ii) an agonistic approach that recognises persistent differences and the legitimacy of plural viewpoints (Manetti et al., 2016 ). This is important for BRT reforms because conflict around corridor restructuring and livelihood impacts may not be “noise” to be suppressed; instead, it can be a governance signal that affected interests were not institutionally integrated into decision processes (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ). This distinction also sharpens how we interpret communication technologies and participatory tools. Manetti et al. ( 2016 ) warn that dialogic approaches face practical barriers (e.g., not all stakeholders can participate; expectations are difficult to balance), and that communication channels can be used for legitimisation rather than authentic dialogue (Manetti et al., 2016 ). In other words, visibility and responsiveness do not automatically equal engagement if communication is not coupled to decision authority or to transparent procedures for how stakeholder inputs are handled (Manetti et al., 2016 ). For this manuscript, the public information/dialogic engagement distinction becomes an operational lens: we assess not only whether “engagement” occurred, but whether it created a feedback loop with plausible influence on design and implementation decisions (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ;). 3.4 Mechanisms of Inclusion/Exclusion: Representation, Decision Rights, Distributive Impacts Building from this lens, we conceptualise inclusion/exclusion through three mechanisms: representation, decision rights, and distributive impacts. Representation concerns whether affected groups are recognised as legitimate stakeholders and whether they have structured channels (associations, committees, hearings, formal consultations) through which their interests can enter decision-making arenas. Debrah et al. ( 2025 ) show how weak representation can be institutionalised when engagement is reduced to one-way information provision without feedback opportunities, producing stakeholder apathy and downstream service problems (Debrah et al., 2025 ). Translating that insight to BRT governance directs attention to whether those most directly affected, often informal actors and lower-income users, are involved early and continuously, or instead encounter decisions mainly at the implementation interface (Debrah et al., 2025 ). Decision rights refer to whether stakeholder participation has any binding or consequential relationship to design and implementation choices. Here, stakeholderism is evaluated by tracing whether participation is linked to authority (ability to shape station-area design, access rules, relocation plans, enforcement protocols, compensation/mitigation arrangements), rather than existing as consultation without consequence (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). Distributive impacts capture who gains and who bears costs from transport reconfiguration – especially salient where inequality is high and state capacity to mitigate externalities is constrained. Pargendler ( 2024 ) argues that problems of state capacity to curb externalities and address inequality help explain why stakeholder-oriented approaches arise and gain legitimacy, and why stakeholderism becomes a way of bringing distributional concerns into governance (Pargendler, 2024 ). While developed in corporate-law comparison, the underlying logic usefully sensitises urban transport analysis to the way reforms redistribute benefits and burdens and to the institutional conditions under which harms are internalised rather than displaced onto low-power groups (Pargendler, 2024 ). These mechanisms also connect to implementation conflict. Moslem et al. ( 2019 ) argue that in public service development decisions, it is essential to reach stakeholders’ agreement to obtain a sustainable result; when this is violated, the impact of development may be reduced by resistance, and lack of consensus in public urban transport decisions can lower utilisation and produce negative outcomes (Moslem et al., 2019 ). This does not imply consensus is always achievable, but it strengthens the analytical rationale for treating resistance, non-compliance, or recurrent contestation as governance indicators of misalignment between decision authority and affected interests (Moslem et al., 2019 ; Manetti et al., 2016 ). 3.5 Analytical Expectations: Sensitising Concepts Guiding the Analysis These concepts generate a set of sensitising expectations that guide the empirical analysis. First, where stakeholderism is primarily informational, we expect participation to be experienced as announcements and sensitisation rather than negotiated decisions, with affected actors reporting limited feedback opportunities—a pattern directly observed in Debrah et al.’s ( 2025 ) “information without feedback” diagnosis (Debrah et al., 2025 ). Second, where stakeholder engagement is framed as dialogic in principle but deployed as legitimisation in practice, we expect to see communication activity without clear procedures linking stakeholder input to decision revision—consistent with Manetti et al.’s ( 2016 ) warning that communication channels can serve legitimacy rather than authentic dialogue (Manetti et al., 2016 ). Third, where inequality and weak regulatory capacity intensify distributional stakes, we expect reforms to create sharp livelihood and access reallocations and to externalise costs onto low-power groups unless stakeholder protections are institutionalised—an intuition consistent with Pargendler’s ( 2024 ) account of stakeholder approaches arising from pressures to address inequality and externalities under state-capacity constraints (Pargendler, 2024 ). Finally, where stakeholder agreement is weak, we expect observable signs of resistance and contestation during implementation, consistent with Moslem et al.’s ( 2019 ) argument that violating stakeholder agreement can reduce project impacts due to resistance (Moslem et al., 2019 ). These expectations are not treated as hypotheses to be tested in a positivist sense; rather, they provide an analytic template for tracing how engagement quality, representation, and authority structures shape distributive outcomes and implementation dynamics in the BRT case (Debrah et al., 2025 ; Manetti et al., 2016 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ). 3.6 Exclusionary Stakeholderism in BRT Implementation Across interviews, field observations (2022–2024), and supporting documentary material, the Dar es Salaam BRT case reflects a pattern of exclusionary stakeholderism: stakeholder language and selective consultation coexist with weak representation for informal actors, limited decision rights for those most affected, and uneven distribution of benefits and costs. In practice, engagement appears to function more as public information than dialogic participation , while implementation is experienced as spatial and regulatory re-ordering that restructures access to customers, mobility, and public space, often through fragmented and discretionary enforcement. The four themes below trace how these dynamics are produced and sustained in everyday BRT corridors and termini. 3.7 How Engagement was Practised: Selective Representation and One-Way Communication A central finding is that stakeholder engagement was experienced as selective and largely one-way, with informal actors (vendors, some paratransit-linked workers, and low-income users) positioned more as objects of implementation than as co-authors of decisions. Official BRT safeguard and resettlement instruments define participation as more than “sensitisation.” The Phase I Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) explicitly sets out consultation and disclosure procedures and a grievance redress mechanism as required parts of resettlement governance, framing displacement and compensation as processes that must be managed through agreed procedures rather than unilateral instruction (PMO-RALG & Dar es Salaam City Council, 2007). Similarly, later BRT resettlement planning for system expansion commits implementers to “engage Project Affected Persons (PAPs) and communities,” “involve PAPs and other stakeholders” in relocation/compensation planning, and to “put down the grievance mechanisms” used during implementation, alongside public disclosure requirements (TANROADS, 2024). Taken as a benchmark, these documents position stakeholder engagement as an accountability practice with information rights and contestation channels; the empirical pattern in our interviews and observations is therefore not simply “ limited consultation ,” but a qualitative downgrade in engagement (from negotiated decision space to instruction), which is central to our stakeholderism argument. In the Phase 4 Resettlement Action Plan (RAPs) stakeholder views, municipal and DART-linked officials stress public sensitization, marking/valuation to “ avoid grievances ,” and compliance with applicable bylaws, showing how implementers frame engagement as risk management and procedural compliance rather than shared decision rights (TANROADS, 2024). The qualitative material repeatedly signals “ being told ” rather than “being negotiated with”: for instance, vendors described impending relocation in ways that highlight uncertainty and lack of voice, “ They keep saying we must move, but we don’t know where to go ” (Vendor 55, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023), which points to the absence of structured, dialogic engagement and unclear mitigation planning. In the same vein, the manuscript notes weak or absent formal communication channels between policymakers and informal traders, contributing to ad hoc relocation practices and deepening insecurity (Debrah et al., 2025 ). Interpreted through the engagement-quality distinction, these accounts align with “public information” (announcements, directives, compliance messaging) rather than dialogic engagement where input could revise decisions (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). A second indicator of selective representation is how “solutions” (e.g., new formal market spaces) were perceived as inaccessible through opaque allocation, suggesting exclusion not only from problem definition but also from remedy design. One vendor explained: “ I planned to move to the newly built market, but people said all the spaces were taken even before the construction was finished. Wealthier individuals occupied them first ” (Vendor 37, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). This is analytically important because it connects engagement deficits (weak voice/representation) to decision rights and distributive outcomes: stakeholders most exposed to disruption also reported minimal control over relocation planning, allocation processes, and the rules governing station-area economies. In stakeholderism terms, the case illustrates a “ double-edged ” participation discourse. That means, stakeholders are invoked, but participation is not institutionalised in ways that meaningfully redistribute decision authority (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 3.8 Spatial Restructuring and Livelihood Displacement around Corridors and Termini The BRT’s corridor design and station geography produced a second, highly visible outcome: livelihood displacement and re-siting of informal commerce into precarious spaces. Observations from 2022–2024 documented vendors gravitating toward pedestrian lanes and other high-footfall edges of the new BRT environment, an adaptive response that simultaneously sustains livelihoods and reduces walkability and safety in spaces designed for movement. At Mbagala Rangi Tatu, for example, the manuscript reports informal vending relocating into pedestrian lanes after construction, reflecting how access to commuter flows remains central to survival even under restrictive spatial regimes. Interviews echo this spatial logic: “ I was in front of a shop, but when the road was expanded, I had to move. Now, I operate in a pedestrian space because it’s where customers are ” (Vendor 19, Kimara Butcher, 2023). Another vendor linked displacement to new rental burdens: “ I was… chased away. Now I have to rent a space for 30,000 TZS per month. But customers are here, so I must stay close ” (Vendor 23, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). Together, observation and interview data show displacement as both a spatial and economic process: exclusion from former nodes translates into higher operating costs, increased risk of eviction, and intensified competition in informal micro-markets (Alison et al., 2015 ). A key mechanism underpinning these effects is how BRT design reorganises access to passengers. Vendors described being physically separated from customers by the median-lane configuration and prohibited trading zones: “ We cannot communicate with passengers who are waiting to board or those who are off-boarding ” (Vendor 11, Mbagala Rangi Tatu, 2022). Displacement and livelihood disruption are not incidental to BRT planning in official documents; they are anticipated governance problems with stated mitigation obligations. The BRT Phase I RPF defines the purpose of resettlement planning as resolving displacement and indemnification in ways that leave affected people “no worse off,” implying that economic activities affected by corridor conversion require attention as part of project governance (PMO-RALG & Dar es Salaam City Council, 2007). In later BRT resettlement planning, the RAP explicitly commits to minimising impacts on livelihoods where possible and (where impacts occur) to putting mechanisms in place to help affected persons restore or improve livelihoods (TANROADS, 2024). This benchmark matters for interpreting station-area design impacts: vendors’ accounts of lost passenger interaction and constrained trading space are not merely “ informal adaptation problems ,” but evidence of a governance gap between stated livelihood-restoration commitments and how corridor design/regulation reorders everyday access to mobility-linked markets. The RAP records consultations with commuter-bus representatives and notes that route/parking arrangements during construction/operations require agreement with DART and LATRA, showing that operators are formally recognised stakeholders in access and livelihood negotiations, even as informal vendors report exclusion from equivalent bargaining space (TANROADS, 2024) During our observation, we noted that the post-BRT traffic regime which is now characterised by faster flows confined to designated lanes, contributed to the decline of some established business areas (e.g., Ubungo Interchange), as these spaces became less “gathering-oriented” and less conducive to informal commerce. Interpreted through the inclusion/exclusion framework, spatial restructuring operates as a distributive mechanism: design choices that prioritise speed and throughput systematically reduce informal actors’ access to footfall and passengers, reproducing exclusion unless mitigated through deliberate integration measures (Hidalgo & Gutiérrez, 2013 ; Pirie, 2013 ; Schalekamp & Behrens, 2013 ; Schalekamp & Klopp, 2018 ; Rizzo, 2019 ; Venter et al., 2020 ). 3.9 Implementation and Enforcement: Fragmented Regulation, Discretionary Practice, Uneven Impacts A third finding concerns governance at the implementation interface: BRT spaces were experienced as regulated through fragmented authority and discretionary enforcement, producing unpredictability and encouraging informal negotiation as a survival strategy. Fragmented enforcement is not just an on-the-ground phenomenon; it is structurally enabled by the way responsibilities are divided across the BRT program. In resettlement and implementation planning for BRT expansion, the RAP distinguishes DART’s responsibilities (e.g., oversight of operations and service systems) from TANROADS’ responsibilities for infrastructure development and supervision, embedding multi-agency implementation pathways (TANROADS, 2024). The same RAP institutionalizes dispute handling through multi-level grievance structures ( district/ward/mtaa committees ), indicating that the governance architecture anticipates conflict overcompensation, access, and implementation decisions (TANROADS, 2024). A related expectation appears in later BRT project terms that explicitly require facilitation of a stakeholder engagement plan and a paratransit transition plan useful as a documentary benchmark for assessing whether engagement is treated as a core implementation instrument or an afterthought. Vendors described confiscations and “ pay-to-retrieve ” practices: “ Sometimes city rangers take our goods, but if we give them some money, we can get them back. If we see them coming, we just run away and return when they leave ” (Vendor 41, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). This account is not presented as an isolated anecdote; rather, it is interpreted in the manuscript as symptomatic of a wider enforcement ecology where bottom-level stakeholders operate in a legal grey zone, visible enough to be targeted, but not institutionally protected enough to seek effective recourse, creating conditions for arbitrary sanctioning and informal payments. The result is uneven impacts across vendors depending on location, timing, and their ability to negotiate with authorities, which undermines trust and stabilisation in newly built transport environments (Salon & Gulyani, 2019 ; Rizzo, 2019 ). Uncertainty about future operationalisation further reinforces this governance gap. As one vendor put it: “ We don’t know what will happen when the mwendokasi starts operating fully. They keep saying we must move, but we don’t know where to go ” (Vendor 55, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). In stakeholderism terms, these experiences reflect weak representation and decision rights: actors are subject to rules and displacement pressures without predictable procedures, accessible grievance channels, or credible relocation arrangements. The paper links this fragmentation to broader patterns documented in other African BRT and urban modernisation contexts, where exclusion of informal actors can generate operational inefficiencies and resistance, highlighting why implementation outcomes cannot be understood as “ technical delivery ” alone (Schalekamp & Behrens, 2013 ; Alison et al., 2015 ; Schalekamp & Klopp, 2018 ; Rizzo, 2019 ). 3.10 Distributional Outcomes: Who Benefits and Who Bears Costs At the program level, the World Bank frames Dar es Salaam’s urban transport reforms around system performance and user benefit e.g., reducing delays at major intersections and improving BRT operations management “ to benefit all road users ,” with performance tracked through travel-time indicators and user satisfaction (World Bank, 2015). At the same time, resettlement instruments define distributional fairness in terms of timely compensation, livelihood restoration, and participatory planning for those who lose assets or income spaces (PMO-RALG & Dar es Salaam City Council, 2007; TANROADS, 2024). Finally, the findings indicate sharply uneven distributional outcomes, spanning both mobility and livelihoods. On the mobility side, the BRT design and operating logic emphasise speed and efficiency, dedicated lanes, high-capacity vehicles, and controlled stations, which can reduce travel times for users who can access the network effectively (Krüger et al., 2021 ). Yet the manuscript documents how benefits are moderated by affordability and connectivity constraints: the BRT is described as less accessible to many low-income residents due to higher fares relative to paratransit and limited integration with daladala and boda-boda feeder patterns, creating barriers for those who rely on multi-leg trips from peripheral and informal-settlement areas (Helberth & Kimambo, 2020 ). The physical layout of some corridors is also described as producing access frictions (for example, concrete slab demarcations that restrict cross-corridor access compared to pre-BRT conditions), reinforcing the sense of a “ dual system ” where middle-income commuters are better positioned to benefit while lower-income residents continue to depend on less reliable options. On the livelihood side, distributional costs are concentrated among informal actors whose incomes depend on access to passenger flows and transport-node economies. Displacement into pedestrian lanes, new rental burdens, loss of established customer bases, and repeated threats of relocation were consistently reported, with some vendors describing “displacement fatigue” and a fear of further moves that would erase newly rebuilt customer relationships (“ They moved us before, and I lost many customers. If they do it again, I don’t know where I’ll go ” (Vendor 14, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). Interpreted through the framework, these outcomes are not incidental: they follow from a governance model that concentrates decision rights among formal institutions while leaving informal stakeholders weakly represented and managed largely through enforcement. This helps explain why stakeholder agreement matters for sustainability: where costs are externalised onto low-power groups, resistance, avoidance, and non-compliance become rational responses, with downstream implications for the legitimacy and performance of the reform (Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 4. Discussion 4.1 What the Case Contributes to Stakeholderism Theory This case advances stakeholderism theory by empirically separating stakeholder rhetoric from stakeholderism as a governance condition, and by specifying how engagement practices translate (or fail to translate) into decision rights. In the stakeholder engagement literature, engagement is not simply the presence of “consultation” but a relational process of interaction and mutual responsibility; in dialogic terms, it is defined by two-way exchange rather than unilateral management (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., 2016 ). Building on this distinction, the Dar es Salaam BRT case shows that engagement can remain largely informational, such as public messaging, sensitisation and directives, yet still be described as “engagement” by implementing institutions. This pattern aligns with accounts from Greater Accra, where officials provide information to operators without offering structured opportunities for feedback (Debrah et al., 2025 ). Theoretically, this supports treating stakeholderism as a two-dimensional construct: (i) engagement quality (from public information to dialogic engagement) and (ii) participatory authority (from voice without consequence to decision rights). The concept of exclusionary stakeholderism proposed in this paper captures configurations where engagement is selective and informational, while authority over consequential choices (e.g., corridor design rules, station-area restrictions, relocation and allocation procedures) remains concentrated—producing participation “in form” without participation “in effect” (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). In this framing, stakeholderism is not evaluated by whether stakeholders were informed, but by whether stakeholder inputs plausibly shaped decisions or mitigation measures, and by whether there were institutional routes for contestation to be registered and acted upon rather than displaced into everyday conflict. The case also contributes by linking stakeholderism to distributional analysis under conditions of high inequality and constrained capacity. Pargendler ( 2024 ) argues that stakeholder-oriented approaches can be interpreted as institutional responses in contexts where inequality and externalities are inadequately addressed through other regulatory channels, foregrounding distribution as a core rationale for stakeholderism rather than an optional add-on (Pargendler, 2024 ). The Dar es Salaam findings align with this logic: where governance arrangements fail to internalise livelihood harms and access costs as legitimate stakeholder claims, those harms are externalised onto low-power groups and reappear as displacement, precarious adaptation, and recurrent enforcement encounters—i.e., as distributive politics enacted through space and regulation rather than through formal deliberation. This is where stakeholderism connects to sustainability not merely as a normative ideal but as a practical condition: when the “agreement” (or at least workable accommodation) of affected stakeholders is weak, resistance and non-compliance become rational and predictable, undermining intended outcomes (Moslem et al., 2019 ). The implication for theory is that stakeholderism should be analysed not only as participation design, but as an accountability-and-distribution mechanism whose effectiveness depends on whether decision rights and mitigation resources are structured to match the scale of impacts borne by affected groups (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 4.2 Links to policy implementation and governance A second contribution of the case is to show how stakeholderism “fails” not only at the planning stage, but at the implementation interface, where governance fragmentation and discretion convert formal plans into uneven everyday realities. The findings suggest a recurrent sequence: limited dialogic engagement during design and early implementation produces unresolved conflicts over space and access; these conflicts then migrate into enforcement practice, where discretionary control, informal negotiation, and inconsistent rule application become de facto governance tools. This mechanism helps connect stakeholderism to implementation dynamics: when engagement is reduced to public information, conflict is not resolved. It is relocated to street-level practice, where it is managed through policing, evictions, and informal settlement of disputes rather than through formalised feedback loops (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., 2016 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). In that sense, the BRT does not simply “produce” exclusion; rather, exclusion is implemented through a patchwork of authorities and practices that stakeholders experience as unpredictable. This aligns with the broader insight that sustainable public service outcomes depend on how far affected groups are permitted to influence decisions that shape their lives; where agreement is violated, resistance can reduce effectiveness and lead to outcomes below expectations (Moslem et al., 2019 ). Applied here, the governance problem is not only that informal stakeholders lack voice, but that the absence of decision rights pushes adaptation into informal channels, running, relocating, paying to avoid losses, thereby reproducing both inequality and enforcement discretion as structural features of the system rather than temporary “transition” problems (Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). The case also clarifies why multi-actor infrastructure delivery can amplify accountability gaps. Dialogic engagement frameworks emphasise the difficulty of creating genuine dialogue when stakeholder expectations diverge and when participation forums are difficult to design and sustain; communication channels can become mechanisms of legitimation rather than effective decision revision (Manetti et al., 2016 ). In donor- and agency-heavy project environments, this risk is heightened: formal accountability may run upward (to financiers and oversight agencies) while everyday accountability runs downward (to affected users and livelihoods) without a governance bridge between the two. Under these conditions, the implementation system can default to “ rule enforcement ” as a substitute for negotiated accommodation, which is precisely how distributional harms are externalised onto low-power groups. Such an outcome is consistent with broader arguments that stakeholder protections become especially salient where inequality and regulatory gaps are pronounced (Pargendler, 2024 ). In short, the case strengthens an implementation-oriented reading of stakeholderism: inclusive transit is not achieved by initial consultation alone, but by institutionalising feedback, authority-sharing, and mitigation in ways that persist into day-to-day enforcement and station-area management (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 4.3 Alternative Explanations and Boundary Conditions Several alternative explanations and boundary conditions should temper interpretation. First, some livelihood displacement and enforcement intensity may reflect broader urban governance trends (longstanding contestation over street vending, periodic “cleanup” campaigns, or shifting municipal approaches to public-space management) rather than BRT-specific intent. In that sense, BRT may operate as an accelerant or focal point for pre-existing governance priorities: when new infrastructure formalises space, it increases the visibility and enforceability of restrictions, intensifying conflicts that were previously negotiated informally. Second, observed outcomes may vary with corridor maturity and local political economy. Where construction is incomplete or operational phases are partial, uncertainty and discretionary enforcement may be more pronounced; as operations stabilise, some practices may regularise, or new accommodations may emerge. Third, market allocation dynamics (e.g., who obtains places in new markets) may be driven by patronage and elite capture patterns that extend beyond BRT governance itself, meaning that exclusionary outcomes may partly reflect broader institutional arrangements shaping urban land, permits, and market access. These boundary conditions reinforce the value of the paper’s analytic approach: by distinguishing engagement quality from decision rights, the framework can accommodate variation—stakeholderism may look different across corridors and time periods depending on institutional capacity, political incentives, and the organisation of informal stakeholder representation (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). A second set of boundary conditions concerns the feasibility and meaning of “better engagement.” Dialogic engagement scholarship highlights practical obstacles: not all stakeholders can participate, divergent expectations are difficult to balance, and agonistic contestation may remain even under well-designed engagement processes (Manetti et al., 2016 ). Similarly, consensus-oriented approaches emphasise that agreement is difficult in multi-stakeholder decisions with competing interests, even though a lack of agreement can undermine sustainability (Moslem et al., 2019 ). For this case, the implication is not that full consensus is a realistic benchmark, but that the governance system needs identifiable procedures for handling contestation, transparent allocation rules, credible relocation pathways, grievance channels, and clear institutional responsibility, so that conflict is not displaced into discretionary enforcement. Finally, the study’s qualitative design prioritises depth over representativeness; it is well-suited for tracing mechanisms (how exclusionary stakeholderism is produced) but not for estimating population-level magnitudes of impacts. These limits suggest directions for future mixed-method work (e.g., measuring corridor-level access changes, travel-time and fare burdens, or systematically mapping stakeholder agreement), while preserving the main analytic conclusion: stakeholderism in BRT implementation is best understood as a governance configuration linking engagement quality, decision rights, and distributive outcomes rather than as a rhetorical commitment to “inclusion” alone (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). 5. Conclusion This paper examined how stakeholder engagement shaped the implementation of Dar es Salaam’s BRT, focusing on the mobility–livelihood interface where corridor-based reforms intersect with informal vending and paratransit-related work. Using a multi-method qualitative case study (documents, interviews, and field observations), the analysis treated stakeholderism not as a rhetorical commitment to “inclusion,” but as a governance condition that can be assessed through (i) the quality of engagement and (ii) the distribution of decision rights (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). This framing directly responds to the need for clearer theory and stronger analytic leverage: rather than assuming inclusion or exclusion as an outcome, the paper traced the mechanisms through which engagement practices, authority structures, and implementation routines produce uneven experiences and distributive effects. Across the four findings themes, the evidence indicates a pattern of exclusionary stakeholderism. Engagement was widely experienced as selective and largely informational, closer to public communication than dialogic participation, while informal stakeholders reported limited influence over consequential choices affecting station-area access, relocation, and livelihood integration (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). Spatial reconfiguration around corridors and termini reshaped access to footfall and customers, displacing vendors into precarious edges of the new transport landscape and increasing livelihood insecurity. At the implementation interface, fragmented authority and discretionary enforcement intensified unpredictability and encouraged informal negotiation, producing uneven impacts that varied across locations and time. Finally, benefits and costs were distributed asymmetrically: efficiency gains were most accessible to users able to integrate BRT into their trip chains and afford its fare structure, while livelihood costs were concentrated among informal actors dependent on transport-node economies, an empirical pattern that highlights why stakeholderism has a distributive and accountability dimension, especially in contexts of inequality and regulatory gaps (Moslem et al., 2019 ; Pargendler, 2024 ). The paper’s main contribution is therefore twofold. Theoretically, it advances stakeholderism research in public transport by specifying how engagement quality (public information vs dialogic engagement) and participatory authority (voice vs decision rights) jointly shape implementation dynamics and distributive outcomes, offering an analytically portable framework for other BRT and corridor-transformation contexts (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Pargendler, 2024 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). Empirically, it contributes grounded evidence from Dar es Salaam showing how exclusion is enacted through everyday rules-in-practice (allocation procedures, station-area restrictions, and enforcement routines) rather than only through formal policy statements. These insights also clarify a practical governance implication without overstating policy prescription: where affected groups lack credible routes to influence decisions or contest impacts, resistance, avoidance, and non-compliance become predictable responses that can undermine intended performance and legitimacy (Moslem et al., 2019 ). Several limitations bound the claims and point to future research. As a qualitative case study, the analysis is designed to explain mechanisms rather than to estimate population-level impact magnitudes; subsequent work could combine qualitative tracing with corridor-level measures of accessibility, fare burdens, displacement trajectories, and stakeholder agreement. Outcomes may also vary across phases and corridors as operations stabilise and institutional arrangements evolve, suggesting value in longitudinal follow-up. Finally, given the sensitivity of enforcement and displacement experiences, continued attention to ethics and participant protection remains essential; the analytic claims should rely on anonymised interviews and fieldnotes rather than identifiable imagery, and future work should further examine how informal stakeholders organise representation and negotiate decision arenas over time (Manetti et al., 2016 ; Moslem et al., 2019 ; Debrah et al., 2025 ). Declarations Funding: This research was funded by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet) , Grant Number 2021-05417. Clinical trial number : not applicable Author Contributions: Conceptualisation, C.T.M.; methodology, P.J.; formal analysis, P.M.; investigation (fieldwork), C.T.M., P.M. and P.J.; data curation, P.M.; resources (collection of relevant reference materials), P.J.; writing – original draft preparation, C.T.M. (conceptual and analytical framing), P.M. (introduction) and P.J. (methodology section); writing – review and editing, C.T.M., P.M. and P.J.; project administration, P.M.; funding acquisition, C.T.M. (through networks with Swedish researchers). All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. Institutional Review Board Statement: This study was carried out in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki and obtained ethical approval from the University of Dar es Salaam, Directorate of Research, via the Research Information Management System (RIMS) (Clearance Permit No. IDS-21069, dated 16th November 2022). Additionally, research activities were authorised by relevant local and municipal authorities in Dar es Salaam, including the Dar es Salaam Regional Administrative Secretariat (RAS) and the Municipal Councils of Ilala, Ubungo, Kinondoni, and Temeke, where fieldwork and observations were conducted. Consent to Participate: Informed consent was obtained from all study participants, including stakeholders in various roles within the BRT system (e.g., informal paratransit operators, vendors, and commuters). Participants were informed about the purpose of the study, that participation was voluntary, and their right to decline or withdraw at any time; confidentiality and anonymity were preserved during data collection, analysis, and reporting. Consent to Publish: Informed consent was obtained from all the individual participants for publication. Data Availability Statement: The data supporting the findings of this study (e.g., interview transcripts and field notes) are not publicly available due to privacy, confidentiality, and ethical restrictions involving human participants. De-identified data excerpts may be made available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request and subject to approval by relevant institutional and local authorities. Acknowledgements: The authors acknowledge support from the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) scholarly platforms, including the UDSM Research Week exhibitions, which provided opportunities to present and refine aspects of this work, and the seminar colloquia at the Institute of Development Studies, which offered critical reflections that strengthened the manuscript. During preparation of this manuscript, the authors used Research Rabbit AI (2025 Release) to identify and map relevant recent scholarship on stakeholderism and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), and Grammarly (v.1.146.0.0, 2025 Release) to support language editing at later stages. The authors reviewed and edited all outputs and take full responsibility for the content of this publication. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results. References African Development Bank (AfDB). (2021). Dar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project: Project completion report. Retrieved from https://www.afdb.org Alison B, Msoka C, Dankoco I. A refugee in my own country: Evictions or property rights in the urban informal economy? Urban Stud J Ltd. 2015;52(12):2234–49. Bryson JM. What to do when stakeholders matter: Stakeholder identification and analysis techniques. Public Manage Rev. 2004;6(1):21–53. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030410001675722 . Cervero R. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): An efficient and competitive mode of public transport. J Public Transp. 2013;16(2):47–65. https://doi.org/10.5038/2375-0901.16.2.3 . Dar Rapid Transit Agency (DART). (2022). Annual report on BRT operations and financing. Retrieved from https://www.dart.go.tz Dar Rapid Transit Agency (DART). (2022). Financial statement report (FS 2022—audited) [Report]. Dar Rapid Transit Agency. https://www.dart.go.tz/uploads/documents/sw-1711365387-Financial%20Statement%20Report%20FS%202022-Audited.pdf Debrah R, Agbo AA, Dapatem DA, Frimpong AO. (2025). Stakeholderism in urban transport planning in Greater Accra Metropolitan Area: A reality or glorified mantra? Transportation, 52, 2447–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11116-024-10580-8 Dar es Salaam Metropolitan Project (DMDP). (2014). Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report for the proposed local roads subproject in Ilala Municipality (25.5 km). Helberth J, Kimambo CZM. Contribution of the BRT to climate change mitigation and sustainable development: The case of Dar es Salaam. Tanzan J Dev Stud. 2020;18(2):1–11. Hidalgo D, Gutiérrez L. BRT and BHLS around the world: Explosive growth, large positive impacts, and many issues outstanding. Res Transp Econ. 2013;39(1):8–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.05.018 . Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). (2019). Feasibility study and master plan for Dar es Salaam BRT system. Retrieved from https://www.jica.go.jp Krüger F, Titz A, Arndt R, Groß F, Mehrbach F, Pajung V, Suda L, Wadenstorfer M, Wimmer L. The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Dar es Salaam: A pilot study on critical infrastructure, sustainable urban development and livelihoods. Sustainability. 2021;13(3):1058. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13031058 . Kumar A, Barrett F. Urban informality and transport planning: Lessons from the Global South. Transp Res Part A: Policy Pract. 2022;156:1–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2021.12.003 . Manetti G, Bellucci M, Bagnoli L. (2016). Stakeholder engagement and public information through social media: A study of Canadian and American public transportation agencies [Conference paper]. Proceedings of the European Academy of Management (EURAM) Conference. Mkalawa CC, Haixiao P. Dar es Salaam city temporal growth and its influence on transportation. Urban Plann Transp Res. 2014;2(1):423–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/21650020.2014.978951 . Moslem S, Ghorbanzadeh O, Blaschke T, Duleba S. Analysing stakeholder consensus for a sustainable transport development decision by the fuzzy AHP and interval AHP. Sustainability. 2019;11(12):3271. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11123271 . National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania (NBS). (2022). Population and housing census: National results. Government of Tanzania. Retrieved from https://www.nbs.go.tz Oviedo D, Scholl L, Innao M. Informal transport and its role in urban mobility: A review of recent literature. Transp Reviews. 2021;41(3):311–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2020.1857886 . Pargendler M. Corporate law in the global South: Heterodox stakeholderism. Seattle Univ Law Rev. 2024;47(2):535–79. Pirie G. (2013). Sustainable urban mobility in ‘Anglophone’ Sub-Saharan Africa. Thematic study prepared for the Global Report on Human Settlements 2013. UN-Habitat. Retrieved from http://www.unhabitat.org/grhs/2013 Poku-Boansi M, Marsden G. Bus rapid transit systems as a governance reform project. J Transp Geogr. 2018;70:193–202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2018.06.005 . Poku-Boansi M, Marsden G. Bus Rapid Transit: A tool for social inclusion or marginalization? Transp Reviews. 2018;38(2):195–213. President’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PORALG). Environmental and social commitment plan (ESCP). Dar es Salaam Metropolitan; 2023. Development Project Phase 2. (DMDP2) [Report]. https://documents.wo rldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports /documentdetail/099111523063527702/p1 782210c7630c0ab0bf72016b19a3f82db Prime Minister’s Office – Regional Administration and Local Government (PMORALG). (2014). ESIA report for the proposed Dar es Salaam Metropolitan Development Project (DMDP) [Report]. http://www.dcc.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1523607122-ESIA%20Report%20for%20the%20Proposed%20D ar%20es%20Salaam%20Metropolitan%20Devel opment%20Project%20(DMDP).pdf Rizzo M. The political economy of an urban megaproject: The Bus Rapid Transit project in Tanzania. Afr Affairs. 2015;114(455):249–70. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu084 . Rizzo M. Life is war’: Informal transport workers and neoliberalism in Tanzania, 1998–2009. Dev Change. 2011;42(5):1179–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01726.x . Rizzo M. Taken for a Ride: Grounding neoliberalism, precarious labour, and public transport in an African metropolis. Oxford University Press; 2017. Rizzo M. (2019). Dar es Salaam’s new rapid bus system won international acclaim–but it excludes the poor. The Conversation , 22 . Salon D, Gulyani S. Commuting in Urban Kenya: Unpacking Travel Demand in Large and Small Kenyan Cities. Sustainability. 2019;11(14):3823. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11143823 . Schalekamp H, Behrens R. Engaging the paratransit sector in Cape Town on public transport reform: Progress, process, and risks. Res Transp Econ. 2013;39(1):185–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.06.012 . Schalekamp H, Klopp JM. (2018). Beyond BRT: Innovation in minibus-taxi reform in South African cities . Proceedings of the 37th Annual Southern African Transport Conference, Pretoria, South Africa, 664–675. Venter C, Mahendra A, Hidalgo D. From mobility to access for all: Expanding urban transportation choices in the Global South. Sustainable Cities Soc. 2020;52:101865. World Bank (WB). (2017). Tanzania—Dar es Salaam Urban Transport Improvement Project (P150937): Project appraisal document [Report]. World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/296221514502741940/tanzania-dar-es-salaam-urban-transport-improvement-project World Bank (WB). (2020). Tanzania: Dar es Salaam Urban Transport Improvement Project. Retrieved from https://www.worldbank.org World Bank (WB). (2024). Tanzania—Dar es Salaam Urban Transport Improvement Project (P150937): Implementation status & results report (Sequence No. 14) [Report]. World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099600104092420188/p15093710268830f01901d01f745c79c601 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-9040607","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":620362330,"identity":"a2611c90-19c5-4ecd-9bf3-d7a5d7254cb5","order_by":0,"name":"Colman Titus Msoka","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Dar es Salaam","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Colman","middleName":"Titus","lastName":"Msoka","suffix":""},{"id":620362331,"identity":"d86b291f-94df-4a75-bb25-4e92d558adce","order_by":1,"name":"Paul Japhet","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Dar es Salaam","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Paul","middleName":"","lastName":"Japhet","suffix":""},{"id":620362332,"identity":"c230df15-1d35-437a-983e-82594e201c29","order_by":2,"name":"Patrick Mlinga","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of Dar es Salaam","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Patrick","middleName":"","lastName":"Mlinga","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-03-05 13:38:36","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9040607/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9040607/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":107088519,"identity":"1cd9359b-13f4-44c6-9ce1-c223238d8c0b","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-04-16 15:26:13","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":964372,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9040607/v1/520da638-897b-4952-8627-df191acc2eeb.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Exclusionary Stakeholderism in Bus Rapid Transit Governance in Dar es Salaam","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eDar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s public transport system has long been shaped by policy shifts and rapid urbanisation that expanded (and normalised) informality as the city\u0026rsquo;s dominant mobility solution. Following economic liberalisation and transport-sector deregulation in the 1980s, privately operated \u003cem\u003edaladala\u003c/em\u003e minibuses became the backbone of everyday urban mobility. They emerged to fill the institutional vacuum left by the decline of state-led bus services \u0026ndash; UDA. However, they operated in a largely unregulated environment, with persistent concerns around safety, congestion and labour conditions (Rizzo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e; 2014; \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). This shift coincided with demographic pressure: between 1988 and 2022 the city grew from about 1.4\u0026nbsp;million to over 5.7\u0026nbsp;million residents, far outstripping the capacity of existing infrastructure and intensifying congestion and commute-time burdens (Mkalawa \u0026amp; Haixiao, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; NBS, 2022). In parallel, the city\u0026rsquo;s informally developed spatial form, characterised by widespread informal settlements and organically evolving transport nodes such as bus stops, terminals and markets, deepened the coupling between mobility corridors and livelihoods, especially for informal vendors whose customer access depends on high footfall commuter spaces\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s BRT, introduced in 2016 and financed through a blended model involving international financiers and state institutions (WB, 2017; 2020;2024; JICA, 2019; AfDB, 2021), was positioned as a modern, efficient and 'world-class' solution to chronic mobility dysfunction (Cervero, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Yet the system\u0026rsquo;s spatial re-engineering (dedicated lanes, controlled stations, altered stop geographies, interchange megaprojects) has also restructured the informal economic ecology that historically co-existed with slower, stop-flexible paratransit circulation. Vendors and small traders report displacement from long-standing trading points, loss of customer access, and forced relocation into precarious or prohibited spaces, illustrating how transport modernisation can externalise socio-economic costs onto informal workers who lack formal representation in governance structures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInitial field engagement undertaken for this study suggested that the BRT\u0026rsquo;s median-lane station design and restrictions on trading may be altering how informal vendors access and interact with passenger flows. For example, one vendor remarked that \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003ewe cannot communicate with passengers who are waiting to board or those who are off-boarding\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Interview 5, a male street vendor, Mbagala Rangi Tatu, 2023). This insight informed our focus on exclusionary stakeholderism and guided our research questions. In the findings (Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec16\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4.2\u003c/span\u003e), we analyse how station design and access restrictions reshape livelihood opportunities for informal vendors.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Methods and Materials","content":"\u003cp\u003eWe adopted a qualitative research design to examine stakeholder dynamics in the financing, design, governance, and inclusivity of Dar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s BRT, and to trace how participation is structured and how inclusion and exclusion are produced at the interface between infrastructure delivery and everyday mobility\u0026ndash;livelihood practices. Given the multi-actor nature of BRT governance and the need to connect formal project rationales to lived experience, we employed a multi-method qualitative strategy combining document analysis, semi-structured interviews, repeated field observations at BRT corridors and stations, and stakeholder mapping to visualise power relations among relevant actors. Methodologically, the approach was informed by comparable qualitative strategies used to study BRT reforms and their socio-political effects in other LMIC settings (Hidalgo \u0026amp; Guti\u0026eacute;rrez, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Pirie, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Schalekamp \u0026amp; Behrens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). In line with prior work emphasising the importance of community engagement for understanding the social impacts of urban transport projects, the design prioritised the perspectives of informal actors and everyday users whose livelihoods and mobility are most exposed to corridor restructuring (Rizzo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Schalekamp \u0026amp; Klopp, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eData were drawn from three main sources: policy and project documents (PMORALG, 2014; DMDP, 2014; DART, 2022a, 2022b; PORALG, 2023), semi-structured interviews, and repeated field observations. These were selected to link formal BRT rationales and governance structures with lived realities at the mobility\u0026ndash;livelihood interface, where patterns of inclusion and exclusion emerge. Following qualitative approaches commonly used to study the socio-political dynamics of BRT reforms in LMICs (Hidalgo \u0026amp; Guti\u0026eacute;rrez, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Pirie, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Schalekamp \u0026amp; Behrens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e), we reviewed reports, policy texts, and planning and financing materials from 2017 to 2023 to examine how stakeholder roles, consultation processes and implementation responsibilities were formally defined. Interviews with stakeholders occupying diverse positions in the BRT system\u0026mdash;including informal transport operators, vendors and commuters\u0026mdash;were used to reflect on and challenge official narratives. Field observations, conducted between 2022 and 2024 along three Phase 2/3 corridors\u0026mdash;Ubungo Interchange to Kibamba CCM (Morogoro Road), Mbagala Rangi 3 to Gerezani (Kilwa Road), and Tazara to Gongo la Mboto (Nyerere Road)\u0026mdash;documented commuter flows, station-area access conditions, and everyday regulatory practices, including enforcement and informal negotiation (Rizzo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Venter et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). To empirically examine stakeholderism and power relations, we constructed a stakeholder map by triangulating data from documents (mandates and formal responsibilities), interviews (perceived influence and access to decision-making), and observations (spatial control and enforcement). This map structured our analysis of representation and decision rights, distinguishing cases where \u0026ldquo;engagement\u0026rdquo; functioned more as one-way information provision than genuine participation (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3. Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1 From Stakeholder Rhetoric to Stakeholderism: A Gap in BRT Governance\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eDebates on BRT governance in LMIC cities often invoke \u0026ldquo;stakeholder engagement\u0026rdquo; as an automatic virtue. Still, the practical content of that engagement is frequently thin: consultation without influence, information provision without feedback, or symbolic inclusion without institutionalised voice. In Dar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s BRT, stakeholder participation has tended to privilege formal actors, including state agencies, private operators and international financiers. In contrast, marginalised groups, such as informal transport operators, vendors and low-income commuters, remain weakly represented or excluded from decision-making arenas. This asymmetry is not unique. Research from Greater Accra characterises engagement as a one-way 'master\u0026ndash;servant' relationship, in which officials deliver information to operators without creating meaningful feedback channels (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This dynamic contributes to apathy and service dysfunctions. These patterns motivate an analytic move from stakeholder talk (a slogan) to stakeholderism \u0026ndash; a governance lens that asks: \u003cem\u003ewho counts, who decides, and through what institutional channels?\u003c/em\u003e (Poku-Boansi \u0026amp; Marsden, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003ea, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003eb).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn this paper, we treated stakeholderism as more than a normative call for \u0026ldquo;inclusion.\u0026rdquo; It is an analytical framework for diagnosing how participation is structured (or denied), how voice is converted into authority, and how accountability travels (or stalls) across multi-actor transport regimes. A useful distinction here is between \u003cem\u003estakeholder management\u003c/em\u003e (containing claims) and \u003cem\u003estakeholder engagement\u003c/em\u003e (dialogue, mutual responsibility, shared decision processes). Dialogic approaches further clarify why \u0026ldquo;communication\u0026rdquo; alone is insufficient: stakeholder engagement should create two-way interaction and potentially surface either deliberative consensus or productive contestation, rather than functioning primarily as legitimation. Framed this way, stakeholderism helps explain why highly unequal, capacity-constrained contexts tend to generate distributional conflicts around megaprojects. When regulatory gaps persist and inequality is high, governance systems face pressure to internalise externalities rather than displace them. This intuition is echoed in broader 'heterodox stakeholderism' debates about how Global South institutional environments shape stakeholder protections (Kumar \u0026amp; Barrett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis paper asks how Dar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s BRT reform, implemented through multi-actor financing and a complex governance network, reconfigures inclusion and exclusion in the city\u0026rsquo;s mobility-livelihood nexus. Building on qualitative field observations and interviews that foreground everyday experiences at BRT corridors and hubs, the analysis focuses specifically on bottom-level stakeholders whose economic survival and daily mobility are tightly coupled to transport space. These include informal vendors and traders operating near stations and terminals, informal transport workers and operators, and lower-income commuters. The study\u0026rsquo;s premise is that exclusion is not incidental; it is often produced through concrete design decisions, regulatory practices, and governance arrangements that concentrate decision authority while leaving affected stakeholders without representation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analysis is guided by three questions. First, how are decision-making power and representation distributed among key BRT stakeholders, state agencies, donors, operators, informal workers and vendors, and commuters, across the stages of financing, design and implementation? Second, how does the BRT reshape access to livelihood spaces and mobility options for informal actors and low-income users, through spatial and regulatory mechanisms? Third, if stakeholderism is treated as a governance \u0026ldquo;test,\u0026rdquo; what would meaningful stakeholderism in BRT governance look like beyond consultation? And how might it reduce conflict, resistance and exclusionary outcomes\u0026mdash;especially given evidence that transport interventions lacking stakeholder agreement often face resistance and underperformance, which can undermine sustainability (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e)?\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paper makes three contributions. Theoretically, it operationalises stakeholderism as a governance diagnostic for BRT reforms in LMIC contexts. It distinguishes stakeholder rhetoric from institutionalised voice and examines stakeholderism as a \u0026ldquo;double-edged\u0026rdquo; concept\u0026mdash;one that can remain exclusionary despite inclusive language. Empirically, it provides grounded evidence from Dar es Salaam, including corridor-level observations and stakeholder testimonies. These show how BRT design and enforcement practices reorganise informal economic life and produce fragmented, discretionary regulation that shapes everyday survival strategies. Policy-wise, the paper advances dialogues on participatory urban transport governance. It highlights the need to recognise informal stakeholders as legitimate governance participants. It also calls for designing integration mechanisms, such as designated commercial spaces within or near hubs, structured feedback loops and co-governance arrangements, rather than relying on ad hoc enforcement and displacement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Defining Stakeholderism in Public Transport Governance\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis paper treats stakeholderism as a governance lens for public transport reforms, centring on three linked questions: who is recognised as a legitimate stakeholder, what forms of participation are provided, and whether participation has decision-making consequences (Bryson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In practice, stakeholderism is often invoked as a norm of inclusion. Still, its operationalisation can be thin, especially where projects are delivered through multi-actor networks and affected groups sit outside formal decision arenas (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Evidence from Greater Accra, for example, describes a \u0026ldquo;master\u0026ndash;servant relationship\u0026rdquo; in which officials provide information to transport operators without opportunities for feedback, generating apathy and service problems (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This framing is analytically useful for BRT reforms because it shifts attention from whether stakeholders were \u003cem\u003epresent\u003c/em\u003e in some forum to whether they had a structured pathway to shape choices that matter, such as corridor design, station access rules, enforcement regimes, or mitigation for affected livelihoods (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA second clarification is that stakeholderism should be distinguished from stakeholder management. Manetti et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) explicitly separate stakeholder management (managing expectations and claims, often tied to stakeholder \u0026ldquo;salience\u0026rdquo;) from stakeholder engagement (bringing primary stakeholders into decision processes, sharing information, and building mutual responsibility) (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). In their review of the stakeholder literature, engagement is defined as creating \u0026ldquo;a dynamic context of interaction, mutual respect, dialogue and change,\u0026rdquo; rather than unilateral management (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). This distinction matters for public transport governance because a reform can be highly communicative and still exclusionary if participation remains non-consequential or confined to \u0026ldquo;managed\u0026rdquo; interactions that do not redistribute decision authority (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3 Engagement Quality: Public Information vs Dialogic Engagement\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA key analytical distinction in this paper is between public information and dialogic engagement. Public information refers to one-way communication\u0026mdash;updates, announcements, sensitisation campaigns\u0026mdash;where the primary purpose is transmission. Dialogic engagement, by contrast, involves interactive processes in which stakeholders can respond, contest, and potentially influence decisions (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Manetti et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) make this distinction explicit by defining stakeholder engagement as a process that creates mutual responsibility and enables stakeholder interaction, rather than simply managing expectations (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). They further argue that engagement can take at least two dialogic forms: (i) a deliberative approach oriented toward consensus under conditions of fair communication, and (ii) an agonistic approach that recognises persistent differences and the legitimacy of plural viewpoints (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). This is important for BRT reforms because conflict around corridor restructuring and livelihood impacts may not be \u0026ldquo;noise\u0026rdquo; to be suppressed; instead, it can be a governance signal that affected interests were not institutionally integrated into decision processes (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis distinction also sharpens how we interpret communication technologies and participatory tools. Manetti et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) warn that dialogic approaches face practical barriers (e.g., not all stakeholders can participate; expectations are difficult to balance), and that communication channels can be used for legitimisation rather than authentic dialogue (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). In other words, visibility and responsiveness do not automatically equal engagement if communication is not coupled to decision authority or to transparent procedures for how stakeholder inputs are handled (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). For this manuscript, the public information/dialogic engagement distinction becomes an operational lens: we assess not only whether \u0026ldquo;engagement\u0026rdquo; occurred, but whether it created a feedback loop with plausible influence on design and implementation decisions (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e;).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.4 Mechanisms of Inclusion/Exclusion: Representation, Decision Rights, Distributive Impacts\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding from this lens, we conceptualise inclusion/exclusion through three mechanisms: representation, decision rights, and distributive impacts. Representation concerns whether affected groups are recognised as legitimate stakeholders and whether they have structured channels (associations, committees, hearings, formal consultations) through which their interests can enter decision-making arenas. Debrah et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) show how weak representation can be institutionalised when engagement is reduced to one-way information provision without feedback opportunities, producing stakeholder apathy and downstream service problems (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Translating that insight to BRT governance directs attention to whether those most directly affected, often informal actors and lower-income users, are involved early and continuously, or instead encounter decisions mainly at the implementation interface (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecision rights refer to whether stakeholder participation has any binding or consequential relationship to design and implementation choices. Here, stakeholderism is evaluated by tracing whether participation is linked to authority (ability to shape station-area design, access rules, relocation plans, enforcement protocols, compensation/mitigation arrangements), rather than existing as consultation without consequence (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Distributive impacts capture who gains and who bears costs from transport reconfiguration \u0026ndash; especially salient where inequality is high and state capacity to mitigate externalities is constrained. Pargendler (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) argues that problems of state capacity to curb externalities and address inequality help explain why stakeholder-oriented approaches arise and gain legitimacy, and why stakeholderism becomes a way of bringing distributional concerns into governance (Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). While developed in corporate-law comparison, the underlying logic usefully sensitises urban transport analysis to the way reforms redistribute benefits and burdens and to the institutional conditions under which harms are internalised rather than displaced onto low-power groups (Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese mechanisms also connect to implementation conflict. Moslem et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) argue that in public service development decisions, it is essential to reach stakeholders\u0026rsquo; agreement to obtain a sustainable result; when this is violated, the impact of development may be reduced by resistance, and lack of consensus in public urban transport decisions can lower utilisation and produce negative outcomes (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). This does not imply consensus is always achievable, but it strengthens the analytical rationale for treating resistance, non-compliance, or recurrent contestation as governance indicators of misalignment between decision authority and affected interests (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.5 Analytical Expectations: Sensitising Concepts Guiding the Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese concepts generate a set of sensitising expectations that guide the empirical analysis. First, where stakeholderism is primarily informational, we expect participation to be experienced as announcements and sensitisation rather than negotiated decisions, with affected actors reporting limited feedback opportunities\u0026mdash;a pattern directly observed in Debrah et al.\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) \u0026ldquo;information without feedback\u0026rdquo; diagnosis (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Second, where stakeholder engagement is framed as dialogic in principle but deployed as legitimisation in practice, we expect to see communication activity without clear procedures linking stakeholder input to decision revision\u0026mdash;consistent with Manetti et al.\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) warning that communication channels can serve legitimacy rather than authentic dialogue (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, where inequality and weak regulatory capacity intensify distributional stakes, we expect reforms to create sharp livelihood and access reallocations and to externalise costs onto low-power groups unless stakeholder protections are institutionalised\u0026mdash;an intuition consistent with Pargendler\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) account of stakeholder approaches arising from pressures to address inequality and externalities under state-capacity constraints (Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, where stakeholder agreement is weak, we expect observable signs of resistance and contestation during implementation, consistent with Moslem et al.\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) argument that violating stakeholder agreement can reduce project impacts due to resistance (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). These expectations are not treated as hypotheses to be tested in a positivist sense; rather, they provide an analytic template for tracing how engagement quality, representation, and authority structures shape distributive outcomes and implementation dynamics in the BRT case (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.6 Exclusionary Stakeholderism in BRT Implementation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcross interviews, field observations (2022\u0026ndash;2024), and supporting documentary material, the Dar es Salaam BRT case reflects a pattern of exclusionary stakeholderism: stakeholder language and selective consultation coexist with weak representation for informal actors, limited decision rights for those most affected, and uneven distribution of benefits and costs. In practice, engagement appears to function more as \u003cem\u003epublic information\u003c/em\u003e than \u003cem\u003edialogic participation\u003c/em\u003e, while implementation is experienced as spatial and regulatory re-ordering that restructures access to customers, mobility, and public space, often through fragmented and discretionary enforcement. The four themes below trace how these dynamics are produced and sustained in everyday BRT corridors and termini.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.7 How Engagement was Practised: Selective Representation and One-Way Communication\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA central finding is that stakeholder engagement was experienced as selective and largely one-way, with informal actors (vendors, some paratransit-linked workers, and low-income users) positioned more as objects of implementation than as co-authors of decisions. Official BRT safeguard and resettlement instruments define participation as more than \u0026ldquo;sensitisation.\u0026rdquo; The Phase I Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) explicitly sets out consultation and disclosure procedures and a grievance redress mechanism as required parts of resettlement governance, framing displacement and compensation as processes that must be managed through agreed procedures rather than unilateral instruction (PMO-RALG \u0026amp; Dar es Salaam City Council, 2007).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilarly, later BRT resettlement planning for system expansion commits implementers to \u0026ldquo;engage Project Affected Persons (PAPs) and communities,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;involve PAPs and other stakeholders\u0026rdquo; in relocation/compensation planning, and to \u0026ldquo;put down the grievance mechanisms\u0026rdquo; used during implementation, alongside public disclosure requirements (TANROADS, 2024). Taken as a benchmark, these documents position stakeholder engagement as an accountability practice with information rights and contestation channels; the empirical pattern in our interviews and observations is therefore not simply \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003elimited consultation\u003c/em\u003e,\u0026rdquo; but a qualitative downgrade in engagement (from negotiated decision space to instruction), which is central to our stakeholderism argument. In the Phase 4 Resettlement Action Plan (RAPs) stakeholder views, municipal and DART-linked officials stress public sensitization, marking/valuation to \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eavoid grievances\u003c/em\u003e,\u0026rdquo; and compliance with applicable bylaws, showing how implementers frame engagement as risk management and procedural compliance rather than shared decision rights (TANROADS, 2024).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe qualitative material repeatedly signals \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003ebeing told\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; rather than \u0026ldquo;being negotiated with\u0026rdquo;: for instance, vendors described impending relocation in ways that highlight uncertainty and lack of voice, \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eThey keep saying we must move, but we don\u0026rsquo;t know where to go\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 55, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023), which points to the absence of structured, dialogic engagement and unclear mitigation planning. In the same vein, the manuscript notes weak or absent formal communication channels between policymakers and informal traders, contributing to ad hoc relocation practices and deepening insecurity (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Interpreted through the engagement-quality distinction, these accounts align with \u0026ldquo;public information\u0026rdquo; (announcements, directives, compliance messaging) rather than dialogic engagement where input could revise decisions (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA second indicator of selective representation is how \u0026ldquo;solutions\u0026rdquo; (e.g., new formal market spaces) were perceived as inaccessible through opaque allocation, suggesting exclusion not only from problem definition but also from remedy design. One vendor explained: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eI planned to move to the newly built market, but people said all the spaces were taken even before the construction was finished. Wealthier individuals occupied them first\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 37, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). This is analytically important because it connects engagement deficits (weak voice/representation) to decision rights and distributive outcomes: stakeholders most exposed to disruption also reported minimal control over relocation planning, allocation processes, and the rules governing station-area economies. In stakeholderism terms, the case illustrates a \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003edouble-edged\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; participation discourse. That means, stakeholders are invoked, but participation is not institutionalised in ways that meaningfully redistribute decision authority (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.8 Spatial Restructuring and Livelihood Displacement around Corridors and Termini\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe BRT\u0026rsquo;s corridor design and station geography produced a second, highly visible outcome: livelihood displacement and re-siting of informal commerce into precarious spaces. Observations from 2022\u0026ndash;2024 documented vendors gravitating toward pedestrian lanes and other high-footfall edges of the new BRT environment, an adaptive response that simultaneously sustains livelihoods and reduces walkability and safety in spaces designed for movement. At Mbagala Rangi Tatu, for example, the manuscript reports informal vending relocating into pedestrian lanes after construction, reflecting how access to commuter flows remains central to survival even under restrictive spatial regimes. Interviews echo this spatial logic: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eI was in front of a shop, but when the road was expanded, I had to move. Now, I operate in a pedestrian space because it\u0026rsquo;s where customers are\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 19, Kimara Butcher, 2023). Another vendor linked displacement to new rental burdens: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eI was\u0026hellip; chased away. Now I have to rent a space for 30,000 TZS per month. But customers are here, so I must stay close\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 23, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). Together, observation and interview data show displacement as both a spatial and economic process: exclusion from former nodes translates into higher operating costs, increased risk of eviction, and intensified competition in informal micro-markets (Alison et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA key mechanism underpinning these effects is how BRT design reorganises access to passengers. Vendors described being physically separated from customers by the median-lane configuration and prohibited trading zones: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eWe cannot communicate with passengers who are waiting to board or those who are off-boarding\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 11, Mbagala Rangi Tatu, 2022). Displacement and livelihood disruption are not incidental to BRT planning in official documents; they are anticipated governance problems with stated mitigation obligations. The BRT Phase I RPF defines the purpose of resettlement planning as resolving displacement and indemnification in ways that leave affected people \u0026ldquo;no worse off,\u0026rdquo; implying that economic activities affected by corridor conversion require attention as part of project governance (PMO-RALG \u0026amp; Dar es Salaam City Council, 2007).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn later BRT resettlement planning, the RAP explicitly commits to minimising impacts on livelihoods where possible and (where impacts occur) to putting mechanisms in place to help affected persons restore or improve livelihoods (TANROADS, 2024). This benchmark matters for interpreting station-area design impacts: vendors\u0026rsquo; accounts of lost passenger interaction and constrained trading space are not merely \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003einformal adaptation problems\u003c/em\u003e,\u0026rdquo; but evidence of a governance gap between stated livelihood-restoration commitments and how corridor design/regulation reorders everyday access to mobility-linked markets. The RAP records consultations with commuter-bus representatives and notes that route/parking arrangements during construction/operations require agreement with DART and LATRA, showing that operators are formally recognised stakeholders in access and livelihood negotiations, even as informal vendors report exclusion from equivalent bargaining space (TANROADS, 2024)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDuring our observation, we noted that the post-BRT traffic regime which is now characterised by faster flows confined to designated lanes, contributed to the decline of some established business areas (e.g., Ubungo Interchange), as these spaces became less \u0026ldquo;gathering-oriented\u0026rdquo; and less conducive to informal commerce. Interpreted through the inclusion/exclusion framework, spatial restructuring operates as a distributive mechanism: design choices that prioritise speed and throughput systematically reduce informal actors\u0026rsquo; access to footfall and passengers, reproducing exclusion unless mitigated through deliberate integration measures (Hidalgo \u0026amp; Guti\u0026eacute;rrez, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Pirie, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Schalekamp \u0026amp; Behrens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Schalekamp \u0026amp; Klopp, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Rizzo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Venter et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.9 Implementation and Enforcement: Fragmented Regulation, Discretionary Practice, Uneven Impacts\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA third finding concerns governance at the implementation interface: BRT spaces were experienced as regulated through fragmented authority and discretionary enforcement, producing unpredictability and encouraging informal negotiation as a survival strategy. Fragmented enforcement is not just an on-the-ground phenomenon; it is structurally enabled by the way responsibilities are divided across the BRT program. In resettlement and implementation planning for BRT expansion, the RAP distinguishes DART\u0026rsquo;s responsibilities (e.g., oversight of operations and service systems) from TANROADS\u0026rsquo; responsibilities for infrastructure development and supervision, embedding multi-agency implementation pathways (TANROADS, 2024). The same RAP institutionalizes dispute handling through multi-level grievance structures (\u003cem\u003edistrict/ward/mtaa committees\u003c/em\u003e), indicating that the governance architecture anticipates conflict overcompensation, access, and implementation decisions (TANROADS, 2024). A related expectation appears in later BRT project terms that explicitly require facilitation of a stakeholder engagement plan and a paratransit transition plan useful as a documentary benchmark for assessing whether engagement is treated as a core implementation instrument or an afterthought.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVendors described confiscations and \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003epay-to-retrieve\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; practices: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eSometimes city rangers take our goods, but if we give them some money, we can get them back. If we see them coming, we just run away and return when they leave\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 41, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). This account is not presented as an isolated anecdote; rather, it is interpreted in the manuscript as symptomatic of a wider enforcement ecology where bottom-level stakeholders operate in a legal grey zone, visible enough to be targeted, but not institutionally protected enough to seek effective recourse, creating conditions for arbitrary sanctioning and informal payments. The result is uneven impacts across vendors depending on location, timing, and their ability to negotiate with authorities, which undermines trust and stabilisation in newly built transport environments (Salon \u0026amp; Gulyani, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Rizzo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncertainty about future operationalisation further reinforces this governance gap. As one vendor put it: \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eWe don\u0026rsquo;t know what will happen when the mwendokasi starts operating fully. They keep saying we must move, but we don\u0026rsquo;t know where to go\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 55, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). In stakeholderism terms, these experiences reflect weak representation and decision rights: actors are subject to rules and displacement pressures without predictable procedures, accessible grievance channels, or credible relocation arrangements. The paper links this fragmentation to broader patterns documented in other African BRT and urban modernisation contexts, where exclusion of informal actors can generate operational inefficiencies and resistance, highlighting why implementation outcomes cannot be understood as \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003etechnical delivery\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; alone (Schalekamp \u0026amp; Behrens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Alison et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Schalekamp \u0026amp; Klopp, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Rizzo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.10 Distributional Outcomes: Who Benefits and Who Bears Costs\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAt the program level, the World Bank frames Dar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s urban transport reforms around system performance and user benefit e.g., reducing delays at major intersections and improving BRT operations management \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eto benefit all road users\u003c/em\u003e,\u0026rdquo; with performance tracked through travel-time indicators and user satisfaction (World Bank, 2015). At the same time, resettlement instruments define distributional fairness in terms of timely compensation, livelihood restoration, and participatory planning for those who lose assets or income spaces (PMO-RALG \u0026amp; Dar es Salaam City Council, 2007; TANROADS, 2024).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, the findings indicate sharply uneven distributional outcomes, spanning both mobility and livelihoods. On the mobility side, the BRT design and operating logic emphasise speed and efficiency, dedicated lanes, high-capacity vehicles, and controlled stations, which can reduce travel times for users who can access the network effectively (Kr\u0026uuml;ger et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Yet the manuscript documents how benefits are moderated by affordability and connectivity constraints: the BRT is described as less accessible to many low-income residents due to higher fares relative to paratransit and limited integration with \u003cem\u003edaladala\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eboda-boda\u003c/em\u003e feeder patterns, creating barriers for those who rely on multi-leg trips from peripheral and informal-settlement areas (Helberth \u0026amp; Kimambo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). The physical layout of some corridors is also described as producing access frictions (for example, concrete slab demarcations that restrict cross-corridor access compared to pre-BRT conditions), reinforcing the sense of a \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003edual system\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; where middle-income commuters are better positioned to benefit while lower-income residents continue to depend on less reliable options.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOn the livelihood side, distributional costs are concentrated among informal actors whose incomes depend on access to passenger flows and transport-node economies. Displacement into pedestrian lanes, new rental burdens, loss of established customer bases, and repeated threats of relocation were consistently reported, with some vendors describing \u0026ldquo;displacement fatigue\u0026rdquo; and a fear of further moves that would erase newly rebuilt customer relationships (\u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003eThey moved us before, and I lost many customers. If they do it again, I don\u0026rsquo;t know where I\u0026rsquo;ll go\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; (Vendor 14, Mbagala Rangi 3, 2023). Interpreted through the framework, these outcomes are not incidental: they follow from a governance model that concentrates decision rights among formal institutions while leaving informal stakeholders weakly represented and managed largely through enforcement. This helps explain why stakeholder agreement matters for sustainability: where costs are externalised onto low-power groups, resistance, avoidance, and non-compliance become rational responses, with downstream implications for the legitimacy and performance of the reform (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Discussion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1 What the Case Contributes to Stakeholderism Theory\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis case advances stakeholderism theory by empirically separating stakeholder rhetoric from stakeholderism as a governance condition, and by specifying how engagement practices translate (or fail to translate) into decision rights. In the stakeholder engagement literature, engagement is not simply the presence of \u0026ldquo;consultation\u0026rdquo; but a relational process of interaction and mutual responsibility; in dialogic terms, it is defined by two-way exchange rather than unilateral management (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Building on this distinction, the Dar es Salaam BRT case shows that engagement can remain largely informational, such as public messaging, sensitisation and directives, yet still be described as \u0026ldquo;engagement\u0026rdquo; by implementing institutions. This pattern aligns with accounts from Greater Accra, where officials provide information to operators without offering structured opportunities for feedback (Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Theoretically, this supports treating stakeholderism as a two-dimensional construct: (i) \u003cem\u003eengagement quality\u003c/em\u003e (from public information to dialogic engagement) and (ii) \u003cem\u003eparticipatory authority\u003c/em\u003e (from voice without consequence to decision rights).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe concept of exclusionary stakeholderism proposed in this paper captures configurations where engagement is selective and informational, while authority over consequential choices (e.g., corridor design rules, station-area restrictions, relocation and allocation procedures) remains concentrated\u0026mdash;producing participation \u0026ldquo;in form\u0026rdquo; without participation \u0026ldquo;in effect\u0026rdquo; (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In this framing, stakeholderism is not evaluated by whether stakeholders were informed, but by whether stakeholder inputs plausibly shaped decisions or mitigation measures, and by whether there were institutional routes for contestation to be registered and acted upon rather than displaced into everyday conflict.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe case also contributes by linking stakeholderism to distributional analysis under conditions of high inequality and constrained capacity. Pargendler (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) argues that stakeholder-oriented approaches can be interpreted as institutional responses in contexts where inequality and externalities are inadequately addressed through other regulatory channels, foregrounding distribution as a core rationale for stakeholderism rather than an optional add-on (Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The Dar es Salaam findings align with this logic: where governance arrangements fail to internalise livelihood harms and access costs as legitimate stakeholder claims, those harms are externalised onto low-power groups and reappear as displacement, precarious adaptation, and recurrent enforcement encounters\u0026mdash;i.e., as distributive politics enacted through space and regulation rather than through formal deliberation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis is where stakeholderism connects to sustainability not merely as a normative ideal but as a practical condition: when the \u0026ldquo;agreement\u0026rdquo; (or at least workable accommodation) of affected stakeholders is weak, resistance and non-compliance become rational and predictable, undermining intended outcomes (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). The implication for theory is that stakeholderism should be analysed not only as participation design, but as an accountability-and-distribution mechanism whose effectiveness depends on whether decision rights and mitigation resources are structured to match the scale of impacts borne by affected groups (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2 Links to policy implementation and governance\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eA second contribution of the case is to show how stakeholderism \u0026ldquo;fails\u0026rdquo; not only at the planning stage, but at the implementation interface, where governance fragmentation and discretion convert formal plans into uneven everyday realities. The findings suggest a recurrent sequence: limited dialogic engagement during design and early implementation produces unresolved conflicts over space and access; these conflicts then migrate into enforcement practice, where discretionary control, informal negotiation, and inconsistent rule application become de facto governance tools. This mechanism helps connect stakeholderism to implementation dynamics: when engagement is reduced to public information, conflict is not resolved. It is relocated to street-level practice, where it is managed through policing, evictions, and informal settlement of disputes rather than through formalised feedback loops (Andriof et al., 2002, as cited in Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn that sense, the BRT does not simply \u0026ldquo;produce\u0026rdquo; exclusion; rather, exclusion is implemented through a patchwork of authorities and practices that stakeholders experience as unpredictable. This aligns with the broader insight that sustainable public service outcomes depend on how far affected groups are permitted to influence decisions that shape their lives; where agreement is violated, resistance can reduce effectiveness and lead to outcomes below expectations (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Applied here, the governance problem is not only that informal stakeholders lack voice, but that the absence of decision rights pushes adaptation into informal channels, running, relocating, paying to avoid losses, thereby reproducing both inequality and enforcement discretion as structural features of the system rather than temporary \u0026ldquo;transition\u0026rdquo; problems (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe case also clarifies why multi-actor infrastructure delivery can amplify accountability gaps. Dialogic engagement frameworks emphasise the difficulty of creating genuine dialogue when stakeholder expectations diverge and when participation forums are difficult to design and sustain; communication channels can become mechanisms of legitimation rather than effective decision revision (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). In donor- and agency-heavy project environments, this risk is heightened: formal accountability may run upward (to financiers and oversight agencies) while everyday accountability runs downward (to affected users and livelihoods) without a governance bridge between the two.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUnder these conditions, the implementation system can default to \u0026ldquo;\u003cem\u003erule enforcement\u003c/em\u003e\u0026rdquo; as a substitute for negotiated accommodation, which is precisely how distributional harms are externalised onto low-power groups. Such an outcome is consistent with broader arguments that stakeholder protections become especially salient where inequality and regulatory gaps are pronounced (Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). In short, the case strengthens an implementation-oriented reading of stakeholderism: inclusive transit is not achieved by initial consultation alone, but by institutionalising feedback, authority-sharing, and mitigation in ways that persist into day-to-day enforcement and station-area management (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3 Alternative Explanations and Boundary Conditions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeveral alternative explanations and boundary conditions should temper interpretation. First, some livelihood displacement and enforcement intensity may reflect broader urban governance trends (longstanding contestation over street vending, periodic \u0026ldquo;cleanup\u0026rdquo; campaigns, or shifting municipal approaches to public-space management) rather than BRT-specific intent. In that sense, BRT may operate as an accelerant or focal point for pre-existing governance priorities: when new infrastructure formalises space, it increases the visibility and enforceability of restrictions, intensifying conflicts that were previously negotiated informally. Second, observed outcomes may vary with corridor maturity and local political economy. Where construction is incomplete or operational phases are partial, uncertainty and discretionary enforcement may be more pronounced; as operations stabilise, some practices may regularise, or new accommodations may emerge.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, market allocation dynamics (e.g., who obtains places in new markets) may be driven by patronage and elite capture patterns that extend beyond BRT governance itself, meaning that exclusionary outcomes may partly reflect broader institutional arrangements shaping urban land, permits, and market access. These boundary conditions reinforce the value of the paper\u0026rsquo;s analytic approach: by distinguishing engagement quality from decision rights, the framework can accommodate variation\u0026mdash;stakeholderism may look different across corridors and time periods depending on institutional capacity, political incentives, and the organisation of informal stakeholder representation (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA second set of boundary conditions concerns the feasibility and meaning of \u0026ldquo;better engagement.\u0026rdquo; Dialogic engagement scholarship highlights practical obstacles: not all stakeholders can participate, divergent expectations are difficult to balance, and agonistic contestation may remain even under well-designed engagement processes (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, consensus-oriented approaches emphasise that agreement is difficult in multi-stakeholder decisions with competing interests, even though a lack of agreement can undermine sustainability (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). For this case, the implication is not that full consensus is a realistic benchmark, but that the governance system needs identifiable procedures for handling contestation, transparent allocation rules, credible relocation pathways, grievance channels, and clear institutional responsibility, so that conflict is not displaced into discretionary enforcement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, the study\u0026rsquo;s qualitative design prioritises depth over representativeness; it is well-suited for tracing mechanisms (how exclusionary stakeholderism is produced) but not for estimating population-level magnitudes of impacts. These limits suggest directions for future mixed-method work (e.g., measuring corridor-level access changes, travel-time and fare burdens, or systematically mapping stakeholder agreement), while preserving the main analytic conclusion: stakeholderism in BRT implementation is best understood as a governance configuration linking engagement quality, decision rights, and distributive outcomes rather than as a rhetorical commitment to \u0026ldquo;inclusion\u0026rdquo; alone (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper examined how stakeholder engagement shaped the implementation of Dar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s BRT, focusing on the mobility\u0026ndash;livelihood interface where corridor-based reforms intersect with informal vending and paratransit-related work. Using a multi-method qualitative case study (documents, interviews, and field observations), the analysis treated stakeholderism not as a rhetorical commitment to \u0026ldquo;inclusion,\u0026rdquo; but as a governance condition that can be assessed through (i) the \u003cem\u003equality of engagement\u003c/em\u003e and (ii) the \u003cem\u003edistribution of decision rights\u003c/em\u003e (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This framing directly responds to the need for clearer theory and stronger analytic leverage: rather than assuming inclusion or exclusion as an outcome, the paper traced the mechanisms through which engagement practices, authority structures, and implementation routines produce uneven experiences and distributive effects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcross the four findings themes, the evidence indicates a pattern of exclusionary stakeholderism. Engagement was widely experienced as selective and largely informational, closer to public communication than dialogic participation, while informal stakeholders reported limited influence over consequential choices affecting station-area access, relocation, and livelihood integration (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Spatial reconfiguration around corridors and termini reshaped access to footfall and customers, displacing vendors into precarious edges of the new transport landscape and increasing livelihood insecurity. At the implementation interface, fragmented authority and discretionary enforcement intensified unpredictability and encouraged informal negotiation, producing uneven impacts that varied across locations and time. Finally, benefits and costs were distributed asymmetrically: efficiency gains were most accessible to users able to integrate BRT into their trip chains and afford its fare structure, while livelihood costs were concentrated among informal actors dependent on transport-node economies, an empirical pattern that highlights why stakeholderism has a distributive and accountability dimension, especially in contexts of inequality and regulatory gaps (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paper\u0026rsquo;s main contribution is therefore twofold. Theoretically, it advances stakeholderism research in public transport by specifying how engagement quality (public information vs dialogic engagement) and participatory authority (voice vs decision rights) jointly shape implementation dynamics and distributive outcomes, offering an analytically portable framework for other BRT and corridor-transformation contexts (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Pargendler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Empirically, it contributes grounded evidence from Dar es Salaam showing how exclusion is enacted through everyday rules-in-practice (allocation procedures, station-area restrictions, and enforcement routines) rather than only through formal policy statements. These insights also clarify a practical governance implication without overstating policy prescription: where affected groups lack credible routes to influence decisions or contest impacts, resistance, avoidance, and non-compliance become predictable responses that can undermine intended performance and legitimacy (Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeveral limitations bound the claims and point to future research. As a qualitative case study, the analysis is designed to explain mechanisms rather than to estimate population-level impact magnitudes; subsequent work could combine qualitative tracing with corridor-level measures of accessibility, fare burdens, displacement trajectories, and stakeholder agreement. Outcomes may also vary across phases and corridors as operations stabilise and institutional arrangements evolve, suggesting value in longitudinal follow-up. Finally, given the sensitivity of enforcement and displacement experiences, continued attention to ethics and participant protection remains essential; the analytic claims should rely on anonymised interviews and fieldnotes rather than identifiable imagery, and future work should further examine how informal stakeholders organise representation and negotiate decision arenas over time (Manetti et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Moslem et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Debrah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding:\u003c/strong\u003e This research was funded by the \u003cstrong\u003eSwedish Research Council (Vetenskapsr\u0026aring;det)\u003c/strong\u003e, Grant Number 2021-05417.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eClinical trial number\u003c/strong\u003e: not applicable\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthor Contributions:\u003c/strong\u003e Conceptualisation, C.T.M.; methodology, P.J.; formal analysis, P.M.; investigation (fieldwork), C.T.M., P.M. and P.J.; data curation, P.M.; resources (collection of relevant reference materials), P.J.; writing \u0026ndash; original draft preparation, C.T.M. (conceptual and analytical framing), P.M. (introduction) and P.J. (methodology section); writing \u0026ndash; review and editing, C.T.M., P.M. and P.J.; project administration, P.M.; funding acquisition, C.T.M. (through networks with Swedish researchers). All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInstitutional Review Board Statement: \u003c/strong\u003eThis study was carried out in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki and obtained ethical approval from the University of Dar es Salaam, Directorate of Research, via the Research Information Management System (RIMS) (Clearance Permit No. IDS-21069, dated 16th November 2022). Additionally, research activities were authorised by relevant local and municipal authorities in Dar es Salaam, including the Dar es Salaam Regional Administrative Secretariat (RAS) and the Municipal Councils of Ilala, Ubungo, Kinondoni, and Temeke, where fieldwork and observations were conducted.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to Participate: \u003c/strong\u003eInformed consent was obtained from all study participants, including stakeholders in various roles within the BRT system (e.g., informal paratransit operators, vendors, and commuters). Participants were informed about the purpose of the study, that participation was voluntary, and their right to decline or withdraw at any time; confidentiality and anonymity were preserved during data collection, analysis, and reporting.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent to Publish:\u003c/strong\u003e Informed consent was obtained from all the individual participants for publication.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statement:\u003c/strong\u003eThe data supporting the findings of this study (e.g., interview transcripts and field notes) are not publicly available due to privacy, confidentiality, and ethical restrictions involving human participants. De-identified data excerpts may be made available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request and subject to approval by relevant institutional and local authorities.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAcknowledgements: \u003c/strong\u003eThe authors acknowledge support from the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) scholarly platforms, including the UDSM Research Week exhibitions, which provided opportunities to present and refine aspects of this work, and the seminar colloquia at the Institute of Development Studies, which offered critical reflections that strengthened the manuscript. During preparation of this manuscript, the authors used Research Rabbit AI (2025 Release) to identify and map relevant recent scholarship on stakeholderism and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), and Grammarly (v.1.146.0.0, 2025 Release) to support language editing at later stages. The authors reviewed and edited all outputs and take full responsibility for the content of this publication.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or in the decision to publish the results.\u003c/p\u003e\n"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAfrican Development Bank (AfDB). (2021). \u003cem\u003eDar es Salaam Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project: Project completion report.\u003c/em\u003e Retrieved from \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://www.afdb.org\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://www.afdb.org\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlison B, Msoka C, Dankoco I. 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World Bank.\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099600104092420188/p15093710268830f01901d01f745c79c601\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099600104092420188/p15093710268830f01901d01f745c79c601\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-cities","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Cities](https://www.springer.com/journal/44327)","snPcode":"44327","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/44327/3","title":"Discover Cities","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), Stakeholder engagement, Stakeholderism, Transport governance, street vendors, inclusive urban mobility, and Dar es Salaam","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9040607/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9040607/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eBus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects are frequently promoted as modern and inclusive mobility solutions, yet their governance can reconfigure urban livelihoods and access. This study examines how stakeholder engagement influenced the implementation of Dar es Salaam\u0026rsquo;s BRT. It focuses on informal vendors and paratransit workers whose activities are closely intertwined with the world-class corridors. Using a multi-method qualitative case study comprising analysis of policy and project documents, field observations at major stations and corridors, and interviews with commuters, vendors, informal operators and officials, we trace how engagement practices were organised and how decisions were implemented on the ground. We find evidence of \u0026lsquo;exclusionary stakeholderism\u0026rsquo;: participation that is largely informational and selective, coupled with fragmented regulatory authority. These dynamics contributed to displacement from high-footfall spaces, uneven access to services, and inconsistent enforcement. The paper advances a governance-oriented account of inclusive transit planning in rapidly urbanising cities. The analysis clarifies the difference between public information and dialogic engagement in governance.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Exclusionary Stakeholderism in Bus Rapid Transit Governance in Dar es Salaam","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-04-16 15:25:37","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9040607/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-04-27T17:45:19+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"236348482777412652111826367593493158012","date":"2026-04-27T16:05:48+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-04-09T05:59:44+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2026-03-27T15:44:45+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-03-19T17:35:24+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2026-03-19T14:58:12+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Discover Cities","date":"2026-03-19T13:58:24+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-cities","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Cities](https://www.springer.com/journal/44327)","snPcode":"44327","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/44327/3","title":"Discover Cities","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"07a516a0-30c2-4c4f-a561-2823367a6a53","owner":[],"postedDate":"April 16th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-04-16T15:25:37+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-04-16 15:25:37","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-9040607","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-9040607","identity":"rs-9040607","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}