The role of relational timing in sustaining economic cooperation

Pooling resources toward a shared goal is central to human cooperation, yet contributions often decline over time as free-riders (and the anticipation thereof) destabilize the interaction. Prior research highlights that incentives, norms, and preferences as stabilize cooperation, but has largely overlooked the role of when we decide—particularly in relation to one another. We propose that relational timing functions as a cue that shapes expectations of cooperation and as a signal of cooperative intent. We employed a repeated four-player public goods game (30 rounds), manipulating whether participants receive (a) timing feedback and (b) contribution feedback (2 x 2 between subjects design). We hypothesize that timing feedback increases cooperation. Competing process hypotheses predict that stable temporal dynamics reinforce cooperation most when contribution feedback is present (reinforcement hypothesis) or, alternatively, when it is absent (signaling hypothesis). Exploratory analyses examine how cooperation unfolds across rounds and whether temporal stability predicts sustained cooperation.